

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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THESIS

**SOF REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO SHAPE
FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS**

by

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June 2003

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OF CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO SHAPE FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS.**

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The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question of how effective are current theater engagement / security cooperation plans at supporting US national interests. The examination of effectiveness focused on two theaters as case studies during the years 1998 through September 2001. This examination divided effectiveness down into two parts. The first part was consistency. Consistency was investigated by a comparison of the national priorities to completed engagement activities. The second part of effectiveness attempted to measure gains produced through the executed engagement missions.

Following the case study analysis, key principles for effectiveness are identified and a modified engagement planning process proposed. The key elements of the modified process are integrated interagency planning, objective based engagement activities, and synchronization of all the elements of statecraft. This framework is tested by applying the modified TEP process to a sub-region of Africa. The significance for this test is not only to demonstrate the capability of the proposed TEP process. This test demonstrates the potential for effective engagement to assist in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

In conclusion, this thesis provides an understanding of what engagement is today, and what engagement should be in the future. The principles of effective engagement planning identified herein should provide a framework for future planners.

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I. INTRODUCTION

*American leadership and engagement in the world
are vital for our security¹*

-Bill Clinton

A. PURPOSE

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the world became far less stable. In reference to eastern Europe alone, one political analyst commented, "the Soviet collapse has left behind significant and unbalanced military forces and weapons inventories among nations experiencing a wave of instability and conflict generated by virulent nationalism".² Residual imbalances and ethnic conflicts re-emerged throughout the world. In response to the growing instability, the importance of global engagement became a priority for US national leadership.

In the 1991 National Security Strategy, President Bush initiated the US emphasis on global peacetime engagement. It then took primacy with President Clinton's 1995 National Security Strategy, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The concept of regional / global engagement is continuing to evolve and it has recently been re-titled Defense and Security Cooperation. The National Military Strategy of 1997 embraced a 'shaping'

¹ Bill Clinton, 1997 US National Security Strategy, (White House, May 1997).

² Ronald D. Asmus, "Building a New NATO," The Shape of World Politics (1997) 264.

philosophy as one of its pillars in its three-pillar defense strategy of "shape," "respond," and "prepare".³

Global engagement includes the application of all four elements of US national power: diplomatic, military, economic, and information. One established definition of peacetime engagement is:

Interagency activities of the U.S. Government, either unilateral or undertaken in cooperation with other national or non-nation state entities, to influence international conditions in such a manner as to protect or advance U.S. national interests abroad.⁴

For the purposes of this thesis, engagement activities include: all preplanned and long term efforts to establish and improve military, diplomatic, informational and economic ties with other nations to shape the world environment favorable for US national interests. This thesis endeavors to analyze one critical aspect of those peacetime activities, the engagement of special operations forces (SOF) abroad.

This thesis analyzes the effectiveness of the previous theater engagement plans and activities of both Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) and Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) from 1998 through September 11, 2001. Following the analysis, the two cases are compared and principles are identified that most contributed to effectiveness. With these principles identified, a modified engagement planning process is proposed and tested.

³ John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy, (Washington, D.C., 1997).

⁴ Hy Rothstein, Regional Engagement: A Concept Paper, (Research Planning Inc., 1999).

B. BACKGROUND

The concept of peacetime engagement is nothing new. Following World War II the United States was committed to being the proactive leader of the world for the prevention of future conflict. No longer could the US avoid foreign entanglements. Many organizations and programs were established to create interaction and stabilization. The epitome of such an organization was the United Nations, whose charter states, "United for a better world".⁵ All elements of US national power have contributed to shaping the global environment for our betterment. Examples for each of the elements of statecraft include:

- The United States Military's forward deployed forces and military exchange programs (military).
- The Department of Commerce and its programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (economic).
- the Department of State's network of embassies and missions abroad (diplomatic).
- Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (informational).

However, it is the interaction with foreign militaries that possesses the greatest potential for regional influence and stability. This potential was acknowledged in a recent Washington Post article describing the shift in international influence from the State Department to the military. The article highlights Pakistani President's, Pervez Musharraf, relationship with the US government following his military coup and rise to power. Instead of communicating with President Clinton or Secretary of State

⁵ "United Nations Charter" [<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>] (27 November 2002).

Madeline Albright, he chose to contact General Anthony C. Zinni commander of Central Command to explain his coup.⁶ Coalition exercises with NATO forces to improve interoperability and strengthen professional relationships resulted in huge gains for the US during Desert Shield / Desert Storm, and Northern / Southern Watch.⁷ The Department of State (DoS) acknowledges the military's importance to and influence on international relations by organizing and funding several military-to-military programs. Examples of such programs include: International Military Education and Training (IMET); Foreign Military Financing (FMF); and Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) training. Additionally, the Department of Defense (DoD) also funds its own programs such as: Section 1004 Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities; non-Security Assistance Unified Command engagement activities (junior officer exchanges, Subject Matter Expert Exchanges, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise program). There are also a variety of other miscellaneous DoD and DoS, funded activities such as Regional Programs (e.g. African Crisis Response Initiative), Regional Education Centers (e.g. Asia-Pacific Center, Marshall Center, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and African Center for Strategic Studies), and the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program.⁸

⁶ Dana Priest, "A Four-Star Foreign Policy?", Washington Post, September 28, 2000, p A01.

⁷ Ralph R. Steinke and Brian L. Tarbet, "Theater Engagement Plans: A Strategic Tool or a Waste of Time?", Parameters, Spring 2000, p70.

⁸ Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest, Volume I Joint Report to Congress, March 1, 2000.

As a participant in many of these activities, SOF has always been a primary military-to-military engagement tool. Army Special Forces (SF), created in December 1951, was formed with a corps consisting of nearly half Lodge Bill troops.⁹ The Lodge Bill (Public Law 597) provided a means for resident aliens to earn their citizenship quicker by volunteering for military service. These new US-patriated soldiers were quickly trained in unconventional warfare and re-deployed to their ethnic homelands on SF A-detachments. Their focus was to prepare for the perceived forthcoming war with the Soviets. If war broke out they planned to train, organize, and lead guerrilla operations behind Soviet lines. They prepared for this mission in peacetime by training with Allied militaries on unconventional warfare. Thus, almost from its outset, SF has been engaging with foreign militaries, influencing their actions and developing their capabilities in support of US security. From this small scale beginning, SF has become the military engagement tool with the largest "footprint".¹⁰ This description of SOF having the largest overall 'footprint' abroad correlates with SOF having the largest influence as well. COL Jim Welsh, USMC, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense on Strategy, has said that the benefit produced by SOF engagement is by far the, "most bang for the buck."¹¹

Other members of the SOF community have become active in engagement activities as well. According to deployment

⁹ Susan Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations, (1997), p 11.

¹⁰ Interview between CAPT Kevin Johnson, PACOM J56 and author January 24, 2003.

¹¹ Interview between COL Jim Welsh, OSD Strategy, and author January 23, 2003.

reports maintained at the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Headquarters, all elements of SOF are contributing. Although Army SOF elements execute the bulk of deployments abroad, 67.3% of them, Navy and Air Force SOF have become increasingly significant contributors to engagement, executing approximately 16.8% and 15% respectively of all deployments.¹²

Two key factors have led to SOF use as the primary military engagement tool. First, SOF language capabilities and cultural understanding, unconventional warfare tactics, and operational versatility, all have made SOF the “force of choice”.¹³ SOCOM’s historian explains the reason for SOF receiving this title:

SOF were capable of operating in all politico-military environments, skilled at peacetime training, foreign internal defense, and nation assistance operations as well as full-blown conventional warfare. SOF’s versatility was particularly useful in areas where political constraints prevented using conventional forces.¹⁴

Second, sustaining the necessary skill sets and regional expertise requires consistent employment in the respective theaters and potential areas of conflict. In almost a symbiotic relationship, the need to deploy SOF units due to their skills was welcomed by the SOF community that sought to deploy to maintain those skills.

The unconventional manner in which these forces have operated highlights their potential for high leverage influence. Unconventional in that SOF execute missions in a

¹² SOCOM deployment data for 1998-2001.

¹³ USSOCOM History, McDill AFB, FL, April 2002, p17.

¹⁴ Ibid.

very diffuse manner with little or no supervision. They deploy teams of three to twelve men at a time to train with foreign units of six to eight hundred. From 1998-2001, SOf elements were deployed to about 150 countries with an average of 4800 personnel deployed per year. A peak was achieved in 1999 with 5,141 personnel deployed abroad.¹⁵ Conservatively, nearly one quarter of a million foreign military personnel can be estimated to have been trained or influenced that year by US SOf.¹⁶ If one compares that to the fact there are only about 4000 US State Department Foreign Service officers deployed abroad who only interact with a similar number of their diplomatic counterparts, the influence SOf can have becomes apparent.¹⁷

Beyond the operational advantages to using SOf for engagement, there are also financial incentives. A quick look at only one of the many SOf missions, the JCET, underscores these fiscal advantages. The JCET was authorized by section 10, subsection 2011 of the US Code. This legal authorization allows SOf forces to deploy abroad to enhance their unconventional warfare skills, and language and cultural orientation. According to John Rudy and Ivan Eland of the CATO Institute, in "FY97 there were 231 deployments in 100 countries." The cost of all 1997 JCET deployments was only \$15.2 million (not including transportation costs).¹⁸ This can be compared to a typical

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ The estimate is based on taking the number of people deployed 5141 divided by an average of 12 men per deployment giving an estimate of 428 separate missions that years. Multiply that times an average unit they would work with consisting of 600 men gives an estimate of 257,050 foreign troops trained.

¹⁷ Rudy, J. & Eland, I, "Special Operations Military training abroad and Its Dangers", Foreign Policy Briefing #53, 22 June 1999, p.5.

¹⁸ Ibid, p3.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercise. A JCS exercise takes place overseas as well, and involves the training of US and foreign forces. A typical biannual exercise called FLINTLOCK is scheduled to take place in South Africa at a cost of \$6.1 million.¹⁹ Comparatively, this JCS exercise affects one country and costs \$6.1 million while an annual JCET program that has 231 separate SOF exercises in 100 countries costs a total of 15.2 million. The leverage of the JCET program is arguably much higher compared to the JCS exercise. Still, there is a second reason for the popularity of JCETs. JCETs are funded by SOCOM through SOCOM's own Major Funding Program 11 budget. Thus, the Theater Commander can bring SOF into his theater without using his own limited resources and budget.

SOF activities in support of theater engagement plans are many and extremely varied. As LTC Cox, former SOJ-5 of SOCEUR, puts it, "They (engagement activities) include all planned and unplanned activities".²⁰ Obviously everything that SOF does overseas is not driven by engagement, nor should engagements benefits be expected from every deployment. To clarify the governing characteristics of engagement I use the following graphic.

¹⁹ "Exercises European Command" [<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/ex-eucom.htm>], 15 August 2002.

²⁰ Personal communication with LTC Cox, ES0J5 SOCEUR, and the author 30 May 2002.




Figure 1. Characteristics of Engagement

For the SOF community, five activity areas exhibit the characteristics of: preplanned, long term effort, bi/multilateral, and focused on regional US interests. They are JCETs, Counter-Drug (CD), Security Assistance operations (SA), Humanitarian De-mining Operations (HDO), and Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEE). Counter-Drug operations are missions designed to improve a host nation's ability to fight the criminal drug industry within its own borders. Security Assistance programs are funded through the State Department to develop a training cadre in host nations. These training cadres could be used for anything from fielding of US weapons sold to a country to creating a regional peacekeeping force. An excellent example of the latter was the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). ACRI trained regional forces in Africa to conduct peace keeping operations in order to avoid US involvement. HDO are also consistent with this train-the-trainer concept in that they are designed to train a host nation cadre on de-mining operations. Finally, SMEE involve military-to-military contact designed to share expertise, develop professional relationships, and foster mutual appreciation.

These five activities clearly demonstrate the core characteristics of engagement as illustrated in Figure 1. There are many other operations that are not engagement activities by design, but later evolve to become major engagement opportunities. Examples of such emergent operations include Bosnia and Operation Focused Relief (OFR) in West Africa. Both operations started as responses to a crisis; Serbian offensive operations and the Sierra Leone civil war respectively. Both evolved into a long term commitment of training, diplomatic exchanges, and a protracted US presence to help shape the region. Once these US operations made this transition and became preplanned activities, these operations changes from crisis response to engagement activities.

Due to the nature of the US government bureaucracy, it is easy to infer a poor degree of coordination and synchronization in engagement activities. One would expect the opposite to be true of SOF engagement strategies. Because SOF elements are small, versatile, and well trained one would expect the character of SOF engagement strategies to be well synchronized. However, this is not the case. Bob Andrews, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) referred to SOF engagement planning with a joke. He mused that SOF planners, when tasked with engagement planning, look to each other and state, "I thought you handled that."²¹ When questioned about coordination regarding prioritizing countries for engagement, LTC Cox commented that it wasn't until after 9/11 that SOCEUR synchronized

²¹ Robert Andrews, OSD SO/LIC, address to Naval Postgraduate School, SOLIC Curriculum, 21 November, 2002.

with its headquarters, European Command (EUCOM).²² Given this, how could SOCEUR's actions possibly have been well synchronized with those of the Pentagon, the President, or the interagency domain of Washington, D.C. if they weren't synchronized within EUCOM's own headquarters? Also, SOF planners never connect the regional objectives to the activities executed. Serving as both the assistant and the primary operations officer in a SF battalion, I can personally attest that not one JCET or other peacetime engagement deployment order included any operational or intelligence directives. These facts are the impetus for this thesis.

C. SIGNIFICANCE

The need for an effective engagement strategy has never been greater. With the United States fully committed to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and operations in the Middle East, every mission executed by our forces must have a purpose. As Professor Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School has suggested, the transnational threat posed by Al-Qaida is in essence a type of global insurgency.²³ As such, a list of actions and requirements can be created for the employment of SOF abroad to aid in this protracted politico-military conflict. Yet, the orders issued to SOF forces deploying abroad include no taskings to conduct intelligence or operational preparation of future battlefields. However, if the requirements identified to fight the GWOT are overlaid on an effective

²² Personal communications between LTC Cox, ES0J-5, and the author, 30 May 2002.

Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) process, the long-term strategy to fight transnational terrorism can be advanced.

If the United States is to destroy this current threat without creating future ones through the arbitrary use of force, high-resolution intelligence is required. This intelligence preparation of the battlefield must first focus on generating accurate area assessments. These area assessments must encompass a fundamental understanding of the regional populations. Following this foundation of regional expertise, information collection can then focus on specific targets. As General Wesley K. Clark (Ret.) asserts, "...the real key to effective operations will be information about the terrorists: details about their identities, locations, habits, logistics and aims... predictive in nature... best gained by well-positioned observers."²⁴ This employment and placement of operators lies at the heart of an effective engagement strategy and strategy to defeat terrorists organizations with global reach.

The benefits of having such detailed intelligence are enormous. What must be highlighted is the fact that not only can these forces employed abroad acquire the raw information; they are also capable of discretely interdicting select targets. They can operate in a politically sensitive way unilaterally or combined with a host nation military that was trained through effective engagement activities. More importantly, with good

²³ Gordon McCormick, Professor at Naval Postgraduate School, Lecture on International Terrorism, 2002.

²⁴ Wesley K. Clark, "Waging the New War," How did This Happen?, 2001.

information and intelligence provided by SOF, host nation forces can execute their own operations with US assistance only as required.

Maintaining effective military-to-military contacts among both conventional and Special Operations Forces has already been beneficial during the first round of the GWOT in Afghanistan. It was due to military-to-military contacts established by the JCET program that the US was able to secure basing support in Uzbekistan to conduct combat operations into Afghanistan.²⁵

D. METHODOLOGY

This thesis employs the congruence case study approach. In essence, the characteristics of SOCEUR's and SOCPAC's engagement planning and activities are evaluated for effectiveness, and then compared to one another. By comparing the two outcomes, a list of the most effective engagement planning principles are identified.

Effectiveness is defined as meeting two requirements. The first is consistency. To obtain a measure of consistency, a ratio is derived by comparing the number of missions completed in countries identified as of primary importance by the President in the NSS to the number of missions executed in countries not identified. The analysis will only look at preplanned exercises and training events so a SOC is not penalized for having been directed to execute an unscheduled mission in a non-priority country. The second component of effectiveness is output. To place a value on the products of the executed engagement missions,

²⁵ Robert Andrews, OSD SO/LIC, address to Naval Postgraduate School, SO/LIC Curriculum, 21 November 2002.

all products of completed engagement missions must be screened against the standard requirements identified both by doctrine contained in Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01A and relevant national and theater level directives. If a particular case study accomplished all assigned engagement tasks and produced results beneficial to US regional security objectives, it was at least partially effective.

The principles identified as most effective become the foundation for a modified Theater Engagement Planning (TEP) process. In some instances, a complete failure in both organizations existed in dealing with certain TEP challenges. Therefore, new concepts are proposed to fill the voids.

This modified TEP process is then used in an illustrative case: Africa. This case is a test of the proposed methodology using a hypothetical scenario. But, it also demonstrates the importance an effective engagement strategy can have on the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as well as on regional stability. The reason for using Africa as the test is because of the future importance of Africa in the GWOT. The presence of Al-Qaida operatives in Africa is indisputable following the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. However, their presence isn't limited to offensive operations alone. Al-Qaida is using Africa to traffic arms, and establish training bases, as well as to generate and launder funds for future operations through

the illegal diamond trade.²⁶ The better our engagement strategy is in Africa the less freedom of maneuver Al-Qaida will have in the future.

As noted earlier, changes to engagement strategies following September 11 are not included. New engagement strategies have not had sufficient time to develop and, consequently, testing their effectiveness is not possible. However, the principles identified herein as necessary to create effective SOF engagement plans should be timeless.

²⁶ Douglas Farah, "Report Says Africans Harbored Al-Qaeda; Terror Assets Hidden in Gem Buying Spree", The Washington Post, **29** December 2002, pA1.

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II. DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE

A. ESTABLISHING A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The rationale for a national security strategy based on engagement has coalesced into its current form from a unique concept called the democratic peace hypothesis. Its premise is that democratic states do not go to war against each other. Historical statistics supports this claim.

Democratic Versus Nondemocratic Wars 1816-1991

DYADS [1]	WARS [2]
democracies vs. democracies	0
democracies vs. nondemocracies	155
nondemocracies vs. nondemocracies	198
TOTAL	353

1. Stable democracies. This only excludes the war between an ephemeral republican France and republican Rome in 1849.
2. Defined as any military action in which at least 1,000 are killed. From Small and Singer 1976, updated to 1980 based on Small and Singer (1982); more recent estimates from the author.

Figure 2. Wars involving democratic and non-democratic states²⁷

The More Democratic Two Regimes, The Less Intensely They Fight Each Other 1980-1988

Dyadic Democraticness	Dyadic Dead[a]	Number of Regimes
democracy-democracy	0	[b]
democracy-authoritarian	567,108	66
democracy-totalitarian	940,796	107
authoritarian-authoritarian	1,664,220	40
authoritarian-totalitarian	2,560,202	11

a. This is the mean of the sums of battle dead for regimes of the given regime type that fought each other in wars.

b. There was no war between any democracies

Figure 3. Intensity of conflicts between states²⁸

²⁷ Rudolph J. Rummel, *The Democratic Peace*, University of Hawaii, [http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills], 19 January 03, Tab 1.

²⁸ Ibid, Tab3.1.

These tables clearly show the logic behind the democratic peace hypothesis and consequently the engagement concept. Therefore, exporting and supporting democracy throughout the world appears a rational policy to promote international peace. There is some academic debate over the attributes within democratic societies which foster peace. As one political scientist contends:

[Non-democratic states] lack the internal safeguards which assist in maintaining international peace. Institutions enabling leaders to maintain control by restricting or eliminating independent initiatives also restrict independent efforts towards defusing potential conflict.²⁹

Other political scientists argue it is the common set of democratic norms shared between like countries that act to stabilize international relations. Still others insist it is the democratic fostered economic interdependence, which makes war too costly. Regardless of the cause and effect relationships at play, following the Cold War, an understandable national security policy decision was made to replace the containment policy with one that exported democracy.

B. OPERATIONALIZING THE NEW POLICY

To implement this policy, a program of global engagement was necessary. Engagement slowly and awkwardly emerged as the new US strategy and was initially highlighted by President George H.W. Bush in his 1991

²⁹ Gus diZerega, "Spontaneous Order and Peace: Implications for the Classical Liberal Critique of Democratic Politics," The Independent Institute Working Paper #20, UoCal. Berkley, January 2000, p.16.

National Security Strategy (NSS). President Bush sets forth in this document a commitment to “enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy”.³⁰ As mentioned in Chapter I, engagement was solidified as the US strategy in President Bill Clinton’s 1995 NSS, *Engagement and Enlargement*. This title exemplifies Clinton’s tying the policy to enlarge the community of democratic nations with the strategy of accomplishing this through global engagement.

However, as was also described earlier, engagement is not a new phenomenon. Many government agencies, including the military, were involved with countries throughout the world prior to a formally established engagement strategy. The era of the Cold War and Super Power positioning drove many government agencies to counter Soviet influence. For the military, these activities focused on interoperability and intelligence sharing to prepare for a possible war against the Soviets.

The so-called ‘peace’ following the Cold War gave rise to hope for peacetime dividend. The peace dividend was to come from the reallocation of funds away from the Department of Defense. No single large threat loomed on its horizon and America wanted to capitalize by downsizing the military. The reduction of DoD’s budget was initiated by President Bush in 1991 and continued under President Clinton. The following chart reflects the budget trend. As one can see, DoD’s budget has been declining. From the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990 through 2001 there has been a

³⁰ George Bush, 1991 National Security Strategy, Washington, DC.

7.5% drop in the overall percentage of Federal outlays (obligated funds) for the DoD and a 5.3% drop in Net public spending on the DoD.




Figure 4. DoD Portion of the Federal Budget³¹

At the same time that the policy of engagement gained prominence, the military's operational tempo (OPTEMPO) increased. According to Texas Representative Larry Combest, the Army's deployment tempo increased 300% during the 1990s.³² As for Special Operations Forces, according to a General Accounting Office report to Congress, "(a) questionnaire from almost 200 senior-level officers and enlisted personnel in SOF units indicated that they believe the deployments of SOF units have increased to the point that SOF readiness has been, or threatens to be, degraded".³³ The three converging conditions of a shrinking budget, increasing OPTEMPO, and increasing emphasis on

³¹ National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2003, OSD Comptroller, March 2002, pp2-6-217.

³² Rep. Larry Combest, press release, 22 October 2000.

engaging abroad led to the development of engagement plans. By formalizing how the military would engage, the hope was that the efforts would be synergized, producing better results with limited resources. That requirement to produce Theater Engagement Plans (TEP) remains today.

The formalizing of the TEP requirement came from a series of important documents that were either written or updated to reflect the new vision. The updating of these documents and the effect they had are a good example of how US Defense policy is still created today. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1996, Public Law 104-201, Sections 921-926, requires DoD to conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review and report it to Congress. The purpose of the review is to, "include a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure,... with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a revised defense program."³⁴ This review is to be completed at the beginning of the term of a new presidential administration. The first QDR was completed in 1997 and then-Secretary of Defense Cohen laid the groundwork for implementing a strategy of engagement and enlargement. Cohen stated:

...the U.S. military and the Department of Defense must be able to help shape the international security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests... These three elements - shaping, responding, and preparing - define the essence of U.S. defense strategy between now and 2015.³⁵

³³ GAO Letter Report, "Special Operations Forces: Opportunities to Preclude Overuse and Misuse NSIAD-97-85", 15 May 1997.

³⁴ Public Law 104-201, Section 923, Subparagraph a.

³⁵ William S. Cohen, 1997 QDR, Section 3 *Defense Strategy*.

The report goes on to define 'shaping' as a means to prevent aggression, foster relationships, and stabilize regions through engagement.³⁶

The first necessary update to a standing strategy was to the National Military Strategy (NMS). Following the publication in May 1997 of the QDR, the NMS was updated and published in September 1997. The NMS is an important document for it "recommends military foundations and strategic principles to support national security objectives" looking 2-8 years ahead.³⁷ GEN Shalikashvili reaffirmed the direction described in the QDR, reiterating the three-tiered approach: shape, prepare, and respond. In essence, this document raised engagement to the level of being America's first layer of defense in our nation's defense-in-depth strategy.

From these two strategic policy documents came written guidance and plans issued to the Regional Commanders. They informed the Regional Commanders of their theater engagement responsibilities, regional objectives, and priorities. The first critical document came from the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF) office, and was entitled the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). This document is the means by which the SECDEF influences the prioritization and overall strategy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). With the CPG, the SEDEF establishes the Prioritized Regional Objectives (PROs) which were then copied into the JSCP's Annex E. It

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ John Pike, "Defense Policy," [<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/intro.htm>] 28 January 2003.

is the JSCP that actually tasked the theater commanders to create a TEP. This tasking to produce TEPs remains in the JSCP today.

The JSCP is a TOP SECRET document distributed only to senior staffs and the Regional Combatant Commanders. It is a standing document focusing on the near term (next two years); it is reviewed annually and updated as needed.³⁸ The following flow chart captures the sequence of events and the relationship between documents.




Figure 5. DoD Strategy Flow Chart

Finally, a manual was created to provide the structure and guidelines to prepare a TEP. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) produced the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01A *Theater Engagement Planning*. It was first issued in 1998 and then updated in 2001.

C. THE PERSCRIBED ENGAGEMENT PLANNING PROCESS

The JCS manual 3110.01A describes a four phase process for developing a TEP. Each separate Theater staff varies in its planning process while still striving to achieve the

³⁸ CJCSM 3113.01A, Washington DC, 31 March 2000, p. A-1.

same prescribed endstate. It is these variations in planning methodologies that have the most dramatic effects on the outcome and success of engagement activities. It is the effective variances between the two cases that I will examine shortly.

The four phases of the TEP development process used from 1998-2001 are: Initiation, Strategic Concept Development, Activity Development, and Plan Review.³⁹ The process strives to synchronize the efforts of the joint US military, the interagency community and the participating host nations. However, the effectiveness of this process at synchronizing efforts is questionable, and will be addressed throughout this study. In the end, the TEP process must provide a framework for all military forces and agencies involved to plan their participation in engagement activities aligned with the regional objectives.

Important to all aspects of engagement abroad is funding. The TEP process has therefore aligned itself with the Planning and Program Budgeting System (PPBS). It is estimated that there are approximately thirty-seven different funding channels involved in support of the different activities.⁴⁰ The planning process must be well synchronized to ensure that the various agencies involved have enough time to properly plan for the use of so many different sources of funds. Also, the timing of this process must allow for the proper planning and development by the host nations involved in these operations. CDR Cline from PACOM's staff (J561) emphasized the importance that a

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Interview with COL Jim Welsh, OSD Strategy with author, 23 January 2003.

JCS exercise may have to a host country's military program. Due to limited resources; it may be their only major training event for the year.⁴¹ As such, it is in their best interest to maximize the event and they will require a great deal of preparation time to do just that.

The SOC, in supporting the TEP process, is also heavily tied to the planning schedule. As a supporting command, its input must be timed to support the TEP process. To accomplish this, it must time internal activities that will ultimately affect the input the SOC provides to the TEP process. An example of this is the timing of the JCET scheduling conference. Because JCETs factor so heavily in theater engagement, the scheduling of upcoming JCETs should be completed before the TEP process can conclude. The following consolidated timeline attempts to capture the process.




Figure 6. TEP Planning Timeline

⁴¹ CDR Cline's, USPACOM, presentation at PACOM Interagency and Country Team Theater Security Cooperation Working Group, 21 January 2003.

Phase 1: The Initiation Phase begins with the receipt and review of the pertinent national documents. At this point, Theater Staffs and the SOC's conduct an assessment of the previous year's activities and their effectiveness. This assessment becomes part of the Strategic Concept that is submitted to, and is used by, the Joint Staff (JS) to assess overall military success in shaping the global environment.⁴² Then, the standing Theater's Strategic Concept for Engagement is reviewed in light of the newly issued national guidance and strategic objectives.

Phase 2: This is the Strategic Concept Development phase. During odd numbered years each Regional Commander is required to submit an updated Strategic Concept for engagement to the JS. After review by the JS and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) it is integrated into the Global Family of Strategic Concepts. The process by which the Strategic Concept is derived is through mission analysis by the Theater Staff. The Theater Staff analyzes the PROs issued in the JSCP and reviews the national guidance issued in the NSS, NMS, and CPG. They then link the PROs to the Regional Commanders own vision and objectives. The Strategic Concept is completed through a deliberate planning process incorporating intelligence, input from the resident political military advisor (a DoS representative), and staffing with all affected forces. The document fits a template provided in CJCSM 3113.01A in Annex C. At this point, the Theater staff then issues guidance to the supporting commands, including the SOC, so they can initiate planning of activities in accordance with

⁴² CJCSM 3113.01A, Washington DC, 31 March 2000, p. A-9.

the Strategic Concept. The Strategic Concept is submitted in the odd numbered year to the JS by 1 April for review.

Phase 3: This is the most challenging phase and it focuses on what is called the Activity Annex. The Activity Annex along with the Strategic Concept and the Regional Assessment completes the TEP. The Activity Annex is a listing of all planned engagement activities linked to the PROs that they attempt to satisfy. This truly is when collaboration takes place. All aligned supporting commands that operate in a given theater contribute to this list with activities they plan to execute within the theater. Their activities are designed to support the Regional Commander's goals while also attempting to meet their unit's training needs. It is here that the SOC's contribute to the theater engagement plan as well as satisfy their own training requirements.

In accordance with the prescribed outline provided in 3113.01A, each Regional Commander must provide this list of all engagement activities that will take place for the next fiscal year and the activities programmed for an additional seven years. At a minimum, the required activities listed are: operational activities, combined exercises, security assistance, combined training, combined education, military contacts, and humanitarian assistance. Part of the specific information required to complete the annex includes support requirements of forces and transportation.

The heart and soul of effective engagement resides within this portion of the plan. The desired endstate is an Activity Annex that synchronizes the Regional Commanders vision both vertically up with the NSS and horizontally

among supporting units and other government agencies. The Activity Annex must be submitted by 1 Oct annually.

Phase 4: This phase is the review of the complete TEP. The JS, supporting Services, and the USDP review the complete TEP. The review process is lengthy and contains many cycles of reviewing and editing. When complete, each Theater Engagement Plan becomes part of the Global Family of Theater Engagement Plans. What is interesting to note in this process is what the plans are reviewed for. The complete TEPs are reviewed for adequacy and feasibility. The CJCS manual defines adequacy as, "whether the scope and concept of planned activities are capable of satisfying the JSCP-taskings".⁴³ To determine feasibility, the Joint Staff simply evaluates whether the available resources are present to execute the proposed plan. Therefore, the plans are not reviewed how they are expected to shape the region. It is also interesting to note that the review process can take up to sixty days to complete. This means that the TEP may not be approved for up to sixty days into the execution year.

D. KEY ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS

At this point, it is important to identify areas of concern about the process for producing TEPs. Theater staffs, by having conducted many evolutions of TEP planning, have developed their own unique methods for attempting to cope with the challenges and weakness inherent in the TEP process. At this point, it is important to note these concerns regarding the process. After my analysis of TEP effectiveness is complete, I will

⁴³ Ibid B-4.

measure how well each staff's unique methods performed against the following TEP challenges.

The first challenge with TEP planning is how to generate unity of effort. Nothing is required of the Theater staffs by the CJSCM to affect Unity of Effort. There are many reasons why this is a challenge. All four elements of national power are involved in engagement, and many publish and work from their own regional strategies. Therefore, they are all not unified on the objectives to be obtained regionally. Also, within the insular world of planning staffs, it becomes easy to focus solely on the concerns of immediate supervisors. Meanwhile the Theater staffs must meet the challenge of unifying the overall effort by working closely with government agencies and attempting to incorporate unit training requirements into a cohesive engagement plan.

For the SOC's, the challenge to create unity of effort is even greater because each SOC works under an additional two layers of command. The message the US is trying to send regionally seems to become ever more distorted the more layers of command that are involved. The best example of this was the deployment of SOF on JCETs to Colombia in 1996 and 1997 after President Clinton prohibited military support programs to the country.⁴⁴ Each Theater SOC must attempt to comply with the vision of the President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Regional Commander, as well as the command guidance of the Commander, Special Operations Command (SOCOM). While deconflicting all of those inputs, Theater SOC's must also

⁴⁴ Daina Priest, "US Military trains Foreign Troops," Washington Post, 12 July 1998, p. A01.

attempt to meet the training needs and desires of the SOF units who will actually be deployed and execute the missions. SOCPAC being issued three separate lists of priority engagement countries is an excellent example of conflicting guidance. At the most recent PACOM Theater Security Cooperation Working Group conference, a SOCPAC briefer noted the difficulty in satisfying the SECDEF, the Regional Commander, and SOCOM. All three had issued separate lists of priority engagement countries. Obviously, any tool that helps unify the effort with all the conflicting guidance would be of tremendous benefit.

The second challenge in the TEP process involves the synchronization of activities. The synchronization of the regional TEPs takes place in two steps. First, synchronization is supposed to happen during the plan development process which incorporates the Theater Staff, embassy teams, and representatives from OGAs. The second step is when each TEP is integrated into the Global Family of Plans, reviewed and approved by the CJCS. However, in reality true integration really only takes place at the embassy level.⁴⁵ Actual decision-making authority to execute missions, approve security assistance sales and training, or coordinate senior-level officer visits rests with the Ambassador and his staff. The challenge at the Theater Staffs is to plan and synchronize activities for commanders while working with embassy teams to ensure the TEP also supports the vision and objects of each embassy Mission Performance Plan (MPP).

⁴⁵ Personal interview with CAPT Childress, L.D., Naval Attaché American Embassy Paris, and the author, 22 January 2003.

Each embassy produces a MPP at the direction of the Ambassador. This is then forwarded to the appropriate regional desk at the State Department. Each regional desk then produces a Regional Performance Plan (RPP). The consequence is that, the two primary engagement arms of the US government - DoD and DoS - are working regionally on two separate plans. To make matters worse, DoD and DoS divide the world up differently in terms of regions. Therefore, some countries considered by the military to belong to the European region belong to the Middle East according to the State Department (e.g. Syria).⁴⁶

The third challenge lies in assessing the previous year's activities and developing measures of effectiveness (MOE). According to CDR Cline (J561) from PACOM, this challenge has not yet been solved.⁴⁷ The regional objectives of stability, democratization, and access are long term and broad objectives, for which MOEs may not be possible. But, without an MOE, charting an efficient course for the future is problematic. As noted earlier, resources for engagement activities are finite and diminishing. Therefore, important decisions must be made about how to reinforce success and eliminate projects that do not appear productive. Thus, the challenge lies in developing objectives and supporting tasks that can have MOEs. Once measurable objectives and supporting tasks are established, tools such as a database system can be employed. A database tool such as the TEPMIS

⁴⁶ Publicly released Unified Command Plan map dated 30 April 2002, [<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/020417-D-6570-003.jpg>] compared to the Near Eastern Affairs country list on the DoS Near-eastern Affairs website <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/>.

⁴⁷ CDR Cline's, USPACOM, presentation at PACOM Interagency and Country Team Theater Security Cooperation Working Group, 21 January 2003.

database could then effectively be used to support decision makers in charting engagement progress and strategy.

With this understanding of the engagement planning process and its inherent challenges it is time to evaluate the case studies.

III. CASE STUDIES

A. SOCPAC CASE STUDY



Figure 7. Regional Commander's AORs

1. Area Orientation

The Pacific Command (PACOM) is responsible for the largest designated theater of all the Regional Commands. SOCPAC as a supporting command of PACOM has the same Area of Responsibility (AOR), which covers more than fifty percent of the earth's surface and includes sixty percent of its population. One of the keys to understanding the complexity PACOM and SOCPAC face when planning engagement is that the world's six largest militaries all operate within the region: People's Republic of China, United

States, Russia, India, North Korea, and South Korea.⁴⁸ Exacerbating the geographic challenge and military climate is the unique bilateral nature of diplomacy in this area. There are no multilateral agreements existing within the region that include the US and two or more Pacific region countries. This has had a dramatic effect on coordinating multilateral exercises and events for engagement. Individual agreements must be worked out with each participating country. Also, long-standing animosities and geopolitical power struggles prevent the inclusion of certain countries in combined events. These countries, that may be independently friendly to the US, such as China and Taiwan, will not participate simultaneously in a US-sponsored exercise. Both, also, refuse to participate in military-to-military conferences held at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS).

SOCAPAC, meanwhile, is a subordinate unified command co-located with PACOM at Camp Smith, Hawaii. "SOCAPAC conducts theater special operations; exercises OPCON of in-theater and apportioned SOF; and is executive agent for all special operations, less CA/PSYOP".⁴⁹ Assigned forces stationed in-theater consist of the 1st Special Forces (SF) Battalion, 1st SF Group in Okinawa; the 353 Air Force Special Operations Group consisting of three squadrons; the 320th Special Tactics Squadron in Japan, and Naval Special Warfare Unit 1 in Guam.⁵⁰ In addition to the in-theater

⁴⁸ USPACOM Official Website, [www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml], 13 February 2003.

⁴⁹ Special Operation Forces Reference Manual, Joint Special Operations Forces Institute, January 1998, p. 2-6.

⁵⁰ Ibid

assets, SOCPAC is apportioned by the JSCP support from the entire 1st SFG, and SEAL Teams 1, 3, and 5.

Organizationally, SOCPAC does not differ much from that depicted below on the standard SOC organizational chart. For PACOM, the J56 staff plans and coordinates theater engagement. The staff issues the approved engagement strategy and consolidates the subunified command's Activity Matrixes. However, SOCPAC doesn't have the manpower to dedicate an entire section to engagement planning alone. Instead, there are designated individuals who are tasked to consolidate the SOC's lists of activities and submit them to PACOM's J56. Ultimately, it is the SOJ3, the senior operations officer, who finalizes the different activity lists and the countries SOF elements deploy to.




Figure 8. Standard SOC Organizational Chart

2. SOCPACs Methodology

PACOM and SOCPAC's TEP planning is prescribed by USCINCPAC Instruction 3010.7. This PACOM instruction

governs the TEP process and the responsibilities of apportioned forces. PACOM takes the requirements and formats dictated by CJCSM 3113.01A and amplifies them into a complete planning process. PACOM's TEP planning process fulfills the CJCS requirements through a series of iterative Engagement Working Groups (EWG) and Pacific Engagement Synchronization Steering Groups (PESSG). These composite groups are designed to integrate all military and government agencies involved in the theater into the planning process. The idea is to systematize a method for creating synchronized plans.

The EWG is composed of elements from all service components, sub-unified commands, and standing JTFs. Invitations also go out to country teams, and government agencies with regional desks for the PACOM area. During the most recent conduct of a PACOM Engagement Working Group, representatives from the Department of State to the Corps of Engineers were present. This essentially creates a composite staff designed to provide information and support in the construction of the TEP during the four separate phases of the process.

The PESSG is the senior level review group. Its membership consists of the deputy commanders of the component commands, sub-unified commands, and standing JTFs. The PESSG reviews the draft products of the EWG and provides guidance and directs improvements to these documents before they are forwarded to the Regional Commander for approval.

As discussed in Chapter II, there are three areas that truly challenge the planning staff while it develops its

TEP. The methods each staff uses to deal with these challenges will, ultimately, affect not only the TEP but its effectiveness. Comparatively, I will chart the methods each staff used and what effect they produced during the case study years. The methods that yielded the best results will then be further developed as principles for implementation in future TEP planning. Again, the three challenges are to: achieve unity of effort, synchronize engagement activities, and measure effectiveness.

From 1998-2001, PACOM tackled the issue of unity of effort by offering a simple vision of the purpose for engagement in a commander's intent statement. The intent statement remained the same from the case study period through today.⁵¹ This intent is to engage with countries to provide the access and relationships needed to support the critical standing PACOM Operational Plans (OPLANS).⁵² What is key is that engagement is regarded as a means to prepare and support the execution of OPLANS. The development of a host nation's military capability and addressing humanitarian needs are considered secondary. Because this intent statement was clear and specific it seemed to lend a purpose to the planning process. In essence, it declared that an engagement focus on supporting OPLANS moves the US in the general direction of its stated regional objectives. As the statistics will demonstrate, the engagement effort was well focused on the directed priority countries.

The methodology adopted for synchronizing activities and preventing resources from being wasted was the

⁵¹ Interview between 1LT Chris Murphy, J56 US Pacific Command and the author 23 January 2003.

⁵² CAPT Johnson, 21 January 2003.

previously-mentioned interagency working and steering group system. The intent of this system was to address the issues and concerns of all executors of activities (SOCPAC, etc) to include the hosts of executed activities (Host Nations, Country Teams). It is, however, important to note that a critical weakness in the process is that the resulting TEP is only a military strategy and not an interagency one. No matter how carefully prepared, the TEP can really only synchronize military activities. Because the plan is binding only on military forces, other agencies are free to act as they see fit potentially creating a flawed implementation of US engagement strategy. Also, even though federal agencies, most notably the State Department, may leave the conferences in general agreement they might not support the TEP implementation. In the end, this system only ensures de-confliction and moderate coordination. Meanwhile, because the two primary actors in regional engagement operate off of two separate plans, true synchronization is unlikely to take place.

A second tool directed by the CJCSM to assist with synchronization is called the Theater Engagement Planning Management Information System (TEPMIS). The CJCSM directed that this database system be fielded and operational by 1 October 2001.⁵³ This system catalogs activities planned and executed, and attempts to link them to the JCSP regional objectives. During Phase One of the TEP process, evaluations can be entered into the TEPMIS so all interested parties can monitor the effects of all engagement activities. Since this system applies to both

⁵³ CJCSM 3113.01A, p. A-15.

SOCAP and SOCEUR equally, and because it became available so late in the case study period, I do not include it in the evaluation.

PACOM dealt with the third challenge of measuring effectiveness by subdividing the PROs. PACOM broke the objectives down into supporting tasks which they called engagement requirements. USCINPACINST 3010.7 states,

The country chapters (of the TEP) explicitly provides engagement planners with the desired endstate, mid-term (typically five to eight years) objectives that support the endstate, and shorter-term (typically one to three year) engagement requirements that will support attainment of the objective.⁵⁴

Unfortunately, what is not clearly defined is how to know when these engagement requirements have been met. It is also unclear whether these requirements have ever been explicitly tasked to the executing unit of an engagement activity. If they have not been, then this subdivision of the PROs is just an administrative drill without any benefit.

Foreign countries often make the task of measuring engagement effectiveness even more difficult. During exchange training with SOF forces, some countries rotate units in and out of training with US forces. This prevents progression in instruction because the basics must be re-taught to each new unit which rotates into the training. MAJ Ian Rice, a SOCAP Army component assistant operations officer during the time period under study, noted some frustration with this problem. He recalled that with the

⁵⁴ "USCINPACINST 3010.7 U.S. Pacific Command Theater Engagement Plan", PACOM, 27 March 2001, p9.

Thailand forces, the same subject of rifle marksmanship was taught over and over for several years.

With this understanding of SOCPAC's methodology it is time to look at which countries in the region were prioritized by the President. This will allow us to conduct the evaluation of the methodology we just explored and determine its effectiveness.

3. Engagement Priorities

The National Security Strategies from 1997 through 2000 were examined to determine the engagement priorities during the case study years of 1998-2001. Because the NSS was published mid to late each year, each publication tended to affect the following year's engagement plan. For the purposes of this evaluation, identification of priority engagement countries was done by analysis of the NSS documents without influence or input from the theater level documents.

The NSS has been accused of being too broad in focus to provide effective guidance. As mentioned in Chapter II, the NSS is supplemented by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who provide more specific military guidance and objectives in the JSCP and CPG. However, it is still the NSS that is the genesis for the TEP process. Therefore, to truly evaluate how consistent each SOC has been in executing engagement activities that supported national priorities, one must start with the top national document. The following table lists the priority countries identified in the NSSs (1998-2001).

1998	1999	2000	2001
Australia	Australia	Australia	Australia
Brunei	Brunei	China	China
China	Burma	Japan	Japan
Indonesia	China	Philippines	Philippines
Japan	Indonesia	Republic Of Korea	Republic Of Korea
Malaysia	Japan	Singapore	Singapore
Philippines	Laos	Taiwan	Taiwan
Republic Of Korea	Malaysia	Thailand	Thailand
Singapore	Philippines		
Taiwan	Republic Of Korea		
Thailand	Singapore		
Vietnam	Thailand		
	Vietnam		

Table 1. NSS Prioritized Countries 1998-2001 for Pacific Region⁵⁵

This list was derived from the Regional Strategies section of the NSS documents. If the country was mentioned by name for the US to be involved with for mutual security and stabilization or the like, it is listed as a priority country. Furthermore, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was listed as an important regional organization with which the US wanted to maintain close ties with in all four NSSs. However, if a country was not mentioned by name, it was not consider an engagement priority for that year.

4. Analysis of SOCPAC Effectiveness

The first component of effectiveness as discussed in Chapter I is consistency. Consistencies is measured by

⁵⁵ Nation Security Strategy documents from 1997 - 2000.

calculating the number of recorded SOCPAC man-weeks dedicated to the countries identified above in a given year, and then compare that figure to the total number of man-weeks SOCPAC deployed forces abroad in the same year. The result is a percentage that I refer to as the consistency ratio. The report from SOCOM listing the deployment man-weeks during the case study period broke mission-types into three categories: training, exercise, and operational. Since the characteristics that define engagement activities are preplanned, long term, multilateral, and focused on regional US interests; operational deployment data was not evaluated. This focused the results of this evaluation on activities that best met the criteria for engagement activities. Below is a table depicting the results.

Year	Consistency of Training and Exercises
1998	%82.8613326
1999	%69.33853996
2000	%74.38825449
2001	%79.37199383

Table 2. SOCPAC Consistency Ratios⁵⁶

The average consistency ratio is %76.5. Although this is a less than perfect ratio, SOCPAC has managed to keep the majority of its engagement activities well focused. If the operational data was included SOCPAC's average would have dropped down to %61.07. The negative effect of operational deployment data highlights the fact that, in many cases, operational deployments are not characteristic of good engagement activities. This is most true when they

⁵⁶ USSCOM Deployment Data, 1998-2001.

are last minute emergent operations or responses to a crisis. Yet operational deployments take precedence, especially during a crisis, over training and exercises. When such a crisis occurs it forces the cancellation of planned engagement activities. Therefore, with an ever increasing operational demand, and thus, less available resources for engagement activities, the consistency ratio of the limited activities must improve.

The second aspect of the evaluation of engagement effectiveness is the qualitative gains achieved from the executed activities. According to USASOC regulations, the only substantive requirement placed on SOF elements to add to the national security following a deployment is the completion of a Special Operations Debriefing and Retrieval System (SODARS) report. Therefore, the following is a discussion on the only tangible item that can be measured for this portion of the evaluation. As will be discussed later in the thesis, this is part of the problem in obtaining desired results from engagement activities. If no directed tasks are given for accomplishment during a deployment nothing of substance can be expected.

The SODARS is supposed to capture important information about the area of operations where the mission was conducted and about the foreign nationals that were involved. These reports are archived by the US Special Operation Command and indexed both physically as well as electronically on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPER net). This report could be an extremely valuable resource. However, it is a passive document, written matter of fact, and it covers only the activities

of the deployment. No taskings for specific information collection are given and no thought given to how to develop an intelligence picture of that region based on the mission. Since the greater military community cannot request certain information be acquired during a mission and reported in the SODARS, there are no interested consumers in the reports. According to the SIPER net web site, which counts the number of visits to that site, since April of 2000 only 49 people have visited and or requested SODARS reports on the Pacific Command countries.

In summary, PACOM/SOCPAC's TEP process addresses the unity of effort and synchronization well, as demonstrated by SOCPAC's consistency ratio. However, PACOM/SOCPAC failed to truly establish an effective way of tasking or measuring aggregate gains produced during engagement activities. The subdivision of the PROs down to engagement requirements never translated into specific tasks issued to units for accomplishment. SOCPAC also never required any additional output from redeploying SOF units beyond the SODARS debriefing report. Therefore, we can conclude that engagement missions were being executed more for their own sake than to contribute toward some long-term US regional objective, thus defying their ultimate intent.

B. SOCEUR CASE STUDY

1. Area Orientation

EUCOM / SOCEUR's AOR covers more than 21 million square miles and includes 93 countries and territories, extending from Norway through South Africa. This AOR includes the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, most of Europe,

parts of the Middle East and most of Africa.⁵⁷ Whereas size and bilateral relationships were particular challenges for PACOM, EUCOM describes their challenges as diversity, conflict and change.⁵⁸

Located in Vaihingen, Germany, SOCEUR's mission is to assume OPCON of all assigned or apportioned SOF in theater, and provides the capability of standing up and deploying a Joint Task Force headquarters (JTF) or a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) headquarters.⁵⁹ SOCEUR has assigned to it the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), located at Panzer Kaserne, Germany; Naval Special Warfare Unit Two also located at Panzer Kaserne, Germany; Naval Special Warfare Unit Ten, located at Rota, Spain; and the Air Force 352d Special Operations Group, located at RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom.⁶⁰ However, as with the case of SOCPAC, SOCEUR is apportioned in the JSCP the 3rd SFG(-) at FT Bragg, NC and the remainder of the 10th SFG at FT Carson, CO.

It is interesting to note that the EUCOM theater has a large geographical overlap with the Central Command's (CENTCOM) Areas of Interest (AOI). EUCOM's AOR straddles CENTCOM's in several unstable areas. The border areas of Turkey and Iraq or Libya and Egypt are examples of unstable areas that are split between the two theater commands. Both

⁵⁷ European Commands Public Website, Area of Responsibility, retrieved from <http://www.eucom.mil/AOR/index.htm> on 2 Mar 03.

⁵⁸ European Commands Public Website, Headquarters Command Staff, retrieved from <http://www.eucom.mil/Command/index.htm> on 2 Mar 03.

⁵⁹ Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, Joint Special Operations Forces Institute, January 1998, p2-5.

⁶⁰ European Commands Public Website, Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR), retrieved from <http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECSO/index.htm> on 2 Mar 03.

Theater Commanders obviously have interests in stabilizing the regions between the two unified commands. Common interests and concerns have had an effect on engagement and engagement forces for SOCEUR. 3rd SFG provides an excellent example. 3rd SFG provides personnel support in accordance with the JSCP to both SOCs. However, all three battalions support standing engagement commitments in both theaters. Examples of this dual regional requirement can be seen by the support provided to both Desert Spring rotations in Kuwait and ACRI in Sub-Saharan Africa. The result of such peacetime engagement activities is SOF that are not properly regionally oriented because of the dual focus.

The organization of SOCEUR is the same as SOCPAC, a Joint Staff with a command group and nine functional directorates. What is interesting to note is the location of SOCEUR compared to SOCPAC. SOCEUR is in a separate building situated down the street from its parent command, EUCOM. SOCPAC, on the other hand, is co-located in the same building with PACOM. Although this may seem a minor difference, it most assuredly affects coordination.

2. SOCEUR's Methodology

EUCOM's TEP planning process was established by EUCOM Directive 56-10 "Theater Security Planning System" and published in October of 1996. This directive does the same that PACOM Instruction 3010.7 does, in that it creates a complete planning system to meet the derived TEP requirements. The directive establishes a very top-down flow of policy decisions and tasks. Although the document

claims to create a system that "synchronizes and focuses theater efforts," in actuality the process contradicts its purpose.⁶¹

First, the process subdivides EUCOM into four sub-regions which increases the challenge to synchronize activities across the entire theater. Second, engagement planning is combined with preparedness planning in the same process. Preparedness activities are, "directed at maintaining forces ready for the full spectrum of military operations".⁶² The objectives of both types of activities, engagement and preparedness, are not always mutually supporting. Therefore, the products produced from the combined process must be somewhat less effective in each area. Finally, EUCOM utilizes a similar structure of regional and steering work groups as did PACOM. However, EUCOM holds each working group session only once to accomplish sub-regional planning, assessments, and to review these products prior to final approval. The effect of this limited group interaction will be discussed in the following section that evaluates EUCOM/SOCEUR's handling of the three challenges of engagement planning.

In terms of the first engagement planning challenge - unity of effort - EUCOM like PACOM, provided a commander's intent statement. As with PACOM, the commander's intent was supposed to provide the unifying philosophy for all forces. For SOCPAC the intent has been engagement activities are to support the standing OPLANs through influence and access. For SOCEUR the intent stated in EUCOM's 1998 engagement

⁶¹ EUCOM, "Directive 56-10 USEUCOM Theater Security Planning System," October 1996, p.1.

⁶² Ibid, p.2.

strategy was to "promote stability and thwart aggression".⁶³ This intent statement was too broad to have had any effect. The end result has been the creation of an activity matrix more diffuse among many nations and much less focused. This will soon be demonstrated through an analysis of engagement effectiveness. Second, the structure established in EUCOM directive 56-10 divides the staff's efforts into sub-regional groups and country desks which each produce separate strategies. Synchronization of these strategies takes place during one meeting of the steering group. This, too, seems to have contributed to the reduced effectiveness of the TEPs.

EUCOM tackles the second challenge of synchronizing its efforts by using two systems. The first system is the working group concept discussed above. According to PACOM's policy, their EWGs meet four times over the course of development for each TEP while EUCOM's meets only once. The same is true for the senior group, EUCOM's senior steering group meets only once compared to PACOM's two review sessions. SOCEUR, as with SOCPAC, is represented in both forums. The membership of these two groups is also the same as with PACOM's. Present at the working group sessions are country team representatives, theater component command staff representatives, sub-unified command staff representatives, and representatives of interested government agencies (primarily the State Department). But, just as with PACOM, all decisions and activities agreed to during the planning and steering group sessions are not binding on anyone outside EUCOM's chain of command. Also,

⁶³ EUCOM, "Exercise Program - Annex C to USCINCEUR Theater Campaign Plan 1998-2003" October 1997, p2.

the final authority to execute a mission in a given country rests with the ambassador and not the SOC or Regional Combatant Commander. What could provide additional synchronization would be the use of the MPPs and RPPs as the foundation for the development of the theater strategy. Unfortunately, SOCEUR views the country MPPs and regional RPPs simply as a reference source. So, no connection between the two strategies takes place, and like with SOCPAC, both organizations implement separate plans.

The second tool used by EUCOM and SOCEUR is called the Theater Resource Apportionment Matrix (TRAM). This tool applies values to select attributes, such as regional priorities, counter-terrorism guidance, country strategic factors analysis (in other words a country's ability to affect US objectives regionally), and a country's activity priority. Each country is then scored on the extent to which engagement efforts are positively influencing that country. This scoring system drives the activities schedules for countries whose score needs to be improved.

This same TRAM system not only drives the selection of activities, but it doubles as EUCOM's and SOCEUR's measure of effectiveness. The key to the matrix appears to be the value given to what EUCOM calls the 'country strategic factors'. The category that relates to measuring effectiveness is called the Regional Objective Mapping (ROM) category. It basically rates "how well a country measures against regional objectives."⁶⁴ Unfortunately, the scoring of countries in this category is done subjectively by a staff officer weighing his perception of what the

⁶⁴ EUCOM, "Theater Security Cooperation," briefing, 22 October 1998, slide 11.

status of a given country is against its PROs. Because the objectives are still broad without measurable supporting tasks the evaluation given in the TRAM is, in essence, an opinion. The answer to measuring effectiveness and producing aggregate gains was not achieved.

3. Engagement Priorities

The same methods of analysis employed in the PACOM case study which made use of NSS documents were employed to derive EUCOM's prioritized country lists. Within EUCOM, unlike PACOM, the US is a member of several important multilateral organizations and commitments. Four commitments are mentioned in the NSS documents as important to engage with and support. The four are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Newly Independent States (NIS), the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). However, for this evaluation, only countries named individually for engagement purposes are included in the following table.

1998	1999	2000	2001
BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA	BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA	ALBANIA	ALBANIA
GREECE	BULGARIA	ALGERIA	ALGERIA
Nigeria	DEM. REP OF CONGO	ANGOLA	BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA
POLAND	ESTONIA	BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA	CZECH REPUBLIC
RUSSIA	GREECE	BULGARIA	ESTONIA
SOUTH AFRICA	HUNGARY	CROATIA	GREECE
TURKEY	LATVIA	CZECH REPUBLIC	HUNGARY
UKRAINE	LITHUANIA	ESTONIA	KOSOVO
ZAIRE	MACEDONIA	GREECE	LATVIA
	POLAND	HUNGARY	LITHUANIA
	ROMANIA	KOSOVO	MACEDONIA
	RUSSIA	LATVIA	MONTENEGRO
	SLOVENIA	LITHUANIA	MOROCCO
	TURKEY	MACEDONIA	NIGERIA
	SIERRA LEONE	MOROCCO	POLAND
	UKRAINE	NIGERIA	RUSSIA
	LIBERIA	POLAND	SLOVENIA
	NIGERIA	ROMANIA	TUNISIA
		RUSSIA	TURKEY
		SLOVENIA	UKRAINE
		SOUTH AFRICA	
		TUNISIA	
		TURKEY	
		UKRAINE	

Table 3. Table of NSS Priority Countries for EUCOM/SOCEUR

4. Effectiveness Analysis

When looking at the total number of activities conducted, SOCEUR was deployed far more often than SOCPAC. On average, SOCEUR expended in excess of 27,000 more man-weeks in its theater compared to SOCPAC.⁶⁵ Without looking at any other numbers, one could conclude that more must be

⁶⁵ USSOCOM, Deployment Data, 1998-2001.

better and that SOCEUR has to be considered effective at engagement because its units are in the field more. Also, according to the NSS documents covering the case study period, SOCEUR had a priority country list of eighteen countries on average. SOCPAC's average priority list was ten. The effect of having a larger list should have increased the evaluated consistency ratio; just like shooting at a target, the larger the target is the easier it is to hit. Unfortunately, the larger target set did not help SOCEUR's accuracy in terms of its consistency ratio.

According to the deployment records at USSOCOM the following table reflects SOCEURs consistency ratios for the case study period.

Year	Training and Exercises Only
1998	%6.216505895
1999	%15.26253741
2000	%16.1869944
2001	%19.25170656

Table 4. SOCEUR Consistency Ratios⁶⁶

Obviously, these numbers reflect a less than desirable level of consistency with the national guidance. Some could argue that EUCOM and SOCEUR was forced to spend deployment man-weeks supporting the four multilateral organizations ACRI, NIS, and PfP, and NATO. All four annual NSS documents mention their importance as well. And, if we reanalyze the consistency ratio to include all activities and all countries, including member countries of ACRI, NIS, PfP, and NATO (a total of 49 out of 91 countries) the ratio obviously does jump. In 1998, the total consistency ratio

⁶⁶ Ibid.

jumps from 6.2% to 88.5%. But, the problem with doing this and applying this logic is that considering over half of the countries within a given AOR as a priority obviously destroys any meaning in the word 'priority'. This also contradicts the desired endstate of EUCOMs Directive 56-10 which states that EUCOM's planning process, "focuses theater efforts and makes the best use of limited resources."⁶⁷

As for aggregate gains, SOCEUR stands at about the same level as SOCPAC. Only 71 inquiries were made via the SIPR net for SODARS reports on the missions executed in African countries.⁶⁸ From a business perspective, SODARS potential consumers have let the producers know through their actions that the SODARS are a relatively worthless product. So, even the one tangible output from executed missions is not regarded as valuable or needed.

Meanwhile, measuring the creation of access into countries as an aggregate gain for US interests is murky at best. The goal of creating access through habitual and professional relationships is difficult to gauge. The degree of discernable interactivity and implied mutual respect does not necessarily translate into mutual support. Turkey offers an excellent example. Turkey is a key ally and received a great deal of US engagement support. That served the US well during the Cold War, but in the current stand off with Iraq, Turkey has denied access to basing of ground troops at a most critical time. This then forced a revision of operational plans and stranded the 4th ID on

⁶⁷ EUCOM, "Directive 56-10, USEUCOM Theater Security Planning System," October 1996, p.1.

⁶⁸ SIPR net statistics dated Sep 02.

board ships in the Mediterranean Sea.⁶⁹ At the same time, members of the NIS have provided political support to the US and its efforts against Iraq even in the midst of French condemnation for such support.⁷⁰ These countries only began receiving US engagement support during the case study period. Nevertheless, not only have these small countries withstood French pressure, but as Latvia's Neatkariga Rita Avize responded to President Chirac criticisms, "we do not repay those who have helped us and who continue to help us with ingratitude."⁷¹ Ten Eastern European countries, petitioning to enter the European Union (EU), signed a letter of support for US efforts against Iraq. All ten of these countries that did so regardless of French and German pressure just happened to have been priority engagement countries during the case study period and received significant engagement support. One can only conclude that the results of maintaining or obtaining access through engagement are ambiguous. However, because the *potential* for benefits through access does exist, engagement missions to attempt to gain access should not be ignored.

C. CONCLUSION

Through the comparison of these two cases we gain some insights into the sort of methods that could render engagement more effective. First, both headquarters supplied a commander's vision statement to focus the efforts of the subordinate commands. PACOM's intent statement - that engagement supports regional OPLANS - seems to have provided the right focus. In contrast,

⁶⁹ BBC News, "No Easing of the Turkish Deadlock," 4 March 2003.

⁷⁰ BBC, 'New Europe' backs EU on Iraq, 19 February 2003.

⁷¹ BBC, Chirac sparks 'New Europe' ire, 19 February, 2003.

EUCOM's intent, that engagement should promote stability and help prevent aggression, offers little in the way of specific focus.

The use of working and steering groups is common between the two cases. However, because the consistency ratio is so much higher for SOCPAC we should conclude that one working group and one steering group meeting are not enough to address all issues or to synchronize activities well. The database system, TEMPIS, used by both headquarters may prove useful over time. It does provide a good system for cataloging executed and scheduled activities. It is a useful reference for all agencies involved, including the State Department, to review scheduled activities to ensure they mesh with the national interests in that region. But the fact that neither one of these devices - the meetings or the database system - compel all interested parties to live up to what was agreed upon, creates room for disunity. An example of such disunity can be found in Pakistan in 1998. The Clinton Administration imposed sanctions on military support for Pakistan following nuclear weapons testing while, at the same time, a JCET was still planned and executed there.⁷² Thus, along with maintaining a robust working group system, it seems critical to develop a method for creating interagency ownership of the TEP.

Finally, measuring effectiveness is always a difficult task when the objectives themselves tend to be ambiguous. The TEMPIS database provides an opportunity to enter evaluations, but only as subjective determinations. Also,

⁷² Dana Priest, "US Military Trains Foreign Troops," The Washington Post, 12 July 1998; Page A01.

cataloging staff officer evaluations do not represent the ground truth of how well engagement objectives are being met. In the case of SOCPAC, evaluations were not even being added to some cases. During the research for this thesis I sampled Thailand's evaluations from the PACOM database. No evaluations were found for the year 1999. This, of course, could be due to the fact this system was not required to be operational until 1 October 2001. The TRAM system seems to fit into the same category except additional subjective numerical scores are being applied to measure the engagement process. What appears to be needed is an objective list (PROs), provide by the National Command Authorities, which is measurable or verifiable from the onset. Understanding that this may not be feasible, the Theater Staffs and SOCs then have the responsibility to break down the PROs into assignable and measurable supporting tasks. These identified tasks then must be assigned to individual engagement activities for completion. With such a system in place objective measuring of effectiveness would be achieved.

Chapter IV will build upon the lessons learned from the two cases studies and propose a set of principles for future SOF engagement planners. Africa will be used to test these principles and demonstrate their utility.

IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION

A. SUMMARY OF THE CASE STUDY RESULTS

From the evaluation of the case studies, there are four principles that emerged to develop future TEPs. The first is the use of an intent statement that is relatively specific and capable of unifying all forces and agencies involved in that region's engagement strategy. Second, the system of interagency working and steering groups must remain a part of the planning and synchronization process. However, they must hold multiple sessions throughout the four phases of a plan's development to ensure good synchronization. Third, the TEPMIS database system for cataloging the history of engagement activities should be maintained and can be used as a means to synchronize the administrative process in preparing a TEP. However, it should not just be a system in which staff officer subjective judgments are entered. Staff officer evaluations should be part of such a data base, but supported with qualitative and quantitative information produced through effective engagement.

The fourth principle falls out of the realm of what the SOC and Theater Staffs control. However, it is important for generating effective engagement. The number of countries listed as top priorities for engagement efforts must be kept to a minimum. It is not clear how much input the Regional Commander has in influencing which countries are listed as priorities in the national documents. However, the list should remain small, as was the case with PACOM during the case study period.

Additionally, the list should remain consistent over a long period. PACOM's list remained 86.3 percent consistent from one year to the next.⁷³

From the case studies it is obvious that there are still some shortcomings in meeting all the challenges of the TEP process as well as with developing an effective TEP. The following section discusses possible solution to the remaining issues in TEP development.

B. FILLING THE GAPS IN THE TEP PROCESS

There are three gapping holes in the TEP process and with effective engagement in general. First, to truly achieve unity of effort and synchronization of activities a sense of joint ownership of the engagement plan must be achieved among all agencies involved. Second, to 'shape' the region in accordance with the PROs, objectives must be broken down into assignable supporting tasks that can be objectively measured. Third, the strategy of engagement and its objectives and supporting tasks must change. We must move from a passive strategy expecting results through benevolent military exchanges to an aggressive one, actively preparing future battlefields.

I will examine these shortcomings in reverse sequence addressing what I think is most degrading to effective engagement and to the security of the US. The logic behind the democratic peace hypothesis, which brought engagement policy to its current form, should no longer drive engagement. The present Global War on Terror requires a new and focused response using all instruments of statecraft.

⁷³ This average was computed by determining the percentage of change in priority countries listed in table 1 from a given year to the sequential year and averaging them together.

To wage this new war a new mindset is required. The authors Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of Unrestricted Warfare, profess this new age of warfare and describe how to fight it. This Chinese People's Liberation Army publication was conceived to demonstrate how to fight and win an asymmetrical war against the United States. However, the concept of asymmetrical warfare relates to the war the US wages now against an enemy of a different size, capability, organization, and motivation in our GWOT. According to Liang and Xiangsui, a nation will win "using all means, including armed force or nonarmed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one's interests."⁷⁴ In essence, we must focus all one's national resources on the war effort not only during open hostilities, but more importantly, before the hostilities begin in order to set the conditions for success.

The implication is that engagement can no longer be considered a concept by which we hope to shape an environment by rotating our presence around in a region, conducting training, and setting the example as a professional military. Also, this means that the different branches of government can no longer operate independently of each other, working off different strategies in the same region. Every resource committed abroad for engagement must have a specific purpose and together must contribute to achieving unilateral gains toward our strategic interests. To accomplish these tasks, forces proactively operating

⁷⁴ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, February 1999, p. 7.

abroad must seek to obtain information. We must also carefully position our forces and establish operational support bases.

SOF can play a major role in this new style of engagement as it did during the last decade. SOF has the capability to prepare future battlefields both by collecting information, but also by conducting operational preparation of the battlefield. Collection of information, establishing evasion support networks, or sowing the seeds of support from indigenous organizations for the US is all possible. In other words, SOF should employ the unconventional warfare talents that it was founded on, but doing it during engagement operations. In a statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Holland, Commander of SOCOM, discussed the Operational Preparation of the Battlefield (OPB) and augmentation of global intelligence as the means for deterring future threats.⁷⁵ By acting as an advanced scouting force, SOF, through engagement will have the ability to shape the operational environment. The aim will not be to generate good will and foster international relations alone. Engagement will also lay a foundation that all elements of statecraft can use to secure US interests.

To accomplish this big shift, a change in the way prioritized regional objectives are derived, broken down, and tasked out must occur. This is the second shortcoming in the TEP process that must be fixed. The fact that supporting tasks for engagement PROs are not assigned to deploying units is unconscionable. To operationalize the

⁷⁵ Statement By General Charles R. Holland Commander USSOCOM to Senate Armed Services Committee, March 12, 2002, p22.

new engagement philosophy, every mission tasking order issued to a unit for conducting an engagement activity must include unilateral tasks. These tasks must be designed to generate an expected return of information or the positioning of resources to shape the region to support possible contingencies. In other words, what I am advocating is a two-fold change involving the assessment phase and the Activity Matrix development phases. First, during the assessment phase, not only should regional and country engagement objectives and supporting tasks be identified, but a country-specific PIR list should be created and maintained. Second, during the creation of the matrix of engagement missions the SOC should then develop a collection plan and assign specific PIR to be collected during specific missions.

To bring about joint ownership in the TEP and really synchronize efforts in the theater, the final and complete TEP must be an interagency plan. It must be binding to all US government agencies involved in a given theater. The process already involves all agencies and departments of the government. Yet, upon completion of the collaboration on a TEP, the separate departments of the government return to their offices and function off their own separate strategies. To combat the transnational actors in this GWOT the tools of the military, diplomacy, finances and information must all be focused on the same objectives.

Now, incorporating these principles I present the following modified TEP process. This process takes into

account all seven items and goes a long way towards changing the strategy of engagement from a passive to an active approach.

C. THE PROPOSED TEP PROCESS

By no means does the entire system need to be completely recreated. The following matrix depicts the proposed flow of activities to achieve an effective engagement plan. As you can quickly see, the procedure remains a four phase process conducted through working groups and reviewed by steering groups.

Table 5. Proposed TEP Flow Chart

Phase	Required Input	Actions Conducted	Output
Phase 1.	1. National Security Strategy 2. National Military Strategy 3. DoS Strategic Plan 4. Treasury Strategic Plan 5. National Engagement Plan 6. CPG 7. JSCP 8. Applicable DoS Bureau Performance Plans	Interagency Working Group (IWG) 1. Reviews nat. strategy docs 2. Conducts regional/ country assessments 3. Develops PIR lists for the regional and individual countries	1. Regional/country assessments 2. PIR lists 3. Prioritized country list
Phase 2.	1. Assessments from Phase 1. 2. PIR Lists 3. Regional policy documents 4. Priority country engagement list	IWG#1 continues: 1. Develop supporting task lists for all regional prioritized objectives and assign to appropriate agencies 2. Create interagency strategic concept for region. 3. Develop resource concept Senior Steering Group (SSG) 4. Develop agency specific annexes detailing their portion of the engagement concept 1. Review strategic concept 2. Submit to CJCS for approval	1. Interagency Strategic Concept 2. Supporting tasks list 3. Unifying Engagement Intent issued
Phase 3.	1. Interagency Strategic Concept 2. Supporting Task lists 3. PIR Lists 4. Engagement Intent	IWG #2: 1. Identify engagement activities 2. Resource requirement fully developed 3. Collection Plan mapped to engagement activities matrix and assigned as additional tasks SSG#2 1. Review matrix, resourcing, collection plan 2. Submit complete TEP to CJCS for approval	Complete TEP with list of: 1. concept 2. missions 3. measurable and identifiable supporting tasks 4. PIR lists and collection plan mapped out to missions
Phase 4.	1. Completed TEP	CJCS 1. Review TEP 2. Integrate TEP into Global Family of Plans 3. Global Family Of Plans approved and submitted to USDP	Effective engagement plan producing measurable returns toward national security

Before going through the details of the proposed TEP process, it is important to note a few general conceptual changes. The emphasis of the working groups must change. These groups can no longer be military working groups open to interagency suggestions and information but must become actual interagency working groups. The lead agency should be the military due to the fact they will shoulder executing the majority of the engagement activities. As was suggested earlier, the outcomes and decisions derived from these working and steering groups is to be binding on all agencies involved. In essence, this process should complement the interagency policy coordination committees (PCCs) with an interagency plan to achieve the desired policies.⁷⁶ According to Élan French, head of the African Securities Bureau, the current intent of DoS involvement with the regional commander's theater engagement plans is only to prevent conflicting DoS and DoD activities.⁷⁷ Through true interagency planning, a better goal of actual *synchronized* efforts can be achieved. The process from start to finish would then be integrated among all agencies involved in regional engagement.

I will now review the proposed TEP flow chart and how this implements the effective principles exposed during the case study analysis. During the first phase of the TEP process we employ the first principle of limiting the set of priority countries in which to engage. In this modified TEP process, a review and a consensus is obtained from the

⁷⁶ LTC Kevin Kenny DoS African Security Affairs Bureau personal conversation, 31 March 03.

⁷⁷ Élan French DoS African Security Affairs Bureau personal conversation, 31 March 03.

interagency working group on the list of priority countries during the assessment phase. Next, an effective commander's intent for the engagement plan should be developed and issued to the group to also unify the effort. Finally, in conjunction with assessing each country's status, a list of PIRs should be generated to develop a better understanding of the disposition of each country in relation to US interests. As for the assessment of country-specific progress, the assignment of specific tasks to engagement activities during Phase Three should be of assistance. When a unit performs a specific supporting task for an engagement PRO or collects a certain PIR the progress can be charted and recorded. In essence, assessment must be based on identifiable objectives accomplished along with the more subjective ranking of countries based on a relative measure of a country's abilities to affect US interests. To capture and record this progress, the TEPMIS database system is more than adequate. By recording the accomplishment of specified tasks instead of relying on subjective judgments, the analysis of country progress should be more accurate.

During Phase Two, change must be made to the production of the regional engagement strategy. As already discussed, this strategy must change from a military to an interagency one and from passive to active. There should be additional annexes specific to each agency, including one for the regional military forces. This forces consensus on the long-term strategy for the region, and demonstrates how each important agency is involved. The second important change to this part of the process is the development of supporting unilateral tasks. Part of the difficulty in

producing and measuring aggregate gains begins with the national documents that issue vague objectives that cannot be broken down into supporting tasks and then measured. It is important to change the method by which national strategy documents on engagement are conceived in Washington DC. This, however, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, with the guidance and objectives that are issued to that Interagency Working Group (IWG), the working group must develop specific unilateral supporting tasks that can be assigned and measured during the next cycle of assessment. With the mindset that the US is in a state of war against terrorists, then the tasks derived must reflect that. For SOF, the tasks derived should focus on utilizing their UW and special operations skills to collect information, work with indigenous personnel, and interdict select targets.

Phase Three still focuses on the development of a matrix listing all engagement activities. The development of the Activity Matrix must begin to weave together the activities of all agencies and how the interaction of the different agencies will be mutually beneficial and supporting. Also, the supporting tasks derived in Phase Two are assigned to activities scheduled in the matrix during this phase. Here is when the SOC must apply General Holland's concept of SOF as global scouts, conducting operational and informational preparation of the battlefield. As scouts, the SOC must assign SOF elements sparingly to engagement activities, but when applied they must have specific unilateral objectives. These unconventional unilateral objectives would then be

accomplished in a sensitive manner while meeting the overarching training mission objectives of military-to-military exchanges.

The Fourth Phase of review and approval by the CJCS remains unchanged. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, common sense dictates that if the regional strategy document changed to an interagency strategy document the review process in Washington, DC would have to change as well.

D. APPLIED TO AFRICA

The intent of this portion of the thesis is to apply the modified TEP process to a portion of West Africa. The outcome will be hypothetical, but illustrative. There are three reasons that make this an appropriate and tough test of the revised TEP process. First, the importance of shaping Africa favorable to US security interests has grown tremendously in the light of the staging and movement of transnational terrorists, weapons, and drugs through the continent. Second, the instability in the region, created as a result of the colonial period and continued by the superpowers, presents a difficult challenge for engagement planners. Third, effective US engagement with Africa has the greatest possible return on US investment. The possible outcomes include stability, access to important regions to preempt possible threats, and the opening up of a large market currently not well exploited by the US.

1. Engagement with a Priority Country

This hypothetical test will examine the outcome of our engagement strategy toward Nigeria were we to apply my modified TEP approach. The process would start out with the

IWG reviewing the national and agency-relevant documents. Currently, President Bush's policy toward Africa is comprised of his strategic approach, policy priorities, and bilateral engagement.⁷⁸ His strategy is to work with the key anchor states in each sub-region, which he has identified as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia.⁷⁹ He conveys the same message in his National Security Strategy.⁸⁰ In the 2002 Department of State Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress, the DoS characterizes Nigeria as a fragile democratic state. Recent events in Nigeria support that claim. Nigeria has the largest population and military in Africa. It is a key oil supplier to the US and has a great deal of influence in West Africa. But, the government only recently changed in 1999 from a dictatorship to a popular democracy. Currently, DoS advocates a two-pronged engagement program of professionalization of Nigeria's neglected military and the nurturing of its fledgling democracy through education at the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS).⁸¹ The Department of the Treasury also identifies with the need to assist in Africa. According to the Treasury's Strategic Plan, assisting with economic growth, "is necessary to reduce poverty and

⁷⁸ President Bush's African policy, [<http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/>], 2 April 2003.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ President Bush, National Security Strategy, September 2002, p. 11.

⁸¹ DoS 2002 Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress, section III.

provide opportunity in these nations (and) can further regional stability, and advance democracy and the rule of law".⁸²

Nigeria, like all other African countries, can be divided along tribal, ethnic and religious lines. These differences have created rifts, which are exploited by domestic figures as well as transnational organizations. The primary ethnic groups are the Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, and Hausa there is a long history of differential development within the country.⁸³ One major indication of the fissures present is the adaptation of Sharia Law in some northern Nigerian states causing Christian Nigerians to flee to other states.⁸⁴ Nigeria has a massive crime problem mainly in trafficking drugs to all parts of the world, including the US.⁸⁵ The criminal element launders money and provides a safe haven for the international traffickers it employs. To this day there remain border disputes in the tri-tip area of Nigeria, Niger, Benin, as well as in the Lake Chad Basin.

The outcome of Phase One would most likely lead to some of the following conclusions. First, Nigeria has to be considered a priority engagement country. As was mentioned earlier, I cannot speculate on what assessment could have been made of the previous engagement programs, but I believe the group would note the active interest Nigeria

⁸² Department of the Treasury Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2000-2005, p26.

⁸³ "Art and Life in Africa, Nigeria Information," [<http://www.uiowa.edu/~africart/toc/countries/Nigeria.html>], 3 April 2003.

⁸⁴ BBC, "Country Profile: Nigeria," dated 6 March 2003.

⁸⁵ "2002 CIA World Fact Bookm - Nigeria," [<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>], 3 March 2003.

demonstrated toward working with US forces during Operation Focused Relief (OFR). The interest of Nigeria to conduct bilateral engagement activities suggests a relationship capable of being further developed. In basic terms, the IWG would conclude that Nigeria is an important strategic partner for the US. It is important because of the size of its military, the oil it provides, and the influence it has with its neighbor states. However, it is also important to the US because of strong ties to international criminal elements and thus quite possibly to international terrorists. With this in mind, the IWG could refine the objectives for Nigeria and generate an impressive list of PIR. The highlights of the information requests would focus on criminal drug trafficking and money laundering, government corruption, and Muslim extremists. There is no need to go into the detailed questions that could be asked. It is simply important to understand that PIR would be generated which could be easily observed by SOF "global scouts" or other government assets, and reported following any engagement mission in country.

The strategy that would be developed would be very robust, involving all the instruments of statecraft. The strategy would need to look out over eight years which would align the strategy to the current planning requirements for the Activity Matrix portion of the TEP.⁸⁶ More importantly, the strategy should define the long-term desired endstate of our targeted priority countries. The strategy must address what reasonably can be expected to be accomplished by each agency in those eight years and illustrate how the efforts of one agency will be reinforced

⁸⁶ CJCSM 3113.01A, p. A-6.

or built upon by others. For Nigeria, it can be assumed that the strategy would be comprised of three primary efforts. The first effort would be led by both the Department of Justice and the Department of Treasury. The long term objective would be to raise the capability and professionalism of the national police force and its investigating arm, while developing informants already inside the criminal cartels for future exploitation. The desired endstate would be for Nigerian law enforcement to be capable of and willing to effectively enforcing the national laws and to develop methods to monitor and thwart international criminal and terrorist activity.

The second effort would be led by the Department of State and the objective would be to bolster the newly established democratic government. Concurrently, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would also run a program to determine the extent of Muslim extremist influence in national and regional government, and attempt to isolate it. The defined endstate would be successful and consistent democratic elections and extremist Muslim influences identified and reduced. The information collected on such extremists obviously would get fed back into the PIR collection plan for future exploitation.

The third effort of engagement would be led by the Department of Defense and the objective would be the professionalization of the officer and NCO training cadre. The desired endstate would be a training cadre established that is capable of training and sustaining the Nigerian Military forces. Concurrently, the unilateral objective of DoD engagement would be the targeting of transnational

terrorists, their support networks, basing, and weapons shipments. By targeting I mean locating, identifying, and destroying members and resources of the transnational terrorist networks either through host nation surrogate forces, unilaterally, or a combination of forces.

From the strategy conceived in the Second Phase it is easy to see how specific supporting tasks could be generated to accomplish these engagement objectives. Based on the strategy, objectives, and PIR, the SOC should then participate in the development of the Activities Matrix to schedule missions that effectively employ SOF. The SOC could generate specific information collection tasks to counter the drug and weapons trafficking operations or the hosting of transnational terrorists. Unconventional warfare tasks of developing indigenous networks could be identified to support direct interventions by Host Nation forces, other US government agencies or US SOF elements.

Most importantly, the product of the Third Phase of planning is an Activity Matrix that weaves all agencies efforts in Nigeria together. The list of scheduled activities includes the supporting tasks to be accomplished by each mission assigned. The Fourth Phase of reviewing the completed TEP back in Washington, D.C. should be accomplished through an interagency process. The final approval of the plan should be accomplished by a body that has senior interagency policy decision authority, like the National Security Council. Again, this is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the change in the approval process is logical if the nature of the document has changed.

Finally, it is important to note that the process is cyclical and does not end with the approval of a TEP. One of the seven principles identified as necessary for effective engagement is the employment of multiple sessions of the different interagency working groups. The reason for this is not only to synchronize activities during the creation of a TEP, but it is also to constantly reevaluate the status of the program and measure its progress.

2. Engagement with a Non-priority Country

The country of Mali offers another hypothetical test case for how the US should engage with a non priority country that seeks US support. Because Mali is not one of the countries the President wants to focus on, the challenge is to maintain positive relations with Mali and take advantage of any opportunities to continue the GWOT with minimal resource expenditure.

The review and assessment in Phase One of the planning will highlight the condition of Mali. Mali is one of four countries in the Sahara-Sahel region, and is one of the world's poorest countries. It was part of the French colonial empire. French is still the language of government and business, and France is still Mali's primary trading partner.⁸⁷ The country is predominantly Muslim and is subdivided by 12 dominant tribes with "little sense of national belonging."⁸⁸ A large portion of the population is semi-nomadic and the remainder are agriculturalists in the Niger River delta. These facts would lead the IWG to conclude the democratic government of Mali only has limited

⁸⁷ Charles Stansfield and Chester Zimolzak, Global Perspectives: A World Regional Geography, 1990, p.552.

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 554.

influence and control over many of its people. The outcome from this situation would be to view Mali as a potential support base for Muslim extremists and their transnational terrorist brethren.

The assessment of previous engagement activities without the benefit of this modified TEP process could only be regarded as weak at best. During the crisis period in 1998 in Sierra Leone, Mali volunteered to be a member of the OFR program which was designed to prepare African forces to intervene in the Sierra Leone crisis. This demonstrated Mali's interest in being an active force in stabilizing its region and thwarting extremism. For whatever reason, Mali was not allowed to participate and instead the JCS exercise FLINTLOCK 98 was planned and executed in Mali. The US message to the Malian government must have appeared to have been a judgment that the Malian forces were inadequate or unwanted. This is not the way to get a dominant Muslim country with weak government control to support US security concerns.

Obviously, the PIR list derived to help develop a better understanding of Mali and the factors at play would be extensive. The focus would be the Muslim society and different internal allegiances. Information would be sought on connections to extremists within the different tribes. Because the assets dedicated to engagement with Mali would be limited, great effort would be needed to prioritize the information requirements so the most critical information is obtained first.

The strategy of engagement with Mali, developed in Phase Two, should attempt to minimize committed resources

to Mali while attempting to provide the maximum benefits to both Mali, and most importantly, the US. A great number of Mali's internal challenges stem from how poor the country is. Following the establishment of democracy in 1991, considerable effort has been made to reform the economy. To continue strengthening Mali's economy while building mutual trust and commitment seems best served by economic engagement. This conserves military forces and their OPTEMPO while maintaining access to the country. To compensate for limited military-to-military contacts in Mali, Mali should receive an increase in allocations of IMET student positions. SOF missions should continue on a very limited basis through any of the SOF engagement programs looking for intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

For Mali, the Activity Matrix conceived would be less intricate than Nigeria's but no less important. Because the activities are fewer, those activities must be more productive for both parties. The strategy of helping develop the economy should be capitalized on by all agencies. For SOF, SMEEs could be scheduled to develop Mali's ability to secure critical infrastructure that supports its economy. While deployed on such missions, the unilateral tasks to collect information could take place.

Obviously, the intensity of the Nigerian and Mali programs would be vastly different. However, if they are both effectively executed the benefits for US security interest and the Global War on Terror will be felt across the region. Reports by US officials and other governments continue to point to heavy weapons smuggling in the Sahel

region, and in Nigeria. Understanding the traffic flow across the entire region is necessary if the US really intends to impact them.

In the existing conditions in Africa, effective action to control arms flows and availability requires determined, comprehensive and co-ordinated action at not only the local and national levels but also at the level of the African sub-regions and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).⁸⁹

E. CONCLUSION

What can be concluded from this exercise is that by applying this modified TEP process a more integrated, measurable and effective engagement strategy can be produced. Most importantly, the strategy is shifted from a passive individual effort to an aggressive team effort. The Bush administration seems to agree in spirit with what I am espousing: We cannot engage abroad in an uncoordinated fashion with every nation that is simply willing to consume US currency and resources. I infer this based on President Bush's African policy of creating, "coalitions of the willing... countries with major impact on their neighborhood such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia".⁹⁰ Any plan worth execution must synchronize all agency efforts in order to bear real fruit. The objectives to be obtained must be specified. For SOF, those objectives must relate to tasks issued to them in the task order sending them overseas to do things such as collect information to support unilateral US security interests.

⁸⁹ Editorial, *Small Arms Proliferation and Africa*, *Institute for Security Studies*, accessed on 21 April 2003, from <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Newsletters/OAU/OAUISS1.html>.

⁹⁰ President Bush's Africa Policy, [whitehouse.gov/infocus/Africa], 4 April 2003.

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V. CONCLUSION

A. THE SUSTAINED IMPORTANCE OF ENGAGEMENT

This thesis provides a methodical way to approach what is the most important element of our national security strategy, engagement. No change to the importance of this strategy appears to, or should, be expected in the near future. The Commander of the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Lt. Gen. Hester, concurs, stating that engagement will continue to be the priority for the future.⁹¹ With this in mind, the importance of effective engagement planning has increased, and thus the discoveries of this thesis deserve careful review.

From this thesis the reader should first have a good understanding of what engagement and engagement activities really are. They are, again: pre-planned activities which are multilateral, long-term, and focused on US interests. These characteristics define engagement and necessitate effective planning for obvious reasons. Simply stated, if we are to synchronize multiple activities involving multiple agencies, schedule them far in advance, and coordinate them with foreign governments, an effective plan is required.

Unfortunately, my evaluation of the case studies presented indicates that current engagement planning systems do not generate the effective plan that is needed. There are three primary challenges to engagement planning. These are: unity of effort, synchronization, and generating

⁹¹ Briefing presented by, LT GEN Paul Hester, to SOLIC curriculum, April 23, 2003.

/ evaluating aggregate gains. Without mastering these challenges a coherent strategy is not possible.

The case of creating unity of effort is not just a joint military problem; it is an interagency problem. This is because all four elements of statecraft are involved in engagement. At the heart of this interagency coordination problem are political, ideological, and organizational differences. The DoS and DoD, the two primary engagement actors, seem to be the most ideologically opposed. Currently, with the cessation of open hostilities in Iraq, a public power struggle between the DoS and DoD is underway. This is a struggle over which department should have the lead in US foreign policy, and thereby controls engagement policy.⁹² At the theater level, these differences have devastating results. The results of the interagency problem have led Phil Keorle, of the US Joint Forces Command to describe theater level interagency planning as the "least effective."⁹³ Even worse, at present, the result of the interagency planning efforts for engagement produce only a military plan and not an interagency plan. Government agencies still generate separate engagement strategies.

As one of the three pillars of US military strategy, it is unacceptable to leave engagement as the least effectively planned pillar. This thesis proposes a TEP process that addresses the challenges of theater engagement planning by changing the paradigms on which it was founded.

⁹²Kessler, Glenn, "State-Defense Policy Rivalry Intensifying", Washington Post, April 22, 2003, p1.

⁹³Kearle, Phil, "Improving U.S. Interagency (IA) operational Planning and Coordination", Joint Center for Lessons Learned, June 2002, p27.

First, engagement cannot be preplanned and executed separately by each government agency. Second, engagement cannot be passive. Finally, the decision to commit significant US resources must be made with expected returns from each and every operation. These returns should be programmed to build on one another. The aggregate effect of these accomplishments would then eventually lead to the achievement of long-term regional objectives.

For SOF involved in today's GWOT, this means engaging abroad as global scouts. SOCs should sustain the current type of engagement activities, but assign unilateral tasks to SOF units conducting them. These unilateral tasks are for the operational and informational preparation of the battlefield for the GWOT. With the combination of multilateral engagement activities, and additional unilateral taskings for the GWOT, we maximize SOF's capabilities and the utility of engagement activities. As the supported Unified Command, for the GWOT, maximizing SOCOMs effectiveness is exactly what is needed in light of an increasing OPTEMPO and diminishing resources. Therefore, each SOC has a vested interest in making the TEP process work effectively for both the good of US security, as well as, for the good of SOF.

To accomplish the required paradigm shift and increase overall effectiveness, seven identified principles for TEP planning need to be applied. They are:

- Publish a clear, unifying intent from the Theater Command and communicate it to all supporting organizations.
- Plan with interagency working groups that meet multiple times throughout the TEP cycle.

- Sustain the TEMPIS database to catalog activities and chart results.
- Keep the list of priority countries small and consistent for several years at a time.
- Publish an interagency TEP that is binding on all agencies involved.
- Develop supporting tasks for all PROs that are measurable and actually assigned them to preplanned activities.
- Transition engagement strategy from passive to one that is active.

The proposed TEP process in this thesis strives to incorporate these principles into the existing TEP framework. The reason for this is to take advantage of existing programs in order to minimize disruption.

B. PERCEIVED DANGERS

Shifting away from the established patterns will be difficult and could have negative repercussions on US foreign policy. As alluded to earlier, the power struggle between DoS and DoD challenges basic policy coordination and decisions. To propose that the Theater Engagement Plan evolve from a military product with interagency cooperation, to an actual interagency plan might seem impossible. However, it is no longer acceptable for the DoS and DoD to conduct interagency coordination on a TEP only in order to prevent conflicting actions. The goal must be more ambitious. The objective of the TEP process must be to create an interagency strategy that synergizes efforts and truly shapes the theater to our advantage in the Global War on Terror as well as support US interests beyond the GWOT.

The danger to US foreign policy lies in the discovery by foreign countries that US SOF, while deployed on seemingly innocuous engagement deployments, are also collecting information. Or, these countries may not approve of SOF forces that are present for an exercise being retasked to interdict a target somewhere else in the region. This may give the impression that the host nation was used as a pre-planned staging base for other operations, and the combined exercise was only a ruse. The results, if such impressions are made, could obviously be damaging to international relations and the policy of engagement in general.

I disagree, however, that these fears justify failing to adopt the proposed changes to TEP planning and strategy. First, in regard to collecting information while abroad, an aggressive engagement strategy does not create a new hazard to US foreign relations. Other military-to-military programs currently collect information with forces deployed abroad. One such program is the Defense Attaché program. One of the primary missions of the Defense Attaché program is, "(1) collecting and reporting military and military-political information.⁹⁴" This is stated openly in the public record. The Defense Intelligence Agency is in charge of the DATT program and uses this information along with other intelligence to support the needs of DoD decision makers. Even though this information is common knowledge throughout the world, no ill effects on US foreign relations have been incurred.

⁹⁴ Government Accounting Office Report NSIAD-93-251, 30 September 1993, p27.

It is also no surprise to US officials that allies collect information on American industry and the U.S. military. According to ABC News, "Japan, Israel, France, South Korea and Taiwan are highlighted (in a report to Congress) as some of the most aggressive in attempting to obtain U.S. business information, through lawful and/or illegal means.⁹⁵" Most information sought is of military importance, but alleged conspirators are rarely prosecuted and damage to foreign relations between the US and those countries have, obviously, not suffered. Therefore, thoughtful use of SOF abroad to conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield to fight the GWOT should be no different.

Finally, the retasking of US forces, while abroad in one country, to interdict a target in another is not without precedent. Arguably, the forward-deployed forces of the US military during the Cold War were positioned to respond rapidly across borders to defend US security interests. The concept of maintaining a forward US military presence is to stop problems before they can really start. That is what this thesis proposes for how SOF can operationally prepare battle spaces in the GWOT. There are, also, examples of SOF repositioning abroad while training. SOF forces conducting combined training in the Republic of Congo in March of 1997 were retasked to prepare for the Noncombatant Evacuation (NEO) of American and Canadian

⁹⁵ David Ruppe, "Friends Spying on Friends: Washington Lists Allies Trying to Gather American Commercial Secrets", ABCNEWS.com, 5 March 2001.

citizens from Brazzaville, Congo. The operation never took place, but the rationale for using capable forces already in the region is not new.

C. CURRENT TRENDS

Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has called for a change in engagement strategy. As confirmed by LT Gen Hester, Mr. Rumsfeld has called for a transition of DoD policy, from Theater Engagement to Theater Security Cooperation.⁹⁶ Secretary Rumsfeld has created a new document which will become the parent of future Theater Security Cooperation Plans (Theater Engagement Plans renamed). Entitled simply 'Security Cooperation Guidance,' this DoD document takes steps toward issuing specific regional objectives that are capable of being broken down and measured. Unfortunately, it is solely a DoD initiative and was not constructed as an interagency strategy. According to COL Welsh, of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Strategy, the draft was shown to the State Department after it was completed.⁹⁷ As a consequence, the advantages created by more thorough guidance will be negated by this lack of interagency coordination and synchronization.

For the SOF community, the designation of SOCOM as the supported command to conduct the Global War on Terror has changed the SOF mindset on engagement. The changes that are taking place and their associated activities are classified. However, the intent of those changes can be characterized by Lt. GEN Hester's comment on the new engagement focus. He foresees engagement in general, and

⁹⁶ Briefing presented by, LT GEN Paul Hester, Commander AFSOC, to SOLIC curriculum NPS, April 23, 2003

⁹⁷ Address given to PACOM TSCWG by COL Jim Welsh, 21 January, 2003.

the JCET program in particular as evolving into a “more robust program in light of the GWOT.⁹⁸” This gives us hope that the SOF community will lead the way in creating a more aggressive engagement program.

D. KEY REMAINING QUESTION

In the upcoming decade, Special Operation Forces will likely maintain the current OPTEMPO if not increase it. Developing and sustaining the national militaries in Afghanistan and Iraq will require continual deployments of US SOF. The GWOT will remain a central focus for SOCOM, demanding significant resources. This leaves little manpower available to conduct peacetime engagement even though, as stated earlier, it remains one of the three pillars of our national military strategy. Yet how can we continue with this policy of engagement in light of so many commitments?

One solution may be in the permanent forward deployment of SOF and restructuring overseas basing of US forces. By positioning forces in areas where the US has never before maintained a presence could provide great engagement opportunities. The US could develop new regional partners, and inject US funds into deserving and developing economies, while taking the GWOT to where the enemy lives. The current forward deployed basing is primarily a result of World War II, the Korean War, and the Cold War. There is discussion about the repositioning of forward-deployed basing to the Middle East as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Further research will be needed to determine where new US military outposts might be located to best attain

⁹⁸ Briefing presented by LT GEN Hester, Commander AFSOC, to SOLIC curriculum at NPS, April 23, 2003.

advantages with Geopolitical positioning, supporting strategic military considerations, as well as, enhance our capability to prosecute the GWOT.

The 21st century is full of uncertainty. The stabilizing effect of a bipolar world is gone and regional instability is rampant. The decision to address instability with US engagement abroad is sound. But, for the US to meet commitments abroad, maintain US security, and shape the global environment a good plan is needed. Effective engagement requires that all agencies work together, synchronize their efforts, and aggressively pursue US security interests. This is the only way to prevent current and future threats from reaching our shores.

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APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS

Acronym	Full Title	Sponsoring Organization	Engagement Purpose
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative	DoS	Teach PKO to regional partners
ACSS	African Center for Strategic Studies	EUCOM	Develop cooperative education among nations
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command	SOCOM	
AOI	Area of Interest	DoD	
AOR	Area of Responsibility	DoD	
APCSS	Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies	PACOM	Develop cooperative education among nations
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations		
CD	Counter Drug	DoS	Support and Assist foreign countries combat drug trafficking
CENTCOM	Central Command	DoD	
CJCSM 3113.01A	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01A	JCS	Provides guidance to Theater Staffs on the preparation of TEPs
CPG	Contingency Planning Guidance	SECDEF	Issued by SECDEF issues PROs

Acronym	Full Title	Sponsoring Organization	Engagement Purpose
DoD	Department of Defense		
DoS	Department of State		
EIPC	Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities	DoS	DoS program to provide assistance to foreign defense
EU	European Union		
EUCOM	European Command	DoD	
EUCOM Directive 56-10	Theater Security Planning System	EUCOM	EUCOMs TEP planning process
EWG	Executive Working Group		
FMF	Foreign Military Financing	DoS	
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism	the President	
HDO	Humanitarian De-mining Operations	DoS	
IMET	International Military Education and Training	DoS	
IWG	Interagency Working Group	Thesis	Proposed structure for TEP planning
JCET	Joint, Combined Exchange Training	SOCOM	Primary SOF engagement tool
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff	DoD	
JS	Joint Staff	DoD	
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan	CJCS	Tasks Regional Commanders on preparing TEP

Acronym	Full Title	Sponsoring Organization	Engagement Purpose
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force	DoD	
JTF	Joint Task Force	DoD	
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness	DoD	Way to chart a strategies accomplishments
MPP	Mission Performance Plan	DoS	Produce by each US Embassy to chart country strategy
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization		
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation	DoD	
NIS	Newly Independent States		
NMS	National Military Strategy	CJCS	
NSS	National Security Strategy	the President	President's official guidance on US Security Strategy
OAU	Organization of African Unity		
OFR	Operation Focused Relief	DoD	Crisis response to prepare regional forces to deal with Sierra Leone crisis

Acronym	Full Title	Sponsoring Organization	Engagement Purpose
OPB	Operational Preparation of the Battlefield	DoD	Actions taken to prepare a battle space for future operations
OPLANS	Operational Plans	DoD	
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo	DoD	
PACOM	Pacific Command	DoD	
PCC	Policy Coordination Committee	DoS	
PESSG	Pacific Engagement Synchronization Steering Groups	PACOM	PACOMs Engagement Strategy review group
PfP	Partnership for Peace		
PPBS	Planning and Program Budgeting System	DoD	
PRO	Prioritized Regional Objective	SECDEF	
RPP	Regional Performance Plan	DoS	Regional plan produced by regional bureau desks to implement DoS policy in a particular region
RWG	Regional Working Group	PACOM	
SA	Security Assistance	DoS	DoS program to provide assistance to foreign defense

Acronym	Full Title	Sponsoring Organization	Engagement Purpose
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense	DoD	
SF	Special Forces	SOCOM	
SIPRnet	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network	DoD	
SMEE	Subject Matter Expert Exchanges	DoD	Military-to-military engagement program
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command, Europe	EUCOM	
SOCOM	Special Operations Command	DoD	
SOCPAC	Special Operations Command, Pacific	PACOM	
SODARS	Special Operations Debriefing and Retrieval System	SOCOM	Report completed by SOF following OCONUS deployment
SOF	Special Operations Forces	SOCOM	
SOLIC	Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict	DoD	
SSG	Senior Steering Group	Thesis	Proposed interagency review group for TEP process

Acronym	Full Title	Sponsoring Organization	Engagement Purpose
TEP	Theater Engagement Plans	SECDEF	Actual plan created by each Theater Staff to implement engagement strategy
TEPMIS	Theater Engagement Planning Management Information System	CJCSM 3113.01A	Required database to manage engagement information
TRAM	Theater Resource Apportionment Matrix	EUCOM	Used by EUCOM to assess countries performance in regards to US engagement
USCINCPAC Instruction 3010.7		PACOM	PACOMs TEP process
USDP	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy	DoD	

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