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MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE


Colin S. Gray

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Colin S. Gray

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FOREWORD

During the Cold War, deterrence was the core concept of U.S. national security strategy. As the 1988 *National Security Strategy of the United States* stated, "America's defense policy throughout the postwar period has been aimed at deterring aggression against the United States and its allies. Deterrence works by persuading potential adversaries that the costs of their aggression will exceed any probable gains."

While deterrence is as old as human conflict itself, it became particularly important with the advent of nuclear weapons when armed conflict between the superpowers had the potential to end civilization. Today, though, there is a sense that terrorism has rendered deterrence obsolete and forced the United States to substitute preemption for it. In this monograph, Dr. Colin Gray illustrates that strategic reality is not simple. Instead the two are inextricable. "Preemption," as Dr. Gray notes, "needs all the assistance that it can garner from effective deterrence." The United States "has no practical choice other than to make of deterrence all that it can be, albeit in some seemingly unpromising conditions."

Dr. Gray provides both a conceptual framework for understanding deterrence—or, more accurately, the psychology of deterrence—and policy guidance on how the United States can most effectively use it. He concludes that an adaptable and flexible military with robust landpower is the only tool that can maintain deterrence. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as part of the ongoing debate on American national security strategy in the era of global terrorism.


DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

COLIN S. GRAY is Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England. A graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Dr. Gray worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), and at Hudson Institute (Croton-on-Hudson, NY), before founding a defense-oriented think tank in the Washington area, the National Institute for Public Policy. Dr Gray served for 5 years in the Reagan administration on the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. He has served as an adviser both to the U.S. and the British governments (he has dual citizenship). His government work has included studies of nuclear strategy, arms control policy, maritime strategy, space strategy, and the use of special forces. Dr. Gray has written 17 books, most recently *Modern Strategy* (Oxford University Press, 1999) and *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History* (Frank Cass, 2002). In 2004 he will publish a study of U.S. national security policy, *The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order* (University Press of Kentucky), and a geopolitical overview of modern history (with Geoffrey Sloan), *Geopolitics and Strategic History, 1871-2021* (Frank Cass). He also is working on a book manuscript intended to reveal the mysteries of *Future Warfare*.

SUMMARY

Deterrence has fallen on hard times. From being the proudest achievement of the U.S. defense community in the Cold War, both intellectually and as policy, strategy, and doctrine, deterrence today looks very much like yesterday's solution to yesterday's dominant problem. Times have changed, and each strategic context promotes the popularity of ideas that seem best suited to help cope with the challenges of the period. This monograph begins by recognizing that, although the Bush administration did not formally retire deterrence as concept or policy, it left observers in no doubt that in the global war it declared against terrorism, deterrence generally would be left on the bench. Whereas deterrence appeared to be resoundingly successful through 40-plus years of Cold War, its utility in the very different conditions of the 21st century is highly problematic at best.

The purpose of this monograph is to explore the state of deterrence now, and to see what can and should be saved from the wreckage of what once was the keystone in the arch of American strategic thought, policy, and strategy. To do this, the text begins by explaining how and why deterrence has fallen out of fashion. Next, it proceeds to detail the main elements in what fairly can be termed the current crisis of deterrence. Finally, the monograph outlines some practical measures, both quite general as well as specific to U.S. landpower, which should maximize the prospects for deterrence being all that it can be, admittedly in some truly demanding circumstances.

It is important to recognize that the monograph is informed by two strong beliefs which probably warrant labelling as assumptions. First, it rests on the conviction that deterrence, though diminished in significance, remains absolutely essential as an element in U.S. grand strategy. Second, the monograph reflects the belief that landpower must make a vital contribution to such success for deterrence as may be achievable.

By way of terse explanation: some of the criticisms of deterrence, including those that are valid and indeed are replayed in this monograph, are apt to be silent on the problems with deterrence's

policy and strategy rivals. It is true that deterrence is inherently unreliable. Unfortunately, as Clausewitz reminds us, "war is the realm of chance." One reason why deterrence has to be rescued from its current condition of semiretirement, is not so much because it offers great prospects of success, but rather because the leading alternatives suffer from severe limitations of their own. Military prevention/preemption is a necessary option as an occasional stratagem. However, it cannot possibly serve generally as the strategy of choice. In addition to military uncertainties, the domestic and international political demands on a preemptive strategy are much too onerous. If preemption can be only a minor, if still vital, player, the principal alternative would be a strategy of accommodation or appeasement. Positive inducements have their place in grand strategy, but there is nothing especially magical about their historical record of success (as our recent experience with North Korea illustrates all too clearly). Preemption and accommodation have roles to play, but if the burdens placed upon them are to be kept within sensible bounds, deterrence needs to handle much of the traffic.

Deterrence in Crisis.

The monograph provides a detailed review of the current crisis of deterrence. Key concepts are defined and explained. Those concepts are deterrence itself, compellence, dissuasion, inducement, preemption and prevention. Familiarity can breed contempt for the precise meaning of words. A surprisingly large number of people do not have a robust grip either upon how deterrence works (i.e., through a leadership deciding that it is deterred), or upon the distinction between preventive and preemptive action.

The monograph presents five broad points which capture much of the basis for the contemporary inclination to marginalize deterrence. First, many people have come to understand that deterrence is inherently unreliable. Those who demand certainty tend to be uneasy with a strategy that leaves a crucial power of decision with the adversary. Second, in retrospect the American theory of (nuclear) deterrence which underpinned, and sometimes

guided, our strategic behavior in the Cold War, looks to have been nowhere near as magisterial as was believed at the time. Our theory, and attempted practice, of deterrence, assumed an effectively culture-free rationality. The American theory of deterrence was, and remains, exactly that, *American*. This fact can promote miscalculation on our part, given that American efforts to deter can succeed only if non-Americans choose to cooperate.

Third, the American theory and attempted practice of deterrence is prone to commit the cardinal error of confusing rationality with reasonableness. A recurring theme in U.S. public discourse is that of the rationality or irrationality of a particular foreign leadership. While genuinely irrational leaders do exist from time to time, meaning people who cannot connect means purposefully with ends, their occurrence is so rare and their longevity in power is so brief, that they can be ignored. The problem is not the irrational adversary, instead it is the perfectly rational foe who seeks purposefully, and rationally, to achieve goals that appear wholly unreasonable to us. American strategic thinkers have long favored the fallacy that Rational Strategic Persons must think alike. More specifically, rational enemies are deterrable enemies. Fourth, deterrence has been marginalized because some of the more implacable of our contemporary adversaries appear to be undeterrable. Not only are their motivations apparently unreachable by the standard kind of menaces, but they lack fixed physical assets for us to threaten.

Fifth, the modern theory of deterrence was devised by people who were not, by and large, historians or close students of Clausewitz. The attempted practice of deterrence is subject to harassment, or worse, affected by events and influences that are best captured by Clausewitz's compound concept of "friction." Whether or not the American approach to deterrence is well-conceived, a great deal can go wrong on both sides of the relationship. Friction can occur at every level of conflict—policy, strategy, operations, tactics. Theoretical texts, as well as official statements of intent, on deterrence, understandably are all but silent on the subject of friction. This concept is notoriously difficult, if not actually impossible to operationalize. Even its author conceded that friction is a "force that theory can never quite define." In the real world of deterrence as

policy and strategy, many things can, and frequently do, go wrong. One might conclude that military prevention or, if we are desperate, preemption, is the prudent path to take, since so much may hinder the prospects for success with deterrence.

In summary, the monograph points out the inherent unreliability of deterrence, the fragility of the theory with which we waged the Cold War, the continuing confusion of rationality with reasonableness, the likelihood that many of our new enemies will not be deterrable, and the working of friction to frustrate our best intentions.

Practical Measures.

So much for the bad news. The concluding section of the monograph advances the much better news that all is not lost on the deterrence front. Divided into "general measures" and "military measures," the study identifies and discusses "practical measures" whose adoption should help rescue deterrence from the discard file, or even from marginalization. As a general measure, the monograph advises that we should not "talk down deterrence." This recent official phenomenon has at least two unfortunate consequences: it provides fuel for those critics who wish to portray America as trigger-happy, and it overpersuades its exponents. Next, the monograph recommends that America look diligently for deterrable elements among, or vitally supportive of, our foes. I am not greatly impressed by the claim that our new enemies are undeterrable. Al Qaeda has many would-be martyrs in its ranks, but the organization is most careful of the lives of its key officers, and it functions strategically. It can be deterred by the fact and expectation of strategic failure.

The monograph advises respect for the working of general deterrence, or dissuasion, as contrasted with immediate (crisis-time) deterrence. Much of our success with deterrence leaves no footprints in the sand. America's military and economic reach and its reputation for firm behavior shape the international security environment. Putative foes are deterred without necessarily even being aware of the fact. They take account of America's guardianship behavior and restrict their ambitions accordingly. The study proceeds to advocate

strongly the development of a more empirical theory of deterrence. America's theory of deterrence for the conduct of the Cold War was largely deductive in character and rested upon the convenient assumption that "one size of theory fits all." This was not true for the Soviet Union, and most assuredly it is not the case for the new adversaries of today and tomorrow. There is no adequate substitute for understanding the minds and the values they seek to maximize, that are targets for influence.

Much as war cannot be waged intelligently except in the light of the peace that it is supposed to herald, so deterrence cannot be attempted save in the context of a broad strategy of influence. War is not an end in itself, and neither is deterrence. The purpose of deterrence is to influence the decisions of others. Military threats comprise only one element in a strategy of influence. Deterrence should be most successful when it is supported by the adversary's knowledge, on the one hand that the United States is willing and able to take preemptive/preventive action, and on the other that promises of rewards for cooperative behavior are to be trusted. The monograph recommends that, contrary to much past American malpractice, the ideas of foreign adversaries should be taken seriously. After all, deterrence is all about influencing foreign minds. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of understanding the beliefs that dominate those minds, and which both shape the way the world is viewed, and serve as spurs to behavior.

It is necessary to demonstrate that terrorism fails. Brave people will sacrifice their live for a cause, but what if nothing seems to change in the world? Al Qaeda has some distinctly terrestrial goals, and those can be denied by competent policies and strategies. Many of its officers and recruits should be discouraged by a growing realization that the Jihad they are waging is an exercise in futility. Finally, the monograph reminds its readers of the unfortunate fact that, by its high-profile opposition to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the United States may be encouraging the perception that it can be deterred fairly easily. The law of unintended consequences has a way of ambushing what otherwise is sound policy. The more vehement the American opposition to proliferation, the greater the political and strategic value of such

proliferation in the calculations of adversaries desperate for some way to secure asymmetric advantage. In its sensible quest to slow the pace of proliferation, America needs to be careful lest inadvertently it sends the message that even the most modest of WMD, especially nuclear capabilities, will reap wholly disproportionate rewards.

Under "military measures" to enhance deterrence, the monograph offers, and explains, four broad principles. It claims that force posture must be flexible and adaptable; that landpower is essential; that no particular military posture is uniquely deterring; and that U.S. landpower must be capable of contributing to strategic success in different kinds of conflicts. The monograph concludes by itemizing the desirable or essential characteristics of U.S. landpower for it to perform satisfactorily in a deterrent role. If there is a guiding principle for this concluding section of the report, it is this judgment of Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, USN: "The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with a gun. The man is the final power in war. He is control. He determines who wins." Wylie's perceptive judgment speaks volumes to the matter of what enhances deterrence. His principle was never more in need of emphasis than it is today. Mission accomplishment can be threatened by risk-averse behavior for fear of casualties. Transformation, in practice, is more about exploiting technology than approaching war "in the round," let alone waging war with a view to winning the subsequent peace.

The following are the practical measures recommended in the report, both general and military.

Practical Measures for the Maintenance of Effective Deterrence.

General Measures.

Don't talk down deterrence,
Look for deterrable foes,
Don't discount general deterrence, or dissuasion,
Develop a more empirical theory of deterrence,
Deterrence should be employed as part of a broad strategy of
influence,
Take the ideas of others seriously,

Show that terrorism fails,
Don't encourage the perception that the United States would be
easily deterred by WMD.

Military Measures.

Force posture must be flexible and adaptable,
Landpower is essential,
No particular military posture is uniquely deterring,
U.S. landpower must be capable of contributing to strategic
success in different kinds of conflicts:

- Raids and brief interventions,
- Taking down rogue states,
- Holding off/defeating major regional powers,
- Irregular warfare,
- Peacekeeping/peacemaking,
- General dissuasion;

And U.S. landpower needs to be:

- Demassified,
- More Joint,
- More network-centric,
- Capable of heavy ground combat,
- Better able to use Special Forces,
- More focused on mission accomplishment than force protection,
- More skilled at civilian interface,
- More patient,
- More able to work with allies.

MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE¹

Strategic Ideas and Political Context.

As theory, policy, and strategy, deterrence has fallen on hard times. This concept, once the intellectual keystone in the arch of Western security, certainly the proudest achievement of the modern American strategic enlightenment, is now under assault from several directions. Scholars have had a long field day subjecting the familiar nostrums of deterrence to elaborate quantitative tests as well as to tests of logic and historical evidence, though for obvious reasons the latter are notoriously difficult to conduct convincingly.² After all, episodes of successful deterrence are recorded as blanks in the pages of history books. Furthermore, deterrence may work most efficaciously when it can rely not upon the potency of explicit threats, but rather upon the fears of publicly undesigned deterrees who are discouraged from taking action by their anticipation of the threats that adventurous behavior would bring down upon their heads. Deterrence can be so internalised by policymakers that it will be at work for our security even when it is nowhere visible, at least in the form either of vulgar threats or even of subtle hints of superpower displeasure.³ Notwithstanding its manifest general attractions—preeminently the prevention of hostile acts without the actual resort to force—deterrence is looking more and more like yesterday's strategic concept for yesterday's strategic context.

Deterrence as an idea is probably as ancient as human society. The proposition that antisocial behavior can be discouraged either by threats of punishment or by a highly plausible capability physically to thwart it, is not exactly a novel, if sometimes contentious, insight of recent times.⁴ Those times did, however, provide the concept with its lengthy strategic moment of supreme historical glory. Strategic ideas rise and fall in popularity as the small community of strategic theorists responds to the needs of the period. Strategy, including strategic theory, is a distinctly pragmatic concern.⁵ The story of the elevation, even coronation, of deterrence, especially of stable deterrence, is very familiar and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that in the strategic context of the great nuclear-shadowed

Cold War, deterrence and a strategic stability resting upon the mutuality of such conferred by secure second-strike capabilities, was the master concept.⁶ The nuclear war that must not be fought and could not be won, as the mantra of the day insisted, had to be deterred. That mission, at least, appeared eminently feasible. Writing soon after the close of the Cold War, Britain's eminent military historian and frequent strategic commentator, Sir Michael Howard, ventured the bold claims that "beyond doubt we effectively deterred the Soviet Union from using military force to achieve its political objectives." He capped that confident if unprovable assertion with the somewhat complacent judgment that "we have become rather expert at deterrence."⁷ He may have been right, but he claimed more than he knew for certain. Since there was no Soviet-American war from 1945 to 1991, and I decline to view either Korea or Vietnam truly as proxy conflicts, self-evidently it was the case that whatever may have needed deterring in those years was deterred. More than that one cannot claim with complete confidence. Henry Kissinger has described the ascendancy of deterrence in the Cold War with characteristic acuity.

The nuclear age turned strategy into deterrence, and deterrence into an esoteric intellectual exercise. Since deterrence can only be tested negatively, by events that do *not* take place, and since it is never possible to demonstrate why something has not occurred, it became especially difficult to assess whether the existing policy was the best possible policy or a just barely effective one. Perhaps deterrence was even unnecessary because it was impossible to prove whether the adversary ever intended to attack in the first place.⁸

The rather abrupt, though mercifully nonviolent, end of the Cold War cast the U.S. defense community conceptually adrift. In the 1990s, the strategic intellectual capital of the previous 5 decades seemed less and less relevant. Despite some brief alarmist speculation about danger from Japan, a speculation that did not long survive the growing evidence of Japan's structural economic problems, and rather more plausible predictions of future conflict with China, a survey of the international horizon revealed little in obvious need of discipline by deterrence.⁹ The occasions when

deterrence might have been a potent strategy, in the several wars of Yugoslavian succession for the leading example, were structured unhelpfully by the fact that the United States perceived no vital national interests at stake. It did not take murderous ethnic cleansers of several persuasions long to realize that Americans did not really care about the Balkans. The 1990s, the no-name post-Cold War era, saw the Clinton administration indulge in occasional belated, punitive military muscle flexing, but there was no national military strategy, or guiding strategic concept, worthy of the name. As a well respected historian observed of the period, "'RMA has replaced TQM as the acronym of choice' among members of the armed forces."¹⁰ Identification of the need to be able to cope near simultaneously with two major theater wars (MTWs) as the standard for postural adequacy was not very imaginative, though with the benefit of hindsight from the vantage point of 2003, the two-war standard was not obviously foolish. Iraq and North Korea were, of course, the most anticipated foes.¹¹ Somewhat encouraged by the successful demonstrations of airpower over Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999, the Armed Forces were not thinking about strategy.¹² Instead they were embroiled ever more deeply in advancing, and revisiting, the pressures to exploit the information-led RMA. Given that money was tight, or worse; that the RMA story was distinctly debateable; that the forces seemed to be busier than ever deploying to support the country's foreign policy; and that an overarching policy concept to guide strategy was noticeably absent, the 1990s was an unusually difficult decade. This was probably only to be expected, since it was both an immediate postwar period and, logically and historically, also an interwar period. To be blunt, in the 1990s, the U.S. Armed Forces did not know what they were doing or why they were doing it, but they did know that they were busy, while resources of all kinds were in ever shorter supply.¹³

It is useful to quote some familiar words of Raymond Aron. In 1968, he wrote that "[s]trategic thought draws its inspiration each century, or rather at each moment of history, from the problems which events themselves pose."¹⁴ That wise observation explains the rise and (relative) fall of the theory of deterrence, more or less in step with the attempt to practice deterrence during the Cold War.

Aron's words help explain also why the post-Cold War decade was a period bereft of much strategic thought, innovative or otherwise. Those years did not present the kind of problems to American professionals that inspire strategic thinking. September 11 changed all that and effected a brutally sudden end to the brief post-Cold War era.

Unquestionably, September 11 was a wake-up call to an American superpower that previously had given the appearance of understanding neither its responsibilities for international order, nor what might threaten that order with such seriousness as to warrant a U.S. strategic response. Unfortunately, when policymakers went to the strategy store in the immediate wake of September 11, they discovered that the "golden age" of American strategic thought had terminated in the mid 1960s. The shelves were well-stocked with dusty variants of the dominant concepts of Cold-War vintage, deterrence in particular, but were almost embarrassingly empty of persuasive sounding concepts for dealing with the shocking new realities of post-modern terrorism. Of course, the strategic theory that should help structure national security policy has been hampered in its potential for organizing understanding by some deep uncertainties over the character and future of the international political context. Was September 11 a singular and probably unrepeatable spectacular in a campaign that inevitably would lose drive and political significance as its perpetrators and their supporters suffered attritional damage at the hands of the guardian of the current international order?¹⁵ Or was September 11 the "Pearl Harbor" for the Third World War?¹⁶ Is the conduct of war against the forces of global terrorism—a hugely diverse enemy, one must hasten to add—the defining activity for American national security for the next decade and more? Indeed, was this struggle best understood as a war?¹⁷ With impeccable sagacity, Clausewitz advised that:

The first supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test [of policy] the kind of war on which they are embarking: neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.¹⁸

The conflict with global terrorism, even in its more restricted form in the guise of the well-networked al Qaeda, bears more resemblance to a protracted hunt than it does to what most people understandably call a war. The cutting edge of the counterterrorist effort is likely to be intelligence, especially multinational cooperation on intelligence, and muscular policework. All of which is fairly plausible, but it is by no means certain that U.S. national security strategy reduces to chasing terrorists of no fixed abode. Terrorists and their backers do provide some targets for military action, and the jury will long be out on just how significant a challenge they pose to American vital interests, including the world order of which the United States is the principal guardian.¹⁹

This monograph is about deterrence and not primarily about countering terrorism. However, bearing in mind the words quoted from Aron, if terrorism is the problem, perhaps the defining problem, for this new post-September 11 era, we would expect, indeed we would require, the fashion in strategic thought to reflect that fact. Superficially, at least, the extended defense community has responded much as one would expect. From being a pursuit marginal to the mainstream of concern, counterterrorism, especially when linked in a diabolical potential marriage with weapons of mass destruction, is the expertise that suddenly is in demand. In the 1950s and 1960s almost any work on nuclear deterrence could find a financial sponsor and a publisher, virtually no matter how ordinary the analysis; while in the 1970s the consumers of wisdom from the strategic cognoscenti seemed to have a boundless appetite for deeply technical studies of strategic arms control. The 1980s were a thin period for American strategic thought, probably because the political context failed to yield a defining problem or two which could serve as a magnet for those who typically ride to the sound of the guns, meaning the strategic challenge of the moment or, less generously, the chink of cash. It should not be forgotten that strategic thought, at least the aspiration to such, is a business as well as a patriotic duty. Ten years ago, as already mentioned, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was the coming big concept. It happened to be profoundly astrategic, but hardly anyone noticed.²⁰ The strategic innocence about RMA occasioned scarcely a ripple, both

because the U.S. Government in the 1990s was not really interested in truly strategic questions, and because the outside world did not appear to press in upon America with urgent problems that demanded an immediate strategic response. Certainly the Clinton administration was concerned about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, just as it was genuinely worried about global and home-grown terrorism. Also, it was sincerely troubled by the policy conundrum of how best to deal with a rising China; what was the prudent balance between cooperation and containment?

Overall, though, and in some respects for honorable reasons, in the post-war decade of the 1990s, the United States gave every appearance of being more than somewhat lost strategically. Obviously, it wished to do good in the world. Provided the cost in anticipated American casualties would be close to zero, the country eventually could be prevailed upon to provide the intelligence, logistics, and generally the aerial muscle that only it possessed.²¹ Feckless allies and incompetent international organizations made a habit of presiding over, certainly permitting, the eruption of repeated crises in the Balkans marked by a barbarism notable even in that vicious neighborhood. But it was all very ad hoc, unless a rather vague globalism and a commitment to a "national security strategy of engagement and enlargement" are judged to be serious ideas for the guidance of operational policy and strategy, as contrasted with being simply noble general sentiments.²² From the end of the Cold War until September 11, 2001, American security policy lacked a theme. This condition did not escape the notice of Henry Kissinger, who, writing shortly prior to September 11, noted censoriously, but all too accurately, that "[a]t the apogee of its power, the United States finds itself in an ironic position. In the face of perhaps the most profound and widespread upheavals the world has ever seen, it has failed to develop concepts relevant to the emerging realities."²³ Harsh, perhaps, but on balance true. At least it was true beyond serious contention before September 11.

Strategic ideas tend not to be developed, or have the cobwebs knocked off them—since there are no new ideas—until official or industrial clients face problems to which those ideas appear to be relevant. In the political context of the 1990s, the great, life-or-death

deterrent task lacked even for a convincing half-life, which was the leading reason why the slow-motion START process became a subject of distinctly minor notice. It is hard to sustain much interest in a "strategic balance" that lacks a convincing political context. Residual deterrence duties were acknowledged as a permanent feature of America's somewhat uncertain role in the world, but there was general confidence, outside of academe (and officials did not read the scholarly literature that was dissecting deterrence theory), that, to repeat Howard's proud claim, "we have become rather expert at deterrence." And, dare one say it, even if deterrence were to fail in the globalized, post-Cold War world, so what? The stakes would be vastly more modest than had attended the genuinely nightmare possibilities of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.²⁴ Surely a concept, doctrine, strategy, and policy that either kept us safe, or at least, plausibly, contributed usefully to that end in seemingly the most stressful of contexts, should have no difficulty speaking effectively to the minor league challenges of the brave new globalizing world after the Cold War? If the enemy was a roguish state whose misbehavior in action would come with a return address conveniently supplied for retaliation, then the mainstream American confidence in deterrence was understandable, even if unwise. The problem was that the new phenomenon (in recent times) of religiously motivated transnational terrorism, did not appear to provide rich pickings for that previous North Star for the guidance of security policy, deterrence.²⁵ This seemed to be true, particularly when it was considered in the light of trends in the ever greater availability of information on WMD.

The Bush administration did not formally retire deterrence as concept or policy, but it left observers in no doubt that in the global war that it declared against terrorism, deterrence generally would be left on the bench. The administration's capstone strategy document could hardly have been clearer.

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.

The document went on to contrast the effectiveness of deterrence when “we faced (post-Cuba, 1962) a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary,” with the situation today.

But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.²⁶

One may be excused for reading those words as a thumbnail character sketch of a certain Iraqi. As if the rogue state challenge is not sufficiently severe for the policy and strategy standing of deterrence, the new terrorism is proclaimed to be quite outside its domain. The President announced, uncompromisingly, that “[t]raditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wonton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness.”²⁷ The principal solution to the new character of threat is advertised as a determination to shoot first in the face of an imminent threat. This well-respected and long-established legal doctrine of justifiable preemption was stated with unparalleled clarity and authority by then Secretary of State Elihu Root in 1911. He spoke of “the right of every sovereign state to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself.” In law, in theory, and in the practice of states, preemption is by no means the novelty, let alone the aggressive novelty, that was claimed by much of the commentary hostile to the President’s announcement. For once, fact was less exciting than fiction. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained the preemptive demands of the new political context with a signature eloquent directness: “People are used to a different century. People are used to Pearl Harbor. They are used to being attacked and then responding.”²⁸

There are, of course, problems with preemption. But, suffice it to say for now that as policy, doctrine, and operational strategy, preemption needs all the assistance that it can garner from effective deterrence, the title of this work. The danger is that it could be required to bear a burden which must be far beyond its competence,

not to mention the political tolerance of the American people and the political acquiescence of what is termed with some irony, the international community. There should be no misunderstanding. This author is strongly in favor both of preemption and, even more, of prevention. The critical difference between the two concepts may only be timing, or it might be manifest in the exercise of a range of policy initiatives, far more extensive than direct military action alone.

Preemption will be useful, even essential, as a very occasional stratagem against rogue polities, and it must be standard practice, whenever feasible, against stateless foes. Nonetheless, it cannot serve as *the* master strategic idea for this new political context. Its demands of America's political, intelligence, and military resources are too exacting. The case for striving to maintain, or newly achieve, effective deterrence rests nontrivially upon the manifest limitations of the alternatives. If preemption is useful, though flawed, what should one make of the other big concept of the era, the one that replaced RMA as the fashionable big idea—namely, asymmetry? Unfortunately, asymmetry, employed affectively to characterize threats or strategy, is of scant operational value.²⁹

To be asymmetrical means to be different, that is all. It has no inherent meaning. One cannot study asymmetrical threats or strategy, except in relation to those symmetrical with our expectations. It is a useful, even important, idea, particularly for the design of policy, strategy, tactics, and force posture, keyed seriously to efforts to deter. But, in and of itself it is only a vital, if obvious insight; it cannot grow into a guiding concept, let alone a strategic doctrine. Because war is "nothing but a duel on a larger scale," as the master wrote on the first page of his classic text, one must take the enemy seriously and on his own terms.³⁰

Given that deterrence can only work, when it does, in the minds of enemy leaders, it is their worldview, not ours, that must determine whether or not deterrence works. If the recent and still current popularity of the concept of asymmetry encourages a healthy awareness of the differences among security communities and their probable attitudes and preferences, then it is useful.³¹ But, to repeat, asymmetry has, can have, no inherent meaning. It is not a candidate

for the short list of “big organizing strategic concepts” that might unlock the mysteries of how best we should strive to cope with this strange new century, with its elusive, complex menace of global apocalyptic terrorists. In their different ways, neither preemption nor asymmetry holds the promise of serving the United States in the 21st century, as deterrence did for nearly 50 years in the 20th century.

It follows from the discussion thus far, that the country has no practical choice other than to make of deterrence all that it can be, albeit in some seemingly unpromising conditions. If this view is rejected, the grim implication is that the United States, as sheriff of world order, will require heroic performance from those policy instruments charged with cutting-edge duties on behalf of preemptive or preventive operations. Preemption or prevention have their obvious attractions as contrasted with deterrence, at least when they work. But they carry the risk of encouraging a hopeless quest for total security. In order for it to be sensible to regard preemption as an occasional stratagem, rather than as the operational concept of choice, it is essential that the United States should wring whatever effectiveness it can out of a strategy of deterrence.

The first section has explained how the popularity of particular strategic ideas rises and falls as demand for what they offer, or appear to offer, shifts more or less in step with changes in the political and strategic context. I will argue that although deterrence may have lost its status as the conceptual centerpiece for the guidance of American strategy, in fact it remains a vital necessity, in part to reduce what otherwise could be a wholly insupportable burden placed by default on the sometimes shaky prospects for preemptive success. However, having said that, it is important to realize that not all is well in deterrence-land. The concept and strategy, at least in their most familiar American guises, have been the targets of powerful criticism, some of it well-merited, some not. The next section examines the contemporary crisis of deterrence and seeks to rescue what is worth rescuing from this much abused notion. Today, the theory and attempted practice of deterrence requires rescue from both its friends and its foes. Once we have sorted out the proper domain of deterrence and identified what needs to be done to

enhance its effectiveness—as well as noted its inherent limitations—the monograph will suggest some practical measures by which the United States should be able to apply its better understanding in pursuit of more effective policy and strategy. The discussion of practical measures includes consideration of the desirable character and roles of American landpower as contributor to a realistic deterrent dimension to national military strategy.

Deterrence in Crisis.

It is difficult to argue with a historical record of more than 40 years' duration which appears to demonstrate a monumental success for the theory and practice of deterrence. We can never know for certain whether or not deterrence theory and doctrine, ours and theirs (which was rather different), made the difference between war and peace, was essentially irrelevant, or possibly was a net contributor to the possibility of the outbreak of war. But since World War III did not occur to terminate the Cold War, we can be sure that our theory and practice of stable deterrence, which was, after all, the dominant strategic concept of the era, at least was consistent with a protracted condition of nonwar. Plainly it was compatible with "the long peace."³² The inherently ambiguous record of deterrence in the Cold War is of more than mere antiquarian interest today. The modern theory in exploitation and elaboration of the concept was forged, elaborated, and applied for 40 years. It educated all save the youngest of today's strategic thinkers and defense analysts, and it appears to have provided the ideas that kept Armageddon at bay for all those many years.

When theorists and officials today pass judgment, which typically leans towards the negative, on the contribution that deterrence can make to national security, their dominant template necessarily is the theory, doctrine, and practical approaches familiar from the Cold War. This is unfortunate. The distinctly Jominian school of stable deterrence, which reigned supreme in the United States for several decades, was both dangerously unsound and carried the opportunity cost of impairing vision of a more intelligent approach to the task of influencing reluctant, culturally

alien minds.³³ The point, urgently in need of wide dissemination and appreciation, is that deterrence, notwithstanding its honorable and prominent record in the Cold War, is not a fixed, settled, and now long-perfected intellectual product.³⁴ When commentators and policymakers discuss the notably limited role for deterrence in the much changed political and strategic context of the 21st century, do they have an accurate understanding of just what it is that they are talking about? My contention is that deterrence is by no means as well-understood as it needs to be. Significant illusions persist about how to promote its success, as well as whether one should be pessimistic over its prospects. Also, as a consequence, the United States risks selling short a concept and strategy of which the country stands in dire need as senior partner to a doctrine of preemption which, though necessary, is fraught with extraordinary political and military hazards.

Before this text is misunderstood, I must clarify speedily the connection between deterrence and preemption. The conclusive policy argument in favor of preemption would be the plausible claims that the adversary cannot be deterred, that it poses an imminent threat, and that its instruments of threat can be neutralized by our arms with really high confidence. Of course, one might choose preemption even if the foe is judged to be most probably deterrable, on the principle of better safe than sorry, perhaps to impress others, and in order to ensure that a particular problem does not recur in the near future. However, if we assume, as almost certainly we should, that preemptive military initiatives are apt to be politically expensive, and can suffer from what Clausewitz identified brilliantly as friction,³⁵ policymakers should welcome some reasonable prospect of success for deterrence. The more potent our strategy of deterrence, the more likely should it be that the preemptive option can be restricted to rare cases of unusual danger. Furthermore, with both deterrence and preemption in good condition in the shot locker, the President might, in some instances, have a most welcome range of choice over how the military instrument could best serve policy.

It may seem a little late in the narrative to offer definitions of important concepts, but the analysis thus far has not seemed to need the added clarification which is the reward for delaying the

argument with discussion of key terms. However, I can defer the task no longer, and must beg the reader's patience while I provide an admittedly somewhat belated explanation of the more important ideas.

- **Deterrence** has the negative object of persuading an adversary not to take action that it might otherwise have done. Whether or not the intended deterree decides he is deterred is a decision that remains strictly in his hands. There is an obvious and undeniable sense in which that decision is made in a context of coercion, but still the intended deterree is at liberty to refuse to allow his policy to be controlled by foreign menaces. Deterrence theory has offered many distinctions, some useful, some less so. For our purpose here, important distinctions can be recognized between: deterrence by defense or by punishment (the former should deter by the threat to defeat the inimical action); general or immediate deterrence (the former refers to a diffuse deterrent effect deriving from one's capabilities and reputation which helps shape the international security environment; the latter to efforts to discourage specific behavior in times of crisis);³⁶ and extended and central deterrence (the former alludes to endeavors to extend deterrent coverage over friends and allies; the latter to the deterrence of attack upon one's homeland).³⁷ And there are many more!

- **Compellence**, or perhaps *coercion* or *coercive diplomacy*, has the positive object of persuading an adversary at a minimum to cease and desist from current misbehavior, and more likely to retreat from positions seized and to surrender assets illicitly seized by force (if the actions in question involve the use of landpower, of course). Compellence/coercion is not the same as defense. A compellent strategy is relevant only after deterrence failed, or was not attempted explicitly. It carries the promise to inflict an escalating weight and perhaps character of damage, unless our policy demands for the enemy's retreat are met.³⁸

- **Dissuasion** is a current American term-of-art, ironically lifted

from the French, and it points to the aspiration to “dissuade future military competition.”³⁹ The DoD *Annual Report* for 2002 was admirably plain in stating the intention of “dissuading future military competition.” Secretary Rumsfeld explained that :

[t]hrough its strategy and actions, the U.S. has an influence on the nature of future military competitions. U.S. decisions can channel threats in certain directions and complicate military planning for potential adversaries in the future. Well-targeted strategy and policy can therefore help to dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions.⁴⁰

To the uncertain degree to which dissuasion helps structure respect for, even fear of, American military prowess, policy demand for deterrent effect should be reduced. Those dissuaded from competing with the superstate guardian should not need to be deterred. Dissuasion is a reasonable goal for a policy effect from military primacy, but nonetheless it is likely to disappoint. The problem, as so often with the American articulation of strategic ideas, is an unconvincing treatment of the political context. While a dissuasive strategy should serve to discourage military competition from those currently far behind, it would be a mistake to underestimate the intensity of international dissatisfaction with the current American hegemonic role. If history is more arrow-like than cyclical, then Steven Metz and Raymond Millen may speak to our future when they write, “decisive war between major states is rapidly moving towards history’s dustbin.”⁴¹ But, if history really is more cyclical than arrow-like, we should expect state-centric enemies to attempt to organize to resist the American hegemony, and in particular to work hard in search of strategic means and methods that might negate much of our dissuasive strength. Of course, they may not succeed. However, we must assume that the political motivation will be strong and persistent. As a final point on this popular notion of dissuasion, it is worth noting its close relation to Patrick Morgan’s long familiar concept of general deterrence, already introduced above. Both dissuasion and general deterrence lack specific addressees, formally at least; they are directed for the

attention of "those whom they may concern." Whether or not the dissuasive or general deterrent message is received, understood, believed, and acted upon, is, of course, an issue that transcends the competence of the world-be dissuader-deterrer. As always with dissuasion and deterrence, the final word lies with the intended deterree.

- **Inducement** is the flip side of the coin from deterrence. Both are strategies for influence, the one with negative sanctions, the other with positive. Much as deterrence should work to reduce the necessity for preemption, except as a quite extraordinary measure (against state-centric forces, that is; stateless rogues are another matter entirely), so inducement, or bribery, should help diminish the demand for effective deterrence. A state may be beyond deterrence, but not beyond persuasion-by-reward for good behavior. General theory is of little assistance here. As a broad proposition, it is important, indeed vital, to be alert to the potential efficacy of positive sanctions. But, whether or not an inducement strategy, or—more likely—a combination of deterrence and inducement, stands a realistic prospect of succeeding in any particular instance is a question that can be answered only with reference to the unique details of the case in hand. Readers are invited to consider the history of U.S. relations with North Korea over the past decade as a record which illustrates almost everything worth knowing about the hazards, and potential benefits, of an inducement strategy.⁴²

- **Preemption and prevention**, strictly regarded, are alternatives to deterrence. To endorse these concepts, in a general way, is to say that one can envisage circumstances wherein confidence could not be placed in the reliability of deterrence. It should be needless to add that the U.S. Government, sensibly, embraces these ideas *and deterrence*. The global superpower, actually and prospectively facing off against enemies of many kinds, motivations, and capabilities, requires policy, strategy, and forces that are flexible and adaptable. A preemptive strategy, hopefully with a national active missile defense backstop, would make all

kinds of sense against a minor state which has only nominal long-range striking power. But against a major regional power, perhaps even a returning great power, let alone an aspiring superpower, preemption would probably be a desperate gamble, vastly more dangerous than an admittedly unreliable deterrence. The concept of preemption could hardly be clearer, at least in principle. It means to attack first in the last resort, which is to say in the face of truly compelling evidence of imminent threat. When the Bush administration talks of preemption, by and large it means prevention instead. The difference between the concepts is simply that of timing. A preventive attack is intended to strike before an identified menace becomes an imminent threat. Israel's blow against Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981 was plainly preventive, not preemptive, as also was the assault on Iraq in 2003. It scarcely needs to be said that a doctrine of preventive assault, particularly in the context of the policy and strategy of *dissuasion* discussed already, invites critics of many stripes to charge the United States with being trigger-happy. To be fair, a doctrine of prevention, despite its preemptive cover story, must hover close to a willingness to shoot on suspicion. Just how strong that suspicion would need to be is a topic riven with political dangers for the American sheriff of world order. If anything would spur efforts to create an anti-American, which is to say an anti-hegemonic, coalition, it would be the United States acting vigorously, and almost certainly all but unilaterally, according to the bold strategic logic of its prevention-preemption doctrine.

In the analysis thus far, I have risked sounding more positive about deterrence, the theory, its ever ambiguous historical record, and its current state of health as an American strategy, than the evidence strictly allows. If we are to maintain effective deterrence, it will be necessary to recognize frankly the more important of the misapprehensions and deficiencies in the now long traditional American approach. My shortlist of discontents with the American "way of deterrence" is by no means identical to the most probable reasons why senior officials in the Bush administration have expressed strong reservations about the relevance of the concept

in an era when transnational terrorism appears to be the defining threat. If the "new terrorism" is not deterrable, a popular, as well as official, assumption that obviously has some merit, then improving the American way of deterrence is not likely to accomplish much of value. I am respectful of that view, but I do not share it in its entirety. It seems to me that the proposition that we face some undeterrable foes is at best a half-truth. Moreover, it is a half-truth which, when accepted somewhat uncritically as revealed wisdom for our time, could have the unfortunate effect of discouraging us from taking the trouble to try to improve our policy, strategy, and force structure for deterrence.

The next section of the monograph identifies some practical measures of several kinds, including the strategic (that is to say, options requiring the threat or use of force to advance our political objectives),⁴³ which should assist us to enable deterrence to be all that it can be. But there is no escaping the prior responsibility to lay bare the leading problems with the concept. To be accurate, the problems I shall outline briefly are not so much difficulties with the logic of deterrence. Rather they are troubles self-inflicted by a U.S. defense community that is much in need of revisiting what it thinks it understands about the concept, its requirements, and its prospects. Five broad points capture much of the basis for the contemporary inclination to marginalize deterrence, though not all of these are recognized widely in the terms in which they are presented here.

First, deterrence is inherently unreliable. Although it is conceived and executed as a coercive strategy intended to control unfriendly behavior, it is a control that has to rest upon the voluntary consent of the deterree. The control achieved by that consent is vastly inferior in quality to the control secured by (successful) military action which removes from the enemy the power to make the wrong choice. Although the argument just outlined is not at all controversial and is fundamental to the very structure of deterrence, it is not as well-understood as it should be. American defense discourse abounds with references to "the deterrent." It makes no logical difference whether the deterrent is held to compromise the nuclear-armed "existing triad" (of ICBMs, bombers, and SLBMs), or the "new triad" (non-nuclear and nuclear strike forces, defenses, and

supporting infrastructure).⁴⁴ Some people have genuine difficulty grasping the point that deterrence is a relational variable; it is not, it cannot be, a quality or a quantity immanent in particular forces. The fact that our nuclear forces were referred to for half a century as "the deterrent" was not an unreasonable error to commit, but it was an error. Whether or not U.S. nuclear-armed forces deter, is a question that only foreigners can answer (aside from the phenomena of self-deterrence). I confess to being uneasy with a monograph title which suggests that deterrence can be effective, but my disquiet is reduced by the conviction that this is a perfectly feasible aspiration. What would not be feasible would be the aspiration to achieve "reliable deterrence," "certain deterrence," "assured deterrence," or any similar formula which literally contradicts the very nature of the phenomenon. While it should be possible to identify and purchase armed forces that ought to encourage would-be foes to decide to be deterred, there can be no removing the power of decision from those foreign leaders. The United States cannot purchase a truly reliable deterrent. In common with love and happiness, deterrence is not a benign condition that can be bought directly. It has been a persisting feature of American strategic thought and policy to confuse the instrument with the desired effect. References to the nuclear deterrent, or the conventional deterrent (much in favor today), provide yet more fuel to the long-standing charge that U.S. respect for Clausewitz's theory of war is fatally deficient in appreciation of the primacy of policy and politics.⁴⁵

Second, it is highly probable that the modern theory of (nuclear) deterrence, the proudest accomplishment of the golden decade of U.S. strategic thought (1954-66),⁴⁶ was, and remains, vastly more fragile than two generations of American strategic thinkers believed. It is not the case that we devised a highly reliable theory of deterrence for the political context of the Cold War, a theory that is now of much diminished relevance because security conditions have changed so radically. Would that the deterrence story were that simple. The problem is that our theory of deterrence always rested upon some dubious assumptions. In the opinion of this author, the American theory, doctrine, and strategy of nuclear deterrence was never severely tested during the Cold War, probably not even

during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, a plausible fact that was probably just as well, given the weakness at the core of the theory.

In the 1960s and 1970s, American defense professionals believed that they had cracked what seemed to be the most challenging strategic problems of the age.⁴⁷ Deterrence, limited war, and arms control were subjects that attracted a confident literature. That confidence was extended to some self-satisfaction over the belief that crisis management had been mastered, probably with escalation and compellence also in the column of intellectual tools of control. Certainly there was a degree of rather smug self-congratulation over the theory, the doctrine, and sometimes policy, of strategic stability, both crisis stability and arms race stability. The latter happy state was deemed to be promoted by behavior which would not fuel the action-reaction cycle, or spiral, that was believed to be the motor for arms race dynamics, as each superpower strove to ensure the security of its ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon the other, even after suffering a first strike. This whole body of American strategic thought, developed to meet the policy and strategy needs of the Cold War, was remarkable for its near silence on the subject of political context. Perhaps the theorists of the day believed that the established, authoritative fact of Soviet-American hostility disposed of the need for much political analysis. The spirit of the theories was distinctly reminiscent of the didactic and positivist writing of that old American favorite, the Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, as noted earlier. American theorists appeared to argue that deterrence, limited war, arms control, arms race management, strategic stability, and the rest, though with the stable exception of counterinsurgency, could become practical skills to be applied successfully by those who had mastered the right principles and techniques. The inspiration for this attitude is clearly visible in Jomini's writings.

It is true that theories cannot teach men with mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case, but it is also certain that they will always point out the errors which should be avoided; and this is a highly-important consideration, for these rules thus become, in the hands of skilful generals commanding brave troops, means of almost certain success.⁴⁸ .

Or, for the Parthian shot in his most accessible work in English, Jomini offers the encouraging and reassuring advice that “[c]orrect theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual events of wars, and added to accurate military history, will form a true school of instruction for generals.”⁴⁹ Through most of the Cold War, the U.S. defense community entertained little doubt that it had discovered the correct theory of deterrence, and identified the right principles to shape the strategic force posture in the interest of stability. Indeed, so confident were Americans of the merit in their theory of strategic stability through mutual deterrence with secure second-strike forces, that considerable effort was expended in the context of the SALT process to educate Soviet officials in this canon lore of the nuclear age. As Michael Desch has observed,

The development and deployment of absolute weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union led many to anticipate that this technology would encourage both superpowers to behave roughly similarly. Nuclear weapons were so destructive that they made cultural differences largely irrelevant. Instead, the nuclear revolution ushered in general theories of strategic behavior such as deterrence theory, inspired by the assumptions (homogeneous rational actors) and methodology (rational choice) of economics. Such rational-actor theories of strategic behavior dominated Cold War national security studies in the 1950s and early 1960s.⁵⁰

In other words, those rational-actor theories were forged not in just any period, but rather in the decade when modern American strategic theory was born and grew swiftly to maturity. Those were the golden years for creative theorizing, not least on the crucial, central subject of stable deterrence. Unfortunately, the problem was that the Soviet Union did not appear to share the dominant American view of stable deterrence. Moreover, it came as a quite startling revelation to many Americans when they began to realize that their strategic enlightenment, of which they felt perhaps justly proud, was not disregarded in Moscow out of ignorance, but was understood and rejected. Rather self-flattering American expectations of strategic intellectual convergence in the early 1970s, naturally with Soviet convergence upon the American “correct theory” of stable nuclear deterrence, withered and died during that decade. At least, they

withered and died for those among us who had eyes to see and ears to hear. On the evidence of Soviet behavior in force development, it should have been undeniable that one size in the strategic theory of deterrence did not fit all. The issue is not, indeed was not, the quality of U.S. theory, doctrine, policy, and strategy for deterrence. We may need to keep reminding ourselves that strategy is not a game of solitaire. Approaches to deterrence cannot sensibly be selected for their autarkic intellectual merit, their methodological elegance, or their aesthetic appeal. Strategy, and therefore deterrence, is a duel. A theory of deterrence may score a "perfect 10" for elegance and persuasiveness *to us*. But, if it rests upon false assumptions about intended deterrees, the theory will be worse than useless. Thus, even for the structurally simple, bilateral world of the Cold War, there are serious grounds to doubt whether the dominant American theory of deterrence and strategic stability was shared by the adversary.⁵¹ Plainly, views could diverge even in the context of a history-terminating scale of nuclear menace, and after decades of a mutual fixation of concern and the experience of talking at, if not often with, each other. How much more serious might the problem be when the targets of our deterrent messages have not signed a Faustian pact with us to keep the peace by a mutual nuclear terror, and indeed may have scant comprehension of the logic and expectations most characteristic of our approach to deterrence?

Third, the American theory and attempted practice of deterrence suffers from a potentially fatal confusion of rationality with reasonableness.⁵² Much tends to be made in popular commentary of the issue of whether or not particular foreign leaders are, or are not, rational. The convenient, but—alas—fallacious assumption is that rational foes must share our strategic logic, or at least ought to be readily accessible to its unmistakable contingent menaces. With some trepidation, I will argue that we can discount the phenomenon of truly irrational political leaders. Such people do exist, of course. To be functionally irrational is to be incapable of purposefully connecting means with ends. There will be political leaders in the future, as there have been frequently in the past, who because of alcohol, drugs, or illness, either temporarily and erratically, or permanently, will not be able to function rationally. However, this

unhappy condition, if severe, is apt to be short-lived, since it is acutely dysfunctional for all concerned, and is not long sustainable. More often than not, when the Western media worries about what it labels as irrational enemies or behavior, it is really referring to enemies and behavior that are judged unreasonable. The point that requires wider understanding is that to be rational is not necessarily to be reasonable, by our standards. The U.S. problem is not, significantly, one of irrational enemies. Rather is the problem one of enemies whose entirely rational behavior purposefully connects policy instruments (e.g., suicide bombers) with policy objectives that are an affront to our values, including international legal and moral norms. The notion of rational behavior is content-neutral. The idea that such behavior must, or should, be responsive to American strategic logic, as expressed in our theory and attempted practice of deterrence, is simply a proposition: it is not a revealed truth. On the contrary, it is fundamentally in error. In a world marked by great cultural and political diversity, globalization notwithstanding, there can be no solid basis for assuming that our generally rational enemies will rationally pursue goals that we find reasonable. Keith Payne has explained this problem better than anyone, and has pointed to what, in principle, must be the attempted solution.

If rationality alone fostered reasonable behavior, then only in the rare cases of manifestly irrational leaderships would we likely be greatly surprised. Assuming challengers to be pragmatic and rational, and therefore reasonable, facilitates prediction of their behavior simply by reference to what we would consider the most reasonable course under their circumstances; the hard work of attempting to understand the opponent's particular beliefs and thought can be avoided. Such an opponent will behave predictably because by definition, it will view the world in familiar terms and will respond to various pushes and pulls in ways that are understandable and predictable. Contrary and surprising behavior would be senseless, "irrational."⁵³

In his book, Payne reminds us that in the 1960s the United States conducted a coercive, if frequently interrupted, air campaign—Rolling Thunder—which was intended to influence minds in Hanoi, even though it knew next to nothing, and understood even less,

about the enemy's policymaking process or how he rank-ordered his values.⁵⁴ Robert McNamara's Pentagon, hoisted on the petard of the recent apparent triumph for crisis management technique over Cuba, was not discouraged by its abysmal lack of local knowledge of Southeast Asia. That same Pentagon also advertised, perhaps perpetrated, the grisly metrics of death and damage that it bloodlessly termed assured destruction (though this was more a principle than an operational doctrine). Both over Vietnam and in the conflict with the Soviet Union, the United States acted on the basis of the thoroughly unsound assumption that the adversary could be deterred or compelled fairly reliably, because Americans would pose threats, or inflict pain, that must influence the minds of rational people in predictable ways. In short, the U.S. defense community had invented a Rational Strategic Person who should behave as American strategic theory predicted, which is to say, by definition rationally and as a matter of optimistic assumption, reasonably.⁵⁵

Fourth, because, inconveniently, "[w]ar is nothing but a duel on a larger scale," so success with deterrence must result from a contest of wills and values.⁵⁶ Today, it is commonplace for deterrence to be dismissed or marginalized on the apparently plausible grounds that the more ferocious and probably culturally mysterious of our new enemies allegedly are undeterrable. The combination of religious fanaticism, with extra-terrestrial rewards for martyrs, and an absence of accessible physical assets for us to threaten, is held to render deterrence largely irrelevant as an effective answer to the new terrorism. Much the same conclusion often is reached with regard to the so-called rogue polities who appear to be America's new state-centric foes. The argument is that our new statist enemies are ill-understood in Washington. They may be moved to what we would judge irrational behavior by commitment to a hierarchy of values that precludes policymaking on the basis of consequentialist reasoning. If that line of thought is deemed underwhelming, it can be supplemented by the suspicion that there are several reasons why deterrence will not work well enough for the containment of rogue states. We may suspect that the leaders of those unhappy lands either will not believe contingent American threats, or may be in such dire domestic political straits that they dare not comply.

To advance the argument yet further, one must take note of the cautionary point that there may be some polities, with particular reference to their acquisition of WMD and the means of delivery, that we judge too dangerous simply to deter, even should we believe deterrence feasible. During the Cold War, preventive or preemptive action against the Soviet Union soon ceased to be a live policy option, on practical grounds for certain.⁵⁷ But America's new roguish state enemies, in this period of hiatus between eras of great power struggle, bear no resemblance to the unlamented USSR of yore. We may choose to argue not only that deterrence would be exceptionally unreliable as the point of our policy spear vis-à-vis many rogue states, but also that a strategy of military prevention, not preemption, would be the prudent policy choice.

Fifth, for the magical realm of rational choice by Strategic Persons obedient to a universal consequentialist logic, deterrence will seem a potent strategy.⁵⁸ The fifth of my broad points indicating the major reasons for deterrence's loss of popularity of late is inspired by the timeless wisdom of both Carl von Clausewitz and Helmut von Moltke (the elder). *On War* tells us that "[e]verything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war."⁵⁹ Clausewitz confides that "[f]riction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper."⁶⁰ He argues that "[f]riction, as we choose to call it, is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult."⁶¹ Unfortunately, friction "is a force that theory can never quite define."⁶² Discipline, training, and actual experience of war are the best counterweights to the friction that can impede tactical military behavior, but when we elevate our concern to policy, strategy, and operations, they can no longer be of much assistance. General Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke, Prussia's Chief of the General Staff, wrote in 1871 that "[n]o plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength. Only the layman sees in the course of a campaign a consistent execution of a preconceived and highly detailed original concept pursued consistently to the end."⁶³ If we regard an intended deterrence nexus as a phase in the duel that can become actual

war and if we allow Moltke's words to advise us, we might coin the maxim that "no strategic theory survives intact attempts to apply it in the real world." In the pristine world of strategic ideas, as presented in a small library of more or less rigorous texts, the myriad reasons why deterrence may fail are rarely accorded much more than a passing nod. It is easy to be critical of theorists who neglect to grant friction its full dimensional due, but one must admit that it is next to impossible to operationalize the concept.⁶⁴ After all, even its original author conceded that it is a "force that theory can never quite define." This fifth broad point means simply that in the real world of deterrence as policy and strategy, many things can go wrong, and even the superiority of ideas and the excellence of the military instrument may not suffice to neutralize friction's grip.⁶⁵ It might follow from this logic that military prevention or, if we are desperate, preemption is the prudent path to take, since so much can occur, or fail to occur, which must hinder the prospects for success with deterrence.

I have pulled no punches in presenting a shortlist of reasons why the theory and possible practice of deterrence has been marginalized over the past decade, and probably can fairly be described today as being in a condition of crisis. To recap, this discussion has pointed out: the inherent unreliability of deterrence; the probable fragility of the theory with which we waged the Cold War; the continuing confusion of rationality with reasonableness; the likelihood that many among our new enemies will not be deterrable; and, finally, that friction lurks to hinder or frustrate our best efforts to deter. So much for the bad news. Quite deliberately, the analysis thus far has devoted little attention to an effort to provide a more balanced judgment. In my opinion, there are serious difficulties with deterrence, as theory and as policy and strategy, and they need to be appreciated in full. However, matters need be by no means as black as they have been portrayed in this text thus far. The concluding section accepts as facts the problems with deterrence, and seeks to identify practical measures to defeat, alleviate, or work around, them.

Practical Measures.

Because this monograph has sought to maintain focus upon deterrence, and particularly upon the reasons for its decline in popularity, little effort has been devoted to exposing the leading difficulties with its principal rivals. I do not propose to correct that imbalance now, save to observe that some of the serious problems endemic to a strategy of deterrence happen to be endemic also to deterrence's major rivals. Consider its two principal alternatives, prevention/preemption and reassurance/inducement. There can be no denying that both alternatives, at either end of the grand strategy spectrum, are inherently unreliable. War, as Clausewitz insisted, is "the realm of chance."⁶⁶ Deterrence may fail, but so might military action or attempts to appease and conciliate. It may be the case that for many years to come the United States will only wage wars that it will have difficulty losing—with the possible exception of the war against terrorism—but it behooves us to recall Metz and Millen's warning that the age of the stupid enemy is past.⁶⁷ They are probably overly pessimistic, but the point is an important one that needs to be taken seriously lest we succumb to a debilitating triumphalism. Moreover, even some of the wars that America wins militarily might be won at a human and political cost that would call into question the meaning of victory.⁶⁸ In addition, since the object of war has to be the attainment of a better condition of peace, the successful conduct of military operations not infrequently sets the scene for yet greater difficulties in winning the peace. These comments are not intended to rain on the parades of those who find exceptional merit in either preemption or conciliation, but rather to emphasize that some of the more troubling features of deterrence as a strategy bedevil alternatives as well.

To ensure maximum clarity in argument, this concluding section proceeds by itemizing practical measures believed likely to enhance American performance with a strategy of deterrence. My purpose here is literally to answer the question posed implicitly in the title of the study: how do we maintain, or achieve, effective deterrence? Because these pages are devoted rigorously to the presentation of suggestions and thoughts intended to be constructive for the efficacy

of deterrence, it should not be presumed that I am generically hostile to such other strategies as preemption or conciliation. Indeed, the reputation for willingness to take swift military action can be essential to help adversaries decide that they would be well-advised to choose to be deterred. Similarly, a reputation for honoring contingent promises of positive sanctions can assist adversaries find that the costs of being deterred should be tolerable. This monograph is about the rise and fall, and contemporary need to reform, deterrence; it is not intended to suggest the merit in a unifocal approach to the challenges of national security. The practical measures itemized below reflect two beliefs: that deterrence remains a useful, indeed a necessary, strategy, for the United States; and that we can improve our prospects for deterrence success by approaching its requirements somewhat, but only somewhat, differently from what has long been our standard *modus operandi*.

My "practical measures" are collected in the general and the military (with particular reference to the contribution that should be made by American landpower).

General Measures.

Don't talk down deterrence. In some of its more robust language claiming that deterrence is not relevant to the principal enemies of today, officials inadvertently and unwisely give the impression that the concept has been all but abandoned. The official adoption of a strategy of preemption logically reinforces the point that little confidence can be placed in deterrence in contemporary conditions. There are several reasons why the official undermining of respect for deterrence is ill-advised. First, the United States happens to remain committed to a deterrent strategy, for whatever it can deliver in admittedly difficult circumstances. Also, the main foes may well be eminently deterrable states, not elusive terrorists moved by dreams of self-sacrifice. Second, usually the prime victims of an overstated argument are its proponents. U.S. officials stand in some danger of over persuading themselves of the demise of deterrence. Third, official statements that read like an obituary for deterrence provide evidence for the opinion abroad that the United States is

becoming trigger-happy and now sees military action as a first, not a last, resort. As we have seen, there is much about deterrence, and particularly about the traditional American approach to it, that warrants criticism and is in need of reform. It is important for officials, and their advisors, to remember that the American approach to deterrence requires reform, not abandonment.⁶⁹

Look for deterrable foes. The inimitable Ralph Peters has drawn a most useful distinction between “practical” and “apocalyptic” terrorists.⁷⁰ The former are people who have an agenda that might just be addressed, if not met, as a result of their criminal deeds. For the latter, in Peters’ words, “destruction is an end in itself.” He goes on to assert that “[o]ne may be controlled. The other must be killed.”⁷¹ That is probably good advice. It does, however, risk missing the point that there is much about even apocalyptic terrorism that should be deterrable. To risk confusing Peters’ admirably sharp distinction, it has to be the case that al Qaeda, possibly the most potent movement ever committed to apocalyptic goals, has been organized (loosely, for security) and administered by some extremely competent and practical people. The facts that many individual members of al Qaeda would welcome martyrdom, and that the organization has non-negotiable goals, are really beside the point. Of course, al Qaeda cannot be deterred by the prospective death of some of its troops; the blood of martyrs will attract new recruits. However, the organization itself, in loose-knit sophisticated networked form though it is, should be eminently deterrable. While its goals may be apocalyptic, they are goals that can be advanced strategically. Al Qaeda functions strategically and rationally, connecting its hideous means purposefully to its other-worldly ends. As this analysis insisted earlier, rational behavior need not be reasonable behavior. Al Qaeda is not careless of the lives of its soldiers, and still less of the lives of its key officers. For al Qaeda, death has a purpose. There are several ways in which a strategy of deterrence should be able to help us control this “monster.”⁷² First, it ought to be deterrable by a growing conviction that they are failing. As the United States improves its counterterrorist performance, so a sense of futility should discourage both the candidate martyrs and their commanders. It is one thing to die to advance a cause. It

is quite another to die in an operation that will both probably fail tactically, and serve no obvious strategic, albeit apocalyptic, goal. After a while, the combination of effective counterterrorism and the resistance of the world to the impact of martyrdom, including the boredom of overfamiliarity, should be quite potently deterring. Second, to survive and prosper al Qaeda has to be careful of the lives of its most important members. Were it otherwise, the organization would be out of business in short order. Credible threats to the lives of those people, and to their ability to function in command, can have a deterring effect. Finally, although al Qaeda lacks a central postal address, it has cells in 50-70 countries—a distressing piece of intelligence, indeed—and is tolerated, and in some cases assisted, by official bodies for their own, distinctly non-apocalyptic, reasons. Much of al Qaeda's extra-organizational fellow-travelling support structure should be deterrable. What is required on our part, as always, is good intelligence and a willingness to act. A little prevention-preemption would do wonders for the subsequent effectiveness of deterrence in the minds of those whose motives were primarily worldly and pragmatic.

Don't discount general deterrence, or dissuasion. It is almost a cliché to observe that when deterrence works, it is apt to leave a shortage of convincing evidence for the data mills of social scientists. If that is largely the case for instances of what is known as immediate deterrence, which is to say crisis time deterrence, how much more true must it be for the benign functioning of general deterrence, or dissuasion. By general deterrence we mean the effect upon behavior, and upon the norms that help shape behavior, of perceptions of U.S. military power and of the likelihood that it would be employed. Possession of a very powerful military machine, and a solid reputation for being willing to use it, casts a shadow or shines a light—pick your preferred metaphor—in many corners of the world. That shadow, or light, may have a distinct deterrent effect, even in the absence of explicit American efforts to deter.⁷³ Regional rogues, ambitious would-be great powers, and perhaps the more prudent terrorists must take account of the fact that they share the planet with a heavily armed superpower with the will to resort to force. The result, quite often, though beyond documentation, will be what

is known most accurately as self-deterrence. The United States does not need to issue rafts of deterrence messages, which is not to deny that there will be occasional need for some carefully targeted efforts at immediate deterrence. Many of the globe's potential malefactors will judge their potentially profitable misdeeds to be far too risky. Their context is an international order policed by U.S. military power as well as by economic sanctions. By being exceptionally powerful in all dimensions, and by demonstrating an occasional willingness to intervene militarily, the United States is a factor in the calculations of many rogues, aggressors, adventurers, and patriots, who do not need to receive personal American messages of discouragement, addressed to them by name, place, and issue. General deterrence, or dissuasion, is at work when a political leader rules out an exciting course of action from serious policy consideration because of the fear that it would trigger an American response. There is probably more successful deterrence "action" of this type than there is in the forms of immediate menaces that appear to succeed in time of crisis. Unfortunately, although common sense, logic, and historical experience all point to the significance of this deterrent phenomenon, it is utterly beyond research. The functioning of general deterrence is well out of sight; possibly it may be scarcely recognized as an explicit factor even by the deterree. Hence it tends to escape notice altogether in contemporary arguments about the relevance, or otherwise, of deterrence in the new international conditions of the 21st century.

Develop a more empirical theory of deterrence. In its immediate form, deterrence is always specific. It is about persuading a particular leader or leaders, at a particular time, not to take particular actions. The details will be all important, not be marginal. A body of nonspecific general theory on deterrence is likely to prove not merely unhelpful, but positively misleading. It is improbable that broad general precepts from the canon lore of American Cold War deterrence theory could yield much useful advice for the guidance of U.S. policy today. What the United States requires is detailed, culturally empathetic, understanding of its new adversaries.⁷⁴ That understanding should include some grasp of the psychology of key decisionmakers, as well as knowledge of how decisions tend to be made. Readers should recall the words of Keith Payne quoted

earlier. He said that if we could make the convenient assumption that "rationality alone fostered reasonable behavior," then we could predict adversary behavior simply by asking ourselves what we would deem to be reasonable were we in their circumstances. If we can predict the reasoning of our enemies reliably enough, because of the general authority of our theory of deterrence, "the hard work of attempting to understand the opponent's particular beliefs and thought can be avoided." The fact that the Cold War did not conclude with World War III is not proof that Payne is wrong. It may well be that our strategy of deterrence was not severely tried. There may never have been a moment when the Soviet leadership posed the question, "Are we deterred?" Given the weight of the general stakes in the superpower contest, notwithstanding the blessed shortage of direct issues in contention, and the transcultural grasp of the horrors of nuclear war, it was probably the case that the success or otherwise of deterrence did not depend upon fine-grained strategic calculation or knowledge. Of course, one can write that with much more confidence today than one could during the decades when responsible officials were obliged to assume that deterrence could be fragile.⁷⁵

However, if the United States now aspires to deter the leaders of culturally mysterious and apparently roguish states, the convenient assumption that "one size fits all" with the (American) precepts of deterrence, is likely to fail badly. It is bad news for those among us who are not regional or local specialists, but to improve the prospects for deterrence of such polities as North Korea, Iran, Syria, and the rest, there is no intelligent alternative to undertaking empirical research to understand those whom we strive to influence. It will not suffice either simply to reach for the classics of American strategic thought, or to assume that the posing of a yet more decisive military threat must carry a message that speaks convincingly in all languages.

Deterrence should be employed as part of a broad strategy of influence.⁷⁶ Many defense analysts, because they do not have history or political science as their root disciplines, are inclined to approach deterrence, or indeed preemption, as it were in a political and historical vacuum. They can find themselves analyzing the

possibilities of deterrence in a particular case in what amounts to all but context-free conditions. What might or might not deter is considered as an isolated strategic challenge. As a practical matter, deterrence invariably is but one strand to a complex political relationship, a relationship that has a history. Furthermore, deterrence cannot be an end in itself; its purpose is to achieve influence over decisions made abroad. Because there are several leading ways in which influence might be secured, it is only sensible to design and execute a strategy of deterrence as a team player in company with other approaches. Deterrence should work best when it is backstopped by a credible commitment to preempt, and when it goes hand in hand with a no less credible record of promising, and carrying through on, positive inducements for cooperation. The practical measures required in most instances are those that influence the minds of the adversary's leaders. By and large, and certainly in all except a very late state in a confrontation, the policy challenge is not how to deter, rather is it how to achieve influence: deterrence is just one approach to meeting that challenge.

Take the ideas of others seriously. To improve performance with deterrence, U.S. officials and theorists would be well-advised not to discount the potency of authoritative foreign ideas.⁷⁷ As I have indicated already, America's somewhat general theory of strategy, invented to answer the policy and strategic needs of the Cold War, was not eloquent on the subject of possible local variation. The American theories of deterrence, limited war, arms control, and crisis management were assumed to express the truth about those subject areas, a truth deemed transcultural. This was 19th century positivism in the modern guise of largely deductive policy science. There could be some difficulty bringing foreigners on board to understand the new American strategy, but the principal task was held to be that of education in the right (American) way of thinking. There is nothing wrong with being proud of the intellectual guidance for policy that our strategic theorists provide. But, such pride can lead to a hubris which blinds us to the reality of an international diversity in strategic understanding and preference. For a notably ideological polity, the United States has a defense community perennially inclined to overvalue material metrics. For example, while Soviet analysts

tracked what they termed "the correlation of forces," a very inclusive set of measures indeed, their U.S. counterparts studied "the strategic balance." The assessment of that "balance" most typically involved computing the shape of draw-down curves calculated to result from force-on-force strategic nuclear attacks under different conditions of warning. The value of taking a broad and culturally empathetic, not sympathetic, view of actual and potential foes, has not been greatly helped by the neorealist fashion in American International Relations scholarship.⁷⁸ A core assumption of this austere theory is that all political actors respond in approximately the same ways to similar stimuli. To the rigorous neorealist, one size in strategic theory most definitely should fit all cases. However, history and common sense tell us that one size does not fit all, and that the beliefs and personalities of local leaders can, and frequently do, serve as the wellspring for their actual behavior. At the very least, authoritative local attitudes and ideas must function as filters which interpret the messages that arrive from the culturally alien outside world. So, as a practical measure, the United States would be well-advised to study and take seriously the ideas and beliefs of the people it seeks to influence. This may seem so obvious as to be banal, but the executives for the global superpower, and an ideological superpower at that, can find it difficult to treat with respect ideas other than their own. Given that the name of the game is influencing foreign minds, the relevance of this suggestion is all too obvious.

Show that terrorism fails. Like good golfers and tennis players, U.S. strategists should be able to play the percentages as a significant practical measure. The new terrorism contains many undeterrable would-be martyrs, but those foot soldiers for paradise are not usually the decisionmakers for their movement. What the United States and its functional allies should be able to effect as a practical measure is inoculation of a growing suspicion, leading to a conviction, one hopes, that the Jihad is futile. Brave people sacrifice their lives for the cause, but what if nothing seems to change in the world? Al Qaeda operates rationally and strategically; it has some terrestrial goals, notwithstanding its apocalyptic ideas. For cultural and political reasons, it will not be possible for the United States to compete in the realm of ideas, but "the support of moderate

branches of Islam" as Antulio Echevarria recommends,⁷⁹ should level the playing field notably. We can oblige al Qaeda to compete with its own expectations and promises. A patient multinational counterterrorist campaign should show both to practical, as well as to apocalyptic, terrorists, that theirs is a journey to nowhere that is doomed to fail. As Mao Tse-tung wrote, "[t]here is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle."⁸⁰ Whether terrorist operations succeed or fail tactically, realization by their perpetrators that such behavior is strategically futile should serve slowly, but inexorably, to reduce enthusiasm and commitment. Few developments have so self-detering a consequence as the unwelcome recognition that one's efforts are a failure.

Don't encourage the perception that the United States would be easily deterred by WMD. Unintentionally, though to some extent unavoidably, the United States is raising the political and strategic value of the proliferation of WMD. If the world was in any doubt as to the importance of WMD, U.S. policy, with its strong focus on opposing their proliferation by all means, has resolved the uncertainty. Some observers of the American scene may suspect, even fear, that the acquisition of WMD, especially nuclear weapons, could trigger American preventive military action. But many others will believe that the presence of WMD in a region would have a powerful deterrent effect upon the United States. Such a belief is both rational and reasonable. There can be no doubt that American policymakers would think long and hard before they undertook military operations against a nuclear-armed enemy. It may be no exaggeration to say that the United States would undertake such action only if it were absolutely convinced that preventive or preemptive measures would neutralize local nuclear forces entirely. As a practical matter, American officials need to try to avoid feeding the foreign perception that the most reliable way to ensure nonintervention in regional affairs by the United States is to become a nuclear-weapon state. Some Americans are nervous lest the current rhetoric and public policy documents on the subject of WMD inspire excessive, politically damaging anxieties about the prospects of U.S. military action of a preventive or preemptive character. However, those people have more cause for anxiety over

the likelihood that the contemporary U.S. fixation on countering WMD proliferation underlines the strategic value of those weapons. The sorry tale of America's dealings with North Korea over the past decade must suggest to many people that there is much to be said in favor of a distinctly modest nuclear-weapon program, if one needs to encourage caution on the part of the superpower. My point is to remind readers of the operation of the law of unintended consequences. America's sensible and necessary determination to arrest, at least harass and hinder, WMD proliferation can hardly help but enhance the significance of those much vilified capabilities. As a practical matter, the principal focus of this section of the monograph, the United States needs to be careful lest its campaign to damn and oppose WMD proliferation does not inadvertently give the impression that these devices most probably would deter American intervention in the neighborhood at issue.⁸¹

Military Measures.

I am all too well-aware that most of the judgments and items of advice offered in this section are familiar ones. Would that I could point to some personal military discovery that I could assure readers would have an assured, uniquely deterring effect upon all of America's adversaries. It would be most satisfying to be able to write in Jominian mode and guarantee "almost certain success," if only my definite advice is followed faithfully. Unfortunately, there is no wonder formula that can deliver successful deterrence in all, or even most, circumstances. That said, the better news is that one can identify some practical measures, including sensible principles for the guidance of behavior, that should maximize the likelihood that America's landpower will help deter what is deterrable.

The guiding question for this final section is "what type of military force would best promote deterrence, with particular reference to the role of landpower?" It would make no sense to proceed from preferred force posture to analysis of how that posture might contribute to deterrence. Instead, we must address the question by means of identifying the capabilities it is necessary to develop and sustain in U.S. landpower. Once the missions are well understood,

force planning should follow logically. The latter must succeed, not precede, the former.

For economy in presentation, practical military measures are offered as a mixture of the general and the particular. I appreciate that beyond my points and suggestions lie the vital stages of implementation in force planning, and actual force raising, training, and arming. To paraphrase John Wayne, "a man must recognize his limitations."

Force posture must be adaptable and flexible. Historically, it has been a rarity for defense analysts to predict accurately the character of future war.⁸² Similarly, it has probably been unusual for the requirements of effective deterrence to be well-identified. One must say "probably," because effective deterrence leaves little trace in the historical record. The U.S. Armed Forces cannot know today to which conflicts they may be committed over the next several decades. As principal guardian of such global order as exists, the American superpower must be largely locked into a reactive policy mode. That political condition might translate into a need to exercise the military operational initiative, but conflicts will happen at times, in places, and over issues, not necessarily selected by Washington. An optimist might try to argue that the United States now enjoys the luxury of waging only wars of discretion, not compulsion. There is some merit in the claim that because U.S. survival, or even vital, interests will rarely be involved in regional quarrels, or even in most potential counterterrorist actions, we should be at liberty to pick and choose when, where, and whether we will fight. Rather than develop a force posture nominally capable of reaching everywhere and accomplishing anything and everything, the United States ought to be able to select its military operations to match its strategic strengths. I cannot deny the logic of the argument just outlined: that the United States should have considerable discretion over when, where and for what reasons it chooses to fight. However, historical experience and a respect for the ability of the course of events to stage surprises should make us wary of the claim that the United States now inhabits a strategic world wherein its wars will be those strictly of discretion. The U.S. Armed Forces need to be adaptable and flexible, even to cope in wars waged at our discretion. The range of

potential conflicts encompasses both traditional interstate hostilities, notwithstanding their currently being largely in remission, and what Metz and Millen have described as "protracted, ambiguous, asymmetric, and complex conflicts."⁸³ Even when the United States elects to enter a conflict from which, strictly, it could stand aside, it does not follow that the terms of engagement can be dictated by American strategy. A smart enemy may succeed in finding ways to prosecute conflict asymmetrically, grand strategically and not only militarily. It follows that the U.S. Armed Forces must be capable of dealing with "adaptive enemies."⁸⁴ As I wrote in a previous monograph in this series, it is a characteristic of really good armies that they are capable of finding ways to win, particularly when they need to adjust to unpleasant surprises.⁸⁵

Landpower is essential. This point is as fundamental, as important, and essentially as impervious to the strategic effect of technological evolution, as it can escape proper understanding. As an enabler of global expeditionary warfare, as well as a source of ever more precise firepower at ever longer ranges, naval power is vital for the effectiveness of joint warfare. Similarly, there is no room for argument over the necessity for air superiority, and the influence that aerial bombardment, allowed by air superiority, can exercise both in combined arms warfare and independently in strategic coercion. However, none of America's recent wars suggests an emerging obsolescence of its landpower, either for deterrence or warfighting. The two Gulf Wars, even Kosovo, and Afghanistan, all had a U.S. landpower story to a greater or lesser extent. Obviously, the mix of forces must vary from case to case. There are several reasons why it is necessary to risk stating what should be blindingly obvious, specifically the continuing importance of landpower. The U.S. defense community has a long-standing love affair with technology. It is inclined to reduce the current process of transformation to the search for yet more impressive standoff firepower, preferably from altitude. The delivery of firepower for the "servicing of targets" is confused with the whole of war. Some of the recent claims for an emerging new American way of war would relegate U.S. landpower to target spotting for the airpower which performs the heavy lifting that supposedly is decisive for victory. The idea of "victory through

airpower" is now nearly 80 years old, and although the technology at long last has begun to render the proposition plausible, the sheer complexity of warfare and the variety of wars mean that the quest for decision by bombardment must be a chimera.⁸⁶ Whether the focus is upon deterrence, warfighting, or—dare one say it—low level combat in support of peacekeeping operations when the peace is distinctly fragile, there is a unique quality to landpower that cannot be trumped by the technology of aerial bombardment. The heart of the matter has been explained most succinctly by a British historian and maritime theorist, and by an American Rear Admiral. The British author, Julian S. Corbett, writing in 1911, claimed unarguably that:

Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided—except in the rarest cases—either by what your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.⁸⁷

The essential truth in Corbett's claim has not been dented by the century of strategic experience, and technological advance (with the exception of nuclear possibilities on the larger scale), that has passed since publication of his most influential work. The importance of landpower has never found more eloquent expression than in a truly brilliant treatise written 60 years after Corbett's work by Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie of the U.S. Navy. The Admiral has a way with words and an enviable knack of penetrating to the core of a subject. He argues persuasively that:

The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with a gun. This man is the final power in war. He is control. He determines who wins. There are those who would dispute this as an absolute, but it is my belief that while other means may critically influence war today, after whatever devastation and destruction may be inflicted on an enemy, if the strategist is forced to strive for final and ultimate control, he must establish, or must present as an inevitable prospect, a man on the scene with a gun. This is the soldier.

Wylie proceeds to offer some important clarification.

I do not claim that the soldier actually on the scene is a requisite in every case; but I do believe he must be potentially available [Kosovo, 1999!], and clearly seen as potentially available, for use as the ultimate arbiter.⁸⁸

No particular military posture is uniquely deterring. During the Cold War those of us who worked on strategic nuclear issues worried incessantly about the details. We were anxious about actual or potential vulnerabilities, about the design of war plans, about choices in targeting, and—last but not least—about Soviet approaches to, and choices in, these matters. With respect to deterrence, however, it was probably the case that the details that so consumed our attention were of little or no significance. The Soviet political minds that we hoped to influence not to sanction dangerous behavior, almost certainly were deeply ignorant of the details of the U.S. strategic nuclear force posture. The detailed course of a hypothetical bilateral nuclear war was profoundly uncertain. That fact alone was probably sufficiently reliable and frightening to achieve all the deterrent effect the United States could desire. This is not to say that the details of military posture do not matter. But it is to suggest that the political leaders, who are the ones who must decide whether or not our efforts to deter shall succeed, are not likely to be moved by reports of the details of our military power. The speculative reasoning just offered concerning the strategic nuclear forces in the Cold War should be allowed to speak to us with respect to our military posture today. It is entirely sensible, indeed it is necessary, for the U.S. defense community to worry about the grand design, the favored trends, and the details, of the country's military posture. For a host of reasons, our choices in posture, organization, doctrine, equipment, and the rest really matter to us. However, it is far less certain that our choices among the several somewhat alternative U.S. Armies we might develop over the next decade and more have any significant implications for the success or failure of deterrence. Militarily, certainly ignorant Soviet leaders appear to have been impressed by the general, but definite, knowledge that nuclear war would be an open-ended catastrophe of historically unprecedented

proportions. Today it is probably the general, again definite, knowledge of American military might that secures whatever deterrent effect is achievable. For excellent reasons, the U.S. Army debates alternative approaches to transformation, worries about the extent and pace of demassification, considers how it should employ its Special Forces, and argues over the meaning of combined arms operations in new conditions; all of which is desirable and quite proper. But, compared with the total multidimensional strength of the country, including its global, multi-environmental military muscle, the details of Army organization, doctrine, force structure, and equipment can scarcely register at all—for *deterrence*. The point is not that American landpower does not matter for deterrence; nothing could be further from the truth. Rather is the argument here that local, regional, or stateless villains are going to be impressed by their general knowledge of U.S. military power, and their perception of America's willingness to use it. They will not know, understand, or care about the kind of military details that so consume our professional military establishment.

The analysis immediately below identifies the principal missions for American forces to which landpower should make a vital contribution. If the armed forces can perform well in the classes of missions I specify, they will support deterrence to the uncertain degree to which it is supportable by what we expect, and hope, are fears of defeat on the part of our enemies. It is important to recognize that there are many dimensions to deterrence. Unfortunately, the military is not the only such dimension, and even that one will be subject to various perceptions, depending upon the worldview, character, and a host of other local details, particular to the intended deterree. There is no denying the strength of the point that even a U.S. military posture calculated, by us of course, to be maximally deterring, in practice may be nothing of the sort. If we follow Clausewitz's reasoning on the proper domination of military affairs by policy, it is clear that there can be little sense in expecting military forces of a certain kind to have a particularly deterring effect, outside of the historical and political contexts of the conflict in question.⁸⁹ The armed forces may well have vital deterrent value, but that will be the result only of their close fit as a responsive instrument for

a policy that carries conviction and engenders fear. Politics and psychology trump military calculations. For a recent example, Saddam Hussein should have found the prospect of being on the receiving end of America's transforming military power hugely deterring, even compelling. But, if as reported, he was assured repeatedly by the French that international diplomacy would not permit the United States to attack, America's deterrent clout must have all but vanished. Politics rules, which is a persisting historical reality that defense analysts have been known to forget or neglect.

U.S. landpower must be capable of contributing to strategic success in different kinds of conflicts. As just baldly stated, this fourth practical military measure is so obvious as to be in acute danger of warranting a charge of banality. However, the analysis behind the statement is probably less obvious in some of its features than readers might expect. Bear in mind that since the prime focus of this study is upon deterrence, "strategic success" in the requirement stated here refers in the first instance to success with deterrence, rather than in warfighting. This is not to deny the logic that a genuine excellence in the latter, and an international reputation to that effect, should enhance the prospects for deterrence. Of course, that will only be true if the political and historical contexts permit American military power to fit well enough into what one might call the flow of events, or the course of history. If the intended deteree is convinced that U.N. diplomacy, American domestic politics, allied pressure, or a host of other ambushes for policy will arrest U.S. ability to apply force, then the putative deterrent merit of this or that force posture must be strictly moot.

Clausewitz insisted that "[t]he degree of force that must be used against the enemy depends on the scale of political demands on either side."⁹⁰ Determination of the type of military force that might best promote deterrence must in good part be answered with reference to the evolving "grammar" of war, to quote Clausewitz again.⁹¹ But the grammar of war, which is to say the state of military science, has meaning strictly in relation to the "logic" of policy. If we seek to connect choices in force planning and doctrine to some hopefully positive deterrent effects, it is necessary to inquire as to whom we may wish to deter, and from doing what? The *National*

Security Strategy document of September 2002 provides the highest level of broad political guidance in abundance, indeed almost to excess. So extensive and varied are the actual or potential duties of the sole superpower on behalf of world order, as well as in protection of its own vital interests more narrowly, of course, that the U.S. Armed Forces will need to be nothing if not flexible and adaptable, as this monograph has emphasized. Those Armed Forces have at least six distinctive missions today, missions that derive directly from the global ordering role that is national policy. The weight of the landpower contribution to each of these missions must vary with the nature of the task at issue. Although the focus here is upon landpower, it should be understood that the value of the U.S. Armed Forces for deterrence and warfighting is a Joint story through and through. If landpower is to help deter as an integral part of the Joint Team, it needs to be able to contribute effectively to the following:

- The conduct of raids and brief interventions,
- The taking down of rogue states,
- The holding off or defeat of major regional powers (a requirement that must have nuclear deterrence, and air and missile defenses, as very high priorities),⁹²
- The waging of irregular warfare, meaning both war against irregulars and the conduct of war by irregular means (this requirement encompasses all aspects of the global struggle against terrorists),
- Keeping the peace, even making the peace, in zones wracked by violence,
- General dissuasion of disordering behavior by states or by stateless movements and organizations.

It is inconvenient, but nonetheless a reality, that the global domain of America's self-appointed duty as the guardian power, means that its armed forces need to be competent in the waging of both regular and irregular warfare. American forces must be able to conduct war by decisive maneuver and, no less probably, decisive firepower, as well as by patient efforts to root out and isolate irregular warriors in circumstances where Americans will have to work with

local civilians. Metz and Millen are plausible when they identify provision of the capability for strategic victory, and proficiency in the waging of "protracted, complex, ambiguous, and asymmetric conflicts," as "the Army's two *unique* strategic functions."⁹³ These authors have made the same vital point as did Rear Admiral Wylie in words that I quoted earlier. The Admiral wrote that "[t]he ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with a gun." That view is usefully rephrased by Metz and Millen as "strategic victory always requires effective landpower."⁹⁴ It should be needless to add, but probably is not, that just as military victory need not mean strategic victory, so strategic victory need not mean true political victory. If we focus overmuch on the conduct of war and our immediate war aims, the subject of the character of the subsequent peace may suffer from relative neglect.

As U.S. military power is a Joint Team experience, so U.S. landpower continues to be a story that extols the virtues of a combined arms approach to warfare.⁹⁵ The merit in combined arms, as contrasted with the placing of near exclusive faith in some, usually novel, allegedly "dominant weapon," is an ancient principle.⁹⁶ It is not likely that the contemporary military transformation, incorporating many "roadmaps," much "planning guidance," and even more high-flying aspirations, will overturn the wisdom of millennia that is expressed in the principle of combined arms. Many complexities and uncertainties have muddied the waters of this analysis more than a little. But still it is possible to identify the kind of American landpower that should prove adequately flexible and adaptable to cope in a strategic context that triggers contrasting demands from policy for military support. What follows is a short list of the more important characteristics and features of an American landpower well-suited to deter, if deterrence is practicable, or to fight if necessary. I offer no apologies for the absence of any startling innovations in the list. American landpower needs to be:

- demassified, meaning lighter, more mobile, and therefore more rapidly deployable,
- more truly Joint, in its planning, approach, and ethos (inter-service rivalry continues as a self-inflicted wound of

significance),

- more network-centric and better informed by an intelligence function more worthy of its name,
- capable of waging heavy ground combat; the Army needs to be lighter, *not* comprehensively light!
- better prepared to make effective use of Special Forces; the time is long overdue for their roller-coaster history of political popularity and unpopularity, generally in the context of mainstream service hostility, to be replaced by a settled appreciation of their strengths and limitations,⁹⁷
- more focused on mission accomplishment than on force protection; of course this is a matter of degree, not a stark choice, but potent landpower should be more willing to take risks than has been the American norm of recent years,⁹⁸
- more skilled at dealing with civilian interface; lack of training or experience in coping with civilian bystanders, in the context of the very high priority accorded force protection, can result in a certain trigger-happiness that is as politically damaging as it is physically lethal,
- more patient; U.S. landpower will not always be able to conduct decisive maneuver for the securing of swift military, then hopefully strategic, victory. The future holds protracted and difficult challenges for landpower to meet which the Army and Marine Corps will need to draw upon another major strand in their traditions, the long experience with "small wars."⁹⁹
- better prepared to work productively with allies, even in an era when allies generally are strictly less important than before. While it is lonely being the superpower sheriff of world order, it will be both lonelier still and gratuitously perilous if U.S. military power seems to prefer not to have its operations complicated by the need to cooperate with less capable foreign forces.

My major argument is that deterrence remains important, notwithstanding its inherent unreliability. I have agreed also that its theory and contingent practice needs to be revisited so that some urgent reforms can be effected. In summary form, the many and

varied items offered here optimistically, perhaps euphemistically, as "practical measures," serve as the conclusions to this inquiry.

Practical Measures for the Maintenance of Effective Deterrence.

General Measures.

Don't talk down deterrence,
Look for deterrable foes,
Don't discount general deterrence, or dissuasion,
Develop a more empirical theory of deterrence,
Deterrence should be employed as part of a broad strategy of
influence,
Take the ideas of others seriously,
Show that terrorism fails,
Don't encourage the perception that the United States would
be easily deterred by WMD.

Military Measures.

Force posture must be flexible and adaptable,
Landpower is essential,
No particular military posture is uniquely deterring,
U.S. landpower must be capable of contributing to strategic
success in different kinds of conflicts:

- Raids and brief interventions,
- Taking down rogue states,
- Holding off/defeating major regional powers,
- Irregular warfare,
- Peacekeeping/peacemaking,
- General dissuasion;

And U.S. landpower needs to be:

- Demassified,
- More Joint,
- More network-centric,

- Capable of heavy ground combat,
- Better able to use Special Forces,
- More focused on mission accomplishment than force protection,
- More skilled at civilian interface,
- More patient,
- More able to work with allies.

ENDNOTES

1. Although this monograph is wholly original, I wish to acknowledge the strong, pervasive influence of two recent works: Keith B. Payne, *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction*, Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001; and Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence*, Cambridge: Polity Press, forthcoming. Some of the ideas and arguments in this monograph are pursued also in Colin S. Gray, *The Reformation of Deterrence: Moving On*, Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, forthcoming.

2. A fine analytical review of the scholarly literature on deterrence is provided in Freedman, *Deterrence*. Those who would like to sample this literature might try Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 2, January 1979, pp. 289-324; Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985; Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988; Paul C. Stern and others, eds., *Perspectives on Deterrence*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994; Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, *Perfect Deterrence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000; and Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence Now*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

3. This notion is well developed in Freedman, *Deterrence*.

4. In modern times, the conceptual distinction between deterrence by denial or by punishment was laid out rigorously by Glenn Snyder. See his *Deterrence and Defense*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961.

5. "Strategic thinking," or "theory" if one prefers, is nothing if not pragmatic. Strategy is a "how to do it" study, a guide to accomplishing something and doing it efficiently. Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*, New York: Macmillan, 1973, p. 452.

6. For some relevant history, see Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3rd ed., London: Palgrave, 2003; and Colin S. Gray, *Strategic Studies*

and Public Policy: *The American Experience*, Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1982.

7. Michael Howard, "Lessons of the Cold War," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 1994-95, pp. 161, 164.

8. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 608.

9. George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, *The Coming War with Japan*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991; Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997. Books whose titles begin with the formula, "the coming war with . . .," seem to have market appeal.

10. The historian was Dennis Showalter. He is quoted in Williamson Murray, "Thinking about Revolutions in Military Affairs," *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 16, Summer 1997, p. 69.

11. The two MTW paradigm is given a rough time in Steven Metz, ed., *Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2001.

12. Robert C. Owen, ed., *Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning*, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, January 2000; Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001.

13. See Daniel Gouré and Jeffrey M. Ranney, *Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999.

14. Raymond Aron, "The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought," in *Problems of Modern Strategy*, Alastair Buchan, ed., London: Chatto and Windus, 1970, p. 25.

15. See John Mueller, "Harbinger or Aberration? A September 11 Provocation," *The National Interest*, No. 69, Fall 2002, pp. 45-50; and Walter Laqueur, "Left, Right, and Beyond: the Changing Face of Terror," in *How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War*, James F. Hoge, Jr., and Gideon Rose, eds., Oxford: Public Affairs, 2001, pp. 71-83.

16. Lawrence Freedman, "The Third World War?" *Survival*, Vol. 43, No. 4, Winter 2001, pp. 61-87.

17. Michael Howard was adamantly of the opinion that it was a "Mistake to Declare this a War," *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 146, No. 6, December 2001, pp. 1-4.

18. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 88-89.

19. For somewhat alternative views of the American role today, see: Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002; and Colin S. Gray, *The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order*, Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, forthcoming.

20. Colin S. Gray, *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History*, London: Frank Cass, 2002, argues for the conduct of RMAs as strategic behavior.

21. Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1, January/February 1994, pp. 109-24, is very much to the point. Also see Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000.

22. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington, DC: The White House, July 1994. Perhaps one might be permitted the comment that some strategies are more strategic than others.

23. Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001, p. 19.

24. For some endeavors to understand the changed roles and significance of nuclear weapons after the Cold War, see Keith B. Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age*, Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1997; T. V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz, eds., *The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998; Colin S. Gray, *The Second Nuclear Age*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999; and John Baylis and Robert O'Neill, eds., *Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

25. See Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, London: Victor Gollancz, 1998; and Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

26. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002, p. 15.

27. *Ibid.*

28. "Rumsfeld Interview," *The Times* (London), February 10, 2003, p. 13.

29. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, *Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2001; and Roger W. Barnett, *Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power*, Washington, DC: Brassey's 2003, are particularly thoughtful and rewarding treatments of this slippery concept.

30. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 75.

31. See Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, London: Croom Helm, 1979; and Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

32. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of The Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Also see Norman Friedman, *The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000; and Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, London: Frank Cass, 2000.

33. John Shy has noticed that some of the criticism of modern American strategic thought is "very like the standard critique of Jomini. The criticism is that strategists in the nuclear age employ abstract methods like model building and systems analysis that reduce war to an operational exercise, transforming it thereby into an unrealistic but extremely dangerous game." Critics argue that the Jominian approach, followed, albeit largely unknowingly by American theorists, "lifts 'strategy' out of its real-world context, demonstrably increasing the risk of major miscalculations." "Jomini" in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Peter Paret, ed., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 183. John Weltman expressed a similar thought most elegantly when he wrote that "[t]he development of nuclear strategy represented an attempt at a Jominian solution to a problem that was essentially Clausewitzian in nature. Rules were propounded and calculations elaborated, designed to ensure with certainty the successful accomplishment of a wide range of national goals through the deployment, threat, or even use of nuclear weapons." Weltman describes convincingly the invention and development of "rules and calculations for nuclear weapons 'intended' to ensure the deterrence of undesired actions." He contrasts the cutting edge of American strategic analysis with the apparent fact that the outcome of conflicts and crises "turned far more on the attitudes, expectations, perceptions and behavior of the antagonists, than they did on sophisticated calculations about the results of hypothetical clashes of armed forces in battle." *World Politics and the Evolution of War*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995, p. 152. This outstanding book deserves to be better known.

34. Those in need of a rapid education in what might be deficient in the deterrence theory, or practice, that we have inherited from past decades, could do worse than consult Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age*; and *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction*.

35. Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 119-21.

36. This significant distinction is usually credited to Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977, ch. 2.

37. Distinctions among different kinds of deterrence are well-handled in Freedman, *Deterrence*.

38. See Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966; Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971; Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998; Stephen J. Cimbala, *Coercive Military Strategy*, College Station TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1998; and Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

39. Bush, *National Security Strategy*, 2002, p. 29. Richard L. Kugler, "Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept," *Strategic Forum* (INSSS/NDU), No. 196, December 2002, provides a first-rate discussion.

40. Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2002, p. 18.

41. Stephen Metz and Raymond Millen, *Future War/Future Battlespace: The Strategic Role of American Landpower*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2003, p. 7. The same thought animates Michael Mandelbaum, "Is Major War Obsolete?" *Survival*, Vol. 40, No. 4, Winter 1998-99, pp. 20-38; and Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.

42. Probably the most consistent and rigorous advocate of inducement as an integral part of a broad strategy of influence, including deterrence and coercion, is Alexander L. George. See George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974; and Alexander L. George, "The Role of Force in Diplomacy: A Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy," in *The Use of Force after the Cold War*, H. W. Brands, ed., College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000, pp. 59-92.

43. By strategy I mean the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy. This is a light update of Clausewitz's definition: "Strategy [is] the use of engagements for the object of the war." Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 128; Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 17.

44. Rumsfeld, *Annual Report*, 2002, p. 85.

45. Clausewitz, *On War*, Bk. VIII is often cited, but is it read and understood? Sometimes one has the impression that many defense analysts are more comfortable with the pre-1827 Clausewitz, who did not complicate his theory of war with any political considerations whatsoever.

46. I advance and defend the golden age thesis in my *Strategic Studies and Public Policy*, ch. 4. The major innovative works that framed this period were William W. Kaufmann, ed., *Military Policy and National Security*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956; and Herman Kahn, *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965; and Schelling, *Arms and Influence*.

47. Writing to introduce a genuinely stellar collection of essays prepared for a conference in 1968, the Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies, Alastair Buchan, gave a strong impression that modern strategic thought was a job well done.

The collection of essays, prepared as papers for this conference . . . is therefore, largely concerned with a retrospective analysis of how strategic ideas, doctrines and policies have developed over the last 15 or 20 years. Though they attack the subject from many different angles and national viewpoints, the reader may find a common thread in the views of many writers that the greater conceptual battles about the nature and limitations of modern strategy, the breaking of the mould of traditional thought on the subject, are now largely over and that the problems of the future are not so much philosophical or conceptual as political, that is the alignment or realignment of our notions as to what constitutes "security" or "stability" or "influence" with the pressures of international politics and the rapid form of technological change.

Buchan, ed., *Problems of Modern Strategy*, Foreword.

48. Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War*, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992, p. 323.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 325.

50. Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1998, p. 145.

51. I appreciate that the structure of international security politics in the Cold War was never really quite this simple. Both superpowers were troubled by a small "awkward squad" of allies, friends, and dependents of convenience, who were never under completely reliable control.

52. This subject is treated most persuasively in Payne, *Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence*, especially pp. 7-15.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

55. For a potent contemporary assessment, see Hedley Bull, "Strategic Studies and Its Critics," *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 4, July 1968, pp. 269-283.

56. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 75.

57. But, preventive war did have its day as an option of strategic interest. See Marc Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991, ch. 3.

58. Some blows for common sense are well-struck in Stephen M. Walt, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring 1999, pp. 5-48.

59. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 119.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

63. Daniel J. Hughes, ed., *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings*, Hughes and Harry Bell, trans., Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993, p. 45.

64. Barry Watts has done his best, though it may have been mission impossible. See his challenging monograph, *Clausewitzian Friction and Future War*, McNair Paper No. 52, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 1996.

65. Stephen J. Cimbala, *Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military*

Policy, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001, ventures boldly where many fear to tread.

66. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 101.

67. Metz and Millen, *Future War/Future Battlespace*, pp. viii, 12.

68. On the meaning of victory, see Colin S. Gray, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2002.

69. This is an argument that I emphasize in my report, *The Reformation of Deterrence*.

70. Ralph Peters, *Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World*, Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002, pp. 22-65.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

72. I am pleased to borrow the metaphor from Peters. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

73. This argument is especially well-developed in Freedman, *Deterrence*.

74. This is the fundamental message of Payne, *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence*.

75. Was the balance of terror ever truly "delicate"? Could officials afford to assume that it was not? What if they were wrong? For the classic statement, see Albert J. Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 37, No. 2, January 1959, pp. 211-234.

76. This advice has been pressed with great consistency for several decades by Alexander George. See George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*; and George, "The Role of Force in Diplomacy."

77. The importance of local, including individual leaders', beliefs is a theme in Payne, *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence*. Also see John Mueller, "The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy," in *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 48-62.

78. The most sacred book expressing the neorealist persuasion is Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979. John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W. W. Norton, 2001, is a recent major example of the genre. For some useful

background, see Jonathan Haslam, *No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002.

79. Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine—Again!* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2002, p. 19.

80. Mao Tse-tung [attrib], *On Guerrilla Warfare*, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961, p. 52.

81. This argument is advanced forcefully in Robert L. Jervis, "The Confrontation between Iraq and the U.S.: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Deterrence," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 2003, pp. 315-37.

82. The poor record of predictions of future war is a subject of considerable personal interest that I explore in my forthcoming book, *Future Warfare*.

83. Metz and Millen, *Future War/Future Battlespace*, p. 24.

84. See the superb essay on the subject of "adaptive enemies" in Robert H. Scales, Jr., *Future Warfare: Anthology*, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 1999, pp. 33-55.

85. Gray, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory*, p. 21.

86. From a very large literature, see Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996; and Gian P. Gentile, *How Effective is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo*, New York: New York University Press, 2001.

87. Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, Eric J. Grove, intro., 1911; Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988, p. 16.

88. J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*, John B. Hattendorf, intro., 1967; Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989, p. 72 (emphasis in the original).

89. Clausewitz, *On War*, especially p. 607. Again this is an argument that is handled exceptionally well in Freedman, *Deterrence*.

90. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 585.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 605.

92. Keith Payne points out that it is something of a heroic task to expect to be able to deter nuclear use by a regional power facing conventional defeat at American hands. In Payne's words: "In the future, Washington will want results from its deterrence policy that it said were not possible for the Soviet Union vis-à-vis NATO during the Cold War: confidence that it can deter an opponent's threat of WMD escalation even while projecting power and defeating that opponent on or near its own soil." *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence*, p. 185.

93. Metz and Millen, *Future War/Future Battlespace*, p. 23 (emphasis in the original).

94. *Ibid.*

95. See Stephen Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2002; and Jonathan House, *Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century*, Laurence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001.

96. The high priest of "dominant weapon" theory was the British theorist, J. F. C. Fuller. See his remarkable little book, *Armament and History*, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1946.

97. See Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997. I have attempted some strategic analysis of the value of SOF in *Explorations in Strategy*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998, chs. 7-9; and "Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special Operations Succeed?" *Parameters*, Vol. 29, No. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 2-24.

98. See the comment in Eliot A. Cohen, "Kosovo and the New American Way of War," in *War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age*, Andrew J. Bacevich and Cohen, ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp. 55-56.

99. Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, New York: Basic Books, 2002, offers a timely reminder of the historically rich variety of the American military landpower experience, and it does not even deal with the Army's role on America's internal frontier.

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