

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR: FAILURE AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

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ABSTRACT

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The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) was a military and political struggle between Left and Right-wing factions in Spain. Despite the likelihood the Spanish Civil War would lead to a larger war in Europe, pro-democracy countries chartered a course of nonintervention and isolationism. It remains one of the most controversial periods in the Twentieth Century as it is often described as the dress rehearsal for World War II. First, this research paper will review the complex political environment in Spain before the war resulting in the outbreak of the Civil War. The second part of this paper will focus on the international political environment and the effects it had on the Spanish Civil War. It will evaluate foreign policies and the strategic-level relationships between Spain, Britain, France, the USSR, the United States, Germany, and Italy. Finally, the paper will conclude with some lessons learned from the War.

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THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR: FAILURE AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) was one of the most defining periods in the 20th Century. At the most basic level, it was a conflict between revolutionary and governmental forces. It was a conflict that had been festering in Spain for over a century, but a conflict that would have far wider ramifications.¹ The war was not only a civil war between opposing ideologies, it was a war that altered the course of world events forever. As many have said, the Spanish Civil War turned out to be the dress rehearsal for World War II.

Domestic issues that led up to the Spanish Civil War rivaled the international politics that made the war as complex as any in modern day history. The first part of this research paper will be spent on the issues leading up to the war, i.e., why the war started, while the second part of the paper will examine the politics of foreign intervention and the lessons we can learn.

HISTORY

PRE-1931

From the beginning of the 1800s to 1931, Spanish governmental rule was in turmoil. The conflict pitted monarchies on the Right, who were supported by the conservative Catholic Church, against those on the Left who favored democracy and a Constitution. In 1820, the Left was able to force a Constitution onto King Ferdinand who abrogated it in 1823.² In 1834, the conflict turned into the first Carlist War where supporters of Don Carlos (brother of the deceased King Ferdinand) and the Monarchy fought against the supporters of King Ferdinand's infant daughter Isabella II who favored a new Constitution. The war was won by the Left, but the margin of victory was too thin resulting in no clear mandate for the victor and hence no mandate for a new Constitution.

From 1837 until 1868, there were numerous leadership changes via coup d'état, some of which were liberal, some conservative. In 1868, Queen Isabella II was ousted by "the greatest of Spain's liberal Generals, General Prim."³ At first, he attempted to rule from a liberal monarchist perspective, but his attempt failed so the first Spanish Republic was established. It was hoped that a Federal Republic could quell local governmental unrest throughout the Spanish countryside as local populations had become distrustful of the government in Madrid. The Federal Republic however failed, and the end result was disorder throughout Spain. In 1874 the government brought back the late Queen Isabella's young son King Alfonso II who ruled until his death in 1885. During his rule, a liberal Constitution was enacted, but like previous attempts at democracy, the government was surrounded by dishonest politicians. By

1890, local populations had become even more restive with the government's misrule. As a result, Parliament attempted to appease the masses by giving all males the right to vote; however, corrupt local officials altered the election results ensuring the outcome favored their own agendas.⁴ Adding to this chaos was the Catholic Church and its position in Spanish society. The Catholic Church which had once linked the country geographically as well as socially was seen as an institution not for the masses but for the wealthy.⁵ The end result was a population totally disillusioned with the government and its leaders.

As World War I approached, there were three events which caused even more turmoil in Spain. First was the rise of two trade unions: 1) The Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) which was supported by the Anarchists, and 2) the Union General de Trabajadores (UGT) which was dominated by the Socialists. The CNT however, wreaked havoc on the government. Its murderous actions by its relentless supporters kept the government in a constant state of fear. The UGT worked with the government but only as a means to an end which was to have its members elected to Parliament.⁶ By 1917, the two trade unions joined together to push for better wages, lower living costs, amnesty for political prisoners. At this same time a small reformist Republican Party met with the UGT to carry out a nation-wide strike whose goal would be to establish a new government with a democratic Constitution.⁷ Although the strike was eventually put down by the Army after martial law had been declared, the unions and the Republican Party gave the central government reason to be concerned.⁸

The second problem the regime had to contend with concerned the province of Catalonia and its major industrial city, Barcelona. As a result of World War I, European countries had to commit their industrial base to war production which allowed Catalonia to become one of the great exporters on the continent.⁹ With the newly found wealth in Catalonia, the central government of Spain attempted to profit from Catalonia's fortunes. Additionally, economic prosperity in Catalonia fostered a disparate allocation of income between the lower class and the other parts of society. This caused a great deal of tension between the classes and the regime.¹⁰

The third problem the government had to cope with involved its occupation of Morocco. As a result of a secret agreement with the French in 1904, Morocco had been divided into zones of French and Spanish influence.¹¹ Over time, the Moroccans started to rebel causing the Spanish Army to be tied down in Morocco until 1927.¹² One of the great tragedies in Spain's military history occurred during this time. In 1921, a significant portion of the Spanish Army was besieged at the city of Anual and in the resulting retreat it lost 14,000 men. The outcry

created in Spain by revelations of incompetence and corruption of its leaders that led to the disaster at Anual put into question the reigning King Alfonso III's leadership abilities.¹³ As a result, the Parliament opened an investigation of the King and his Army. Before the report could be released however, General Miguel Primo de Rivera, Captain-General of Catalonia, gave an ultimatum to the King. Either support a military dictatorship led by the General himself or war will be declared against the Monarchy. Knowing General Primo had the support of the Army, the King gave his consent whereupon the General took control of Spain as dictator. He immediately suspended the Constitution and abolished the Parliament.¹⁴ At the beginning, General Primo's regime was doing fairly well due to the prosperous times in the 1920s. However, with the onset of the Depression and the fact that General Primo had little concern for much of the population, most notably the liberal and professional working class, his popularity diminished rapidly resulting in his resignation and exile to Paris in January 1930.¹⁵

Although General Primo was able to rule in relative harmony, he left the country with little hope for a peaceful existence: the key fundamental problems within the country still existed.¹⁶ There was no authoritative sector within Spanish society that now supported the throne.¹⁷ Army officers were upset at how King Alfonso III had let Gen Primo succumb to outside pressures which forced his resignation. The direction the Church was going had become ambiguous as many of its top leaders were leaning towards establishing a pro-democracy government as opposed to their previous open support for the monarchy. The middle and lower classes had no signs of hope for their future as they were still being treated as nothing more than an uneducated, cheap labor force.¹⁸

By the end of 1930, Spain was void of any leadership which had any chance of averting the imminent crisis. A leadership power vacuum clearly existed that would eventually cause grave consequences for the Monarchy, the government, and the people of Spain. As a result of the leadership vacuum, three separate groups banded together to form The League for the Defense of the Republic. The League was made up of Republicans, Socialists, and key leadership from Catalonia who believed a revolution was necessary to establish a democratic parliamentary republic.¹⁹ To overcome the crisis, the League decided they would carry out a coup d'état. With that decision, The League for the Defense of the Republic published the following:

A passionate demand for Justice surges upwards from the bowels of the Nation. Placing their hopes in a Republic, the people are already in the streets. We would have wished to communicate the people's desires through the due process of law. When we have demanded Justice, we have been denied Liberty. When we have demanded Liberty, we have been offered a rump parliament like

those of the past, based on fraudulent elections, convoked by a dictatorship, the instrument of the King who has already broken the Constitution. We do not covet the culminating drama of a revolution. But the misery of the people of Spain moves us greatly. Revolution will always be a crime or an act of insanity when Law prevails and Justice exist. But it is always just when Tyranny prevails.²⁰

This was the beginning of the end for the Monarchy as it had no group willing or able to defend it. King Alfonso III made one last attempt to save the Monarchy as he restored a constitutional government and elections for a new parliament; however, this too failed as the Left refused to participate. Realizing he had no choice, King Alfonso III set municipal elections for 12 April 1931.²¹ Although the rural districts with its wealthy landowners remained committed to the Monarchy and would garner a majority of those overall votes, the Left candidates won by huge numbers in almost all of the cities throughout Spain including Barcelona and Madrid. The King's unpopularity was self-evident which shocked the Monarchy. To make matters worse, General Jose Sanjurjo, commander of the Civil Guard, along with much of the Army refused to throw their support behind the regime. In the end, the Left had won. On 14 April 1931, King Alfonso III stepped down from the throne and left the country for exile putting an end to the reign of the Bourbon rulers forever.

Sunday's elections have shown me that I no longer enjoy the love of my people. I could very easily find means to support my royal powers against all-comers, but I am determined to have nothing to do with setting one of my countrymen against another in a fratricidal civil war. Thus the nation speaks, I shall deliberately suspend my use of Royal Prerogatives.²²

—King Alfonso III

1931-1936

With the King's abdication, the middle class center-Republicans took control of the government without bloodshed. The Second Republic had now been formed but significant problems abounded. It was a government that was weak from the beginning. On the Right were the aristocracy, supporters of the deposed monarchy, the Church, the Army, and much of the bourgeoisie. On the Left were the Anarchists, the Socialists, the Communists, trade unions and the lower class.²³ The Republican Center found itself floundering in between. On one side it had the traditionalists who saw the overthrow of the Monarchy as a short-term problem that would soon be resolved after putting a new monarchist government into power. On the other side it had the remaining populace who categorized themselves as the underprivileged class.²⁴

General elections for the parliament were held in June 1931 with the Republicans winning 192 seats, the Socialists winning 176 seats and the non-Republican Right winning 57

seats.²⁵ Although the Republicans and Socialists did exceedingly well in the elections, each party had its own complexities as the seats were split between the Right, the Center, and the Left with each pushing their own agenda. Overall, there was no definitive mandate for any one party, but the message was clear, those on the Right, including the Catholic Church, who had supported the Monarchy, were clearly in the minority.

The most difficult challenge still remained for the newly elected government: how to effectively govern with such a diverse group of political parties and elected officials. The first major issue the government had to deal with was the Church. The Church had been part of the elite and was now in a fight for its survival. Its leader, Cardinal Pedro Segura went on the offensive urging Catholics to revolt against the newly elected government. His pleas however initially fell on deaf ears. The problem the Church had was its abandonment of the populace (both the lower and middle classes) over the last century. The Church, which once signified the spiritual leadership for the working class, was now detested by them. It was a Church that preached acceptance of poverty while amassing an enormous fortune for itself. Its mantra was to "have patience, brother" as things will eventually improve. To the middle class, the Church had tried to stymie their climb up the social ladder. Instead of promoting education as the vehicle to success, the Church had stopped teaching students how to read. The Church felt an educated populace would find itself seeking alternatives to Catholicism, one of which was Socialism. Another consequence of holding down these classes was that it also turned teachers, scientists and doctors away from the Church. These educated professionals felt it was criminal not to educate the Spanish people.²⁶

As a result of the dispute between the Church and the masses, fighting broke out in Madrid on 11 May 1931 shortly after Cardinal Segura's inflammatory remarks to the populace. Churches were set on fire, but the government made no attempt to restore order because it was concerned about provoking the masses who had just placed it in power. The crisis grew worse spreading to many of the provinces. Eventually the government established martial law which put an end to the immediate violence; however, the fallout for the Republican government from the crisis was significant. Many in the middle class were disturbed by the lack of immediate action by the authorities. They felt the number one priority of any government was to ensure the safety of its people. As such, many of its supporters were now disenchanted with the new Republic and its elected leaders. The uprising had a devastating impact:

...war with the Church may have been necessary for creating a modern society, but it placed believing Catholics in the awkward dilemma of choosing between their government and their Church, alienating many who would otherwise support the Republic. By making church-state relations its top priority, the Republic

breathed new life into a dying Church, created a powerful enemy that was to hurry its downfall, and diverted from far more important issues in favor of a symbolic battle that strained society to the breaking point.²⁷

Despite these difficulties, the newly elected Parliament worked tirelessly on a draft Constitution which was ratified in December 1931. The clauses written into the Constitution in reference to the separation of Church and state only exacerbated the tension between the elected government and the Church. The new Constitution:

...allowed women to vote, provided for a parliamentary democracy with an elected parliament, placed limits on the power of the president, and guaranteed the rights of the individual. It also separated Church and state, dissolved the Jesuits and nationalized their property, placed severe limitations on other religious orders, and allowed divorce and civil marriage.²⁸ It also guaranteed every worker the necessary conditions for a dignified existence. It also said that property would be the object of expropriation for social utility, but guaranteed compensation.²⁹

The second major issue and probably an even more difficult one to resolve was social reform. Two-thirds of the population, most of whom were day laborers on the brink of poverty, were committed to agriculture. The Republican government was hesitant to force the wealthy landowners to hand over their property as it would be going against its democratic principles; however, in being true to its promises of reform, it passed the Agrarian Law of 1932. The Law confiscated some of the land with provisions for compensating landowners, while other land was taken without compensation. Although the Constitution granted every worker the "necessary conditions for a dignified existence," the government did not have the financial resources that would allow it to purchase land for the peasants. Hence, the government found itself in a very precarious situation. On one hand, the Law made one of their constituencies, the smaller landowners, very resentful. Regardless of whether or not the law was enforced, these landowners lost any trust they had in the newly elected democratic government. On the other hand, the peasants initially believed their lives would soon change for the better. Their exuberance soon was replaced by anger as the government failed to follow through on its promises.³⁰ In the end, the peasants were driven to the Left, either toward socialism and the UGT union, or even further to the Left as part of the anarchist movement and the CNT union.³¹ What may have seemed like a prudent political maneuver in the beginning, eventually turned into a fiasco for the Republican government.

The third and final major issue the Republican government had to concern itself with was the Army. Spain's Army was somewhat different than most militaries around the world. It was an Army designed to preserve order within its borders rather than a Army concerned with

defending its borders. Previous governments had used the armed forces as a tool for law and order and therefore had been deeply committed to it. Now however, the government wanted to reduce its reliance on the Army and what it had represented. As a result, the government moved to draw down the Army's end strength in an effort to reduce its power.³² Prime Minister Azaña went about cutting the force, both literally and figuratively. He cut 10,000 officers from the 15,000 officer corps by:

persuading the surplus officers, especially those with monarchist sympathies, to retire by generously offering them pensions at full salary. Half the Generals were forced to retire, and Azaña concentrated on promoting officers he thought would be loyal to the Republic. He also cut the length of military service, strengthened the neglected air force and the Army's non-commissioned officers, and cut the number of military academies. The result was an Army that was still far from a modern fighting force but was less of a burden on the nation.³³

Additionally, in the press, Azaña attacked the Army for its incompetence and its pretentiousness. This did little to win over any future support the government would need. As a result, many of the retired and active duty Army leaders started to plot against Azaña and the Republic. The first attempt at an overthrow came from General Sanjurjo who had been persuaded by the monarchists that it was his duty to rise up against the Republic. The coup attempt was a miserable failure and General Sanjurjo was sentenced to life in prison.³⁴

The Republican government was starting to feel extreme pressure from both the Right and the Left. Despite the many successes including some land reforms, increased religious freedoms, better wages and a reformed Army, the opposition was significant: the Army, the Catholic Church and its supporters, the middle class, and the peasants who had gained very little in their daily life. The Socialists had had enough of working with the Republicans. Little had come their way so they charted a different course which moved their party much further to the left and aligned themselves much closer to the rebellious Anarchists. The Right was able to come together led by a new Catholic party, the Confederacion Espanola de Derchas Autonomas (CEDA). Its leader, José María Gil Robles, skillfully brought together the Army, the Catholic Church and its supporters who despised the government policies, the Monarchists, and the wealthy landowners.³⁵ Faced with the swing in national opinion, President Alcala Zamora called for new elections which occurred on 19 November 1933.³⁶ The outcome was devastating to the Republican government as they only won 8 seats, where the Socialists had gained 60. To make matters worse, the Right garnered 309 seats which shifted the parliamentary power to the right.³⁷ With the Right now in control under the Lerroux Radical Party,³⁸ they renounced

many of the laws the Left had put into place, including doing away with the separation of Church and State.³⁹

Although the Right had taken control, significant issues existed between each of these factions which comprised the Right, most notably the division between the Monarchists and their Carlist allies, and Gil Robles and his CEDA party. The Monarchists and the Carlists believed CEDA was too far to the left of their own principles. Unlike CEDA, they detested political and technological changes in society. As such, they planned a rebellion with the goal of taking back the government. In order to carry out their coup, they conspired with the Italians and Mussolini so they could acquire money and arms to support the overthrow of the government.⁴⁰

The political situation in Spain in 1934 was bad and getting worse. The Left which had been working together, was now moving in completely opposite directions. The Right, although coming off a shocking victory in the 1933 elections was clearly divided.

The countryside was torn by strikes that were ruthlessly suppressed by the Civil Guard, and thousands of peasants were jailed. Land reforms were suspended, and landlords took revenge on their Socialist and Anarchist workers, many of whom were denied jobs. The laws restricting the Church's privileges were not enforced. General Sanjurjo and his fellow rebels were released from jail, and his new residence in neighboring Portugal became a center for conspiratorial activity. Regional autonomy was threatened.⁴¹

The years of 1934 and 1935 would later be called "the black two years" as chaos ran wild throughout Spain. On 1 October 1934, Gil Robles demanded change within the government. He wanted his CEDA party to control the governing Cabinet. His actions had a monumental impact on the political front as the Socialists felt he had caused the downfall of the ruling government. Their response was to rebel whereupon they initiated strikes throughout the country. Generally the strikes were easily put down but there was one exception, the northern mining areas of Asturias. Here, all parties on the Left threw their full support behind 30,000 miners. With an all out revolution staring them in the face, the government sent General Francisco Franco in to shut down the uprising.⁴² Eventually Franco was victorious but it came at a significant price. Franco's soldiers committed countless atrocities that only deepened the hatred the Left had against the Right. By the end of 1935, Robles actions along with a political scandal involving Lerroux's Radical Party, allowed the Left to regain popularity among the masses.⁴³

The Left having learned from its mistakes during the 1933 elections, formed a united party known as the Popular Front.⁴⁴ The Right, who was now in the midst of a political crisis, entered the 1936 elections in total disarray. The overall vote count was relatively close with the

Popular Front getting 4,700,000 votes to the Right's 4,576,000.⁴⁵ The popular vote yielded a more significant victory in terms of parliamentary seats won by the Left. Total count had the Popular Front winning 278 seats, the Right winning 134 seats and the Center winning 54 seats.⁴⁶ A clear victory for the Left.

With the Left back in power, Azaña again became Prime Minister. One of his first actions was to banish those military leaders he suspected of treason to harmless posts where it was hoped they would do little harm to the Republic.⁴⁷ The pendulum had swung again. With it, the Left reverted back to its more liberal policies including more self-government, the freeing of political prisoners, separation of Church and State. Land owners were forced to take back workers who had been discharged after the strikes in 1934. Most controversial of all was its policy on land reform where it gave 70,000 peasants their own parcels of land. Despite these reforms, there was still no plan for a massive redistribution of land or any policies to force some relaxation of the strict controls the powerful bank owners had on the economy. As such, the peasants were starting to demand even more. They began to understand what life could be like without the oppressive laws which they had been forced to live with. Soon the entire country was besieged by the lower class clamoring for more land, better conditions, and better pay. The government was ill prepared to halt the chaos.

The election victory of the Popular Front had led expectations that were so high as to be impossible to fulfill. Even if the government were to settle every landless peasant on his own farm, Spain, as a nation, was too poor to provide the seeds, tools, and credit necessary. If the Republic had come to power in a violent revolution that destroyed the ruling oligarchy, it might have been able to nationalize land, banks, and industry while unifying the working class. But the republic itself was the fruit of a compromise with the middle class that wanted order, political liberty, and an end to the monarchy, and was relatively less concerned with social and economic equality that would endanger its own status. So the Spanish Republic in that fateful spring of 1936 thrashed blindly in the dark, struggling for a way to survive.⁴⁸

Almost immediately after the election, the Right plotted its course to win back its position of power. Before being exiled from Spain, some of the top Army Generals met and had agreed to plan an overthrow of the government.⁴⁹ In April 1936, CEDA merged with the Falange⁵⁰ party whereupon they conspired with the military to take back the government for the Right. The Right had become much more violent as they responded to the government's liberal policies and the Socialists support of the peasants of the lower class. Falange gangs began raids into Socialist neighborhoods which in turn prompted Socialists to retaliate. In an attempt to regain control, the government banned the Falange party and jailed their leader, José Antonio. This, in turn, led to even more violence. On 12 July 1936, the Falangists murdered an officer of the

government's Assault Guard who had killed a Falange member weeks earlier. In retaliation the Assault Guards, the elite armed riot police of the Republic, shot and killed one of the rising stars of the Right, Calvo Sotelo. With the murder of Calvo Sotelo, Gil Robles lashed out at the Popular Front:

There is an abyss between the farce that parliament is performing and the profound and most grave national tragedy. We are not prepared to let this farce continue. . . You can be sure – this has been the constant law of all human collectivities – that you, who are planning violence will be its first victims. Very ordinary because very well known, but none the less true, is the proverb the revolutions are like Saturn, that they devour their own children. Now you are very calm because you see your opponent fall. Soon will come the day when very the violence you have unleashed will turn against you.⁵¹

By the end of the day on 17 July 1936, Army rebel troops aligned with the Right began their assault on the town of Meilla on the coast of Spanish Morocco hunting down leftist organizations and with it came the start of the Spanish Civil War.⁵²

THE WAR

The outbreak of war was defined by terrorist acts against the opposing factions throughout most of Spain. Death squads on both sides had taken over causing everyone to fear for their lives. The Right was on its heels defending itself from the attacks of the Left. The Church was marked from the beginning as it was an easily identifiable target. The Army generals and officers were also on the hit list, along with the wealthy landowners. Peasants, for the first time in their lives, sensed they controlled their own destiny as they took over the farms and villages once owned by the rich. For them, it was a sense of payback for the social injustices and wretched treatment they had continually received from the Right. To show their unwavering support for the government they joined militia units to combat the Army rebels.⁵³ Although much of the country was being ransacked by terror squads, the Left was able to take some monumental steps by uniting so they could oppose the Army and the Right. As a result, the Popular Front, made up of the left Republicans, the Socialists, the Communists, and the Anarchists were able to move forward, despite the chasms that existed between each party.⁵⁴

The Right (Nationalists), at this time, was completely fractured. Each faction (Falangists, Carlists, monarchists, CEDA and the Army) was vying for power; however, control over the Nationalists was clearly in the hands of the Army. "The declaration of a state of war gave the generals the legal basis for their authority; political activity and union action was simply forbidden."⁵⁵ Franco consolidated his power as he moved his Nationalist Army north to Madrid, the capital of Spain, which was still occupied by the Popular Front. With the death of General

Sanjurjo,⁵⁶ Franco had no competitor and on 21 September, was elected as Commander-in-Chief. Soon after, a decree was issued which appointed him as Head of Government of the Spanish State giving him absolute powers to run the country as he saw fit.⁵⁷ Both the Popular Front and the Nationalists asked for foreign aid to support their war effort. The dress rehearsal for World War II was on.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Both the Republicans and the Nationalists saw the war as a war that went far beyond the borders of Spain. Both believed the war had international ramifications.

It was actually a much larger European struggle. The generals had come to present a military rising that had drifted into a civil war as a crusade in the defense of Catholic, conservative values against international communism, social dissolution and bolshevization of Europe. For this reason, General Franco told a reporter, "our enterprise goes beyond national issues and is converted into a crusade in which the fate of Europe is at stake."⁵⁸

FRANCE

The French government and its Socialist leader Premier Léon Blum were sympathetic to the Popular Front. Yet, France as a whole was deeply divided as to whether or not it should be involved in the Civil War. The majority of the French population fully supported the Socialists and the Popular Front, but that was not the case for the minority Nationalist opposition party. The Nationalists who were dominated by high ranking military officers and politicians, as well as wealthy businessmen were against the Popular Front and its socialistic underpinnings. The quandary facing the government was even more difficult to resolve because France had to be concerned with Hitler's course in Europe, as well as the British who said they would not come to France's aid if the war spilled onto the European continent.⁵⁹

At the onset of the war it was alleged that young Frenchmen were crossing the Franco-Spanish border to offer their support to the Socialists fighting Franco. Although the facts are somewhat unclear, the French government purportedly started providing the Socialist forces with weapons including bombs and airplanes; however, the French government repeatedly denied any involvement. To add to the controversy, the Paris newspaper, Figaro, reported that the French government would send Spain 20,000 bombs, 10 batteries of three-inch guns, 25 bombing planes, and 40 machine guns.⁶⁰ Regardless of what actually transpired, the Spanish government continued to press the French for assistance.

After the weapons were highlighted in the open press, the French Cabinet met to decide what their policy would be towards Spain. The ministers had unanimously

decided not to intervene in any manner in the internal conflict in Spain. The French conservatives were not satisfied with that decision, as they felt it would leave the way open for traffic in arms by private companies, and under the Cabinet decision would not constitute 'intervention' by the French government.⁶¹

The French government realized the situation in Spain was only getting worse. They had come to understand that Italy and Germany were beginning to support the Nationalists in Spain with troops and weapons while the USSR was starting to support the Left. If a coherent, consistent policy were not acted upon by the European powers, the Civil War would probably explode into a much larger European conflict. Blum made the decision to engage in an official policy of non-intervention provided they could get others to follow.⁶²

GREAT BRITAIN

Like the French, the British were divided as to whether or not they should provide support of any kind to either side in Spain's Civil War. Both sides of the government wanted to avoid the war at all costs, not wanting to repeat anything that closely resembled what they had been through during World War I. Most of the Conservatives in Britain, including Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, were deeply concerned with the potential subversion of another Bolshevik Revolution as had happened in the Soviet Union. The Republican government in Spain was fighting for its existence and so they had no choice but to open up their party to Communists, the Socialists and Anarchists. As a result, many of Britain's political leaders felt the Republican government was doomed as they would never be able to control the Left, nor would they ever become strong enough to defeat Franco's Nationalists. As such, they saw a Franco victory as more favorable than having the Popular Front win which could lead to another Communist country in Europe. On the other hand, Britain's Labor party fully backed the Republican government and the union workers as they were more fearful of having another Fascist dictator in Europe if Franco was the victor.⁶³ Realizing the situation in Spain could get out of control, and after conferring with the French, the British also declared a policy of nonintervention.

THE UNITED STATES

When the war started, the US was gearing up for a Presidential election with President Roosevelt running for reelection. Although Hitler was making news on the European continent and there was some uneasiness over what was happening in Spain, most Americans were much more concerned about their own welfare as they were still suffering from the Great Depression. Both political parties favored isolationism, not wanting to subject the American people to problems outside its own borders.⁶⁴ Roosevelt's priority was clearly the domestic

front. His “overriding consideration was not what was morally right or wrong, but what was best for the United States and, incidentally, for himself and the Democratic Party.”⁶⁵

Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was kept fully abreast of the Civil War, wanting to ensure the President acted on the correct political strategy to ensure his re-election. Although Hull was concerned about the war leading to a larger European conflict, he was even more concerned about the consequences if the Republican government won the war. His concerns were over the Communists and how they had garnered a good deal of power within Republican government and how they were positioning themselves to possibly overthrow the government if they could defeat Franco. If so, this would empower the Communists and their movement throughout Western Europe.⁶⁶

On 10 August, the Glenn L. Martin Company called the State Department requesting the sale of eight of their aircraft to the Spanish government. This request put the State Department into a difficult dilemma as they had not announced an official policy on how they were going to deal with Spain, i.e., whether or not they were going to support the government of Spain or declare neutrality, staying out of the conflict. The State Department was strongly divided. Some argued the United States should impose a “moral embargo” on any arms shipments to Spain. Others argued that to deny the sale of arms to a sovereign nation, the President would need specific congressional authorization to block it. If the President were to block the sale of weapons due to a moral embargo, it could leave the United States in an awkward position the next time a friendly government came calling asking for help in putting down a rebellion.⁶⁷ In the end, President Roosevelt blocked the sale whereby announcing a policy of nonintervention. On 11 August, it became public policy for Spain and the world to see.

USSR

Soviet allegiances to Spain and the Socialist factions during the war were based on Stalin's motives rather than idealism, morality or any love for Spain. He acted purely out of what he thought best for the Soviet Union and his Communist movement.⁶⁸ In 1936, the USSR was very interested in the spread of Communism, but was also concerned with the Fascist movements in Germany, Italy and Japan. Allowing Germany or Italy to gain another ally, did not bode well with Stalin and his goal of having Communist states throughout Europe.

At the beginning of the civil war, Stalin was at first opposed, then reluctant, and at all times full of misgivings on the question of aiding the Republican government. He was determined that Russian intervention should never reach proportions that might lead to a European war. While he sent some military advisers, pilots, and tank drivers to Spain, they were few in number and always worked as secretly and as isolatedly as possible.⁶⁹

Almost from the beginning, Stalin realized nonintervention would fail and therefore saw no reason to support it; however, he also knew he could never supply enough arms or troops to help the Republican government win the war. With the Germans and Italians providing considerable amounts of war material to Franco and the Right, Stalin knew he could not match their effort to make a difference in the outcome of the war. As a result, he decided against supplying the Left with arms or troops, knowing it was a lost cause. With France and Britain staying on the sidelines, Stalin knew the Republican government was in trouble. By 1938, Stalin had reduced Soviet aid to a few military advisors.⁷⁰

GERMANY

At the beginning of the war, Hitler's foreign advisers were concerned about Germany's involvement in Spain because they were afraid of the negative reaction they might get from the British. Hitler despised all bureaucrats and therefore relied on his military who supported Franco's cause.⁷¹ Hitler concurred with the military and supported the war for numerous reasons: 1) he was concerned with having another Communist country in Europe if the Popular Front won the war; 2) he saw Spain as a target of opportunity to improve Germany's position economically; by providing troops and materiel to Franco, Germany in return would receive critical war-making materials needed to build up the army at home; and 3) the German military would receive first-hand experience on the battlefield using some of their newest warfighting equipment.⁷² In the end, Germany's support of Franco was critical as it helped prepare the Wehrmacht for the start of the Second World War.

Although Germany's support for Franco was significant, the significance had to do with the type of support Hitler was sending. The support was not limited to fighters, bombers, gun batteries and tank companies. The main thrust of the support was actually:

the heavy equipment and the organizing, supplying, and manning of the air, tank, and artillery services. German engineers designed and built field fortifications. Germans set up and ran training schools for Spanish officers and noncoms. German naval vessels played a key role in keeping the sea lanes open for war material and troop shipments and in paralyzing the activities of the Loyalist navy.⁷³

Germany was clearly the reason for Franco's victory. Germany gave Franco what he needed most, critical expertise which numbered approximately 6,500 specialists at any given time. Although there are no official numbers of how many Germans served in Spain, the best guess is around 16,000 specialists, none of which were infantry.⁷⁴ With these professionals and some of the best fighting equipment, Germany gave Franco's Army everything it needed to win the war.

ITALY

Like Germany, Italy supported Franco from the beginning. Mussolini was also concerned that Spain could become a Communist country which would be a serious threat to his power in the Mediterranean. Trying to capitalize on an opportunity, Mussolini took action to support Franco in the hopes of ridding themselves of a potential threat.⁷⁵ The Italian's support of Franco was quite different in composition than what Germany had sent to support Franco's Army. Mussolini sent planes, tanks and naval vessels, but he also ended up sending upwards of 50,000 troops by the end of October 1937. Mussolini wanted his forces on the ground directly supporting the Right. Although the Italians remained in Spain for the duration of the War, its contributions to the war would have been ineffective had Germany not supported the effort.

INTERNATIONAL BRIGADES

One final piece on the international stage were the volunteers who joined the fight with the Left against the National Front in 1936. The volunteers, who came from numerous countries around the world, identified themselves with the Left and their fight for freedom. Volunteers came for different reasons. Some were common workers who were caught up in the class struggle having "been beaten down by the depression, unemployment and the national government."⁷⁶ Others were those who were deeply concerned about the rise of the Nazis in Germany and the Fascists in Italy. Allowing Spain to fall to the Right would result in France being surrounded by three Fascist regimes. If that were to happen, the rest of Europe would be at risk to a Fascist takeover. Volunteering to go to Spain was a way of fighting Hitler and Mussolini before they could gain elsewhere on the European continent.⁷⁷ Other volunteers were the politically conscious intellectuals fighting for democracy and freedom.⁷⁸

Recruitment of the volunteers was mainly (but not exclusively) accomplished by the Communist Parties within each country; led by the Communist International (Comintern) at the direction of the Communist Party in Moscow. Before the war was over, there were between 30,000 and 40,000 from various countries around the world. Volunteers were organized into approximately 40 battalions which made up 7 brigades.⁷⁹ The International Brigades paid a high price for their services. With relatively little training, they were sent into battle and suffered heavy casualties throughout the war. By July 1937, recruitment had decreased sharply forcing the Republican government to initiate a draft. By September 1938, there were only 12,000 volunteers left in Spain whereupon it was decided the International Brigades were no longer needed. Despite their altruistic reasons for wanting to fight the Fascists, the volunteers who

made up the International Brigades left without winning their crusade. In the end, 10,000 died on the battlefields in Spain.⁸⁰

NONINTERVENTION

Despite the Republican government being the recognized legitimate government of Spain, their request for arms was limited to an initial response by France who agreed to send aircraft and weapons. This request however was never fully acted upon as the British government applied pressure to the French to stop the exports. France, after being informed that the Italians were sending planes to Franco felt compelled to stop the intervention of foreign powers in Spain's Civil War. On 1 August 1936, France took the steps that would eventually send a non-intervention proposal to 26 countries including Great Britain, Germany, Italy and the USSR who would eventually sign the agreement over the next month.⁸¹ This in turn compelled the British to set up a committee (officially known as The International Committee for the Application of the Agreement Regarding Nonintervention in Spain) designed to oversee nonintervention in Spain with its first meeting on 9 September 1936. The purpose of the Committee would be to "exchange and collate information on measures regarding nonintervention in Spain that have already been taken and to suggest new measures which may be usefully employed."⁸²

NONINTERVENTION COMMITTEE

The first meeting went generally well with most of the 26 countries in attendance feeling positive that France and Britain would do everything in their power to keep Spain's Civil War in check. There were two exceptions, Germany and Italy. Their perception after the first meeting was that France and Britain would do very little to ensure nonintervention and that their aim was nothing more than watching over the Left making sure they were not abused.⁸³ The Committee had all kinds of problems, one of which was its size. For this reason a Chairman's Sub-committee was set up to work through issues more efficiently, before sending their decision to the Nonintervention Committee for approval. The negative aspect to this setup was smaller, less powerful countries felt as though they would have little say in what policies were put forward and approved.⁸⁴

The Nonintervention Committee had four phases, the first three took 6 months to work through while the last phase took almost 2 years.⁸⁵ Each of the phases proved extremely challenging to the Committee, with no real progress toward nonintervention made in any of them.

Phase I: Attempt to prove Italy and Germany were providing support to the Nationalists. The debate revolved around the Soviets, the Italians and the Germans. On 7 September 1936, the Soviets charged the Germans and the Italians with specific violations of the agreement. The Germans and Italians on the other hand countered with very loose, unsubstantiated charges of Soviet violations which were almost impossible to prove one way or the other. At the same time, the Committee received evidence from the Spanish government specifying further German and Italian breaches. The Committee Chairman presented all the allegations to the German and Italian representatives who in turn denied each one. Additionally, both countries simply repeated their own charges that the Soviets were intervening themselves. The British and French were now in a difficult position. To acknowledge that the Germans and the Italians were providing arms and troops this early in the Committee's existence would seriously endanger the continuance of the Committee, exactly what Britain or France could not afford to happen. If Germany and Italy withdrew, Britain and France could be drawn into military action. Neither was prepared to do so financially, militarily or emotionally. Both had taken catastrophic losses during World War I and both were still attempting to recover from the worldwide Depression. In the end, the Chairman simply announced there was not enough evidence to support the accusations allowing the Germans and the Italians to continue supporting Franco and his Army which then forced the Soviets to temporarily send more arms and supplies to their allies in Spain.⁸⁶

Phase II: Develop plans to stop war material from reaching Spain either by land or sea. The Committee formulated a plan where observers would monitor key supply points including sea ports and border check points. Patrols were established on the border frontiers around Spain, at ports, as well as patrol vessels on the sea. Significant problems existed.

A chief defect of this plan was that any ship flying the flag or that of a country not party to Nonintervention Agreement was immune from observation. It was cumbersome to operate and the chances for evasion were too easy. There was also the danger of the powers becoming involved in incidents with the armed forces of one or other of the conflicting parties in Spain. It was this which finally brought the naval control to an abrupt end and almost terminated the life of the Nonintervention Committee itself.⁸⁷

Phase III: The Nonintervention pact did not prevent foreign troops ("volunteers") from fighting in Spain so special decrees needed to be written to stop foreign soldiers from participating. The original treaty was directed towards the ban of weapons and ammunition. It had not foreseen the numbers of foreign volunteers which had entered the war by the end of 1936. The Committee attempted to take the steps necessary to overcome this oversight. Despite numerous heated exchanges between the Soviets and the Germans, both of whom

charged one another with sending large numbers of troops to Spain. By 16 February 1937 an agreement was reached to stop volunteers from leaving each country to help out in Spain. Despite the agreement, the Germans and the Italians did not abide by it. Although they took formal steps to show the Committee they were in fact complying, the opposite was actually true. Both countries sent aid to Spain in sizeable amounts thus going around the requirement of needing official passports, the only real mechanism for tracking foreigners in and out of countries.⁸⁸

Phase IV: Establishing guidance to remove foreign soldiers who had been fighting in Spain since the beginning of the war. The first meeting to discuss the issue was held on 1 March 1937, but little came out of it. The Germans and the Italians refused to participate as they felt the negotiations could not be discussed separately from the other forms of non-intervention. The heart of the matter was their opposition to the Soviets and how they were providing indirect financial support to the Spanish government. In effect, the two countries were simply using stall tactics as they wanted to ensure their troops remained in Spain as they felt Franco was moving in on victory. Numerous attempts at formalizing an agreement were tried, but no legislation was passed through the end of 1938.⁸⁹ By the beginning of 1939, Franco was closing in on victory. Thousands of volunteers remained in Spain until the end as the Non-intervention Committee had failed in its attempt to remove the troops from Spain. On 1 April 1939, Franco having received the news that his Army now controlled the entire country issued a simple message, "Today, after capturing and disarming the Red Army, the National troops have attained their last military objectives. The war is over."⁹⁰

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN EUROPE AT WAR'S END

Germany and Italy got exactly what they wanted out of the war. Spain was now aligned with them because of being so deeply indebted to them for their victory. Secondly, Spain gave Germany critical resources for its war machine. Finally and maybe most importantly, Hitler and Mussolini and their armies gained incomprehensible battlefield experience. It became a "proving ground for testing their equipment under combat conditions and at the same time had an opportunity to test their latest tactical doctrines."⁹¹ Despite all the outside attempts at imposing nonintervention, Germany always planned on supporting Franco. Italy, with Hitler's support, saw Spain as a land of opportunity for its Fascist regime. Intervention was critical and very beneficial to both countries. Each saw Spain as a stepping stone to greater prizes in Europe.

The war was very costly to both Britain and France from a political point of view. The once great powers struggled trying to prevent Germany and Italy from supplying troops and war materials to Spain. Not wanting to force controls on Italy and Germany via military action for fear of another war in Europe, both countries attempted to use diplomatic means to achieve their goals. World War I had been horrific to on the European continent, a war that neither country was ready or willing to revisit. As a result, Britain and France turned to a policy of appeasement which would prove costly five months after the Spanish Civil War ended.

The Soviet Union, from the beginning, tried to intervene in order to support its fellow Communists fighting the Right. It continued to provide support to the Left throughout the war for fear of having three dictators on the European continent, who opposed Communism if Franco were to prevail.

STRATEGIC-LEVEL LESSONS LEARNED

Strategic level lessons learned from the Spanish Civil War were numerous; however, two stand out. First, when national interests are at stake, great nations that practice policies of nonintervention and isolationism, without unquestioned justification, are nations that are willing to accept catastrophic outcomes. Britain, France, and the United States were each guilty, in their own right, of practicing such politics during the Spanish Civil War. The three great democracies failed to act at that time because they feared they would be drawn into war. The policy of nonintervention and isolationism, which in fact turned out to be a policy of intervention for the Germans and the Italians, allowed Franco to obtain the necessary war materials to win the war. The British, the French and the Americans allowed the Right to gain a significant edge militarily and with it came victory for Franco. Had they allowed the supply of war materials to the Left, the Republican government could have been on equal footing with the Right.⁹² There is some argument that due to post-WWI disarmament, the democratic countries did not have the necessary means to wage war if they were to support the Left; however, it is also true that by attempting to win a game of power politics against aggressor nations by diplomatic means without mentioning military force, is a recipe for failure. With Britain, France and the United States demonstrating weak power politics, both Germany and Italy took full advantage. Had the democratic countries followed a policy of a "firm stance and denounced the breach of the agreements...the policy had at least a possibility of upsetting the dictator without war being needed."⁹³ A policy of intervention by the democratic powers which may have forced them into war "would have been fought in circumstances more favorable for the Western democracies than that which came in 1939 over Poland."⁹⁴ By the end of the war, both Germany and Italy

were confident that the democratic countries were in a position of weakness and would do little to stop their aggression on the European continent.

A second strategic level lesson learned is for nations to fully understand the criticality of being ready and the willingness to engage in war if it is in their national interest. The British and the French were both militarily weak at the end of World War I and with the Great Depression their situation only became worse. Although the United States had begun to build up its military as World War I ended, it reverted to its previous policy of isolationism. Unfortunately, for the Republicans of Spain, the democratic nations were not able to or were not willing to make themselves strong militarily. When it came to implementing the Nonintervention Treaty, neither Britain nor France was in a position to enforce what had been agreed upon through military means. As such, Germany and Italy were able to support Franco without fear or reprisal from the democratic nations. Great powers must understand that to successfully promote their political agendas, they must have a strong military to back it up. Not doing so is a clear policy for disaster, which is exactly what took place in Spain from 1936 to 1939.

CONCLUSION

The Spanish Civil War was a tragedy for all of Spain, with the total number of deaths amounting to nearly 600,000.⁹⁵ It was also a war that proved disastrous for an international peace agreement which in the end would have devastating consequences for all of humanity in the 20th Century. The end of the war gave Franco and his Fascist Party control of Spain, which also helped to increase Hitler's and Mussolini's power as leaders of their own nations. The war significantly damaged the role of France and Britain as great powers in Europe. The USSR, who supported collective security and the balance of power for her own causes, completely reversed itself at the end of the war aligning itself with Germany with the Nonaggression Treaty of 23 August 1939. Finally, the war impacted the United States and Roosevelt. The President, who had supported a policy of isolationism, realized after it was too late that his policy was wrong and that the United States should have been concerned about the Spanish Civil War from the outset. If he had done so, the outcome may have been quite different. It cannot be overstated what effect the Spanish Civil War had on those involved along with many other countries throughout the world. It was a war that influenced and continues to influence how the world views the conflicting ideologies of Communism, Fascism, and Democracy. It was a war that yielded so many critical lessons, a war that must be continued to be studied so we do not repeat these errors again.

WORD COUNT = 9,346

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Civil War (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972), 3.
- ² Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1961), 12.
- ³ Ibid., 13.
- ⁴ Ibid., 13-14.
- ⁵ Ibid., 32. The Spanish Church, due to its pre-eminent position when Spain was great power, remained the embodiment of the Spanish nature until the 20th Century. When the Church declined, the chief unifying force in the country lost its vitality also. Spain therefore fell apart both geographically and socially. Partly due to the profound penetration of the Roman Catholic religion into the nature of the people, all the inevitable disputes which followed were carried on with a peculiar and uncompromising intensity and all the parties to these disputes aspired to that total national and exclusive position which in Spain has only been possessed by the Church.
- ⁶ Ibid., 14.
- ⁷ Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish Revolution (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc, 1970), 69.
- ⁸ Ibid., 71.
- ⁹ Ibid., 39. Catalonia's industrial wealth was attributed to its textile industry which manufactured both cotton and wool products.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Morocco - History. <<http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/marochis.htm>>; Internet; accessed; 10 December 2002.
- ¹² Thomas, 15.
- ¹³ Henry Kamen, A Concise History of Spain (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 148.
- ¹⁴ Daniel S. Davis, Spain's Civil War: The Last Great Cause (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc, 1975), 3.
- ¹⁵ Ibid
- ¹⁶ Ibid
- ¹⁷ Thomas, 17.
- ¹⁸ Ibid

- ¹⁹ Franz Borkenau, The Spanish Cockpit (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1963), 45.
- ²⁰ Thomas, 18.
- ²¹ Borkenau, 46.
- ²² Thomas, 18-19.
- ²³ Herbert L. Matthews, Half of Spain Died (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 48.
- ²⁴ Antony Beevor, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Peter Bedrick Books, 1983), 27.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, 28.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*
- ²⁷ Davis, 6-7.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.
- ²⁹ Beevor, 31.
- ³⁰ Raymond Carr, The Spanish Tragedy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), 34.
- ³¹ Davis, 12.
- ³² Thomas, 58.
- ³³ Davis, 14-15.
- ³⁴ Thomas, 62-63.
- ³⁵ Davis, 17.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, 15, 18.
- ³⁷ Beevor, 34. Azana's Republican Action Party won 8 seats and the Socialists 60, In contrast, the Center-Right Radical Party (Lerroux) won 104, the conservative Catalan Lliga 24, the Agrarians 29, the new Catholic CEDA alliance 117 (Gil Robles), and the Monarchists and Carlists 35.
- ³⁸ Davis, 18. The Lerroux Radical Party was headed by Alejandro Lerroux who was a lion gone tame. In his youth he had been an anti-clerical rabblouser in the Barcelona district. Age and spoils of the office had mellowed him, and he came to power with a reputation as a corrupt political boss. Promising to roll back many of the reforms of the Azaña period, Lerroux formed a government dependent on the CEDA's votes in the Cortes.
- ³⁹ Borkenau, 51.

⁴⁰ Davis, 20.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 22. General Francisco Franco was born in 1892 and entered the Military Academy of Toledo in 1907. From 1912 to 1927 he served mostly in Morocco with great distinction, both in the native Regulares and in the Spanish Legion which he commanded. He married in 1923 and was a divisional general at the age of forty-one. In 1927 he became Commandant of the Military Academy of Saragossa (later closed by the Republic in 1931). In October 1934 he directed operations from Madrid against the Asturian miners and in May 1935 Gil Robles appointed him Chief of the General Staff. After the Popular Front Victory he was "relegated" to the relatively unimportant post of Military Governor of the Canary Islands.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Beevor, 39. The center and left wing parties, Republicans, Socialists, Communists, and the PODUM, grouped themselves in the Popular Front alliance under Azaña who had become a symbol of unity after his imprisonment following the October 1934 uprising. This electoral pact, first arranged between the Socialists and the Liberal Republicans, was born of the unity forged during the Asturias revolt.

⁴⁵ Matthews, 61.

⁴⁶ Thomas, 93.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 100.

⁴⁸ Davis, 25.

⁴⁹ Thomas, 100. Azaña exiled General Franco to the Canary Islands and General Goded to the Balearics. General Mola, previously in command in Morocco, had been transferred to be Military Governor of Pamplona, Navarre. Before the officers left Madrid, they held a meeting with General Varela where they agreed to support an uprising if Azaña were to give power to Largo Caballero (Socialist) or if anarchy should overwhelm the country. Varela was anxious for an immediate uprising, Mola was more cautious, while Franco seems to have finally committed himself to the idea of a military uprising to save Spain, but vacillated once or twice more.

⁵⁰ Carr, 62.

⁵¹ Raymond Carr, The Republic and the Civil War in Spain (London: Macmillan St Martin's Press, 1971), 69, 73.

⁵² Davis, 31.

⁵³ Ibid., 46-47.

⁵⁴ Carr, 90-91.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 119.

⁵⁶ Matthews, 86-87. It is natural to write about Franco's Army since everyone came to know it as such, but things had to happen before he became Caudillo and Generalissimo. The first thing that occurred was the death of the nominal rebel leader, General Sanjurjo, in a plane crash on July 19.

⁵⁷ Carr, 120-121.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 229.

⁵⁹ Matthews, 134. Hitler invaded the Rhineland on March 19, 1936

⁶⁰ William E. Watters, An International Affair (New York: Exposition Press, 1971), 34.

⁶¹ Watters, 34.

⁶² Ibid., 40.

⁶³ Ibid., 30.

⁶⁴ Matthews, 173.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 176.

⁶⁶ Douglas Little, Malevolent Neutrality. The United States, Great Britain, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 236.

⁶⁷ Little, 237.

⁶⁸ Matthews, 154.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 154.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 158.

⁷¹ Beevor, 113.

⁷² Matthews, 137, 139.

⁷³ Ibid., 138.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Watters, 35-36.

⁷⁶ Carr, 127.

⁷⁷ Ken Bradley, International Brigades in Spain 1936-1939 (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1994), 6.

⁷⁸ Carr, 141-142.

⁷⁹ Bradley, 8. Countries represented by the volunteers were: Albania, Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Yugoslavia, and the United States. Volunteers from Germany and Italy were anti-fascists and were fighting against their own countrymen on the Right. The 11th Bde was made up of mainly Germans, the 12th Bde was mostly Italian, the 13th Bde was Slav and Balkan, the 14th was mostly French and Belgian, the 15th was English speaking (including both the Abraham Lincoln Battalion and the George Washington Battalion), the 86th Bde was a mix of British, US, Irish, Czech, Albanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Yugoslav battalions, while the 150th Bde was Hungarian. The 11th through 15th Brigades were considered the key brigades.

⁸⁰ Carr, 143-144.

⁸¹ Watters, 40.

⁸² Ibid., 65-66.

⁸³ Ibid., 68.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 70. The most influential nations in Europe made up the Sub-Committee: Belgium, Britain, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the USSR

⁸⁵ Patricia Van Der Esch, Prelude to War: The International Repercussions of the Spanish Civil War (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1951), 72.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 75-76. The Russian note referred to fourteen Italian planes which arrived at Seville on 7 September and twelve German planes which flew Spanish Foreign Legion troops from Teutan in Morocco to Spain on 20 September.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 77.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 79. The word "Volunteers" was used by the Committee to cover all men of non-Spanish nationality on both sides.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 131-132.

⁹⁰ Davis, 161.

⁹¹ Watters, 403.

⁹² Van Der Esch, 162.

⁹³ Thomas, 614.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 615.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 606. Deaths amounted to nearly 600,000. of these about 100,000 may be supposed to have died by murder or execution. Perhaps as many as 220,000 died by disease or malnutrition directly attributable to the war. About 320,000 were probably killed in action.

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