In Support of Decision Making
Abstract
This monograph investigates the art and science of problem solving and decision making in the operational planning environment. The Army's current problem solving and decision making doctrine found in FM 5-0 (101-5) Army Planning and Orders Production (Final Draft) provides one simplistic process and lacks information in the art of problem solving for planners and decision makers to follow. This research investigates the theory of problem solving and compares proven problem solving processes used and accepted in the business community with the Army's problem solving and decision making process. The research identifies components common to the processes analyzed, establishing goals or end state objectives, gathering information, and assessing implementation, which generally present challenges to the planner, and suggests methods to facilitate definition and communicate findings. The problem solving and military decision making process contained in the Army's doctrine serves as a sufficient beginning point for planning at the tactical level; however, due to rigidity and a lack of examples in problem solving theory, it is not sufficient when dealing with operational level problems. The Army's process contains significant shortcomings for planners at the operational level because it does not address the theory of problem solving and lacks sufficient background of key components of the process - goal setting, information gathering, and implementation assessment. This research concludes with recommendations to improve the Army's doctrine. It suggests the Army modify its existing problem solving and decision making doctrine to address additional relevant processes that are effective in a time constrained environment and when dealing with complex problems.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2003
- Accession Number
- ADA416051
Entities
People
- Rhett C. Russell
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College