Intelligence Reform: The "Phoenix" of 9/11?
Abstract
On Wednesday, 12 September 2001 before the dust had settled in Lower Manhattan, the attacks began on the Intelligence Community. Someone had to shoulder the blame and the most logical target was the Intelligence Community which is responsible for warning policy- makers of looming crises and threats to our national security. Shortly thereafter, Congress launched a joint inquiry, conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The inquiry concluded that the Intelligence Community had plenty of strategic warning regarding an imminent spectacular" event prior to 11 September, but lacked actionable" intelligence to tell specifically when, where, and how such an attack might occur. This paper argues that the pre-911 I national security structure was not optimized to deal with complex transnational threats, such as international terrorism, which blur the lines between national security and crime. It shows how our strategic focus which served U.S. policy makers well during the Cold War fell short in warning against terrorism. It explains how the mandate to protect civil rights and preserve enduring American values has clashed with security concerns and U.S. interests. Further, the paper reviews the recommendations of various recent committees regarding intelligence reform. It concludes by recommending a revised national security structure that more effectively integrates foreign and domestic intelligence collection and analysis without compromising the rights of U.S. citizens-and one that will enhance our ability to preempt, disrupt and defeat terrorism.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 07, 2003
- Accession Number
- ADA414650
Entities
People
- Margaret E. Schalch
Organizations
- United States Army War College