Synchronizing Airpower and Other Operational Fires - The Joint Force Commander's Role
Abstract
Poor decisions by the Joint Force Commander (JFC) regarding command relationships and synchronization procedures will inhibit effective employment of airpower and other operational fires given the compressed time, greater mobility, and enhanced lethality of twenty-first century warfare. The trend toward a smaller force structure, diminished acceptance of collateral damage and increased involvement by political leaders makes the modern battlefield less forgiving to errors in command relationships, apportionment, targeting, and fire support coordination. Operation Desert Storm proves that improper command relationships, incorrect apportionment, absence of a joint targeting coordination board (JTCB), and poor placement of the fire support coordination line (FSCL) will prevent accomplishing the desired end state even with a harmonious operational design. Operation Allied Force demonstrates that success is elusive and operational fires ineffective with incoherent national policy objectives, poor center of gravity analysis, unsuitable command relationships, fruitless apportionment, and a nonexistent JTCB. This analysis suggests that for the effective employment of operational fires, U.S. Joint Doctrine should require the JFC to construct a coherent operational design and then actively orchestrate synchronization by designating component commanders, initiating a logical air apportionment decision, establishing a JTCB, and then controlling placement of the FSCL for any campaign or major operation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 21, 2003
- Accession Number
- ADA417153
Entities
People
- George D. Kramlinger
Organizations
- Naval War College