

JOINT PLANNING, EDUCATION, AND EXECUTION

**A Monograph
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Abstract

JOINT PLANNING, EDUCATION, AND EXECUTION by LIEUTENANT COLONEL Margaret M. Vanasse, United States Army, 42 pages.

After a series of military failures in the early 1980s, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and President Ronald Reagan signed it into law. Two key facets of the legislation were the intent to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning, and the implementation of mandatory joint education and training for officers of all services. The legislation helped formalize collaboration between largely autonomous military services.

In the sixteen years since the Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed, the Department of Defense has taken steps to implement its provisions. Joint Vision 2020 articulates that the Armed Forces will be “fully joint: intellectually, operationally, doctrinally and technologically.”

This paper examines the current two-phased Joint Professional Military Education system adopted by the Army in response to the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It determines what the legislation actually said and how the law has been clarified and modified in the years since it was passed. It briefly discusses joint doctrine and examines three recent military operations, Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, and Anaconda to show the maturation of that doctrine.

The Department of Defense is meeting the letter of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but has been slower to embrace the intent - to improve the interoperability of the services in joint operations. To improve future joint planning and execution, the Department of Defense must encourage officers to serve in multiple joint duty assignments, continue to improve and incorporate joint doctrine, and make joint education beneficial to the officers who attend and their gaining commands.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In a message to Congress in April 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed his intent to reform the Department of Defense. “Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparation and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized with unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service.”¹

President Eisenhower was unable to significantly change the Department of Defense or unify the military services. It would take a series of military failures in the early 1980s to produce significant reform through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The primary objective of the Act was to strengthen the joint elements of the military; especially the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders, and weaken the influence of the autonomous military services, in order to improve the interoperability of the services in future military operations.

In the sixteen years since the Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed, the Department of Defense has taken steps to implement its provisions. In fact, Joint Vision 2020 articulates that the Armed Forces will be “fully joint: intellectually, operationally, doctrinally and technologically.”²

This monograph examines the current two-phased Joint Professional Military Education system adopted by the Army in response to the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols. It determines what the legislation actually said, and how the law has been clarified and modified in the years since it was passed. It examines three recent military operations, Operations Desert Storm, Allied

¹ Alice C. Cole and others, eds., *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1949-1978* (Washington: OSD, 1978), 175.

² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020, “America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow”* (Washington, D.C.: JCS, 2002).

Force, and Anaconda to determine if the military is meeting the intent behind the legislation – to improve the interoperability of the services in joint military operations. Lastly, the paper makes recommendations for improvement.

CHAPTER TWO

THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandated significant changes in the realm of joint doctrine and education. Historically the services (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps) had been solely and independently responsible for training soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. A series of military failures led Congress to the conclusion that the services could not effectively coordinate their actions. The Goldwater-Nichols Act placed joint doctrine, training and education squarely under the responsibility of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). By law, the CJCS is responsible for (1) developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces; (2) formulating policies for the joint training of the armed forces; and (3) formulating policies for coordinating the military education and training of the armed forces.³ The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) is responsible to ensure that the Joint Staff is “independently organized and operated” to support the CJCS in the integration of the combatant forces into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces.⁴

In addition to mandating organizational changes within the Department of Defense, Congress believed it necessary to improve the performance of officers assigned to joint elements. To this end, the Goldwater-Nichols Act required personnel management changes designed to (1) select quality officers for joint duty assignments; (2) increase the joint experience level of officers in joint assignments; and (3) educate them appropriately.⁵

³U.S. Congress, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 Conference Report (To Accompany H.R.) 3622*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), House Conference Report no. 99-824, 18.

⁴ *Goldwater-Nichols Act*. 20

⁵U.S. Congress, *Report of the Panel On Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 1st Session*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 50.

Much of the Goldwater-Nichols Act concerns the caliber of officers assigned to joint duty positions. The SECDEF is required to report semiannually to the Congress on how present and former members of the Joint Staff fared on promotion boards against their peers who did not venture into joint duty assignments. This measure is to ensure that the services select quality officers for joint duty positions, and to increase the incentive for officers to compete for those assignments.

Congress defined joint specialists as officers of the Army, Navy, Air Forces or Marine Corps on the active duty list who are particularly trained in and oriented towards “joint matters.” Joint matters were defined as the integrated employment of land, sea and air forces including matters relating to (1) national military strategy; (2) strategic planning and contingency planning; and (3) command and control of combat operations under unified command.⁶ With the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO), Congress attempted to create an officer who would serve a mix of service and joint tours and remain current and effective in both areas.

Congress left the determination of joint duty positions to the SECDEF while the services nominate officers to fill those positions. The legislation specifies that approximately one half of those positions designated as joint duty must be filled with officers nominated or designated as JSOs. Any senior captain (or naval lieutenant) can be nominated, but only those who complete Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment can be designated as JSOs.

Congress additionally required the SECDEF to identify critical joint duty assignment positions. Only designated JSOs are eligible to fill these positions. Simply stated, those joint duty positions determined to be critical must be filled by officers who have been educated through JPME and have completed at least one previous joint duty assignment.

⁶ *Goldwater-Nichols Act*, 41.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated new personnel policies that tie officer promotions, assignments and education to joint duty. Prior to 1986, many officers never served in joint duty assignments, or had only one joint duty tour, and had no formal joint education. Although these officers may have been experts in their own service, Congress believed that they were not expert or current on joint matters. Post Goldwater-Nichols, no officer may be selected for promotion to general or flag rank without previously serving in a joint duty assignment. In December 2001, Congress further amended the law to require most officers being considered for promotion to this grade after 30 September 2007 complete the joint education program as well.⁷ After selection they are required to attend Capstone, a military education course designed specifically to prepare new general and flag officers to work with the other armed forces.⁸

The Goldwater-Nichols Act specified that each military department remains responsible for the training of its individual service members. The CJCS and the SECDEF are responsible for determining the joint military education of JSOs, and the services are required to ensure that the curriculum at each school has sufficient focus on joint matters.

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is a two-phased program. The first phase is incorporated in the curricula of the intermediate and senior level service colleges. Graduates are awarded JPME Phase II credit after completion of a follow-on, temporary duty, twelve-week course taught at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). The Senior Service Colleges at the National Defense University (the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces) award credit for both phases of JMPE.⁹ The curriculum of each JPME school is periodically reviewed by the SECDEF with the assistance of the CJCS to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters. Service schools that are not part of JMPE are also

⁷ United States, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002*. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2001), Pub Law 107-107, Div A, Title V, sec 525 (a), (b).

⁸ *Goldwater-Nichols Act*, 38.

⁹ Information about both of the National Defense University senior service colleges is from the NDU home page [National Defense University]; available from <http://www.ndu.edu/>; Internet; accessed on 15 April 2003.

responsible to periodically review and revise their curriculum for senior and intermediate grade officers in order to strengthen the focus on (1) joint matters and (2) preparing officers for joint duty assignments.¹⁰

In 1987, Representative Ike Skelton was selected to chair the House Armed Services Panel on Military Education. The panel's purpose was to review the Department of Defense's implementation of the JPME requirements established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and to assess the ability of the current military education system to develop professional military strategists, joint war fighters, and tacticians. Skelton's panel stated that historically the formulation and execution of U.S. military policy had been hindered by a difficulty in clearly linking military policy with a strategic perspective. "Service interests, unleavened by a larger perspective, have tended to dominate the development of U.S. military policy. A major objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, as discussed in Chapter I, is to encourage a larger perspective on the part of the U.S. military officer corps."¹¹

The Skelton panel evaluated the intermediate and senior level Professional Military Education (PME) schools within the Department of Defense. They examined the curriculum at each school to determine the focus on joint subject matter, the mix of students and faculty members from each of the services at each school, and the student/faculty ratios. They pointed out the lack of an overall framework to integrate the PME schools into a coherent whole. Finally, they recommended improvements for the service PME schools and the joint schools of the National Defense University, as well as a framework to integrate the learning that takes place at each level of military education.

¹⁰ *Goldwater-Nichols Act*, 38.

¹¹ *Skelton Report*, 24.

In December 2002, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted another study of joint officer development and reported their findings to Congress. The GAO report concluded that the Department of Defense had taken “positive steps” to implement the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that address joint officer development. The study also noted that DOD has not identified how many joint specialty officers it needs and, without this information, cannot determine if its joint education programs are properly structured.¹²

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 created the joint specialty officer and mandated joint military education for all officers. The legislation placed joint doctrine, training and education under the responsibility of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The Skelton panel evaluated DOD’s education system in 1987. The next chapter will briefly examine the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) system as it exists in 2003.

¹² U.S. Government Accounting Office, *Military Personnel: Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach Is Needed*, (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 2002), 7 and 30.

CHAPTER THREE

JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

According to the Skelton panel, the individual services were pursuing incompatible educational agendas and few of the courses taught at the service colleges placed any emphasis on joint operations. The panel agreed with the Department of Defense that a critical component of a joint specialist should be service expertise, but concluded that there must be a joint education process to augment service education. “The most fundamental conclusion of the panel is that joint specialist education should take place in joint schools.”¹³ Accordingly, the panel reforms required that JSOs complete a two-phased education program to ensure both service and joint expertise.

Phase I of the joint education program is firmly established at the intermediate and senior level service schools and is provided to all students. The Skelton panel recommended that JPME Phase I include (1) capabilities and limitations, doctrine, organizational concepts, and command and control of forces of all services; (2) joint planning processes and systems; and (3) the role of service commanders as part of a unified command.¹⁴ The panel agreed with DOD that the intermediate and senior service colleges should introduce joint concepts from the individual service’s perspective and concentrate on producing an officer who is an expert in his service.

The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Ft Leavenworth is the Army’s intermediate service school. In 2002, CGSC began transitioning to the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) course. The purpose of ILE is to “increase the quality of educational opportunities available to majors to prepare them for their next ten years of Army service, enhance the capability of the Army to conduct full spectrum operations, re-green all officers on Army warfighting doctrine, and provide life-long learning opportunities aimed at developing self-

¹³ *Skelton Report*, 3.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

aware and adaptive officers.”¹⁵ The core component of ILE provides students with a broad-based education including critical reasoning, leader assessment and improvement, Army organization, leadership, twentieth century history, strategic studies, operational studies and tactical studies instruction. The curriculum is specifically designed to establish a common officer culture grounded in leadership, Army full-spectrum warfighting in joint and multinational contexts, military history, and critical reasoning/critical thinking.¹⁶ Although there are students and military faculty from each of the services at the college, it is apparent that joint matters are studied primarily from the Army’s perspective.

The joint military education of officers is the responsibility of the SECDEF with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. The CJCS provides guidance for the joint portions of the curriculum and sets goals for both faculty and student mixes (between officers of different services). The intermediate level service colleges are directed to expand student understanding, from a Service component perspective, of joint operations and joint force employment at the operational and tactical levels of war.¹⁷ This is in keeping with both the letter and the spirit of the law. The Goldwater-Nichols Act intended for all officers at the intermediate level (majors and lieutenant commanders) to be introduced to joint matters from the service perspective.

The War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania is the Army’s senior service school. Lieutenant colonels and colonels selected to attend are presented a more robust joint curriculum than that found in CGSC (or ILE). The mission of the Army War College is to “educate students

¹⁵ Additional information about ILE is at the Directorate of Academic Operations, Command and General Staff College home page; available from <http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/DAO/ile/mission.asp>; Internet; accessed on 15 April 2003.

¹⁶ From “Intermediate Level Education Overview” [Directorate of Academic Operations, Command and General Staff College]; available at <http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/DAO/ile/mission.asp>; Internet; accessed on 1 March 2003.

¹⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 1800.01a, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, (OPMED), (Washington, D.C.: JCS, 2000), A-B-.6.

about the employment of land power as part of a unified, joint or multinational force in support of the national military strategy....”¹⁸

The Skelton panel recommended that senior service colleges (1) make national military strategy the primary focus and (2) increase the mix by service of both the military faculty and the military students.¹⁹ They believed national military strategy to be inherently joint and thought that better blended student bodies and faculties studying joint curricula would meet the Goldwater-Nichols intent of educating all students in joint matters. As with the intermediate level schools, the CJCS provides written guidance on the curriculum. The CJCS focuses senior service colleges on strategy and the art and science of developing and using instruments of national power.²⁰ The curriculum is to address theater and national level strategies and processes and focus on how the unified commanders, Joint Staff, and Department of Defense use the instruments of national power to develop and carry out national military strategy.²¹

The CJCS accredits the intermediate and senior service schools through a rigorous process conducted by Joint Staff representatives. CGSC and the Army War College are fully accredited to award JPME Phase I credit to their graduates.

Joint matters are introduced to all officers at the service colleges, but the National Defense University (NDU) is the only joint university and as such, only the NDU can award JPME Phase II credit. The NDU has its own intermediate and senior level colleges that are attended by officers from all the services. Graduates are credited with both phases of JPME. For those officers attending the service colleges, the National Defense University’s Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) awards JPME Phase II credit after completion of a twelve-week temporary duty

¹⁸ The mission of the Army War College is from the U.S. Army War College home page; available from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil> ; Internet; accessed on 15 March 2003.

¹⁹ *Skelton Report*, 5.

²⁰ *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, A-B-4.

²¹ *Ibid*, A-B-6.

course at Norfolk, Virginia. The JFSC differentiates between graduates of the intermediate and senior service schools and offers separate courses for each.

The Joint and Combined Warfighting Course-Intermediate (JCWC-I) is designed for intermediate level service college graduates assigned to joint duty. The curriculum consists of seven courses and an elective program. JCWC-I is based on a fictitious combatant command, U.S. Africa Command (USAFCOM). The students in each seminar serve as members of the USAFCOM staff and over twelve weeks of school experience nearly two years of time on the USAFCOM staff. The lessons and practical exercises are structured to replicate normal staff requirements. Guest speakers (senior level decision makers or experts within a particular field) add depth to the overall instruction and complement the lessons. Retired three and four star generals and admirals, as well as ambassadors, interact with individual seminars following selected practical exercises.²²

Senior service college graduates selected for joint duty attend the Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Senior (JCWS-S). JCWS-S educates senior officers and other government leaders in joint operational-level planning and warfighting in order to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, attitudes, problem solving and perspectives. JCWS-S begins with a crisis exercise to rapidly coalesce the seminar and engender an appreciation for the complexities of joint, interagency, and combined operations. This exercise is followed by an overview of strategic decision-making, with particular focus on joint, multinational, and interagency processes. Joint doctrine and lessons learned are applied, analyzed, and evaluated during student-led practical exercises. Integration of multi-service, interagency elements and multinational forces is emphasized throughout the course. As with the

²² Information about the JCWC-I curriculum is from the Joint Forces Staff College home page; available at <http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/jcsos/jcsoshm.html>; Internet; accessed on 15 April 2003.

intermediate level course, retired flag and general officers and ambassadors interact with the students during practical exercises and through a guest lecture program.²³

DOD implemented this two-phased Joint Professional Military Education program as required by law under Goldwater-Nichols, and directed by the CJCS, to educate officers selected to fill joint duty positions. Unfortunately, according to a recent U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) study, only one third of the officers serving in joint duty positions in fiscal year 2001 were graduates of both phases of JPME.

Officers assigned to joint duty told the GAO that they viewed their assignments as a positive experience and that their services viewed joint assignments as valuable career moves.²⁴ However, these same officers are not necessarily encouraged to attend JPME Phase II. When the GAO investigated the lack of JPME educated officers assigned to joint duty positions they found that “[w]hile the senior officers talked about the strengths and importance of the joint education, some senior officers told us that they did not check the records of the officers serving under them to see whether the officers had attended the second phase of the joint professional military education program and that they did not view this lack of education as an issue.”²⁵

An officer may be nominated for JSO after completion of a joint duty tour and both phases of JPME. The GAO found that many officers are reluctant to seek the joint specialty designation. “Their concern was that they would be flagged as joint specialty officers, and accordingly, be reassigned to subsequent tours of duty within joint organizations. They were concerned about the need to balance the requirements of already crowded service career paths and the expectation to serve in joint organizations.”²⁶

²³ The JCWS-S course description is from the Joint Forces Staff College Home page; available at <http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/jcws/jcws.htm>; Internet; accessed on 15 April 2003.

²⁴ *Military Personnel: Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach Is Needed*, 27.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 12-13.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 27.

Congress did not mandate a specific number of JSOs. However, the law requires that only joint specialty officers fill those joint duty positions further identified as critical joint duty positions by the SECDEF. In fiscal year 2001, 331 of the 808 critical joint duty positions were not filled by JSOs. When no JSO with the requisite skills is available, or the best-qualified candidate is not a JSO, a waiver must be approved to fill the position with an otherwise qualified officer. The most frequently cited reason for requesting a waiver is because the commander believes that the best-qualified officer for the position is not a JSO.

Before Goldwater-Nichols was enacted, the services opposed the creation of the joint specialty designation. “They were concerned that a succession of joint duty assignments may result in a loss of currency with respect to service doctrine, operations and capabilities.”²⁷ The Goldwater-Nichols Act forced the services to protect officers assigned to joint duty and made joint duty more lucrative by making it a precursor to flag or general officer rank. The Department of Defense asserted to the GAO that officers today are more experienced in joint matters; and therefore, the difference between a joint educated officer and a joint specialty officer has diminished.²⁸

The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires that officers complete a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment, or receive a waiver from the Secretary of Defense, prior to selection for general or flag rank. The final phase of an officer’s formal education is the six-week Capstone course. Capstone’s mission is to ensure newly selected generals and flag officers understand (1) the fundamentals of joint doctrine and joint operational art; (2) how to integrate the elements of national power in order to accomplish national security and national military strategies; and (3)

²⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed Services, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate (Locher Report)*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1985), 227.

²⁸ *Military Personnel: Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach Is Needed*, 32.

how joint, interagency, and multinational operations support national strategic goals and objectives.²⁹

The Joint Operations Module of Capstone is a three-day course of instruction conducted at U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) in Suffolk, Virginia. It uses the life cycle of a Joint Task Force (forming, planning, deployment, employment, transition, and redeployment) for comprehensive study of joint doctrine and joint operational art. Students participate in interactive practical exercises that emphasize critical Joint Force Commander issues and lessons learned. Senior mentors, observer/trainers, and various subject matter experts support the students in their efforts.³⁰

The CJCS accredits the joint portion of Capstone. His guidance focuses Capstone towards joint operational art and its application in implementing the National Security Strategy “to make newly selected GO/FOs [general officers/flag officers] more effective at planning and executing joint and multinational operations, as well as more knowledgeable of when and how these operations support national strategic goals and objectives.”³¹

The Goldwater-Nichols Act intended a JSO to serve in a mix of service and joint tours and to be appropriately educated so as to remain current and effective in both areas. The major policies for achieving “appropriate education” are to (1) strengthen joint education for all officers; (2) require that JSOs successfully complete joint education at a joint PME school before a joint duty assignment; and (3) require all new flag and general officers to attend Capstone, a course “to prepare them to work with the other armed forces.”³²

Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, many officers never served in joint duty assignments, or had only one joint duty tour, and had no formal joint education. Congress mandated that only quality

²⁹Information about Capstone’s mission and the course program is from *The Capstone Information Book*; available at http://www.ndu.edu/capstone/capstone_information_book.doc; Internet; accessed on 15 March 2003.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, A-B-7.

³² *Skelton Report*, 50-51.

officers fill joint duty positions, and only officers who had served in at least one previous joint duty assignment fill critical joint duty positions. As the system exists today, there is little incentive for an officer to voluntarily serve in multiple joint duty assignments – a prerequisite to fill critical joint duty assignments. Commanders charged with filling critical joint duty assignments are unwilling or unable to require their subordinates to complete JPME Phase II, and have successfully requested waivers to fill those positions with otherwise qualified non-JSOs.

The law recently changed to require that for “most appointments to the general and flag level made after September 30, 2007, officers will have to meet the requirements expected of a joint specialty officer.”³³ It remains to be seen if this will become an incentive for more officers to complete JPME Phase II and become JSOs.

³³ 10 U.S.C. sec. 619a (a) (2).

CHAPTER FOUR

JOINT DOCTRINE

Prior to World War I, the two military services (the Army and the Navy) employed a doctrine of “mutual cooperation.” Essentially the Army was responsible for land warfare, the Navy for naval warfare, and those traditional functions separated the services at the water’s edge. If the services were forced to operate jointly, common sense and good fellowship were to be used.

Mutual Cooperation showed its limitations in the Pacific Theater in the early twentieth century. The Pacific was Navy territory, but the presence of an Army Garrison in the Philippines necessitated a joint plan of defense against Japanese air power. A planning committee of the Joint Army-Navy Board (the precursor to today’s Joint Chiefs of Staff) decided against appointing a unified commander in 1919. “The committee is of the opinion that in joint Army and Navy operations, the paramount interest of one or the other branch of the National forces will be evident, and in such cases intelligent and hearty cooperation...will give as effective results as would be obtained by the assignment of a commander for the joint operation, which assignment might cause jealousy and dissatisfaction.”³⁴

The services published a new edition of the Joint Army-Navy Board’s guidelines, *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* in 1927. It maintained Mutual Cooperation but also introduced the concept of “Unity of Command.” Unity of Command was to be invoked when the objective required the hierarchical subordination of all component forces under a single commander but only in those instances where the President specifically authorized such a command.³⁵

Although Unity of Command now existed as a concept of joint doctrine, it was neither embraced nor employed by the services and Mutual Cooperation continued to be widely

³⁴ *Joint Operations of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps*, (Washington, D.C.: Army-Navy Board, 1919), Cited by C. Kenneth Allard, *Command Control and the Common Defense*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 95.

³⁵ *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* (Washington, D.C.: Army-Navy Board, 1927).

practiced. The two service commanders at Pearl Harbor genuinely operated under “mutual cooperation” and the disaster suffered there was not so much indicative of their individual failures, as a revelation of the end product of limited service perspectives.³⁶

After World War II, President Truman urged Congress to merge the War and Navy Departments. “Wartime experience highlighted the need for cooperation; air, sea, and ground forces often had to work together to achieve maximum effectiveness. But wartime experience also highlighted the difficulty of achieving smooth cooperation among military organizations that had emerged from disparate histories, used different technologies, and operated in starkly different milieus.”³⁷

President Truman’s call for unification was bitterly contested by the services and by many in Congress. Although the war had clearly demonstrated the need for tighter integration between the Armed Forces, the services fiercely guarded their autonomy and adopted what become known as “Roles and Missions.” Originally a framework agreed to by the Joint Chiefs, “roles and missions” quickly took on more than doctrinal importance and were used to justify the allocation of resources. Two difficulties with “roles and missions” became apparent. First, no unifying concept of how the United States should fight was determined. Second, cooperation between the services was not mandated or even encouraged – in fact the services competed independently for scarce financial resources.

President Eisenhower, a former five star general, listed defense reorganization as his first priority in his State of the Union address in 1958. In a message to Congress in April of that year, he expressed his vision: “Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparation and organizational activity must conform to this fact.

³⁶ For a detailed discussion see Allard, 97-98.

³⁷ Thomas L. McNaughter and Roger L. Sperry, “Improving Military Coordination: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization of the Department of Defense”, 1994, Chapter 9 of *Who Makes Public*

Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized with unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service.”³⁸ Despite his intentions and his credibility, President Eisenhower was unable to significantly change the Department of Defense or unify the military services. Defense Department reform would wait until 1986 and the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The Skelton panel felt that investigating doctrine was outside its purview, but found that many of the officers who testified wanted to discuss the lack of joint doctrine. “The panel learned that another reason for superficial coverage of more complex joint issues may be the absence of a comprehensive body of knowledge on joint doctrine, organizing concepts, and command and control.”³⁹ A former Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander told the panel that the armed forces “lack policies, procedures and techniques to synchronize the operation of the four services.”⁴⁰ The Skelton panel envisioned JSOs, working through the Joint Staff J-7 and the joint schools, and with the assistance of service experts, eventually taking the lead in developing procedures for joint force organization, deployment and employment.⁴¹

Development of joint doctrine progressed slowly. In 1994, General Shalikashvili said: “While we have *some* joint doctrine, it is really in its infancy, at best. It is not well vetted; it is not well understood at all; and it is certainly not disseminated out there. And most certainly, it is almost *never* used by anyone.” A year later, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces characterized the first generation of joint doctrine as “a compendium of competing and sometimes incompatible concepts (often developed by one ‘lead’ service)”⁴²

Policy: The Struggle for Control between Congress and the Executive, eds. Robert S. Gilmore and Alexis A. Halley (Chatham House Publishers, 1994), 220.

³⁸ Cole, *The Department of Defense*, 28.

³⁹ *Skelton Report*, 62.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁴² “Directions for Defense” Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions, 1995 cited in James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac*, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 446.

While joint doctrine development lagged, the individual service doctrines began to address integrated operations and to move towards a joint focus. In 1986, the Army published a new version of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, to provide guidance for the operational and tactical employment of U.S. Army units within a theater. “Cooperation with the US Air Force will be vital always... [while] each service’s doctrine and applicable joint doctrine will guide employment.”⁴³ The Army’s new doctrine was called AirLand Battle and it recognized that all ground actions would be “strongly affected by the supporting air operations...”⁴⁴

Also in 1986, Colonel John Warden wrote *The Air Campaign* as a student at the National Defense University. Colonel Warden noted, “Many current problems over the uses of the various Armed Services stem from a lack of coherent doctrine on how they should be used individually and collectively in an operational campaign to secure some strategic end. This book is an attempt to fill that gap and to provide a framework for planning and executing air campaigns at the operational level.”⁴⁵

Operation Desert Storm would test both AirLand Battle doctrine and COL Warden’s air campaign planning framework in 1991. The next chapter will examine three recent military operations including Desert Storm to see how service doctrine and joint interoperability evolved after Goldwater-Nichols.

⁴³ U.S. Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5, (Washington DC: 1986), 161.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴⁵ John A. Warden III, *The Air Campaign*, (Lincoln NE: toExcel Press, 2000), 3.

CHAPTER FIVE

CASE STUDIES

Operation Desert Storm The Persian Gulf War of 1991 is often cited as proof that the services have mastered joint warfare. Shortly after the war, an article in *Forbes Magazine* noted, “The extraordinary efficient, smooth way our military has functioned in the Gulf is a tribute to [Goldwater-Nichols], which shifted power from individual services to officials responsible for coordinating them.”⁴⁶ *The Washington Monthly* added, “Goldwater-Nichols helped ensure that this war had less inter-service infighting, less deadly bureaucracy, fewer needless casualties, and more military cohesion than any major operation in decades.”⁴⁷

In spite of a clear military victory in Kuwait, the military has been less effusive about its conduct of Operation Desert Storm. In 1996, *Joint Force Quarterly* dedicated an entire edition to the Goldwater-Nichols Act entitled “Ten Years Later.” General John Sheehan, a Marine serving as the commander in chief of Atlantic Command and a former J-3 on the Joint Staff wrote:

Operation Desert Storm represents specialized joint warfare in that the coalition employed an impressive array of multi-national, multi-service, multi-dimensional, and multi-functional forces with the common objective of ousting Iraq from Kuwait. The United States and its allies had the luxury of powerful, massed, deeply redundant, separate services fighting in the same battlespace. Service capabilities were deconflicted rather than integrated.

Although specialized joint operations in the Persian Gulf clearly improved on multi-service operations prior to Goldwater-Nichols, the United States can no longer afford the inefficiencies of a system that brings redundant forces together for the first time on the battlefield.⁴⁸

General Sheehan makes an interesting point about “deconflicted” rather than “integrated” service capabilities. A decade ago, the joint team fought literally side-by-side, but in segregated lanes. Desert Storm began with an air campaign that lasted thirty-eight days. When the ground campaign began, the Marines attacked in a sector along the coast of Kuwait, Arab coalition forces

⁴⁶ Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., “Fact and Comment,” *Forbes*, vol. 147, no. 6 (March 18, 1991), 23-24.

⁴⁷ Katherine Boo, “How Congress Won the War in the Gulf,” *The Washington Monthly*, vol. 23, no. 10 (October 1991), 31.

⁴⁸ John J. Sheehan, “Next Steps in Joint Force Integration,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn 1996) 42.

assaulted the middle sector, and American soldiers of VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps swept around the western flank. Many close air support sorties were flown in the 100-hour ground campaign, but they were primarily used beyond the sight of the ground forces. The joint force operated in the same battlespace, but each component fought a separate fight.⁴⁹ This was largely due to separate and distinct service planning efforts.

Generals Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell credit Colonel John Warden with creating the air campaign for Desert Storm. Using the Five Rings doctrine that he introduced at the National War College, Colonel Warden planned the air campaign to attack targets in this manner: (1) Leadership – Saddam Hussein’s government, the communications systems and the Internal Security Forces; (2) Key Production – electricity, retail petroleum and weapons of mass destruction; (3) Infrastructure – railroad bridges; (4) Population – military elites, foreign workers, Ba’athists and the middle class; and (5) Fielded Forces – strategic air defenses and strategic offensive systems (air platforms and missiles).⁵⁰ COL Warden and other planners from the Air Staff suggested to General Schwarzkopf, the Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander, that it would be possible to secure national objectives without ever attacking the Iraqi army in Kuwait.

General Powell, Chairman of the JCS, honed in on what he considered to be the principal omission of the air campaign plan: it did not call for any strikes on the Iraqi ground troops that had invaded Kuwait. From the start, General Powell defined victory in terms of destroying Iraq’s ground forces. “Warden promised that the air campaign would induce Saddam Hussein to pull his forces out of Kuwait. But Powell did not want the Iraqis to withdraw their equipment; he wanted their invasion force to be destroyed.”⁵¹

⁴⁹ Richard B. Myers, “A Word from the Chairman.” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 31 (Summer 2002), 4.

⁵⁰ Warden, *The Air Campaign*, 146.

⁵¹ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals’ War*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 84.

Colonel Warden's air campaign was dubbed "Instant Thunder." It envisioned six days and nights of attacks. On the first two days, American aircraft would attack all of the strategic targets on the targeting list. On days three and four they would reattack targets that had not been destroyed. On the final two days, the air attack would concentrate on chemical weapons production facilities and other military-industrial targets. Attacks on Iraq's ground forces were relegated to a subsequent phase of the attack plan. Phase one would be Instant Thunder; phase two would be a one-day effort to achieve air superiority over Kuwait; phase three would be attacks on the Iraqi ground forces.⁵² General Schwarzkopf approved the approach the Air Staff had developed, but Lieutenant General Benjamin Horner, CENTCOM's senior Air Force Officer, was critical. Warden's plan did not address how the air campaign would work in conjunction with a land offensive. CENTCOM air planners modified Warden's plan, but the air campaign eventually accepted by Lieutenant General Horner embodied the same principles as Instant Thunder.

Meanwhile, the ground campaign was developed separately by a group of CENTCOM Army planners. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Purvis briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "Air-power would be critical to making the plan work because American forces would be outnumbered... The assault on Iraqi front-line fortifications would be preceded by a withering barrage of air and artillery attacks."⁵³ He did not illuminate further. The ground plan involved one Army Corps attacking into the teeth of the Iraqi defenses in Kuwait and was categorically rejected by top officials in Washington. General Al Gray, the Marine Corps commandant objected vehemently to the plan, which had been prepared without consulting the Marines and essentially eliminated the Marine amphibious capabilities "so that the Marines could breach the Iraqi fortifications on the behalf of the Army land offensive."⁵⁴ Subsequent to Lieutenant Colonel

⁵² Ibid., 89.

⁵³ Ibid., 132

⁵⁴ Ibid., 133.

Purvis' brief in Washington, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney created his own group of retired and active-duty military officers to secretly develop a better ground campaign plan and General Powell had the Joint Staff J-3 launch yet another separate planning effort to develop a land campaign plan for CENTCOM.

Eventually General Schwarzkopf's staff prepared an operations plan that spelled out its strategy. The first phase was a bombing campaign aimed at Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Seven to eleven days into the air war, the focus of the bombing would shift to support the initiation of the ground campaign. The land offensive would begin with Arab members of the coalition and the Marines launching a supporting attack. The main Army attack would begin the next day and go west, aimed at destroying the Republican Guard.⁵⁵

The services fought Desert Storm in "deconflicted" lanes. General Schwarzkopf's decentralized leadership approach allowed each service to conduct planning and operations according to their individual doctrines. The air campaign was designed using Warden's rings and aimed to defeat Saddam Hussein's forces in Kuwait by destroying strategic targets in Iraq. The ground campaign was designed around the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine with air forces used primarily to attrit enemy formations prior to the ground attack. The scope of Desert Storm allowed the air and ground campaigns to occur sequentially and each service concluded after the war that their independent doctrines had been validated by victory.

The general officers at the time had received as much formal military education as is available today. Ten years after Desert Storm General Horner described the relationship between the commanders. "The trust and respect we had for one another was unbelievable. This was a function of personality as much as a desire to get the job done. Unless you understand our relationships, then you really won't understand what went on in Desert Storm, all the good and the bad – and there was plenty of each."⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Ibid., 190-191.

⁵⁶ "Ten Years After," *Proceedings*, (Jan 2001),65.

This relationship between senior commanders of separate services is exactly the intent of Goldwater-Nichols. If senior officers, each an expert in his service, produce a coherent plan to win the nation's wars, we have met the intent behind the legislation. Unfortunately, the level of trust and respect General Horner described was a product of personalities rather than doctrine.

Operation Allied Force. Operation Allied Force in 1999 was the most intense and sustained military operation in Europe since World War II.⁵⁷ NATO's military intervention in Kosovo was initiated to stop violence committed by the Yugoslav government against an ethnic minority. Operation Allied Force compelled the Yugoslavs to end the ethnic cleansing, withdraw their forces from Kosovo, accept an international military presence in the province, and permit the unconditional return of refugees. Despite clear victory, Allied Force demonstrated the strategic deficiencies of not taking a joint planning approach to a military conflict.⁵⁸

There were powerful political reasons why mounting an integrated ground and air campaign was not possible in this specific conflict. However, once an "air only" or "deep fires only" operation was adopted for Kosovo, initial campaign planning did not extend much beyond a few days of air strikes focused on a relatively small set of integrated air defense (IAD) and command and control targets. Following the first three days of Allied Force, Yugoslav forces dug in, used air defenses selectively to minimize NATO effectiveness, and launched an accelerated campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

Differences in service doctrines led to visible tension between the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACUER) General Wesley Clark and the air component commander, Lieutenant General Michael Short. As General Clark later characterized this difference in his memoirs, he considered the achievement of success against Yugoslavian ground forces to be the

⁵⁷ Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Lessons from the War in Kosovo", *Joint Force Quarterly*, vol. 30 (Spring 2002), 12.

⁵⁸ Bruce R. Nardulli, Walter L. Perry, Bruce Pirnie, John Gordon IV, John G. McGinn, *Disjointed War* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Arroyo Center) xiii and 111

air effort's "top priority"⁵⁹ while Lieutenant General Short insisted that a more effective use of allied air power would be to pay little heed to those forces and to concentrate instead on infrastructure targets in and near downtown Belgrade.⁶⁰

This difference of priorities between senior commanders in Allied Force, demonstrated a fundamental service disagreement between the Army and the Air Force about how to prosecute an air war. General Clark saw Yugoslav ground forces as a key center of gravity and the ultimate guarantor of Milosevic's power and he wanted to attack them directly. Lieutenant General Short judged that attacking strategic targets in Belgrade would be the best way to pressure Milosevic. These differing philosophies can be traced directly to the dramatically different Army and Air Force doctrinal views of warfare and targeting that existed prior to, and had been validated by, victory in Desert Storm. These independent service doctrines were not integrated and neither service viewed the campaign as a whole.

In Allied Force, the two services "were equally prone to remain wedded to parochial service views of their preferred target priorities, based on implicit faith in the inherent correctness of their own service doctrine. They might more effectively have approached Milosevic as a unique rather than generic opponent, conducted a serious analysis of his particular vulnerabilities, and then tailored a campaign plan aimed at attacking those vulnerabilities directly, irrespective of canonical land or air warfare solutions for all seasons."⁶¹

A joint planning approach among the services could have maximized the effectiveness of the air operations. "[D]espite its successful outcome, the bombing effort was a suboptimal application of airpower."⁶² To attack enemy land forces more successfully, air force targeters needed insight into land force operations that the Army and Marine Corps could have provided.

⁵⁹ General Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*, (New York, Public Affairs, 2001), 241.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 243-244.

⁶¹ Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Lessons from the War in Kosovo", 16.

⁶² Ibid., 13.

The problems created by ruling out a ground option suggest an important corrective to the argument over airpower versus boots on the ground. Although Allied Force reconfirmed that friendly ground forces need no longer be inexorably committed to combat early, it also reconfirmed that airpower often cannot perform to its potential without a credible ground component in the campaign strategy. Airpower alone was not well suited to defeating Yugoslav forces in the field.⁶³

Operation Allied Force was a joint operation, but it was not fought that way – especially when it came to joint planning and operations in integrating air and ground capabilities.

In Operation Desert Storm, a generally cooperative atmosphere among the senior leadership allowed the services to gloss over the gaps between their doctrines. Operation Allied Force clearly demonstrated that wide gaps still existed. “Everybody trains, organizes, and equips to their service doctrine,” retired Air Force doctrine chief Colonel Bob Gaskin told *Defense Daily*. “When the services come to a war, they come with their service doctrines, not a joint doctrine. What Goldwater-Nichols did is give the [Combatant Commander] the power to do what they need to make the plan work. He has the authority. The [Combatant Commander] has to put his foot down.”⁶⁴

General Clark was under considerable political pressure to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo quickly and never agreed with his senior air force commander on the best employment of air power for the operation. Early in the conflict it seemed evident that allied air strikes against dispersed Serbian forces in Kosovo were largely ineffective. General Clark asked the Army to deploy AH-64 Apaches to the combat zone to provide a better close-in capability against enemy tanks. The concept was to use them in conjunction with the ongoing air operation to strike at Yugoslav forces in Kosovo.⁶⁵

The Army’s “Task Force Hawk” deployed to an airfield in Tirana, Albania. In addition to the requested twenty-four Apaches, the task force included: twenty-six UH-60L Blackhawk

⁶³ Ibid., 17.

⁶⁴ David Atkinson and Hunter Keeter, “Apache Role in Kosovo Illustrates Cracks in Joint Doctrine,” *Defense Daily*, 202, no. 40, (1999): 1.

⁶⁵ Nardulli, *Disjointed War*, p5.

and CH-47 Chinook helicopters, a light infantry company, a multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) platoon with three MLRS vehicles, an antitank company with thirty-eight armed vehicles, a military intelligence platoon, a military police platoon, a mechanized infantry company equipped with Bradley AFVs, an armor company with fifteen M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks, a howitzer battery with eight 155mm artillery pieces, a construction engineer company, a short-range air defense battery with eight additional Bradley AFVs armed with Stinger surface to air missiles, a smoke generator platoon, and multiple headquarters and maintenance elements.⁶⁶

Once Task Force Hawk was in place, the Apaches did not fly a single combat mission for Allied Force. The reason given afterward by the CJCS, General Hugh Shelton, was that the Serbian air defenses in Kosovo warranted keeping the Apaches out of action until suppression operations had “reduced the risk to the very minimum.”⁶⁷ The CJCS did not mention that existing military doctrine never considered Army helicopters used directly in support of an air campaign. In fact, the request for Apaches caused considerable controversy among senior military officers who viewed it as non-doctrinal to use Army helicopters in the absence of a maneuver ground force. Confronted by sharp differences of opinion among his senior military advisors, the President agreed to deploy the Apaches to Tirana, but withheld final approval for their employment. Allied Force’s senior service commanders did not ever agree on how best to employ them.

The confusion over the employment of the Apaches can be viewed as a lack of applicable joint doctrine that will certainly reoccur. It is unrealistic to expect doctrine to predict every conceivable operation. Army doctrine had been revised after Desert Storm with the 1993 version of FM 100-5, *Operations* which claimed to be compatible with joint doctrine. “It recognizes that

⁶⁶ Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, Arroyo Center, 2001) 149.

⁶⁷ Molly Moore and Bradley Graham, “NATO Plans for Peace, Not Ground Invasion,” *Washington Post*, May 17, 1999.

the joint force commander (JFC) has a variety of ground, sea, air, special operations, and space options available to accomplish strategic objectives. Nonetheless, actions by ground-force units, in coordination with members of the joint team, will be the decisive means to the strategic ends.⁶⁸ The Army's assumption that ground operations would always be decisive was certainly not applicable to Operation Allied Force.

Operation Anaconda The Enduring Freedom Campaign began with the decision to support local forces in Afghanistan in a civil war against the Taliban. The difficulties of deploying American forces to the region were both physical and political. In the initial stages of the operation, American Special Forces serving with Afghan combat units directed air strikes. Within a few months, conventional ground forces from the 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) were also deployed. Operation Anaconda was the first operation in Afghanistan that involved conventional U.S. ground forces.

In March 2002, over one thousand enemy Taliban and al Qaeda fighters occupied the rugged mountains in eastern Afghanistan, eight to nine thousand feet above sea level. To defeat them, the American ground commander, Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, incorporated Afghan fighters to occupy key blocking positions while Air Force bombers and fighters, Navy carrier-based strike aircraft, and Army attack helicopters provided air support to a task force of American ground forces. This integrated joint force destroyed a larger enemy force and secured the mountainside after a four-day battle. General Richard Myers, the CJCS surmised, "we and our partners won because of the bravery of the troops involved as well as the synergy gained from fully integrating the lethal effects of our joint capabilities."⁶⁹

Major General Hagenbeck's Task Force Mountain was under fire and without much organic fire support during Operation Anaconda. The terrain and the altitude precluded air lifting 105 mm artillery by Chinook helicopter so fire support was limited to organic mortars, Apache

⁶⁸ U.S. Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5, (Washington, D.C.: CSA, 1993) 2-0.

⁶⁹ Myers, 6.

helicopters, and close air support (CAS). Requests for CAS quickly deluged air controllers and precision engagements took “anywhere from 26 minutes to hours (on occasion)”⁷⁰ to hit targets. An article in *Air Force Magazine* noted that until Operation Anaconda, recent military operations featured little or no true CAS. “In Operation Desert Storm, CAS played only a minor role, accounting for just six percent of the sorties.”⁷¹ The author also noted that CAS is not the optimum employment of airpower in support of land forces.

Optimum or not, CAS was employed effectively in Operation Anaconda but both the air and ground forces admitted that there were procedural challenges. Major General Hagenbeck stated that, “it really boils down to wanting responsive, effective fires. I’ll underscore that point by saying this – a ground force commander does not care about the number of sorties being flown or the number and types of bombs being dropped and their tonnage. Those statistics mean nothing to ground forces in combat. All that matters is whether or not the munitions are time-on-target and provide the right effects.”⁷²

The differences between Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan and Allied Force in Kosovo are striking. Allied Force was essentially a limited war with limited political objectives. In contrast, the objective of the campaign in Afghanistan was the elimination of the Taliban regime and the destruction of the al Qaeda terrorist network.⁷³ There was no question from the start of the campaign that both air and ground forces would be necessary. In both operations, military planners were forced to develop new approaches to effectively bring ground and air forces to bear. Despite procedural friction, land and air forces in Afghanistan were able to jointly accomplish the mission without any fratricide.

⁷⁰ MG Hagenbeck, “Fire Support for Operation Anaconda”, *Field Artillery*, (Sep-Oct 2002), 8.

⁷¹ Rebecca Grant, “The Clash About CAS,” *Air Force Magazine*, (Jan 2003) 56.

⁷² MG Hagenbeck, “Fire Support for Operation Anaconda”, 8

⁷³ William R. Hawkins, “What Not to Learn from Afghanistan,” *Parameters*, 32, no. 2 (Summer 2002) 26.

President George W. Bush noted that the combination of “real-time intelligence, local allied forces, Special Forces, and precision air power” shattered the Taliban regime.⁷⁴ It is very early to draw lessons learned from Operation Anaconda, but it seems apparent that the services were able to forgo doctrinal differences and craft innovative solutions to bring the strengths of each service to bear. It remains to be seen if this is an enduring lesson that will be incorporated in future joint education and doctrine.

⁷⁴ cited in Hawkins, “What Not to Learn from Afghanistan,” 26.

CHAPTER SIX

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated change within the Department of Defense in order to improve service interoperability in military conflicts. In the sixteen years since the Act was signed into law, DOD has taken steps to implement the legislation. After examining the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Joint Professional Military Education System, joint doctrine, and three recent military operations, the following recommendations and conclusions are offered for future improvement.

Joint Specialty Officers. The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 mandated the creation of the JSO. Congress originally hoped that the Department of Defense would conceptualize and implement a system of joint officer management. This has not occurred. DOD met the intent of the legislation by identifying, educating, and promoting officers assigned to joint duty positions. The Goldwater-Nichols objective of improving joint education for all officers has been achieved, but DOD will fail to meet the intent of the legislation until it articulates its own vision of the need for joint specialty officers and how to best prepare and reward them.⁷⁵

The Goldwater-Nichols Act forced the services to protect officers assigned to joint duty, and it made joint duty more lucrative by making it a precursor to flag or general officer rank. The quality of officers assigned to joint duty has improved because of those measures, but there is little incentive for officers to attend Phase II of JPME, seek successive joint duty positions, or become designated JSOs.

Senior officers admitted to the GAO that they do not routinely ensure that officers assigned to joint duty positions complete JPME Phase II. The frequency of waivers to place non-

⁷⁵ James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols", *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996), 15.

JSOs in critical joint duty positions is also an indication that JPME Phase II and the JSO designation are not critical to senior commanders. One explanation is that since Goldwater-Nichols, all officers attending an intermediate or senior service college receive some joint education. That education coupled with operational experience over the last decade may be making all officers more joint and negating the need for a separate JSO qualification.

After his retirement, Gen Dupuy wrote about the newly created Joint Specialty Officer and the challenges a JSO would face. He argued that the Services should not have been weakened in order to strengthen the joint component of the military. “Congress doesn’t seem fully aware of the seminal contribution of the services in combining technology and tactics within fighting organizations and in training individuals and units up to high performance in the employment of those forces.”⁷⁶

GEN Dupuy also discussed the ragged execution of the successful mission to rescue Americans in Grenada: “We seem to have a problem in organizing, training and equipping joint headquarters before they are needed. They are therefore not always fully prepared for the complexities of modern joint operations. It is a problem worthy of the joint specialist’s most urgent attention.”⁷⁷

It is intriguing that GEN Dupuy, a former commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), did not see the inherent contradiction of lauding the “seminal contribution of the services... in the employment of those forces” and placing the onus of preparing those forces for “modern joint operations” elsewhere. The services are legally bound to provide trained and ready forces to the Combatant Commanders who fight and win the nation’s wars. It is a service responsibility to provide forces trained and ready for modern joint operations.

⁷⁶ William E. Dupuy, “For the Joint Specialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb”, *Parameters* 3 (September 1989) 9.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 8

A true JSO should not be merely a quality staff officer. “The ultimate joint specialist will be a joint task force commander or commander of a unified command.”⁷⁸ The Goldwater-Nichols Act intended not only to ensure quality joint and combatant command staffs, but also that combatant commanders would be joint specialists capable of conceiving and implementing solutions larger than those suggested by service-centric doctrine. The military is meeting the letter of the law, but will not meet the spirit of the legislation until it encourages officers to serve in multiple joint duty assignments and become designated JSOs.

Joint Professional Military Education for Senior Officers. As discussed in Chapter Three, the last formal education most officers receive is the senior service college. A RAND study examined all Army officers selected for the rank of Major General in fiscal year 2000. The study showed that it had been an average of nine years since the nineteen officers graduated from a senior service college or fellowship. This means that their final formal professional military education (excluding six weeks of Capstone) occurred during Desert Storm and prior to operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. The RAND study notes that “the operational environments that the professional military education system prepared these officers for has changed radically.”⁷⁹

An article in *Joint Force Quarterly* in 1995 suggested that the JPME system was not enough joint education for senior officers. “The services train individuals and units for [combatant commanders]. But who trains [combatant commanders] and their staffs to integrate and synchronize the ready forces provided by the services?”⁸⁰ The Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) educates the largest portion of staff officers assigned to the combatant commands. As a JPME Phase II institution, it prepares officers for the joint specialty. With its emphasis at

⁷⁸ Admiral James Halloway, former Chief of Naval Operations, in testimony to the Skelton panel

⁷⁹ David E. Johnson, *Preparing Potential Senior Army Leaders for the Future: An Assessment of Leader Development Efforts in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Arroyo Center, 2002) 29.

⁸⁰ Robert D Adolph, JR, Charles W. Stiles, Franklin D. Hill, JR, “Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn’t go Far Enough”, *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Spring 1995), 51.

combatant command and Joint Task Force staff level, “JFSC instruction hits the mark identified by Congress and the Chairman. It provides the focused curriculum, joint faculty and students, rigorous education, and assessment mandated. It must be seen as the benchmark for joint education.”⁸¹

The law changed recently to require JPME Phase II in addition to completion of a joint duty tour for most officers selected for general or flag officer rank in 2007. It remains to be seen if this will increase attendance at the courses already offered by the National Defense University or if revamping Capstone is a more appropriate response. In either case, there is a window of opportunity to revise Capstone to better meet the needs of the joint staff, combatant commanders, and the officers selected to attend.

Joint Planning. The intent of Goldwater-Nichols was to improve the interoperability of the services through JSOs who would have both joint and service expertise. Eventually Congress envisioned that JSOs would become the key commanders and staff officers within the combatant commands and the joint staff. Although there has been progress as evidenced by the success of military operations since Goldwater-Nichols, there is tremendous tension between sustaining multiple, independent and autonomous military services, and obtaining joint and integrated military plans. Currently, individual service planners produce these joint military plans.

Army division and corps planners are trained primarily at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Ft Leavenworth, Kansas. The Skelton Panel reviewed SAMS in 1987. “The panel was impressed with the caliber of the SAMS students, the quality of the faculty, and the sharp focus of the curriculum on warfighting issues. However, one limitation caused concern. The course is primarily Army-oriented even though the subject matter of its curriculum – the operational and strategic levels of war – is by definition joint.”⁸²

⁸¹ Robert M. Antis and Claudia H. Clark, “Creating a New Path for Joint Education” *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Spring 2002) 79.

⁸² *Skelton Report*, 183.

The Air Force and Marine Corps have each implemented a service school similar to SAMS for their planners, but none of the schools award JPME credit. In an article for *Military Review* in 1992, Representative Skelton proposed that a joint school for advanced military studies, modeled after SAMS, be established at the [Joint] Forces Staff College. “Such a school would allow the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the [combatant] commanders to have a pool of officers well governed in the planning and conduct of joint operations.”⁸³

SAMS was established to provide the Army with officers specially educated for military operations. It is fully expected by senior Army leaders that graduates will become commanders and general staff officers within the Army. Implementation of a “joint SAMS” will require incentives for officers to attend. It is difficult to imagine that same senior service leaders who don’t encourage completion of JPME Phase II will encourage officers to spend an entire year in another joint school. Regardless, the existing service advanced military schools should be encouraged by the CJCS to merge their exercises and expertise where possible. Inexpensive technology-based interaction between the schools would allow students practice at integrating their planning efforts and should improve future operational planning.

Joint Doctrine. “The essence of joint operations is full synchronization and integration of combat power. This means that all Services must approach the battlefield from the same perspective, with each complementing the other in achieving the commander’s goal.”⁸⁴ Given the complexity of modern warfare, joint doctrine should provide the perspective applied to military operations.

There are those who think the services should become ever more joint, but many senior military officers caution against it. “Remember that effective jointness means blending the distinct colors of the services into a rainbow of synergistic military effectiveness. It does not

⁸³ Ike Skelton, “JPME, Are We There Yet?”, *Military Review*, May 1992, 2.

⁸⁴ Robert Scales, *Certain Victory, The US Army in the Gulf War*, (Washington, D.C.: CSA, 1993) 368.

suggest pouring them into a single jar and mixing them until they lose their individual properties and come out as a colorless paste. No army that has worn purple uniforms has ever won a battle. Balanced military judgment and combat effectiveness depend upon service individuality, culture, training, and interpretation of the battlefield. The essence of jointness is the flexible blending of service individualities.”⁸⁵

C. Kenneth Allard, an Army lieutenant colonel who served as a Congressional Fellow on Capitol Hill in 1985, discussed the development of joint doctrine in his book, *Command, Control and the Common Defense*.

The focal point for the refinement of joint doctrine is, of course, the JCS, but an important part of the work must be accomplished by the military educational establishment, including the service war colleges as well as the National Defense University system. Their placement in this process is important for two reasons. First, they are the only institutions capable of providing the shared academic and operational perspectives that can help produce the intellectual underpinnings of the larger body of joint doctrine. Second, their twin missions of research and training make the war colleges ideal places to study the larger strategic implications of joint doctrine and to inculcate those perspectives into a student population from which our future generals and admirals are ultimately selected. The incorporation of such a common ideal was something strongly hoped for by those who enacted Goldwater-Nichols; however it does not appear that there was always a full understanding of the fact that the absence of an effective body of joint doctrine has made the task of training officers for joint service daunting – in the war colleges or anywhere else.⁸⁶

The Skelton panel also recommended giving the joint schools of the National Defense University a major share of the responsibility for reviewing, revising, and developing joint doctrine.

Military forces will be employed as part of a joint or combined joint task force in the future. As was the case in Operations Allied Force and Anaconda, service doctrine may not fit the situation. Senior officers must adapt and lead forces in operations that are outside their personal

⁸⁵ Carl E. Mundy “Cautions on Goldwater-Nichols” an excerpt in “Defense Organization Today” by John P. White, *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn 1996) 21.

⁸⁶ C. Kenneth Allard, *Command Control and the Common Defense* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, 1990), 262.

experience and without definitive doctrine as a guide. Neither the joint professional military education process nor joint doctrine can provide a complete solution for the diversity and complexity of every operational environment.

Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force and Anaconda show mixed results in incorporating forces from the services. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that when senior commanders create a generally cooperative atmosphere even significant doctrinal differences can be smoothed over. Operation Allied Force clearly demonstrated the extent to which doctrinal gaps still exist, especially in the integration of ground and air operations. Operation Anaconda proved that despite doctrinal and procedural gaps, military forces from all of the services can be successfully integrated.

Conclusion. In 1996, Secretary William Perry called the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 “perhaps the most important defense legislation since World War II.” While developing the legislation, Congress studied the Department of Defense and military campaigns as far back as the Spanish-American War. “The Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed a huge problem – the inability of the military services to operate efficiently as a joint team – and solved it. By establishing a clear chain of command and focusing operational responsibility in the warfighting commands, the Goldwater-Nichols Act made possible the military successes of the 1990s.”⁸⁷

Military operations since the Goldwater-Nichols Act demonstrate improvement in joint military operations. Joint education and doctrine will only continue to improve as it becomes widely accepted that future conflicts will always involve joint and integrated military responses.

⁸⁷ Senator Sam Nunn, introduction to *Victory on the Potomac*, by James R. Locher III, xii.

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