

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**ASSESSING THE RESULTS OF EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS (EBO): THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF WARFARE**

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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In the Joint arena, Effects-Based Operations (EBO) is a new way of thinking about the translation of effects to objectives and uses all the elements of national power, kinetic and non-kinetic to achieve the objective. The will of the adversary is a potential Center of Gravity (COG), therefore EBO must also be applied against the morale and will of the adversary when it is a COG. Overall, EBO needs to consider an adversaries' will in all operations as an enabler even when will is not considered the COG. Geo-strategic factors in the operational areas of the theater require an assessment of political, economic, sociological, informational, and psychological factors to enable proper planning and evaluation of courses of action (COAs) at all levels - strategic, operational, and tactical. History and the study of previous conflicts and wars indicate that the concept of effects-based operations is not new. Current perceptions of effects-based operational tenets clearly indicate misunderstanding of the total nature of effects-based operations as a capability. Knowledge of the opposition can be used to create a psychological effect that assists in the attainment of the overall objective. How can this psychological effect be incorporated into strategic, operational and tactical planning? This paper argues that the psychological dimension of warfare has a profound correlation to effects-based operations, both for the opposition as well as for our own national strategy and how this nation can plan and better use all elements of our national power to perhaps avoid the next conflict, but if we must, be better prepared.

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ASSESSING THE RESULTS OF EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS
TITLE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS AND THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF WARFARE

Wearing down the enemy in a conflict means using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.¹

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

The historical study of conflict indicates that the concept of effects-based operations (EBO) is not new. Current perceptions of effects-based operational tenets and the decisional process are oriented towards producing effects using surgical strikes and dominance of a battlespace with maneuver. EBO truly represents using all the elements of power to achieve National Security objectives through the creation of effects desired to bring about an end-state that leads to a strategic goal. How can we use knowledge of the opposition to create a psychological effect and what are the implications of this effect? How can we incorporate this psychological effect into strategic, operational and tactical planning? Part of this evaluation will look at salient lessons and draw a relationship of EBO to psychological operations. This paper argues the psychological dimension of warfare has a profound correlation to EBO. This correlation is true for both the opposition as well as for ourselves, and may affect how this nation will fight the next conflict.

The process by which we can use the psychological dimension of warfare may create opportunities and a desired effect to achieve strategic ends. We will explore the motivation and behavioral aspects and the use of Information Operations with a closer view of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), which can create the effects to achieve a desired end-state. How we perceive the tenets of EBO as a warfighting technique can have far-reaching advantages. These benefits can affect the opposition without entering into major conflicts with potentially high casualties. The relationship that we will draw is to understand the adversary as a complex interrelated network, a system of systems with a psychological dimension. This understanding will enable us to create psychological effects at the strategic, operational and tactical level. The intent is to foster the message that the adversary's current behavior is wrong or destructive to the point that we achieve modification of that behavior to conform to a generally accepted standard. When dealing with people's minds, psychological operations can oftentimes be more important than firepower.² This paper will explore the current tenets of EBO, together with Center of Gravity (COG) analysis, to gain a better understanding of where physical and psychological forces may come together. Preparation and

shaping of the battlespace entails understanding the enemy and selecting an appropriate course of action to bring about a desired end state. This information may be one of the links to the enemy's COG, capabilities, vulnerabilities and the decisive action necessary to bring about the desired change. It is understanding the human and psychological dimension that will enable the right action to bring about an effect. Finally, this paper will explore effects-based planning using the psychological dimension and how we as a nation prepare and plan for achieving national objectives based on our National Security Strategy. EBO is a new way of thinking about the spectrums of warfare and using all the elements of national power. The will of the adversary is a potential COG, therefore EBO needs to also orient by using all the tools associated with IO to include PSYOP against the morale and will of the adversary when it is a COG.

WHAT ARE THE TENETS OF EBO?

Tenets are the principles or beliefs held in common by an organization or profession. For military purposes, tenets are generally accepted, enduring characteristics of the topic of discussion. Before describing the tenets of EBO, it is important to put the term in appropriate context. According to Webster's dictionary, the term "effects" means something brought about by a cause (result) and the power or capacity to obtain a desired result (influence).³ Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, refers to "effects of operations," "effective symmetrical attack," "mass effects," and "effects" of lethal or non-lethal weapons as representative of the term usage. Joint Doctrine publications include the term "effects", although used many times, EBO remains undefined.⁴ Service doctrines also use the term, although they too do not define the term in the sense of a commonly held belief, however all services reference the practice of taking advantage of the enemy's system break-points to destroy his coherence. These break-points are a critical factor, which we will explore.

A review of Naval Doctrine does not define EBO but relies on maneuver and attrition warfare to create effects. The doctrine further explains Maneuver Warfare more as a philosophy, closely associating the writings with Sun Tzu and emphasizing the need to allow the commander to have freedom to deal with specific situations. The key is to focus more on the enemies' weaknesses and vulnerabilities by collapsing the enemy's cohesion and effectiveness through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions.⁵ The 2002 edition of *Vision...Presence...Power: A Guide to U.S. Navy Programs* provides insight into the Navy's ability to "rapidly attack an adversary's critical vulnerabilities, avoid his strengths, and destroy his centers of gravity. The Navy will attack not only its adversary's physical assets, but will conduct effects-based operations targeting potential adversary's perspective, will, and belief structure."⁶

The Air Force views effects-based operations as a method of matching precise capabilities to achieve desired effects by applying simultaneous application of force, maneuver, freedom of navigation, or aerospace superiority against key nodes, at multiple levels of war, and at the same time to paralyze the enemy's ability to function. The Air Force is looking at having the desired effect drive the targeting process, not to have the process or target drive the effect. A non-lethal strategic effect may be to deliberately confuse and disorient an adversary to the point of paralysis, without killing the adversary or non-combatants. Air Force doctrine further states that the use of military power should be effects-based and applied best in parallel operations.⁷ "The Air Force believes that information operations, as an element of combat power, brings together many information activities and services, occupational disciplines, resources, capabilities, and assets to help achieve effects-based operations. Information operations is an 'around-the-clock' war-fighting capability that produces effects, conducted across the spectrum of conflict, every day."⁸

The Army's concept for the Objective Force defines a force that is highly responsive, agile, deployable, versatile, survivable, lethal, and sustainable. Essentially, a force that is capable of producing a variety of effects. "Effects-based operations is in the framework of 'we want to create this condition at the end of a military action.' Then the supporting commanders figure out how best, with their resources in a joint environment, to accomplish that effect."⁹ "The psychological effects produced by the power and precision of Objective Force units will serve to deter hostile acts, both prior to deployment and during the stability phases of operations."¹⁰

Marine Corps doctrine refers to 'effects' in terms of achieving political objectives as either a strategy of annihilation or a strategy of erosion. Selecting a specific strategy drives the selection of specific military actions depending on the specific effects desired. Annihilation is simply to eliminate the military capacity; whereas erosion or attrition can focus on the mind of the enemy leadership. This doctrine recognizes that certain assets may have limited military importance but are of critical economic or psychological value.¹¹ Marine Corps' expeditionary maneuver warfare is the means of "concentrating force at critical points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and momentum" to achieve decisive effects.¹² "Maneuver warfare is a war-fighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope."¹³ The ultimate goal is to eliminate his ability to fight effectively and create panic and paralysis to the point that he no longer has the will to resist.¹⁴

The Joint Force Quarterly, in an article entitled "Seeking Synergy: Joint Effects-Based Operations" postures that commanders can dramatically enhance the ability to defeat enemy land forces, but only if they are prepared to exploit unprecedented airborne ground surveillance and precision targeting techniques with joint effects-based operations.¹⁵ "Joint EBO resembles *Blitzkrieg*, with its emphasis on exploiting movement and human factors (fear, fatigue, and uncertainty) to achieve quick success in land operations. It recognizes the powerful synergy possible when land and air forces are integrated to influence both sets of factors."¹⁶

U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCDE), defines EBO as "a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on the enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels."¹⁷ Key differences are the focus on results vice attrition-based operations and the emphasis on the linkage between effects to objectives. JFCOM further defines "effects" as "the physical, functional, or psychological outcome, event, or consequence that results from specific military or non-military actions."¹⁸ "Effects Based Operations (EBO) is a new way of thinking about fighting the enemy. Effects Based Operations seek to continually focus the full range of our military and inter-agency asymmetric advantages against the enemy's system break-points to destroy his coherence. Early inter-agency involvement enhances our influence, deterrent, and coercive effects over an adversary and our preparation and execution of operations. Effects Based Operations are transforming the art and science of war."¹⁹

Also of importance is our policy of deterrence, which can bring about certain effects sought by our national objectives. "Deterrence is the state of mind brought about by a credible threat of retaliation, a conviction that the action being contemplated cannot succeed, or a belief that the costs of the action will exceed any possible gain."²⁰

As we continue to refine the term and understand the broad implications, we can begin to appreciate the all-encompassing nature of EBO and possible applications within the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic framework. Our focus will be on the informational aspect that portrays how psychological impressions can affect the will of the people, creating perhaps the effect sought.

For the ensuing discussion of EBO, the following tenets are proposed: first, the strategic and operational objectives should be results driven, second, they must be applied at all levels, third, requires a well-communicated endstate, and finally that it uses all elements of power. To create an effect, there should first be a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective with a clear end state in mind. To obtain

the objective, some action must occur in order to bring about the results desired. Understanding and having knowledge of the situation, the order and pattern of the adversary's Center of Gravity (COG), vulnerabilities and obtaining results desired is essential in determining what effect the action will have. Understanding and further high-level analyses of the COG can provide insight into an adversary's vulnerabilities and determination of the 'effects' which can achieve our national intent. In this study, we will examine the concept of center of gravity, highlighting intangible aspects, such as the psychological dimension and show the relationship to creating effects.

CENTERS OF GRAVITY

Joint doctrine defines Centers of Gravity (COGs) as the foundation of capability and "those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight."²¹ It is the focal point where the physical and psychological forces come together. Oftentimes, it is not only the force, but the resolve to use that force to obtain a strategic endstate. As an example, Hitler and his top military leaders could be considered a Strategic COG, since one could argue that it was their vision and drive that brought the forces together. The Panzer Forces would be considered the Operational COG, since they could be mobilized and bring about a physical defeat of the opponent. Carl von Clausewitz stated that the "COG is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely."²² Understanding adversary COGs requires knowledge of many factors to include psychological strengths and weaknesses. It has been demonstrated that the COG has at times more to do with creating the effects that influences a particular objective impacting not only the opponent's ability to fight but his will to fight as well. "National will can also be a COG, as it was for the United States during Vietnam and the Persian Gulf Wars."²³ In the case of Vietnam, eventual lack of public support and the will of the people contributed to the US withdrawal without a decisive victory, though none doubt the superior nature of US military technology and hardware. It could be argued that the nightly television and photo images with certain angles and expressions captured the hearts and minds of Americans in a negative way, which ultimately led to the eventual desire to withdraw from the conflict. Of equal importance were the disparity between tactical actions and the strategic objectives and a lack of an operational level of war. If there is no clear picture of the endstate, any road traveled will not necessarily get you there...hence the American public became more incensed over the continued arrival of body bags for no apparent reason or connection to vital US interests.²⁴ Without strategic and operational goals and objectives, not only could we not achieve the effects desired, but we also could not effect the COGs of the enemy. For the Vietcong, the

COG was the moral right to self-governance and regime legitimacy. The will of the Vietcong triumphed and far outweighed our desire to continue supporting the war effort.

The COG at the strategic, operational and tactical level can also be different. For example, at the strategic level, the COG may be the national will, an economic resource or geographic locations that also support sustainment and transportation. There is much in the literature to suggest that this is merely the capability by which the state is able to carry out its will or purpose. Operationally, the COG could be the "mental and psychological balance of a key commander"²⁵ or the lines of communication (LOCs) to support logistical movements. Finally, at the tactical level, the COG could be an important piece of terrain or port. Understanding the COG and critical vulnerabilities can enable one to devise the appropriate action to take to bring about the effects desired. The key to understanding the COG principle is that it is those characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a faction derives its "freedom of action, its physical strength, and will to fight."²⁶ For example, if the operational COG is the military fighting force because it represents a source of power and power projection, then the capability to ensure viability is the means to transport and resupply that force. The means to transport will require access to ports and airfields, which may be viewed as a "vulnerability," if access can be denied to these facilities. In this case, the operational COG is the combat force, the vulnerability would be the ability to move or resupply at the operational level. Attacking the critical vulnerability will bring about a desired effect on the COG, which in this example is the ability of the combat force to move or be sustained.

Access to and opportunities to destroy a COG can be considered a critical vulnerability or weakness. What oftentimes is critical may depend on the situation and may not always be static. "COGs can change during the course of an operation and at any time, COGs may not be apparent or readily discernible."²⁷ As an example, Saddam Hussein may be considered a strategic COG, because he decides how the regime should act or not act. It is through his control mechanisms such as human atrocities and infrastructure destruction, which he typically resorts to, which creates fear and obedience. Violence and repression keep him in power, while his people struggle with subsistence. He uses misinformation, physical doubles and various hiding places, which make it difficult to capture and destroy him. Iraq's operational COG is centered on the 60,000-strong Republican Guard (RG) and conceivably in the current situation if the fighting moves to the streets of Baghdad this could have both a physical and psychological effect. The RG is considered an operational COG, because it serves as one of the instruments by which Saddam Hussein controls his people internally and protects himself.. If the Iraqi and RG elite Army does not mass, the COG may not be as evident or as easy to destroy. The RG could be rendered ineffective if its leadership

changed and that leadership could be impacted by Information Operations (IO) and PSYOPs. Finally, Baghdad, itself may be a tactical COG, because of the cultural and historic importance of the city to the population, which they will defend at all costs. If Baghdad is attacked, the resolve of the people may even be strengthened. If Saddam uses Baghdad and civilians as “cover,” this will make direct attacks potentially more costly and bring about possible negative opinions from other Arab nations, especially if the network Al-Jazeera televises U.S. and coalition troops killing innocent Arab civilians, used illegally or not. This “vision” could breed heightened terrorist attacks especially with the ongoing Israeli and Palestinian dispute which may be the chaotic state that Saddam Hussein is counting on.

To affect center of gravity, we must first understand what capability it brings, how it strengthens the adversary, and what the requirements are to execute the capability, such as the capability to move forces. “Destruction or disruption of critical adversary functions can create uncertainty, confusion, and even panic in adversary leadership and forces and may contribute directly to the collapse of adversary capability and will.”²⁸ To deny Saddam Hussein’s forces the ability to drag out the war, we must first take quick and devastating blows to his Army and the RG, second, use all methods of PSYOP to compel his military forces to surrender and lastly, convince the population that the west is not the criminal. This operation must take advantage of the interagency and fuse all information to bring about the “right” approach that will best influence the behavior of this nation.

Mapping an adversary’s strength or cohesion that holds the adversary together will identify his vulnerabilities or break points, thus leading us to explore what actions against that break point will bring about the greatest effect. The point here is that we must be willing and able to carefully and continuously assess the COG to include the socio-political aspects. “It follows that a political-psychological-military effort would be a potent combination of ways to control a conflict.”²⁹ This complete assessment of the COG of the adversary will help to build the ends, ways, and means to influence and create the desired effect.

CAUSAL LINKAGES TO CENTER OF GRAVITY

According to Clausewitz, COG is the hub of all power and movement, the point at which we should direct all energies. Understanding causal linkages to the COG and the second and third order effect should be part of the information and knowledge gained about the adversary and connecting efforts to achieving key objectives. It is important to gauge the strength and ability of the adversary, the people, government, and the military. In Michael Howard’s synthesis of *Clausewitz*, he referred to war as the “paradoxical trinity, composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity. These elements he further elaborates as blind natural

force; the play of chance and probability within which the human element is able to speak, and of the element of subordination as an instrument of policy. These three elements are further broken down as being resident in the people, the Army Commander and lastly, the government. These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another."³⁰ Accepting Clausewitz's premise that a balance must be maintained between these three tendencies, to upset that balance would then be a focus for effects. Understanding the adversary's power enables us to determine how and through what means he can be defeated. As we look at figure 1, the theory follows that if 'A' takes actions that are perceived as a threat to 'B,' and if 'B' responds in a similar manner, which increases the threat to 'A,' then more threatening actions will be taken by 'A.'³¹ If 'A' can be influenced through psychological means to behave in a certain way, this capability can be viewed as a valuable resource. There is the risk of escalation by a response in kind.




FIGURE 1: SPIRALING STRUCTURE PROTOTYPE

However, depending on the degree of effect on the adversary, his choice of response and magnitude, as well as duration may have unacceptable consequences. What must be relevant is the level of perceived threat and the underlying assumptions associated with the threat and the actions that need to be taken, which not only can affect the here and now, but future actions as well. These 2^d and 3rd order effects demonstrate, as an example, the kind of profound psychological effect these actions and results can take, and the need to respond rapidly to changing conditions. As we look again at the Vietnam example, "U.S. leadership failed to defend American public opinion against the full-scale propaganda war that was

conducted by North Vietnam and its allies throughout the world."³² This process of action-reaction clearly demonstrates the importance of anticipating correctly an opponent's actions and reactions, accounting for cultural and religious impacts as an example, and not committing the common error of mirror imaging. The presentation of ideas and ideologies and carefully prepared messages can provoke a particular reaction either consciously or unconsciously on a target audience. Army PSYOP in Bosnia is another example of creating an environment where timely, credible and robust information operated effectively with many factions.³³ It was the ability to establish communications between all factions that ensured information reached the populace through many mediums such as, print media radio broadcasts, and some television. More importantly was the positive psychological impact that was accomplished by including mine awareness aimed primarily at children to stress the dangers of land mines and ordnance.³⁴ This rapid, unified, and consistent concerted effort to provide information influenced the way people thought and saw the United States. In order to achieve this action-reaction, cultural understanding coupled with intelligence exerted the kind of influence over people and events and showed America as a benevolent nation, which was the primary intent.

UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS

To gain a better understanding of these critical values we must first understand the difference between direct and indirect effects. "Direct effects are immediate, first-order effects, the results of military actions with no intervening effect or mechanism between act and outcome, and are usually easily recognizable. Indirect effects are second-and third-order systemic effects that are the results created through an intermediate effect or mechanism to produce the outcome, which may be physical or psychological in nature. Indirect effects tend to be delayed and may be difficult to recognize and are often a cumulative or cascading result of many combined direct effects."³⁵ Preparation and shaping of the battlespace entails understanding the enemy and selecting an appropriate course of action commensurate with the end state desired. This information must also link with the enemy's COG, capabilities, and vulnerabilities and more importantly be accessed through a continuing process. Anticipation of the enemy's actions or the intentions of foreign powers, organizations, or persons can be gained through intelligence gathering and operational assessment of the situation as well as the operational environment.³⁶ As an example, "during Operation RESTORE HOPE in 1993, Marine Corps tactical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations ...were able to determine which indigenous forces were friendly, neutral, or potentially hostile, where weapons caches were located and where threat situations might develop."³⁷ Oftentimes knowing

the human and psychological dimension is essential to understanding the intentions and gauging development of potential events, with discernment of the direct and indirect effects of the actions.

Disorientation and disruption of the opponent's system response as either a direct or an indirect effect may be the result of slight changes to our decision cycle and these changes to certain factors can have a disproportionate change in behavior.³⁸ An example of this was Iraq's ability to attempt to create chaos by using SCUD missile attacks and utilizing these attacks as a way to destabilize Muslim alliances within the coalition. Hussein's intent was to get the Israelis to react militarily and bring about heightened chaos. It will be of great benefit to account for these kinds of effects in a chaos model.³⁹ "Chaos theory is a relatively new branch of science of seeing order and pattern where formerly only the random, erratic, and unpredictable had been observed."⁴⁰ More technically called nonlinear dynamics; this nascent field may provide ways to rethink old challenges and account for human psychology. The idea is to turn "chaos" into an advantage and ultimately drive your adversary to do your bidding. By applying a tiny "push" at just the right moment (time and space), one may be able to make a specific chaotic system behave in a certain predescribed manner. The behavior that may seem random may actually demonstrate an underlying order, which by introducing the tiniest bit of change may bring about a correlated direct and indirect effect. We cannot predict with any kind of certainty what effect our actions will have on the adversary from a behavioral perspective, especially in times of turbulence and chaos. A force multiplier may lie in applying influence and winning the battle of wills. To make a determination of any patterns or associations, we must be acutely aware of an adversary's ideological, religious, national (political and economic), cultural, and philosophical aspirations and influences by applying vulnerability/effectiveness analyses. This analysis of COG, and vulnerabilities will also help to understand the direct and indirect effects of actions.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF WARFARE

But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it.⁴¹

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

Webster defines psychology as "the science of mind, emotions, and behavior."⁴² Joint Publication 3-53 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations describes the current theory and concept of "joint PSYOPS to reduce efficiency of opposing forces."⁴³ These operations are planned to convey information and intent

to nation states, organizations, or peoples to influence their emotions, motives, and behavior.⁴⁴ PSYOP use and application fall across the operational continuum from peacetime missions other than war, such as educating the civilian population to major theater conflicts typically directed towards the enemy. The intent should fully reflect the strategic objectives set by the President and the Secretary of Defense. To this end, the strategic, operational, and tactical PSYOP all have their defined purpose and intent to achieve effectiveness to "influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning or behavior of a targeted audience."⁴⁵ "Psychological warfare is closely tied to political or military policy."⁴⁶ Within the military, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) commands and controls the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) units to include Active, Reserve, and National Guard. The command and control of these units is the same in war and peacetime and is an effective combat multiplier as well.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS - HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND APPLICATION

"The morale of the enemy is the target of high priority, its reduction an essential preliminary to the armed clash."

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War⁴⁷

"History provides the strongest proof of the importance of morale factors and their often incredible effect."⁴⁸ It was only through Major General William Donovan's perseverance, that unconventional and psychological warfare ultimately found a place and the close interrelationship between the two, which would finally become Special Operations, as we know it today.⁴⁹ It was linking the efforts and techniques of attacking both the minds and the bodies of the enemy and incorporating this into a single training operation that was finally developed during the interwar years. These concepts are implicit on how he proposed to execute warfare and are resident in current special operations. Adding to PSYOP support are the special relationships developed over time and maintained with Department of State, U.S. Information Agency, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The information these agencies develop about alternative political systems and details they articulate about the virtues of democracy, can be used to "counter adversary propaganda, misinformation and disinformation to correctly portray friendly intent and actions...and effect the political will."⁵⁰ Additionally, "PSYOP units develop and disseminate propaganda designed to lower morale and combat efficiency and to fragment the loyalty of enemy forces and counter

enemy propaganda aimed at undermining friendly deep operations."⁵¹ These units make up the task force complements in many diversified missions and are often augmented by indigenous writers, announcers, illustrators, and interpreters to enhance the effectiveness of the operations. As an example of the capabilities these units bring to the fight, Operation Just Cause demonstrates how the PSYOP and CA soldiers helped to stabilize the area and assisted new governments to reestablish control. The very presence, language skills, cultural awareness, and expertise in low intensity conflict proved invaluable in speeding the process of transforming Panama into a more democratic nation. These soldiers also disseminated newspapers, leaflets, and radio/TV broadcasts to influence the minds and hearts of the Panamanians and helped transition from the combat mission of Just Cause to the stabilization missions of Operation Promote Liberty. This is just a single example of how the physical and psychological aspects of conflict can influence the results or effects of the outcome.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCE LINKS EBO TO COG TO PSYOPS

CREATING NEGATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS

"To seduce the enemy's soldiers from their allegiance and encourage them to surrender is of especial service, for an adversary is more hurt by desertion than by slaughter."⁵²

—Flavius Vegetius Renatus, *The Military Institutions of the Romans*, c. 378 AD

Historical evidence supports the proposition that attacking certain key nodes or decisive points linked to a COG can create negative desired effects that will also have an adverse effect on morale. In preparation for the Normandy invasion, the Allies concentrated bomber attacks on the German fighter production and airfields crippling the Luftwaffe and their control of the sky over Normandy. "This crippling of the Luftwaffe and the Allies' dominance of the air would be the greatest adverse morale factor to the German troops in Normandy."⁵³ In this case, the German ground combat forces and their associated air superiority was an operational COG. As mentioned earlier, Hitler and his top military leaders could be considered a strategic COG, because of their vision and resolve that brought the forces together. The air superiority supported military forces' ability to power project and carry out the purpose and intent of the nation. By attacking fighter production and airfields, a critical vulnerability, the Allies were able to cripple the air capability, which also had a demoralizing effect. On Iwo Jima, the Japanese General, Kuribayashi, through simplistic tactics of nightly infiltrations and small well-organized counterattacks, was able to wear

the Marines away, psychologically as well as physically, by slow attrition.⁵⁴ This may have also created a negative effect, because it protracted the combat operation. Another method of demoralizing and creating a negative psychological effect was Bushido, which is the underpinning of the Kamikaze attacks on the allied fleets during World War II. The Japanese term means “the way of the warrior,” and was based on such virtues as rectitude, endurance, frugality, courage, politeness, veracity, and, especially, loyalty to ruler and country. Only through the exercise of these virtues could a knight maintain his honor, and one who had forfeited honor was compelled to commit suicide.⁵⁵ Supporting Bushido was Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino, a Japanese American born in Los Angeles, also known as Tokyo Rose, who conducted broadcasts in English to American servicemen in the Pacific area. She was later convicted of treason and served a long prison term. Mildred Elizabeth Gillars of Portland, Maine, known as Axis Sally, served a sentence for broadcasting for the Germans.⁵⁶ In both cases, the morale of the military was viewed as a tactical COG and both sought to achieve an adverse psychological effect.

We also observed this in Operation Desert Storm. According to the Department of Defense's (DOD) Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress, the Coalition identified three Iraqi centers of gravity critical to the campaign.

First were the command and control and leadership of the Saddam Hussein regime. If rendered unable to command or control their military forces, or to maintain a firm grip on their internal population control mechanisms, they might be compelled to comply with Coalition demands. Second, degrading Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability would remove a major part of the threat to regional states. This meant degrading the known Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological warfare production facilities along with various means of delivery—ballistic missiles and long-range aircraft. Finally, the third of Iraq's Centers of Gravity were the various elements of the Republican Guards. If the combat potential of those Republican Guard forces located in Iraq just north of the Kuwaiti border were eliminated, Iraq would be unable to continue its occupation. Eliminating the Guard in the KTO as a combat force would dramatically reduce Iraq's ability to conduct a coordinated defense during Operation Desert Storm or to pose an offensive threat to the region later.⁵⁷

The surrender of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces, brought about by the crippling effect of dominant combat power on the COGs and the demoralizing impact of PSYOPS on the forces, demonstrates the effectiveness of defeating the COGs and ensuring success in achieving effects-based operations. "Psychological operations, supported by B-52 strikes targeted the front-line Iraqi soldiers' confidence in Iraqi leadership. The result of this integrated use of these capabilities was the decreased ability of the Iraqi leadership to respond effectively to the land operation when it began."⁵⁸ Paramount is gaining understanding of the enemy and functional areas, (such as the leadership, lines of communication (LOCs) or command and control (C2)), and the causal linkages to the centers of gravity in order to leverage the appropriate psychological effects focusing on the intended result, and ultimately shattering the enemy's cohesion through fear and terror. In order to exploit timely intelligence of the opponent's weaknesses, full cooperation and effective coordination of all dimensions of national power to include the psychological linkage is essential. Knowledge and anticipation is key to permit preemptive action to influence the peoples' and the military's behavior and will to fight.

CREATING POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS

Looking at other historical examples supports the thesis that influencing ideas and winning the hearts and minds of people can have a profound positive effect on an outcome or objective. "Neither policies nor machines will determine the history of tomorrow. This, then, is the ultimate battlefield: the hearts and minds of men."⁵⁹ History illustrates that influencing ideas and winning the hearts and minds of people can have a profound effect on an outcome or objective. Whenever there is continued suffering and plight, typically unrest and instability follows. Continued struggles to satisfy basic needs bring about lawlessness and chaos, especially in countries where the governance is weak. By taking proactive measures, such as influencing what one believes to be true, some volatility can be averted and anti-American sentiments could be altered. As an example, the U.S. government was able to communicate directly with virtually every political elite ...and it was through many underground cultural mediums that important influences on the revolutionary events occurred, which ultimately led to the eventual fall of the Soviet Union.⁶⁰ There certainly were other influences, mainly economic, however, these cultural exchanges brought about human desires and wants. If a family living in a country maintains a meager standard of living and this family sees another nation of greater opportunity and a promise for a better life, is there not a desire for this way of life? This nation through overseas broadcasting and student exchanges, as an example, has the ability to influence behaviors and ultimately defeat totalitarian efforts to

suppress information. The point is that ideological warfare, or more accurately, "ethics of democracy," can help, if used to our advantage, to diminish conflicts before they increase in intensity. The United States did not fare well in the "ideological" warfare as compared to Cold War Soviet Russia. Congress eventually passed the Smith-Mundt Act on January 27, 1948 "to promote a better understanding of the US in other countries."⁶¹ Some important agencies that came into existence as a result of this act were the Office of Educational Exchange (OEX) and Office of International Information (OII) in the State Department.⁶²

Other methods such as diplomatic representations, foreign aid, and propaganda influenced countries towards democracy.⁶³ "Strategy involves two things: development of basic themes to govern propaganda and utilization of various techniques to make that propaganda effective."⁶⁴ Part of the strategy behind Voice of America (VOA) was to encourage the Russian people to do less, in effect "loaf on the job" or resort to their own way of retaliation towards the Kremlin.⁶⁵ There are negative influences as well, with such television programs and movies that portray Americans as deprived and immoral. These are viewed as threats to some religious segments of society. Many radical Islamists and Muslims view the West as the evil society. It is no wonder that a renewed Intifida sponsored by these groups will threaten Western governments and civil stability. Much of these tensions are because identities are at stake as well as religious differences.

President Reagan in 1982, reasserted the goal of spreading a more positive democratic creed by asserting that the "final arbiter of the global conflict will not be bombs and rockets, but a test of wills and ideas."⁶⁶ The fall of the Berlin wall was pivotal which ultimately was the beginning of the end for the USSR. The control of the Baltic States by the USSR, along with internal conflicts and subsequent rejection of Communism, led to reform. Protests mounted and citizens were emboldened to begin challenging the Kremlin. Did organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) or multimedia international broadcasting services such as Voice of America (VOA) or Radio free Europe - Radio Liberty plant the seeds of discontent? "VOA began in response to the need of peoples in closed and war-torn societies of news."⁶⁷ The activities supported by the endowment provided the best evidence of the effects, which comes from the beneficiaries, because of the difference that NED made to the democracy movement in countries like Czechoslovakia.⁶⁸ International Public Information Presidential Decision Directive 68, dated 30 April 1999, further emphasized promoting civil society development through the establishment of International Public Information (IPI). These activities focus on foreign audiences only and are designed to improve the ability of US to coordinate independent public diplomacy and accurately promote our values and interests.⁶⁹ IPI replaces Radio Free Europe and is an excellent tool to bring together interagency

coordination, since participants are from 42 USG agencies. Common commitments from these organizations help to foster mutual interest and respect, which bring a stabilizing effect to regions.

CREATING UNINTENDED EFFECTS

"All warfare is based on deception."

—SunTzu, The Art of War⁷⁰

Some of the techniques employed during WW II, included ruse, disinformation, guerrilla forces, and partisans that would limit the German's ability to mass overwhelming force.⁷¹ The British War Cabinet on Methods of Breaking the German Will to Resist (GEN 52), was established on 22 November 1944, in response to a personal request made by General Eisenhower to reduce the German will to resist by other than purely military means.⁷² In addition to propaganda and deception, other means such as subversion and sabotage capabilities played a role in undermining German propaganda and bringing about an end to the war. One such initiative was code named Periwig. Periwig aimed to create imaginary resistance organizations, putting a maximum strain on the Gestapo, and developing a lack of confidence and insecurity within Germany, causing an eventual breakdown of security services. How successful these initiatives were is debatable. The largest obstacle was coordinating and linking the effort to alliance policy, since Unconditional Surrender constrained some courses of action and perceived intentions. Based on the evidence, some historians' claim that the defeat of the German will to resist was not fully achieved because the correct target was not identified. Giving greater attention to the German troops on the battlefields as opposed to influencing the industrialists, security services, organized religious groups, and various other targets could have created more of an impact on combat operations since the front line troops may have been more vulnerable than commonly believed.⁷³ The Unconditional Surrender may have caused an unintended effect by bolstering the will of the populace to continue to resist, therefore making many of the previously stated missions marginal. The real lost opportunity was in assessing the vulnerabilities and exploiting the psychological dimension of the German troop morale. Other historical cases indicate that direct attack only strengthened the population's resolve, such as in London during WW II. In this case the Germans believed the COG was the will of the people and the critical vulnerability was the protection of the cities. How might this be similar to the conflict in Iraq today and the possible attack of Baghdad? How might the psychological impact been otherwise achieved and what kind of indicators would be appropriate

to determine the nature and extent of these effects? More importantly, how does this relate to Center of Gravity Theory and how can it be exploited? The psychological impact cannot be underestimated and to achieve the desired effects, we must further explore the human dimension before entering as well as during any conflict.

THE IMPORTANCE OF GEO-STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING

The effect of US perspectives on the opposition and the effect of the opposition on the US will require thinking in a broad geo-strategic context. Understanding the strength of will, the character and abilities of both the opponent and the US will be necessary. Clearly, the effects of the attack on September 11 made a psychological impact on the American, as well as other free-nation peoples around the world. The attacks were not only against the very threads of freedom that we as Americans cherish, but they were also aimed against the symbolic, economic, and military components of our instruments of power. Perhaps the terrorists wanted to achieve disruption and demoralization. Perhaps the focus of the attacks was economic, or perhaps it was an attack on our national resolve. Many believe that Bin Laden hurt us economically and psychologically. Certainly, there existed an urgency and determination to get back to business, if only to demonstrate to the attackers that they did not achieve the effect they sought. America and the world, psychologically, emotionally, and economically, needed the markets back up and at least the appearance of business as usual restored. America needed its confidence restored. Did the opposition misread the US COG, as the American psyche or did Al Qaida perhaps hope to inflict greater harm? It is difficult to understand totally the terrorists' intentions or goals, however, based on the psychological and emotional trauma, certain effects were achieved, simply because Americans reacted and changes took place. Given the current world of asymmetric threats and the global reach of some of these organizations, we must be able to anticipate, plan, and prepare for new types of conflict. The attention given to the sluggish economy, creation of a Department of Homeland Security, international attention on the War on Terrorism, and increased military intervention are just a few examples of the United States' resolve to counter the effects of the terrorist's threat. What the enemy does not understand is the complexity of the attack of national will as a COG. American identity is not resident in the Statue of Liberty or the World Trade Centers; it is resident with our sense of freedom, individuality, and the ability to rise above adversity that better models our true identity. Our collective and diverse personalities forged this nation and it is with this COG that we will persevere. There were certainly unintended effects as a result of these attacks and it might be said, in some respects, the events renewed American appreciation for our freedoms with a surge

of patriotism and love of country. Along with this, Americans began a self assessment to better understand why other Nation-states view the United States as evil. Do Americans need to do a better job in projecting positive images and what it really means to be an American? What ways can we counter these negative images and bring about more positive effects?

HOW TO DO EFFECTS-BASED PLANNING INCORPORATING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION

UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSMENT

From as early as the days of Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, public diplomacy played a part in shaping the minds and hearts of others, pushing people towards a specific objective. This was possible because of the length of time each of these men spent in England and France over a period of years and the knowledge they gained about the French and British people. They were deeply engaged in all aspects of the diplomatic, political, economic and military aspects of these countries. They knew people, their culture, and more importantly, the people knew them. "Each not only sought but gained close relationships with leaders in these realms."⁷⁴ General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Combatant Commander of US Central Command (referred to as CINCCENT at the time), spent time in the region during his childhood, and gained knowledge, and insight of Middle East attitudes, cultures, and nuances. This was extremely helpful in not only coordinating coalition missions, but also collaborating the Iraqi surrender and liberation of Kuwait City. Generally, if people routinely operate in an environment, they will be able to quickly discern change within the area. The establishment of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) at each combatant command offers a method to achieve similar understanding and assessment at a theater level. JIACG coordination with Ambassadors, country teams, law enforcement, and other intelligence gathering agencies, can fuse relevant interagency information together that will better help us conduct situational analysis and focus our attentions in understanding the geo-strategic factors in the operational areas..

PLANNING FOR THE RIGHT EFFECT




FIGURE 2: EFFECTS BASED METHODOLOGY

Planning for the right effect should examine causal linkages that will lead to objectives. The Air Force Doctrine Document 3 on EBO illustrates the concept in figure 2. By attacking a specific capability, such as a communication link or planting false information, the effect may be the inability of the adversary to communicate or may prevent his ability to mass, thereby putting the adversary in a vulnerable position.

The President determines our national interests based on an assessment of the current environment and evaluation of strategic intelligence. The planning process begins with a review of the state of U.S. national security objectives, consideration of broad strategies for dealing with the threats to national security, followed by defense-wide policies, and ultimately produces the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).⁷⁵ This guidance, developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, translates the National Security Strategy (NSS) of where we are now, where we are headed and how we will get there to the Department of Defense. The National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the President's NSS and serves to implement the guidance in the Secretary of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The NMS outlines "national military objectives to: defend the US homeland, promote security and deter aggression, win the Nations wars, and ensure military superiority. Based on these objectives, the military will protect the US homeland and interests abroad, prevent conflict and unwarned attacks, and prevail against adversaries today and tomorrow."⁷⁶ The QDR outlines the necessity to develop a broad portfolio of military capabilities that will create "substantial margins of advantage" to include information that will "hedge against and dissuade future threats."⁷⁷

The point is that commanders are expected to prepare courses of action and plans that support political objectives. Political, military, and cultural situations can be highly fluid and dynamic, which create dilemmas for the regional component commander.⁷⁸ Geo-strategic factors in the operational areas of the theater require an assessment of political, economic, sociological, informational, and psychological factors to enable proper planning and evaluation of courses of action (COAs).⁷⁹ These COAs must consider the asymmetric means our potential adversaries may seek to gain the advantage. Head-to-head confrontation, at least in the near-term, will not take place given US military superiority. However, asymmetric threats will continue. "The proposed definition of asymmetry emphasizes the psychological components and disproportionate effects of asymmetric warfare,"⁸⁰ much as we saw with the attacks of September 11. The psychological effect is often the impetus behind the actions, not the action itself. *Asymmetric warfare* is "leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength against the vulnerabilities of a superior opponent to achieve disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining the opponent's will in order to achieve the asymmetric actor's strategic objectives."⁸¹ The essential component is the psychological impact and what we as a nation are willing to sacrifice for a particular cause or interest. To prepare for this new kind of warfare, we must see ourselves as foreign organizations, nation states and other people see us, but also understand how actors will try to exploit a destabilized situation for their own narrow purposes. These actors can apply the stratagems across the entire spectrum of conflict to achieve desired effects. The ultimate question is how do we as a nation prepare and plan for these transgressions?

Effects based operations merely use all elements of national power, kinetic and non-kinetic to achieve the objective. In the Iraq example disarming Saddam is the objective. To accomplish this objective we want Saddam to comply with the UN resolutions and dispose of WMD so he is unable to employ such weapons against the US or anyone else (effect). IO is employed to inform him that deployments are leaving the US, that there are daily press conferences led by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State has offered evidence at the UN and there are speeches by the President. The US is conducting exercises, using UN inspections, and conducting Southern and Northern watch. These are just some of the methods of IO used to bring about a desired effect. Psychologically, the effect is to make him realize that he must modify his behavior or risk loss of his regime. If successful, the objective of disarmament is possible without combat operations.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

Planning at the national strategic level links goals to the national policy objectives. It also assigns the means to achieve the end-state, which are not necessarily all resident within the DoD. The effects of the September 11 attacks on America's soil brought about revised strategic planning and operations to prevent and respond to threats to our nation. As an example, within New York City, this entailed establishing regional interagency and cross-organizational planning that is both responsive and proactive. Part of this effort included the establishment of "Syndromic Surveillance" which is a process of monitoring ambulance calls to look for trends and utilizing forecasting models in the event of chemical or biological attack. Reliance on interagency cooperation such as the New York Police Department's Joint Terrorist Task Force, an investigative arm for the prevention and response to counter-terrorism, became the normative relationship.⁸² At the national level, the State Department, the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, Justice, Transportation, Homeland Security, as well as the Department of Defense are all essential players in establishing targets of opportunity, and nation stability.⁸³ By maximizing political solidarity through the efforts of the Office of Homeland Security, these efforts and resulting intelligence may then be fused to capitalize on maintaining stable regional or global co-existence by improving the mechanism for dealing with international challenges. To visualize the future of warfare, one must be able to understand how the employment of available means for a predetermined end or objective is linked. Just as the asymmetric actor can achieve a strategic objective through tactical means by deploying asymmetric threats, so too can the United States leadership bring about effects through collective efforts by way of psychological tools of engagement. Assuredly, we have come a long way since World War II and the ultimate development of Special Warfare.⁸⁴ History demonstrates clearly the need for cooperation among agencies and the necessity for sharing information and intelligence for effective mission analysis and an identifiable end state. Clearly defining objectives and conditions with termination criteria provides for the right course of action and the identification of effects desired.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Operational planning links the strategic and tactical levels, by orchestrating tactical events in time and sequence to achieve national level goals. Military planning at the operational levels "include the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, the full integration of rear operations with close and deep operations (one battle), force allocations, and the issuance of orders."⁸⁵ Often, information warfare and especially PSYOP is viewed as a softening technique to prepare the battlespace prior to entering a conflict.

To accomplish more effective EBO operational planning, maximizing expertise in the theaters of operation is a requirement. If the JIACG is used to improve understanding and assessment, establishing better relationships with the country Ambassadors, country teams, and other intelligence gathering and law enforcement agencies will be required. As a result the theater staff will have increased exposure to a wider variety of geo-strategic factors, concerns, cultures and nuances. Complete preparation of the battlefield needs a national level organization that can orchestrate public diplomacy that will play a part in shaping the minds and hearts of others and pushing people towards a specific objective. Knowledge gained about the people and engaging in all aspects of the diplomatic, political, economic as well as the military aspects of these countries will help to know the people, their psychological demeanor, their culture, and more importantly, the people will better understand the US.

TACTICAL PLANNING

Typically, this planning focuses on obtaining a certain objective, such as seizure of a stretch of territory, destruction of essential infrastructure, regime change, or halting aggression. Planning for conflicts at this level translates the commander's intent and operational objectives that covers all aspects of the conflict, with specific designated military forces and operations. These objectives (endstate) will help to prescribe the ways and means to obtain the objective. CJCSM 3500.05A (Draft) is the Joint Task Force (JTF) manual for planning joint operations and The Joint Targeting Coordination Board is part of the Joint Task Force structure that explores lethal and non-lethal aspects of employment in order to achieve the desired effects according to the campaign end-state. In many theaters this board is becoming an overall integration and coordination board to include IO and PSYOPS. Planning should include taking advantage of friendly strengths and evaluation of the adversaries' vulnerabilities with the ultimate goal of crippling their capabilities and will to resist. The Combatant Commander must translate national political goals into military objectives and communicate these to subordinate commanders in his Commander's Intent. Per Joint Pub 1, "the joint campaign plan is based on the commander's concept." Furthermore, "the joint campaign is oriented on the enemy's strategic and operational centers of gravity (COG)."⁸⁶ "Anticipation is key to effective planning. Commanders should remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation."⁸⁷ Maintaining essential personnel in-theater for the express purpose of developing assessments of the essential elements of information, both traditional and non-traditional, is key to maintaining or gaining the initiative. EBO in the psychological realm must be clearly communicated at this level.

RECOMMENDATIONS

EBO is a new way of thinking about the application of resources to achieve effects that accomplish objectives and uses elements of national power, kinetic and non-kinetic to achieve the objective. The will of the adversary is a potential COG, therefore EBO must also be applied by using PSYOP against the morale and will of the adversary when it is a COG. Overall, EBO needs to consider an adversaries' will in all operations as an enabler even when will is not considered a COG. Geo-strategic factors in the operational areas of the theater require an assessment of political, economic, sociological, informational, and psychological factors to enable proper planning and evaluation of courses of action (COAs) at all levels - strategic, operational, and tactical.⁸⁸ In order to exploit timely intelligence of the opponent's weaknesses, full cooperation and effective coordination of the interagency is required to leverage all dimensions of national power. The psychological linkage to the opponent's weakness is essential. Knowledge and anticipation is key so that the US can take preemptive action to influence a potential adversary's behavior and will to fight. IO, to include PSYOPS should be planned at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to ensure unity of effort and to impact psychologically the way Americans are perceived, better portray our intentions and to modify the behavior of the adversary. This effort should include a national level organization that addresses the issue of unified action. To achieve cooperation among disparate interagency or national groups at the strategic level, the strategic assessment should set clear psychological effects and objectives that provides for continuous cooperative planning. These psychological effects should capitalize on the strengths of US collection and analysis and focus on adversary vulnerability. Coordination of the national intelligence community should be supported with collection of intelligence from traditional and non-traditional sources. Incorporation of PSYOP activities and interoperability of joint PSYOP forces should receive emphasis during joint exercises to ensure organizations train to use the processes in peacetime that they will use in wartime. This training should focus on training planners to be able to identify effects desired, not just targets of opportunity. This knowledge should include the understanding of political, psychological, moral, societal and informational activity that can be brought to bear in any given situation. Finally, designate trained PSYOP officer/civilians as part of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) and Joint Task Force organizations within the Component Commander's organizations. This will prove to be a valuable resource in regions where stability is challenged.

WORD COUNT=9,671

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⁵¹ Field Manual (FM) 100-15, Corps Operations, (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 29 October 1996), 2-27.

⁵² The Joint Staff, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations Joint Pub 3-53 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 10 July 1996), I-3. Hereafter referred to as JP 3-53.

⁵³ Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, The North African Campaign November 1942 Case Study (Carlisle Barracks: USAWC, 2002), 101.

⁵⁴ Philip A. Crowl and Jeter A. Isely, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 483.

⁵⁵ Treason, Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2002; available from <<http://encarta.msn.com>>; Internet; accessed 2 Jan 2003.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1992.), 2-5.

⁵⁸ JP 3-0, III-36.

⁵⁹ The Joint Staff, Joint Doctrine For Multinational Operations, Joint Pub 3-16, (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 5 Apr 2000), III-1.

⁶⁰ Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1991), 189-193. This study demonstrates the power of overseas broadcasting and student exchanges as a method of influencing foreign politics and weaving American "ethos" into their understanding of democracy.

⁶¹ Summers, 37.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Muravchik, 82.

⁶⁴ Summers, 64.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 78.

⁶⁶ Muravchik, 206.

⁶⁷ Voice of America; Available from <<http://www.voa.gov/index.cfm?sectiontitle=fast%20facts>>; Internet; accessed 12 Jan 2003.

⁶⁸ Muravchik, 218.

⁶⁹ Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) - 68, 30 April 1999. 1-2.

⁷⁰ Griffith, 66.

⁷¹ Noel Annan, Changing Enemies: The Defeat and Regeneration of Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 52.

⁷² Philip M. Taylor, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television March 1998: Breaking the German Will to Resist, 1944 - 1945: Allied efforts to end World War II by non-military means; Available from <http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m2584/n1_v18/20576700/print.jhtm1>; Internet; accessed 23 Oct 2002.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Fitzhugh Green, American Propaganda Abroad (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1988), 4.

⁷⁵ "Financial Management of the Armed Forces, Naval Postgraduate School, Available from <<http://pcc.nps.navy.mil/PPBS/Planning/planning.htm>>; Internet; accessed 29 Oct 2002, 1.

⁷⁶ National Military Strategy Pre-Decisional Draft, September 2002.

⁷⁷ Michele A. Flournoy (Ed.), QDR 2001: Strategy Driven Choices for America's Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001), 15. Extensive listing of various studies from sources such as: Congressionally mandated reviews, intelligence community reports and assessments, Office of the Secretary of Defense reports and studies, services' studies, federally funded and independent research institute studies, etc.

⁷⁸ The Joint Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, Joint Pub 3-07.3 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 12 Feb 1999), I-12.

⁷⁹ Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, U.S. Army War College, Campaign Planning Primer AY03, Version 1, 1 Oct 02, 12.

⁸⁰ QDR 2001, 75.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁸² Comments made during the *Urban Affairs Speakers Panel*, New York City Domestic and International Affairs Trip October 9 - 12, 2002, Urban Affairs Speakers, October 11, 2002.

⁸³ Robin R. Cababa, Nation Assistance - A Misunderstood Mission (Newport: Naval War College, Dept of Operations, 1991), 6.

⁸⁴ Paddock, Jr. Col Paddock traces the origins of Army special warfare from 1941 to 1952 and more specifically describes how the Army hesitated to accept this new unconventional warfare, since many officers did not see the value of psychological warfare, because it was murky and had political ramifications.

⁸⁵ *Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)*, Priority Issue: Rear Operations, Bulletin No. 2-86, November 1986, 10.

⁸⁶ JP 3-0, III-8.

⁸⁷ JP 3-0, III-12.

⁸⁸ Campaign Planning Primer AY03, 12.

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