

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**AN ANALYSIS OF MANEUVER COMBAT TRAINING CENTER TRAINING METHODOLOGY IN
DEVELOPING OBJECTIVE FORCE LEADERS**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. Cloy
United States Army

Professor Robert C. Coon
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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The decline in warfighting proficiency at the Combat Training Centers (CTC's) is well documented. CTC trends analysis continues to highlight the same lessons learned without significant observable reversal in trends. Units are not able to reach and maintain the band of excellence as per army training doctrine. The end result is predictable. Upon first contact with the enemy, units are attrited to the point that they are rendered combat ineffective. Constant premature mission failure does not allow leaders, in particular officers, to experience initiative, adaptability and self-awareness throughout multiple forms of contact. The purpose of this work is to analyze current CTC training methodologies in the development of the officer corps as the Army pursues the objective force leader. The current CTC's training methodology may be inhibiting the development of the objective force leader. In short, the Army needs to make an assessment of its CTC's contribution towards the objective force leader development. Transforming the CTC training methodology may assist in reversing negative warfighting trends but more importantly enhance the growth and confidence of our future leaders.

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AN ANALYSIS OF MANEUVER COMBAT TRAINING CENTER TRAINING METHODOLOGY IN DEVELOPING OBJECTIVE FORCE LEADERS

The Army needs to redraw the map of its expert knowledge and then inform and reform its educational and developmental systems accordingly, resolving any debate over the appropriate expertise of America's Army

—Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins

TRANSFORMATION, THE REDRAWN MAP OF EXPERT KNOWLEDGE

The Chief of Staff (CSA) of the Army's transformational portrait is the redrawn map generating the need for growth in expert and professional knowledge across the Army. The CSA has slowly revealed glimpses of this portrait and the Army has at last begun to identify with where it is headed in the future as a warfighting profession. However, this new map of expert knowledge lacks a charted course for the reforming of Army educational and developmental systems. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is valiantly attempting to find its azimuth on the transformational map in hopes of reforming educational and developmental systems that will ensure the Army remains on azimuth and more importantly has a means of self-correcting its course on this new map. To date TRADOC's knowledge and expertise producing approaches are not fully developed nor reinforced through systematic coaching, teaching and mentoring in the field Army, and therefore the Army as a warfighting profession is in danger of not being transformed but further deformed as it searches for its objective force expertise.

The Army's current educational and developmental deformities are a result of an Army that has attempted to perform in a new stability and support environment on a cold war map of expert knowledge. In particular, the officer corps educational and developmental systems remain fixed on the Berlin Wall or a Line in the Sand. Occasional sprinkling of contemporary environmental training methodologies are applied as a band-aid approach in an attempt to patchwork the expert knowledge of those who will perform these missions. The post-Cold War expansion of the Army's professional jurisdiction has created a gap between the knowledge that its officers receive during their professional military education and the professional knowledge they need to effectively complete the missions that are being assigned in today's contemporary operational environment.¹ Thus, the evolution of a deformed expert knowledge base, because the Army has not conclusively determined the new scope and boundaries; it has not holistically redrawn the map of its expert knowledge.²

The Army is now overlaying the full spectrum environment on top of the same old archaic outdated cold war map as if this operational concept was a piece of maneuver acetate that will describe its axis on the map of professional expertise. Thinking on acetate is good as long as the correct map is used across the Army in a unity of effort. TRADOC needs to focus on the CSA's objective force and produce supporting and synchronized overlays that will expedite unity of effort. If the Army does not change map sheets and develop, distribute and digest supporting educational and developmental maneuver graphics then it will continue to deform the CSA's vision of the objective force. As an integral functional proponent in the development of the Transformation Campaign Plan of 2015, TRADOC needs to take the lead as the educational and training "Superintendent" of all its learning centers and develop milestones, inchstones and timelines that will resolve the debate of the Army's expertise.³

THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING SPECTRUM

Before delving into the depths of how the Army pursues an expert knowledge, it is necessary to first define education and training terminology. Col Harry Summers summed up the difference between the education and training when he stated, "You can train for the known, for the unknown you educate."⁴

Further literature survey reveals that training is the building in of information and progressive repetition of tasks to develop skills and proficiencies.⁵ Training is focused on what the student is expected to do; education emphasizes what the student is expected to know.⁶ Training quantifies proficiency, but we educate to stimulate to expand perspectives to enhance judgment, to allow and encourage flexibility to deal with the unexpected and to indeed shape the unexpected.⁷ Indeed training and education are often used interchangeability and synonymously. Training emphasizes the DO of the Army's BE, KNOW, DO leadership mantra. Education emphasizes the KNOW of the Army's leadership mantra. This work's focus is where training and education achieve overlap across the spectrum of education and training. This overlap occurs within the BE element of the Army leadership mantra.

ARMY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IMPLIES LEARNING

The presupposition of the second of nine concluding Snider and Watkins statements (as highlighted at the beginning of this work) from their professionalism study is that the Army is a learning organization. More importantly, they assert that through education and training the Army will more effectively transform as a profession. But is the Army truly a learning

organization? Are the lessons the Army is learning facilitating the CSA's transformational vision and subsequent development of its future leaders?

LTC Stephen Gerras does not believe the Army is a learning organization when he states, "If a learning organization is framed as a change in the structure leadership and interaction norms of the organization in order to better achieve a quest for accurate and new knowledge, the alternative is to remain on our current path of slow, incremental change that is focused on the periphery of the organization and involves a decision making process that thrives on the status quo."⁸ Gerras argues that the Army will become a learning organization if it focuses more on the reinforcing mechanism as opposed to the embedding mechanism of structure and leadership changes. Reinforcing mechanisms reach deeper into an organization and effect and ensure change within.⁹ Reinforcing mechanisms hold education and training institutions accountable in order to demonstrate to the individual and units that learning is actually occurring.

Gerras argues that the Army must establish holistic reinforcing mechanisms to create an Army that truly learns and expands its jurisdictional knowledge. Merely changing the environmental conditions, much of what has taken place in TRADOC reformational initiatives, will not suffice. Educational and training methodologies must change. These methodologies must be linked with measurable outcomes to remove the subjectivity of our professional expert knowledge. Reinforcing mechanisms within educational and training methodologies must become the foundation underneath the protective roof and walls of embedding mechanisms.

As Gerras stated above, today's Army attempts to effect change on the periphery. For example, in pursuit of the CSAs vision TRADOC has embedded mechanisms of the Contemporary Operating Environments (COE) in support of operational demands. Historically, reinforcing mechanisms within the educational and developmental methodologies are left for the field Army to sort out and implement. The mandating of Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) for units executing stability and support operations is a good example of our dyslexic expert knowledge between TRADOC and the field forces. Forces Command (FORSCOM) and United States Army Europe (USAREUR) require certification of deploying units in COE jurisdictional tasks. This is a reactive approach to learning as opposed to the proactive nature the CSA envisions. It works, but does it solve the immediate challenge of building a body of knowledge amongst our leaders in advance of, or in the midst of, an environmental shift in warfighting? Researchers at the Army Research Institute sum up the need for the Army to be proactive in developing its professional expertise stating, "If we are to transform the Army during this

decade, we will need to validate training approaches that accompany, not trail, the implementation of new warfighting technologies and the tactics that they will bring.”¹⁰

So, how will the Army arrest its educational deformities and become proactive in developing learning methodologies as it strives to truly become a learning institution? LTC Paul Reoyo says it best when he states for the Army to become a learning organization and to develop the objective force leader “requires commitment on the part of the Army and its leaders. The Army must commit to be a learning organization that institutionalizes the organizations learning philosophy and provides the resources necessary to foster continuous education, training and leader development for our future leaders.”¹¹ LTC Mike Prevou further refines and amplifies LTC Reoyo’s assertion when he states, “If we accept the belief that experience and knowledge are the basic elements of our battlefield wisdom, then we must consider our educational philosophy as well as curriculum, instruction and technology. What we teach and how we teach it provides a roadmap and vehicle for the reform journey. Why we teach provides the destination. We need to set a course.”¹²

The Army will become a learning organization when all its educators and trainers understand its educational identity via a soundly implemented educational philosophy nested under the Army’s training doctrine. The Army needs a pervasive and cohesive educational philosophy that is deeper than the current objective force educational mantra of wanting to teach leaders how to think as opposed to what to think. Simply stating that Field Manual 7-0 is the Army’s capstone training document and is applicable to all units at all levels and components is not the answer to an overarching educational philosophy.¹³ A good solid Army educational philosophy will describe to those who are executing the training management system how the Army expects the soldier and leader to learn, how to excel in the human dimension of soldiering and how to create critical thinking warfighters.¹⁴

Therefore, analysis of the Army’s learning ethic suggests that there is a serious gap in the Army’s supporting educational and developmental systems. This gap has existed and will continue to exist until the Army holistically institutionalizes the new transformational redrawn map of expert knowledge via reinforcing mechanisms that hold accountable the subordinate educational, training and developmental institutions. These supporting systems must define and enforce reformational reinforcing mechanisms that demonstrate learning is occurring. Simply stating task, condition and standards and hoping the learning environment will create learning opportunities will not ensure the development of leaders in line with the CSA vision of the objective force leader. Turning Army educators and trainers loose with go forth and teach how to think, not what to think also falls short. The Army needs a comprehensive educational

philosophy that once again provides unity of effort across its educational institutions. This philosophy needs to be more than ensuring Army doctrine is understood, applied and adhered to, it needs to facilitate this and more. The Army educational philosophy needs to ensure that its students know how and when to adapt and deviate from doctrine. LTG John M. Riggs, Director of the Objective Force Task Force, sums up this need for Army wide unity of effort when he directed the following:

“Leader Development and Soldiers are inextricably linked on our path to The Objective Force. Adaptive and self-aware leaders are essential to the employment of the Objective Force. Leadership training will focus on developing skill sets using experiential vice process-oriented training. It will be adaptable, and flexible to prepare the soldiers at every level to assume a leadership role at echelons above their own. TRADOC will modify leader educational models to prepare future leaders for full spectrum operations at the combined arms, joint, and strategic levels.”¹⁵

TRADOC needs to follow through on LTG Riggs' directive and first develop an Army wide educational philosophy that will lead it to change into the learning organization the CSA envisions. This philosophy must describe the content, method, timing, and relevance of its professional military education across institutional, unit and individual leader development programs.¹⁶

THE ARMY'S PROVING GROUND FOR LEARNING AND LEADERSHIP.

The Army's first step towards the development of an educational philosophy is the transformation of its Professional Military Education (PME) system. Embedding mechanisms of Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) and Intermediate Leadership Education (ILE) are piloted with completion of Officer Education Systems (OES) in FY06 and Non Commissioned OES to follow. Examination of both OES and NCOES confirms that the CTC's are not considered full partners in the OES system. Nowhere in the PME are CTC's addressed as part of the PME system.

The salient question is how will the Army truly know when it has become a learning organization outside of an operational mission? The answer for warfighting proficiencies is found at the CTC's. The Army's premier institutions of higher warfighting and leadership development are its CTC's. (See Figure 1 for the Army Training and Leadership Development Model). The CSA emphasizes the criticality and the unilateral effect of the CTC's on learning and leading in his purpose statement for all CTC's. He has stated openly that the “purpose of

the Army's CTC's is to develop leaders."¹⁷ He believes that each CTC is primarily a leader development training ground. "The primary focus of the CTC program should be training and developing flexible leaders able to quickly assess ambiguous situations, make decisions and act on them."¹⁸ As noted earlier, the question at hand is how is TRADOC following through and enforcing the CSA vision and LTG Riggs directive? What are the contemporary reinforcing mechanisms ensuring compliance, providing evidence that learning is occurring? Is it the After Action Review (AAR)? Is it the Take Home Package (THP)?

Army Training & Leader Development Model




FIGURE 1. ARMY TRAINING AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT MODEL

Inspection of current Army Regulation (AR) governing the CTC Training Program, AR 350-50, indicates that reinforcing mechanisms are yet to be applied to the CSAs vision and LTG Riggs' supporting directive. (In fact, the current AR 350-50 is dated 24 May 1995, published four years before the CSA transformational announcement. There is a draft update ready for signature three years after the CSA transformational announcement. The final draft is currently awaiting approval, which is projected to be early 2003. None-the-less AR 350-50 final draft will be used in this work).

Analysis of the second of five supporting CTC advanced collective training pillars against supporting FORSCOM and TRADOC regulations provides interesting insight as to why the Army needs to nest all of its educational and training institutions under educational philosophy. The second pillar requires each CTC to establish and maintain a dedicated, doctrinally proficient Operations Group (OPSGRP) containing trained and experienced Observer / Controllers (O/C).¹⁹

As directed by LTG Riggs, TRADOC is the executive agent for the Army to modify leader education models. However, in accordance with the Action Plan for the TRADOC Accreditation of the CTC's, the National Training Center (NTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) are indeed considered TRADOC organizations but, placed under the operational control of FORSCOM. The Action Plan assigns the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTTC) to the Commander of the 7th Army in total.²⁰ These two dysfunctional command relationships clearly raise issues of unity of effort much less command. If TRADOC was required to publish an overarching educational philosophy the potential for erosion in execution highly exists due to this unusual command relationship between FORSCOM, USAREUR and TRADOC. How can TRADOC expect to establish and ensure compliance via reinforcing mechanisms leading to comprehensive accreditation of objective force training methodologies under this command relationship?

Evidence of this lack of unity of effort between these three Major Commands (MACOMS) can be easily seen from a cursory look of each CTC's mission statements and their subordinate Operations Group (OPSGRP) mission statements. All CTC mission statements should be nested within AR 350-50 vision statement below:

The CTC vision supports multidimensional training centers leveraging technology to prepare the best Army in the world for the full-spectrum operations. It maintains the qualitative edge in warfighting, preserving the warrior ethos during a period of strategic transition. The CTC's will support achievement of Joint Vision 2010, Army Vision, and Army Transformation goals by providing an operational environment, where our capabilities-based Army will train to achieve advanced, full spectrum dominance throughout the operational and tactical levels of warfare against a freethinking, opportunities based Opposing Force.²¹

Below are the CTC Mission statements for comparison and contrast against the vision statement above:

CMTTC Mission Statement: The CMTTC, in a forward deployed environment at Hohenfels, Germany, provides realistic joint and combined arms training focused on developing soldiers, leaders and units for success on current and future battlefields. The CMTTC trains up to a task organized brigade combat team and selected divisional maneuver assets across the entire spectrum of conflict from high intensity to stability and support operations.²²

JRTC Mission Statement: The JRTC, at Ft Polk, LA, provides realistic joint and combined arms training focused on developing soldiers, leaders, and units of our nation's joint contingency forces for success on future battlefields. The JRTC trains up to a task organized brigade,

selected division maneuver assets, special operations forces and selected multi-echeloned combat support and combat service support to conduct and rehearse combined arms operations across the spectrum of conflict from mid-intensity to stability and support operations. Training occurs under tough, realistic combat-like conditions across a wide range of likely tactical operations and missions rehearsal exercises capable of full integration into higher-level exercises and scenarios.²³

NTC Mission Statement: The NTC, at Ft Irwin, CA provides realistic joint and combined arms training focused on developing soldiers, leaders and units of America's Army for success on the 21st century battlefield. The NTC trains up to a task organized brigade and selected division maneuver assets to conduct and rehearse combined arms operations across the spectrum of conflict from high intensity combat to stability operations.²⁴

Again, cursory comparison and contrast begs the question of why each CTC mission statement deviates from the regulatory CTC vision and even with each other? The most glaring discrepancy is there is no mention of Joint Vision 2010, Army Vision, and Army Transformation goals or any of these elements within any of the mission statements. According to these self-attesting mission statements, the CTC's feel that they are meeting such visionary requirements by just providing the training environment for future battlefields.

The simple answer for such dysfunction is that TRADOC is not adequately reinforcing its vision statements because there is not a unifying and cohesive educational philosophy evident in these CTC mission statements and there is internal and external organizational friction because supporting and supported relationships are not well defined.

A more detailed examination of each CTC's Operations Group (OPSGRP) mission statements reveals additional evidence of this confusion. Such organizational dysfunction should not be, especially since AR 350-50 states that OPSGRPs are the foundations of the CTC program.²⁵ For comparison and contrast the OPSGRP mission statements are below:

NTC OPSGRP Mission Statement: The Operations Group mission is to provide realistic joint and combined arms training focused on developing leaders and units for the power projection Army of the 21st Century Battlefield. OPSGRP executes this mission by providing realistic training and feedback to soldiers, leaders, and staffs at every echelon from platoon to brigade as well as providing feedback to units, agencies, and training institutions that document, and implement the lessons learned by trained units.²⁶

CMTC OPSGRP Mission Statement: In a forward deployed environment at Hohenfels, Germany, the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) provides realistic joint and combined arms training focused on developing soldiers, leaders and units for success on current and

future battlefields. Trains up to a task organized brigade combat team and selected division maneuver assets across the entire spectrum of conflict from high intensity to stability and support operations. Conducts Mission Rehearsal Exercises to prepare units for stability and support operations as part of a multi-national force, and supports Corps level aviation deep attack exercises.²⁷

JRTC OPSGRP Mission Statement: The Operations Group is the executing agent for the Joint Readiness Training Center's (JRTC) rotations. Ops Group is responsible for planning, executing, and observing and controlling each JRTC rotation. The Ops Group is Organized into Divisions Consisting of: Brigade Command and Control, Battalion Task Forces 1 and 2, Fire Support, Intelligence, Aviation, Combat Service and Support, Special Operations Division, Live Fire, and Plans EMC.²⁸

After reviewing these three separate and in some cases distinct missions statements, the immediate and pressing question is how do they support the CSA transformational vision, AR 350-50 vision statement and more importantly their own higher headquarters mission statements? In many ways they do not. For example, the CSA emphasizes leader development. Only the NTC addresses this essential task. The CSA discusses the full spectrum of conflict and only CMTC address this essential task. AR 350-50 mandates realistic training feedback but only NTC and CMTC include this essential task in their mission statements.

What is not mentioned in any of them and should be is the development of objective force warfighting traits across the spectrum of conflict. They should address their training methodology and supporting reinforcing mechanisms that will ensure units will learn against the entry-level skills the leaders and units possess upon arriving the CTC. An example of a proposed revised OPSGRP mission statement is as follows: CTC OPSGRP mission is to provide realistic joint and combined arms training focused on developing objective force leaders and soldiers across the full operational spectrum. OPSGRP executes its mission by observing and controlling training events for the purpose of assisting field commanders in achieving prerotational identified training objectives, which are realistically based on current unit warfighting proficiencies. OPSGRP observations will be addressed via operational reviews before, during and after mission sets via formal and informal teaching, coaching and mentoring sessions against objective force warfighting skill, knowledge and attribute competencies.

So, after this lengthy scrutiny of CTC missions, the question comes to mind, so what? The point is, the CSA expects TRADOC to be the executive agent over the CTC's in modifying an educational and training methodology that will focus on developing leader skill sets using

experiential vice process-oriented training that will produce adaptable and self-aware leaders. If TRADOC is to accomplish this mission then it must have full authority over the CTC's with all other MACOMs in support. Full authority to require that each CTC OPSGRP is trained and accredited in all its training methodologies from developing training scenarios and training each O/C on how to control the seven forms of contact to ensure leaders learn adaptability and self awareness skill sets through timely and responsive feedback systems. If TRADOC expects its proponent educators and trainers to operate off the same map of expert knowledge then it needs to clarify its command relationships both amongst its brother MACOMs and more importantly within its own command.

Currently the CTC's are the primer learning and leadership proving grounds in name only. They are living on their past after action reviews. They continue to operate off the cold war map of expertise as Snider and Watkins charged the Army in their research. The CTC's have only changed the environmental learning conditions by applying the COE and most recently full spectrum operations on top of the cold war teaching, coaching, mentoring, training and feedback methodologies. If the CTC's are to fully adopt the CSAs vision then they must look inward and change the way they teach, coach and mentor those who they are charged with making adaptable and self-aware warfighters. They need to relook how training methodologies create positive and meaningful repetitions in order to reverse several years of rigid, set piece thinking. LTC Prevou best sums up this education decay when he states,

"The current focus in professional military education on the decision making process verses decision-making during execution and knowledge transfer verses experiential learning has created a generation of military leaders who are prisoners of a system that were taught what to think and failed to develop adequate experience through deliberate practice required in a rapidly changing world. They have become predictable and rigid thinkers as opposed to the self-aware and adaptive flexible leaders we need today."²⁹

To become a learning Army and to breakout of the prison of rigid thinking, instructors and O/Cs need to have in their hands a working TRADOC centric educational and training philosophy that is nested under Army training doctrine and links institutional, unit and individual learning. Under the umbrella of TRADOC's educational and training philosophy the CTC's need to demonstrate that the Army is growing adaptable and self-aware leaders via valid reinforcing mechanisms derived from a holistic and mutually supporting Doctrine Training Leader Development (DTLD) process. Not until then will the CTC's become the proving ground for learning and leading. Not until then will the CTC's actually become full partners in the Army's

transformation towards the objective force. Not until then will the Army become a learning organization.

DEVELOPING ADAPTABLE AND SELF- AWARE LEADERS AT CTC's

TRADOC PAM 525-3-90, Objective Force, Tactical Operational and Organizational Concept for Maneuver Units of Action (MUA) describes the objective force soldiers and leaders as "marked by mental agility and rapid decision making. They will be adaptive and self-aware – able to master the transitions in the diversity of 21st century military operations."³⁰ Flipping to the back of the pamphlet looking for the glossary for a definition of adaptive and self-aware the reader will be sorely disappointed. There are no official, prescriptive definitions of adaptive and self-aware objective force leader to work towards. The reader is left to build his own definition based on a plethora of adaptive and self-aware descriptive qualities embedded from cover to cover of the pamphlet.

How do CTC's develop a training methodology building objective force soldiers and leaders based on sound bites of how to think as opposed to what to think marked by mental agility and rapid decision making, if the Army does not know what an objective force leader is? Is the training methodology to be found in TRADOC 525-3-90 when it states that MUA are based on meeting a set of required operational capabilities that respond to a new system design principle of trainability? According to this pamphlet trainability is "The tactical acumen of small unit leaders must be task oriented on mission, but also make sense out of the variables on the operational environment in order to provide experiences that really develop skills and attributes at full spectrum."³¹

Is this design principle founded on some overarching TRADOC educational philosophy or better yet rooted in our training doctrine so units and CTC scenario writers can build training methodologies leading with tactical acumen to become to adaptive and self-aware? Therein lies the problem, it is not, and units across the Army are searching for objective force truth of what we want our future leaders to look like.

LTC Mike Prevou, doctoral candidate at the University of Kansas, is conducting qualitative research of adaptive and self-aware leadership. He conducted an initial study survey to determine what officers in the field define as self-aware and adaptive leaders. His findings indicate that there was no agreed upon definition of self-aware and adaptive leaders. Self-aware leaders are possess the following seven traits.

- What their personal role / function / responsibilities are per circumstance.

- How the basis of their commandship, leadership, general authority and credibility may vary per situation.
- The interpersonal skills needed at a particular moment / in a particular circumstance.
- What are their personal shortfalls per situation / environment / interference with certain players.
- How they are being viewed by all players in their battlespace.
- How they need to see / view the situation at hand.
- The varying command and leadership principles, concepts, TTPs they must embody and employ all of which may vary according to a broad range of circumstances they might find themselves in down the road.³²

For adaptive leaders, his findings describe such leaders as one who can lead and manage in fast-paced operations in a changing environment. Adaptive leaders possess the following six traits. Adaptive leaders are...

- Comfortable with ambiguity.
- A team builder and trainer.
- Accelerated – passionate learner.
- Flexible and innovative. Willing to try different approaches.
- Highly developed conceptual skills. Can view a problem from multiple perspectives.
- Tactical expert-technically proficient.³³

The self-aware common thread woven throughout LTC Prevou's research is the ability of the objective force leader to sense and manage his internal strengths and weaknesses in relation to the external pressures and circumstances acting upon him and his decision making process. The adaptive common thread is the ability of the objective force leader to make the right mission decision in a complex, dynamic, uncertain and ambiguous environment.

TRADOC PAM 350-7-0, Pre Decisional Draft, Objective Force, Doctrine, Training and Leader Development (DTLD), is probably the best “almost on the market explanation” of objective force attributes. The PAM's purpose is to link the training and development of the objective force leader to doctrine and to seven strategic capabilities. One of the seven strategic capabilities speaks directly to reforming the Army towards objective force leadership development. All the others again speak towards creating learning environments and the linking of institutional, unit and individual learning environments. The PAM is a good first attempt towards codifying the DTLD concepts found across a growing plethora of objective force TRADOC documents. It should not be mistaken as an educational philosophy.

Of particular note, is how 350-7-0 PAM provides the Army its first true “almost” doctrinal definition of what a self-aware and adaptive leader is.³⁴ It defines self-aware and adaptive

leadership under an objective force leader framework as being competency based upon a set of interrelated Skills, Knowledge and Attributes, (SKAs, See Figure 2 for a depiction of the objective force leader differences³⁵). Self-Awareness and adaptiveness are only two of the nine competencies. The others are interpersonal, conceptual, technical, tactical, mental, physical,




FIGURE 2. OBJECTIVE FORCE LEADER DIFFERENCES

and emotional. Self-awareness and adaptiveness are the only two that are defined. Self-awareness refers to the extent that a leader is conscious of his identity, understands his emotions, strengths, weaknesses, needs, drives, as well as understands how these effect others. Adaptability refers to the leader's ability to achieve success in situations of uncertainty, quickly make sense of complex environments, provide creative solutions in ambiguous situations and help others as well.³⁶

Reviewing these competency based SKAs it is important to note that CTC's currently are involved in coaching, teaching and mentoring in only the tactical, technical competencies. The average O/C does not endeavor nor is he required and for that matter trained to delve into other competencies, especially those competencies that deal with other than technical and tactical

expertise. The above average O/C may touch upon the others competencies but it is not the norm and it certainly is not codified.

For the CTC's to develop such leaders' competencies there must be significant changes to the CTC training methodologies within OPSGRPS. These changes must be founded upon multiple observation opportunities in the form of SKA contacts, much more than those created by chance today. These should be anticipated learning engagements across the seven forms of contacts or even warfighting friction and stresses within units. These contact observations must be multiple in nature for the leaders' O/C counterpart to coach, teach and mentor while assisting the leader in seeing, developing and changing his SKA leadership composite. Therefore, a battery of contacts enables the O/C to collaboratively build his counterparts objective force leadership competence composite for use in constant post rotation self-examination. This methodology ensures the leader develops actual combat experience vignettes built upon mental vignettes practiced at home station.

The CTC's must change their current training methodologies to create, encourage and facilitate the multiple contacts under a collaborative effort between the O/C and the leader. Currently, the CTC training methodologies can best be described, as *que-sera-sera*, what will be, will be. This is because CTC's emphasize the word AFTER action in the review process too much. To do so causes learning opportunities to be lost and not transfer from home station mental vignettes to operational combat vignettes. Reinforcing mechanisms must be crafted and validated to provide O/Cs the opportunity to conduct formal and informal operational reviews within the before, during and after mission cycle. O/Cs must be trained and systematically permitted to control scenarios throughout this mission cycle to ensure multiple contacts with leaders throughout the unit to prevent repetitive and immature mission failure. Assisting the unit in achieving realistic training objectives in the midst of these contacts should be a key part of the O/C training ethic. To do so otherwise steals away soldier and leader tacit learning experiences and degrades as opposed to upgrading objective force leader competencies.

Admittedly, this CTC's transformational study goes against the current O/C training ethic and therefore is expected to be readily rejected by the CTC OPSGRP's. OPSGRP's internally operate within a mindset of if it "isn't broke then don't fix it," the exact antithesis of the transformational message. New training methodologies may require the CTC's to divorce themselves in part from the comfort and constant of three generations of proven training methodology. However, each CTC OPSGRP needs to look internally and remember leaders at all levels have a critical role in the Army's attainment of the objective force and must work to overcome the inertia that impedes progress.³⁷

SKA COMPETENCY BASED CTC's

While it is understood that CTC training foundations will endure, the objective force will need new and innovative approaches to the use of these capabilities to meet the new training challenges.³⁸ For the CTC's to join the transformational process they must reform three critical approaches of the CTC experience. CTC's must address scenario development, O/C collaborative involvement in controlling training and the AAR process.

Training scenarios need to design anticipated contacts so that these nine SKA competencies will come to fruition. The purpose of a scenario may not purely be a tactical mission but also to deliberately and specifically produce or enhance the SKA set of leaders. Current scenario development at the CTC's considers leader development a byproduct of the tactical and technical engagements. This must change if the emphasis of SKA competencies apply equal weight to the BE, KNOW and DO mantra of leadership as opposed to today's CTC scenario emphasis on KNOW and DO. This BEing element of leadership will require scenarios manipulation in the midst of a rotation. It will also require training objectives to be reviewed more often in the midst of a rotation and if they are not being met due to repetitive mission failure then scenarios must be adjusted.

Repetitive mission failure, as occurs most often at today's CTC is the enemy of competency based training. Repetitive mission failure hardens the leaders' heart towards his SKA set. When a leader is not able to self examine his SKA set because the scenario or, the mission prematurely comes to closure, his map of expert knowledge is not expanded and there is very little learning occurring. This is not to suggest that tough realistic training at the CTC's should be abandoned. Transforming scenario development at the CTC's does mean that a units' current SKA competencies should be included in scenario development and management and not merely to be determined by engineered train wrecks. CTC's should be developing scenarios that require higher order cognitive skills that enable leaders to adjust and adopt their thinking and tactical decisions to rapidly changing operational situations and conditions.³⁹

To reiterate, this means the CTC's need to get as many leaders into the fight as often as possible. CTC's need to abandon and avoid scenarios that continually attrite and repeat previous failures mission to mission to mission. Repetitive mission failure scenarios only serve to feed the endless litany of negative trends. CTC's need to rethink how they can contribute to trends reversal via scenario development and management. An example may be that the CTC's do away with the one-size fits all 14-day force on force rotations. Instead rotations are designed to fit the unit being trained based on their SKA skill sets and training objectives. To achieve this senior leaders responsible for approving scenarios need to provide CTC's with

realistic training objectives instead of the traditional defend, movement to contact and attack menu approach. Scenario developers must know the brigades unblemished SKA competency profile so as to develop reinforcing mechanisms to stretch the unit in a deliberate manner. This approach will allow scenario management to be based on a series of decision points predetermined and refined throughout the rotation. These decision points enable senior leaders observing the rotation to consult with senior trainers and leaders within the organization and to collaboratively assess and determine the direction of future scenario throughout the rotation. This means that rotations are fluid and may change course for efficient and effective learning to occur.

A critical element to the flexibility in scenario execution as described above is the teaching of O/Cs how to anticipate and recognize opportunities to control and then observe SKA contacts. This means they must know the qualities of the SKA competencies in detail and at advanced levels so they will know when and how to shape and control SKA inserts. In the SKA based competencies CTC's the O/Cs must control training as much as observe training so as to provide their counterparts an SKA composite. To balance control with observation, O/Cs need to be masters of dialogue as opposed to primarily being doctrinal experts and critics. Genuine and candid dialogue drives a collaborative effort amongst the O/C and his counterpart more than technical and tactical proficiency. If the CTC's expect the O/Cs to become catalyst causing future leaders to breakout of the rigid rut of what to think and into a new training level of how to think, then the O/C code must de-emphasize or better yet balance two of the nine SKA competencies, (technically and tactically proficient), and emphasize the other seven.

Finally, the whole AAR process needs serious comprehensive review. SKA competencies often require immediate tacit and mental cataloguing. Waiting for an action to run its course so a learning event can be reviewed will not help leaders transfer home station mental vignettes into mature combat vignettes. O/Cs need the ability to insert and capitalize on an AAR thought, seed, and insight at just the right time to help their counterpart reflect on the SKA moment. TRADOC PAM 350—7-0 states, "All Army trainers, regardless of component or location, must have the capability to prepare, produce and rapidly reconfigure individual and unit performance oriented standards and realistic multi-echelon training."⁴⁰ The O/Cs should be the master of this technique.

An example of this is an FM hot wash at a tactical pause in a fight on a protected frequency for only the O/C and his counterpart. The O/C can plant a seed thought, or simply remind his counterpart of a decision point without interfering on the command net. Another example is the use of a simple dry erase board with a question posed on it stating, "What do

you think yelling on the radio is doing to your subordinate leaders?” Or, “What is it you wanted to know or do at this phase of the fight?” Armed with an in depth knowledge of a unit and its leader SKA competencies, the O/C can develop and insert reinforcing mechanisms that will drive SKA learning to new levels. If and when a formal unit cooperative traditional AAR is conducted the participants will have recency to call upon and become vested in learning as opposed to the current AAR dynamic of fixing blame and self-preservation.⁴¹ Calling upon the recommended OPSGRP mission statement previously discussed above, O/Cs need to retool the benchmark of the CTC’s and remove the word AFTER from the CTC lexicon. AARs need to transform to operational reviews (ORs) before, during and after mission sets via formal and informal teaching, coaching and mentoring sessions against objective force warfighting SKA competencies. The infamous CTC AAR question of “What is the one thing you could change or would have done differently,” is reminiscent of the cold war map of knowledge. That question needs a change to the present tense to, “What is it you would do differently right now!”

Assessment and feedback are key to developing confident, self aware, and adaptive leaders who can see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively.⁴² How can the current training and AAR methodology of repetitive mission failure followed by a review of tactical and technical blame fixing build confident SKA skill sets for the objective force leader? The answer is, it cannot and therefore the CTC’s are obligated to keep pace with transformational initiatives.

OBSERVATIONS FROM OUT OF THE BOX

As a major part of this study I was determined to capture CTC “in the box” leader training experiences and insights from my fellow Army War College classmates now that they are out of the box. My experiences as an O/C at both NTC and most recently at CMTC have convinced me that the CTC’s are not fully realizing their potential now and will definitely not in the objective force future. I wanted to know if my classmates had the same or similar observation. More importantly, I wanted to know the projected impact current CTC training methodologies may have on the transformation glide path of leader development. I developed an unscientific random survey to poll opinions about this subject. The survey was administered to 79 classmates of infantry, armor, field artillery, aviation, and special forces branches. Each officer was selected from the Army War College class of 2003 biographical book database. The criterion for selection besides branch was the past potential for CTC rotational experience based upon tactical duty assignments as a battalion commander, executive or operations officer. A 60% response rate was achieved with 48 of 79 surveyed responding. Key results of the survey are discussed below with subsequent analysis.

ROTATIONAL BACKGROUND

Twenty-eight of the respondents' commanded battalions at maneuver CTC's. Fourteen did not command battalions or did not train their battalions at a maneuver CTC. The majority of the CTC experiences were obtained at NTC with JRTC and CMTC having equal representation of 8 each, totaling to 36 command rotational experiences. Twenty-four respondents had battalion / task force (BN/TF) S3 operations officer rotational experiences, 9 were BN/TF executive officers, 3 where Brigade (Bde) S3s, 5 where Bde executive officer and 1 was a deputy commanding officer and 1 was a Bde fire support officer.

ANALYSIS

The survey did reach its intended population with a valid representation of rotational experience to deem acceptable for analysis.

ROTATIONAL EXPERIENCES

A majority of respondents believed current training methodologies enhanced their units and officer rotational objectives stating, "I had input to the training objective process through Bde and Div and had an opportunity to execute the training before and during the rotation at JRTC; LTP a definite plus to training staffs; Informal and formal feedback systems very helpful, dedicated training resources, mentorship of supervisors; Excellent capability to provide an enhanced view of the fight that I didn't have visibility on; and CTC's establish a goal to work towards – albeit a very tough goal that requires focus and resources to attain." Those who believed that CTC training methodologies in general were a "Good process; but too rigidly executed – no time for leaders to conduct their own AARs; Did not allow for innovation and initiative; We were not allowed to experiment, thinking out of the box is not allowed; and the process was more important than outcome – success does not count if not done IAW doctrine; and too much time spent in formal AARs."

Almost two thirds of the respondents conducted "recock" or "redo" missions because training objectives were not met of which 32 percent of that 1/3 believed their seniors leaders considered their recock missions as mission failure. Over one third, 66 percent, stated they did not have input during the rotation to their senior leaders that they needed to change mission sets inorder to achieve training objectives.

Only 1/3, 33 percent, of the respondents stated that they experienced constant or repetitive mission failure during the rotation frustrated their ability to achieve their training objectives with 51percent stating that this inability frustrated them personally. A significant

majority, 72 percent, stated that did not rationalize their training objectives away due to repetitive failures in lieu of more subjective training objectives like warrior ethos.

When asked what was the impact of this frustration on them, their leaders and their unit respondents stated, "Although my unit executed missions designed to achieve or train on specific training objectives, not all training objectives were executed to standard. I did not have an opportunity to retrain on objectives that did not meet the standard. However, I was able to retrain at home station upon return from JRTC; Think it matters what objectives you go with and how you coach those objectives with your leaders. You are always going to be frustrated if you go in with unrealistic objectives / frustrations; After several failures I believe many leaders quit listening; At platoon / company level, the light infantry soldier didn't always get into the fight. Schedule doesn't allow flexibility for attaining "Ts" for METL tasks an any level; My frustration – and maybe this is a personal shortcoming – was OCs never gave any credit for success. I enjoyed the NTC but never enjoyed my OCs. I got it – we had things to improve but all negative turns people off; Leaders "turned off" went through the rotation trying to wait out the pain; Motivation and moral declined drastically; We looked for diamonds in the coal pile to highlight to keep soldiers morale up. Units had to do this by themselves, OCs were not inclined to accent positive things;" and finally "No time to correct deficiencies before having to perform the same task again."

However, 49 percent did state that they think CTC training methodologies reinforce repetitive mission failure and creates an environment of defensiveness and learning failure while 44 percent did state that the CTC's did not contribute to defensiveness and learning failures. Those who think CTC's reinforce repetitive mission failure stated, "Tough question, I think this depends on the O/C and AAR mediation and the TF Cdr. There are many good points that occur at CTC's, as long as the process allows for strength and weakness, negative is ok, as long as it is balanced; Think it is more the chain of command that creates it; Focus seemed to be on beating the OPFOR through non-doctrinal TTPs; You have the ability to "win" any mission failure that creates defensiveness is a command climate issue."

Finally, when asked if they could change one thing what would it be the majority of the respondents, 37 percent, stated they would train to standard not to time, allowing units to execute missions until standards were met, and 27 percent would conduct less non-instrumented AARs and more leader AARs and 24 percent would allow BN/TF Commanders to decide what missions are redone.

ANALYSIS

The opinions of the respondents indicate their CTC experiences were of significant value both personally and for their units, even though they felt on average that the repetitive mission failure methodology was disruptive and did not allow for growth nor sustained improvement and sometimes caused negative reaction and stress from senior leadership. The AAR process, though beneficial exacerbates the rigidity of the training experience, often leading to negative perceptions of defensiveness ultimately stealing from potential positive learning experiences. Respondents on average do believe the CTC's as a whole focused more on mission gates as opposed to training to a standard. With exception of desiring more control in reaching training objectives, respondent experiences were positive, beneficial and 'Transformational' in outcomes.

LEADER DEVELOPMENT

A small majority, 59 percent, believed CTC's are instrumental in developing transformational leaders with 34 percent believing they are not. A large majority, 78 percent, believed the CTC training methodology develops the skills of adaptability and self-awareness for their subordinate officers. When asked what the main reason why the CTC training methodology may not be building future leaders as described by the CSA, 41 percent believed the CTC's are meeting the CSA charter for transformational leadership, 22 percent believed the CTC's do not take into account the training level and experience of subordinate leaders, 24 percent equally believe that the AAR process is too laborious, disruptive and interferes with the ability to conduct multiple repetitions, and finally 29 percent believed that the CTC's training methodology of training to time not to standard, does not allow subordinate leaders to experience and create positive "muscle memory" so as to discover what right looks like.

A significant majority, 76 percent, believed CTC's need to transform to build officer leadership as described by the CSA transformational vision. Written responses included statements such as, "I don't think the CTC's should be a primary source for building officer leadership. Perhaps they should be adjusted to more effectively measure the qualities desired in an objective force unit; but not individual based. CTC's are more than officer assessment tools. CTC's should remain unit focused with less attention on individual officers. CTC's become a tool focused on developing individuals, then we must build it for the masses of our leaders – junior NCOs; CTC transformation is more largely dependent on rotational unit demands (Div Cdr's goals/ objective); More focus on "leadership" less on execution of TTP; Allow units to

deviate from doctrine; New training for new missions and requirements; CTC scenarios require more flexibility and get all elements / leaders into the fight.”

When asked what phase of the mission cycle does the officer decision making skills improve most, 63 percent, believed it was the execution phase, 22 percent, felt it was the planning phase and, 10 percent, the preparation phase.

Responses to the question of how can the Army best train adaptability and self-awareness on the battlefield at the CTC's were wide and varied. “Create an environment that changes in time and space. Provide leader development assessments for officers, more importantly NCOs; Have unit (Div and Bde) commander include it as one of their objectives for the rotation. But, we must acknowledge the cost / risk associated with replacing current METL focused training with something that “trains” individual leaders on less measurable skills; Expand the focus – continue to train unit skills (TTP) but incorporate training feedback on leader attributes and provide less scripted scenarios and more free play; Balance the capabilities of the OPFOR and demand realistic use of doctrine by the OPFOR and BLUFOR. This is combat training not an experiment on how to beat the OPFOR; More independent Ops so junior leaders can make decisions – extend time in the box to maximize, multiple training opportunities. Make use of muscle movement getting to and from the training areas; FRAGOs – less emphasis on planning / preparation. CTC's, experience is precious. In my opinion repetition, repetition, repetition is key to developing bad ass platoons and companies. If you have great companies the Bn will be successful with a mediocre staff and solid BCT Cdr; Free play exercise, leader less scripted; Provide mission sets well in advance, (at home station...why is it a secret?) to allow train-ups to better focus. Train to standard. Allow for 2 days at the NTC for platoon training, 2 days for company training, 2-3 days for Bn/TF training and then do BCT ops; Senior leadership needs to take subordinate leaders out of the daily picture and discuss sit awareness, self-awareness and impacts of current ops on achieving objective; Continue non-compliant OPFOR, increase scenario flexibility no unit should be allowed to execute plays, have units and leaders get multiple iterations over the course of a rotation; Stop the process of allowing units to be ground down in combat power.” And finally, “Avoid scenarios that have AAR prep timeline restrictions – continuous ops for 3-4 days, stand down for AAR and then retrain 2-3 days – execute another 4-6 days.”

Responses also ranged in opinion when asked if they thought CTC's would successfully have an impact on the CSA transformational vision. Respondents stated, “Yes, leaders must be trained to operate in the future environment. Failure to do so may result in mission failure; I'm not sure what needs to change --- if the leadership is tolerant of honest mistakes made while

attempting innovative TTP when it is not really a change at CTC but with unit leadership; Yes – slow it down. New environment / new doctrine with same leadership and attributes does not equal transformation; Undoubtedly, CTC experiences shaped all the leaders in my unit; Because leaders need to know how to think, not what to think. Getting it right in the box is a growth, confidence builder at any leadership level; Yes: We must establish a methodology that enables young leaders to experience what right looks like,” and finally, “Leaders are penalized for taking initiative and risk at the NTC, opposite of what we want them to do.”

The majority of the respondents did not believe it was possible to quantify how many positive repetitions were necessary to help an officer learn how to think and a majority believed that the CTC's are teaching officers both how and what to think.

Finally, when asked for further thoughts on this issue the following opinions were solicited. “I think the CTC's should remain focused on providing a well-resourced training environment for unit based high-resolution training. Unless there is a glaring individual weakness, I would stay away from using CTC's as an individual leader development tool. Leader development takes much longer than a 10-day rotation and should be the primary responsibility of home station leader development programs. This is where the Army needs more attention; The CTC's have criminally polluted doctrine with more how to beat the OPFOR. Units leave CTC's practicing tasks they would never consider doing in combat; Since the NTC is primarily focused at the collective level, I'd suggest officers get their repetitive learning experiences in an assessment center – like environment, a UCOFT for leaders with tables and gates to accomplish relative to their responsibilities. NTC is too expensive to be altering it to suit leader development alone; CTC's are too focused on an illusory enemy that does not exist. CTC's are also focused as a capstone graded event – regardless of weather or not precursor training events have occurred. Every unit is not the same...all have difficult entry-level points...but CTC's do not take this into account.”

ANALYSIS

Although an almost overwhelming majority of those surveyed believe CTC's need to join the Army transformation with regards to leader development, the responses were wide and assorted as how to develop leaders at the CTC's. This is probably the result of many of those surveyed not understanding SKA competencies nested in the objective force leadership and development model. The survey purposely did not define self-awareness and adaptability because there is no doctrinally approved definition for either to date. The majority of those surveyed felt again that training to time not to standard, the rigidity of scenario and embedded

AAR process coupled with the O/C lack of understanding of unit level entry skills was the main distracter to CTC's contributing to the development of objective force leaders. Unique insights of exercising initiative and being allowed to deviate from approved doctrinal approaches were suggested as possible solutions. However, no respondent specifically commented on how CTC's need to specifically transform its training methodologies for objective force leader development.

CONCLUDING SURVEY ANALYSIS

The survey did not probe deep enough into the experiences of those surveyed to support my hypothesis that CTC's need to change their training methodologies. It also may be an issue of respondents, as a whole, are not familiar with the emerging objective force transformation campaign plan and in particular the soon to be doctrinal leadership and training development model to make informed comparison and comment. In this respect this survey supports LTC Prevou's study indicating that the field Army does not have a unified understanding of the SKA competencies of self aware and adaptive leader qualities. The survey did sufficiently solicit opinions concerning constructive criticism of current CTC training methodologies that give cause too further investigate and research under a more scientific study.

BALANCING PRACTICES WITH BELIEFS

LTG Steele, the Director of the Army Training and Leader development Study Panel set the tone for the CTC transformation when stating, "To move ahead with our transformation process, we must be willing to challenge everything from doctrine, to OERs, to OPMS XXI, to unit status reporting, to the way the Army designs forces, assigns operational missions and allocates resources. We must send the right message by balancing our practices with our beliefs."⁴³ This all inclusive charge requires CTC's to conduct an AAR on their performance in light of the objective force. No such comprehensive inward looking analysis has been done in the history of the CTC's to determine their potential effectiveness against a new warfighting doctrine.

LTG Riggs, in a response to an email I sent him asking if there has ever been such a study especially in regards to the AAR process or is there an ongoing study LTG Riggs replied, "Currently, the Combat Training Center Directorate at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas does not have any on-going initiatives to change the current AAR methodology used at the Combat Training Centers and Army-wide," and "Your proposed research paper will examine a relevant and timely topic and with your O/C experience, I'm sure

you will be addressing this from a unique operational perspective.⁴⁴ In fact the only study remotely related to this subject is the 1999 General Accounting Office study on CTC's and Military Readiness.⁴⁵ The time has come to balance CTC practices with transformational beliefs. CTC's can change, just as they have changed the Army for the last thirty years. This work is just an effort in that direction.

WORD COUNT 9,550

ENDNOTES

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- ³ LTG John M. Riggs, "The Objective Force," memorandum for Army Leaders, Arlington, Virginia, 8 December 2002.
- ⁴ Thomas E. Sheets, Training and Educating Marine Corps Officers of the Future, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College,. 06 April 1992), 15.
- ⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶ Ibid.,4
- ⁷ R.A. Mason, " The Challenge of the Twenty-first Century: Balancing General Education, Military, and Professional Studies," in Forging the Sword, ed. Elliot V. Converse III (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1998), 393.
- ⁸ Stephen J Gerras, The Army as a Learning Organization, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College,. 03 March 2002), 10
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- ¹¹ Reoyo, 18
- ¹² Mike Prevou, Leadership for the 21st Century. A Qualitative Study of Self Aware and Adaptive Leadership, (Doctrinal Candidate Qualitative Research Paper, University of Kansas, 16 December 2002), 13.
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- ¹⁴ Department of the Army, Pre Decisional Draft, US Army, Objective Force, Doctrine, Training and Leader Development, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 350-7-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 22 November 2002), H-1-1.
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²⁴ Ibid.

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²⁸ Fort Polk, Louisiana, “Joint Regional Training Center Web Page,” 1 October 2002; available from < <http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/OPS/INDEX.HTM> >; Internet; accessed 28 February 2003.

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⁴⁰ Ibid., H-1-3.

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