

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**A COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE
POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: GREEK POLICY
AND STRATEGY ON ESDP**

by

Miltiadis Fakitsas

June 2003

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Donald Abenheim
Edwin R. Micewski

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 2003	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: A Common European Security and Defense Policy in the European Union: Greek Policy and Strategy on ESDP			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Miltiadis Fakitsas				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Since 1998, the European Union (EU) has begun to develop a Common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which provides a stronger role in the security and defense areas in order to become a more important actor in these fields. Since that time, the member states of the European Union have been pursuing capabilities to conduct conflict prevention and crisis management operations, with no intention of overcoming NATO's role and capabilities in the field of collective defense, but with the intention of strengthening the Union's role and influence in international politics. This thesis demonstrates that a common European Security and Defense Policy is vital for the future of the European Union. The need for a common policy is more urgent than ever because only in this manner can the European Union be strong and significant. This thesis identifies and analyzes the origins of this concept, shows how the current situation has increased that demand and explains the reasons for the establishment of ESDP. The thesis concludes with an evaluation of these ideas and policy recommendations for a member state, for Greece and for the European Union itself.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS European Union, European Security and Defense Policy, NATO, Greece			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 79	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

**A COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: GREEK POLICY AND STRATEGY ON ESDP**

Miltiadis Fakitsas
Major, Hellenic Air Force
B.A., Hellenic Air Force Academy, 1989

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2003**

Author: Miltiadis Fakitsas

Approved by: Donald Abenheim
Thesis Advisor

Edwin R. Micewski
Second Reader

James J. Wirtz
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

Since 1998, the European Union (EU) has begun to develop a Common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which provides a stronger role in the security and defense areas in order to become a more important actor in these fields. Since that time, the member states of the European Union have been pursuing their capabilities to conduct conflict prevention and crisis management operations, with no intention of overcoming NATO's role and capabilities in the field of collective defense, but with the intention of strengthening the Union's role and influence in international politics.

This thesis demonstrates that a common European Security and Defense Policy is vital for the future of the European Union. The need for a common policy is more urgent than ever because only in this manner can the European Union be strong and significant. This thesis identifies and analyzes the origins of this concept, shows how the current situation has increased that demand, and explains the reasons for the establishment of ESDP. The thesis concludes with an evaluation of these ideas and policy recommendations for a member state, for Greece, and for the European Union itself.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	ORIGINS OF THE IDEA FOR A COMMON “EUROPEAN ARMY”	5
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	5
B.	BRIEF HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN ANCIENT TIMES.....	6
C.	FROM NAPOLEON’S ARMY TO WAFFEN SS	9
D.	THE IDEA FROM THE END OF THE WWII TO MAASTRICHT.....	12
III.	DEFENSE STRUCTURES IN EUROPE	15
A.	THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION (UNO).....	16
B.	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO).....	17
C.	ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)	19
D.	WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU).....	21
E.	TEETHING TROUBLES IN THE EU	23
1.	Yugoslavia.....	23
IV.	THE ROLE OF THE EU’S ESDP ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY.....	29
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	29
B.	DEVELOPMENT AFTER MAASTRICHT TREATY	30
1.	Capabilities’ Gap	36
2.	Challenges and Problems Created by the Gap for a Common ESDP	38
C.	NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT	40
D.	PROPOSALS FOR A POSSIBLE SOLUTION.....	41
E.	CONCLUSIONS	43
V.	GREECE AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY	45
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	45
B.	THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER.....	45
C.	THE CHANGING FACE OF EUROPE AND THE NEW CHALLENGES.....	46
1.	The Geostrategic Position of Greece	47
2.	The Concept of Greek Security and Defense Policy	49
3.	Greek National Strategy	49
4.	Problems with the Neighboring Countries	51
5.	Greece in International Organizations	53
6.	Greece and European Union.....	54
D.	CONCLUSIONS	57
VI.	CONCLUSION	61
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	67

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the Hellenic Air Force, which gave me the opportunity and capability to pursue a postgraduate degree here at the prestigious Naval Postgraduate School. I would also like to thank my professors Donald Abenheim and Edwin R. Micewski for their dedicated and insightful commitment to this work. I would also like to thank Ron Russell for his meticulous editing of this thesis.

Most of all, I would like to thank my beloved and devoted wife, Maria, for her unflagging support and patience throughout my entire stay here at NPS. Also, I must express my adoration of my daughter, Anastasia, who is our greatest joy in life, and for my son, whose birth we are eagerly awaiting. Finally, I would like to thank my beloved parents, Taxiarchis and Anastasia, who through a life of hardship and sacrifice gave me everything that I needed to succeed. I am eternally grateful for all their support and love.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

Since 1998, the European Union (EU) has begun to develop a Common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which provides a stronger role in the security and defense areas in order to become a more important actor in these fields. Since that time, the member states of the European Union have been pursuing the capabilities to conduct conflict prevention and crisis management operations, with no intention of overcoming NATO's role and capabilities in the field of collective defense, but with the intention of strengthening the role and influence of the Union in the arena of international politics. All member states of the Union would like to become an equivalent part of NATO and not to remain simply auxiliary members, and this is important, with no intention of becoming antagonistic to the alliance. It must be very clear that the common desire of the member states of the European Union is to remain the ESDP's ally and not a foe of NATO's structure and policy.

Is a common European policy about security and defense necessary for the European Union's future? How could all these developments become a reality in the dangerous post-Cold war environment? What effect will the Common European Security and Defense Policy have on trans-Atlantic relations in security matters?

For a better understanding, it is necessary to answer questions such as what are the origins of the idea for a common "European Army," what defense organizations exist now in Europe, and why are all these organizations insufficient for European security. What is the role of European Union's ESDP in the 21st century in view of the threats and the challenges that the Union confronts, what policy regarding the establishment of the Common European Security and Defense Policy should Greece adopt. Greece as a member of NATO and the EU is in an extreme geographical position among three highly sensitive continents as well as in a place where all future developments will have great importance for the rest of the world, for its future and progress?

All these questions must be answered so the decisions makers can understand exactly the importance of the ESDP for the future of Europe and the European Union, and also for relations between NATO, the EU and the United States.

Therefore, this thesis demonstrates that a common European Security and Defense Policy is vital for the future of the European Union. The need for a common policy is more urgent than ever because only in this manner can the European Union be strong and significant. This thesis identifies and analyzes the origins of that idea, shows how the current situation has increased that demand and explains the reasons for the establishment of ESDP. The thesis concludes with an evaluation of these ideas and policy recommendations for a member state, for Greece, and for the European Union itself.

The challenges that the EU faces today results in one completely clear and concrete policy: a policy that can solve all the major problems that emerge daily in all countries. The Maastricht Treaty was implemented to acknowledge all these demands. The EU through that treaty took a major step forward in the future construction of the European edifice. European Union's structure was established on three fundamental pillars: 1) community, 2) common foreign and security policy, and 3) justice and home affairs. No single pillar in such a system can function properly without some support from one, or often all, of the other pillars. Clearly, each pillar in the system affects the others, and by extension, the European Union.

Security and defense have become global and the European Union has the responsibility to play a significant role in that very important battlefield. Therefore, creating a framework to pursue a common foreign and security policy among the members is essential. That policy should be complemented with a common defense policy and a common defense in order to become credible, effective, and capable of facing the new threats and challenges that emerged after the Cold War. The European security and defense policy should be developed and be complementary rather than countering the Atlantic Alliance and NATO must remain the main element of the European security system.

Chapter I examines the historical background of that particular case and the historical origins of the idea of a common "European Army" during the last centuries in Europe. It also explains the concept behind a common "European Army," where and when the concept initially took shape. How was that idea developed, how did it coincide

with the Napoleonic Army at the beginning of the 19th century and how did it develop until the end of WWII? Finally, what happened in Europe concerning this idea, and what happened with the idea of a common security and defense policy in Europe after the end of WWII until the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty on a European Union in December of 1991?

By answering all these questions, it will be clear that the concept of a common European Security and Defense Policy is an old idea, an idea that dates back to ancient times, and it is an idea that is extremely important to the future of Europe.

Chapter II provides a list of today's existing security and defense organizations in Europe and other security and defense structures at the core of the EU. It also discusses the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), and finally the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It is essential to verify and to discover whether all the other existing security organizations in Europe are sufficient for European security and the reason a new security institution or a new security and defense organization is so important for Europe's future and its new significant international role. This chapter explains why eventually the existence of all these security and defense structures and organizations did not help very much when a serious problem emerged, a problem that demanded common strategies and common positions, such as the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the beginning of the 1990's. If one can understand the problems and the shortcomings of the other security structures, one can agree to the establishment of the Common European and Security Defense Policy.

Chapter III analyzes the role of the European Security and Defense Policy on the threshold of the 21st century and explains the historical background of the developments associated with the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) since the end of the Cold War. This chapter also examines the institutional framework and the main objectives of that policy, the challenges and the demands for European Union at the threshold of the 21st century, and eventually, the effectiveness and the need for one common European security and defense policy. This chapter explains the reasons for the capabilities gap created between the EU and NATO, what contributed to that huge

disparity, and the steps and the solutions that the ambitious European Union must adopt in order to decrease that capability vacuum and to thus become an equal member of the alliance and an appreciable power in international affairs.

If these factors are clarified, one can understand the major role of a common European security and defense policy for the future of the European Union and how necessary the ESDP is for further European integration.

Chapter IV clarifies Greece's place in the new era, its geopolitical and geostrategic position, its national strategy, and the threats that confront the contemporary international environment. Since Greece, as a European, Mediterranean, and even a Balkan country, has had its share of troubled history in South-East Europe, hopefully the nation is, at the beginning of the 21st century, in a much better position than all its neighbors, economically, politically and socially. Thus, Greece constitutes an important factor in the democratic and economic reforms of the countries of Southeastern Europe on their way toward stabilization the European security architecture.

Due to challenges that resulted from the disputes among the great powers for the best policies in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, Greece feels deeply anxious about its future and its sovereign rights and looks forward to the safeguarding of peace and stability in this very dangerous region. Such safeguarding can be achieved, in one sense, by establishing and deploying a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This is the reason the ESDP is so important and extremely vital to the future existence of Greece.

Finally, this thesis concludes with the evaluation of the above ideas, which will help to clarify the debate and will make the European Union's policy understandable along with Greece's policy concerning this extremely crucial issue.

II. ORIGINS OF THE IDEA FOR A COMMON “EUROPEAN ARMY”

A. INTRODUCTION

Philosophers have dreamed of a united Europe for centuries. However, it was not until the Second World War that a genuine and responsible movement toward European integration began. The main speculation, at that time was how to establish a more united Europe after a hellish war had created a major rift among the European countries, and left, in its wake, intense hatreds and economic catastrophe.¹

Nonetheless, the notion of Europe as one community with common values is not a new concept that appeared for the first time during the second half of the 20th century. On the contrary, it is a very old idea.

Actually, the notion dates back to antiquity, more specifically to the Roman Empire. Certainly, the idea has always coincided with the emergence and development of only one great power on the European continent. The emergence of one ruling empire in Europe always raised the issue of one united Europe, under the sway of the most powerful nation. As if according to some natural law, in almost every century, a powerful country power seems to emerge, possessing the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system to its own values.² Since a common foreign and security policy must, like any other such policy, rest ultimately upon military force this vision, of one united Europe, engenders the idea for one common European army: an army responsible for the security and defense of all Europe.

Charles, King of the Franks, known as Charlemagne, who became the supreme ruler of Western Europe when crowned Emperor on Christmas Day in the year 800 AD,³ rose from such a power vacuum and the lack of such an army after the fall of Romulus Augustulus in 476 AD. Eventually, Charlemagne’s attempts were not successful, but he was the ancestor of Napoleon and Napoleon’s aspirations in the 19th century for one

¹ Ronald Tiersky, *Europe Today: National Politics, European Integration, and European Security*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999, p. 241.

² Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Touchstone Book, New York, 1994, p. 17.

³ Hagen Schulze, *States, Nations and Nationalism*, Blackwell Publishers, 1996, p. 4.

united European empire with one common army. Even though France was not the ruling power at that time in Europe, during the 17th century, under Cardinal Richelieu, a new approach toward international relations, followed by Great Britain in the 18th century and Metternich's Austria and Bismarck's Germany in the 19th century, reshaped European power and diplomacy.⁴

Therefore, what exactly was the idea behind a common "European Army," where did it begin and how far back in the European history did this idea occur? How was that idea developed and how did it coincide with the Napoleonic Army at the beginning of the 19th century and how did it develop until the end of the Second World War? Finally, what happened in Europe concerning this idea, and what happened with the idea of a common security and defense policy in Europe after the end of WWII until the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty on European Union in December of 1991?

Answering all these questions, clarifies the concept of a common European Security and Defense Policy, an old idea, dating back to ancient times, an idea that is still extremely important to the future of Europe.

B. BRIEF HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN ANCIENT TIMES

Undoubtedly, the first force that could claim to possess the title of a common European army was the Roman army, and in particular, the Roman Legions. From early times until the 3rd century A.D., the Roman army was based on its legions, which were its core. The Roman army was composed of these units called legions from the Latin *legio*, meaning a levy.⁵

In the early Republic, the legion of the Roman army was a self-contained formation equivalent to a complete army itself. During the first three centuries of the empire, from 25 to 34 legions existed. Each of these units consisted of approximately 4,000 to 6,000 men recruited from among the citizen body, and even though the soldiers of the legion were Roman citizens, this did not mean that they were from the city of

⁴ Henry Kissinger, p. 4.

⁵ G. R. Watson, *The Roman Soldier*, Thames & Hudson, 1969, p. 21.

Rome or even from Italy.⁶ Due to the spread of the legions among the population of conquered territories, people from all these remote provinces became the most important source of recruits.

Each legion had its own name, number and badge, to which honorary titles could be added. The numbering and naming of legions did not follow a logical pattern and several legions carried identical numerals or nicknames. The legion was organized in ten cohorts, each of which consisted of three *manipuli*, which in turn was subdivided in two *centuriae*.⁷ The title of the leader of the legion was *legatus* whose appointment was for three years and his staff officers numbered six officers, called *tribuni*. The commander usually was picked by the emperor from the senatorial class who had served as Praetor, and in general, had prior military experience through service as a *tribunus*. The most important officers in the legions were the *centuriones*, men who were partly recruited from the Roman knights or the city council members, but the majority of the centurions had previously served as soldiers and NCOs in the legion or the praetorian cohorts. They were the backbone of the legion, responsible for implementing training and discipline in their companies.

A legion consisted of a heavily armored infantry and the personal weapons for everyone were two javelins and a short thrusting sword. Additionally, the legion had two types of spring-operated artillery, a light field gun and a large catapult.⁸

The conditions of service varied from period to period, so there were periods when the minimum term of service was sixteen years, and other times when a legionary had to serve 25 years or more before being able to retire.

The most important element for the success of the legions, and the Roman army in general, was its legendary discipline, according to their oath "...to follow the consuls to whatever wars they may be called, and neither desert the colors nor do anything contrary to the law."⁹ Most historians agree that their success was primarily due to the

⁶ Ibid, p. 22.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ H. E. L. Mellersh, *Soldiers of Rome*, Robert Hale Ltd, London, 1964, pp. 38-39.

⁹ Ibid, p. 98.

stiff discipline imposed on every rank. Discipline was the root of morale and personal responsibility and unit drills obtained it. However, in the later days of the empire, discipline apparently relaxed, the main reason being that the army was now a volunteer army.

Rome's army remained unequaled for centuries. After their collapse in 476 A.D., almost four hundred years had to pass before another dominant leader could attempt to create such an empire, and an army for all of Europe. That leader was Charlemagne, or Charles the Great, King of the Franks and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. "By the sword and the cross," he became master of Western Europe. Through his enlightened leadership, order was restored to Medieval Europe. By 800 A.D., Charlemagne was the undisputed ruler of Western Europe. His vast realm encompassed what are now France, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands. It included half of present-day Italy and Germany and parts of Austria and Spain. By establishing a central government over Western Europe, Charlemagne restored much of the unity of the old Roman Empire and paved the way for the development of modern Europe.

However, the Roman Empire that Charlemagne attempted to resurrect could not survive. Even without the disputes over the succession among Charlemagne's heirs, the empire was certain to be dissolved. The haste with which he had grabbed the Roman crown excluded any true empire in Europe in the foreseeable future because an attempt had been made to assume an imperial style of government far beyond the economic, judicial and technical resources, which disintegratory forces took on enduring forms of their own.¹⁰ Besides, all the successor states of the continent were designed against the imposing ancient glamour of the universal Roman state.

One of the major ironies of history is that the reconstruction of the Roman Empire was, in fact, the collection of states that created modern Europe.¹¹ One thousand more years had to pass for another unique man of history, another genius to appear and to continue that long-term undertaking of Charlemagne to integrate Europe and to develop one common army. That unique man was, without a doubt, Napoleon Bonaparte.

¹⁰ Hagen Schulze, p. 5.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 4.

C. FROM NAPOLEON'S ARMY TO WAFFEN SS

As the Spanish historian Diez del Corral has mentioned, “the genius of Napoleon had already been frustrated a thousand years in advance by the phenomenon of Charlemagne.”¹²

Napoleon Bonaparte is the embodiment of the right man at the right time. Certainly, the reforms in the French army had already begun. The crucial point was the disaster during the Seven Year's war in 1763. Before then, the French army was like all others armies in Europe in that the nobility dominated the officer corps and enlisted soldiers were recruited primarily from the lower classes and often joined to escape poverty, unemployment, and sometimes the law. These soldiers felt little loyalty to the crown and desertion was a severe problem.

However, after the disaster of 1763, the government called for an increase in light infantry, which later led to efforts to train conventional infantry in light infantry tactics, and thus created a soldier who could fight in either close or open order. For the artillery corps, the numerous gun calibers were reduced to four. New guns were introduced that were lighter and more mobile than their predecessors and featured standardized parts and packaged rounds.¹³

However, the most important change was the innovation that came after the French Revolution: the policy of universal conscription, which led to a great increase in the number of soldiers. This fact gave new weight to the French foreign policy and provided the opportunity for French commanders to fight more campaigns, more aggressively. To be sure, they were also more costly.¹⁴ The commanders began to combine two or more demi-brigades with supporting artillery under a single commander, thus forming a division. This led to the formation of permanent divisions. The division could march and fight independently as well as be part of a greater force. This meant that commanders could seize the opportunity to wage battles quickly if the opportunity arose.

¹² Ibid., p. 6.

¹³ David Gibson, *Napoleon and Grande Armée*, Available at [<http://www.napoleonseries.org>], January 12, 2003.

¹⁴ Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy, from Machiavelli to Nuclear Age*, Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 124.

The independence engendered by the divisional structure allowed contact battles where divisions could be thrown into the fray as they came on-line rather than forcing commanders to wait until their full force was deployed.¹⁵

In a sense, it was a stroke of luck that placed Napoleon in command of the *Grande Armée*. It was clear that Emperor Napoleon was head of the Nation as well as the *Grande Armée*, an excellent position for any commander, with the resources of the state at his disposal. Napoleon gave to those great army elements of his genius, elements that made the army one of the most efficient armies ever. The emperor had understood very clearly that every age has its own strategy, which when put into practice, embodied the army with his passion for speed, maneuver, surprise, and offensive. Beyond these characteristics, Napoleon also emphasized the need to maintain the initiative, to concentrate forces, and to economize effort while maintaining morale. That army became the reflection of Napoleon's beliefs for absolute victory and rejection of limited wars for limited goals. These were beliefs and attitudes that made the army capable of prevailing in Europe in a very short period of time, surprising everyone. In the fall of 1813, the war plan for the various allied armies in central Europe advised the direct withdrawal of any army against which the *Grande Armée* advanced.¹⁶

Many people believe Napoleon's army was ahead of its time, in terms of effectiveness, strategy and tactics. For many people that army was the most characteristic example of a common European army.

Since Napoleon, no other nation dominated in Europe to such a degree as to prevail in most of these areas and to be able to create an army, which might be the one and only army for Europe. This did not occur again until Nazi Germany began the Second World War in 1939. During that period in Germany, many of the characteristics of a European army existed. These characteristics were the exact ambitions of its creators.

In December 1940, Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS (Schutz Staffeln), established the Waffen-SS. This new army grew rapidly and within six months grew to

¹⁵ David Gibson.

¹⁶ Peter Paret, p. 134.

over 150,000 men. By October 1944, the Waffen-SS had grown to over 600,000 men.¹⁷ The Waffen-SS, which is translated as “Armed-SS,” was the military wing of the black uniformed SS (Schutz Staffeln, or Defense Squads) and became the equivalent of regular army divisions. Its conceptual origins lay in the “political ready reserves” in the early days of the Nazi movement. These reserves were the fanatical Nazis who would protect the party leaders and ruthlessly attack all enemies during the political chaos of Germany in the 1920's and '30's.

It is important to distinguish that *serving* in the Waffen-SS (a military organization with foreign troops and conscription) was not the same as *membership* in the SS (a Nazi political organization and executive arm for racial Germans), although the two concepts are confused. The Waffen-SS was expected to be a military organization absolutely and perfectly obedient and loyal to its master, Adolf Hitler, and even though there is no indication that the Waffen-SS were going to replace the entire army after the assassination attempt on Hitler (C. Stauffenberg), the goal was to reconstruct the entire army command on the basis of the SS leadership after the war.¹⁸ The Waffen-SS recruited many foreign volunteers into its ranks. After the May 1940 “Victory in the West,” the SS began an active program to obtain Western European recruits for several new Waffen-SS volunteer legions. This effort intensified after June 1941, as the SS asked volunteers to join the “anti-Bolshevik” campaign in the Soviet Union and over 125,000 West Europeans volunteered for the Waffen-SS.

The great irony and contradiction for the Waffen-SS was that the military force created as the ultimate racial elite, during the last days of the war, recruited large numbers of non-German, volunteers from northern, western and eastern Europe,¹⁹ because the racial standards were increasingly ignored as the German war fortunes declined and the Waffen-SS was in desperate need of manpower.

¹⁷ Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914-1945*, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995, p. 373.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 373.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 373.

Eventually, the defeat of Germany by the Allies had catastrophic results on German plans for one European army, and Hitler's and Himmler's plans ended up being a complete disaster.

D. THE IDEA FROM THE END OF THE WWII TO MAASTRICHT

Just after the end of WWII, many countries in Europe had believed that European unity would keep them safe from the Soviet threat, a threat that would be more dangerous in case the United States' forces, according to the statements of its President's Roosevelt, could not remain in Europe for more than two years after the war.²⁰ In addition, one of the most fervent supporter of the idea for European unity was Winston Churchill, who declared in 1946, that

the first step in the recreation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. The structure of the United States of Europe will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important. The fighting has stopped. But the dangers have not stopped. If we are to form a United States of Europe or whatever name it may take, we must begin now.²¹

As a result of this development, the Treaties of Dunkirk (1947), and mainly of Brussels (1948), took shape, and had as a goal, the establishment of a security community, which would eliminate any further prospects of war.

Even the United States, as stated by President Eisenhower, agreed with the idea of European unity. As Eisenhower declared in 1951:

I believe in it this much, when I came over here I disliked the whole idea of a European Army, and I had enough troubles without it. However, I have decided that it offers another chance for bringing another link here, so I made up my mind to go into the thing with both feet. So I am going to

try to help, and I realize that a lot of my professional associates are going to think I am crazy. But I tell you that joining Europe together is the key to the whole question.²²

Therefore, discussions and deliberations among the countries of Western Europe, led to the Treaty establishing the European Defense Community (EDC), in Paris on 27

²⁰ Edward Fursdon, *The European Defense Community, A History*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1980, p. 12.

²¹ Ibid., p. 14.

²² Ibid., p. 119.

May 1952. It was an attempt by the six Western European nations of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg to create a European Army for the common defense of their territory against a Soviet threat. The United States and the United Kingdom were involved as principal observers and the Soviet Union played the role of principal critic.

The aim of the military side was creating of a European Army with a homogenous unity, structure and administration. That result could ensue in two phases. The first was the passage of national contingents to a European Army at the same time as the creation of the first German units, and the second, the progressive integration of training and administration, leading to a fusion of European divisions and European reserves, which would be accompanied by controlled central recruitment and basic training.²³ However, the demands of sovereignty and the deep complexity of the European security problems, such as early German rearmament and the need for a transatlantic alliance, destroyed that first attempt at defense integration.

Unfortunately for Europe, one more attempt did not have the desired outcome and just two years later, in 1954, it ceased to exist. Responsibility and blame for the failure rested on many, and actually had no importance whatsoever. What was important was that one more chance for all of Europe had been missed as a result of national priorities. Also, after that dramatic development, the subject of defense in the context of Europe was taboo for almost forty years.

However, in May 1992, the creation of Eurocorps by France and Germany at the beginning, came to “disturb the stagnant waters” for a common European defense. The creation of the corps by France and Germany symbolized a fundamental reconciliation and cooperation between two historical enemies. France and Germany wanted to use the Eurocorps to enable the WEU to act according to the orders of the EU by helping defend NATO territory, in peacekeeping activities outside the NATO area, and in humanitarian operations. Their components are drawn from the five-member states of France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Luxemburg and they comprise 60,000 troops.²⁴ Both

²³ Ibid., p. 109.

²⁴ Francois Heisbourg, “European Defense: Making it Work,” *Chaillot Paper* 42, September 2000, p. 47.

NATO and the WEU can make use of the Eurocorps. Additionally, Great Britain agreed to commit 20,000 troops to that force, to be drawn mainly from its NATO Rapid Reaction Force. France would probably contribute the same number of troops, Germany offered 18,000 and Spain 6,000 men.

The Eurocorps consists of the following military units:²⁵

- The EUROCOPPS (European Corps)
- The Multinational Division (Central)
- The UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force
- The EUROFOR
- The EUROMARFOR (European Maritime Force)
- The Headquarters of the 1st German-Netherlands Corps
- The Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force

Actually, this was the first attempt at the idea of European defense integration, after what happened in the 1950s. Also, that attempt simultaneously, with the new aspects created after the Maastricht Treaty regarding the second pillar of the European Union, gave new impetus to the idea of a common “European Army,” of a common European Security and Defense Policy.

²⁵ Eric Eagle, *The Eurocorps: A European Army?* Available at [<http://www.geocities.com>], August 2002.

III. DEFENSE STRUCTURES IN EUROPE

During the Cold War, alliances formed along ideological lines, and the areas of greatest concern for the military planners were those of confrontation between U.S.-led NATO and the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact. Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, these areas have lost much of their strategic significance, and other regions have gained increased attention. However, the end of that bipolar system, contrary to many people's expectations, did not result in a secure environment numerous conflicts erupted in the former Soviet Union's "democracies" and in the Balkans. Therefore, since the end of the Cold War, one of the central debates between the United States and European countries is the importance of security in post-Cold War Europe and the establishment of a defense structure to ensure security within Europe.

Following the Second World War and until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe was accustomed to living under the umbrella of the United States against the threat of the Soviet bloc. During that period, the U.S. dominated European security militarily. While Western European countries focused on ensuring security and stability through economic development. Following the Cold War, Western European countries developed into a powerful economic group, and the European Union (EU) member states were interested in developing of a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) to give the EU one strong voice in world affairs.

To better grasp the current situation, one must be familiar with the other European defense organizations. One must also understand what other security and defense structures are at the core of the EU. Once the structure of these organizations is understood, it is imperative to ask whether these existing security organizations are sufficient or insufficient for European security and the reason a new security institution or a new security and defense organization is so important for Europe's future and its new significant role in the international arena.

Only in this manner will decision makers understand the problems and the shortcomings of the other security structures and agree to the establishment of the Common European and Security Defense Policy.

A. THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION (UNO)

The name “United Nations,” coined by the United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was first used in the “Declaration by United Nations” of 1 January 1942, during the Second World War when representatives of 26 nations pledged their Governments to continue fighting together against the Axis Powers.

The forerunner of the United Nations was the League of Nations, an organization conceived in similar circumstances during the First World War, and established in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles “to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security.” The International Labor Organization was also created under the Treaty of Versailles as an affiliated agency of the League. The League of Nations ceased its activities after failing to prevent the Second World War.

The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, when China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States and a majority of other signatories ratified the Charter. Preserving world peace is the central purpose of the United Nations, and under the UN Charter, member states are to settle disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the use or threat of military force against other states.

The relevance of the UN Charter to the North Atlantic Alliance is twofold. First, it provides the juridical basis for the creation of the Alliance, and second, it establishes the overall responsibility of the UN Security Council for international peace and security.²⁶

From 1949 until today, the formal link between the United Nations and the North Atlantic Alliance has remained constant, and contacts between the two organizations were limited, both in scope and in content. However, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia changed the entire situation as a number of measures were taken, including joint maritime operations, NATO air operations; and close air support for the United Nations Protection Force.

²⁶ *NATO Handbook*, Office of Information and Press, 2001, p. 339.

In addition to these conflicts, in the face of other threats to world peace, NATO countries, while not directly involved as an Alliance, have lent their support to the attempts of the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary General to prevent conflict and restore the rule of international law.

Two other significant and important components of the UN are the following:²⁷

- The General Assembly, which is the main deliberating body of the United Nations, is composed of representatives of all member states, each of which has one vote. Decisions on important issues such as peace and security require a two-thirds majority, while decisions on other, less important issues, require only a simple majority.
- The Security Council is the body that according to the UN Charter has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Under international law, the Security Council alone has the power to authorize the use of force against one state and decisions such as these are legally binding to all member states. The Security Council consists of five permanent members and ten members elected by the General Assembly. Only permanent members can veto Security Council resolutions.

B. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

After the Second World War, Western European countries and their North American allies viewed with concern the expansionist policies and methods of the USSR. Between 1947 and 1949, a number of serious political events created chaos. These included direct threats to the sovereignty of Norway, Greece and Turkey and other Western European countries, the June 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, and the illegal blockade of Berlin, which began in April of the same year.²⁸ Negotiations begun among five European countries, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, led to the Brussels Treaty of March 1948, with the United States and Canada desiring the final goal of creating a single North Atlantic Alliance based on security guarantees and mutual commitments between Europe and North America. The invitation of five more countries led to the creation of NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty establishing NATO was signed in Washington in April 1949, by the twelve foreign ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the

²⁷ *The Charter of the United Nations*, Articles 7-19.

²⁸ *NATO Handbook*, p. 29.

Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Britain and the U.S.²⁹ Greece and Turkey acceded to the Treaty in 1952, West Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982. In March 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became members of NATO. In accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, the alliance remains open to accession by other European states in a position to further its principles and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

The Treaty created an alliance for collective defense as defined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and led to the formation of NATO. The organization now links much more independent nations in a voluntary security system in which roles, risks and responsibilities are shared. The Treaty commits each member country to sharing the risks and responsibilities as well as the benefits of collective security and requires each of them to not enter into any other international commitment that might conflict with the Treaty.³⁰

Key changes and innovations undertaken by NATO since 1989 include the adoption of a new strategic concept and increased coordination and cooperation with other international organizations such as the UN, OSCE, WEU and EU.

The new strategic concepts of 1991, also established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in December 1991, and expanded and intensified political and military cooperation in Europe through the Partnership for Peace program, launched in January 1994.³¹ The concept combines a broad approach to security based on dialogue and cooperation with the maintenance of NATO's collective defense capability. It brings together political and military elements of NATO's security policy and establishes cooperation with new partners in central Europe as well as in the former Soviet republics.

It provides for reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and introduces major changes in NATO's integrated military forces, including substantial reductions in their

²⁹ Ibid., p. 29.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 30.

³¹ Ibid., p. 67.

size and readiness, improvements in mobility, flexibility and adaptability to different contingencies, increased use of multinational formations, creation of a multinational rapid reaction force, and adaptation of defense planning arrangements and procedures.

Also, in contrast to previous relations between NATO and the former USSR, a Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security has tried to improve their relations. The creation of Permanent Joint Council provides for regular meetings between both parties and has helped to change their previous hostile relations.

Moreover, NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe and the means by which the Alliance carries out its security policies including the maintenance of a sufficient military capability to prevent war and to provide for an effective defense and overall capability to manage crises affecting the security future of its members.³²

Between the establishment of the Alliance and present day, more than half a century has passed. For much of this time, the central goal and focus of the Alliance was to provide almost everything for the immediate defense and security of its member countries. This goal remains its main task even today, but its immediate focus has advanced to a fundamental choice.

C. ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)

The idea of a pan-European security conference was raised by the Soviet Union in the 1950's. In the mid 1960's, the Soviet Union, taking advantage of détente and more frequent exchanges between the East and West, proposed the convening of a European security conference, which would confirm the existing borders in Europe and would pronounce the framework for large scale East-West economic cooperation.³³ The former Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was founded on July 3, 1973 in Helsinki. Initially, the CSCE was a political process aimed at defining the fundamental principles needed to ease tensions between the East and West, and by building confidence

³² Ibid., p. 31.

³³ *OSCE Handbook*, Third Edition, 2002, p. 7.

among members of the blocs. After the Cold War, the CSCE was institutionalized into an all-inclusive European security organization. Today it consists of 55 members, which is all the European states including Canada and the United States.

The CSCE was unique for many reasons. In an era characterized by bloc-to-bloc confrontation, it had a wide membership of all states and full equality. At a time when most negotiations adopted a piecemeal approach to security, the CSCE endorsed a comprehensive and cooperative approach to security. Decisions were made by consensus, and in this manner, the decision-making process was very important. Decisions were politically rather than legally binding and were thus very flexible. Finally, as the CSCE had no institutional structures, the very impetus needed to keep the process advancing was an end in itself.³⁴ To clarify, the concept of cooperative security presupposes non-hegemonic behavior on the part of participating states. It requires a true partnership based on mutual accountability, transparency and confidence on both the domestic and the foreign policy level.

The collapse of Communism, symbolized by the removal of the Berlin Wall, dramatically transformed European security, and with it, the CSCE. Having opened a new era of democracy, CSCE participating states could look forward to a brighter future, but still had to overcome the legacy of the past. The CSCE assumed new responsibilities and challenges in that period of transition, characterized by institutionalization, the strengthening operational capabilities and developing of field activities.

Eventually, the CSCE was renamed OSCE at the Budapest Summit in December 1994, and the organization was intended to develop into a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation “from Vancouver to Vladivostok.” The expectation was that the OSCE could provide a framework for security cooperation in Europe, which includes the United States, Europe and the Russian Federation.

The OSCE has an unusual status because on the one hand, it has no legal status under international law and all its decisions are politically but not legally binding. On the

³⁴ Ibid., p. 11.

other hand, it possesses most of the regular attributes of an international organization. Most of its instruments are framed in legal language, and furthermore, the fact that OSCE commitments are not legally binding does not detract from their efficacy.³⁵

The basic priorities of the OSCE today are

- to consolidate the common values of the participating States and assist in building fully democratic civil societies based on the rule of law;
- to prevent local conflicts, restore stability and bring peace to war-torn areas;
- to overcome real and perceived security deficits and to avoid the creation of new political, social or economic divisions by promoting a cooperative system of security.³⁶

The last OSCE Summit of Istanbul in November 1999 determined a security concept of Europe in the 21st century, aiming to strengthen the organization. The OSCE continues to provide active and direct support where needed for promoting democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights throughout the OSCE area. In many of its activities, the OSCE comes into contact with other international and non-governmental organizations and consequently, increased priority is being given to inter-institutional cooperation and coordination.

D. WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU)

The Western European Union (WEU) was first established as a mutual assistance commitment with the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, developed into a security organization for cooperation in defense and security and today includes ten member states, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, all of which are both NATO and EU members. The foundation of WEU was partly a way to justify an American commitment to the defense of the continent and partly a means to accomplish a European defense effort.³⁷

³⁵ Ibid., p. 3.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 17.

³⁷ Stuart Croft, John Redmond, G. Wyn Rees and Mark Webber, *The Enlargement of Europe*, Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 89.

After having served as a mere forum for consultation in the previous decades, it experienced a period of reactivation in the mid 1980's. The WEU was reactivated in 1984 with a view to developing a "common European defense identity" through cooperation among its members in the security field and strengthening the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance.³⁸ The NATO secretary general is invited to all WEU ministerial meetings while practical measures of cooperation include joint meetings of the councils of NATO and WEU.

WEU goals, under the Hague platform on European security interests agreed upon in October 1987, were to develop a more cohesive European defense identity, which would translate more effectively into following the obligations of solidarity, to which members are committed in the framework of the WEU and NATO. It was within the context of the WEU that the Petersberg Tasks in Bonn were agreed upon in July 1992. According to the decisions at Maastricht with the Treaty on the European Union, and at Petersberg, advanced steps were undertaken to develop the WEU's operational capabilities in order to provide the organization with the necessary tools to undertake the Petersberg missions.

Under these circumstances, a WEU Planning Cell was created to complete planning for possible WEU operations. The WEU has no standing forces or command structures of its own. Therefore, the military units and command structures designated by WEU members and associate members can be made available to the WEU for its possible tasks and include both national units and several multinational formations.³⁹

Concerning the military tasks of the WEU, it was premature for the organization to be made responsible for the territorial defense of its members, and at the 1992 Petersberg meeting of the WEU Council, it was agreed that three new types of tasks would be accorded priority: humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping operations and the employment of combat forces in crisis management.⁴⁰ These types of conflicts were the

³⁸ *NATO Handbook*, p. 360.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 364.

⁴⁰ Stuart Croft, John Redmond, G. Wyn Rees and Mark Webber, p. 96.

most possible to arise in the near future, were mostly low-intensity operations, within the capabilities of the WEU, offered the benefit of occurring outside the traditional area of NATO responsibility, and thus solved the possibilities of overlap.

The missions that the WEU has conducted have been mainly low-key, low-risk and low-cost. Militarily speaking, after three decades, the WEU acquired some significance in 1987 to 1988 in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war by going beyond geographical constraints. A second incident was operational engagement during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, and finally since 1992, the WEU has been involved in the enforcement of the UN embargo on former Yugoslavia, in cooperation with the OSCE.⁴¹

Unfortunately, it has been obvious almost to everyone that the WEU has been unable, in one sense, to clarify its functions and its grandiose hope that would embody a dynamic European defense identity has led to naught.

Today, the objective of creating new security and defense-related bodies in the framework of the EU does not provide a clear answer to the question of what will happen with the WEU. The goal of the Cologne declaration was to merge the WEU with the EU, yet on the other hand; the Helsinki material does not contain any clear indication that this goal is still valid. At the same time, the reference to possible treaty amendments still seems to keep the door open for some sort of merger.

E. TEETHING TROUBLES IN THE EU

1. Yugoslavia

Unfortunately, the existence of all these security and defense structures and organizations did not help very much when a real serious problem emerged, a problem that demanded common strategies and common positions that would define the Union's political and military approach. This problem occurred in the beginning of the 1990's with the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Therefore, the most obvious examples of military action that created the first indications of problems within the EU were the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the operations there under the auspices of NATO.

⁴¹ Antonio Missiroli, "CFSP, Defense and Flexibility," *Chaillot Paper* 38, February 2000, p. 10.

With the exception of Slovenia, which tried to and managed to avoid the bloodshed, and to set itself on the road to membership, none of the newly independent Republics can claim that no better way to choose and to follow existed.

The EC, at that moment, failed to see the long-term dangers of structural underdevelopment, which threaten the area. The danger did not arise from shortcomings in its multiculturalism and market economy, but from the unsuccessful attempts of the states in the region to impose and implement law and order. Therefore, the real fear had to do with the collapse of administrative mechanisms, and in areas where the state mechanisms had collapsed; Europe had to help to construct new and legal mechanisms.

In the beginning, this conflict was not considered to be a case for NATO. In addition, officials of the European Community (EC) were sure that the crisis was a challenge for the EC to resolve and the U.S. administration agreed. Luxembourg's foreign minister Jacques Poos, speaking as chairman of the EC Council of Ministers, declared that it was "the hour of Europe, and that if one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans and not to anybody else."⁴²

However, unfortunately, whatever Europe wanted to believe about its abilities and its power, the reality was very much different and worse than ever before. The intervention of Europe and the attempt to implement a common and acceptable policy without further stating the absence of such a policy, which would lead to a resolution of the crisis and to the peaceful settlement and accommodation for the overall dispute, was never successful, and the entire situation took a different turn, deteriorated and spiraled completely out of control. That development resulted in NATO, in mid-1992, to becoming much more interested in the conflict, which was concentrated in Bosnia, and to being responsible for attempts at peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement.

The Bosnia conflict had three phases, with different engagements by NATO and the EU. The first was from 1992 until 1995, when NATO had only limited roles and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) carried out the main role on the ground,

⁴² David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D. C., 1998, p. 193.

composed to a large extent of European troops. The second phase occurred during the summer of 1995, when the Dayton agreements called for NATO forces to assist in a plan to construct a single, democratic and multiethnic Bosnia and finally, the third phase, which began in late 1995 with NATO's staying power. Its mission was the implementation of the Dayton arrangements.⁴³ The previous negative opinions and reluctance of the U.S. to become involved directly in the conflict had changed dramatically. Distinctive is the opinion from a few observers that "The United States must stay out of war in the Balkans in order to stay in Europe."⁴⁴

From December 1995 to December 1996, NATO forces were present on the ground in Bosnia as part of the Implementation Force, known as IFOR, and since December 1996, IFOR has been replaced by another NATO-led force, the Stabilization Force (SFOR).⁴⁵ The size of IFOR was 60,000 troops and the size of SFOR was around 32,000 troops, with only 6,000 from non-NATO countries.⁴⁶

The next operation where NATO and the U.S. played a significant role in European issues was operation Allied Force in March 1999, NATO's intervention in Kosovo. While non-U.S. aircraft carried out over 15,000 sorties, about 39% of the total, U.S. aircraft delivered over 80% of the weapons.⁴⁷ Seventy-seven days into bombardment, over 900 aircraft had been involved in the operation and two-thirds of them were American, and the United States met approximately 95% of NATO's intelligence requirements in the operation.⁴⁸ The only area where the European contribution in Kosovo was greater than that of the U.S. was the size of the troops that

⁴³ Ibid., p. 195.

⁴⁴ *NATO Handbook*, p. 116.

⁴⁵ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p. 197.

⁴⁶ *NATO Handbook*, p. 117.

⁴⁷ David S. Yost, "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union," *Survival*, Vol. 42, Winter 2000-01, p. 103.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 104.

Europe had at present. The U.S. share comprised less than 20% while the European troops composed 75% or more from a force of 50,000 troops⁴⁹ for the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Furthermore, in the Spring of 2001, the emergence of violent clashes on the borders of Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) between ethnic Albanian extremist groups and FYROM forces led the President of the FYROM to request help from NATO and the international community. The result was the deployment of Operation Amber Fox, with the mandate to contribute to the protection international monitors from the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, who were overseeing the implementation of the peace plan in FYROM.⁵⁰

The operation consists of approximately 1,000 troops and a large contingent from the EU had started and eventually led to a happy ending for the Europeans. The latter troops are to take over the NATO mission in FYROM as the latest news from that front indicates that European troops in the beginning of April 2003 will replace the NATO forces there, under the auspices of the ESDP. To turn Amber Fox into a EU-led operation would not be extremely difficult, given the size of the force, but it will result in a highly significant task for the EU, as it will be the first time that an entire operation will execute exclusively by EU-led forces.

Certainly, even that small-scale operation did not receive unanimous acceptance from the EU. Member states as the UK, Germany, Finland and Portugal have expressed their doubts and their concerns about the necessity of such a movement, thinking mostly about the fragile situation that exists in the broader region.

The disaster and the failure of the policies that followed and their attempted implementation, especially in that crisis, was the crucial point for the future decisions of the European Union and for their further agreements on a Common European Security and Defense Policy, the Petersburg Tasks, Headline Goal, and so forth.

⁴⁹ Ivo H. Daadler and Michael E. O'Hanlon, "The United States in Balkans: There to Stay," *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2000, p. 166.

⁵⁰ *NATO's Role in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Operation Amber Fox, Available On Line at [<http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tff/home.htm>], February 2003.

The tasks of a Common European Security and Defense Policy will be significant contributions to international peacekeeping, the use of military force when appropriate and the promotion of international cooperation, democracy and human rights.⁵¹

The foundations for that, for the Common European Security and Defense Policy laid at the Treaty of the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. That was the treaty upon which the whole edifice of the CESDP was supported.

⁵¹ *Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defense Policy*, Available On Line at [<http://ue.int/pesc/pres.asp?lang=en>], February 2003.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IV. THE ROLE OF THE EU'S ESDP ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY

A. INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 21st century, the European Union (EU) is confronted with acute challenges, demands and controversies caused by the sweeping changes that Europe has witnessed, especially since 1989. The Treaty of the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty, in force since 1993, represented a major step forward in the construction of the European edifice. Nevertheless, crises such as those in the former Yugoslavia, or more recently, the crisis in the Persian Gulf with Iraq, have shown that the European Union lacks the instruments and clearly defined objectives to deal effectively with the new situation that has emerged since the end of the Cold War on the continent and beyond.

The European Union's structure has been established on three fundamental pillars: 1) the community dimension, comprising the arrangements prescribed in the EC, ECSC and Euratom Treaties, namely, Union citizenship, community policies, the Economic and Monetary Union, and so forth; 2) the common foreign and security policy, which comes under Title V of the EU Treaty; and 3) police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which comes under Title VI of the EU Treaty.⁵² No single pillar in such a system can function properly without some support from one or both of the other pillars. Each pillar in the system has an effect on the others, and by extension, on the overall vision of the European Union.

Therefore, obviously, creating a framework for the common defense and security policy among the members is essential. Such a framework would make the EU credible, effective and capable of facing the new threats and challenges that have emerged since the end of the Cold War. The European Security and Defense Policy does not, however, affect the specific nature of the security and defense policies of certain member states, and this policy is also compatible with the policy and framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The European Union's security and defense policy should be developed in a way that compliments the Atlantic Alliance because NATO must remain the main element of the European security system.

⁵² *Pillars of European Union*, Available at [www.europa.eu.int], (Glossary/P), August 2002.

Surveying the history of the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) since the end of the Cold War is essential. One must also review the framework and the main objectives of that policy, the challenges and the demands for a European Union at the threshold of the 21st century, and eventually, the effectiveness and the necessity for one common European security and defense policy.

With such factors in mind, one perceives how imperative the ESDP is for the future of the European Union and how necessary the ESDP is for further European integration. From such an analysis rises the frequently asked question, "What kind of Europe do we want to establish?"

As Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission, declared,

No European nation can go it alone in the world. And if we are to play our part in ensuring peace, security and prosperity in Europe and beyond, we need a strong foreign and security policy - as a corollary to a strong economic presence on the world stage. We want to be successful at preventing the conflicts, not just good at picking up the pieces. History stepped in again on 11 September. Today the need for a Common Security and Foreign Policy and a European Security and Defense Identity is more urgent than ever. Because the European Union cannot be strong without them. And only a strong and united Europe can help bring peace and stability and prevent war.⁵³

B. DEVELOPMENT AFTER MAASTRICHT TREATY

At Maastricht in December 1991, the EU started to form its own post-war destiny and started discussions about further European integration, including a defense dimension unique to the EU. Maastricht set as a goal "the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense."⁵⁴ The Maastricht Treaty introduced the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its main objectives and aims were to safeguard common values and fundamental interests,

⁵³ Speech by Romano Prodi in Brussels, 2 October 2002, Available at [www.europa.eu.int], November 2002.

⁵⁴ Robert E. Hunter, *The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?* RAND, 2002, p. 10.

strengthen the security of the Union, preserve peace and international security, promote international cooperation, and develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and freedoms.⁵⁵

The Western European Union (WEU), a separate defense organization which had been in existence since 1954, was requested “to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications,”⁵⁶ and would have the task of leading crisis management operations. Unfortunately, the WEU never became a credible organization for the development of a common ESDP. Moreover, that European Union nations did not have the military capabilities to meet their political ambitions either as part of NATO or out of the context of NATO become obvious.

The Amsterdam Treaty went beyond Maastricht in that it provided for “the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide.”⁵⁷ The Amsterdam Treaty also stated “the progressive framing of a common defense policy will be supported, as member states consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments.”⁵⁸ The Amsterdam Treaty endorsed three basic forms of flexibility: 1) enabling clauses, the mode of integration which enables willing and able member states to pursue further integration, 2) case-by-case flexibility, which allows a member state the possibility of abstaining from voting on a decision by formally declaring that it will not contribute to the decision, while accepting that the decision commits the entire EU (constructive abstention), 3) pre-defined flexibility that covers a specific field, is predefined and is automatically applicable as soon as the treaty enters into force.⁵⁹

Current work on the EU’s security and defense dimension was initiated at St. Malo in December 1998. St. Malo is widely considered as the start of the European security and defense policy (ESDP) project. Prime Minister Blair, Prime Minister Jospin,

⁵⁵ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1998, p. 79.

⁵⁶ Robert E. Hunter, p. 10.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Antonio Missiroli, “CFSP, Defense and Flexibility,” *Chaillot Paper* 38, February 2000, pp. 8-9.

and President Chirac, after the revolutionary changes in the United Kingdom's attitude toward EU involvement in security and defense matters and its lifting of its decades-long objections to the EU acquiring an autonomous military capacity, issued a joint declaration aimed at addressing all the deficiencies.

The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom agreed that:

The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defense industry and technology.⁶⁰

Since St. Malo, progress has been comparatively rapid. The basic approach, developing arrangements for the European Union to decide on military matters while drawing on national forces and capabilities, NATO planning support and, when necessary, other NATO assets, has been widely supported. The NATO Washington Summit and Cologne European Council, in April and June 1999, respectively, specified the basic framework to implement this policy.⁶¹ At the European Council's Cologne Summit in June 1999, the EU formally launched the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP).

Further European Councils in Helsinki, Feira, Nice and Gothenburg have developed this framework. The summit at Helsinki in December 1999 built on the progress made in Cologne and defined new EU structures to undertake the crisis management role. Further issues that have been addressed include the arrangements for consultation between the European Union and NATO, the establishment of the necessary political and military structures within the European Union, and the arrangements by which non-EU NATO European nations as well as candidates for EU membership can be properly involved in ESDP operations and the civilian aspects of crisis management.

⁶⁰ Maartje Rutten, "From St-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents," *Chaillot Paper* 47, May 2001, p. 13.

⁶¹ Robert E. Hunter, p. 53.

The summit at Nice in December 2000 also “signaled the member states’ determination to make the necessary efforts to improve their operational capabilities further, focusing on command and control, intelligence and strategic air and naval transport capabilities,”⁶² areas where the Europeans would have to rely on NATO. Obviously, improvements in the military capabilities of participating EU member states lie at the heart of these arrangements, and that will continue to be the focus of future work on the European Security and Defense Policy.

The approach to improving capability in the Union has been straightforward. Having set an overall goal, the “Headline Goal,” at Helsinki in December 1999, the EU member states assessed where they collectively stood in relation to that goal and identified the shortfalls and what to do about them.

More specifically, the EU Headline Goal, in terms of military capabilities, stated that:

- cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, member states must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of full range of Petersberg Tasks, including the most demanding,
- these forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements,
- modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU members,
- appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union’s decision-making autonomy, non-EU European members and other interested states to contribute to EU military crisis management,
- a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the member states.⁶³

⁶² Maartje Rutten, p. 14.

⁶³ Frans Osinga, *European Defense: Does Anyone Really Care?* June 2002, p. 2.

Additionally, the EU member states agreed that they would make a serious effort to:

- develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military means,
- open existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from other member states,
- reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces,
- prepare the establishment of a European air transport command,
- increase the number of readily deployable troops,
- enhance strategic sealift capacity.⁶⁴

The main reason that the target of the Headline Goal was set for EU member states was to give them a challenging target and to encourage them to make real and effective improvements in their military capability.

Furthermore, to clarify, the so-called Petersberg Tasks, on which to a large extent the Helsinki Headline Goal was based, were originally defined by the WEU. They are described as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking,⁶⁵ which now are also the focus of the ESDP, according to the official EU website.

Since Helsinki and the agreement on the Headline Goal, military experts from EU participating nations and the EU Military Staff, with assistance from NATO experts, have developed a statement of the forces and capabilities required. At the Capability Commitment Conference of 20 November 2000 in Brussels, EU member states presented their national contributions to meet the EU Petersberg Tasks. All the participating members, except Denmark that has chosen not to participate in the ESDP, agreed that their goals require:

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Robert E. Hunter, p. 10.

- more than 500 kinds of land-, air- and naval units, as well as key or strategic capacities in seven areas: C3I, ISTAR, Deployability and Mobility, Effective Engagement, Protection and Survivability, Sustainability and Logistics, and General Support,
- an 80,000-man strong land force, which would enable a force of 60,000 to operate,
- an air element of between 300 and 350 fighter planes,
- a naval element of 80 ships.⁶⁶

At that conference, the contributions from the participating states exceeded the numbers of the Headline Goal. The EU could have at its disposal a land force of more than 100,000 troops, 400 fighter aircraft and 100 ships, making the Union capable of carrying out with success all the kinds of missions that were possible according to its declarations.⁶⁷

The commitment of forces at the conference toward the implementation of the Headline Goal does not mean the creation of a standing “European Army.” It is considered a pool of forces from which forces can be rapidly assembled for particular operations, with the approval of the relevant national governments. All units available to the EU must be at a very high degree of readiness and equipped with modern and high performance equipment, which meets criteria for interoperability, sustainability and deployability. According to the Helsinki Declaration it should be recalled,

The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of an European army.⁶⁸

In Nice, the EU added “NATO remains the basis for the collective defense of its members and will continue to play an important role in crisis management.”

⁶⁶ Frans Osinga, p. 4.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 5.

1. Capabilities' Gap

However, even today, there are many different views and ambiguities concerning the meaning of the ESDP. Should it be considered a friend or a foe to NATO? Is it NATO's companion or competitor? Ambiguities persist about the types of operations in which the EU is going to take part, the nature of its military actions, and even the geographical range of its operations.⁶⁹ As one French expert in defense economics, Francois Heisbourg, has admitted,

With defense spending close to 60% of America's, the Europeans could in theory be expected to achieve 60% of US capabilities. They are probably below 10% in the realm of strategic reconnaissance and theatre-level C⁴ISR, at substantially less than 20% in airlift capacity, and possibly at less than 10% in terms of precision guided air-deliverable ordnance.⁷⁰

Therefore, a widespread idea is that the EU does not possess the logistical assets needed to deploy the necessary military units, and simultaneously, it has neither the will to pay the costs of such deployments nor the capacity to develop common policies. The capabilities gap between NATO and the EU, actually between the United States and the EU, has its origins in the past, and many reasons contributed to that problem.

The gap has emerged for three fundamental reasons: historical demands, structural considerations and financial limitations.⁷¹ More specifically, during the Cold War era, all NATO European countries had to be prepared for a war in their regions, rather than to use their forces over long distances and for long periods of time. That notion required the creation of heavy armies, with no airlift capacity, with no long-range missiles and so on. In contrast, the United States had to be ready for a different kind of war in which capacities such as mobility, sustainability and the development of forces overseas and with no limits of time, were indispensable factors for the final victory.

The conclusion to the Cold War, the changes in relations between the former rivals, and the emergence of new threats made the previous development of large standing armies in European countries, in one sense, useless. Yet simultaneously these

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ David S. Yost, "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union," *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 4, Winter 2000-01, p. 99.

⁷¹ James Appathurai, "Closing the Capabilities Gap," *NATO Review*, Autumn 2002.

factors increased the value of the American-type army, with the ability for rapid reaction deployment with fewer limitations on place, distance and time. Under all these new concepts, European nations had to make a new start that would require time and money, and no one could be certain that they would be able to cover the gap between these two parts of the Alliance.

Furthermore, European mentalities were not helpful for constructing a common European defense. The idea of defense remains an extremely national issue, even though European political and economic integration has been underway for decades. In the European Union, there are fifteen countries, with fifteen armies, fourteen air forces and thirteen navies, each with its own command structures, logistics organizations, and so forth. Every nation has its own foreign and defense policy, according to its national interests, and the EU has, as a result, no coherence and no common strategy among its members, even on issues of common interest. Defining and agreeing upon all the present requirements for a modern and capable defense policy is virtually impossible.

Finally, the most important factor explaining the capabilities gap is without a doubt the financial factor. Budget constraints are a daily and alarming phenomenon in the discussions of any improvements or changes concerning the further development of the common ESDP policy, which would be able to bridge the capabilities gap. European Union nations collectively spend less on defense than the U.S., in absolute and relative terms. The quantity and the quality of European defense spending are insufficient to provide for the capabilities the EU needs to fulfill its declared ambitions.

The main reasons for this situation are generally known: the strictness of fiscal policies with the main goal of the European Union countries during the last decade being the European Monetary Union, and the budgetary constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact, the social structure of the European Union today and the correspondingly different priorities of the European governments, and eventually the lack of tangible strategic threats to the EU homeland.

Owing in large part to these factors, since the end of the Cold War, the Europeans have cut their defense budgets by more than 16%, and on average, they spend 2.1% of GDP, while the U.S. spends 3%.⁷² Likewise, European procurement budgets have decreased by 18% in the last decade and the U.S. decreased only by 8%.⁷³ Moreover, in future years, according to the official statements, U.S. defense budgets will increase, while European defense budgets will decrease or remain at the present levels at best.

Certainly, the opposite opinion exists that the European Union does not have the number of commitments that the U.S. has, and that its global interests and aspirations are more limited than those of the U.S. That allegation fails to recognize that geostrategic conditions have changed, and the European Union, in light of that new global concept, must undertake its responsibilities and determine its role in the international arena.

From a different view of point, no one could claim that Europeans spend too little on defense. European NATO countries still spend about \$165 billion on defense annually,⁷⁴ which is a huge amount of money, but unfortunately, the outcome from that expenditure is unimpressive in terms of military capability, owing to many inefficiencies in European budgeting and procurement practices.

2. Challenges and Problems Created by the Gap for a Common ESDP

Generally speaking, that capabilities gap between the EU and the United States, two important parts of the alliance, makes cooperation and coordination extremely difficult and sometimes impossible. Many examples of these problems occurred during the wars in the former Yugoslavia.

Certainly, the official policy of the U.S. is that the Americans, enthusiastically support any such measures that enhance European capabilities. But any initiative must avoid preempting Alliance decision-making by de-linking ESDP from NATO, avoid duplicating existing efforts, and avoid discriminating against non-EU members.⁷⁵

⁷² Frans Osinga, p. 28.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 29.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Robert E. Hunter, p. 34.

Obviously, the gap has serious implications for the conduct of military operations as well as for transatlantic relations. Moreover, those fundamental problems have to do not only with the relations between the U.S. and the EU but also with relations among the various EU member states.

Madeleine Albright stated when she was Secretary of State that the first possible problem of de-linking had involved autonomous European action, which was introduced in the St. Malo declaration, along with the absence of the essential words “separable but not separate.”⁷⁶

Discriminating against non-EU members was important, as eight members of NATO - Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the U.S., not forgetting the different status for Denmark - are not EU members. All these countries have made clear their concerns about the implications of a military action within the framework of the ESDP, as it is not entirely clear to what extent the EU operations would be based upon NATO capabilities. These ambiguities have heightened concerns about the capabilities gap because the EU developments might widen the gap with non-EU NATO countries.⁷⁷

The most important of these possible problems was duplication. That meant for the EU’s ESDP could not spend scarce resources on trying to create the same capabilities that NATO possesses, as the EU countries could not use them without special processes and complications.⁷⁸ The European Allies should not be expected to copy the U.S. armed forces structure, but rather to complement their capabilities, and in that way, increase NATO’s power and flexibility. Nevertheless, the issue of unnecessary duplication has continued to be at the center of transatlantic debate about the future of the ESDP and its relations with NATO. Further problems associated with the capabilities gap, which could lead to huge debates about the future of the Alliance, include divisions of labor and burden-sharing ambiguities.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 40.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 41.

The division of labor refers to the distinction between the high technology Allies who provide the logistics, air power, strategic airlift and sealift, intelligence capabilities and the others who possess the low-level power, and are responsible for the manpower intensive tasks, such as crisis management and peacekeeping with a high risk of casualties.⁷⁹ Such a division of labor would create different concepts of risk and cost and would put the Alliance's future and unity in serious jeopardy.

The gap also intensifies another issue of conflict in the Alliance: burden-sharing. The inability of the European countries to contribute seriously to the most demanding operations could lead many people in the U.S. to criticize Europeans for their "unfair" unwillingness to spend more, while at the same time, many people in Europe might feel "humiliated" about that limited contribution, and by the same token, "humiliated" by their limited political influence.⁸⁰

C. NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Ten years after Maastricht, the EU must think again and must reorient its security and defense policy, as two new developments have emerged: enlargement and the changed nature of international violence. The international arena has changed radically during the last decade, particularly since the events of 11 September 2001. Where all these changes may be leading is not clear, and our attempts to impose security through intervention "can create backlashes which interact with complex globalization processes to create new sources of uncertainty: overlapping and competing cross-border networks of power, shifting loyalties and identities, and new sources of endemic low-level conflict."⁸¹ The new security dilemma cannot be dealt with through the traditional approach of defense and security policy with clear-cut definitions of interests and threats and respective military instruments. Nevertheless, the challenges of the new environment must be examined because of the effects they might have on regional or world order.⁸²

⁷⁹ James Appathurai.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ David S. Yost, p. 102.

⁸² Ibid., p. 116.

However, if European Union nations want to become a strong and united polity, as Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission claims, a common ESDP will be necessary for them at a moment when clouds are gathering over the security of all the planet and the basic principles on which the international system is founded are likely to be called into question. All the European nations have the obligation to deal with, and at least to try to find solutions to all the emerging problems, which are associated with their goal.

These challenges include the lack of a unified command, the lack of satellite intelligence, absence of heavy lift, political disunity, non-nuclear weapons except for France and Great Britain, transatlantic relations with emphasis on the unique British-American relationship and last, but not least, the failure of European countries to resolve the crises, such as the one in the former Yugoslavia, a failure that was primarily a result of an incoherent policy, and a lack of political cohesion among the EU member states. Political and military unity is necessary for the deployment of one common ESDP.

D. PROPOSALS FOR A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

Therefore, the first and foremost problem involves mainly the quality and not the quantity of the European defense spending, that is, with the way EU member states allocate their limited resources. Since increased spending is not the solution, spending more efficiently is essential to changing the situation.

In spite of the reductions in defense spending from 1985 to 2000 in the U.S., the gap between European and U.S. investments has widened since the 1970's. The U.S. is far ahead of its Allies in capabilities necessary for large-scale operations such as command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), airlift and sealift.⁸³

As a result of that capabilities gap, the European Union defense structure on the threshold of the 21st century suffers from serious shortfalls. These include insufficient air and sea transport to deploy forces, inadequate air-to-air refueling, a lack of precision-strike weapons, a lack of all-weather offensive fighter capability, inadequate

⁸³ Hans-Georg Ehrhart, "What Model for CFSP?" *Chaillot Paper 55*, October 2002.

reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities at the strategic and tactical level, insufficient deployable command and control, interoperable communications and finally, no expeditionary capabilities.⁸⁴

If the EU intends to find solutions to the fundamental reasons that have created the capabilities gap, an immediate solution certainly must be found concerning economic factors, as success depends on funding. As noted above, the amount of money that the EU spends on defense is not negligible (\$165 billion), but the problem is the way in which that money is spent. Europeans must spend more wisely and according to their requirements. Only if these funds are spent in the correct manner can the EU narrow that gap. Of course, for the European politicians to convince their people of the need to spend more on defense when no obvious threat to Europe is apparent and when many great social problems demand urgent solutions is different. An excellent chance for the European politicians could have been the events of 11 September. It was an opportunity to persuade their people to support more expenditure on defense. However, this did not happen and social issues, such as health systems, pensions, unemployment, and so forth continue to be the first priority for citizens and voters, with little attention paid to defense issues.

Also, Europe confronts difficulties in defense spending due to its demographics. By 2040, the U.S. will overtake the EU in population, and by 2050, the EU's population could be 360 million and falling, while the U.S. population would be over 550 million and rising, contrary to the fact that only one hundred years ago, Europe's population was exactly double the U.S. population⁸⁵. As *The Economist* notes, "If Europeans are unwilling to spend what is needed to be full partners of the U.S. now, they will be even less likely to do more in 2050."⁸⁶

Thus, it becomes less and less likely that the Europeans will decide to spend more on defense, if that requires cutting budgets from social programs.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 18.

⁸⁵ *The Economist*, "Demography and the West," 24 August 2002.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

Furthermore, a closer and more effective defense industrial cooperation is necessary as that factor could change a great deal, both in terms of economics and in the operational capabilities of European forces. At this time, almost every country has national defense industries that are supported mainly for reasons of national independence and effectiveness. Instead, more attention should be given to the sharing of demands, as more of the products from a defense industry are too costly for its own government to buy or to develop by itself. Unfortunately, the result is duplication to a large extent, of industrial equipment and effort, procurement systems and equipment, and a lack of coordination in common policies, and without a doubt, higher costs. This fact leads to the waste of large amounts of money, and simultaneously, the European defense industries are at a disadvantage in comparison to the corresponding U.S. defense industries.

Finally, for the EU to be able to solve the capabilities gap in the long term, it will be necessary to invest more money in research and development (R&D). Only in that manner can it be possible for the gap between the EU and the U.S. to become narrower. Today, the U.S. spends more than four times the European total on defense research and development, while 90% of the European investments in new military equipment come from the countries of France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Spain and the Benelux, and there is no indication that this will change in the immediate future.⁸⁷

E. CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, every aspect of the ESDP is directly connected to the main question, “What kind of Europe do we want to establish?” The European Union needs to decide whether it wants to exist or not as an appreciable international actor. In case of a positive answer, the EU has to establish the common ESDP and to develop and improve European capabilities. Without the ambition to play an important international role, and only with the EU member nations recognizing that the role can only be played together, the technical, military and financial obstacles in the way of a common defense policy will not be overcome.

⁸⁷ Frans Osinga, p. 30.

Toward that end, the most important change required is psychological, meaning that without losing sight of the broader transatlantic or NATO dimension, European Union decision-makers have to think and act “European,” if they would like to increase EU capabilities, in terms of security and defense.⁸⁸ Contrary to the belief of many Europeans that the hegemonic tendencies of the U.S. restrict the international role of the European Union, they have to understand that the main problem of the Union is its weakness and lack of ambition. However, to achieve such a great change in this way of thinking is very difficult, as that change would not have many positive consequences either for sovereignty or for national defense industry. The EU must define and declare its own strategic concept, but it is not necessary to cover exactly the same fields as the U.S. strategic concept. The tendency to develop the ESDP does not mean that the European Union wants to create a competitor to NATO. On the contrary, by improving its capabilities, the European pillar of NATO becomes stronger automatically.

Facing the challenges of the third millennium, it is almost a moral obligation for the European Union to intervene in world affairs and to become a serious partner for the U.S. because an efficient ESDP would not only enhance the EU’s role in the world, but could also improve the transatlantic relationship.⁸⁹ As Maartje Rutten has written,⁹⁰

The 11 September 2001 attacks have revealed the disparity and broadness of the threats at hand. Those attacks have shown the vulnerability not only of the USA but also of the rest of the world. Security and defense have become global concerns, and the EU has a responsibility to play a significant role in this respect.

⁸⁸ General Rainer Schuwirth, “Hitting the Helsinki Headline Goal,” *NATO Review*, Autumn 2002.

⁸⁹ Yves Boyer and Burkard Schmitt, “Can and Should Europe Bridge the Capabilities Gap,” *NATO Review/Debate*, Autumn 2002.

⁹⁰ Frans Osinga, Presentation at Naval Postgraduate School, November 2002.

V. GREECE AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

A. INTRODUCTION

Greece as a European, Mediterranean, and a Balkan country has had its share of troubled history in South-East Europe but hopefully for the country, Greece, at the beginning of the 21st century is in a much better position than all its neighbors, economically, politically and socially. Consequently, Greece constitutes an important factor in the democratic and economic reform of the countries of Southeastern Europe as they stabilize the European security architecture.⁹¹ However, threats to Greek security, from the Balkans and in the east Mediterranean area, destabilize the area, which has been characterized as “the powder-keg of Europe.” Challenges resulted from the disputes among the great powers for the best policies in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Under these circumstances, Greece is deeply anxious about its future and its sovereign rights and looks forward to safeguarding peace and stability. Such a safeguarding can be achieved, in one sense, by establishing and deploying of a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

Therefore, clarifying Greece’s place in the new era, its geopolitical and geostrategic position, its national strategy, and the threats that confronts its international environment is crucial. The efforts being made that would allow Greece to participate in international organizations and in alliances contributing to international security must prevail. This is extremely vital to the future existence of Greece and to the development of a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

B. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Ironically, the dissolution of the bipolar system and improved relations between the United States and Russia, the former two super powers, ushered in a new era. Yet it seems to be an era fraught with many regional conflicts. Previously the bipolar system contained such skirmishes, and the sudden collapse of that balance opened Pandora’s Box in many dangerous areas.

⁹¹ *White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces*, Ministry of National Defense, Athens, 2000, p. 1.

Therefore, the strategic environment continues to be dangerous and complicated. Even though the threat of a world war has decreased, tensions in ethnic, economic and environmental disputes continue to create instability in the international security system. The ambitious increase in regional powers, which have appeared in the areas of South East Asia and the Persian Gulf, could very possibly create serious problems for the international community. Threats such as minority disputes, religious fundamentalism, international organized crime, illegal arms trade, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, mass refugee movements, and terrorism constitute a challenge to international peace and security.⁹²

All these radical changes in the security environment have totally befuddled Greece's strategic situation. By virtue of its position and economic strength in the Balkans, Greece has a key role in the development of European structures. It also has a crucial role in strengthening and broadening European integration in the region. Greece has an opportunity to become one of the significant factors and a creative force for peace and progress, both in Europe and in the international community, and it must grasp this unique historic chance.⁹³

Consequently, the regional challenges in and close to Europe must be resolved to create a wider European security system, and it is necessary to redefine the relations and the cooperation structure in the European Union in order to resolve matters of peace and security.

C. THE CHANGING FACE OF EUROPE AND THE NEW CHALLENGES

Today, the old European political order is no longer in force and a new order is starting to replace it. The dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the crises that occurred afterward transformed the European structure. In Europe, the usual social responsibilities of security, welfare and progress of every country can no longer be successful on a purely national basis, and international cooperation is necessary. Integration will be the only solution for survival in the global community. European nations have to grow together to form one of the most important unions in the world.

⁹² Ibid., p. 9.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 9.

The end of the East-West conflict has shifted the political map of Europe, and through cooperation, the political weight of every European country is changing. Old alliances are becoming insignificant and leading powers and roles are emerging.

Europe faces new challenges while the end of the conflict between the East and West has been replaced by regional crises for social, ethnic, religious and economic reasons. Even one possibility for war or civil war in Europe will call the entire new European structure into question, as well as the process toward a peaceful and stable continent. Therefore, what is needed is not only political measures to promote stability among neighbors in Europe and to prevent new regional arms races, but mainly, a clear crisis and conflict management capability.⁹⁴ These capabilities must be able to handle complex modern threats and crises in our era between rich and poor, problems from resource constraints, environmental problems and problems regarding weapons of mass destruction.

1. The Geostrategic Position of Greece

Greece is a southeastern European and Mediterranean country situated at a traditional crossing point of countries and civilizations, between East and West, North and South, in a sea area of enormous geopolitical importance. Greece is the only country in the region to be a member of the EU, WEU and NATO. Moreover, Greece is the remotest member state of the EU and the only country with no common borders with the other EU members, as well as the only orthodox Christian country in the European Union.

In addition, Greece is located in a dangerous area of the Balkans, an area full of conflicts and tensions, which since 1989, has been in a state of flux and in a ceaseless nationalistic race. However, Greece's critical position in a fragile environment is not only because of the Balkans, but also because of the situation in the Middle East, where persistent hatred and violence could result in a free-for-all clash. One other important factor that should not be ignored is that Greece is the only member state of the European Union that feels an intense external threat to its national sovereignty and territorial integrity from a neighboring country.

⁹⁴ *German White Paper*, p. 31.

This unique location of Greece, as well as the distinctive geographic formation of the Hellenic territory, which combines a mainland with an extended coastline and more than 3,000 islands and rocky isles lends Greece a particular geostrategic character, rendering it as Europe's gate to Asia and Africa.⁹⁵ That distinct geostrategic importance of the area also explains the special security requirements of Greece. From a geostrategic point of view, the Aegean Sea, in combination with the Greek mainland, exercises control over the sea lines of communication from and to the Black Sea and the Middle East to Southern Europe and Northern Africa. These are also the sea lines of energy, controlling the strategic raw materials to the West.⁹⁶ The continental and island Greek territory, located at the critical meeting point of the three Continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, and on the sea line of communication between the two crucial seas of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and therefore of two oceans, the Atlantic and Indian oceans, constitutes a unified undividable defense area, characterized as a strategic area of global value and importance.⁹⁷ As an example, the island of Crete, with its naval and air facilities and its central position in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, covers all directions and controls all sea lines from the Dardanelle to the Suez as well as the air lines from Western Europe to the Middle East. Only one simple confirmation of Greece's geostrategic importance was the Gulf War in which it played a significant role in the transference of the armed forces and their supplies. The same is true for the Thessalonica area, which comprised, without a doubt, a key point for the moving of peacekeeping forces to the region of Kosovo during the outbreak of nationalistic hostilities in the former Yugoslavia.

Therefore, the number of harbors, airfields and its road network make Greece an excellent support and operational base for military forces that would be able to operate in any direction, and as a result, makes the country a strategic area of universal importance.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 3.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 3.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 5.

2. The Concept of Greek Security and Defense Policy

All these developments created new security conditions for Greece. Today Greece is facing a particular security situation.⁹⁹ Beyond the existing and apparent threat from the east, it also faces instability along the northern borders. The entire focus of international security moves today from Central Europe and the outdated conflict between the East and West to the European periphery, and particularly, to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.¹⁰⁰

Greece must follow a strategy characterized by responsibility and consistency, with respect to international law, and with no claims over the territories of the neighboring small countries, due to their weakness to protect their countries. By far, the Greek policy and strategy of today is based on realistic assumptions. Of course, by not continuing that strategy, Greece might confront many serious problems with surrounding countries.

Although acting under the universal law of right, “act externally in such a manner that the free exercise of thy will may be able to co-exist with the freedom of all others; according to a universal law,”¹⁰¹ sounds moral and just, but its application can be an extremely dangerous strategy for the interests of one’s country if the others do not follow this universal idea of Immanuel Kant. Nevertheless, it provides the normative measure for just relations between individual nations or, in other words, gives us a measure of how far away strategic arrangements might be falling short of this ideal.

3. Greek National Strategy

In particular, the Greek national strategy includes a few of the following fundamental principles:¹⁰²

- the defense of national independence, sovereignty and integrity of the country against any threat, and especially, against the threat of Turkey. Turkey remains the number one threat for Greece, with all convinced that it always has the ulterior motive of changing the status quo for the region,

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁰¹ Immanuel Kant, “*The Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Right*,” 1798, (Professor Micewski’s Notes).

¹⁰² *White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces*, Ministry of National Defense, Athens, 2000, p. 16.

- the support of the European leaning of the country, due to the concept of integration for the European Union in the same way that it attempts to make the country the most important pillar of the EU in the Balkans
- the efficient function of the country as the metropolitan center of the Greek nation by taking the necessary initiatives for national motivation for every Greek citizen around the world whenever it is essential.

In order for these national strategy goals to be successful, and especially due to the Turkish threat, which recently has become more offensive in nature for the first time with the making of demands, and even for territorial claims such as for the Imia/Kardak isles in the winter of 1996, Greece seeking means of securing its sovereignty.

Greek policy is committed to peace and its first goal is to safeguard, to promote and to shape peace, both within Greece and in the international community. As a result, the military doctrine of Greece is a defensive doctrine, oriented to face any external threat,¹⁰³ and it is neither correct nor wise to forget that deterrence will be successful only when the combination of incentives and intimidation is plausible and existent.

The most important concepts of the Greek national military strategy are defensive sufficiency, a flexible response and the capability to cover the joint defense area of Greece and Cyprus.¹⁰⁴ Defensive sufficiency is not meant as an uncontrollable arms race but, on the contrary, the necessary quality of human resources and weapon systems and an attempt to maximize the “cost-efficiency” ratio.¹⁰⁵ A flexible response means that in the case of a crisis, the Greek reaction should be appropriate, selective, fast and efficient.¹⁰⁶ Instead of a black and white situation, a range of options will be available if Greece must react to a potential crisis instead of a black and white situation.

As a last point concerning the national military strategy, in order to deter the Turkish threat, Greece and Cyprus decided to create a “Joint Defense Area”. The implementation of this initiative is only defensive in nature and aims to deter or face any aggressive action against any of the participating countries.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, both

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 20.

countries must understand that any deviation from that doctrine, in case of any dispute with Turkey, will automatically undermine the whole idea, and even the first time, will be the swan song for that, for their credibility and deterrence ability.

In all these ways, Greece is trying, by itself, to reduce tension in the area by limiting armaments and enhancing of the regional institutions and structures of security, stability and cooperation.¹⁰⁸ However, these attempts are not enough, have not always had the desired result, and Greece must find other means to be successful and to preserve peace.

4. Problems with the Neighboring Countries

In order to address this topic and to attempt to clarify the relations between Greece and Turkey, it is useful to refer to the bilateral and international issues that have troubled the two countries for many years to better understand the ongoing situation.

The most important issue of all without a doubt is the Cyprus issue, the Turkish invasion and occupation of the island since that time of the northern part of the island. This happened with little international outcry, and proved that war can promote foreign policy objectives through other means, became a lasting impression on the military and diplomatic establishments, an immutable factor in Turkey's policy-making.¹⁰⁹ From then onward, the Turkish demands on Greece are always increasing. A sense of self-worth in terms of size territory and population, military might and strategic value became the determining factor in Turkey's view of its western neighbor and even moderate Turkish politicians, diplomats and analysts have not escaped the temptation of using power as the major criterion in resolving Greek-Turkish differences.¹¹⁰

The Cyprus invasion, also, opened Pandora's Box for Greek-Turkish disputes and one after another, the contested issues arose in quick succession. Besides the Cyprus issue, many other disputes created serious tensions between the two countries, for

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 23.

¹⁰⁹ Thanos Veremis, "The Ongoing Aegean Crisis," *Thesis Journal*, Issue No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 22-32.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 22-32.

instance, the Aegean continental shelf, the control of air traffic over the sea; and the allocation of operational responsibility of the Aegean and its air space within the framework of NATO.¹¹¹

Greece does not accept the validity of all the disputes that Turkey has created for the benefit of its claims. Most of its objections must be brought to the International Court of Justice, since some of them are obviously legal questions. However, contrary to that policy, Turkey refuses to accept international litigation on any issue and continues to assume all the problems as bilateral for a very clear reason - all the Turkish claims have no basis either in International Law nor in international practice and they are convinced that such a development would only negatively impact its interests. According to Greek perceptions, Turkey is forever burdening the agenda with new claims so that if bilateral negotiations were to occur, it would be on Turkish demands only and advantageous to its positions.¹¹² It is obviously an extremely preposterous ploy.

Pressure from countries in the international community for Greece to submit to bilateral discussions with Turkey on the basis of an agenda with no Greek input and no Greek demands will inevitably lead to a conflict that will destabilize both neighboring countries for years to come and will ultimately destroy Turkey's European prospects.¹¹³

Likewise, along the northern borders of Greece, the existing economic uncertainty, political instability and statutory changes may require a long period of time to overcome. After the wars that took place in the greater territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the entire region continues to be characterized by great instability, and a possible deterioration of the situation may cause serious problems in the structure of Balkan security and stability.¹¹⁴

The role of Greece in the area is to reinforce the political and peace procedures to resolve the existing disagreements, and to promote, and eventually to establish peace,

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 22-32.

¹¹² Ibid., pp. 22-32.

¹¹³ Ibid., pp. 22-32.

¹¹⁴ Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

security and stability. Such a role will eliminate all possible threats to Greece and will have a beneficial impact on Greek security, protection and prosperity, which certainly are the first priorities of every country.

5. Greece in International Organizations

Under these circumstances, Greece, trying to protect and secure its territory against all threats in the Balkan area, has been a member of the most important alliances and organizations and its policy in the Balkans is guided by the principles of respect of international borders, stability, peace and security as well as by fully respecting human and minority rights.

As Hans Morgenthau states in his book *Politics Among Nations*, alliances are the most important manifestation of the balance of power¹¹⁵ and it is evident that Greece, as not being a superpower, militarily or economically, must rely, parallel with its power, upon help from its allies concerning disputes that were always thrust into the international arena.

Therefore, Greece today is a member of the UN (United Nations), of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), of the EU (European Union), of the WEU (Western European Union), of the Council of Europe (COE) and of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with the ulterior motive of preserving its national integrity and establishing of peace and democracy among all nations.

Certainly, participation in these international defense organizations entails not only rights but also obligations for the members. Every member has the obligation to contribute to peace support missions with personnel from the Armed Forces, with the primary goal of implementing international law and compliance with that rule.

Greece is participating in all the missions of those organizations and has made essential and definite contributions to all these activities, from the Gulf War to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Kosovo Wars. Of course, one prerequisite for participation is the existence of a clear mandate prior to the formation of the force as well as the definition of the rules and the concepts of operations.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ *White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces*, Ministry of National Defense, Athens, 2000, p. 23.

¹¹⁶ Heinz Gartner, Adrian Hyde-Price, Erich Reiter, *Europe's New Security Challenges*, First Edition, Lynne Rienner Publish., 2001, p. 125.

Unfortunately, the participation of Greece in all these organizations and the indisputable contribution to global promotion of peace have not helped the country solve the existing disputes with Turkey. Even the huge and thorny question of Cyprus and the occupation of one-third of the island has not resulted in a just and legal solution.

In spite of the common belief that the international community would solve the issue if it really wanted a solution, nothing has changed over the last thirty years, except a few resolutions of condemnation from the UN Security Council for that abhorrent and illegal act from Turkey against an independent country, against Cyprus. The example of Kuwait in 1991 was in almost the same situation, yet the entire international community rallied to the support of that weak country against the invader, Iraq.

6. Greece and European Union

Furthermore, this year 2003 will be a milestone year in the history of the EU. Ten new member states will be joining forces with the present fifteen, in one of the most courageous steps toward realizing the goals set by the Union's founders, namely peace and prosperity through an extensive European integration. A new era is dawning, which finds Europe stronger and ready to meet new challenges. In this context, the Treaty of Nice goes into force while the discussion on the future of Europe is reaching its climax, and the European Union is about to draft a fundamental text, of constitutional character, that will enshrine the principles on which European nations have relied and the new objectives for Europe. At the same time, the Greek Presidency is expected to unfold in a particularly volatile and unpredictable global environment. The emergences of new factors in shaping the international balance, the existence of international terrorism, organized crime and, more generally, the development of forces that are not subject to any institutional control or discipline, create a climate of marked uncertainty worldwide. The Greek Presidency needs to remain extremely vigilant in order to handle crises that may arise and must also be ready to tackle major challenges such as:¹¹⁷

- Fighting international terrorism and organized crime (Iraq, North Korea, Al Queda). Recent experience has shown that the fight against international terrorism is a complex process with many dimensions: military, economic, political and cultural. A global strategy should aim at combating both the symptoms and causes of this phenomenon.

¹¹⁷ *White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces*, Ministry of National Defense, Athens, 2000, p. 26.

- Given the current economic slowdown, improving the climate of confidence and investment, increasing productivity, levels of employment and fiscal stability are all objectives of critical importance.
- The challenge of “sustainable development” on a global scale that can contribute to eradicating poverty and destitution and bridge growing socio-economic inequalities while, at the same time, protecting the environment and safeguarding ecosystems.
- Reaffirming the role of international law and international institutions and promoting a new, democratic governance model, in the light of globalization.

This situation of uncertainty and the major challenges that Europe faces make it imperative for the European nations to strengthen and to restore the European citizen's feeling of security, as a primary and all-encompassing objective. Whether this involves fighting terrorism and organized crime, controlling the flow of immigration, protecting workers' health and safety, ensuring the viability of pension schemes, or food safety and consumer protection, the European Union must reestablish a climate of security and confidence. This is precisely the goal that most of the undertakings included in the Greek Presidency's program will strive to achieve. With regard to the European Security and Defense Policy, the basic priority of the Hellenic Presidency is the finalization of all those outstanding issues that will allow the realization of the European Union's full operational capability in the field of comprehensive crisis management during 2003, through the balanced development of both the civilian and military aspects and the advancement of civil-military coordination.

The Greek Presidency takes place at a time of critical change in Europe and new challenges in the field of Security and Defense Cooperation, an area in which the Union is trying to forge a new identity. In a period when the EU will be engendering the greatest enlargement in its history, the Union will be called upon to reconsider the context of its relations with its new neighbors and promote policies reflecting the new situation in Europe. In this light, the promotion of the EU's relations with the Balkan countries will be a foremost priority for the Greek Presidency.

The effective development and deepening of relations with Russia will also constitute an important parameter in the EU's efforts to consolidate peace, stability and cooperation in Europe. Relations with the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, as well as the

Caucasus region, acquire a special significance in this new European reality. At the same time, the strengthening of the EU's cooperation with Mediterranean countries will be a major task for the Greek Presidency. The Greek Presidency will promote political dialogue with all groups of countries. It will give special emphasis to the respect of human rights and the rule of law. It will seek closer cooperation between the Union and the U.S. in the fight against inequality, the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, armaments control and conflict prevention. It will also aim at a more active participation of the EU in the international community's fight against terrorism, promoting the development of capabilities and policies and supporting multilateral cooperation with third countries and international organizations, with the goal of eradicating this scourge, which has developed into a major international problem following September 11, 2001.

At the same time, it will strive for stronger policies for combating poverty, protecting the environment, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, resolving regional conflicts and facing the problem of drug trafficking. The Greek Presidency's immediate priorities include the strengthening of relations with the U.S. and cooperation at all levels, so as to form a joint response to international challenges. European citizens expect the Union to respond to its international responsibilities, by preventing international conflicts and managing crises when they occur. The Greek Presidency will endeavor to strengthen the EU's capacity for effective political intervention in conflict areas, by improving and further developing existing institutional instruments such as common strategies and joint actions. At a time when the EU is trying to build new capabilities in the field of Security and Defense Cooperation, the Greek Presidency will pursue its efforts in order to reinforce the institutional framework of the CFSP, by creating the area of "Freedom, Security and Justice." As the Greek Prime Minister has declared

we want and we will try to strengthen the common foreign policy and the defense and security policy in order to upgrade the EU's role in the international scene. That establishment will overcome the present-day phenomena of insecurity and by that way; we can build a tomorrow of hope and progress for everyone.¹¹⁸

D. CONCLUSIONS

Foreign policy is often based upon selfish interests and cultural bias and not morality or international law. The Great Powers consider Turkey to be more important and consistent with their strategic interests than Cyprus, so they do not want to disturb one "loyal" friend and ally, even if history, such as in WWI and WWII, has taught everyone dissimilar lessons about Turkey's stance against the international democratic society. Today, it is evident that realistic ideas prevail in the international arena and legality and morality are followed and referred to only when they are consistent with Western interests. However, one must not forget that the concept of international legality being the common good is of profound importance in all aspects of international relations, even if it has been constantly ignored by the powerful all throughout history.¹¹⁹

To put it another way, Greece believes in the creation and existence of the European Security and Defense Policy, as it will be the only protective force against a possible attack from Turkey, according to the concept of collective defense. Even NATO has avoided taking a clear stand concerning its attitude on the hypothetical situation in which another member of the alliance attacks one country, a member of the alliance. Greece believes that the existence of the European Security and Defense Policy will have, at the minimum, the result of intimidating Turkey and preventing any aggressive attitude against Greece and Cyprus. The common foreign and defense policy of the European Union should be an effective system to resolve crises, as well as a collective system that would guarantee peace, stability and security. Developing of that common policy should strengthen the security of all member states, protect borders, and defend the vital interests of each member state and the entire European Union.

¹¹⁸ Speech of Greek Prime Minister C. Simitis, *Priorities of Greek Presidency of the European Union*, Athens, 10 January 2003.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., Spring 2002.

Furthermore, taking into consideration the European dimension of Greece the support of the European Security and Defense Policy is necessary. The ESDP creation is imperative for a united Europe with a common parliament, a common currency and a common defense and security policy. Creating a genuine security community would be the greatest achievement in the remarkable process that the theoreticians call “European integration.”¹²⁰ A main goal is the deployment of an army with a purely European identity, a goal to which there are many objections, which would not clash with NATO. On the contrary, the European Security and Defense Policy would be coordinate and cooperate with the security and defense policy within the context of NATO.

Greece believes that the new NATO, the expanded NATO, will constitute the best possible guarantee for peace in the Balkans and Europe, since it will be the credible entity to cover the “void of power” that was created by the collapse of the bipolar system.¹²¹ Equally, NATO assumes that Europe can and must establish, under a complementary and not competitive spirit, its European Security and Defense Policy, its military industry and its multinational, rapid reaction, effective troops. In the case that a future U.S. government wants to resign from European affairs, Europe cannot remain without protection.

Finally to conclude, Greece, because of the particularities of the threats it faces and of its geopolitical position, is obliged to participate in building an army with a European defense identity, within the EU. Greece is obliged to play a positive role in structuring its own strategy and goals. The future of the European Union, with the prospect of the forthcoming enlargement to 25 member states, is an issue of fundamental interest for the Greek Presidency. Greece has always believed that the Union's enlargement should be linked to deepening European unification. The enlarged Union should evolve into an institutional system capable of making effective decisions with a democratic and social content.

Greece's policy is based on the realization that its national interests are best served by stability and democracy in the Balkans and in the same way, its modernization

¹²⁰ Theodoros A. Couloumbis, Stelios Stavridis, “Bypassing the Euro-Army Imbroglio,” *Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy*, Spring 2002.

¹²¹ *White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces*, Ministry of National Defense, Athens, 2000, p. 22.

and its deterrent power through the ESDP is the best guarantee to develop and to secure the prosperity of the country. Therefore, establishing and developing the ESDP, which by extension would be considered a “Greek Army,” would contribute to the one and only physiognomy of the EU and to the construction of the Europe of the 21st century. The above thoughts comprise the aspirations of most Greeks. As T. S. Eliot said: “History deceives us by whispering ambitions, guides us by vanities.”¹²² In other words, examining history, ambitions and vanities tend to make any “reasonable” predictions or assumptions a most frustrating task.

¹²² *Eliamep Times*, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Spring 2002.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VI. CONCLUSION

The European Security and Defense Policy is only a part of the much broader plan concerning the future of Europe and the European Union. It also greatly concerns the issue of what kind of Europe we want to establish for the future. EU members participating in the ESDP agree on the need to improve their military capabilities as well as to make them more effective.

However, given that the deadline for the Headline Goal is fast approaching, the doubts of many of the participating countries have become greater and greater concerning how they can improve their military capabilities as an outcome to all these problems. The desired goal for the entire operation is improving military capabilities in conjunction with coordinated NATO-EU decision-making structures. This is the most desirable outcome for the EU, NATO and the United States. The ESDP will be successful and the European Union will be able to handle security challenges on its own, without direct help from the United States, and at the same time, the United States will still be influential in European affairs through NATO.

The European Union, by developing its military capabilities, would strengthen its position and its international political power. The ability for the European Union to speak with only one voice would change its position in international relations forever, making the European Union an equivalent member of international politics.

Furthermore, a joint declaration adopted by both the European Union and NATO on December 16, 2002 opened the way for closer political and military cooperation between the two organizations with no contrary or antagonistic policies in the areas of crisis management and conflict prevention. Furthermore, the political principles for EU-NATO cooperation were outlined and gave the European Union access to NATO's planning and logistic capabilities for its own military operations.¹²³ The European Union and NATO declared that their relationship will be founded on principles such as

¹²³ *EU and NATO Adopt Framework for Cooperation*, 16 December 2002, Available at [nato.int].

partnership, effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation, transparency, equality, and respect for the interests of the member states as well as for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.¹²⁴

The members of the European Union responded in unison to the terror attacks in the U.S. on September 11th even paradoxically according to the disagreements and disputes among them. These attacks reminded everyone that insecurity had become globalized, and does not discriminate among countries. Almost all Western leaders expressed their immediate and unconditional support for the U.S. through communiqués and press releases.

The EU expressed “its complete solidarity with the government of the United States and the American people at its terrible time and extended its deepest sympathy to all the victims and their families.”¹²⁵ Another declaration that day announced that the EU would

make every possible effort to ensure that those responsible for these acts of savagery are brought to justice and punished. The US administration and the American people can count on our complete solidarity and full cooperation to ensure that justice is done. We will not, under any circumstances, allow those responsible to find refuge, wherever they may be. Those responsible for hiding, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable.¹²⁶

Unfortunately, that hopeful and promising message was replaced by major disputes and among the United States and the countries of the European Union concerning the war against Iraq. Absolutely different approaches regarding Iraq emerged within the allies in NATO as well as within the members of the European Union.

Two major and different approaches occurred. One was supported mainly by the United States and the United Kingdom while the other was supported mainly by France and Germany. The first approach argued that military conflict and intervention would be the only possible solution to the problems of Iraq’s regime and weapons of mass destruction. The second argued that a policy of an extended system of containment

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Frans Osinga, *European Defense, Does Anyone Really Care?* June 2002, p. 33.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 33.

would be the desired solution before any military action occurred. That policy would combine increased weapons inspections, over flights by spy planes throughout Iraq and the insertion of thousands of UN peacekeepers virtually to occupy the country. There were divisions across the Atlantic and disagreements within Europe that were symptoms of the deep divergence between those who believed that Iraq's time was up and those who wanted an extended system of containment.¹²⁷

The outcome of history was not so encouraging for the European Union and for a common stance among the EU members. The common declaration from the eight European countries of Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, who did not respect the institutions of the EU, and five EU members, who torpedoed the common European policy on the issue of war against Iraq, created a direct threat of driving a wedge between the EU. As the French newspaper *Liberation* wrote under the main title "Vassals, Europe is the first adjacent loss of the war against Iraq."¹²⁸ Also, for many people everywhere, the debate over the war against Iraq had as its first victim the European Union and its aspirations to become a global actor and its co-called "common" European Security and Defense Policy. According to them, the issue of Iraq revealed all the limits that this policy contains within, as member states of the EU simply pursued national policies and interests, leaving the EU on the sidelines. World policies have been decided elsewhere, and action on common European foreign, security and defense policies have been restricted to their traditional, narrowly defined playgrounds.¹²⁹ It became clear to everyone with regards to this issue, the three major Western pillars, the European Union, NATO and the UN Security Council, that they have already been shaken and that too much effort would be required by all members to change the situation and have relations return as they were before.

However, the reactions that arose because of the comments of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, about "old and new Europe" were full of anger. The Secretary of Defense declared on January 22, 2003:

¹²⁷ Paul Reynolds, "Iraq Crisis Provokes Anger and Confusion," *BBC News*, 10 February 2003, Available on [news.bbc.co.uk].

¹²⁸ "*Liberation*", Issue of 31 January 03.

¹²⁹ Burkard Schmitt, "The EU Still Can't Speak with One Voice," *International Herald Tribune*, 12 February 2003.

Now, you are thinking as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east. And there are a lot of new members. And if you just take the list of all the members of NATO and all of those who have been invited in recently, what is it? Twenty-six, something like that? You are right. Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem.¹³⁰

Even though significant efforts have been made between the European nations, even with the spirited attempts by Greece, which was the presidential country of EU at that time, no agreement has been achieved on Iraq, and as the Greek Alternate Foreign Minister, Tassos Yiannitsis, briefed the European Parliament in Strasbourg, he noted that the EU's identity was at stake.

The issue of Iraq the danger of its using weapons of mass destruction or the regional balance of power, really concerns the EU. At stake are the credibility of the EU, its interests, its role and its potential. We must answer the question as to whether we will be able to bridge our differences. My answer is that I do not know if we can but that we have the duty to make the effort. And we have a duty to exhaust all possibilities to achieve this.¹³¹

ESDP probably in the future will be a reality but it is undoubtedly a long-term process. The enlargement of the European Union will make the situation more difficult as a consensus among them will be extremely rare. In addition, the intergovernmental method that governs the common foreign, security and defense policies is the best guarantee that national interests will prevail.

Of course, according to the Athens declaration on April 16, 2003 concerning the enlargement of EU to 25 member states, that was a historic day for Europe as the divisions in Europe after the World War II eventually reached an end. However, challenges remain and as President Chirac of France said, "this new Europe will not meet the expectations of its citizens, as the recent crisis showed, if it does not clarify its political ambitions and reform its functions radically."¹³²

¹³⁰ Donald H. Rumsfeld, 22 January 2003.

¹³¹ "*I Kathimerini*", (Greek Newspaper), Issue of 13 February 03.

¹³² "*I Kathimerini*", (Greek Newspaper), Issue of 17 April 03.

However, despite the great aspirations and expectations for the ESDP operations in the near future, the EU needs to approach any given mission with extreme caution and skepticism. Many people in the EU are afraid that the very early deployment of the EU forces, according to the schedule of Headline Goal, could lead to failure, and very possibly have catastrophic consequences for any future deployment of the ESDP. These thoughts are not very far removed from reality, and pertaining to many difficulties, disagreements and concerns that have been expressed from a large number of the member states of the EU.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
2. Professor Donald Abenheim
National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
3. Professor Edwin R. Micewski
National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
4. Hellenic Air Force General Staff
Athens, Greece
5. Hellenic Air Force Academy
Athens, Greece
6. MAJ Miltiadis Fakitsas
Piraeus, Greece