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THESIS

SUPPLYING DEMOCRACY? U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN, 1989-2002

by

Nathan G. Forbes

March 2003

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Democracy promotion has been a principal foreign policy goal of the United States in the post-Cold War world. Democratic expansion is seen as an essential element of enhanced security and stability throughout the world. Jordan, having begun its own democratization program in 1989, has been a major recipient of U.S. security assistance since the end of the 1991 Gulf War. This thesis explores the question of whether U.S. security assistance has helped or hindered democratization in Jordan. It accomplishes this through an examination of the military aid received and the specific nature of civil-military relations in Jordan, particularly during the democratization program and its subsequent rollback. This thesis concludes that, counter to declared U.S. policy, U.S. security assistance to Jordan has effectively helped to limit democratization in Jordan through the empowerment of anti-democratic elements in Jordan. The findings present challenges to further democratization in Jordan that will be difficult to surmount. A conditional foreign aid program would encourage further political reform in Jordan that could serve as a model for other authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.

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SUPPLYING DEMOCRACY? U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN, 1989-2002

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ABSTRACT

Democracy promotion has been a principal foreign policy goal of the United States in the post-Cold War world. Democratic expansion is seen as an essential element of enhanced security and stability throughout the world. Jordan, having begun its own democratization program in 1989, has been a major recipient of U.S. security assistance since the end of the 1991 Gulf War. This thesis explores the question of whether U.S. security assistance has helped or hindered democratization in Jordan. It accomplishes this through an examination of the military aid received and the specific nature of civil-military relations in Jordan, particularly during the democratization program and its subsequent rollback. This thesis concludes that, counter to declared U.S. policy, U.S. security assistance to Jordan has effectively helped to limit democratization in Jordan through the empowerment of anti-democratic elements in Jordan. The findings present challenges to further democratization in Jordan that will be difficult to surmount. A conditional foreign aid program would encourage further political reform in Jordan that could serve as a model for other authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, the United States has relied on foreign aid to further its national interest and foreign policy objectives. Beginning in the 1990's, democracy promotion became an integral component of US foreign policy and thus a major goal of U.S. foreign assistance. In the years inclusive of this study, U.S. foreign policy and foreign aid attempted to promote democracy both directly and indirectly in developing countries, although its success remains questionable.

Although the current Bush Administration has not promoted democracy as explicitly as the previous two administrations, in March 2002, President George W. Bush created the Millennium Challenge Account, which seeks to provide conditional foreign aid by rewarding good governance, improved health and education, and sound economic policy that supports economic growth and poverty reduction. Furthermore, many U.S. policy makers are advocating an increase in foreign aid to reduce poverty and promote stability and democracy in support of the global war on terrorism. Although the U.S. foreign policy has transformed with each administration, democracy promotion remains a key tenet.

The subject of this thesis more narrowly questions whether democracy is attainable in Jordan with the aid of U.S. security assistance. Does security assistance inhibit, promote, or have no impact on democracy in Jordan? This thesis aims to test the hypothesis that security assistance inhibits further democratic reform in Jordan. Do failures of democratic reform mean that foreign aid is absolutely and solely responsible for this democratic retreat? It would be difficult to argue that foreign aid effects democratization positively or negatively in absolute terms because of numerous intervening variables. Therefore, this thesis will attempt to test whether or not aid is an enabling factor.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is of significant interest due to the fact that such a seemingly small and inconsequential nation ranked third among nations receiving U.S. security assistance throughout most of the last decade. Jordan's historic dependency

on foreign aid since its creation in the 1920's leads one to inquire about its effectiveness. Despite the wealth of scholarship on foreign aid, there remains a void with a focus on the efficacy of U.S. security assistance to Jordan.

Some supporters of foreign aid maintain that it promotes stability while opponents opine that foreign aid props up despotic regimes and hinders democratic development. The U.S. Agency for International Development lists economic growth, the expansion of democracy and free markets, and conflict prevention among the main goals of foreign assistance. Other proponents of foreign aid maintain that security assistance promotes regional stability, a dependency on the United States for parts and maintenance, and economic benefits to the defense industry.[1] However, security assistance that promotes stability and fails to advocate political reform will not likely attain political liberalization. If the spread of democratic values are secondary or contradictory to other U.S. foreign policy goals, it will likely deny necessary reforms for democracy abroad. Therefore, the success of democracy promotion in Jordan is questionable since democratic reforms have gradually retreated as foreign assistance continues to rise.

Among the opponents of foreign aid, Michael Klare and Cynthia Arnson argue that security assistance supports authoritarianism and repression rather than democracy and human rights.[2] Others argue that arms transfers in particular facilitate coups, inhibit democracy, and thus provide insecurity.[3] Do these arguments hold validity in Jordan? It is the intention of this thesis to test whether this is indeed the case in Jordan. U.S. foreign aid programs have received considerable criticism for supporting repressive, authoritarian governments such as Egypt. Jordan, however, is not associated with repression or authoritarianism relative to other Middle East states and is therefore often labeled as

[1] Duncan L. Clarke, Daniel B. O'Connor and Jason D. Ellis. *Send Guns and Money: Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997) pp. 127-128.

[2] Michael T. Klare and Cynthia Arnson. *Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad* (Washington D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981) p. 4.

[3] Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Arms Transfers, Military Coups, and Military Rule in Developing States," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 1992) and Shannon Lindsey Blanton, "The Role of Arms Transfers in the Quest for Human Security," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 29 (Winter 2001).

"moderate", or pro-west. Thus, since Jordan is one of the few examples in the Middle East with democratic reform, it accentuates the notion that security assistance may counteract the forces necessary for democracy to take hold even with a "moderate" and pro-western monarchy.

In order to test whether security assistance inhibits democratization in Jordan, it is imperative to identify the quantitative data and analyze the various funds and weapons transferred to Jordan and their rationale. Additionally, it is also important to analyze the effect of these funds on the Jordanian economy to determine whether Jordan remains a distributive state and whether security assistance promotes economic and political reform or simply postpones it. The analysis will focus mainly on the military since it receives a large portion of the security assistance and, more significantly, it remains the key constituent of the monarchy's power. Ultimately, due to this relationship between the monarchy and the military, it is crucial to assess the prospects for a transition towards democracy.

Chapter II will identify Jordan's dependency on foreign aid and the distributive nature of the economy. It will also assess whether a direct or indirect correlation exists between potential crisis in Jordan and the amount of U.S. security assistance given. Finally, it will analyze the relationship between political or economic crisis, U.S. security assistance increases, and the retreat of democratic reform in Jordan. This chapter will utilize primary and secondary source material on security assistance funds and economic data. Although most data on U.S. security assistance is available, transfers of weapons worth $14 million or less are not publicly available. Therefore, it is difficult to trace precisely how the Jordanian government spends the funds. The usage of secondary literature will also aid the analysis to determine the impact on the economy and military.

Chapter III explores how security assistance might enable the retreat of democratization by examining which domestic constituency in Jordan benefits most from security assistance. This chapter looks at the historic ethnic demography of the Jordanian military and the mutual distrust between Jordanians and Palestinians using secondary literature. The term Jordanian will be used to identify individuals of Transjordanian origin such as Circassians and Bedouins, both of which are linked to the identity of the

Jordanian army. The term Palestinian will be used to identify Arabs from Mandatory Palestine and those who became Jordanian nationals after the unification of the West and East Banks in 1950.[4]

It will be assessed whether Jordanians remain the political-military elite or whether the military demography has changed throughout history simultaneous with the influx of Palestinian citizens. It is also significant to determine whether the Jordanian military transformed into a more professional military, inclusive of Palestinian soldiers. Finally, this chapter will explore the impact of security assistance on an ethnically divided military and the consequences for democracy. The demography of Jordan and the military in particular, is a closely held state secret and therefore presents a challenge as a means to test the commonly held belief that Jordanians control the military. Current census data that identifies ethnic cleavages are unavailable. Therefore, primary source data of key military leadership in the Jordanian military are central to determine who controls the military and, more significantly, who benefits most from security assistance.

Chapter IV serves to answer why a bolstered monarchy and Jordanian-controlled military would likely postpone political liberalization indefinitely. Since the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1994 and the resultant "peace dividend", Jordan has gradually rolled back its democratization process begun in 1989. Analysis on the role of the military and its response to political liberalization will use the framework of civil-military literature. Finally, an assessment will conclude whether security assistance plays a determining factor in the transition towards democracy. It is normative to suggest that aid hinders democracy because it assumes that the Hashemite monarchy desires democratic reform. Based on the history of Jordan, it is feasible that the regime would shift alliances away from the United States rather than succumb to reformist policies.

Chapter V will offer conclusions and policy implications for the United States. This thesis is of interest to policy makers and advocates of foreign aid, as well as scholars and students of the Middle East and civil-military relations.

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[4] Adnan Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians & the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999) p. xv.

II. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN, 1989-2002

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will set the context for the thesis through analysis of the United States policy regarding military aid to Jordan. This analysis will serve to answer the following questions. How does U.S. security assistance provide stability and security to Jordan? Does U.S. policy succeed at its stated objectives or does it perpetuate Jordan's distributive economy?

To answer these questions, this chapter will analyze U.S. policy towards Jordan, explain its economic structure, analyze U.S. security assistance data, and use historical examples to explain Jordanian and U.S. responses to crisis in Jordan. During the years of this study, the United States was the primary supplier of military aid to Jordan. Therefore, the primary focus of this paper will be the finances granted to the Jordanian military since it serves as the bedrock of the Hashemite monarchy.

B. U.S. POLICY

Before determining the effects of military aid on the democratization process in Jordan, it is imperative to explore U.S. policy towards Jordan during this period. In order to make a generalization about U.S. policy to Jordan over the last ten years it is important to determine whether or not this policy has changed over the span of the last decade.

The national security strategies of all Presidential administrations since 1990 included elements of democracy promotion. However, beginning with the Bush administration, the 1990 national security strategy denoted more lenient goals of democracy promotion towards the Middle East. This document gives a token nod to democracy in the Middle East, simply stating, "We will also encourage regional states to evolve toward greater political participation and respect for human rights."[5] Democracy promotion reached its peak during the Clinton Administration making it one of the three main pillars of its national security strategy. This Administration focused on democracy promotion more prominently and explicitly than previously, although once again the

[5] U.S. National Security Council, "The National Security Strategy of the United States," August, 1991.

Middle East component of the 1995 national security strategy fails to list democracy promotion as a goal in that region.[6] Not surprisingly, the security of Israel and maintenance of the free flow of oil remained two of the key tenets of U.S. security policy in Middle East. In 1997, the Clinton Administration added a sentence to the Middle East regional strategy that reads, "We will encourage the spread of democratic values throughout the Middle East and Southwest and South Asia and will pursue this objective by a constructive dialogue with countries in the region."[7] From 1998 onward, the Clinton Administration expanded this one sentence slightly to encourage democratic values, rule of law, political participation, and human rights in the Middle East.[8] In reality, the goals of democracy promotion in the Middle East were mainly rhetorical even during the Clinton years.

President George W. Bush administration's National Security Strategy does not offer a major transformation regarding democracy promotion. The 2002 document promoted democracy and challenged nations to reform democratically in return for greater foreign aid, however this strategy did not specifically target the Middle East. Furthermore, the creation of the Millennium Challenge Account potentially provides the greatest challenge to the Middle East, which may see very little of the funds due to the lack of democratic reform. The current administration places the most pressure on Palestine, Iraq, and even Iran to conform to democracy, however Jordan and other Middle Eastern states that have strong relations with the United States are able to avoid reformist policy.

The U.S. State Department and U.S. military policies obviously reflect the national policy and do not present a significant departure. However, U.S. State Department documents do reveal more accurately U.S. foreign policy with Jordan. The State Department website reads:

> A primary objective of U.S. policy, particularly since the end of the Gulf war, has been the achievement of a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East. Jordan's constructive participation in the Madrid

[6] Ibid, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," February 1995.

[7] Ibid, "A National Security Strategy for A New Century," May, 1997.

[8] Ibid, "A National Security Strategy for A New Century," 1998-2000.

> peace process is key in achieving peace. U.S. policy seeks to reinforce Jordan's commitment to peace, stability, and moderation. The peace process and Jordan's opposition to terrorism parallel and indirectly assist wider U.S. interests. Accordingly, through economic and military assistance and through close political cooperation, the United States has helped Jordan maintain its stability and prosperity.[9]

This policy of peace and stability in Jordan is complementary to Israeli security, which is one of the dominant goals of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Not surprisingly, the State Department does not mention promotion of democracy or reform in Jordan. This is revealing since maintaining the peace with Israel is clearly a priority. Once Jordan signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, the primary objective of U.S. policy in Jordan sought to promote stability in order to prolong the peace. U.S. Central Command's (USCENTCOM) goals correspond similarly serving to protect, promote, and preserve free flow of energy resources and the maintenance of regional stability.[10]

Therefore, one could deduce that democracy promotion has been a major goal of U.S. foreign policy over the past decade at least rhetorically, however the Middle East, and Jordan in particular, are an exception. In examining the past foreign policy with Jordan there has been little promotion of reformist policy. It should not be a surprise that this liberal ideology is not a focus at all in the Middle East and even with a pro-west nation such as Jordan. Recently Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the Middle East Partnership Initiative, which promotes tailored economic, political, and educational reform in the Middle East.[11] Time will tell if this initiative is merely more rhetoric or if it offers a shift towards a truly reformist policy. Access to oil and Israeli security continue to be the preeminent focus of U.S. policy in the Middle East, while reformist policy brings with it the nefarious notion that anti-west, Islamist parties could come to power controlling oil resources and threatening Israeli security. Consequently, military aid to Jordan is used to "promote peace and stability" through a policy of bolstering the regime in order to preserve the fragile and unpopular peace that exists with Israel. Additionally,

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[9] Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, "Background Note: Jordan," (January 2002).

[10] U.S. Central Command, www.centcom.mil/aboutus/cinc_strategy.htm, (November 2002).

[11] Secretary of State Colin Powell, "The U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative," www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/WM180.cfm (December 12, 2002).

King Abdullah's' ultimate goal is the oft-stated regime preservation; he would likely resist a U.S. policy that demanded democratic reform.

C. ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES – THE RENTIER STATE

Since its birth, Jordan has been reliant on foreign aid to provide approximately 50 percent of its budget.[12] This foreign aid is used as "rent" in order to maintain a distributive economy like that of the oil-rich Arab states. Giacomo Luciani argues that oil rent in Arab countries perpetuates authoritarian governments making it difficult for these states to democratize.[13] Through the rents, these states are able to "buy" supporters and quell opposition by distributing goods and services to the public. The "reliance upon 'rent' weakens a regime's accountability to society, since it can function without extracting substantial revenues from domestic sources."[14] This provides a one-way flow of benefits and services from state to society without extracting taxes and without providing political representation as opposed to democratic system which provides a two-way flow of tax extraction and electoral political representation. In a rentier state, only a fiscal crisis resulting in higher taxes or reduced distributions could potentially encourage greater societal demand for democracy.[15] However, "states that do not face a fiscal crisis and enjoy continuing access to exogenous rent will be able to postpone democratization indefinitely."[16] Thus, a rentier state confronted with a fiscal crisis is forced to liberalize or replace the rents from other sources.

Laurie Brand extends this rentier model to Jordan's foreign policy and argues that Jordan shifts alliances to fulfill external rents in order to respond to or prevent an economic crisis. She labels this "budget security," defined more specifically as "a state or leadership's drive to ensure the financial flows necessary for its survival."[17] By

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[12] Laurie A. Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations - The Political Economy of Alliance Making* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) p. 42.

[13] Giacomo Luciani, "The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratization," in Ghassan Salame (ed.), *Democracy without Democrats* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) pp. 130-152.

[14] Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: The Case of Jordan", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Autumn 99) p. 608.

[15] Luciani, p. 132.

[16] Luciani, p. 134.

[17] Brand, p. 277.

shifting alliances, Jordan is able to maintain external rents, prevent a fiscal crisis, and delay liberalization of its rentier structure.

Table 1. Key Budgetary Figures (JD in millions)

Year	Expenditures		Revenues				
	Military	Total	Foreign Loans	Foreign Grants	U.S. Grants converted to JD ($)*	Current Revenues	Total
1991	283.2	1055.7	431.7	230.3	61.3 (91.9)	760.2	991.8
1992	238.8	1081.2	328.4	137.5	20.0 (30.0)	1108.9	1246.9
1993	258.6	1235.1	130.3	163.3	52.7 (74.9)	1119.0	1282.9
1994	272.0	1312.8	99.4	175.6	26.8 (38.1)	1161.5	1338.0
1995	296.0	1471.5	313.3	182.8	14.6 (20.6)	1331.1	1515.4
1996	283.3	1666.9	326.4	219.9	76.9 (108.4)	1364.0	1586.8
1997	301.0	1681.9	105.6	205.0	113.0 (159.4)	1311.8	1517.6
1998	336.0	1876.8	46.0	172.2	99.0 (139.6)	1421.5	1594.4
1999	347.0	1804.1	92.2	198.5	184.9 (260.7)	1528.7	1729.0
2000	356.0	1868.6	-58.2	240.2	335.6 (473.2)	1503.4	1746.8

Source: Adapted by author from IMF *Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, 2001*,
* Economic and Military Assistance converted from current $. Source: USAID, "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants – Greenbook," http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html (September, 2000). Exchange rates from Central Bank of Jordan, http://www.nis.gov.jo/nis/owa/get_table?main_code=5&sub_code=15 (December, 2002).

The table above highlights military expenditure and revenues from foreign governments received throughout the 1990's. Grants to Jordan from the United States were increasingly significant throughout the 1990's as portrayed in graph below.

Figure 1. Foreign Grants vs. U.S. Grants



Source: Adapted by author from Table 1.

Both Table 1 and Figure 1 show glaring discrepancies that the United States granted more funds to Jordan than the total it received from the entire international community in the year 2000. This discrepancy could be due to definition problems based on the two sources used. Differences of the time frame in which grants were received or

given or a conflict in calendar or fiscal years are logical reasons to explain this. Regardless, Figure 1 still depicts an undeniable trend of increasing reliance on U.S. foreign aid.

1. The 1989 Crisis

In 1989, the Hashemite monarchy confronted a fiscal crisis when it was unable to overcome declining foreign aid. In support of the rentier model, this crisis was a result of diminishing external rents from Arab states throughout the 1980s and King Hussein initiated a top-down, state-driven approach to liberalization. The inability to replace this foreign aid forced Jordan to reschedule debts and accept economic reform policies with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF mandated an increase in taxes and the reduction of subsidies on fuel and other goods, which served to "buy" patronage from Jordanians. In short, this fiscal crisis and the resultant IMF mandated economic reforms triggered violent riots in Ma'an. King Hussein was unable to simply quash these riots since they involved traditional supporters of the regime. Furthermore, since King Hussein was unable to secure financial assistance, he had no other option but to respond with parliamentary elections in order to quell the discontent. Quintan Wiktorowizc writes, "…democratic reform in Jordan was initiated from above as a tactical strategy to maintain social control in the face of severe economic crisis. Political change was driven by a stability imperative, not by a benevolent desire for enhanced political participation."[18] Similarly, Glenn Robinson defines this as "defensive democratization" or the ability to maintain regime survivability through "pre-emptive liberalizing strategies available to rentier states."[19] Despite their defensive nature, the parliamentary elections that followed were relatively free and fair, martial law was lifted, press restrictions were removed, and freedoms of assembly were granted.

2. The Gulf Crisis

Upon the beginning of the 1990 Gulf War, the United States offered to increase military and economic aid to Jordan in attempt to bribe Jordan into joining the U.S. led alliance against Iraq. King Hussein was unable to join the coalition due to the Palestinian

[18] Wiktorowicz, p. 607.

[19] Glenn Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* Vol. 30, No. 3 (August 1998) p. 387.

majority that supported Saddam Hussein and an important Iraqi trade relationship. Consequently, King Hussein determined that the threat of joining the coalition was greater than losing security assistance from the United States. In short, aid could not overcome the risk to the regime and Jordan failed to bandwagon with the United States.

With declining rents, Jordan's refusal to join the international coalition against Iraq during the Gulf War did not help its poor economic situation. Since bribery did not work, the United States and other Arab states threatened to cut off Jordanian aid hoping that it would scare the King into joining the coalition. Once again, King Hussein determined that the threat of joining the coalition was greater than losing the foreign aid from the United States. Therefore, even the threat of removing the aid did not provide enough political leverage to persuade Jordan into joining the coalition.

The Gulf War put Jordan in a difficult situation politically and economically. Politically, Jordan became outcast in the region because Kuwait and other Arab states were distraught that King Hussein did not come to the aid of Kuwait. Economically, Saudi Arabia ceased sending oil to Jordan, the United States froze foreign aid payments, and unemployment increased from 15 to 20 percent.[20] Furthermore, since Iraq was Jordan's largest trading partner from 1986-89 and provided 82.5 percent of Jordan's petroleum for the first three quarters of 1989,[21] the sanctions on Iraq put a damper on this trade relationship.

Due to this political climate created by Jordan's increased taxes, decreased distribution of services to Jordanians, increased unemployment, and increased political voice of Islamists; King Hussein decided to abstain from the international coalition. Despite Jordan's economic weakness and the necessity to replace lost rents, King Hussein was unwilling, or unable to overcome Iraqi popularity and suppress political voice at a juncture when Jordanians had more political participation. Thus, the significance of 1989 riots led to the realization that the resultant liberalization actually threatened regime stability. The political and financial constraints limited King

[20] U.S. Library of Congress, "Jordan: A Country Study," http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/jotoc.html (November, 2002).

[21] Brand, p. 286.

Hussein's ability to modernize the severely degraded military and security apparatus, maintain their privileges, and mitigate threats to the regime. Brand elucidates, "Short of a massive transfer of assistance directed specifically at the army and internal intelligence, it probably would have been extremely difficult to prevent massive defections".[22] From this moment on, the Hashemite monarchy renewed its effort to maintain foreign aid in order to prevent domestic instability and further democratic reform.

3. Transition from the Rentier Model?

If the rentier state model has validity, the best method to inhibit political opposition to the monarchy is to continue this system. Thus, restoration of foreign aid was imperative to prohibit a reoccurrence of the budgetary crisis of 1989. Since King Hussein desired to avoid the bloody riots and resultant liberalization in 1989, the United States was able use the promise of reestablished foreign aid as political leverage and Hussein was more apt to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Consequently, the United States policy towards Jordan since then provides increased security assistance aimed at reinforcing Jordan's commitment to peace and stability in Jordan and the region.

Table 2. External Revenues of Central Government

Year	U.S. Grants as % of Foreign Grants*	Foreign Grants as % of Total Revenue	Foreign Loans as % of Total Revenue	Total Contribution of Foreign Grants and Loans	Domestic Revenue as % of Total Revenue
1991	26.6%	23.2%	43.5%	66.7%	76.6%
1992	14.5%	11.0%	26.3%	37.4%	88.9%
1993	32.3%	12.7%	10.2%	22.9%	87.2%
1994	15.3%	13.1%	7.4%	20.6%	86.8%
1995	8.0%	12.1%	20.7%	32.7%	87.8%
1996	35.0%	13.9%	20.6%	34.4%	86.0%
1997	55.0%	13.5%	7.0%	20.5%	86.4%
1998	57.5%	10.8%	2.9%	13.7%	89.2%
1999	93.1%	11.5%	5.3%	16.8%	88.4%
2000	139.7%	13.8%	-	10.4%	86.1%

Source: Adapted and computed by author from Table 1.
*U.S. Grant figures from Table 1.

If Jordan based its foreign policy on budget security and its rentier structure through the Gulf War, the question arises whether Jordan is still dependent on foreign aid

[22] Brand, p. 291.

to maintain a distributive economy. Table 2 above shows the percentages of external revenues and domestic revenues. The total contribution of foreign grants and loans demonstrates Jordan's reliance on foreign aid. This table also demonstrates that Jordan was increasingly dependent on U.S. grants while other foreign grants declined throughout the 1990's. Additionally, since 1989, Jordan's domestic revenue has risen dramatically particularly due to the increase in taxes. Domestic revenue as a percentage of total revenue has remained above 85 percent for most of the 1990's due to the IMF mandated reforms, as shown above in Table 2. In contrast, from 1973-1988, domestic revenue reached 60 percent only twice maintaining an average of 50 percent.[23] One may argue that the increase in domestic revenue enables Jordan to reduce their dependence on foreign aid. However, if this were true then the increase of taxes would likely force government accountability creating greater demand for democratic representation. Thus, this seems to be a potential scenario in the future and not an explanation of the past decade.

Table 3 below portrays the dramatic increases in U.S. security assistance over the past decade, especially after 1995. Although domestic revenue increased throughout the 1990's, military expenditure increased only modestly despite dramatic increases in U.S. military assistance (see Tables 1 and 3). If domestic revenue and military aid increased considerably throughout the 1990's, one would expect military expenditure to increase substantially as well. However, military expenditure attained only modest increases over the past decade, it is questionable where this money is spent.

[23] Brand, p. 48.

Table 3. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan 1991-2002 ($ in millions)

Fiscal Year (FY)	Economic Support Funds (ESF)	Military Assistance		Totals
		FMF	IMET	
1984	20.0	0	1.7	21.7
1985	100.0	0	1.9	101.9
1986	95.3	0	1.8	97.1
1987	111.0	39.9	2.0	152.9
1988	18.3	26.5	1.8	46.6
1989	15.2	10.0	1.8	27.0
1990	3.8	67.8	2.0	116.8
1991	35.0[a]	20.0[b]	1.3	56.3
1992	30.0[b]	20.0[b]	.6	70.6
1993[c]	5.0	9.0	.5	44.5
1994[d]	9.0	9.0	.8	37.8
1995	7.2	7.3	1.0	37.2
1996	7.2	200.0[e]	1.2	237.3
1997[f]	112.2	30.0	1.7	152.1
1998[f]	150.0	75.0[g]	1.6	227.8
1999	150.0	70.0[g]	1.6	223.0
1999(Sup)	50.0	50.0	0	100.0
2000	150.0	75.0	1.7	228.2
2000(Sup)	50.0	150.0	0	200.0[h]
2001	150.0	75.0	1.7	228.4
2002	150.0	75.0	1.8	228.2
2003[i]	250.0	198.0	TBD	448.0

Source: Adapted by author from Alfred B. Prados, "Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues" CRS: IB93085 (November 20, 2002) and USAID "U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants (Greenbook)."

a. Suspended in April 1991, released in early 1993.
b. Released in late July 1993.
c. Restrictions on FY 1993 funds waived by Presidential Determination (PD) 93-39, Sept. 17, 1993.
d. FY 1994 funds released Jan. 13, 1994.
e. Three components: $30 million (Administration's original request); $70 million in additional FMF under FY 1996 appropriation to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100 million in special drawdown authority.
f. Figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the Middle East Peace and Stability Fund ($100 million in FY 1997, $116 million in FY 1998).
g. For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority.
h. Some of these funds to be obligated in future years (FY 2001 or 2002).
i. Requests for FY 2003.

Note: These figures do not include military loans or financing, debt relief listed in Table 5, or small amounts for de-mining assistance.

According to a study by Khilji and Zampelli, U.S. military aid is perfectly fungible.[24] Khilji and Zampelli conducted a study of major U.S. aid recipients, including Jordan, and concluded that U.S. military assistance enables recipients to release some of their own resources for non-military purposes that would have been allocated to military

[24] Nasir M. Khilji and Ernest M. Zampelli, "The fungibility of U.S. military and non-military assistance and the impacts on expenditures of major aid recipients," *Journal of Developmental Economics*, Vol. 43 No. 2 (April 1994) pp. 345-362.

expenditures.[25] Moreover, a major portion of this fungible military aid was channeled to the private sector via a tax relief mechanism.[26] If Jordan takes some funds that would have been spend on military expenditure and uses it for tax relief, it lessens the need for political representation and thus it retains rentier characteristics. Tax relief enables the regime to maintain patronage from society, while security assistance targets the loyalty of the military. Thus, despite the increase in domestic revenue and consequently the decrease in foreign contributions to total revenue during this period (see Table 2), Jordan still relies on external aid to maintain regime security through a rentier structure.

Daniel Brumberg argues that liberalization seen in the Arab world is not simply a survival strategy but rather a type of political system, which he labels a "liberalized autocracy".[27] This semiauthoritarian regime, or dictablanda, is a product of exposure to the American pursuit of democratic transition and the expanded flow of aid to reforming states. Explaining this relationship Thomas Carothers writes,

> They come to crave the attention, approval, and money that they know democracy attracts from the Western international community. As a result, their rule becomes a balancing act in which they impose enough repression to keep their opponents weak and maintain their own power while adhering to enough democratic formalities that they might just pass themselves off as democrats.[28]

This strategy of liberalized autocracy permits the continuous flow of rents from the United States, where democracy is rhetorically linked to foreign policy. Although this policy serves to prevent crisis by strengthening the military, it also appears to solidify the rentier structure making it more difficult for King Abdullah to reform.

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[25] Khilji and Zampelli, p. 358.

[26] Khilji and Zampelli, p. 361.

[27] Daniel Brumberg, "The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (October 2002), p. 56.

[28] Thomas Carothers, "Democracy Without Illusions," *Foreign Affairs*, (January-February 1997) pp. 90-91.

Table 4. Arms Transfers to Jordan by Supplier ($ in millions of current dollars)

Year	U.S.	Russia	China	Major West European	All Other European	All Others	Percent Supplied by US*
1985-1989	460	1200	0	160	160	90	22
1987-1991	300	390	20	160	140	90	27
1991-1993	50	0	0	30	0	5	59
1993-1995	140	0	0	0	0	5	97
1995-1998	200	0	0	0	0	100	66
1998-2001	100	0	0	100	0	100	30

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers* (Washington D.C.) various editions; Richard F. Grimmett, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations," Congressional Research Service, various editions, (Washington, August 6, 2002). Data rounded to nearest $100 million. Major West European states include Britain, France, and Germany.
*Calculated by author

D. CRISIS AND RESPONSE -- U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the United States has been the largest donor of military aid to Jordan (see Table 4 above). Thus, since aid from the United States is increasingly important relative to other foreign governments. The empirical data and analysis below will portray that U.S. foreign aid is imperative to the survival of the Jordanian monarchy. As Figure 2 below depicts, U.S. military and economic assistance reached two distinct climaxes in the past decade in response to political events that had the potential to destabilize the Jordanian regime. The first peak occurred following the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1994 due to the "peace dividend" and the delivery of various weapons promised following the signature of the treaty. The second peak of security assistance follows the death of King Hussein in 1999. Additionally, a third climax is currently underway. The current spike in aid flows is a result of the global war on terrorism and the forthcoming war with Iraq. Increased financial flows following all these events appear to bolster the regime through military modernization thus preventing further liberalization. The following analysis will include Economic Support Funds (ESF), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Excess Defense Articles (EDA) all in the form of grants as well as debt forgiveness.

Figure 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan 1984-2003



Source: Adapted by author from Table 3.
^ 1991 and 1992 funds released in Jul 1993
* Requested funds for FY 2003.
** Includes Wye River supplemental funds and debt forgiveness listed in Table 5.

1. 1994 Crisis and Response

In 1994, Jordan confronted a large level of opposition domestically and regionally upon the signature of the non-belligerency agreement on July 25, 1994 and the subsequent peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Since 1994, Jordan has been able to secure itself from opposition threats and further liberalization securing financial assistance from the United States. In 1993, two days after Israel and Jordan reached an agenda for peace talks, the United States released foreign aid allocations suspended in 1991-92. In addition to economic and military assistance, the U.S. promised to write-off over $700 million in debt once the peace treaty was signed (see Table 5 below). Of note, $309.9 million of the debt relief incorporated military loans.[29] Thus, the aggregate of these figures present a peak as depicted in Figure 2. beginning in 1994. The figures for economic and military assistance listed in Table 3 appear as if aid did not increase significantly until 1996. However, this is due to U.S. budgetary process delays and furthermore the graph portrays funds according to fiscal year appropriations, and not the year released.

[29] Alfred B. Prados, "U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues," Congressional Research Service, IB93085, (November 20, 2001) p. 12.

Table 5. U.S. Debt Forgiveness for Jordan ($ in millions)

Fiscal Year Funds	Amount of Subsidy	Approximate Amount Given
1994	99	220
1995	275	419
1997-1998	27*	63

Source: Prados, "Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues," various editions.

* Subsidy split as follows: $15 million in FY 1997 funds, $12 million in FY 1998 funds.

Due to the opposition of the peace treaty, one could question the motivation for King Hussein to formalize this treaty with Israel amidst opposition from other Arab states. Was this simply an effort to align with the United States as the world's hegemonic power? This is highly unlikely since King Hussein did not simply bandwagon during the Gulf War. On the contrary, Stephen M. Walt argues "a large aid relationship is more often the *result* of alignment than a *cause* of it."[30] Furthermore, he concludes that, "foreign aid can make an existing alliance more effective, but it rarely creates one in the absence of shared political interests."[31] Similarly, the King's decision was based on the need to restore lost rents and the necessity to secure the regime. The United States shared the interest of domestic stability in Jordan and preventing the Islamists from damaging relations with Israel.

U.S. security assistance to Jordan following the peace treaty served several purposes. First, one could interpret the finances as simply a reward for peace or "peace dividend." Second, aid enabled the channeling of finances to the public and private sectors benefit to provide continued patronage and quell opposition to the peace treaty. Third, the military assistance in particular could modernize military equipment and provide training to improve fighting capability. Lastly, military assistance could fund higher salaries for military personnel to reward voluntary service and ensure loyalty to the regime. To state that King Hussein signed the treaty solely to bandwagon with a superpower denies the fact that diminished external rents available before 1989 necessitated replacement to provide regime security.

Following the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, the United States made a better effort to make improvements to the Jordanian military. In addition to the economic and

[30] Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), p. 28.

[31] Walt, p. 30.

military assistance and debt forgiveness listed in Tables 1 and 2 respectively, Jordan became eligible in 1995 for lethal and non-lethal Excess Defense Authorizations.[32] Thereafter, used U.S. military equipment was transferable to Jordan at no cost.

Additional significant events followed the treaty such as the restructuring of the Jordanian military, salary increases, and price reductions. Based on recommendations from the U.S. Department of Defense in 1994, Jordan restructured the military to provide a lighter more mobile force focused primarily on border security and internal security.[33] Moreover, the military turned from a conscript to a volunteer force immediately following the signature of the peace treaty and the King granted a ten percent salary increase to military.[34] These issues will be addressed in more depth in the next chapter, however, in general it is suffice to say that these measures promoted loyalty to the regime within the military. In addition to the focus on the military, the King cut customs duties and luxury good prices and teachers received a salary increase.[35] All these actions collectively promoted loyalty from the Jordanian-dominated public sector which remains the bastion of support for the monarchy.

In an effort to enhance Jordan's ability to maintain border security and implement the terms of the treaty, the United States awarded a $300 million military assistance package in 1996. The package included assorted military equipment for the Jordanian Land Forces, Navy and Air Force issued through "drawdown" authority which grants excess equipment taken from the U.S. Department of Defense inventories.

Jordan held relatively free and fair elections in 1989 and 1993, however simultaneous to the return of U.S. security assistance was a significant retreat in Jordan's democratization process. Once Jordan restored external rents and the peace negotiations with Israel began, the monarchy introduced changes to the electoral law, postponed parliamentary elections, clamped down on press freedoms and political parties, and cracked down on the Islamist-led anti-normalization campaign. This reversal of

[32] Alfred B. Prados, "Jordan: U.S. Military Assistance and Cooperation," Congressional Research Service, 96-309F (April 5, 1996) p. 3.

[33] Prados, "Jordan: U.S. Military Assistance and Cooperation," p. 2.

[34] United Press International, "Jordan to increase government salaries," June 5, 1994.

[35] Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," p. 405.

liberalization was unfortunate to the private-sector led by the Palestinian business community which would have benefited from greater economic liberalization. Furthermore, the fundamentalist Islamic Action Front (IAF) boycotted the 1997 elections claiming unfair electoral changes. The Jordanian regime was unable to alienate the East Bank Jordanians who dominate the public sector and serve as the bastion of support for the monarchy. Thus, the public sector would have lost elite privilege in a more market-oriented economy and democratic political structure. In order for Jordan to maintain peace with Israel it had to create internal order by reversing the liberalization movement and cracking down on the opposition.[36]

The monarchy responded to the 1989 fiscal crisis with defensive democratization; however the Jordanian military was now better equipped to quell any opposition with additional financial assistance. Thus, opposition to the peace treaty and the bread riots in 1996, which resulted from IMF austerity measures, was now containable with greater U.S. economic and military assistance. Similarly, with the financial ability to restore the rentier structure and quell opposition, there was no longer a need for a liberalization process to secure the regime.

2. 1999 Crisis and Response

The second apex of U.S. security assistance to Jordan followed the death of King Hussein on February 8, 1999, as portrayed in Figure 2. This political event was potentially destabilizing due to the transition of the regime from King Hussein to his son Abdullah. Crown Prince Hassan made efforts to undermine King Hussein while he was out of the country, which led to a contentious battle for the throne.[37] Once in position, King Abdullah had to secure the throne by establishing support within the military. Ultimately the increase in security assistance for this period served the same purposes to reward, or in this case demonstrate strong U.S. support for King Abdullah, to enable patronage to quell internal uprisings, to continue military modernization and ensure the loyalty of the military to the new king.

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[36] Glenn Robinson, Seminar: "Middle East Political Economy of the Peace Process," Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School (April 02).

[37] Details of this situation are included in Chapter 3.

Separate from the increase in security assistance following the death of King Hussein, the United States and Jordan made an additional bilateral effort to aid the Jordanian economy. In September 2001, the United States and Jordan signed into law a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). This agreement demonstrates the priority of Jordanian security to the United States by providing the elimination of duties and commercial trade barriers. Currently only Mexico, Canada, and Israel have a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States. According to the former Jordanian Ambassador to the United States, Marwan Moasher, the FTA would help revive the Jordanian economy by easing unemployment, increasing foreign investment and bolstering the quality of exports.[38]

On July 23, 2001, King Abdullah approved a new electoral law that lowers the voting age, increases membership in the lower house of parliament, and contains safeguards to prevent electoral fraud. Originally parliamentary elections were scheduled for November 2001, however after consecutive postponements in order to allow enough time for these reforms to take place, it now appears elections will not occur until spring 2003 at the earliest.[39] What appears to be honest election reform can only be determined if elections take place. The reforms may simply be a guise to delay elections indefinitely. Currently the growing dissatisfaction with the normalization of relations with Israel, the poor economic conditions, and the unrest over the pending U.S. led war with Iraq continue to threaten Jordanian stability. As dissatisfaction grows, the regime is likely to repress liberalization even more in order to secure the regime and maintain peace with Israel.

Following the transition of the monarchy to King Abdullah, Jordan's military modernization continued to focus on internal and border security. Essentially, much of the equipment acquired since 1999 functioned to sustain weapon systems already in possession. Spare parts, ammo, and training can serve to keep the military loyal to some degree. As Table 6 shows, the arms received by Jordan have been paltry with the exception of the F-16 fighters, attack helicopters, and tanks and even those are older generation weapons systems. In the strategic picture, despite the increases in U.S.

[38] Jordan Times, "US Trade pact gives 'political, economic' boost to Jordan," 26 September 01.

[39] Prados, "Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues," (January 6, 2003) p. 3.

security assistance throughout the past decade, it has not resulted in any noteworthy improvement in the overall fighting capability of the Jordanian military. Jordan remains surrounded by nations with stronger and larger militaries. If Jordan's military is unable to defend against external threats and it can only serve to fend off internal threats, the efforts to modernize the military are largely artificial. If regime preservation is the only mission the Jordanian military is capable of, it remains praetorian rather than professional.

Table 6. U.S. Arms Assistance Received

Year	Supplier	Details
1992	United States	6 machine guns and 2 rocket launchers
1993	United States	1 machine gun, 20 5-ton trucks, 1 commercial vehicle, 141 TOW anti-tank missiles
1995	United States	18 UH-1 utility helicopters
1996	United States	50 M60A3 tanks, 18 UH-1H utility helicopters, 1 C-130H cargo aircraft, 2 40-foot personnel boats, 1 65-foot rescue boat, assorted vehicles, night vision devices, radios, ammunition, and support equipment
1998	United States	12 F-16A fighter aircraft, 4 F-16B trainer jets, 100 AIM-9 air-to-air missiles, 50 AIM-7M air-to-air missiles
1999	United States	24 HAWK air defense missile launchers and associated equipment, 9 UH-1F Cobra attack helicopters, and ammunition
2000	United States	1 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter and spare parts

Source: Adapted by author from Alfred B. Prados, "Jordan: U.S. Military Assistance and Cooperation" p. 4-5; Prados, "Jordan: US. Relations and Bilateral Issues," pp. 13-14; Herb Phillips, "The Peace Falcon Program," *DISAM Journal* Vol 21, No.1 (Fall, 1998) p. 107; Martin S. Indyk, "President's Request for the Wye Support Package and the Question of Implementation of the Wye Agreement", *DISAM Journal*, (Summer, 1999) p. 16; DSCA, EDA Database www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/eda/search.asp (November, 2001); Federation of American Scientists (FAS) "Arms Sales Monitoring Project," www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/index.html (November, 2001).

E. CONCLUSION

The empirical data and the argument made above attempted to portray not only Jordan's unremitting dependence on external aid, particularly U.S. financial assistance, but also the direct proportionality of aid distributions to potential crisis in Jordan. If we understand that crisis is a catalyst for liberalization in a rentier state, then preventing a potential crisis through increased rents can also impair the liberalization process. Therefore, the U.S. policy of bolstering the Jordanian regime does little to promote reform despite providing temporary stability. Although, it is unlikely that security assistance is the sole factor for the failure of further political liberalization, it has enabled Jordan to maintain a "liberalized autocracy".

Wiktorowizc argues that reliance on foreign aid weakens regime accountability and progress towards democratization, however the increase in taxes from the IMF mandates have potentially forced a degree of accountability.[40] The current dissension in Jordan could thus foreshadow further democratic demands. Although, just as other rentier states have demonstrated, the demand for democracy does not guarantee democratic institutions or a successful transition to democracy.[41]

Since 1993, U.S. security assistance has enabled Jordan to maintain its current path of failed liberalization. Based on Jordan's history of shifting alignments to provide regime security, the future is uncertain. Thus far, the United States has successfully achieved the vague policy goal of Jordan stability through security assistance. However, to base success on the perpetuation of a rentier economy is paradoxical, when it may also jeopardize the process of democratization. On the other hand, if U.S. policy attempted to force democratic reform, King Abdullah may simply look to another state for financial assistance in order to avoid reform.

What can this analysis determine about the future of Jordan and the bilateral relationship with the United States? The sanctions on Iraq, the loss of Iraq as a major ally and trading partner, and pro-Iraqi sentiments within Jordan have a major impact on the economy and domestic stability. Jordanian officials were quick to announce that the U.S.-Jordanian joint military exercise held in fall 2002 was not connected with the potential war in Iraq for fear of repercussion. Currently, Jordan is undergoing another crisis due to the poor economy, opposition to the normalization campaign, and the potential war in Iraq. As history has shown, the United States responded to crisis in Jordan once again with increased security assistance. From the United State's perspective, the additional aid assists Jordan with the war on terrorism and compels the monarchy to give tacit approval to the war on Iraq. Although Jordan has increased their efforts in intelligence sharing and cracking down on the Islamists, ultimately the finances will equip the regime to uphold the rentier structure and protect itself. Will this crisis be

[40] Wiktorowicz, p. 608.

[41] Luciani uses Algeria and Egypt as case studies to make the argument that progress towards democratization does not guarantee success (pp. 144-152).

the force that demands further liberalization? The answer is inconclusive, but as long as security assistance continues to bolster the regime, it does not bode well for a future democracy.

III. JORDANIAN ELITE PRIVILEGE AND THE MILITARY

A. INTRODUCTION

If Jordan depends on foreign aid to retain its rentier structure and if these rents enable the democratic retreat by bolstering the regime, who is the main benefactor? Historically, the Jordanian Armed Forces are disproportionately composed of traditionally loyal East Bankers of Bedouin and Circassian origin. However, with the weakening of tribal affiliations since the mid-1980's,[42] support for the king must go beyond tribal identities. This decline of support is evidenced by the participation of East Bankers in the 1989 riots. It will be argued that finances have replaced tribal attachments as the primary factor for maintaining loyalty to the monarchy.

The ethnic composition of the military is shrouded in the utmost confidentiality and there is little research focusing on this topic alone despite such claims that the army has a dominant Jordanian identity. Thus, the focus of this chapter will survey the historical ethnic foundations of the Jordanian military. Are Palestinians fully integrated into the Jordanian Armed Forces including leadership positions? Has the influx of refugees since 1948 altered the demographics of the military? What methods are used, if any, to maintain the Jordanian identity of the Armed Forces? The following analysis relies on theory of soldiers in an ethnically divided state as well as methods of recruitment and other political devices used to shape military composition. The answers to these questions serve to determine whether Jordanians benefit from U.S. security assistance disproportionately. Furthermore, the analysis strives to discern whether security assistance maintains Jordanian elite political-military privilege in order to keep the regime in tact.

[42] Library of Congress, "Jordan: A Country Study," http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/jotoc.html (November, 2002).

B. DEMOGRAPHICS

There is a virtual consensus that Palestinians comprise the majority and up to two-thirds, of the general population of Jordan.[43] Official claims from Jordan maintain that Palestinians account for only 40 percent for the population.[44] Despite disputes over whether Palestinians consist of 40 percent or 60 percent, this segment of society is significant and remains influential in both Jordanian domestic and foreign policy arenas. The reciprocal is true for the demography of the military establishment. It has long been acknowledged that the Jordanian Armed Forces are dominated by the 'loyal' Jordanian members of the population.[45] Thus, despite the overwhelming proportion of Palestinians in Jordanian society, they lack a significant presence in the Jordanian military.

The Jordanian census taken in 1979 and 1994 failed to publish empirical data to account for the Palestinian-Jordanian percentage of the population. Therefore, notwithstanding the consensus of scholars and historians, little empirical data exists to support such claims. Several problems confront those who attempt to determine the demographic breakdown of Jordan, such as the secrecy of the topic and defining who is a Jordanian or Palestinian.

The Jordanian government disputes claims of Palestinian majority. Primarily, this is to counter the Israeli Likud party's historical slogan that "Jordan is Palestine," or that "Palestinians already have a state." Furthermore, acknowledgement of a Palestinian majority is contradictory to the effort of producing a united Jordanian national identity.

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[43] Schirin H. Fathi, *Jordan - An Invented Nation?: Tribe-state dynamics and the formation of national identity* (Hamburg, Germany: Deutsches Orient—Institut, 1994) p. 121; and Laurie A. Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) p. 186; and Joseph A. Massad, *Identifying the nation: The Juridical and Military Bases of Jordanian National Identity.* Diss. Columbia University, 1998 (Ann Arbor: UMI Microform, 1998) p.352; and Adnan Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians & the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999) p. 196; and Laurie A. Brand, "Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity," *Journal of Palestinian Studies,* Vol. 24, No. 4 (Summer 1995) p. 47.

[44] Valerie Yorke, "Jordan is not Palestine: the demographic factor", *Middle East International* (16 April 1988) pp. 16-17.

[45] Alon Peled, *A Question of Loyalty* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998) p. 16. See also, Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World, p. 155; and Massad, p. 309; and Lawrence Tal, "Is Jordan Doomed?" *Foreign Affairs,* (November-December 1993) p. 47.

In the end, most documentation of the Palestinian population in Jordan results from refugee statistics.

Various events have affected the flow of refugees into Jordan, consequently changing the demography. The influx of Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war followed by the annexation of the West Bank in 1950 and the granting of citizenship to all Palestinians in Jordan, eventually raised the Palestinian population to two-thirds the majority.[46] The loss of the West Bank due to the 1967 war and the consequential influx of additional refugees maintained the 60 percent figure.[47] Formal separation of the West Bank in 1989 followed by the Gulf War in 1990-91 created additional refugees raising the Palestinian population to approximately 70 percent.[48] However, the question arises whether these historical demographic fluctuations occurred in the Palestinian population in the military as well.

C. PALESTINIANS, THE FIFTH COLUMN

The military is considered the backbone of the Hashemite monarchy. Under King Hussein the army was known as the "most constant and reliable source of support."[49] Schirin Fathi maintains that the army continues to this day to be the "final arbiter of political power," also noting that the Jordan remains the "quintessential monarchical/ tribal-military axis."[50] Thus, as the key pillar of the regime, the Jordanian military prevents challenges to the state both internal and external. To require such loyalty to the Hashemite monarchy, the military plays a pivotal role in overcoming the increasing Palestinian population who are seen as a threat to the Jordanian identity of the state. Valerie Yorke, concurs that,

> Transjordanians play a key stabilizing role as the backbone of the Armed Forces and the security system. The binding unity between the monarch

[46] Abu-Odeh, p. 51.

[47] Massad, p. 352.

[48] Massad, p. 352.

[49] Brand, "Palestinians in the Arab World," p. 184.

[50] Cited in Fathi, p 133.

> and the Transjordanian-dominated Army, police and intelligence remains the principal underpinning of the Hashemite Kingdom.[51]

The most sensitive positions and most essential units to internal security require unquestionable loyalty to the King. Thus, "elite units and commands remain largely tribal, and in crisis situations are entrusted to members of the Hashemite family, with the King himself maintaining close links to the elite units."[52] A Transjordanian identity itself was traditionally not enough to declare loyalty to the King. During World War II, almost all the Arab Legion's soldiers were recruited from the southern Jordanian tribes, regarded as the most devout to the monarchy.

It would seem that with the unification of the West and East Banks in 1950, it would be necessary to incorporate Palestinians into the military in order to placate the Palestinian population. Adnan Abu-Odeh writes, that Palestinians began to join the military in the 1950's, but the combat units themselves remained mostly Transjordanian. Furthermore, after fifteen years only a few select loyal Palestinians joined the senior ranks of the Armed Forces.[53] Why are Palestinians seen as disloyal? How does the Hashemite monarchy keep the large Palestinian population from joining the military and overtaking the ranks?

1. Ethnic Soldiers as a Liability

Several works have been written on minority or ethnic soldiers and their integration into the military.[54] Alon Peled asks the crucial question, "If recruited, trained, and armed, will ethnic soldiers become loyal soldiers or dangerous saboteurs?"[55] If the Jordanian military has been and remains the bedrock of the Transjordanian identity and regime stability, it becomes axiomatic that Palestinians are considered a liability. History reminds the Monarchy of attempted coup de etats, but the worst fear is an uprising similar to the Shi'a revolt against Saddam Hussein in the 1990-91 Gulf War. Would Palestinians

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[51] Valerie Yorke, *Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel* (Brookfield, Vermont: Gower Publishing, 1988) p. 18.

[52] Fathi, p. 141.

[53] Abu-Odeh, p. 51.

[54] See Alon Peled, *A Question of Loyalty* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) and Cythia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980).

[55] Peled, p. 2.

lead an armed revolt with the arms and military training granted by the very government they are supposed to protect? Cynthia Enloe writes,

> Rifles and tanks may still be entrusted only to men from certain trusted ethnic groups, and their field officers remain subject to political-communal security. But jobs in the kitchens, behind the wheels of trucks, in hospital tents or at radar stations may be increasingly considered by security elites to be far enough removed from real power to be open to men—and women—with ethnic identities considered politically untrustworthy.[56]

Therefore, the assignment of duties to ethnic Palestinian soldiers that do not threaten the mission, or more importantly the regime itself, can control the integration of Palestinians and minimize the threat to the regime.

In the 1950's, Palestinians joined the military but primarily served in technical career fields of Signal or Engineer units.[57] Furthermore, Palestinians were almost exclusively assigned to the maintenance shops of the Arab Legion.[58] Glubb Pasha noted that the Arab Legion was even more thorough than the British Army in conducting security checks on an annual basis to maintain loyalty.[59] Palestinians were therefore heavily scrutinized to determine whether or not they had any political involvement.[60] In 1968, Palestinians started to join some infantry units; however their participation in these units did not exceed 15-20 percent.[61] Following the civil war, the Palestinians as a whole increased as a liability, which in turn decreased their percentage in combat units.[62] The same situation exists today where Palestinian officers are not allowed to command combat units at the battalion level or above.[63] Palestinians by their nature are regarded as the merchant class of the population. Therefore, Laurie Brand asserts that they are more

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[56] Enloe, p. 221.

[57] Cited in Massad, p. 309.

[58] Cited in Massad, p. 309.

[59] Cited in J.C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982) p. 315.

[60] Cited in Massad, p. 310.

[61] Cited in Massad, p. 364.

[62] Cited in Massad, p. 364.

[63] Cited in Massad, pp. 327-328.

likely to have the technical and managerial skills needed by a modern army; however their inclusion is primarily in the lower-echelon.[64]

The demography of the Jordanian military thus reveals an appearance that the Jordanians are typically loyal while Palestinians are not. To the contrary, Laurie Brand points out that serious threats to the throne have not always come from Palestinians; the army and East Bank collaborators have also historically presented threats.[65] The coup attempt in 1957, came from the military, however it was also loyal elements in the military that rescued King Hussein. Since 1957, the intense focus on maintaining loyalty in the military has prevented a successful coup.

It is perplexing that Palestinians would not demand further integration into the combat units and the senior ranks. Abu-Odeh notes, that "the de-Palestinianization of the security apparatus has triggered a self-perpetuating divisiveness. Transjordanians look on Palestinian-Jordanians as disloyal or, perhaps, as permanent suspects, and thus see no reason why they should be a part of officialdom."[66] After the attempt on King Hussein's life on June 9, 1970, the military responded by shelling two Palestinian refugee camps in Amman. Thus, the target of the refugee camps "implied that the army looked on all Palestinians as an extension of the fedayeen and vice versa."[67] The beginnings of the civil war were brewing and the direct threat of the fedayeen and the Palestinians as a whole to the monarchy, converged in Black September. More confounding is that Palestinians in the army, for the most part, remained loyal during the civil war. Palestinians and Jordanians alike were on both sides of the conflict during the civil war;[68] nonetheless, their percentage in the Jordanian military dropped immediately following the crisis.[69] Thus, the Palestinians are still regarded as a liability regardless of their allegiance during one of the country's most challenging moments.

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[64] Brand, "Palestinians in the Arab World," p. 155.

[65] Brand, "Palestinians in the Arab World," p. 184.

[66] Abu-Odeh, p. 198.

[67] Abu-Odeh, p. 177.

[68] Fathi, p. 138.

[69] Fathi, p. 140.

2. Recruiting Reliable Personnel

In order keep a consistent loyal base in the military; the Armed Forces must evaluate the reliability of a recruit versus their value. The less allegiant will be made cannon fodder or cooks, or as noted above placed in non-combat, technical fields. During a crisis, the need for greater manpower will also increase the liability as more minorities are inserted into the army. Furthermore, according to Enloe, several military transformations can take place during the course of a war with respect to ethnic cleavages. First, the ethnic composition of a military will change, second, the ethnic differentiations between the ranks will change, and third, the ethnic differences between various branches and units will grow.[70] Ethnic integration during a war also results in a "last in, first out"[71] procedure that situates the troops of questionable reliability at the perilous front lines when manpower needs prescribe additional troops. These unreliable troops will also immediately detach from the military at the end of a crisis.

These ethnic variations are evident in the history of the Jordanian military. Palestinians began incorporation into the Jordanian military in the 1950's in a separate National Guard unit. The low-paid National Guard was assigned the duty of watching the front line and to defend their villages from Israeli retributive attacks.[72] The National Guard gave the Palestinians a sense of participation, although this was not its purpose. King Hussein asserted that the purpose of the National Guard was to "defend the border in order to allow the better trained and equipped army, in the event of (Israeli) aggression, to direct its strikes at specific targets."[73] However, with little training, few weapons, and hardly any coordination or transportation,[74] the National Guard was essentially canon fodder for Israeli attacks. Moreover, the regime feared armed, trained, mobile Palestinian troops would threaten regime stability.[75] To counter this fear, Arab

[70] Enloe, p. 83.

[71] Enloe, pp. 52-53.

[72] Abu-Odeh, p. 111.

[73] Cited in Massad, p. 307.

[74] Massad, p. 307.

[75] Massad, p. 307.

Legion officers and NCOs commanded the National Guard,[76] thereby intensifying the ethnic differences between ranks.

Conscription itself can change the ethnic composition of a military; however a state can mitigate an ethnic transformation through the establishment of selective conscription versus universal conscription. Therefore, if universal conscription risks the security of the state by introducing disloyal groups of society, the state can opt for selective conscription.[77] Voluntary service is another method of securing self-motivated, more loyal men to receive training and arms rather than forcing a potential liability to have a gun.[78] In order to take advantage of manpower needs while preserving loyalty, the Jordanian military was able to control the ethnic balance in the military through various stages of conscription.

In the 1950's, the demand for Palestinian participation in the military resulted in selective conscription and King Hussein's policy to scrutinize potential Palestinian recruits.[79] However, Cynthia Enloe argues that the purpose of conscription is solely manpower and *not* to promote participation or inclusion of ethnic soldiers.[80] Although the conscription of Palestinians was contrary to Enloe's rule of inclusion and participation, the duties they were given were negligible. Furthermore, the demography of Jordan is unique by the fact that the discriminated ethnic group is the majority. This vulnerability of security and identity makes the inclusion of Palestinians more sensitive when domestic political instability arises. In 1965, the National Guard was disbanded, conscription was halted, and Palestinians were infused into the Arab legion forming about 40 percent of the military.[81] In 1966, conscription was again initiated in response to protests in the Palestinian West Bank. The perceived ineptitude of the Jordanian government to protect the village population of al-Samu from an Israeli attack forced

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[76] Hurewitz, p. 316.

[77] Enloe, p.51.

[78] Enloe, pp. 54-55.

[79] Cited in Massad, p. 310.

[80] Enloe, p. 83.

[81] Fathi, p. 140 and the Library of Congress, "Jordan: A Country Study."

King Hussein to integrate the Palestinians into the army once again.[82] Even though conscription was a state policy at this time, it was never really applied in full;[83] therefore it was still more selective than universal in nature. In 1970, the conscription policy was banned altogether for fear of admitting fedayeen and non-loyal Palestinians lowering the Palestinian component of the military to approximately 15 percent.[84] Thereafter, the military was replaced by a voluntary Popular Army consisting of mostly Jordanian officers and Jordanian volunteers to maintain the utmost loyalty.[85] Joseph Massad cites an example in 1972 in which the Cadet School had only 20 Palestinians out of 273 candidates.[86] Furthermore, those Palestinians that remained in the army were retired early.[87] Up until 1976, conscription in the Jordanian military can be characterized as selective in nature based on loyalty.

Compulsory service was reinstated in 1976, which in turn boosted the Palestinian composition of the military once again.[88] However, this universal conscription did not result in a thorough integration of Palestinians since the overall identity of the army remained Jordanian, especially the officer corps.[89] Conscription remained on the books until 1992, where it was discontinued in pursuit of a more "professional army." The Jordanian Prime Minister Sharif Zeid bin Shaker said that lessons learned from the Gulf War demonstrate that professional soldiers perform better than conscripts, thus Jordan needed a more cost-effective, modern army.[90] There are several ways to interpret what bin Shaker meant by this statement, but there is no doubt that the revolting Shi'a conscripts in Iraq served a lesson that ethnic soldiers were a liability as a fifth column. Furthermore, several months before conscription was terminated, Jordan began peace

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[82] Abu-Odeh, pp. 130-131.

[83] Fathi, p. 140.

[84] Massad, p. 366-367 and the Library of Congress, "Jordan: A Country Study."

[85] Massad, p. 366-367.

[86] Cited in Massad, p. 320.

[87] Cited in Massad, p. 320.

[88] Brand, "Palestinians in the Arab World," p. 155.

[89] Massad, p. 327.

[90] *The Financial Times,* "Jordan suspends call-up," 5 March 1992.

negotiations with Israel. Thus, at a moment when potential political instability demanded more loyalty in the military, halting conscription of Palestinians was paramount to maintain the allegiance of the key pillar to regime stability.

Today since conscription does not exist at all in Jordan, the Jordanian military is able to selectively recruit those who will join the ranks. For enlisted recruits, these campaigns are conducted twice a year in predominantly non-Palestinian areas.[91] On the officer side, Mut'ah University, the equivalent of West Point, recruits primarily non-Palestinians as well. Although some Palestinians do enter the Armed Forces, the selective recruitment prohibits more from signing up.

3. The Professional Military

The stated objective of discontinuing conscription in 1992 was to increase the professionalism of the military, but is the Jordanian Armed Forces truly a professional military? A true professional military, as defined by Cynthia Enloe, will allow the advancement of ethnic soldiers, give them a chance to command combat units and become equal members of the military.[92] Professional militaries also will allow officers to make manpower decisions; therefore promotion will be based on performance rather than loyalty. Conversely, ethnic soldiers in politicized militaries have difficulty with promotion and command, and typically serve in service-oriented and poorly equipped units. Politicized militaries have politicians formulating manpower decisions based on political considerations, dooming ethnic soldiers to segregation and exclusion from the armed forces.[93] Thus, the 1992 abolition of conscription in the Jordanian military provides little to generate a true professional military. On the contrary, Jordan's Armed Forces have everything in common with a politicized military. Palestinians have had little success making the senior ranks and cannot rise in combat units above the rank of Major or Lieutenant Colonel, whereas in non-combat units they can make General.[94] Furthermore, the Palestinian presence in military units is historically not representative of

[91] Maj Kyle Carnahan, "NPS research," E-mail correspondence, (5 Mar 2002).

[92] Enloe, p. 2.

[93] Enloe, p. 2.

[94] Alexander Bligh, "The Jordanian Army: Between Domestic and External Challenges," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 2001).

their majority status in the general population of Jordan. Finally, loyalty rather than performance has traditionally been the key factor in promotion. The King has traditionally used promotion to reward and perpetuate loyalty.[95] The politicized character of the Jordanian military is also bolstered by the fact that many senior officers have close personal ties with the King.[96]

Complementary to the policy of loyalty-based promotions is the dismissal of undesirable individuals or groups of individuals from the military. Even if Jordan truly desired a professional military, external political intervention such as purging erodes any progress towards professionalism.[97] Jordan's history of implementing purges to dilute the influence of Palestinians in the military[98] further reflects the politicized nature of the military. Following the coup attempt in 1957, the Chief of Staff initiated a purge of dissident soldiers; some officers were decommissioned and some were tried by military courts.[99] In 1967, following the defeat from Israel, King Hussein dismissed about forty officers and assumed personal command of the army himself to prevent internal threats from destabilizing the regime.[100] In 1970, following the civil war, the monarchy conducted massive purges of both Palestinians and Jordanians in the military who were perceived as colluding with the fedayeen.[101] More recently in 1999, when King Abdullah came to the throne, almost 100 senior officers were purged.[102] This purge was initiated days after reports that leaflets were circulating the kingdom expressing support for the King's brother, Crown Prince Hassan.[103] Furthermore, it was assessed that many of the officers were dismissed due to their relationship with the Crown Prince,[104] and that

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[95] Fathi, p. 141.

[96] Yorke, "Domestic Politics and Security," pp. 21-22.

[97] Peled, 23.

[98] Yorke. "Domestic Politics and Security," p. 21.

[99] Fathi, p. 137, and Brand, "Palestinians in the Arab World," p. 167.

[100] Hurewitz, p. 328.

[101] Massad, p. 373.

[102] FBIS, "King 'Abdallah Said Conducting 'Purge Operation' in Army," 2 March 1999.

[103] *The Financial Times*, "Jordan's King sacks senior army officers," 23 February 1999.

[104] *Jane's World Armies,* "Jordan: Current Developments and Recent Operations," 17 November 2000.

he guaranteed promotions to various officers in an attempt to establish loyalty while King Hussein was away in the United States receiving cancer treatment.[105] King Hussein himself accused his brother of meddling with the senior echelons of the armed forces and declared his son Abdullah as Crown Prince over Hassan.[106] The 1999 purges, while political in nature, also demonstrate that *both* Palestinians and Jordanians have a history of threatening the crown. Also of note, it has become tradition in Jordan that top military officers are promoted immediately before they retired.[107] Therefore, due to the political nature of promotions and purges, the last ditch promotion is most likely an effort to preempt the organization of subversive acts even after these officers leave the military. Moreover, the large scope of the 1999 purge exhibits the seriousness of the internal threat, the pivotal role of the military in both attempting and quelling a coup and finally, the questionable reliability of one's own brother.

The final key trait of a professional military is its reluctance to accept an internal defense mission, and will do so only to defend the state from external threats.[108] On the contrary, Jordan's military has redirected its focus *towards* the internal threat versus an external threat since making peace with Israel in 1994. Based on recommendations from the U.S. Department of Defense in 1994, Jordan restructured the military to provide a lighter more mobile force focused primarily on border security and internal security.[109] Subsequently, as described in Chapter 2, the military becomes a defender of primarily the regime rather than the entire state. Therefore, the Jordanian military has traditionally used various tools to maintain loyalty but they have been counterproductive to producing a true professional military if that is indeed the end goal.

4. Finances

The final and possibly most important factor that enables the Jordanians to remain in control of the military is the continuous flow of money. Finances are imperative to

[105] FBIS, "King 'Abdallah Said Conducting 'Purge Operation' in Army," 2 March 1999.

[106] *Jane's World Armies,* "Jordan: Current Developments and Recent Operations," 17 November 2000.

[107] FBIS, "New Air Force Commander, Army Inspector General Appointed," 3 August 1999.

[108] Peled, 23.

[109] Alfred B. Prados, "Jordan: U.S. Military Assistance and Cooperation," Congressional Research Service, 96-309F (April 5, 1996) p. 2.

fulfill a patron-client network in which money flows from the state to the military to the military elite who are rewarded for their loyalty to the monarchy. Risa Brooks distinguishes military perquisites in two forms: "corporate benefits", which include the military budgets, weapons, supplies, and other symbolic awards; and "private benefits", which include high salaries, housing benefits, education benefits, and high-quality health care. [110] Conversely, the lack of funds to provide corporate and private benefits to the military can erode loyalty and create political instability. Yorke writes, "failure on the part of the King to acquire access to the weapons necessary for the Army to fulfill this defensive role, or a consistent disregard for defense as opposed to development needs, could cause professional morale problems and erode loyalty for the King."[111]

Since the United States reestablished security assistance to Jordan following the Gulf War, the Jordanian military benefited from just under $1 billion dollars from the United States.[112] This accounted for approximately 43% of the total security assistance package, which essentially fell into the hands of the ethnic Jordanian military elites.

As shown in Chapter 2, Jordan's military budget has been increasing modestly to fund corporate benefits. Acquisition of improved military technology and advanced weapons can act as a force multiplier, thereby enabling a smaller military force. This is likely appealing to the monarchy, since it suspended conscription as evidenced in 1992 and it prefers increased selectiveness among its soldiers.

In addition to modern training and weapons, targeted financial benefits toward military quality of life promotes steadfastness as well. For example, in 1980, the King granted reserved seats at Jordan's universities and full scholarships to the children of military officers and servicemen whose fathers served for at least ten years in the Armed Forces.[113] Additionally, the military lives in exclusive villas built for them by the government, they have the best health care system in the country, and they are highly

[110] Risa Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, Adelphi No. 324 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 26.

[111] Yorke, "Domestic Politics and Security," p. 22.

[112] Defense Security and Cooperation Agency, From 1991-2002 Jordan received $880.8 million in Foreign Military Financing and International Military and Educational Training funds.

[113] Cited in Massad, p. 329.

paid relative to the rest of the population.[114] Approximately 85% of Jordan's military budget is earmarked directly for salaries, care and training of soldiers.[115]

Cynthia Enloe argues that security assistance has ethnic consequences by infusing money, training, and weapons into the military, turning a weak military into a strong one and making the military worth controlling.[116] Secondly, externally derived military resources can alter the domestic influence and internal order-keeping capabilities of the armed forces.[117] For better or for worse, military aid has improved Jordan's ability to maintain internal security thus abetting Jordanian control over the means of violence. Therefore, security assistance appears to encourage the persistence rather than the decline of ethnic calculations among military state elites.[118] Hurewitz proclaims that financial assistance to Jordan in the 1950's "kept a nonviable state alive".[119] Is this true today with U.S. security assistance? Military aid provides improved weapons and training thus raising the stakes of recruiting more Palestinians. The monarchy fears if more Palestinians were to enter the military, especially in key leadership or combat positions, they would be better equipped to stage a successful coup with these modern weapons.

Some may argue that relative to the billions of dollars in military aid that Israel receives, the amount granted to Jordan is insignificant to pacify the military. On the contrary, in Jordan where resources are scarce and the industrial base is weak, employment in the military is a private benefit, a matter of prestige, and a form of cooptation for Jordanians.

Together these corporate and private benefits serve concurrently to "buy" patronage from the military and maintain loyalty. In short, an increasing military budget can facilitate the effort to buy Jordanian loyalty and exclude Palestinians. Keeping these

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[114] Massad, p. 332.

[115] King of Jordan Official Website, "About Jordan—Government—Armed Forces," http://www.kingabdullah.jo/about_jordan/about_jordan.html (January, 2003).

[116] Enloe, pp. 230-231.

[117] Enloe, pp. 230-231.

[118] Enloe, pp. 231-232.

[119] Hurewitz, p. 326.

weapons out of the hands of Palestinians, thus upholds Jordanian hegemony and regime stability.

D. THE JORDAN ARMED FORCES TODAY

The Jordanian military to this day is still proclaimed as a Jordanian dominated force despite the Palestinian majority in the general population. In the mid-1980's, it was estimated that the Palestinians in the Jordanian military was under 25 percent,[120] however this estimate is hardly recent. Adnan Abu-Odeh writes,

> The exact percentage of Palestinians in the army, public security, and Mukhabarat is unknown, but few observers would describe it as other than insignificant. One can easily feel that the state is specifically Transjordanian rather than just Jordanian.[121]

Joseph Massad asserts that numbers or percentage of Palestinians in the military is not as important as who receives the key assignments at the senior levels.[122] Even then, it is still accepted that Palestinians are excluded from the sensitive senior ranks today,[123] however, the empirical data to support these claims are lacking. Is it possible that after fifty years of a Palestinian majority that they would become more integrated into the military and recognized as first class citizens? The fact that Queen Rania herself is a Palestinian could lead one to believe that Palestinians are now able to break the barrier. Furthermore, with the increase in intermarriages between Jordanians and Palestinians, such as the King and Queen, it has clouded personal and national identities even further. Therefore, if a true communal identity exists, it would seem any Palestinian-Jordanian loyal to the state would be able to serve in the military without any discriminatory consequences.

In an attempt to identify the current ethnic foundations of the Jordanian military leadership, the following analysis involves a pool of 115 current and retired Jordanian officers.[124] The majority of the officers held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and above.

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[120] Cited in Massad, p. 364.

[121] Abu-Odeh, p. 196.

[122] Massad, p. 328.

[123] Yorke, "Domestic Politics and Security," p. 21.

[124] The names of the officers were current as of 8 January 2002. Several retirements and officer shuffles that took place in March 2002 are not included in the percentages.

The method of choice to determine whether one is of Palestinian or Jordanian descent is through the surname. This method does not take into account one's nationalistic loyalty nor one's personal identity, however, it is difficult to unravel the national 'origins' of the offspring except through paternalist notions of nationality.[125] Therefore, the following data bases nationality on the surname of these officers. Of 115 officer names, 51 percent were easily identifiable of Transjordanian origin. While 49 percent were unidentifiable, they could easily be Transjordanian who use their Grandfather's names as last names making the distinction more difficult.[126]

Since key assignments are of more interest than overall numbers, it is important to note that Transjordanians held six of the eight most senior military positions. The remaining two were unidentifiable by name alone, however it is also of interest that one of these two was suddenly retired in the beginning of March 2002[127] and the other was in Washington D.C. as a Defense Attaché. Also of significance is that King Abdullah used his familial ties to promote his brother, Prince Faisal to Chief of Staff of the Jordanian Air Force in March 2002.[128] The March 2002 officer shuffle consisted of ten senior officer dismissals including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[129] Simultaneously, the growing Palestinian demonstrations in Jordan and the United States' call for regime change in Iraq demonstrate that this purge resulted from political instability.

Thirty of the surnames were predecessors to the senior most positions. Of these, twenty-one were Transjordanian and eight were unidentifiable. Furthermore, there were only two Palestinian officers identified in the entire list of 115. One of the two Palestinian names was that of the former Defense Attaché assigned to Washington D.C. This particular Palestinian officer rose to the senior ranks of Brigadier General, however, he was certainly geographically removed from the regime to do any harm. Furthermore, as an Attaché he did not command a combat unit and therefore did not have access to

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[125] Massad, p. 401.

[126] Joseph Massad, "Research request," E-mail correspondence, 22 Mar 2002.

[127] *Jordan Times*, "Sarayreh appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 5 March 2002.

[128] *Jordan Times*, "Prince Faysal Assumes Air Force Commander Post," 7 Mar 2002

[129] Stratfor.com, "Jordan Cleans House to Prepare for US Campaign," 20 March 2002.

arms to create any trouble. Therefore, according to this analysis, the claims of Jordanian control of the military appear to be valid today. The extent to which the military exploits available tools to subjugate the Palestinians prevents the military from providing a means of social mobility as it does in many societies.

Despite the evidence that Jordanians hold the key positions, does this mean it is a state policy to exclude Palestinians from the senior ranks. Adnan Abu-Odeh discusses the discrimination present in Jordan and boldly declares, "the Transjordanian domination of the army *was* a policy..."[130] Furthermore, he argues that purges conducted by Transjordanians of Palestinian-Jordanians following the 1970 civil war was "tantamount to an official declaration that Transjordanians were the favored, trusted community."[131] However, if it *was* a policy is it still policy today? Laurie Brand asserts that preferential recruitment into the army is in fact policy however, unwritten.[132]

Some dispute the Palestinian discrimination and state that it is merely a choice of Palestinians to refrain from the Armed Forces and not policy. Schirin Fathi interviewed Palestinians who insisted that Palestinians as a group prefer to take advantage of other options open to them, in the private sector for example.[133] This belief may hold since it is also accepted that Palestinians dominate the business sector of Jordan, however, the history of policies to maintain loyalty in the military has resulted in Palestinian exclusion to the present day and the means which the monarchy uses to consolidate power is unquestionably politically inspired.

E. THREAT OR PAWN?

Despite perceived discrimination against the Palestinians in the military, some argue that Palestinians not a threat at all. Alon Peled asserts, "Given a chance to serve their countries, ethnic soldiers are almost always loyal soldiers." In his case studies of

[130] Abu-Odeh, p. 196.

[131] Abu-Odeh, p. 200.

[132] Brand, "Palestinians in the Arab World," pp. 184-185.

[133] Fathi, p. 141.

South Africa, Israel, and Singapore, he finds few incidents of disloyalty.[134] Adnan Abu-Odeh concurs that,

> Charges of Palestinian-Jordanian disloyalty to the state of Jordan have become ludicrous…equally ludicrous are arguments that Palestinian-Jordanians pose a threat to Jordanian identity—a threat that seems not to have existed before 1967, despite Palestinian-Jordanian accounting for two-thirds of the population.[135]

Furthermore, as explained above, even in 1970, Palestinian-Jordanians remained just as loyal as Jordanians. Brand concurs, "Palestinian members of the army did not mutiny, and large sectors of the Palestinian community remained aloof from the fighting."[136] Moreover, Hillel Frisch interprets a survey conducted by the University of Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies in the winter of 1995 and remarks, "it is significant that the vast majority of Palestinians regarded themselves as being loyal to the state."[137] Yet even though Palestinians regard themselves as loyal, those who effectively control the manpower of the military fear losing their monopoly of violence to the Palestinians. However, Joseph Massad asserts that historically all internal military threats to the regime came from Transjordanian elements in the military.[138] Similarly, the 1989 popular uprisings took place in southern almost exclusively Transjordanian cities with no Palestinian Jordanian participation whatsoever.[139] The recent March 2002 purge in the senior ranks of the military also demonstrates a potential Transjordanian military threat to the regime. Are Palestinians truly a threat or might they be discriminated against simply to preserve the Jordanian domination of the military and give cause to the regime's focus on internal security?

Such a policy effectually increases divisiveness between Palestinians and Jordanians. Historically, periods of terminating conscription or inadequate Palestinian

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[134] Peled, p. 173.

[135] Abu-Odeh, p. 278.

[136] Brand, "Palestinians and Jordanians," p. 54.

[137] Cited in Hillel Frisch, "Ethnicity, Territorial Integrity, and Regional Order: Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel," *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 34, No. 3 (August 1997) p. 263.

[138] Massad, 401.

[139] Massad, 401.

representation in the military has resulted in Palestinian inclusion to appease the potential for political instability. However, for the past ten years there has been no effort to further integrate Palestinians into the Armed Forces. Adnan Abu-Odeh writes,

> Transjordanian control of the security apparatus has had a more adverse impact on national unity that Transjordanian dominance of civil administration. The state—any state—holds the monopoly on violence. But when the security apparatus is controlled by one group in a society where tribal kinship supercedes the rule of law, then neutrality of repression, an essential factor for intercommunal harmony, disappears.[140]

Jordanian-Palestinians have become second-class citizens in a state where they consensually hold the majority of the population. Despite the granting of official Jordanian citizenship in 1950, Palestinians are not equal to Transjordanians. If military service is recognized as a precondition for full and equal citizenship, then those barred from the military are neither citizens nor soldiers.[141] The 1995 survey conducted by the University of Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies revealed that 74.1% of the Palestinian elite felt that restriction to sensitive posts represents an obstacle to national unity, the highest response rate to any of the differences or obstacles posed in the survey.[142] Regardless of whether the Palestinians consist of 50 or 70 percent of the total population, the regime has always maintained a defensive stance domestically.[143] It appears that the threat of Palestinian-Jordanians may be more paranoia than a true threat. Regardless, the discrimination of Palestinians from military service threatens discord among the society as a whole.

F. CONCLUSION

In summary, this chapter acknowledges that Palestinians are not fully integrated in the Jordanian military and that ethnic Jordanians remain in control the military. Currently, it is virtually impossible to determine the true demography of the military due to the utmost confidentiality. However, the empirical data from the sample of surnames demonstrates that Jordanians do in fact hold the majority if not all the key positions in the

[140] Abu-Odeh, p. 197.

[141] Peled, xiii

[142] Cited in Frisch, p. 265.

[143] Bligh.

military. Principally, it is U.S. security assistance that sustains the elite political-military privilege of Jordanians.

The political methods used to instill and perpetuate loyalty consequently affect the demography of the military. Palestinian exclusion from combat units and command, the history of selective conscription, and the current policy of selective recruitment serve to maintain Jordanian loyalty and control of the military for the sake of regime security. The nature of this politicized military places so much focus on loyalty that job performance is secondary and purges become commonplace. Furthermore, financial resources provide the mainstay for Jordanian supremacy, increases the risk of Palestinian subversion, and also enables the military to focus on internal, rather than external security. Whether Palestinians are truly a fifth column is almost inconsequential since historically their subjugation will result regardless. Any future demographical transformation or professionalization of the Jordanian military would have to take place at the expense of the Jordanian military elite.

While tribal and ethnic identities are important for the military to remain loyal, the finances supplied to the military are a solidifying factor. Without their current budget, it is doubtful the military would remain supportive of the monarchy.

IV. THE MILITARY, SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN JORDAN

A. INTRODUCTION

The variety of published works on democratization in Jordan all describe the process with negative connotations such as "defensive"[144], "facade"[145], "monarchical[146]", "top-down", "tactical"[147], "frozen"[148], and "decorative and superficial."[149] In short, present research demonstrates that the democratization process appears not to attain the goal of democracy but rather a strategy of regime survivability. Most of these publications emphasize domestic constraints such as political economy, civil society, or political culture. The intent of the following analysis is to examine the external factor of military assistance and determine whether it plays a role in the process of democratization. More specifically, does U.S. security assistance to a Jordanian-dominated military impact the process of democratization?

The objective is to determine whether security assistance: 1) maintains the status quo of a politicized Jordanian military and presents civil-military challenges that inhibit further democratization, 2) supplies cooptation of ethnic Jordanian military elites to enable democratization, or 3) has no factor in the democratization process. The organization of this research endeavors to explain the military's role in transition from authoritarian rule, pacts as they apply to the Jordanian military, and more specifically, the cooptation of the Jordanian military elite. Furthermore, it will present challenges to

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144 Glenn Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (August 1998) pp. 387-410.

145 Beverly Milton-Edwards, "Facade Democracy and Jordan," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1993).

146 Rex Brynen, "The Politics of Monarchical Liberalism: Jordan," in Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble (eds.) *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: Vol. 2 Comparative Experiences* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998) pp. 71-100.

147 Malik Mufti, "Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 (February 1999) p. 103.

148 Mehran Kamrava, "Frozen Political Liberalization in Jordan: The Consequences for Democracy," *Democratization,* Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1998) pp. 136-157.

149 Layth Shubaylat quoted in Abla Amawi, "Democracy Dilemmas in Jordan," *Middle East Report* (January-February 1992) p. 28.

Jordanian civil-military relations that must be overcome for a successful path to democracy. The hypothesis is that security assistance provides an incomplete military pact that presents more problems than solutions to a democratic transition. The focus on regime stability and regional peace promotes the status quo of a politicized Jordanian military with an internal security role and sacrifices further democratization.

Ali Kassay concludes that King Hussein took the path of democratization to acquire financial assistance after witnessing the example in Eastern Europe.[150] He writes,

> Since emergent democracies were strong candidates for Western assistance by becoming a regional leader in democratization. In this sense, democratization may not have been an attempt to reform the rentier economy, as the classic outlook suggests, but an attempt to gain the means to preserve it.[151]

If this is true, then security assistance may simply be a means to maintain the status quo and not to implement true democratic reform in Jordan. It is not the objective to argue that military aid is holistically responsible for the lack of democratization but rather to ask the question whether military aid has a positive relationship facilitating democratization or a negative relationship that enables the retreat of this process specifically in Jordan.

U.S. policy seeks to provide regional and internal Jordanian stability and security through its program of security assistance. Admittedly, democracy is not a stated goal in U.S. foreign policy with Jordan, although as mentioned in Chapter 1, throughout the 1990's democracy was increasingly promoted as a foreign policy objective of the United States; therefore any promotion of democracy in Jordan remains indirect. It is still significant to determine whether or not a positive or negative relationship exists between military aid and democratization.

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[150] Ali Kassay, "The Effects of External Forces on Jordan's Process of Democratization," in George Joffe (ed.) *Jordan in Transition* (New York: Palgrave, 2002) p. 54.

[151] Kassay, p. 61.

One scholar insists that a negative relationship exists between military aid and democratization arguing that arms transfers can facilitate coups.[152] More specifically, Shannon Lindsey Blanton argues that increased arms transfers inhibit "human security" and consequently hinders democratization.[153] Both of these statistical analyses present a bleak outlook for the future of arms transfers in relation to democratization in Jordan.

Talukder Maniruzzaman writes, "by strengthening the armed forces, arms transfer facilitates and accelerates the process of military takeover of the powers of the state."[154] In his analysis of 80 developing countries, Jordan ranked high at number six in terms of per capita arms transfers relative to population and GNP.[155] Maniruzzaman readily admits that he cannot explain why Jordan ranks so high for a potential coup and yet a coup attempt has not occurred since 1957. The short answer is that Jordan, along with other Middle Eastern states, has become cunningly adept at preventing coups. The detailed answer will become evident as the analysis continues.

Blanton flatly states, "The negative relationship between democracy and arms imports indicates that developing countries that import greater amounts of arms are less likely to be democracies…As a consequence, the development of democratic governance is inhibited."[156] Blanton bases her assertion on a dataset of 91 developing countries for a 15 year period from 1981-1995 using liberal democracy, personal integrity rights, and human development as three separate dependent variables.[157] She concludes,

> Increased arms imports are linked to weaker levels of democracy and harsher personal integrity rights conditions. Thus a paradox exists: though arms transfers are commonly conceived as a primary tool for increasing

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[152] Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Arms Transfers, Military Coups, and Military Rule in Developing States," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36 No. 4 (December 1992) p. 738.

[153] Shannon Lindsey Blanton, "The Role of Arms Transfers in the Quest for Human Security," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 29 (Winter 2001). Blanton defines human security as the internal conditions needed to assure the political and personal security of the individual, such as democratic, liberal, and human rights.

[154] Maniruzzaman, p. 738.

[155] Maniruzzaman, p. 751.

[156] Blanton, p. 250.

[157] Blanton defines personal integrity as the element of human security that represents the security of the individual and consists of violations such as murder, torture, imprisonment, and forced disappearance.

> 'security' against threats, in reality they contribute to insecurity in the developing world.[158]

Despite Jordanian liberalization since 1989, one cannot deny the lack of meaningful democracy however, simply attributing security assistance as the failure risks exaggerated oversimplification. Therefore, it is important to assess if or why this negative relationship may exist in Jordan.

On the other hand, scholars of democracy profess that military pacts are essential to keep the military from intervening in democratic reform. O'Donnell and Schmitter define pacts as "an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the 'vital interests' of those entering into it."[159] In short, a pact is a temporary solution to avoid negative outcomes.[160] Pertaining specifically to the military, a pact can provide guarantees to the military while also committing the military to the process of liberalization and the institutions of democracy. Thus, the military will refrain from intervening in politics and attempting a coup and finally will submit to civilian control in order for democracy to be successful.

B. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE TRANSITION

In order to identify a positive or negative relationship between security assistance and democratization in Jordan it is important to study the role of the military in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Since the military holds the monopoly of violence it has the means to abruptly end the democratization process through force. Thus, the role of the military in this process can be the most difficult to overcome. Primarily, it is critical to prevent military intervention in the democratization process. The goal is to neutralize the military and keep the military in the barracks to prevent a coup. Many developing countries have experienced military interference in the transition to democracy and a return to an authoritarian or military regime. The military fears not

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[158] Blanton, p. 253.

[159] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusion about Uncertain Democracie*s (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986) p. 37.

[160] O'Donnell and Schmitter, p. 37.

only losing their benefits and prestige but they also fear blame and persecution for domestic crimes committed during the authoritarian rule.

Since the process of liberalization has winners and losers it is also imperative to compensate the losers in order to receive a commitment to democracy. In the case of the Jordanian military, they are anticipated losers in the democratization process. Following the example of other democratizing states, it will be necessary for the military to accept civilian control and oversight. Typically democracy involves a reduction of a bloated military budget common to authoritarian regimes, oversight of the budget, possible reduction of perquisites and an overall professionalization of the military. These alone are reason for the military to resist democratization. Additionally, the winners are certain to be the opposition to the monarchy. In the case of Jordan, the Palestinians and the Islamists are likely to gain more access to the military and parliament through democracy. This would risk Palestinian infiltration into the ranks of the Jordanian dominated military which threatens a transformation of the very institution linked with the Jordanian identity and a reduction of their prestigious status. Larry Diamond adds,

> The challenge for democratic consolidation, then, is to gradually roll back these prerogatives and refocus the military's mission, training, and expenditures around issues of external security. By definition, democracy cannot be consolidated until the military becomes firmly subordinated to civilian control and committed to the democratic constitutional order.[161]

Therefore, secondary to the guarantee that the military will not intervene and commit a coup is a guarantee or a pact to commit the military to professionalization or civilian control.

C. THE MILITARY PACT

As mentioned above, a negotiated transition or a pact can potentially keep the military from intervening in the democratization process. Without a pact, if the military feels threatened, "they may simply sweep their opponents off the board or kick it over and start playing solitaire."[162] Although pacts are not necessary for the transition to democracy, O'Donnell and Schmitter are convinced that they enhance the probability that

[161] Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) p. 113.

[162] O'Donnell and Schmitter, p. 69.

the transition process will lead to a viable democracy,[163] while others proclaim that pacts among elites are the "most successful formula for democratic transition."[164]

In the case of Jordan, it appears that security assistance could provide an economic incentive to the military to commit to democracy, however it also presents some problems. First, O'Donnell and Schmitter readily admit that pacts are undemocratic as a means to secure loyalty to democracy.[165] Second, pacts may be aided or voided by the forces of civil society.[166] Considering the weak civil society in Jordan and the means of controlling it through the security services and police[167], the odds of civil society aiding a military pact is discouraging.

Finally, Peter Feaver insists that economic incentives are essentially bribes that when broken can trigger a coup. Furthermore, they are inherently corrupting and they buy allegiance to the bribe not the institution.[168] It is more probable that the military pact in Jordan is a bribe to retain allegiance to the regime, to refrain from intervening in politics and in return a guarantee of continuous benefits. The pact made with the Islamists was formal and recognized in the National Charter, however this document does not address civil-military relations with any specificity. The only mention of professionalism in the National Charter reads,

> Jordanian national security is also dependent on inculcating the concept of professionalism in the armed forces, broadening their base, developing their capabilities and rallying the resources of the country and people to their support, to enable them to perform their duty of protecting the country and contributing to its growth and development.[169]

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[163] O'Donnell and Schmitter, p. 39.

[164] Doh Chull Shin, "On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research," *World Politics*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (October 1994) p. 161.

[165] O'Donnell and Schmitter, p. 38.

[166] O'Donnell and Schmitter, p. 47.

[167] Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (October 2000) p. 28.

[168] Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Reviews of Political Science*, Vol. 2 (1999) pp. 223.

[169] The National Charter, December 1990, p. 26.

Felipe Aguero observes, "A military will not be able to sustain the postauthoritarian regime the power and influence with which it enters the transition if this power is not backed with formal-legal arrangements."[170] Therefore, if professionalization of the military and civilian or parliamentary control over the military were goals it seems that it would be acknowledged in the National Charter in more than a vague manner. Considering the defensive nature of the democratization and the fact that the regime maintains it power through the military, it is not surprising that these issues are swept under the rug.

C. CO-OPTING THE JORDANIAN MILITARY ELITES

The Jordanian military's stance on democracy is not public knowledge, however Diamond asserts, "Military officers in particular need to be convinced that expanding civilian control will not compromise the nation's security or the institutional prestige and integrity of the military."[171] Thus far, U.S. security assistance provides the resources to implement a pact to ensure loyalty to the regime, however not necessarily for subordination to civilian leadership. In addition to this pact, the Jordanian policy of recruiting primarily ethnic Jordanians, the purging of disloyal soldiers, frequent officer rotations, and promotions based on loyalty also explains the lack of coup attempts in Jordan. Once the regime is secure with exogenous rents and a loyal military there is no need for further democratization as a regime survivability strategy.

The retreat of democracy since making peace with Israel in 1994 brought a mission shift towards internal security as opposed to external security. Additionally, the military decreased in size by approximately 30,000 personnel, most of which were reserve troops.[172] This downsizing of the military further hindered its ability to fend off an external attack. In return, the Jordanian military benefited financially from the "peace dividend", and its decrease in size increased the per capita benefits in the military. The

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[170] Felipe Aguero, "Transition Pathways: Institutional Legacies, the Military, and Democracy in South America," in James F. Hollifield and Calvin Jillson (eds.) *Pathways to Democracy: The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (New York: Routledge, 2000) p. 92.

[171] Diamond, p. 115.

[172] Shlomo Gazit, *The Middle East Military Balance: 1992-1993* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1993) p. 286 and Shlomo Gazit, *The Middle East Military Balance: 1990-1991* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1992) p. 275.

cancellation of conscription and the reduction of force maintained Jordanian control while creating the façade of moving towards military professionalism. More importantly, this concentrated the loyalty in the military to protect the regime while opposition to normalization with Israel was mounting.

King Abdullah's background as Commander of the Special Forces provides him a special rapport and legitimacy with the military. The officer shuffle that took place following his ascent to the throne most likely resulted in the promotion of his acquaintances in the Special Forces community to senior positions. Would King Abdullah strip prerogatives from his bastion of support and shift the military away from an internal security role that may threaten the endurance of his regime? Such a move would likely result in a swift coup terminating Abdullah's rule.

D. CHALLENGES TO CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

There are various challenges to Jordanian civil-military relations due to the mission of the military, the structure, the lack of civilian oversight, and the potentially insurmountable task of changing the mindset of the Jordanian military. Jordan has not taken any major steps towards professionalization since abandoning conscription in 1992.

First, the inward-looking, domestic security role and politicized mission of the Jordanian military presents challenges to the military's relationship towards society. O'Donnell and Schmitter insists that even more important than buying off the military is transforming its doctrine or operational capability and shifting from an internal security role to an external security role.[173] Furthermore, Michael Desch argues that internal security missions can develop the worst pattern of civil-military relations and gears the military towards intervention in domestic politics.[174] It is perplexing that five years into the process of democratization and following the peace treaty with Israel that Jordan placed an greater emphasis on internal security. One would expect that if the regime truly desired democracy that a pact with the military would include a reduced focus on internal security.

[173] O'Donnell and Schmitter, p. 36.

[174] Michael C. Desch, "Threat Environments and Military Missions," in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds.) *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996) p. 14.

Civilian government officials must resist the temptation to turn to the military during political conflict or unruly domestic protests,[175] however the monarchy has a history of utilizing the military for intervention in domestic security issues. The Jordanian military was called in after the police failed to suppress riots at Karak in 1996 and played a prominent role in restoring order in Ma'an in 1998.[176] The Mukhabarat, or Public Security Directorate, as well plays a prominent role in checking potential domestic security issues. Although the role of the Mukhabarat has diminished with the democratization process,[177] it still succeeds in suppressing civil society and the formation of political opposition.[178]

Second, the structure of the military is focused around internal security as well, and due to a degree of paranoia the forces are diversified to prevent any one from being overly powerful. As in many Arab countries, "multiple military branches and intelligence services are maintained to cancel each other out in terms of power and influence."[179] Jordan's Arab Army, the Royal Jordanian Special Forces, the Royal Guard, and the Public Security Directorate all have a role in maintaining domestic security. Furthermore, the General Intelligence Directorate is a component of the military but it provides domestic as well as foreign intelligence. Risa Brooks writes, "Developing specific combat and intelligence units designated for internal security is another essential safeguard against military intervention in politics."[180] Therefore, all of these organizations serve to protect the regime from opposition as well as preventing one of the military organizations from committing a coup.

Third, there is a general lack of civilian oversight of the Jordanian military. The military is only accountable to the King; this is true for the military mission, the budget, and procurement. In Arab regimes, "the lack of legislative oversight encourages

[175] Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996) p. xxxiii.

[176] Brooks, p. 8.

[177] Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," p. 405.

[178] Wiktorowicz, p. 28.

[179] Barry Rubin, "The Military in Contemporary Middle East Politics," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 2001) p. 50.

[180] Brooks, p. 36.

bureaucratic parochialism and means that there is little transparency in decisions affecting military procurement."[181] Military acquisitions are often based on prestige and not need and thus they do not always provide a military with an expanded capability. Therefore, security assistance does not necessarily provide a strong military considering Jordan remains weak relative to regional forces. Subordinating the military mission, budget and procurement process to the parliament appears to be a "red line" that oppositionists are not allowed to cross.[182] Even debating such topics in the parliament are likely to be prohibited.[183]

Fourth, the mindset of the Jordanian military is not that of a professional military. The goal of International Military Education and Training (IMET) is to overcome the political involvement of foreign militaries and instill professional qualities "respectful of human rights and civil authority."[184] Samuel Huntington argues that exposure to U.S. military training and schools can increase acceptance of democratic norms and civilian control.[185] However, can IMET itself overcome the inadequacies of Jordanian civil-military relations? Norville de Atkine blames Arab military culture for the failure to apply lessons taken from the American military. He writes, "American military advisors find students who enthusiastically take in their lessons and then resolutely fail to apply them. The culture they return to—the culture of their own armies in their own countries—defeats the intentions with which they took leave of their American instructors."[186] More specifically, those personnel who receive American military

[181] Brooks, p. 50.

[182] Baaklini, Abdo, Guilian Denouex, and Robert Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999) p. 40. The authors state that crossing certain "red lines" by the opposition "would prompt the regime to respond in ways that would endanger the gains that the opposition already has made."

[183] Kamrava, "Frozen Political Liberalization in Jordan," p. 140.

[184] Marvin C. Feuer, "US Policy and Middle East Armed Forces," in Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney (eds.) *Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and* Strategy (London: Frank Cass, 2002) p. 53.

[185] Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds.) *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996) p. 7.

[186] Norville De Atkine, "Why Arab Armies Lose Wars," *MERIA Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2000) p. 24. Atkine's impression is derived from personal experience with Arab military establishments in the capacity of U.S. military attaché and security assistance officer, observer officer with the British-officer Trucial Oman Scouts (the security force in the emirates prior to the establishment of the United Arab Emirates), as well as some thirty years' study of the Middle East. Additionally, he observed the Jordanian Army fight the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1970.

training seldom share their knowledge with other soldiers. De Atkine continues, "An Arab technician knows that he is invaluable as long as he is the only one in a unit to have that knowledge; once he dispenses it to others he no longer is the only font of knowledge and his power dissipates."[187] Further confounding and costly to professionalism is that that American military training may even impede promotion to prevent the growth of American influence.[188] Therefore, the task to attain military professionalism through IMET appears to be a disappointment.

Since regime security is more important than the transition to democracy and meaningful military professionalism the prospects for civilian control of the military and consolidation of democracy are daunting. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner write, "Democratization of civil-military relations therefore needs to rely on processes of bargaining, dialogue, cooperation, and consensus-building that gradually diminish military prerogatives and redefine and professionalize the military's mission through a series of incremental steps."[189] Admittedly, democratization is a gradual process and civil-military relations will not develop overnight, however the military pact in place does not seem to guarantee anything outside the protection of the monarchy. The professionalization of a military can be a double-edged sword and can undermine the regime seeking to implement it.[190] If the monarchy has no intention of greater democracy then the military should not feel any threat from losing its benefits. The regime is as dependent on the military as the military is on the regime.

Maniruzzaman asks why economic and military aid had one result in Western Europe and Japan and the opposite in the Third World. He responds that a country must reach a "threshold of modernization" before military aid can facilitate the military withdrawal from politics. Finally, he concludes that military withdrawal from politics is caused by intrastate dynamics rather than interstate factors such as aid.[191] Jordan appears

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[187] De Atkine, p. 18.

[188] Brooks, p. 48.

[189] Diamond and Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy,* p. xxx.

[190] Cited in Mehran Kamrava, "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, No. 1 (Spring 2000) p. 69.

[191] Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Military Withdrawal From Politics: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge,

not to have reached that threshold, however its strategic importance in regional peace prevails over democratization and military professionalism in rationalizing military aid from the U.S.

Should the U.S. be more proactive in supporting democratization in Jordan? Kassay writes,

> Conservatives (in Jordan) realize that Western assistance is more closely linked to Jordan's regional policies than its domestic politics, hence a modicum of restrictions and falsification of elections would pass unnoticed. However, they also realize that overt restrictions of civil liberties would not fail to attract a negative reaction.[192]

Therefore, external pressure could theoretically aid democratization by supplying rewards focused on domestic politics. Consequently, the lack of conditions on aid and the priority of peace with Israel also permit the retreat of democracy without repercussion. Ironically, the retreat of democracy in Jordan has brought increased aid from the U.S. rather than a decrease.

E. THE MILITARY RESPONSE TO FURTHER POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION

Despite the roll-back and the tactical nature of the democratization process it is significant to analyze how the Jordanian military would react to increased political liberalization. Thus far it has been explained that due to the nature of the pact between the monarchy and the military, the military is unlikely to react violently as long as the perquisites continue unabated. An additional factor is the nature of the democratization process which has limited the potential for significant gains in political power for the Palestinians and the Islamists.

It is unlikely the Jordanian military would react similar to the Algerian military's response in 1992. First, the gerrymandering and control over political parties in Jordan limit the extent to which the opposition can attain a majority in elections. More importantly, the Algerian military plays a much more prominent role in Algerian politics than the Jordanian military. Furthermore, the Algerian military did not have the financial

Ballinger Publishing, 1987) p. 202.

[192] Kassay, p. 60.

incentive to refrain from intervention. While declining oil revenues in the 1980's created the financial crisis in both Algeria and Jordan, security assistance to Jordan enabled the continuation of the rentier economy and benefits to the military. The Algerian military did not have the same comfort, thus the military expenditure encountered a period of decline. The benefits enjoyed by the Algerian military were dependent on their power status and control over the political system, thus the threat that the Islamists posed to the military was real. The lack of a pact with the military elites and the Islamists created a situation of extreme vulnerability for the Algerian military following the 1991 parliamentary elections. Conversely, the Jordanian military stayed in the barracks throughout their process of democratization partially because they were bought off but also because the elections did not threaten their status or benefits due to the cooptation of the Islamists. However, the Jordanian military's involvement in quashing domestic riots reveals that domestic instability is a valid threat and justifiable for intervention. This also demonstrates that the military is not completely withdrawn from political intervention. Thus, democratization controlled by the monarchy does not threaten the regime nor the military due to their co-dependence.

Potentially the greatest threat to the Jordanian regime is an alliance between the military and the Islamists. Through Islam, the Islamist party could potentially unify the Palestinians and Jordanians. As the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Action Front's platform stands for supporting the military and reinforcing the unity between East Bank Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians.[193] Unique to Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood supports the Hashemite regime instead of rallying opposition against it. However, the Brotherhood once dominated by ethnic Jordanians is becoming increasingly Palestinian and less sympathetic to the monarchy's alliance with the United States and normalization movement with Israel.[194] To counter this potential unification, the regime uses divide and rule tactics by fueling animosity between groups.

[193] Mehran Kamrava, "Frozen Liberalization in Jordan: The Consequences for Democracy," p. 147.

[194] Anthony Shadid, "Anger and Islam Rise in Jordan," *Washington Post*, (January 28, 2003) p. A01. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52250-2003Jan27.html

Furthermore, in an effort to depoliticize the military, they are not allowed to participate in political parties.[195]

A military coup is unlikely as long as the military continues to benefit financially from the Hashemite monarchy. Should security assistance halt or should an economic crisis result that affects military benefits, the chances for a coup would be greater. The question of the military committing to democratic institutions is another issue. Thus far, democratization seems to be a ploy to keep the monarchy in tact and arguably to sustain external rents. Therefore, democracy does not threaten the regime because it is tactically controlled by the regime to prevent a snowball effect and it will not threaten the military since King Abdullah needs the backing of the military to remain in power.

F. CONCLUSION

The lack of civil-military relations in Jordan is a result of state-driven democratization as a regime survival strategy. Democratic consolidation or even a constitutional monarchy, based on the model of the UK, do not appear to be true goals of Jordan. Security assistance has successfully provided regime security and will continue to do so at the expense of political liberalization or a viable democratization process in Jordan. Risa Brooks writes, "Political liberalisation – and democratisation – can only proceed so far before challenging the military's institutional and financial prerogatives."[196] True military professionalism could weaken the main pillar of the regime by threatening the Jordanian character of the military and it would weaken the coercive capability to counter domestic opposition.

Military aid that focuses on internal security, maintains the preferential treatment of ethnic Jordanians, and indirectly represses civil society, counteracts the promotion of democracy and in effect aids in the democratic retreat. Security assistance does not promote democracy as that is not its intent. Through the promotion of stability and security, the regime is guarded by the Jordanian led military, which indirectly enables a top-down democratization approach that threatens neither the regime nor the political role

[195] The National Charter, December 1990.

[196] Brooks, p. 74.

and composition of the military. With regime security of paramount focus it is exclusive and contradictory to attempt professionalization of the military and democratization.

A military pact can aid democratization, however not unless the military transforms the structure and policy to promote professionalism and comply with civilian control. Security assistance has worked thus far as a pact to constrain the military from attempting a coup or acting out against liberalization. However, without restructuring the military through contestation, it would still be at risk during further liberalization. The military must give loyalty to the system and institution of democracy and not just the regime or the bribe for democracy to be successful. Thus, the current military pact is incomplete. The cooptation of the Islamists through the National Charter accepted Hashemite legitimacy and ironically, by approving the Charter, the oppositionists also accepted the absence of a framework to achieve improved civil-military relations. This deficiency of civil-military relations is thus institutionalized in the National Charter, therefore making any such modification more complex. Furthermore, any deliberation over military privileges would cross the "red line" imposed by the state and consequently any transformation is unlikely in the near future.

Although the democratization process may be gradual, it is unlikely for true professionalism to take place if it threatens regime security. The current pact provides more of a hindrance than a buttress for democratization. If other aspects of democracy in society are not successful such as civil society, free, fair, and regular elections, and liberal rights, how can civil-military relations be expected to reform successfully? The "peace dividend" has thus provided legitimacy for the status quo rather than the promotion of democratization. Diamond writes,

> In the end, the military threat to democracy will not be permanently contained without other changes that improve the effectiveness of democratic institutions and the depth of popular involvement with, and commitment to, them. While causality may be reciprocal and intertwined, ultimately, civilian supremacy and democratic legitimacy go hand in hand.[197]

[197] Diamond, p. 116.

If democratization in Jordan is truly tactical and defensive due to political economy constraints and regime survival concerns it is unlikely to continue along the road towards democracy.

This analysis does not mean that democracy cannot take hold in Jordan in the future; however the lack of negotiations on civil-military relations will delay the process and aid the retreat of democracy until these issues are brought to the fore. If military aid continues to flow in increasing levels, there is even less motivation to restructure the military and transform the mission. The regime appears unwilling to make these concessions at the cost of denying democracy.

V. CONCLUSION

Jordan as a moderate, pro-west, Arab nation receives scant attention that it fails to attain a more liberal form of governance. Over the past decade, U.S. foreign policy increasingly promoted democracy throughout with world while eschewing such policy in the Middle East. Slowly, the current administration raised the expectations for political, economic, and educational reform in the Middle East through the Millennium Challenge Account and the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative. In the past, the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy was quite evident with democracy promotion a primary foreign policy goal, while foreign policy in the Middle East was framed in "stability," peaceful relations with Israel, and continuous access to oil. Although it appears the U.S. State Department developed the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative to reconcile this hypocrisy, democracy promotion remains clouded by other U.S. security and economic interests.

Currently, since security assistance strives to bolster the Hashemite regime whenever there is a potential crisis it removes the opportunity for the monarchy to deal with a crisis and eliminates the prospect of reform. This relationship receives little attention due to Jordan's alignment with the United States and relative to its neighbors Jordan is far less authoritarian. Furthermore, the lack of reform is overshadowed by Israeli security, regional stability, the war on terrorism, and fears of Islamist political parties.

Despite calls for a professional military in Jordan, conversely it has become more praetorian. In order to become more professional, reforms must remove the ethnic division and political nature of the Jordanian armed forces. Dominance of key leadership positions in the military by ethnic Jordanians perpetuates a system where origin determines loyalty and thus trumps performance. U.S. security assistance provides the finances and weaponry for private and corporate perquisites that primarily benefit ethnic Jordanians in a nation where Palestinians comprise approximately two-thirds of the population. Therefore, these finances maintain elite political-military privilege to ethnic Jordanians where tribal alliances have diminished.

The bolstering of the Jordanian character of the military presents many civil-military challenges. Military aid strengthens the internal security role of the military rather than an external role, which is necessary for a more professional force. Additionally, this solidifies the second-class status of Palestinians and even portrays them as the fifth column despite their loyalty during periods of instability. Currently, security assistance upholds a pact that simply attains loyalty to, and protection of, the regime. Furthermore, since the regime is dependent on foreign aid and military loyalty for survival it is unlikely to take the necessary steps to truly professionalize the military and commit it to civilian oversight. Consequently, these challenges must be addressed in order to truly promote democracy and eliminate the defensive nature of democratization in Jordan.

This phenomenon of supporting autocratic leaders when it is in U.S. security interests is certainly not new. The United States is often criticized for abandoning the promotion of liberal democratic ideals when it is convenient. Most recently, the global war on terrorism led the United States to increase aid to authoritarian regimes throughout the Middle East and Asia. As Thomas Carothers notes, there may be an institutional divide between the State Department and the Department of Defense that inhibits the ability to balance democracy promotion and national security needs.[198] While the State Department is actively promoting the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative, the Pentagon is primarily concerned with more tactical goals of basing rights in foreign countries. Rarely does the Department of Defense actively promote democracy. Of note, U.S. Southern Command is the only unified command that has democracy promotion as one of its main missions.[199] Therefore, demanding change and reform in Jordan as well as other Middle East nations may also require reform of the U.S. foreign policy approach to security assistance and democracy promotion.

There are three main policy options for the United States to confront the issue of providing aid to nations, such as Jordan, that bolsters the incumbent leader rather than

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[198] Thomas Carothers, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 82, No 1 (January-February 2003).

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promoting reform. The first option is to maintain the current course regarding security assistance policy. The second option would be to cease or significantly reduce aid transfers to foreign nations. The third option would be to dramatically modify and reform the security assistance program in order to harmonize the promotion of regional stability and democratic reform.

The status quo option brought us where we are today and does not offer a valid solution to combat the democratic retreat. This option would allow the United States to continue aiding foreign nations regardless of whether democratic reform takes place. This may be the most flexible for changing U.S. national interests and beneficial in the short run, however in the long run the first option is a failed solution.

The second option of ceasing foreign aid does not offer a significant improvement to the status quo. If stability of the Hashemite monarchy is the intended goal of security assistance, it is likely that the democratic retreat is simply an unintended consequence. This does not signify that foreign aid to Jordan must be terminated in order to resolve the problem. Jordan remains an important ally in the Middle East region due to their military and intelligence cooperation with the United States. Furthermore, due to Jordan's proximity to, and peaceful relations with Israel, Jordanian stability will remain a primary goal of U.S. foreign policy. Simply halting foreign aid payments would create massive instability in Jordan. The military would likely turn on the monarchy and the Islamists would attempt to capitalize on the chaos by unifying opposition forces. Rather than allowing this mass instability to play into the hands of the Islamists, the United States should reform the security assistance program so that it may provide stability and promote democracy concurrently.

As the United States makes a strong appeal for democracy in Palestine and Iraq it continues to ignore the failed reform efforts of the pro-west Arab nations. If the United States truly wishes to promote political, economic, and educational reform in the Middle East, these countries should be the example rather than the exception. Therefore, beyond creating the U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative, the United States must reform the security assistance program as well if it truly desires political reform in the Middle East. Without reforming the security assistance program, U.S. aid will continue to bolster the

status quo and the Jordanian monarchy will continue to use divide and rule tactics between the Palestinians and Jordanians in order to maintain legitimacy.

The prescribed method for harmonizing the promotion of regional stability and democratic reform is the third option, to reform security assistance and establish a conditional foreign aid program. This would transform how recipient nations would use the finances and furthermore, it would demonstrate that the United States is serious about political reform in the Middle East. Currently, U.S. security assistance does not advocate reform, thus it cannot be expected to achieve it. The retreat of democratization is likely to continue unless some degree of pressure or guidance is issued by the United States. Simply put, the Jordanian monarchy does not desire a more liberal political system that would undermine its authority is unlikely to liberalize further without some incentive. Thus, the United States should capitalize on Jordan's dependence on foreign aid and create conditional aid in order to assist political reform.

Tomorrow's geopolitical landscape may provide the opportunity for changes in the U.S. security assistance program. Assuming the United States goes to war with Iraq in the near future and succeeds in removing Saddam Hussein, the United States will need to revise the current security architecture throughout the entire Middle East region. No longer will the United States need to support authoritarian governments in the region in order to contain Iraq. By altering or removing the policy of supporting despotic regimes in the Middle East, it provides the opportunity to dismantle the rentier economic structure that permeates much of the region. While most of these states rely on oil rents for revenue, Jordan continues to rely on foreign aid as a means to delay political reform. Furthermore, with regime change in Iraq, Jordan’s current role as a buffer between a belligerent Saddam Hussein and Israel will diminish. The short-term instability that Jordan will face domestically during the war will be restored with a more secure eastern border and a more stable region. Finally, the long-term stability effects of a more democratic government in Jordan may aid future reform elsewhere in the Middle East. Thus, with a new security environment in the region, it will provide the opportunity to actively promote political reform.

If the United States truly desires democratic reform, then security assistance would be linked to the U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative. Potentially, the Millennium Challenge Account could serve as a test bed to conditionalize all U.S. foreign aid. With these modifications to the security assistance program, Jordan would continue to receive aid on the condition that the state moves forward on a self-instituted timeline that dictates political reform. Even if this timeline moves in a slow, gradual manner, it would still be progress towards democratization as opposed to the reversal witnessed over the last decade.

The reform of security assistance should also include a coherent vision from the U.S. State Department and the Department of Defense. Currently, security assistance carried out by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency have distinct policy goals. In order for conditional aid to succeed and for democratic reform to take root in the Middle East, the policy goals of the State Department and the Department of Defense should be reinforcing rather than diverging.

Without the conditionality of security assistance there is simply no incentive to change the status quo in Jordan. If the goal of security assistance in the Middle East is to create regional stability, democratic reform may be the most prudent option for long-term stability in the region.

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