

Organizing NORTHCOM for Success: A Theater Special Operations Command

**A Monograph
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Abstract

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A Theater Special Operations Command (SOC), a sub-unified command, advises combatant commanders on the capabilities of Special Operations Forces (SOF), provides SOF for employment, and integrates SOF fully into theater plans by planning, coordinating, conducting, and supporting the geographical unified commander. The SOC is a trained and resourced rapid deployment joint task force headquarters, if needed. The new unified command, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), attained "initial operations capability (IOC)" on October 1, 2002. NORTHCOM is not organized for success to accomplish its new mission of homeland defense and civil support. NORTHCOM must transform to an organization that can anticipate and adapt to its new missions.

By analyzing the planning, command and control, and coordination of SOF support during Hurricane Andrew and the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, it was determined that a SOC would be a critical component to this new organization. The SOC will be vital during both deliberate and crisis action planning, advising on the best method to integrate SOF capabilities. Early planning efforts by SOCOM for SOF support to JTF-Olympics determined only a small JSOTF was needed to coordinate with the lead federal agency for counterterrorism, the FBI. In contrast, JTF-Andrew did not have a Special Operations Coordination element and had to learn the capabilities and limitations of SOF before being able to employ them effectively for the disaster relief efforts. This was a problem in the time-sensitive environment of a massive hurricane recovery operation. SOCNORTH would ensure SOF are integrated into any operational plan, so they can assist NORTHCOM responses to any future homeland crises.

A critical element to a crisis response is the chain of command established to delineate command relationships and responsibilities. Normally, command and control of SOF, like the other service components, should be executed within the SOF chain of command. JTF Andrew's command and control structure was not optimized because Special Forces and psychological operations assets were assigned to the ARFOR and civil affairs soldiers were assigned to the JTF/J5. In contrast, the JSOTF assigned to support the 1996 Atlanta Olympics adequately planned for and lead SOF who were supporting JTF-Olympics. SOCNORTH would provide the needed command and control to integrate SOF in future NORTHCOM operations.

Necessary within the command and control structure are liaison officers who understand the capabilities and limitations of their represented organization. These officers and specific liaison elements assigned to the components within the JTF will ensure coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction. No SOF liaison existed at the JTF level during Hurricane Andrew. In comparison, liaisons were used extensively between the many command and control centers for coordination and collaboration at the Atlanta Olympics. SOCNORTH would advise the NORTHCOM commander to ensure SOF functions were integrated appropriately, and work with SOCOM if additional special operations forces are necessary. SOCNORTH will ensure SOF are synchronized, coordinated, and deconflicted in any operation assigned to NORTHCOM.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iii
LIST OF FIGURES	iv
CHAPTER ONE.....	1
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER TWO.....	4
LEARNING ORGANIZATION THEORIES.....	4
LEGISLATIVE PARAMETERS.....	11
DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES.....	17
COMBATING TERRORISM	19
CHAPTER FOUR.....	23
HURRICANE ANDREW: DISASTER RESPONSE.....	23
ANALYSIS OF JTF ANDREW.....	29
PLANNING.....	29
COMMAND AND CONTROL.....	32
COORDINATION.....	37
CHAPTER FIVE.....	39
ATLANTA OLYMPICS: CRISIS MANAGEMENT	39
ANALYSIS OF 1996 ATLANTA OLYMPICS	47
PLANNING.....	47
COMMAND AND CONTROL.....	49
COORDINATION.....	53
CHAPTER SIX.....	55
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	55
RECOMMENDED SOCNORTH ORGANIZATION.....	57
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	59

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: JTF ANDREW Task Organization	24
Figure 2: Proposed Command and Control Organization for Domestic Support Operation	34
Figure 3: JTF-Olympics	42
Figure 4: JTF-Olympics (Pre-Crisis Relationships)	44
Figure 5: Proposed Command and Control for Special Events	51

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Theater Special Operations Commands, more commonly referred to as SOC's, are functional components of the geographical combatant commanders' organizations. The theater SOC commander provides the geographical combatant commander and the other service components a source of expertise in all areas of joint special operations. As a sub-unified command, the SOC is like the other service components -- a force provider. Just as important to a geographic combatant command are the other two SOC functions -- force advisor and force integrator. As the force integrator, the SOC plans, coordinates, conducts and supports joint special operations within an assigned operational area. The SOC staff also ensures special operations are fully integrated into the theater plans. Finally, they are trained and resourced to stand up as a rapid deployment joint task force headquarters if needed.¹

If the SOC deploys, the commander exercises operational control over assigned or attached special operations and conventional forces and may provide the nucleus of a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) when a joint task force is formed.² Normally, a JSOTF is formed when "SOF command and control requirements exceed the capabilities of the theater SOC staff."³ A SOC could provide a trained and ready battlestaff and can lead in crisis action planning. They are a highly capable crisis response force. There are currently six theater SOC's assigned to the unified commands -- in the European (SOCEUR), Southern (SOCSOUTH),

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Operations Division, "Special Operations Definition," ed. Col German (12 March: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986).

² U.S. Department of Defense, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations," in *Joint Publication 3-05* (Washington D.C.: 1998), GL-10.

³ *Ibid.*, III-3.

Central (SOCCENT), Pacific (SOCPAC), Joint Forces (SOCJFCOM), and the Korean (SOCKOR) commands.

The new unified command U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) does not have a SOC assigned to its organization. In fact, the Air Force is the only service component assigned to NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM's missions are homeland defense and civil support. In the homeland defense role, NORTHCOM conducts operations to protect the United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructures against external threats and aggression.⁴ It also includes steady state activities designed to deter aggressors and to prepare U.S. military forces for action if deterrence fails. In this effort, the Department of Defense takes the lead, but coordinates closely with other government agencies. On the other hand, in the civil support role, NORTHCOM will support federal, state, and local agencies as needed for an emergency or a major disaster, including consequence management.⁵ NORTHCOM provides unity of effort under one commander for the defense of the United States, defined by the President and Secretary of Defense as the U.S. military's highest priority. The Constitution of the United States reinforces this notion by putting "...provide for the common defense" up front in the Preamble.⁶

NORTHCOM's organizational structure does not reflect the Constitution's or President's priority. Homeland defense and civil support cannot be accomplished through ad hoc organizations. Even though NORTHCOM has combatant command of three joint task force

⁴ Peter Verga, *Northcom: Questions and Answers on the Eve of Implementation* (WebMemo #152) (Heritage Foundation, 1 October 2002 2002 [cited 27 February 2003]); available from www.heritage.org/research/HomelandDefense/wm152.cfm/.

⁵ The difference between an emergency and a major disaster is one of duration, severity, and the extent of assistance needed. Emergencies are less severe than major disasters, requiring a shorter time to recover and to provide adequate relief.

⁶ U.S. Constitution, Preamble.

headquarters and an air component, it does not have land, naval or special operations forces assigned. A SOC, as a crisis response headquarters, can provide initial situation assessments, recommend courses of action, and/or conduct military operations. If the situation warrants, NORTHCOM can request and assign a larger JTF and the SOC can serve as an advance party to facilitate the arrival of this larger JTF, and then transition to a JSOTF. SOF, as an inherently joint force, can bring a secure, mission-tailored, highly mobile, and reliable communications package that is readily adaptable to a broad and constantly changing range of tasks and conditions. "Their organizational agility allows SOF to quickly concentrate synergistic effects from widely dispersed locations and to assist joint-force commanders in achieving decisive results without the need for the time-consuming and risky massing of people and equipment."⁷ A SOC, as a force provider, integrator, and advisor would provide the NORTHCOM commander a capability that is a force multiplier in his area of responsibility.

The question this monograph answers is, "Does NORTHCOM need to create a SOC for the mission of homeland defense and civil support?" The next chapter will discuss the opportunity NORTHCOM has to build an effective learning organization. The legislation and laws governing this mission and how they impact SOF are presented in chapter three. Two distinct case studies, Hurricane Andrew and the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, where SOF were employed to support homeland defense and civil support, will be discussed and analyzed in chapters four and five. The criteria for analyzing these two case studies will be planning, command and control, and coordinating. Planning and coordinating are two of the four Theater Special Operations Command functions, the other two being conducting and supporting. Finally, in chapter six, conclusions and recommendations will be presented.

⁷ General Peter J. Schoomaker, "U.S. Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead," *Special Warfare*, Winter 1998 Winter 1998, 4.

CHAPTER TWO

LEARNING ORGANIZATION THEORIES

In standing up a new unified command, the organizational structure and the command and control relationships NORTHCOM develops at its inception will be critical to its future success. As a new organization, exploring the fundamental principles of successful organizations is valuable. This chapter compares and contrasts organizational principles and how they might be applied to NORTHCOM.

A renowned public policy expert, James Wilson, in *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* provides his views of why the organization matters.⁸ The most important principle is that the institution itself is the most enduring. The people, the mission, and the product are only secondary and can change over time, but the organization will endure. Likewise, *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies*, by James Collins and Jerry Porras, recognizes that the world's premier lasting corporations also focus on the institution first. Successful organizations do not become obsolete or disappear even though their leaders change over time and their products may become obsolete.⁹ The institution survives through multiple generations.

James Wilson goes on to state that the success of bureaucratic organizations has depended on how effectively they handled the following three issues. First, he asserts that goals-to-tasks should not be connected in a linear fashion. Stating the goals does not necessarily lead to the tasks that need to be accomplished to reach the goals. Tasks are not “means” that lead

⁸ James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (Basic Books, 1989), 21.

⁹ James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies* (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), 1-2.

logically to the “ends.”¹⁰ Most goals are unclear and do not logically lead to how they should be accomplished. The second issue is that the people within the organization agreed with how the critical task was defined. In other words, they embraced the mission of the organization. This second issue leads to how the “operators” define the culture of the organization. The operators are those who carry out the tasks. Combining their actions with prior experiences, personal beliefs, expectations of peers, and interests develops the organizational culture. When the organizational culture is a source of pride and commitment, there is a sense of mission.¹¹ If a goal is sufficiently clear and the tasks to accomplish it can be agreed upon by the operators, then it is called an operational goal.¹² The third issue is the organization needs to acquire enough freedom of action to act semi-autonomously. It must have the authority and resources necessary to achieve its operational goal. The NORTHCOM commander must seize the opportunity to create organizational excellence given its new mission.

Morton Halperin in *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* states that autonomy is a high priority. The organization wants to control its own resources, choose its manpower, and have its own policies to execute the mission. Likewise, he discusses the culture of an organization, which he calls the essence of an organization.¹³ The organization’s mission and capabilities define its “essence.” It is the dominant group of the organization, or as James Wilson defines it, the operators, who define the essence. Usually, the executives or career officials have a common vision of what the organization should be. If this is shared with the dominant group, then the essence of the organization transcends to all levels.

¹⁰ Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, 25.

¹¹ Ibid., 27.

¹² Ibid.

When organizing for success, it may be more appropriate to look at why similar organizations have failed in order to avoid their mistakes. Eliot Cohen and John Gooch in *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* describe several explanations for failure. These include the individual, the commander, the team, and the entire institution. They further state that we know what the institution is, but we don't know how it works.¹⁴ It is the organization that has "characteristics that can determine how tasks are approached, shape decisions, and affect the management of disaster."¹⁵ The organization is part of a system that is interconnected. Cohen and Gooch describe three basic ways to avoid failure: learn, anticipate, and adapt.¹⁶ If the organization does not use its intellectual resources and multitude of experiences, in addition to not observing and analyzing other organizations' setbacks, it fails to learn. Knowing a given situation is predictably hazardous and not predicting the probable dangers is failure to anticipate. The last type is failure to adapt to new and unexpected circumstances. An organization must avoid all three of these "failures" if it is to be successful.

A learning organization, according to Peter Senge in *Fifth Discipline*, needs five vital components. The first "discipline" is systems thinking, which is a conceptual framework to see interrelationships rather than cause-and-effect chains, and to see processes rather than snap-shots in time. The second component is personal mastery, a commitment to lifelong learning. Personal mastery is the cornerstone of a learning organization.¹⁷ Mental models are the third component. These are deeply held internal images of how the world works. Our own mental

¹³ Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 28.

¹⁴ Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 15.

¹⁵ Ibid., 22.

¹⁶ Ibid., 25.

models are sometimes beliefs and not reality. Next is building a shared vision. Senge notes, “when there is a genuine vision (as opposed to the all-too-familiar “vision statement”), people excel and learn, not because they are told to, but because they want to.”¹⁸ The last component is team learning, which starts with dialogue. This is the ability of the team to think together, allowing the group to discover insights together. “When teams are truly learning, not only are they producing extraordinary results, but the individual members are growing more rapidly than could have occurred otherwise.”¹⁹ All of these components must become lifelong learning techniques, according to Senge. Fusing them together and using systems thinking allows individuals to achieve metanoia, a shift of mind.²⁰ This is at the heart of a learning organization, where operators are continually discovering reality and how they can change it. “The organizations that will truly excel in the future will be the organizations that discover how to tap people’s commitment and capacity to learn at all levels in an organization.”²¹

The essence of what the authors above describe is an interrelated system that needs a roadmap for the future, a shared vision through commitment and building a team, and an ability to anticipate and plan for the future by learning and adapting. NORTHCOM is a new organization formed around the previous U.S. Space Command and given the new and complex mission of homeland defense and civil support. The opportunity exists for this new organization to be built to endure. Understanding the interrelationship dynamics will lead to a significant strategic advantage. A shared vision will evolve over time as the NORTHCOM “operators” gain

¹⁷ Peter Senge, *The Fifth Discipline* (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 10.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

personal mastery of their responsibilities with respect to the new mission, and are empowered to work as a team, causing a fundamental shift in the operators' way of thinking. According to the NORTHCOM commander during an interview on September 27, 2002, General Eberhart stated that the command's priority should be to build an organization that can evolve and use its own initiative and innovation.²² His greatest challenge is setting up the organization and making sure his people receive realistic training to be proactive rather than reactive.²³ A portion of this challenge requires educating the staff and components about the myriad of federal, state, and local agencies participating in or impacting the NORTHCOM mission. Another part is learning about and integrating SOF, a component not included in the old U.S. Space Command structure. Then, the command needs to aggressively exercise these capabilities, ensuring its readiness to respond.

As a combatant command, NORTHCOM is responsible for devising plans that will detail how the military will support the range of responses required to assist a lead federal agency when directed by the Department of Defense. These may include domestic disaster relief operations like those that occur after fires, hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Other missions include counterdrug operations and consequence management assistance, such as would occur after a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack. Planning for all of these will dictate the command and control relationships necessary should an emergency exceed local, state, and federal agencies' capabilities and military forces are used to support a lead federal agency.

²² Dan Sagalyn, "Online Newshour," in *Air Force General Ralph Eberhart's View of the Northern Command* (Public Broadcasting Station, 2002).

²³ Ibid.

NORTHCOM has combatant command of three relatively small joint task forces that can respond in this supporting role.²⁴ The first is Joint Force Headquarters-Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS). This joint task force is the component of NORTHCOM that coordinates the land and maritime defense of the continental United States. JFHQ-HLS also coordinates military assistance to domestic civil authorities. The second is Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), which provides “command and control for Department of Defense forces deployed in support of the lead federal agency managing the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, or high yield explosive (CBRNE) incident in the United States, its territories and possessions.”²⁵ It is a standing joint task force headquarters element, falling under operational control of JFHQ-HLS, but with no assigned forces. Lastly, Joint Task Force-6 (JTF-6) synchronizes and integrates DoD support to domestic law enforcement agency counterdrug efforts in the continental United States.²⁶

If however, the situation requires a purely military response, then NORTHCOM must also be prepared to command and control assigned and attached forces and any additional military forces made available for planning. The only functional component assigned to NORTHCOM is First Air Force, providing an offensive and defensive counterair capability. Additionally, NORTHCOM receives its aerospace warning and control from NORAD, a joint U.S. and Canadian organization in existence since 1958.²⁷ If NORTHCOM needs additional

²⁴ U.S. Northern Command, *United States Northern Command* (2002 [cited 31 October 2002]); available from www.northcom.mil.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Joint Task Force-6, *Mission* (08 October 2002 [cited 30 January 2003]); available from www.jtf6.bliss.army.mil.

²⁷ The commander of NORTHCOM is also the commander of NORAD.

forces to complete either its homeland defense or civil support mission, they will be apportioned as necessary.²⁸

NORTHCOM's unique mission of providing military assistance to domestic civil authorities when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense distinguishes the command from the other geographic combatant commanders. As NORTHCOM's organizational structure emerges, the command "must continuously evolve to meet the needs of the nation and to seize the opportunities brought about by change."²⁹ It must adapt these learning organization principles to endure. One piece of legislation that has evolved to meet the needs of the nation is the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.³⁰ Over the years, Congress has enacted a number of exceptions to the Act in order to employ the armed forces in support of domestic operations. Precedence has been set for not only conventional, but also special operations forces, to respond in a supporting role.

²⁸ Sagalyn, "Online Newshour."

²⁹ Schoomaker, "U.S. Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead," 7.

³⁰ The Posse Comitatus Act as stated in Title 18 of the US Code, Section 1385, states "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."

CHAPTER THREE

LEGISLATIVE PARAMETERS

Before presenting the different guidelines governing the employment of the armed forces in support of domestic operations, the legislation that created U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as a unified combatant command will be described. Next, a history of the theater SOCs will be presented to give the reader some insights into their formation. Then, the relevance of the Posse Comitatus Act is articulated with respect to NORTHCOM's mission. Finally, the policies, strategies, and legislation governing military responses to domestic emergencies and counterterrorism, such as the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, and FEMA's Federal Response Plan, are described.

SOCOM was created as a result of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Defense Authorization Act of 1987. The law has five key elements.³¹ The first created SOCOM on April 16, 1987, commanded by a four-star general officer with combatant command of all U.S. based Special Operation Forces including Air Force Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, and a trained and ready battlestaff, the Joint Special Operations Command. Second and third, respectively, were the creation of a Low-Intensity Conflict Board under the National Security Council and the staff and post of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. The fourth element gave the commander of SOCOM specific authorities and service-like responsibilities. These are to manage a separate program and budget (Major Force Program 11) for special operations unique requirements; to research,

develop, and acquire special operations peculiar goods and services; to develop joint SOF doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures; to conduct specialized SOF courses of instruction; to train all assigned forces and ensure their joint interoperability; to monitor the readiness of all assigned and forward-deployed joint SOF; and to monitor the professional development of SOF personnel of all the services.³² Finally, the law provided for flag or general officer leadership for two of the five theater SOCs – SOCEUR and SOCPAC.³³

The SOCs did not come into formal existence until 1988. The debate over what to call the theater-level special operations organizations first began in 1983 between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands. Each unified command had a different name for their special operations component. For example USPACOM's was the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Pacific (JUWTFPAC) and USEUCOM's was the Special Operations Task Force Europe (SOTFE). In November 1983, JCS/J3 approved a common, more descriptive and pronounceable name, Special Operations Command.³⁴ However, not until the establishment of SOCOM in 1987 did this organizational change take hold.

This change came about for two reasons. First, SOF was no longer viewed as conducting only unconventional warfare. The nine principal missions first assigned to SOCOM were counterterrorism, direct action, strategic reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, psychological operations, civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, and theater search and rescue.³⁵ In the ensuing years, this list evolved. In response to the changing threat environment,

³¹ R. Lynn Rylander, "ASD-SOLIC: The Congressional Approach to SOF Reorganization," *Special Warfare* Spring 1989, 14.

³² Schoomaker, "U.S. Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead," 3.

³³ At that time, SOCKOR was considered subordinate to SOCPAC, thus five instead of six TSOCs.

³⁴ Division, "Special Operations Definition."

³⁵ Congress, House. *Combatant Commands*, PL 99-433, Title 10, USC 167.

the Department of Defense in May 1995 assigned SOCOM specific responsibilities to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The second reason was organizational trends. SOCOM was established and among COMSOCOM's responsibilities was 'monitoring the preparedness to carry out assigned missions of special operations forces assigned to unified combatant commands other than the special operations command.'"³⁶

As an example, Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Pacific, established 1 November 1965, provided unconventional warfare support for operations in Southeast Asia. JUWTFPAC was disestablished in 1969 and its functions were transferred to the PACOM staff and subordinate commands. However, after the unsuccessful attempts to first rescue U.S. prisoners of war at Son Tay in 1970 and then the Mayaguez Incident to recover the crew of a U.S. merchant ship in 1975, it became clear that there was an increasing need for special operations planning and coordination in the Pacific, and a special operations staff within the CINCPAC Operations Directorate was established on 15 May 1976. In 1983, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the establishment of Special Operations Commands in PACOM and EUCOM. Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC) was activated on 1 November 1983 with a total strength of 18 personnel. Since then, the organization has grown to approximately 100 active duty personnel and assigned operational control of 353d Special Operations Group (Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan) and 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Torii Station, Okinawa, Japan), Naval Special Warfare Task Unit-Pacific and a subordinate SEAL platoon, (Apra Harbor Naval Station, Guam). SOCPAC is the special operations component of PACOM and provides all three functions of force provider, integrator, and advisor to the commander. In the face of adversity, PACOM rediscovered the value of a dedicated SOF command and control

³⁶ Ibid.

headquarters that can plan, coordinate, conduct, and support special operations. NORTHCOM has the opportunity to learn from this example and anticipate the need for a SOCNORTH.

The laws governing the military's employment within the United States are complex, subtle, and ever changing. NORTHCOM's area of responsibility is the continental United States and surrounding waters, and therefore the laws governing domestic military support are crucial to accomplishing its mission.³⁷ There is a long history of the Army supplementing law enforcement on the American frontier and in the South during the Reconstruction era after the American Civil War.³⁸ The Judiciary Act of 1789 allowed United States marshals to call upon the military as a posse comitatus.³⁹ In 1878 Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act, limiting use of the military to enforce domestic laws, because of perceived repression and abuse during the 1876 presidential election.⁴⁰ Over the years, Congress has created and passed legislation giving additional statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act, allowing the military to support law enforcement agencies in counterdrug operations, illegal immigration, civil disturbances beyond the states' capabilities, security for special events such as the Olympics and presidential inaugurations, and in times of natural disaster. NORTHCOM assigned or apportioned forces, to include SOF, may provide military assistance to civil authorities within the constraints of the Posse Comitatus Act and when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.

³⁷ NORTHCOM's area of responsibility includes the air, land and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It will also include the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

³⁸ Washington University, "The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of Renewal," *Washington University Law Quarterly* 75, no. 2 (Summer 1997).

³⁹ *Posse comitatus* is defined as follows: "The power or force of the county. The entire population of a county above the age of fifteen, which a sheriff may summon to his assistance in certain cases, as to aid him in keeping the peace, in pursuing and arresting felons, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162 (6th ed. 1990). In 1854, the Attorney General interpreted *posse comitatus* to include the military.

US policy, strategy, and response to domestic emergencies and combating terrorism have evolved over the last 29 years. Current policy on the federal response to domestic emergencies is seeded in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, first passed in 1988, amending the Disaster Relief Act of 1974.⁴¹ Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) and other written guidance articulated the strategy and response for combating terrorism. It was first formalized in 1986 with the issuance of National Security Decision Directive 207, which primarily focused on terrorist incidents overseas. After the 1994 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, President Clinton issued PDD-39, "US Policy on Counterterrorism," in June 1995, which assigned or reaffirmed lead and supporting roles to federal agencies in combating terrorism, including domestic incidents.⁴² PDD-39 divides the threat into two distinct categories -- crisis management and consequence management. These are defined as:

Crisis management includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal Government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; State and local governments provide assistance as required. Crisis management is - predominantly a law enforcement response.

Consequence management includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.⁴³

Overseas, the Department of State, through its Office of Counterterrorism, is the lead agency for **crisis management**. An interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) is

⁴⁰ University, "The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of Renewal."

⁴¹ Stafford Act was amended in 1993, Public Law 93-288

⁴² White House, "Presidential Decision Directive 39," titled U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (Washington D.C.: The White House, 1995), 7.

⁴³ Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Federal Response Plan," FEMA 229 (Washington D.C., 1999). Further noted as the Federal Response Plan.

established to provide advice and support to US Ambassadors, Washington decision-makers, and host governments. Domestically, the FBI is designated the lead federal agency for ***crisis management***, and an interagency Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) is established to provide advice and support to FBI on-scene commanders. Both of these teams are rapidly deployable, interagency organizations, tailored to meet the specific terrorist threat or incident.

PDD-39 further states that the Department of State, through its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, is responsible for ***consequence management*** in overseas incidents. In the continental United States, FEMA has responsibility for ***consequence management***. FEMA is supported by all the agencies in the Federal Response Plan (FRP), throughout the federal response.

At the same time the President signed PDD-39, he also proposed and Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar II Domestic Preparedness legislation entitled, “The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act.” This Act required the Secretary of Defense to coordinate the preparedness and response to terrorism at the federal, state, and local level. Before the Nunn-Lugar law was passed, the Secretary of Defense, under authority of Title 10, United States Code, Section 2564, could authorize DoD support to civilian sporting competitions such as the Olympics, provided the Attorney General certified the support was necessary to meet essential security and safety needs of the event.

Three years later in May 1998, PDD-62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas, reaffirmed PDD-39 and further articulated responsibilities for specific agencies. One aspect of PDD-62 allows the National Security Council, under the joint recommendation of the Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury, the authority to designate important public events, such as the Olympics or a presidential inauguration, as National Security Special Events. Additionally, PDD-62 established the Office

of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator was charged with oversight of the relevant policies and programs including such areas as counterterrorism, protection of critical infrastructure, preparedness and consequence management for weapons of mass destruction. Within the new Department of Homeland Security, an Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection and an Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response were established, doing away with the National Coordinator.⁴⁴ The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the states to respond to the consequences of terrorism. The federal government will provide assistance as required. These policies, strategies, and legislation promote deliberate planning as will be presented in the Federal Response Plan.

DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES

FEMA developed the Federal Response Plan (FRP) as the government's response to the Stafford Act for domestic emergencies. The FRP is an interagency mechanism for coordinating the federal government assistance if the State and local governments are overwhelmed by a man-made or natural disaster.⁴⁵ Specifically, "the Basic Plan presents the policies and concept of operations that guide how the Federal Government will assist disaster-stricken state and local governments."⁴⁶ The state's governor, however, must make a formal request for use of federal resources to perform emergency work deemed essential to preserve life prior to the event being declared a presidential disaster. Once the President declares a domestic disaster, all or some of the FRP is implemented. FEMA designates a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) who calls

⁴⁴ White House, *Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan* (2003 [cited 30 January 2003]); available from www.whitehouse.gov.

⁴⁵ Federal Response Plan.

upon the emergency support functions of the lead agencies as needed.⁴⁷ However, command and control of military units is retained under a military chain of command. The chain of command, according to DoD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), runs from the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Army, to the Director of Military Support (DOMS), who identifies needed capabilities.⁴⁸ The directive further details the framework for DoD to provide assistance during major disasters. It also provides guidance to the DoD elements to comply with the provisions of the Stafford Act. Instructions are given by DOMS to the Specified and Unified Commands to provide the required support after coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Staff.⁴⁹

The FRP also summarizes federal planning assumptions, response and recovery actions, and responsibilities.⁵⁰ It assigns 12 mission areas, called Emergency Support Functions (ESF), to 28 organizations. The 12 ESFs and the corresponding designated lead agencies are outlined in the FRP.⁵¹ They are:

Transportation	Department of Transportation
Communications	National Communications System
Public Works & Engineering	Department of Defense (US Army Corps of Engineers)
Firefighting	Department of Agriculture (Forest Service)
Information and Planning	FEMA
Mass Care	American Red Cross
Resource Support	General Services Administration (GSA)
Health and Medical Services	Department of Health and Human Services

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Donald E. Booth, "The United States Military and Humanitarian Operations" (National Defense University, 1995), 3.

⁴⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Assistance for Civil Authorities (MSCA)," (1993).

⁴⁹ Booth, "The United States Military and Humanitarian Operations," 4.

⁵⁰ Federal Response Plan.

⁵¹ Ibid.

Urban Search and Rescue	FEMA
Hazardous Materials	Environmental Protection Agency
Food	Department of Agriculture
Energy	Department of Energy

Although the military is the lead agency on only one ESF, it is a primary supporting agency on all others. As the National Military Strategy says, “existing military capabilities may have utility in a civil support role and those that are not otherwise committed to critical military missions can contribute to the interagency homeland security effort.”⁵² It further states, “The US armed forces may also be directed to provide civil support to federal, state and local authorities for domestic emergencies and designated law enforcement activities.”⁵³

COMBATING TERRORISM⁵⁴

The Department of Defense is also a supporting agency for terrorism response. “As directed in PDD-39, the Department of Defense will activate technical operations capabilities to support the federal response to threats or acts of NBC/WMD terrorism. As required under the Constitution and laws of the United States, DoD will coordinate military operations within the United States with the appropriate civilian lead agency(ies) for the technical operations.”⁵⁵ Within the realm of counterterrorism, “SOCOM Special Operations Forces offer a wide variety of skills to mount offensive counterterrorism measures directed at preventing, deterring, and vigorously responding to terrorist acts against US interests, wherever they occur. SOF

⁵² Richard B. Myers, "The National Military Strategy," (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2002), 15.

⁵³ Ibid., 14.

⁵⁴ Combating terrorism encompasses all actions including antiterrorism, counterterrorism, terrorism consequence management and intelligence support according to Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, March 23, 1994.

⁵⁵ Federal Response Plan.

capabilities are ideally suited for this type of mission where there is no margin for error.⁵⁶ Most regional unified combatant commanders, through the theater SOCs, are assigned “CINC in extremis forces” which can be employed for limited counterterrorism missions.

As part of the Department of Defense’s response to PDD-62, Joint Task Force-Civil Support was established on October 1, 1999. This headquarters is now a subordinate command of NORTHCOM. As explained in Chapter 2, JTF-CS can plan and coordinate a federal response to chemical, biological, radiological, or high-yield explosive incident in support of the lead federal agency. Additionally, DoD has other terrorism consequence management response assets such as the Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team, Defense Nuclear Advisory Team, Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Team, US Air Force Radiological Assessment Team, US Army 52nd Ordnance Group, US Army Response Task Forces, and US Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force, among others.⁵⁷

FEMA, in response to PDD-39, coordinated and completed an interagency annex, “Terrorism Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan,” dated February 1997, that details how the federal government would assist state and local authorities in managing the consequences of a terrorist attack in the United States.⁵⁸ FEMA developed procedures and responses for consequence management for situations prior to an incident, trans-incident (situation involving a transition from a threat to an act of terrorism), and post-incident (response without prior warning). All response activities are done in close coordination with the FBI and other federal, state, and local agencies.

⁵⁶ Pat Nolin, "Congressional Report, Dod Combating Terrorism Activities Fy 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 932," (Washington D.C.: 2000), 10.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 11.

⁵⁸ Federal Response Plan.

If a domestic crisis management response is needed, then the FBI is the lead federal agency. They will conduct operations aimed at interdicting or otherwise preventing the threat from becoming a consequence. If requested, JTF-CS can deploy in support of the lead federal agency to conduct detailed planning for consequence management if crisis management efforts fail. The FBI drafted “Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and Employment of U.S. Government Agencies in Response to a Domestic Terrorist Threat or Incidence in Accordance with PDD-39” that describes specific procedures and responsibilities of deploying the Domestic Emergency Support Team. Additionally, the FBI drafted the “United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan” that gives overall guidance to federal, state, and local officials on how the federal government is structured to respond to a terrorist threat or incident in the United States.⁵⁹

The case studies that follow in the next two chapters will focus on SOF participation in two significant domestic operations, Hurricane Andrew and the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. They were chosen because of the extensive special operations forces participation in these operations. Analyzing two of the SOC functions of planning and coordinating, in addition to command and control, against these two different case studies will help determine if NORTHCOM needs a SOC.

The first case study, Hurricane Andrew, offers an example of civil support. Chapter four describes how Army special operations forces (Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations) performed many diverse missions such as Disaster Assessment Survey Teams (DASTs), dissemination of public service information, and civil affairs support to local authorities. SOF helped the disaster victims’ transition back to normalcy.

⁵⁹ GAO Report, “Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations,” (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, 1999).

The other case study, to be explored in chapter five, is the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. This event was designated a special event and was not covered under the Federal Response Plan. Because of the pre-planning involved in the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, contingency planning identified the need for a Joint Special Operations Task Force for the mission of counterterrorism. SOCOM is the only DoD component legislatively tasked to prepare forces for the mission of counterterrorism. A small element JSOTF was employed with the FBI for planning and coordinating this mission. Fortunately, a response to a WMD incident was not necessary.

CHAPTER FOUR

HURRICANE ANDREW: DISASTER RESPONSE

On August 24, 1992 at 0500, Hurricane Andrew made landfall south of Miami, Florida, leaving an estimated 250,000 people without shelter, power, and drinking water, and causing an estimated \$15 billion in damages. The DoD mission started before Hurricane Andrew made landfall. The Federal Response Plan provided the necessary guidance for FEMA and other federal agencies to respond to just such a disaster.

During Hurricane Andrew, Joint Forces Command was responsible for appointing a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to work with FEMA's Federal Coordinating Officer and state officials, which they did one day prior to the hurricane hitting Florida. They began coordination with the FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and his emergency response teams at the Florida State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Tallahassee, Florida. Also assembled at the EOC were the Florida governor and his state counterparts to the Federal Emergency Support Functions.

The governor can request federal assistance only after assessing that the state's resources are inadequate to respond to the severity of the damage. Governor Chiles submitted this request at 1300 on 24 August, eight hours after Hurricane Andrew hit Florida. President Bush declared Florida Counties of Dade, Monroe and Broward to be disaster areas the same day Governor Chiles asked for assistance. Unfortunately, although the DCO was on site, no other military forces could be deployed until this formal request was received. JTF-Andrew (figure 1) was not formed until 28 August, under the commander of the 2d Continental U.S. Army, LTG Ebbesen. He was given operational control (OPCON) of all DoD forces supporting hurricane relief operations. Eventually, 23,808 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines provided humanitarian

support; 1,014 support sorties were flown providing 19,231 tons of cargo; almost 900,000 meals were served; over 67,000 patients were provided medical care; over 1000 tents were erected; and 4 life support centers were constructed to provide basic care for an average of 2400 disaster victims per day.⁶⁰




Figure 1: JTF ANDREW Task Organization

The JTF Commander had a personal, coordinating, and special staff. The personal staff included the chaplain, public affairs, and legal support. Although designated as a joint staff (J-staff), the coordinating staff included the normal G-staff functions with nominal representation

⁶⁰ Joint Task Force Andrew, "Joint Task Forces Andrew after Action Report, Overview Executive Summary," (Miami, Florida: U.S. Forces Command, 1992).

from the other services. These functions were personnel (J1), intelligence (J2), operations (J3), logistics (J4), civil-military (J5), signal (J6), and then they added a budget and resource function (J8).⁶¹ The special staff had liaisons from the different component task forces, engineers and medical support. The Army, Navy, and Air Force contributions to the JTF were organized into service component task forces--ARFOR, NAVFOR, and AFFOR respectively. The Marine Corps forces were under operational control of the ARFOR. ARSOF elements were split between the ARFOR and the JTF/J5. Special Forces and PSYOP soldiers were placed under the command of the ARFOR, whereas the deputy JTF/J5, designated the civil-military officer, was given command of the Civil Affairs soldiers.

Parts of the first military response were elements from Army Special Forces. Soldiers from the 11th Special Forces Group (Reserve) deployed immediately after the hurricane to offer medical assistance, initial damage assessment, and communication links.⁶² In addition, National Guardsmen from the 20th SFG were tasked by Governor Chiles to provide 24-hour security against looting of businesses, homes, and public buildings left vulnerable after the hurricane. Active duty soldiers from 7th SFG stationed at Fort Bragg were also deployed to aid in the recovery efforts. In all, a Special Forces Company headquarters and six detachments, about 48 soldiers in all, were deployed to assist with damage assessment.

Humanitarian and disaster assistance are a collateral mission for SOCOM. Geographical combatant commanders employ SOF for humanitarian and disaster assistance because they can respond rapidly and their training skills, combined with their language proficiency, cultural

⁶¹ U.S. Department of the Army, "U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations," (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997). P. 4-3 to 4-13 At the joint level some of these staff functions translate, but the J6 is command, control, computer, and communications and the J5 is future plans, not civil-military, and the J8 is requirements and integration.

⁶² Keith Butler, "SOF Support to Hurricane Andrew Recovery," *Special Warfare* July 1993, 13.

awareness, regional orientation, and their ability to plan within the political context of their missions. In many cases, not only is SOF suited for this task, but also they are often the force with the capability to arrive at the incident first. Some of the Special Forces Groups do train for domestic assistance support (DAST) missions. Fortunately, the soldiers who deployed for Hurricane Andrew had this type of training.

Organic to each Special Forces detachment are medical, engineering, and communication experts. These skills allowed each SFOD-A team to provide emergency assistance. Furthermore, deploying with their own long range communication equipment enabled them to report pertinent information at all times. They also deployed with their own vehicles, which gave them access to remote or semi-trafficable areas. SF teams pinpointed communities in outlying areas with the direst needs and then delivered food, water, lanterns, heating fuel and medical treatment.⁶³ Additionally, deployed personnel spoke Spanish, a skill acquired through their Special Forces training. This enabled them to work, coordinate with, and provide assistance to Spanish-speaking disaster victims.

Building rapport with indigenous populations is another Special Forces wartime skill. After Hurricane Andrew, conventional forces and federal agencies had trouble establishing rapport with the Miccosukee Indians. Special Forces teamed up with civil affairs personnel to assess the damage to the Miccosukee Indians' 75,000-acre reservation north of Everglades National Park. Special Forces had to learn much about the Miccosukee customs and culture before making contact. They understood that when dealing with the Miccosukee Indians, they were dealing with a nation who practiced their own customs, lived by their own laws, and spoke their own language. The SF and Civil Affairs soldiers were able to establish immediate rapport

⁶³ Ibid., 14.

with them and assess their needs. Then, they were able to deliver the needed and promised supplies from the 10th Mountain Division's Main Support Battalion. Once the supplies were delivered, the tribe leader blessed them before re-building could begin. Civil affairs personnel were instrumental in the success of the Miccosukee Indian relief effort. It was a team effort between ARSOF and conventional assets.

Civil affairs, another element of Army special operations, personnel also responded to Hurricane Andrew. Civil affairs soldiers are predominately in the reserve component and work in an array of professions in civilian life, from doctors to lawyers to engineers to corrections officers. They are trained to integrate the civilian and military capabilities; civil-military operations are their wartime mission. Civil affairs soldiers can function as mediators between civilian agencies and their military counterparts. Since a disaster relief operation is essentially a civil-military operation, their expertise was essential in bringing normalcy back to the communities of South Florida. Reservist volunteers were accepted for 31 days; then, the JTF Deputy J5 was responsible for ensuring sufficient follow-on civil affairs support for the duration of the mission.

Civil affairs personnel conducted damage assessments throughout the city and directed residents to local relief centers and medical facilities.⁶⁴ Gathering information about damage to the communities was accomplished using U.S. Postal Service mail carriers, an innovative approach, because they were familiar with and could share information on any area needing assistance. Additionally, civil affairs personnel interacted with local authorities such as the police, water authorities, sewage, engineers, Florida Power and Light, and building-code officials to provide services to the relief victims. Food distribution relief points were centralized at the

⁶⁴ Ibid., 12.

heart of the hardest-hit enclaves. Once businesses started re-opening, civil affairs focused on linking customers up with the businesses. Other services provided by civil affairs personnel were animal rescue and control and free legal assistance to residents.

Getting information to the disaster victims about the emergency services available fell partially to the Psychological Operations Task Force (POTF), which was established in less than a week. The JTF-Andrew POTF was assigned to the Army element, ARFOR, and not the JTF commander. It included active duty forces from the 4th PSYOP Group and reservists from the 5th PSYOP Group. This integrated team provided public service information via print products, radio broadcasts, and loudspeaker teams. “A tremendous requirement was necessary because telephones, radio stations, newspapers, and television had been wiped out, leaving local citizens with no means of receiving the word about relief centers and aid available.”⁶⁵ The Product Development Center, the heart of the POTF, designed over 400 different products informing citizens about safety precautions, preventive medicine, debris clearing, and school and church functions. Besides radio broadcasts, posters and fliers were placed around Dade County, and loudspeaker teams took to the streets ensuring all citizens were reached. The PSYOP team also used its Spanish, Creole and Kanjopal-speaking ability to reach the diverse cultures in the disaster area. These services were crucial for the victims’ survival at the outset because of the language barrier and rural areas where most of them lived. As the population responded to the public-service announcements, the POTF shifted their emphasis to recovery operations. This included coordinating the information programs among local, state, and federal agencies.

The FRP calls for the establishment of a Joint Information Center (JIC) reporting to FEMA and ultimately the Secretary of Transportation. Its charter is to provide information to the news media and to coordinate information released to the public about how to get assistance. In

Hurricane Andrew, the JIC emphasized its first task, but did not focus on the pertinent information needed by the disaster victims to get assistance.

ANALYSIS OF JTF ANDREW

PLANNING

For natural disasters, little preparation time is afforded when the crisis action planning processes begin. It emphasizes the requirement for swift planning and execution. SOF must be involved throughout the planning process and execution. Bringing SOF in early to the process can significantly improve the SOF contributions to the overall operation. The goal should be to minimize the time between the immediate aftermath and the commencement of an effective response and relief effort. If this time is expanded, then it can lead to the detriment of the stricken population and legitimacy of the relief effort itself. Since the military is in a support role for domestic disaster relief operations, a clear understanding of the legal issues is necessary. Additionally, this mandates prior coordination with other governmental agencies. Planning should include clear guidance, force options and sequencing, and extensive coordination.

In a domestic relief operation, the military's objectives should be in support of the federal, state, or local government agency. Guidance given from FEMA, the lead agency, was lacking. Although the Federal Response Plan was activated, no initial guidance or mission statement, no parameters for success, and no criteria for an endstate were given. This made defining the military requirements challenging. The Stafford Act and DoD Directive 3025.1 provided the basic framework for the JTF Commander, LTG Ebbeson. His intent was to immediately establish initial feeding and water facilities in the most affected areas, to continue

⁶⁵ Ibid., 15.

assessments and expansion of operations by assisting other organizations, and to restrict the military from conducting law enforcement activities.⁶⁶ JTF Andrew's specific mission was to:

Provide humanitarian support by establishing field feeding sites, storage/distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local/line haul transportation operations and other logistical support to the local population.

The JTF Commander's endstate was to establish life support systems relieving the initial hardships until non-DoD, state, and local agencies could establish the capability to handle the operations after which the JTF commander could redeploy his forces.⁶⁷ LTG Ebbeson's intent, mission statement, and endstate clearly demonstrated his understanding of the mission.

Even though LTG Ebbeson understood the mission, his command had done minimal prior planning and coordination among DoD elements and other agencies. It took five days for JTF-Andrew to stand-up. This delayed response induced perception by the disaster victims that no support was forthcoming. In a disaster relief operation, an initial response needs to occur within 24 hours. Many other factors contributed to this belated response. First, the legislative requirement for the state governor to assess the damage before requesting federal assistance, followed by the President having to declare it a disaster area, made force options and sequencing difficult. The preliminary damage assessment done by the FCO and State Coordinating Officer were conducted without the military DCO.⁶⁸ This delayed the request and deployment of military forces and resulted in the initial piecemeal commitment of support forces. Once the advance party and early echelons of the JTF arrived, they lacked the training and knowledge to assess the situation. More specifically, 2d Army did not have SOF assigned to its staff.

⁶⁶ Andrew, "Joint Task Forces Andrew after Action Report, Overview Executive Summary."

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Major A.G. Smart, "Military Support to Domestic Disaster Relief Doctrine for Operating in the Wake of the Enemy?" (United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 27

Effectively matching SOF capabilities with mission requirements proved difficult because 2d Army did not have the expertise. During Hurricane Andrew, Special Forces personnel often had to educate supported commanders about their special capabilities and limitations before they could be integrated into relief operations.⁶⁹ This lack of expertise also directly impacted the planning of civil affairs employment. Since most of the civil affairs force is in the reserve component, prior planning is critical to ensure sufficient civil affairs support throughout the duration of the mission.

Had NORTHCOM been organized for success and given this mission, its SOC could advise the NORTHCOM staff beforehand on the optimal functions for SOF in responding to this domestic support operation. The SOC would ensure applicable SOF capabilities were effectively integrated into the response. Furthermore, a SOC, as a crisis response headquarters, could have deployed rapidly, usually less than 24 hours after notification, to begin assessing the damage caused by Hurricane Andrew. These comprehensive assessments would help decision makers determine the force structure required for military support, as the SOC reported the information back to NORTHCOM in real-time. As they conducted the assessments, their special skills and inherent capabilities would help them provide emergency assistance to remote and initially inaccessible areas. Therefore, the real or perceived perception by the disaster victims would indicate that help is forthcoming. Then, a SOC would assist the arrival of the JTF forces as the SOC transitioned to a JSOTF and started relief efforts. Instead, Second Army staff lost valuable time trying to determine force options and sequencing.

⁶⁹ Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Operations Other Than War, Vol II, Disaster Assistance," (Fort Leavenworth: 1993).

COMMAND AND CONTROL

As part of prior planning, an unambiguous chain of command, well-defined command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities needs to be structured.⁷⁰ The organizational structure of JTF Andrew followed service lines, except for SOF who were divided between the JTF staff and the ARFOR. The special operations headquarters, detachments, and psychological operations soldiers were under operational control of the ARFOR, whereas the civil affairs soldiers worked for the JTF/J5 coordinating staff element. Integration of ARSOF assets during Hurricane Andrew was not optimized because no SOF command and control structure existed.

Normally, command and control of SOF should be executed within the SOF chain of command.⁷¹ Not creating a Joint Special Operations Task Force, Joint Psychological Operations Task Force, or Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) under the operational command of the JTF Commander caused disunity of effort. The JTF-Andrew organizational structure was based on service lines because the Second Army staff did not have SOF expertise. Similarly, the former U.S. Space Command did not have SOF expertise as part of its staff. Therefore, as NORTHCOM transitions to a successful organization, it needs a SOC to help its staff form the optimal command and control structure for the employment of SOF in future disaster relief operations.

The “essence” of the 2d Army’s organization lacked the time, talent, and tools to transition from an army to a joint task force. They were not set up for success. They were given

⁷⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, "Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces," (Washington D.C.: 2001), III-7.

⁷¹ U.S. Department of Defense, "Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations," (Washington D.C.: 1998), III-1

the mission to establish a JTF in minimal time in support of domestic relief efforts, and yet the 2d Army staff was deficient in their knowledge, experience, and training in forming a joint task force. This was evident in the tasks assigned the JTF coordinating staff. They maintained their responsibilities and duties as defined in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, and added a few officers from the other services to make it nominally joint. This was especially evident in the JTF/J5, who was given the responsibility for civil-military operations. In an Army Corps or Division, the G5 is the “principal staff officer for all matters concerning civil-military operations.”⁷² In contrast, the J5 is the plans and policy officer who is responsible for future deliberate planning. In Hurricane Andrew, instead of creating a JCMOTF, the JTF commander reverted to his army culture and assigned the civil-military tasks to the J5, not realizing the second and third order effects on his organization. The first effect was the J5 directorate lacked the expertise needed to go beyond initial contact with the civilian agencies. Secondly, assignment and employment of civil affairs personnel was not coordinated well.⁷³ No mechanism existed for the alert and deployment of Civil Affairs specialists, especially those assigned in the reserve component. Since most of the civil affairs specialists are in the reserves, the JTF/J5 should have developed procedures for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of the reservists as they rotated into the area of operation for 30 days at a time. Additionally, if the proposed SOC existed as part of NORTHCOM’s organization, then civil affairs officers assigned to the SOC could be the initial force to establish a working relationship with the civilian agencies and to establish the command and control element necessary to conduct civil-military operations. Thirdly, the JTF/J5 staff was dedicated to the civil-affairs mission, which left other coordinating staff directorates with the responsibility for

⁷² Army, "U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations," 4-15.

developing and implementing a smooth transition from military to civilian support of the relief effort – a J5 planning function necessary to achieve the JTF commander’s stated endstate.

The chain of command structured for JTF Andrew was not optimized. SOF were not included in the initial planning and therefore, 2d Army was not advised on the best integration of ARSOF assets. One recommendation that a SOC could make is to form a Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command equal to the other component commanders (figure 2).




Figure 2: Proposed Command and Control Organization for Domestic Support Operation

Its staff would be comprised of personnel from the SOC headquarters element at NORTHCOM. This command and control element would be responsible for the integration of

⁷³ Andrew, "Joint Task Forces Andrew after Action Report, Overview Executive Summary."

all assigned SOF through the following organizations: Joint Special Operations Air Component, Naval Special Warfare Task Group, and Army Special Operations Task Force. The air component can have assets assigned from the Army and Air Force special operations, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment or 16th Special Operations Wing. These assets could be used in support of special operations during all phases of the disaster relief mission, but the essential time is the first 24 hours. The transport aircraft, such as the MC-130H, could deploy the required special operators and their associated equipment to the disaster area. Another likely scenario is if the amount of land affected by the devastation is large enough, then helicopters may be necessary to transport special forces, civil affairs, and psychological operators to remote areas to begin relief efforts. Sea, Air, and Land operators (SEALs) would be assigned to the NSWTG. Possible missions for them might include flood relief efforts using their inflatable boats. Special Forces soldiers assigned to ARSOTF would focus on performing the same missions performed in Hurricane Andrew and they would be relieved of having to coordinate at the JTF level by the SOF command and control element, JFSOCC. Liaison elements to the other components are necessary for coordination and deconfliction, which will be addressed in the next section. The staff headquarters element at the JFSOCC is capable of advising the JTF commander and integrating assigned SOF assets to accomplish the domestic support mission.

Additionally, the creation of a Psychological Operations Task Force, operationally controlled by the JTF commander, was needed during Hurricane Andrew. By doctrine, PSYOP product development should be centralized at the JTF level.⁷⁴ Themes and products used need to be consistent and developed by one product development cell. Piecemeal deployment of psychological operations soldiers resulted in uncoordinated dissemination of information. In

⁷⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, "Joint Publication 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations," (1996), III-1.

many instances, “mini-POTFs” sprang up and started printing their own leaflets, which did not support the overall JTF themes, nor were they designed by PSYOP-trained soldiers.⁷⁵

Moreover, the approval authority for POTF products is usually the geographic combatant commander or JTF commander when operating overseas.⁷⁶ During Hurricane Andrew, the lack of a POTF at the JTF level, caused coordination problems because of the layered command and control structure. POTF products had to gain approval from the ARFOR/G3 and AFFOR commander, JTF/J3 and JTF commander, and then the Joint Information Center assigned to FEMA, the final approval authority for PSYOP products. No military doctrine existed for the approval of PSYOP products in a CONUS-based operation. By creating a POTF, direct coordination with FEMA’s JIC would have allowed a coordinated effort between civilian and government agencies.

In some disaster relief operations, a POTF may not be needed. A PSYOP assessment team (POAT) of about 4 to 12 personnel can provide the JTF commander an assessment of the situation, development of PSYOP objectives, and recommendation of an appropriate combination of personnel, equipment, and Service components to accomplish the mission.⁷⁷ If a POTF is not warranted and the POAT can accomplish necessary planning and assistance to execute the mission, then the POAT can be assigned to the JFSOCC for command and control and ensure unity of effort among SOF and conventional assets.

⁷⁵ LTC Paul B. Kappelman & Major Robert E. Armstrong, “PSYOP Task Force to JTF Andrew: A Case Study in Support to Disaster-Recovery Operations,” *Special Warfare* July 1993.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Defense, “Joint Publication 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,” III-4.

COORDINATION

The liaison elements assigned to the JTF special staff and other components are critical in coordinating all relief efforts. Since none of the usual SOF command and control organizations such as a JFSOCC, JSOTF, or ARSOTF were implemented, a Special Operations Coordination element (SOCOORD) would have helped synchronize all ARSOF activities. However, because 2d Army did not have a SOCOORD or a SOC, they were unable to integrate SOF.

This element serves as the primary advisor to the Army or Marine commander with regard to SOF integration, capabilities, and limitations. If a SOC existed at NORTHCOM, then the SOC commander would have this responsibility during day-to-day activities. During a contingency, like JTF Andrew, the JFSOCC would ensure these functions are executed. As a force provider, the SOC would coordinate with SOCOM for additional forces if necessary.

It was only through the culture of the SOF community that coordination occurred among the different command and control elements of JTF Andrew. For example, the civil affairs and Special Forces DART teams helped in assessing the information needed by disaster victims. They conducted face-to-face interviews to survey the needs and attitudes of the victims. The POTF adjusted their products to provide the information needed to keep the population moving toward recovery. Additionally, SF soldiers coordinated with civil affairs teams to assist in the recovery effort of the Miccosukee Indians. They combined their activities in less than 24 hours and congealed into an excellent team because of their experience and knowledge of each other's capabilities. Both of these are excellent examples of SOF coordination, integration and execution.

SOF liaison elements ranging from individuals to small cells in the proposed command and control structure (figure 2) are critical to the integration of SOF and responsible for coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction.⁷⁸ These efforts are critical to maintaining the geographic combatant or JTF commander's unity of effort.⁷⁹ For instance, a POTF liaison to the joint information center was needed to collaborate themes, products, and messages sent to the affected population.

ARSOF's successful performance during relief efforts "stemmed directly from their training and ability to professionally execute missions which traditionally and doctrinally have supported military efforts during conflict."⁸⁰ The Federal Response Plan provides a deliberate plan framework for domestic support operations. NORTHCOM must be ready to anticipate and adapt when a crisis happens. Having a SOC at NORTHCOM, with the knowledge, expertise, training, and authority to coordinate SOF assets, will enable NORTHCOM to avoid the fractured command and control, delayed response, and uncoordinated activities witnessed in JTF-Andrew.

⁷⁸ Defense, "Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations," III-7.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Learned, "Newsletter 93-6."

CHAPTER FIVE

ATLANTA OLYMPICS: CRISIS MANAGEMENT

In the early 1990s, the U.S. faced increased domestic security threats. In the wake of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building, PDD-39 and the Nunn-Lugar Domestic Preparedness Act were passed. PDD-39 provided the Federal response framework to domestic terrorist events solidifying the responsibilities and coordination relationships among the federal agencies. In response to PDD-39, FEMA added a terrorist annex to the Federal Response Plan. The plan described the Federal concept of operations, but was in draft and not published until February 1997. The Atlanta Olympics provided the catalyst needed for defining roles and responsibilities for crisis and consequence management among all levels of government.

The new directive and legislation, in conjunction with the already existing FRP, were instrumental in the deliberate planning process for the Olympics. Congress authorized DoD to begin planning for Olympic security support in fiscal year 1991. It stated,

“The Secretary of Defense shall initiate discussions...with appropriate Federal, State, and local officials and the Atlanta Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games for the purpose of planning for security and logistical support that the Department of Defense may provide for the 1996 Games...not later than April 15, 1991, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report...describing the results of the discussions...”⁸¹

A report detailing planning areas and possible DoD support capabilities was submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense. Congress authorized and appropriated a total of \$35.4 million to support the mission between fiscal years 1992 and 1996. In all, over \$50 million was available to DoD to support the Olympics and Paralympics in Atlanta.⁸²

⁸¹ Office of Special Events OUSD (P&R), "1996 Olympics after Action Report," (Washington D.C.: 1997), 11.

⁸² Ibid., 12.

The DoD Office of Special Events (OSE), a function of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD), Force Management and Personnel (FM&P), issued DoD policy guidelines for agencies requesting support. These guidelines detailed the types of support available from DoD and clearly stated security support took precedence.⁸³ The DoD Office of Special Events established a liaison office in Atlanta to coordinate directly with law enforcement officials and the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games. The OSE office approved military non-emergency support such as engineering, aviation security, communications, physical security, and explosive ordnance detection and disposal. Other agencies such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Operations Division (J3-SOD) and Army's Director of Military Support (DOMS) handled the emergency support requests for counterterrorism, and natural disasters and civil disturbances respectively.⁸⁴

To support of the Atlanta Olympics, DoD deployed 1,277 active and 13,376 National Guard soldiers. They also provided over 300,000 items of equipment and supplies to over 60 Federal, state, and local organizing committees and law enforcement agencies.⁸⁵ The military supported security operations at 96 different venues in 10 locations over 4 states (Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and Tennessee) and the District of Columbia. The geographic dispersal of security operations presented significant security and logistical challenges. Maintaining a safe and secure environment was paramount to organizers, law enforcement personnel, and the military assigned to support the Atlanta Olympics.

⁸³ Ibid., 12.

⁸⁴ US FORSCOM History Office, "HQ FORSCOM and the 1996 Summer Olympic Games," (Atlanta: U.S. Forces Command, 1997), 3.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 1.

Creating a military command and control structure responsible for routine support as well as contingency operations involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), high explosive and special improvised explosive device (SIED) was paramount. Since the Atlanta Olympics was a special event, it was afforded plenty of time to conduct deliberate planning and to reach the necessary consensus among the governmental participants. On 18 January, 1995, the Department of the Army appointed FORSCOM as the action agent for planning, coordinating, and executing Army support to the Olympics. Among FORSCOM's tasks were to establish an Olympic Support group, which was done by 14 February 1995; to provide command and control of all Army forces assigned to supporting the Olympics, excluding soldiers in Title 32 status; and to give assessments of Army capabilities to provide support.⁸⁶

Anticipating this guidance, FORSCOM performed mission analysis. FORSCOM staff recommended to the Commanding General, FORSCOM, a need for a command and control structure for non-emergency support and emergency support operations. To coordinate all routine, non-emergency administrative and logistics support, including security, vehicle inspection, law enforcement agency support, and transportation FORSCOM activated JTF-Olympics on 2 October 1995.⁸⁷ This joint task force was commanded by an active duty general. A parallel command structure for non-emergency support was necessary to command and control all military forces in support of the Olympics because National Guard soldiers in Title 32 status cannot be under operational control of a Title 10 organization and still perform law enforcement support for their states. (figure 3)

⁸⁶ Soldiers in Title 32 status belong to a specific state National Guard unit. The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to them and therefore they can be activated by the State Attorney General in support of law enforcement activities.

⁸⁷ DoD Pamphlet, "DoD Support for the 1996 Olympics," (Washington D.C.: undated), 7.




Figure 3: JTF-Olympics

JTF-Olympics was under the combatant command of US Atlantic Command (ACOM), now U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). ACOM was supported by the Pacific, Special Operations, and Transportation Commands in terms of personnel, materiel, logistics, and any other necessary support.⁸⁸ In turn, they authorized FORSCOM to serve as the lead operating authority. JTF-Olympics mission was “to receive, assess, and coordinate all requests for DoD personnel and equipment to support Olympic security operations, organizing committees, and other Federal Agencies.”⁸⁹ Additionally, the joint task force was to maintain property

⁸⁸ U.S. FORSCOM History Office, "HQ FORSCOM and the 1996 Summer Olympic Games," 10.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 14.

accountability for all DoD loaned equipment; to ensure all support complied with applicable policy and legal guidance; to provide guidance to the Georgia National Guard's Task Force Centennial Guard; and to provide command and control for all active-duty personnel assigned to this mission. Additionally, a DCO was appointed for each state and the District of Columbia for coordination of non-emergency military support.

The FORSCOM Commander was also given the following mission to fulfill National Security Council and Secretary of Defense preparedness requirements in accordance with Federal Response Plan.

When directed, COMFORSCOM will deploy military contingency response task forces to 1996 Olympic and Paralympic area of operations to support the federal response to a major disaster or terrorist incident involving WMD in Alabama, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, or Tennessee from 5 Jul to 25 Aug 96 and transition support to other state or federal agencies and redeploy.⁹⁰

In response to this mission, Commanding General, FORSCOM, directed First US Army for disaster relief and other incidents. Two response task forces were created: Civil Disturbance Task Force (CDTF) and Disaster Response Task Force (DRTF), commanded by the FORSCOM G3. These response task forces were given the authority to liaison directly with the appropriate lead federal agency (FBI or FEMA) in order to solidify deployment plans and integrate capabilities.⁹¹ "Emergency planners developed detailed checklists, timelines, phone lists, and coordinated specific command and control charts for each type of incident."⁹² Varying scenarios

⁹⁰ U.S. FORSCOM, "Olympic and Paralympic Games Operations Plan for Emergency Contingency Support," (Ft. McPherson: U.S. Army Forces Command, 1996), 10

⁹¹ LTC Robert W. Madden, "Achieving Unity of Effort: A Challenge in Domestic Support Operations" (U.S. Army War College, 1998), 30.

⁹² US FORSCOM History Office, "HQ FORSCOM and the 1996 Summer Olympic Games," 19.

required different command and control depending on who was the lead federal agency (FBI or FEMA) and if the military forces were requested to provide support. (figure 4)




Figure 4: JTF-Olympics (Pre-Crisis Relationships)

Another separate command and control element was created to further delineate responsibilities for crisis and consequence management in accordance with PDD-39 and the draft terrorist annex to the Federal Response Plan.⁹³ Under Department of Defense policy, the Secretary of Defense personally oversaw military support of Federal response to acts of terrorism. DoD supported the federal response to a terrorist crisis through a standing Joint Special Operations Task Force and also established a Crisis Response Task Force (CRTF). The

⁹³ Madden, "Achieving Unity of Effort: A Challenge in Domestic Support Operations," 29

CRTF, created and under operational control of ACOM, was a headquarters element with the responsibility of consequence management. It had forces assigned and established DoD communications and provided liaison to FORSCOM and the FBI.

“For any WMD incident, the JSOTF is the primary response option should the President so choose.”⁹⁴ As mentioned previously, the FBI is the lead federal agency and will function as the on-scene manager for the U.S. Government. The National Security Council structure serves a coordination role in facilitating other Federal agencies’ assistance to the FBI during a crisis response. For a terrorist incident, the FBI must request and the Attorney General approve, DoD support followed by Presidential approval to deploy the JSOTF through the Secretary of Defense. For planning, preparation, and interagency coordination of these contingencies, SOCOM provided liaison officers to the FBI operations center in Atlanta, as well as the FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C.⁹⁵

Advance elements of the JSOTF, approximately 13 personnel, were co-located with the FBI Hostage Rescue Team to provide advice on the capabilities and employment of military forces.⁹⁶ In coordination with the FBI, the JSOTF created a concept of operation (CONOPS) for potential DoD support. It identified the units available for technical advice and operational tasks, explained the request process for employing SOF, outlined the responsibilities of the FBI On-Scene Commander and commanders of the JSOTF and CRTF, and described the phased incident response process.⁹⁷ The phased incident response process states that after the necessary approval is received, to include Presidential proclamation and deployment orders, the FBI will assist in

⁹⁴ Pamphlet, "DoD Support for the 1996 Olympics," 13.

⁹⁵ Madden, "Achieving Unity of Effort: A Challenge in Domestic Support Operations," 31.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 7.

⁹⁷ Pamphlet, "DoD Support for the 1996 Olympics," 13-21.

coordinating JSOTF plans for conducting military operations to resolve the crisis. Then transfer of tactical responsibility for an incident site will occur from the FBI On-Scene Commander to DoD control, followed by the return of the site to FBI control after completion of the operation.⁹⁸ Additional Special Operations Forces were put on alert at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to respond if necessary.

All FBI planning and coordination in support of crisis management were coordinated from the FBI Operations Center in Atlanta. The JSOTF also provided a liaison team to support the FBI On-Scene Commander. The FBI brought over 1000 additional officers to Atlanta, including a dozen S.W.A.T. teams, which were propositioned around the Olympic Village.

Several suspicious incidents occurred during the Olympics, requiring DoD Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and military working dog teams to respond to over 550 incidents. The one notable incident during the Atlanta Olympics was the bomb that exploded in Centennial Park on Sunday morning, 28 July, killing two and injuring 113.

Centennial Park, located near the Olympic Village, was one of the most notable venues of the Games. The park was usually a hub of activity and on the evening of 27 July, a local band held a concert attended by over 60,000 people. Law Enforcement Officers were notified by a 911 call about 20 minutes prior to the explosion and were able to begin evacuating the area. Per the crisis management response plan, a DoD EOD team was dispatched. That team was enroute from the Bomb Management Center at Dobbins AFB by helicopter when the bomb exploded.⁹⁹ The FBI took control of what was assumed to be an investigation into a terrorist incident. All venues entering and leaving the park were locked down and since some reports were being

⁹⁸ Ibid., 7.

⁹⁹ Madden, "Achieving Unity of Effort: A Challenge in Domestic Support Operations," 34.

received about respiratory problems, the joint FBI-Army Chemical/Biological Response Team was flown in. Samples taken did not indicate the presence of a chemical agent. Local response was sufficient to respond to those injured. DoD was the first federal agency, in conjunction with state and local police, to respond to the incident. In response, JTF-Olympics doubled the security force at select venues within 24 hours.

ANALYSIS OF 1996 ATLANTA OLYMPICS

PLANNING

Special events such as Olympics, Super Bowls, or Presidential Inaugurations give planners a long lead-time to coordinate the Federal Response Plan. Integrating all the required governmental agencies in the deliberate planning process precludes ad hoc solutions. In the case of the Atlanta Olympics, DoD's possible participation was deliberated between the Atlanta Organizing Committee and FORSCOM, co-located in Atlanta, prior to Atlanta being awarded the games. Even though FORSCOM was not designated the lead agency until 1995, these informal discussions helped the military planners anticipate what type and how much DoD participation would be necessary to support an event of this magnitude.

Other informal emergency support requests were received by J3-SOD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Operations Division, to begin coordinating a counterterrorism plan. The coordinating relationship between SOCOM and J3-SOD, already established, started deliberate planning for SOF support early in the process. Singular responsibility for a military response to all terrorist incidents lies with SOCOM, who provides an appropriate response capability through a standing JSOTF.¹⁰⁰ The JSOTF and other DoD organizations can assist the federal response

¹⁰⁰ Pamphlet, "DoD Support for the 1996 Olympics," 6.

for crisis or consequence management by providing technical expertise and capability.

Contingency operations for the Atlanta Olympics envisioned the use of the JSOTF for terrorist incidents involving the taking of hostages or use of WMD.

As stated earlier, the terrorist annex to the FRP was in draft and PDD-39 was not enacted until 1995, the same year FORSCOM received its official tasking. But the recent domestic terrorist bombings, along with the remembered images from the Black September terrorist incident at the 1972 Olympics, taught FORSCOM that detailed planning analysis and scenario development were essential to establishing JTF-Olympics. This deliberate and informal planning proved vital because of the magnitude of DoD support required and delays in tasking from Department of the Army. If FORSCOM had waited until tasking was received, then military support would have been adversely affected from the lack of time available to plan with support and lead agencies. Most after action reports, even from the recent support to the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics, states that planning, with members of the JTF, needs to start at least two years prior to the event.¹⁰¹

Coordination and collaboration needs to occur with the government agencies involved to develop a common operational picture of not only the capabilities each organization brings to the table, but likely responses in case of any incidents. If NORTHCOM had existed, then there would have been no question where responsibility for this mission rested. NORTHCOM's SOC would have taken the lead in planning for and integrating the range of special operations' potential contributions. Formal and informal planning could have started as soon as the Olympic games were awarded to Atlanta, thereby allowing more lead-time. Furthermore, the staff of NORTHCOM would have already formed many of the relationships with civilian agencies vital

¹⁰¹ J.D. Johnson, "Joint Task Force-Olympics after Action Report," (Salt Lake City: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2002).

to the planning process. SOCNORTH would have represented SOF in NORTHCOM's planning as a force integrator and force advisor. Then, those staff members involved in the initial planning could form the nucleus of JTF-Olympics. Finally, the development and execution of a long-range realistic exercise program would test the NORTHCOM staff and the participating governmental agencies, evaluate their capabilities, identify any limitations, and apply corrective actions as necessary before the actual event start date.

Prior to and as a result of SOCOM's creation in 1987, relationships between the standing JSOTF and the FBI were formed, primarily for the purposes of responding to a terrorist event overseas. Although SOCOM has a standing JSOTF, a SOC at NORTHCOM, with augmentation by subject matter experts, could perform deliberate planning to include a domestic survey and assessment of the potential special event areas. By being co-located with the projected JTF-Olympics staff, this would allow for parallel and collaborative planning. Once planned, then the SOC as a force provider to NORTHCOM, could coordinate SOF unit support as needed. Just as SOCOM determined through mission analysis that a small JSOTF was all that was needed, so could SOCNORTH determine the specific command and control relationships required to respond to anticipated terrorist threats in the future.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Just as in a crisis domestic support operations, the command and control structure of a special event needs to delineate clear responsibilities and well-defined relationships. FORSCOM was forced to develop a parallel command and control (C2) structure because National Guard troops could not be under operational control of active duty units and still support law enforcement agencies. As depicted in figure 3, one C2 structure consisted of JTF-Olympics and the other was for the National Guard support. This bifurcation of command caused some

disunity of effort because separate command and control centers were established. It was only through the senior leadership of JTF-Olympics and National Guard and establishment of liaisons within each C2 center that overcame the disadvantages of having a parallel command structure.

Additionally, referring back to figure 4, another separate command and control structure was created for consequence and crisis management. Commander, U.S. Atlantic Command retained operational control of the CRTF and its assigned forces and coordinated their activities with the JSTOF advance element co-located with the FBI. Operational control of the JSOTF was retained by SOCOM because of the Presidential Proclamation and Executive Order needed to execute its counterterrorism mission. The concept of operation was coordinated with the consequence management plan.

If NORTHCOM had existed, then representation from all the staff elements, to include the SOC, would have contributed to the deliberate planning process. An advantage of this recommendation is that it builds upon existing NORTHCOM operational relationships with other governmental agencies. This planning cell could become the nucleus of JTF-Olympic staff, augmented by National Guard resources in Title 10 status, from the state where the event was to take place. (see Figure 5) Another advantage to making SOCNORTH the nucleus of a JTF for something like an Olympics, is it improves the timeliness and responsiveness of NORTHCOM support to the special event.




Figure 5: Proposed Command and Control for Special Events

To alleviate the problem of a parallel command and control structure, a National Guard general in active duty status should be designated as the commander. This commander could have operational control over the active and reserve forces in addition to having operational direction and coordination of the National Guard forces. This command and control structure relies heavily on the cooperation of the affected State Governors, requiring memorandum of agreements (MOA) between the Governors (The Adjutant General), Commander of NORTHCOM, and Chief of the National Guard Bureau to establish the working relationships, policies, procedures, and coordinating responsibilities of the parties providing support to the

Olympics.¹⁰² An advantage to having a commander activated from Title 32 status gives him an organizational culture advantage of understanding the preponderance of force in support of the JTF. It also alleviates the requirement for a separate National Guard command center and staff to support the mission, because the affected state Adjutant General would agree to approve orders for those in Title 32 status, through the MOA.

The SOC commander would establish a JSOTF, most likely commanded by one of the special operations reserve component senior officers, to command and control any SOF assigned for the non-emergency support missions and to liaison with the standing JSOTF. Senator John McCain from Arizona proposed and Congress passed legislation limiting the support by DoD to five specified categories for non-emergency support. The categories are aviation, communications, explosive ordinance disposal, physical security, and temporary facilities.¹⁰³ These categories may lend themselves to significant civil affairs support; especially in coordinating with the civilian agencies involved with DoD support the event. Since most civil affairs resources are within the reserve component, one of its senior officers could be the commander of the JSOTF.

Contingency planning would still be essential for the consequence or crisis management functions. JTF-Civil Support could lead the planning and coordinating efforts for a consequence management incident. They would provide a component to command and respond to any consequence management incidents. Similarly, SOCNORTH could take the lead for the crisis management function. They would understand the capabilities and assets of the standing JSOTF and be able to advise the NORTHCOM commander on its integration and employment. As a

¹⁰² Ibid., 2.

¹⁰³ J.D. Johnson, "Joint Task Force-Olympics after Action Report," (Salt Lake City: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2002), 5.

force provider and integrator, the SOC would coordinate with SOCOM to provide the support needed to counter a terrorist threat. The JTF-Olympics JSOTF would ensure all efforts, non-emergency, consequence or crisis management, were coordinated for DoD special operations requirements. This new structure streamlines command and control and coordination, allowing for unity of effort while providing the required support to a special event.

COORDINATION

The liaison function is critical in any command and control structure. For deliberate planning they become even more essential in keeping all participating agencies informed on the status of the planning process. Liaisons need to be qualified to describe response systems, assets, and capabilities of the organizations they represent. FORSCOM understood the importance of liaison officers and gave the two-crisis response task forces (CDTF and DRTF) direct authority to liaison with the lead federal agencies, FBI or FEMA, as appropriate. Furthermore, FORSCOM placed liaisons at the multiple command and control centers for coordination and collaboration. Liaisons enabled FORSCOM to accomplish its mission.

Even though only a small element JSOTF was needed to support the FBI, special operations liaisons were still assigned to the FBI headquarters in Washington D.C. and within the command center of JTF-Olympics and CRTF to ensure synchronization and deconfliction. Although no incident required a JSOTF response, these liaisons would have proved critical during a crisis.

DoD had the time to deliberately plan support for this special event. The roles and responsibilities for crisis and consequence management among all levels of government were solidified during the Olympics. Having a SOCNORTH with working relationships already

established, the knowledge of what SOF missions are necessary, and streamlining the command and control structure would enhance special operations support to a special event.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Everything else – our organization, force structure, platforms, equipment and missions – must continuously evolve to meet the needs of the nation and to seize the opportunities brought about by change.

General Peter J. Schoomaker, U.S. Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead

President George W. Bush in his State of Union Address on January 29, 2002 said, “Our first priority must always be the security of our nation....America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.”¹⁰⁴ The new unified command, NORTHCOM, is not organized for success and does not reflect the priority placed by the President and the Constitution of the United States on defense of our nation. NORTHCOM must take the opportunity now to transform from the old organization of U.S. Space Command to an organization that can accomplish its new mission of homeland defense and civil support. A Theater Special Operations Command is part of the solution. SOCNORTH as a sub-unified command can be the commander’s special operations force advisor, provider, and integrator.

The “essence” of a SOC is they have the knowledge, experience, training, and authority to employ SOF appropriately. As a crisis response headquarters, they would provide initial situation assessments, recommend courses of action, and/or conduct military operations. SOCNORTH would provide NORTHCOM a quick reaction joint force capability and then transition to a JSOTF, if the situation warrants.

The SOC will be vital during both deliberate and crisis action planning. During deliberate planning, the SOC will advise on the best method to integrate SOF capabilities. As in

¹⁰⁴ George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” (Washington D.C., 2002)

the case of Hurricane Andrew, 2d Army did not have a Special Operations Coordination element and had to learn the capabilities and limitations of SOF before being able to employ them effectively for the disaster relief efforts. This was a problem in the time-sensitive environment of a massive hurricane recovery operation. Having an operational plan on the shelf, integrating SOF and other military capabilities would have gone a long way towards solving the problems discussed in chapter 4.

In contrast, SOCOM was brought in early to the planning efforts for JTF-Olympics and through mission analysis determined only a small JSOTF was needed to coordinate with the lead federal agency for counterterrorism, the FBI. SOCNORTH would build upon this model and conduct parallel and collaborative deliberate planning with the NORTHCOM staff, so they can assist NORTHCOM responses to any future homeland crises.

A critical element to a crisis response is the chain of command established to delineate command relationships and responsibilities. Normally, command and control of SOF, like the other service components, should be executed within the SOF chain of command. JTF Andrew's command and control structure was not optimized because Special Forces and psychological operations assets were assigned to the ARFOR and civil affairs soldiers were assigned to the JTF/J5. In contrast, the JSOTF assigned to support the 1996 Atlanta Olympics adequately planned for and lead SOF who were supporting JTF-Olympics. SOCNORTH would provide the needed command and control to integrate SOF in future NORTHCOM operations.

Necessary within the command and control structure are liaison officers who understand the capabilities and limitations of their represented organization. These officers and specific liaison elements assigned to the components within the JTF will ensure coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction. No SOF liaison existed at the JTF level during Hurricane

Andrew. In comparison, liaisons were used extensively between the many command and control centers for coordination and collaboration at the Atlanta Olympics. SOCNORTH would advise the NORTHCOM commander to ensure SOF functions were integrated appropriately, and work with SOCOM if additional special operations forces were necessary.

RECOMMENDED SOCNORTH ORGANIZATION

Assuming SOCNORTH will not plan for and support Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) or mil-to-mil relationships with Mexico or Canada, SOCNORTH can be a relatively small organization consisting of approximately 29 personnel. NORTHCOM needs a trained and ready battlestaff and small reaction force, with SOF capabilities, to provide the initial assessments and if additional forces are necessary, a SOC would request them. SOCNORTH can provide this capability and at the same time be a force advisor, provider, and integrator. The SOC should consist of the following billets:

- Commander – Brigadier General (NG general officer on extended active duty tour)
- Deputy Commander – Colonel
- Staff Support – 3 (executive officer, NCO, and government service secretary)
- J-1 – 2
- J-2 – 4
- J-3/5 – 10 (2 Psyop, 2 Civil Affairs, 2 Special Forces, 2 Airmen, 1 SEAL, 1 Marine)
- J-4 – 4
- J-6 – 4

The manpower billets at SOCNORTH should be a mix from the active, guard, and reserve components. The nature of the missions at NORTHCOM dictates knowledge and experience from all three components will be vitally important in executing the NORTHCOM missions. The commander should be a National Guard general officer in extended active duty status. This will facilitate command and control of National Guard and Reserve special operations forces assigned to SOCNORTH during crises and contingencies because of the

knowledge and experience gained from working in these two components. The commander could also serve as NORTHCOM's JTF Commander if the situation warrants.

Organizationally, SOCNORTH should combine the staff functions of the J3 (current operations) and J5 (planning). The command's focus should be the J5 staff functions of planning and coordinating for JTF-Homeland Security and JTF-Civil Support. There are three distinct reasons for combining these staff functions. First, the J3 is usually responsible for the JCET program and mil-to-mil relationships and there is minimal requirement for this capability in NORTHCOM at this time. If this requirement is added in the future, more personnel will be needed. Secondly, SOCOM has a standing JSOTF for the counterterrorism mission. SOCNORTH's role will be to plan and coordinate with this existing organization, and request through SOCOM, these specialized forces if the crisis warrants. This relieves SOCNORTH from having to educate, train, and exercise a special operations force with these capabilities. Lastly, the current SOF support to JTF-6 is minimal. However, if this counterdrug mission expands, then the SOCNORTH/J3 may need to also expand – a separate issue beyond the scope of this monograph. The proposed billets within SOCNORTH J3/5 bring a combination of special operations talent-enabling SOCNORTH to support the NORTHCOM commander and his staff with special operations crisis action and deliberate planning expertise as needed.

NORTHCOM must transform to an organization that can anticipate and adapt to the new missions of homeland defense and civil support. SOCNORTH will plan, coordinate, conduct, and support operations in support of NORTHCOM's new missions as the Theater Special Operations Command. The time to create this organization is now, before institutional inertia takes hold.

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