American Leadership and Decision-Making Failures in the Tet Offensive

Abstract

Officers in today s United States military can learn from the policy and military decision-making failures and successes in American history. The hope is that in future military operations, they will not repeat the mistakes of the past. This thesis will address the question of how the American leadership failed to correctly assess the indications of an impending offensive in the months preceding the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam. The thesis will analyze and investigate the following weaknesses that contributed to the failure to foresee the Tet Offensive: North Vietnamese and Viet Cong deceptive actions, American inability to analyze those actions, measures the United States had in place to detect and to counter North Vietnamese preparations for the offensive, and the incomplete organization of the American intelligence organization in theater. The Tet Offensive serves as a cautionary parable for modern-day and future military leadership.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 06, 2003
Accession Number
ADA416144

Entities

People

  • Charles A. Turner

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Sensors
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Intelligence Collection
  • Intelligence Cycle
  • Military Applications
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Military Science
  • National Security
  • Personnel Management
  • Second World War
  • Southeast Asia
  • Surveillance
  • Test And Evaluation
  • United States
  • United States Pacific Command
  • Urban Areas
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Educational Psychology
  • Library and Information Science/ Studies, Southeast Asia Studies, Bibliography of Vietnam and Lao Studies.
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies