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Military Culture

A Paradigm Shift?

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Foreword

In this study, Lt Col Karen O. Dunivin, USAF, examines social change in American military culture and explores the current struggle between the military's traditional and exclusionary combat, masculine-warrior (CMW) paradigm or belief system and the contradictory evolving model of military culture characterized by egalitarianism and inclusiveness. It is a contest between old thinking and new thinking. The author uses two recent and ongoing cases to illustrate the divergence between paradigm and model: women in combat and homosexuals in the military.

Colonel Dunivin also examines the long-term conflict within US military culture, suggesting that the American military is now, once again, undergoing a cultural paradigm shift—moving away from its traditional CMW beliefs and values of exclusion toward an inclusionary view of soldiering. Assuming that the US military actively seeks to create a paradigm shift for its culture—as evidenced by the evolving model of culture—the author argues the US armed forces must, in the process, reduce their tendencies toward separatism and exclusiveness. She suggests three strategies for implementing a paradigm shift: alter the military's prevailing combat, masculine image and identity which fosters exclusion rather than inclusion; proactively embrace and manage ongoing, major social change; and accept both institutional and individual commitment and responsibility for this paradigm shift. Specifically, paradigm pioneers must foster a culture of inclusion and egalitarianism. Colonel Dunivin also argues that senior US military leaders are the best catalysts to produce a US military paradigm shift—they are the true pioneers who can institutionalize a cultural paradigm embodied by an inclusive whole rather than a paradigm personified by an exclusive few. But senior leadership must act clearly

and decisively and ensure that training, monitoring, and teamwork accompany their decisions.

Colonel Dunivin concludes that if America expects its military to reflect society, it is imperative that the military adopt an inclusionary cultural paradigm.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bruce Smith". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

D. BRUCE SMITH
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About the Author

Lt Col Karen O. Dunivin is a military sociologist whose previous positions include personnel analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, an associate professor at the US Air Force Academy, and a logistics planner at strategic bomber bases. She earned her PhD degree from Northwestern University. Colonel Dunivin is a 1996 graduate of the Air War College.

Military Culture

A Paradigm Shift?

*An old world is collapsing and a new world is arising.
We have better eyes for the collapse than for the rise,
for the old one is the world we know.*

—John Updike

In my 1994 article on military culture, I used the analytical tools of paradigm and model* to review ongoing change and continuity in the American military culture.¹ At the risk of oversimplification, *Military Culture: A Paradigm Shift?* extends my initial work. First, I briefly summarize the previous article. Second, I examine the growing divergence between the military's evolving, inclusionary model of culture and its traditional combat, masculine-warrior (CMW) paradigm from two perspectives: the short-term battle and the long-term war. This paper illustrates the paradigm/model battle with two recent case studies: women in combat and homosexuals in uniform. Third, the discussion of the long-term struggle concerning the CMW paradigm raises this question: Is military culture undergoing a fundamental paradigm shift?

If we assume so, then the recommendation in this paper of the strategies for a successful paradigm shift toward inclusion must be adopted.

In "Military Culture: Change and Continuity," it is observed that the American military continues to undergo fundamental social change, evident by an emerging split between its traditional cultural paradigm and its evolving model.² I explained how paradigms are important because, as fundamental belief systems, they shape the types of models (representations of reality) we create to organize and explain our social world. That article specifically described how the CMW paradigm is the foundation of the US military culture—it influences how the US military

*Paradigm is defined as the underlying collection of broad, often unstated assumptions, beliefs, and attitudes that shape peoples or organizations views. Models are representations, usually by means of simplification or in miniature, of reality.

views soldiering and how it equips and trains its forces.³ Further, it was noted that the military's core activity (i.e., *raison d'être*) is combat—its primary job is to fight and win wars. Soldiering was viewed primarily as a masculine role because combat has generally been defined as men's work.⁴ Consequently, a deeply entrenched cult of masculinity (i.e., masculine norms, values, and lifestyles) pervades US military culture.⁵

However, to survive and thrive in a dynamic world, culture must adapt to changing conditions. Two cultural models, the traditional and the evolving, currently operating in the US military are described in table 1.⁶ The traditional model is characterized by social conservatism, a homogeneous, predominantly male force with masculine values and norms, and exclusionary laws and practices. In former times, the traditional model of military culture complemented the CMW paradigm. Thus military culture was characterized by exclusion—minorities and women were routinely excluded from military service or limited in their participation.⁷ From its gender-segregated worldview, the US military maintained distinct gender roles (i.e., appropriate masculine and feminine behaviors) and restricted women to a limited sphere of military service.⁸ The military also banned homosexuals, rationalizing that homosexuality was incompatible with military service.⁹

Table 1
US Military Culture

<i>Cultural Variable</i>	<i>Traditional Model</i>	<i>Evolving Model</i>
Ethnics/Customs	Conservatism, Moralism	Conservatism, Moralism
Enculturation	Combat, Masculine Warrior	Combat, Masculine Warrior
Laws/Policies	Exclusion	Inclusion
Force Structure	Homogeneity	Heterogeneity
Attitudes	Separatism	Egalitarianism
Majority/Minority Interactions	Hostility	Tolerance

At the other end of the spectrum is an evolving model characterized by social egalitarianism, a socially heteroge-

neous force with diverse values and norms, and inclusionary laws and policies.¹⁰ The 1994 article chronicles this incremental inclusion by describing the integration of blacks into the military after World War II. In 1973 the draft was abolished and the US military had to field a force of volunteer soldiers. Consequently, the military services adopted more inclusionary practices, increasing the number and proportion of minorities and women in uniform. Table 2 highlights this incremental inclusion of others into military service.

Table 2
Incremental Inclusion of Others

1940	Blacks were accepted into training for Army Air Forces.
1942	Navy opened up more career fields (other than steward occupation) to blacks.
1948	President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9981, mandating the integration of blacks in the military.
1948	Congress passed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act, which established a permanent but separate women's corps in the military services.
1951	Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) was established.
1963	Department of Defense (DOD) established civil rights office and directed each military service to develop internal civil rights monitoring systems.
1967	Public Law 90-130 removed the statutory ceiling on the number of military women (2 percent) and grade limitation (one line colonel per each service).
1972	Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) admitted women.
1973	Flight training opened to Army and Navy women; Air Force in 1976.
1974	DOD rescinded its policy which involuntarily separated pregnant servicewomen.
1976	Military service academies admitted women.
1977	Army began coeducational basic training of women and men recruits (the Army returned to separate training in 1982).
1977	Air Force assigned the first women to Titan missile launch control crews.
1978	Public Law 95-485 abolished the Women's Army Corps (WAC), fully integrating women into the Regular Army.
1978	First Navy women reported for sea duty aboard USS <i>Vulcan</i> .

Table 2—continued

1980	DOD issued its first sexual harassment policy statement (in 1981 the SecDef issued a memorandum emphasizing that sexual harassment was unacceptable conduct).
1981	DOD issued a policy that banned homosexuals from military service.
1985	Air Force assigned the first women to Minuteman/Peacekeeper missile launch crews.
1989	Servicewomen participated in Operation Just Cause.
1990–1991	More than 40,000 women participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, many in nontraditional roles. Two women were prisoners of war and five women died due to hostile action.
1993	SecDef directed the military services to open combat aircraft and ships to women. Congress repealed laws prohibiting women from assignment aboard combatant vessels.
1993	SecDef directed implementation of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy allowing discreet homosexuals to serve in the military.
1994	Since SecDef Memo, DOD opened an additional 260,000 positions to women. Today 80 percent (versus 67 percent before SecDef Memo) of military positions are open to women.

While both models of military culture simultaneously operate in today’s US armed forces, the evolving model suggests where the trends of change in military culture are headed. Moreover, it was concluded that the evolving model contradicts the military’s entrenched CMW paradigm; thus we see conflict between cultural continuity (embodied by the CMW paradigm and its traditional model of exclusion) and cultural change (personified by the evolving model of diversity and inclusion).¹¹ The CMW paradigm, however, remains the key to military culture because its assumptions and beliefs shape both models.

The Battle

The present battle is between the military’s emerging evolving model of culture which is out of sync with its underlying CMW paradigm (and complementary traditional model of culture). Two recent cases vividly illustrate this dilemma between the CMW paradigm and the evolving model: women in combat and homosexuals in the military.

These two issues are particularly contentious because both reflect and symbolize ongoing social change that contradicts and undermines the military's traditional CMW paradigm.

Women in Combat

During Operations Desert Shield (1990) and Desert Storm (1991) more than 40,000 US servicewomen served in the Persian Gulf War. Similar to their male colleagues, women performed their military roles professionally and served their country with distinction. Shortly after the war, former secretary of defense Richard B. Cheney made the declaration that "women have made a major contribution to this [war] effort. We could not have won without them."¹²

After the war, both US society and Congress questioned whether American women should perform combat roles. From this public debate evolved the 1991 Defense Authorization Act (or Public Law 102-190) that, among other things, created a presidential commission to "assess the laws and policies restricting the assignment of female servicemembers."¹³ As a compromise between liberal senators (who wanted to repeal exclusionary laws restricting women from flying combat aircraft) and conservative senators (who wanted to continue excluding military women from all combat roles), the commission was formed to study the legal, military, and societal implications of amending the exclusionary laws. Over the next year, the commission conducted an exhaustive study of the complex and emotional issue of duty assignments available to servicewomen, including combat roles. In its 1992 report to the president and Congress, the commission identified 17 relevant issues, made recommendations, and summarized its findings drawn from extensive testimony, reports, and site visits.

Analysis of the commission (both its process and its report) demonstrates the fundamental battle between the military's CMW paradigm and its evolving cultural model.¹⁴ Content analysis of the report indicates that the members, for the most part, came to their commission duties with entrenched values and beliefs (i.e., a dominant paradigm) about the role of women in the military and combat.¹⁵ Often, their values and beliefs were rooted in a fundamen-

tal ideology about the role of women in society, including work and family. Like society's polarization over this issue, there were two dichotomized camps. Typically, traditionalists viewed women in limited societal and military roles, while evolutionists saw women in expanded nontraditional roles, including combat arms.

In turn, the commissioners' prisms shaped their analyses. For example, if traditionalists assumed that women generally were the weaker sex, their conception of military culture was one where servicewomen were rightfully relegated to support roles because their participation (especially in combat) degraded the military's mission readiness and war-fighting capability. In short, they favored a traditional model of military culture (see table 1). Conversely evolutionists, who generally viewed women as an equal sex, constructed a conception of military culture in which they expected women to be full partners of defense. Anything short of total equal opportunity and responsibility, including combat, was considered discrimination.

The commissioners' analyses reflected these contradictory perceptual sets. Drawing from the military's CMW paradigm, traditionalists tended to view women as anomalies who did not fit conventional images of combat or the masculine warrior. Their reality was a military where women were peripheral figures, especially in war. For example, one commissioner, Brig Gen Samuel G. Cockerham, USA, Retired, cited military necessity (i.e., national security, combat readiness, and mission accomplishment) as the primary consideration when deciding an acceptable role of women in the military. He apparently viewed women as detrimental to military necessity when he wrote that "the introduction of female personnel into the direct combat environment . . . is a giant distraction that would reduce the effectiveness of combat units across the board. I believe an all-male combat force is the most effective one, and that the current policy of excluding women from 'closed' positions be retained."¹⁶

Likewise, Ms. Elaine Donnelly espoused very traditional views about women in combat, constantly opposing any changes to existing exclusionary laws and policies. She wrote in her commissioner statement that "the American

military is the finest in the world, and we have an obligation to keep it that way.”¹⁷ Her unstated assumption is that women undermine mission effectiveness.

Ronald D. Ray also reflected the traditional CMW paradigm in his statement, “Battles and wars for thousands of years have involved armies of men. . . . No military in history has willingly chosen to send women as combatants . . . because men are inherently better designed for such savage activity.”¹⁸ Mr. Ray defended his universal male soldier paradigm with biblical scripture. “The military laws of the Old Testament specified the age and gender of combat soldiers: ‘All able-bodied men twenty years old and up were eligible for military service (Numbers 1:2, 3, 18, 29, 45; 26:2, 3).’”¹⁹ Mr. Ray quoted Peter in the Bible (3:7) when he wrote, “Peter, in calling women ‘the weaker vessel,’ does not berate or demean her, but simply acknowledges biology and self-evident reality [sic].”²⁰ Obviously this commissioner, steeped in biblical law and military tradition, fully embraced the military’s CMW paradigm supported by a culture of exclusion.

Finally, the well-respected commissioner, Gen Maxwell R. Thurman, USA, Retired, endorsed the CMW paradigm.²¹ He supported exclusion of women from ground combat for two reasons: increased chance for casualties and increased sexual activity among members of mixed-sex units (citing reported experiences from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm). He also favored exclusion of women from air combat citing women’s risk of capture and subsequent torture as prisoners of war. His statement reflects General Thurman’s paternalistic attitude toward women. Likely, he comes from the traditional school where men protect women at work, home, and in society. Like other conservative commissioners, General Thurman embraced a traditional paradigm (or view) of soldiering which, by definition, excludes women from combat, therefore protecting them.

The selection of the 15 members also reflected a conservative/liberal fissure. As a politicized body, members were chosen primarily for their ideology. For example, Dr. Charles C. Moskos (a renowned military sociologist) was a well-known friend of the more traditional Army ethos, sharing its conservative view of servicewomen’s roles. Other highly

qualified social scientists who were less politically or ideologically biased (at least publicly) were available to serve on the commission; yet they were not chosen. Similarly, President George H. Bush appointed two staunch conservative women. Barton Gellman reported that “when Bush formed the commission, he dropped supporters of women in combat from a list of panelists proposed by Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney and, over Cheney’s objections, added Kate Walsh O’Beirne of the Heritage Foundation and Elaine Donnelly of Phyllis Schlafly’s Eagle Forum, according to sources involved in the selection.”²²

On the other end of the ideological spectrum were more liberal or egalitarian thinkers such as Meredith A. Neizer, a former chairwoman of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS). Another member, Capt Mary M. Finch, USA, probably had experienced some institutional exclusion during her military career as an Army helicopter pilot. Similar to conservative members, these evolutionists likely held strong (but contrary) opinions about appropriate roles for military women.

Given such strong paradigm roots, the commission’s objectivity was suspect—for some commissioners impartiality was not a priority. Certain members came to the commission with entrenched assumptions and ideas (i.e., a paradigm) about the role of women in military, and their analyses and votes reflected prejudicial beliefs and opinions (whether conservative or liberal) rather than objective analysis of relevant issues or information provided.

As a result of this paradigm chasm, some commissioners complained about a lack of objectivity. In his commissioner statement, Brig Gen Thomas Draude, USMC, wrote about his frustration.

I reported to the Commission with an open mind regarding the question of the proper role of women in combat. . . . I took my oath eagerly and listened carefully to the charge of our Chairman: to evaluate objectively the evidence . . . I believe, however, that objectivity was not the goal of every Commissioner. Some arrived with a pre-determined agenda and sought to sway the Commission in their direction. They displayed their bias in their questions, their comments, and their absences during testimony with which they disagreed.²³

Another commissioner, Maj Gen Mary E. Clarke, USA, Retired, expressed frustration as well.

I accepted the appointment . . . because I believed my experiences serving in the United States Army from WWII until 1981 would enable me to assess objectively the proper roles for women in the Armed Forces today. Early on in the deliberations, it became clear that a number of the Commissioners had come with a set agenda and no amount of facts or testimony would change their minds for expanding opportunities for women in the military. This was evident in their questioning techniques . . . absenting themselves when they knew testimony would not support their views, and their insistence upon using equal opportunity as a red herring rather than recognizing women's capabilities and contributions to the military services. . . . Finally, I would comment on those Commissioners, presumably professional adults, who walked out on the rest of the Commission because they were out-voted on their proposal to amend the agenda. . . . I believe this action, on their part, impacts on their credibility, objectivity, and fairness, and gives credence to the belief that their minds were made up from the first.²⁴

The commission reflected society's division over the issue of women in combat. As a politicized decision-making body, the commission's report reflected this ideological clash. For example, the report (excluding appendices) is 121 pages. Section I ("Issues and Recommendations") identified 17 issues and made specific recommendations based on the majority vote of the 15 commissioners. This 41-page section is the heart of the report and reflected the commission's official findings and recommendations. Interestingly, the commission resorted to majority vote rather than consensus for their recommendations—they could not reach consensus because of their divisive paradigms.

The other two sections (Section II, "Alternative Views," and Section III, "Commissioner Statements") reflected dissenting voices by both traditionalists and evolutionists. Section II (38 pages) began with a letter to President Bush from five traditionalists who offered an alternative view of the commissioner's report. The summary emphasized their adamant opposition to women in combat. Their letter to President Bush reflected the CMW paradigm, evident by their concluding remarks. "The Commission learned that assigning women to combat would adversely affect a successful military. . . . Most importantly, it would overturn two centuries of settled law and military policy based on deeply held and commonly shared cultural assumptions defining how men should treat women. . . . The Armed Forces should not assign women to combat."²⁵

Section III (42 pages) presented the commissioners' statements. One statement by seven evolutionists opposed the recommendation to exclude women from combat aircraft. There were similar statements of dissent with regard to excluding women from ground combat (three commissioners) and amphibious vessels and submarines (seven commissioners). The report's first 41 pages provided the commission's relatively short official findings, followed by extensive dissension (80 pages) from both traditionalists and evolutionists. Obviously, there was tremendous ideological disagreement among the politicized commissioners as reflected by a report that presents more dissension than consensus.

Finally, there was the infamous incident where five traditionalists walked out of the final deliberation process.²⁶ In response to persuasive argument for women in air combat, these commissioners staged a walkout in a successful effort to gain control over portions of the commission's final report by demanding that their opposition on women in combat be inserted as part of the final report, subsequently Section II.²⁷ Such public demonstrations indicate an overwhelming (and likely dysfunctional) level of strife among commissioners and the politicized nature of this commission. It also reflects a genuine concern by some commissioners about the impartiality of the commission's findings and report. For example, the chair (Gen Robert T. Herres, USAF, Retired) told the commissioners shortly before their final vote on women in naval combat (and after the commission had voted to bar women from both ground and air combat) that ". . . our report will be ignored if it rejects any change in status quo."²⁸ After final deliberations and voting, the only two active duty commissioners expressed contempt for the traditional majority who, in their view, displayed persistent prejudice throughout the process. Marine general Draude complained that Ms. Donnelly "uses facts the way a drunk uses a lamppost, not for illumination but for support."²⁹

The commission epitomizes the ongoing paradigm/model battle over the issue of women in combat. The commission's membership composition, decision-making process, and final report reflect a deep division between an

evolving model of culture characterized by inclusion and the traditional CMW paradigm characterized by exclusion. This clash of polarized worldviews is why the commission was formed; the issue was further politicized by the commission's actions.

Although the paradigm/model battle over women in combat is contentious, this conflict is relatively benign compared to the embittered controversy over homosexuals in uniform. In fact, some could argue that integration of women into combat has been helped by the debate over gays in uniform.³⁰ Gays represent a new minority whose exclusion (compared to women's exclusion) is more important to military men. Therefore, some military leaders may compromise—allow women in air and naval combat but exclude open gays from military service.

Homosexuals in the Military

The debate over homosexuals in the US military represents the breaking point between the military's dominant CMW paradigm and the evolving model. While American military culture (as expressed by inclusionary laws and policies) has begun to accept women to some degree, there remains adamant opposition to open homosexuals serving in uniform. In its study of homosexuals in the military, RAND concluded that "the prevailing attitudes of both the [military] leadership and many personnel are hostile to any change" (i.e., lifting the ban on gays).³¹

This hostile attitude is not surprising in the context of the military's CMW paradigm. The US military defines itself as a combat, masculine-warrior organization—a characterization that, by definition, excludes members who do not perform combat roles (i.e., many women) or who are not perceived as masculine (gay men). From its CMW paradigm, military culture fosters traditional gender roles (i.e., distinct masculine and feminine roles) and embraces heterosexuality. In her study of Army soldiers, Laura L. Miller concluded that military men "are unwilling to relinquish the assumption of universal heterosexuality that guides their behavior for everyday interaction."³²

Some observers even argue that the military promotes male hyper-heterosexuality especially in its combat arms.³³

M. C. Devilbiss described military aviation as a subculture with a flyboy mythos characterized by the “hard-charging, hard drinking, skirt chasing, arrogant conqueror” where male hyper-heterosexuality is the ideal to emulate.³⁴ As long as the military retains its CMW worldview, it will vehemently resist integrating gays (whom are stereotypically perceived as effeminate homosexual men) because gays are viewed by many as moral anomalies who do not fit the military’s image (or paradigm) of masculine combatants.

Until the Clinton administration, there was little support for gays in the military. The prevailing DOD policy (adopted in 1981) explicitly proclaimed this nonsupport. “Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the military environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military mission.”³⁵ The policy made no distinction between homosexual status (i.e., sexual orientation) and actual sexual conduct. Although a few individual gays legally challenged their dismissal based upon DOD policy, the courts traditionally deferred to the military on personnel matters, even when certain laws and policies were discriminatory.³⁶

While the CMW paradigm remains steadfast, some social change (i.e., the evolving model) has been observed. Public attitudes about homosexuals reflect some level of tolerance, especially in the context of the workplace.³⁷ There is a paradox in public attitudes toward homosexuals. When surveys frame the question of homosexuality as a moral issue, most Americans do not approve nor accept homosexuality, and this trend remains constant. In its literature review on the topic, RAND found that in the last two decades, 70 to 75 percent of the American public consistently respond that homosexuality is wrong.³⁸ There is general disapproval and nonacceptance of homosexuality as an alternative lifestyle.

When framed as a civil rights principle, however, opinions about homosexuality are more tolerant. In recent surveys, approximately 80 percent of the American public believes homosexuals should not be discriminated against in the workplace.³⁹ When asked about gays in military serv-

ice, there is more divided opinions. Recent surveys show 40 to 60 percent of Americans approve of homosexuals serving in the military. One poll shows only 21 percent of polled respondents said that homosexuals "should not be allowed to serve under any conditions."⁴⁰ In response to the statement, "homosexuality is incompatible with military service," 48 percent of the polled American public agree; 49 percent disagree.⁴¹ However, support declines (40–45 percent) when asked if open gays should be allowed to serve. Finally, approximately 57 percent disapprove of ending the ban on gays. RAND concluded that "the American public remains divided on this issue [allowing homosexuals in the military]."⁴²

Although the American public is more ambivalent about gays in the military, service members overwhelmingly oppose lifting the ban on gays. A 1993 survey of military opinion found 74 percent of military respondents disapprove of removing the military ban on homosexuals.⁴³ Not surprising, more men (76 percent) disapprove of lifting the ban than women (55 percent), more combat arms members (80 percent) than support members (64 percent). It is important to note, however, that this disapproval is not universal and is likely a change from former times if comparative survey data were available.

In addition to an evident gradual shift in attitudes, there has been some erosion of legal support for the military's ban on gays. In 1993 a federal appeals court ruled that the armed forces cannot exclude military members solely because of their sexual status.⁴⁴ The US Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., ordered that a former US Naval Academy midshipman be graduated from the academy, commissioned as an officer, and reinstated into military service. "America's hallmark has been to judge people by what they do, and not by who they are . . . a court need not close its eyes to the dictates of the Constitution whenever the military is involved. . . . There is no 'military exception' to the Constitution."⁴⁵ The Clinton administration's subsequent decision not to appeal this judicial decision suggests a retreat of sorts from the new policy.⁴⁶ Perhaps its inaction quietly demonstrates the administration's less-than-enthusiastic support and defense of a policy that

President William J. Clinton pledged to overturn. In another 1993 decision by New York's Supreme Court, military recruiters were banned from the law school at State University of New York and presumably from all public schools and universities in New York.⁴⁷ The court ruled that the military's homosexual ban violates New York's ban on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by any state agency.

Consequently, there is a slight shift toward inclusion of gays in uniform despite the military's relentless opposition. The most obvious change is the current military policy: "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue."⁴⁸ Enacted in 1993, this policy allows discreet (i.e., closet) homosexuals to serve in the military without fear of prosecution and discharge. As a compromise between the conservative military culture and more liberal factions of American society, the military will not ask service members (or applicants) about their sexuality. In turn, gay members cannot proclaim their homosexual status nor engage in homosexual acts (or at least don't get caught) while in the military.

Theoretically the military and discreet, abstinent homosexuals will coexist peacefully. Practically, however, the policy will fail because inclusion of gays contradicts and undermines the military's CMW paradigm. Phrased differently, there is a lag between the evolving model of culture (as expressed by greater inclusionary policies and practices) and the military's dominant paradigm (as expressed by CMW norms, values, and attitudes). Therefore, certain individuals and organizations will work feverishly to undermine the unpopular policy because it contradicts their fundamental CMW paradigm in which homosexuals (especially gay men) do not fit the stereotypic warrior image. Already there is evidence of this circumvention. The final version of the policy (enacted into law on 30 November 1993) reflected Congress's successful codification of a more restrictive policy than envisioned by President Clinton or proposed by Les Aspin, former secretary of defense.⁴⁹ And recently, former congressman Bob Dornan successfully worked to pass legislation that discharges service members who test positive for the HIV virus.⁵⁰

In the case of gays in military service, the CMW paradigm will prevail, at least temporarily (depending on final judicial rulings and legislation). Similar to its long history of resistance to women in combat, the military will continue to vigorously rebuff the integration of gays into its ranks. For example, when President Clinton asked the military to examine the impact of lifting the homosexual ban, two independent study groups were formed. The internal group, led by senior military officers (all men), reported widespread hostility toward gays and recommended no policy change. As noted by Thomas W. Lippman, this group concluded that "all homosexuality is incompatible with military service."⁵¹ This group embraced the status quo (i.e., retention of the outright ban that prohibits all homosexuals from military service). However, since the president's directions precluded the status quo, the panel reluctantly accepted the proposed "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" compromise where sexual orientation is considered a private matter and not grounds for discharge.

In contrast, RAND's 1993 study (a 518-page comprehensive analysis) concluded that most of the concerns regarding gays in uniform were unfounded.⁵² According to this independent (and likely more objective) study, sexual orientation, by itself, was not germane in determining who may serve. RAND reported that the military could integrate gays into military service with little adverse impact on military effectiveness or our nation's defenses. RAND concluded that "such a policy [a successful policy to end discrimination] emphasizes actual homosexual conduct, not behavior presumed because of sexual orientation, and holds all service members to the same standard of professional conduct. It requires tolerance and restraint to foster the good of the group, but implies no endorsement of a 'homosexual lifestyle.'"⁵³

Not surprisingly, the CMW paradigm reigned supreme in this particular battle between traditional paradigm and an alternative model. In his analysis of the new policy, Aspin believed that "you need enthusiastic support in the services in order to implement any kind of complicated social change."⁵⁴ Since the military services adamantly opposed lifting the ban, RAND's study was virtually ignored by de-

fense policy makers. "The RAND report seems to have played no role in the formulation of the policy."⁵⁵ While the *Washington Times* acknowledged that the study was an impressive research effort, it was not the paramount factor in this issue. "The question of open gays serving in the military is simply not going to be resolved on the basis of 'systematic research and analysis.' . . . It is one that must be left . . . to the common sense and experience of those who live, and die, with the exigencies of military service."⁵⁶

Some observers claimed that RAND's study was suppressed when its findings did not support the military's antigay position. "The Defense Department now acknowledges that it covered up a \$1.3 million study that showed gays could be readily absorbed into the armed forces without jeopardizing military effectiveness. . . . The findings [RAND's] were conveniently ignored when they didn't agree with the tradition. . . . Another \$1.3 million in tax money wasted."⁵⁷ RAND's report was not released until the news media persistently asked for the report to compare it to the military's internal report.

Regardless of its future success or failure, the current homosexual conduct policy graphically illustrates the incremental progress of cultural change occurring in US military culture and the ongoing battle between the military's traditional CMW paradigm and its evolving, inclusionary model of culture. Until the military's paradigm and model of culture complement each other, the military will continue to resist social change that it finds repulsive. Simultaneously, social activists will continue to shake the foundation of military culture, chipping away at its exclusionary policies toward homosexuals.

The debates regarding women in combat and gays in uniform are microcosms of society's battle over complex and controversial social change. This battle will continue—social change is inevitable thus problems (e.g., sexism and gay bashing) will persist because the evolving model contradicts and undermines the military's underlying CMW paradigm or belief system. Although military culture has shifted toward greater inclusion of others, many military members still embrace a CMW paradigm and tacitly endorse excluding others who contradict their image of

the combat, masculine warrior. Traditionalists will diligently work to protect their world by resisting cultural change reflected by the evolving model of military culture. Conversely, evolutionists will passionately fight to promote an egalitarian, inclusionary paradigm and instill social change in military culture.

The War

Although the current battle is between the military's CMW paradigm and an evolving cultural model, the long-term war centers around the paradigm. Will the military retain its traditional CMW paradigm or adopt an inclusionary view of soldiering, or will the military be a proactive agent of social change or a reactive guardian of the status quo? The military's paradigm is the key to its cultural future.

Is the military undergoing a cultural paradigm shift? A paradigm shift is a major change in a person's worldview—the way we see the world.⁵⁸ Paradigm shifts occur when some major change causes us to view the world differently. For example, Darwin's theory of evolution forced a paradigm shift in how a majority of academicians view human development, shifting from a paradigm of creationism to evolutionism.⁵⁹ Similarly, dramatic social change can create a paradigm shift as illustrated by the American civil rights movement during the 1960s. From this volatile era, many Americans altered their views of blacks and race relations, adopting a more egalitarian (versus racist) paradigm of civil rights for all citizens.

Culture, however, is far more difficult to change than structures because underlying cultural beliefs and attitudes are more enduring than institutional structures that are reflections of cultural values. The lag between culture and structure is apparent in the US military's process of racial integration. Primarily in response to external pressures (e.g., President Truman's executive order to racially integrate the military, lawsuits, President Clinton's decree on lifting the homosexual ban, and changes in laws), military structure has changed over time, allowing blacks, women, and closet gays to serve in its ranks and perform nontraditional jobs. Yet traditional military culture, epitom-

mized by the CMW paradigm, resists such inclusion, especially for gays in uniform. While attitudes toward women in combat have softened somewhat (at least in some military circles), there remains adamant opposition to gays in uniform.

Regarding the inclusion of women in combat arms, the military's underlying CMW paradigm (and traditional model) defines soldiering as a CMW role. Thus many proponents of a CMW prism assume a universal male model of combatant and filter out women from their prism because women do not conform to their image of a combat, masculine warrior. Of course, some observers argue that traditionalists have a distorted view of soldiering—nostalgically mythical and simplistic given today's complex and diverse military.⁶⁰ Judith H. Stiehm argues that since the warrior role is synonymous with masculinity, the restriction of women from this role becomes a priority for men who view the combat, masculine warrior as a role exclusive to men.⁶¹

In turn, this paradigm can engender prejudice—through a CMW prism some people may view service women as second-class citizens who do not share full responsibilities of soldiering.⁶² As a group, women are judged primarily upon their ascribed status as women. Consequently, people with a CMW paradigm mind-set see women essentially as a gender class, not as warriors, peers, or even as individuals. It is a small leap from myopic cultural assumptions about women as not real warriors to prejudice (e.g., stereotypic attitudes), discrimination (e.g., sexual harassment), and violence against perceived inferiors.⁶³ Consequently, relational clashes (e.g., sexual harassment) will persist. As long as the military (particularly its leaders) narrowly defines soldiering as a CMW role, integrating women will remain problematic because its CMW paradigm (universal male image of warrior) excludes women from its cultural core, especially in combat. Tailhook '91 highlighted this dilemma, as Devilbiss points out. "The Gulf War showed what women could do given the opportunity, while the Tailhook scandal pointed out graphically what the underlying values and attitudes toward women in the military actually were."⁶⁴

Some observers argue that the military's CMW paradigm is archaic because it represents a distorted view of soldiering in today's complex military.⁶⁵ In her address before a military conference, Cynthia Enloe described how the military's myopic focus on hypermasculinity instills a distorted view of masculinity and soldiering.⁶⁶ Such distortions, she argued, can turn off whole groups of well-qualified recruits (both men and women). Instead, she proposed that the military portray the whole experience of soldiering, highlighting the technical and professional aspects of the job, not just the romanticized masculine ideal. A. J. Bacevich similarly observed that "the convergence of profound cultural changes and spectacular technological advances threaten to render obsolete the military's warrior mystique."⁶⁷

From the military's point of view, however, its entrenched CMW paradigm, inculcated over generations, has served the military and nation well, producing superb soldiers who win wars. Drawing from a CMW paradigm, traditionalists stress that the military's core activity remains combat, and the military should not be a laboratory for social experimentation.⁶⁸ Two marines emphasized this point. "The institutional values that once defined a proud force are rapidly being eroded by inroads into its culture by feminist and homosexual-interest groups who view the military as a platform for their politically correct agendas."⁶⁹

Such traditionalists cite combat readiness and unit cohesion as essential to success, and thus resist social change (e.g., integration of women or homosexuals) that may destroy combat effectiveness, degrade cohesion and morale, or create an ill-trained, unprepared hollow force. This military effectiveness argument was the basis of the traditionalists' decisions on the presidential commission.⁷⁰ Traditionalists conclude that both the military and nation will lose if sweeping social change subsequently destroys the military's cohesion, readiness, and ability to fight and win.

Yet views are changing (i.e., a paradigm shift) as illustrated by the evolving model of military culture. Despite the US military's entrenched CMW worldview and resistance to change, incremental inclusion proceeds forward. Recent legislative changes and military policy changes reflect greater inclusion of women and homosexuals. For example,

in a 1993 policy memorandum, former secretary of defense Aspin directed the armed forces to open combat aircraft and additional ships to women.⁷¹ In 1994 he replaced the restrictive 1988 DOD risk rule (which barred women from most combat jobs) with a less restrictive direct ground combat rule.⁷² These two actions, in effect, dismissed the presidential commission's recommendations (i.e., keeping the status quo) and opened up approximately 260,000 additional positions (80 percent of all DOD military positions—99.7 percent of Air Force, 94 percent of Navy, 67 percent of Army, and 62 percent of Marine Corps).⁷³ As Aspin noted in 1994, "Expanding roles for women in the military is right, and it's smart. It allows us to assign the most qualified individual to each military job."⁷⁴ Such sweeping changes reflect a fundamental shift in how military leaders and society view the role of servicewomen.

At the presidential commission, the issue of women in combat was of paramount importance as well. Ms. Jean Appleby Jackson, a former chairwoman of DACOWITS, made an eloquent plea for inclusion when she appeared before the commission shortly before its final deliberations. "As you complete your work . . . I only ask you on behalf of the 362,061 servicewomen worldwide to think in terms of inclusion, rather than exclusion, opportunities rather than limitations and possibilities rather than problems. . . . I hope the Commission's recommendations will be in terms of using our best people, not just our best men. . . . Let them [service-women] be a part of the whole team."⁷⁵

Drawing from a paradigm of inclusion and equality, evolutionists note that the military, as a servant of society, must reflect societal core values or be labeled an anachronism.⁷⁶ Without a paradigm shift, the military runs that risk—divorcing itself from society. In turn, this insular military may lose public confidence, respect, and support (e.g., funding, resources, recruits). Evolutionists advocate an ideology of equality and denounce the military's practice of exclusion. They believe that social change is both mandatory and manageable. For example, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, former assistant secretary of defense Lawrence Korb argued that the inclusion of gays is not that disruptive. "I find no convincing

evidence that changing the current policy would undermine unit cohesion any more than the other social changes that society has asked the armed forces to make over the past 50 years.”⁷⁷ According to Korb, training and strong leadership can minimize any disruption. In its analysis of the military’s homosexual policy, RAND made similar observations.⁷⁸

Like traditionalists, evolutionists also are concerned with military necessity. However, these activists cite military necessity as justification for social change. They contend that when the military excludes whole groups of others (e.g., women and gays), the pool of talent is reduced which undermines military readiness and effectiveness.⁷⁹ As early as 1981, General Clarke, appealed for military effectiveness (via inclusion of more servicewomen) in the Army. “The bottom line for the Army is the mission. Do women really contribute to mission readiness? Anyone who asks that question seriously, man or woman, needs to question his or her assumptions and prejudices, and instead face the facts. It is the quality of women’s service which gives an affirmative answer to the readiness question.”⁸⁰

Until the military and society embrace a mutually shared cultural paradigm—whether CMW, inclusion, or some combination—clashes will persist. External and internal pressures will force the military to adopt some social change; evolutionists will push for inclusion and equality for all service members. In response, the military will resist social change that challenges its core CMW paradigm, the *raison d’être* for its existence. While the military will accept some social change (evident by the recent inclusion of women in air and naval combat), it has drawn a line in the sand over other change (e.g., declared homosexuals in its ranks) and resists that which threatens its core values personified by its CMW paradigm.

Dr. Robert Wood, a renowned national security analyst, cited seven US national security concerns, one of which he called “tribalism.”⁸¹ Tribalism (or ethnic identity/ultranationalism) in a multipolar world with diverse people and ideologies often leads to acts of ethnic cleaning and repression because majority/minority relationships emerge and the powerful majority cannot (or will not) accommodate

change and diversity. Doctor Wood also noted that we all belong to tribes (e.g., familial, religious, political, gender/race) yet these affiliations must be politically insignificant in the United States, else we run the risk of tribalism in America—we must subordinate our tribal affiliations in order to sustain a strong national identity as an American.

The traditional CMW paradigm is a form of tribalism in American military culture. Through tribalism, the entrenched CMW paradigm (and its attendant traditional model of culture) promotes homogeneity, separatism, and exclusion. The military has fought hard to preserve its dominant CMW paradigm, as evidenced by the painfully slow and incremental integration of blacks, women, and homosexuals into its ranks. The CMW paradigm (and associated tribalism) does not accommodate diversity and inclusion which is the direction military culture is headed as evidenced by its evolving model. Consequently, majority/minority (or we/they) relationships can flourish, and “ism” (e.g., racism, sexism, gayism) occurs too often.

Strategies for a Paradigm Shift

Social change is the genesis of any paradigm shift—through change, new ideas, beliefs, assumptions, and attitudes evolve (i.e., a paradigm shift).⁸² For example, the 1960s American civil rights movement was the catalyst for dramatic social change (e.g., new laws, relational behaviors, and educational systems). Over time a new paradigm or framework of reality emerged—how American citizens thought of and viewed race relations in the United States. The evolving model of culture reflects fundamental social change in the military and suggests that a paradigm shift is, indeed, under way.

As an institution, the US military is moving toward greater inclusion and diversity in terms of its functions (i.e., roles and missions), its demographic composition of personnel, and its organizational culture (as reflected by the evolving model of military culture). It is unlikely that the US military can retain its traditional CMW paradigm, especially in an American society (and the current Democratic Party administration) which expects inclusion, social

equality, and diversity. It is difficult to reverse the train of social change in our democratic, egalitarian society, including our military institution. If the military retains its CMW paradigm and moves in a cultural direction contrary to that of US society, it may become an isolated counter-culture—an alienated warrior class divorced from the society it serves and defends. Some military oppose such divergence, including former Air Force chief of staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak who said “we simply must not permit today’s debates about . . . social issues to divide us from the society we serve.”⁸³

Recommendations

A paradigm shift begins with the ability to recognize its necessity. Assuming that the American military genuinely *seeks* to replace its CMW paradigm with an inclusionary paradigm (evident by the evolving model characterized by heterogeneity and egalitarianism), how can it proactively implement and facilitate such a paradigm shift? Phrased differently, how can the military lessen its tribalism tendency by adopting an inclusionary paradigm that complements the evolving model emerging in today’s military? The leap from exclusion to inclusion requires not only structural (model) alterations but fundamental cultural (paradigm) change—a monumental struggle, to say the least, for a military that prides itself on tradition. Until the US military and its senior leadership *voluntarily* embrace social diversity, endorse cultural pluralism,⁸⁴ and reduce exclusionary policies and practices, a paradigm shift toward inclusion will not occur. Instead, the evolving cultural model will continue to clash with the CMW, and there will be little institutional or individual commitment to social change.

To implement fundamental social change in American military culture, paradigm pioneers⁸⁵ (people both within and outside the military) must willingly step forward and take significant risks to institute a paradigm shift. As Joel A. Barker notes, successful paradigm pioneers must possess three characteristics: (1) intuition to recognize the big idea, the emerging paradigm; (2) courage to act on their intuition and their unpopular idea; and (3) commitment to see their paradigm shift through to fruition.⁸⁶ It takes time

to institute fundamental social change; therefore, it takes special people (i.e., pioneers) with the intuition, courage, and commitment to effect a paradigm shift in today's military.

To facilitate a paradigm shift, the military must first examine its traditional combat identity and alter its CMW paradigm. Does the exclusive combat identity fully portray today's military workforce where only one in six enlisted members perform combat roles?⁸⁷ As demonstrated by recent military operations including disaster relief (Hurricane Andrew) and humanitarian support (Somalia and Haiti), the military is not merely an instrument of war. The military must adopt an identity that encompasses war fighting, peacekeeping, and humanitarian roles.

There appears to be some paradigm shift from the military's traditional combat identity. In his Bottom-Up Review (presented to the House Armed Services Committee on 30 March 1993), then secretary of defense Aspin noted that Fiscal Year 1994's military budget included \$398 million for anticipated peacekeeping and humanitarian/disaster relief operations. In addition, Aspin listed economic danger as one of the four post-cold-war dangers that the military must plan for in the future, and he added national economic security as an official mission of the military.⁸⁸

Moreover, the Army adopted new doctrinal thinking which, for the first time, included peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief among its military missions.⁸⁹ The former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Colin L. Powell, proclaimed that it is time for the military to diversify and accept peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and domestic improvement as military functions.⁹⁰ President Clinton's 1996 national security strategy listed three goals: (1) to sustain America's security with military force; (2) to bolster America's economic revitalization; and (3) to promote democracy abroad.⁹¹ Interestingly, the last two goals addressed economic and political elements of national security. National security now encompasses more than the traditional framework of national security (i.e., combat). All of these actions suggest a paradigm shift from the conventional combat identity to a broader view of military service that encompasses both combat and noncombat missions and roles. The traditional view of the

military's exclusive combat identity may be obsolete. Consequently, the military must adopt a paradigm that transcends the conventional war-fighting image and encompasses the myriad military functions including peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and drug interdiction operations.

In addition, the military must alter its prevailing view of warrior as a male-only masculine vocation. In the emerging pluralistic, egalitarian military, combat includes soldiers (e.g., gays and women) who do not fit the traditional image of masculine warrior. Their very existence and successes challenge the military's narrow image of warrior. Therefore, the military must define a professional warrior as one whose role extends beyond conventional combat arms and whose ability transcends one's sex or sexual orientation.

There appears to be some shift from the military's traditional masculine-warrior identity as well. For example, in the wake of Tailhook '91, former chief of naval operations Adm Frank Kelso acknowledged that "Tailhook brought to light the fact that we [Navy] had an institutional problem in how we treated women. . . . In that regard, it was a watershed event that has brought about cultural changes."⁹² Shortly after his statement, Admiral Kelso opened more combat roles to women. Such statements and actions indicate a change in the Navy (or at least in Admiral Kelso), shifting from an exclusionary masculine-warrior paradigm to a more inclusionary, egalitarian paradigm of warrior.

The Air Force chief of staff seems to be distancing himself from the old paradigm of a male-only, masculine-warrior identity. In one of his first speeches as the new chief, Gen Ronald R. Fogleman described the Air Force as a mosaic of civilians, guardsmen, reservists, active-duty airmen, and their families.⁹³ He then described how all personnel, regardless of occupation (e.g., combat arms or support) or social identification (e.g., religious, ethnic, sexual, or racial identity), are members of an inclusive total team of the Air Force. He concluded that the Air Force will not tolerate harassment (zero tolerance policy) because it is the right thing to do, it is the law of the land, but most importantly, "we cannot expect people to achieve their maximum potential in an environment where harassment

or prejudice exists.”⁹⁴ Obviously, General Fogleman is creating a climate of inclusion that transcends the traditional CMW paradigm.

As noted previously, social change is the genesis of paradigm shifts, and the incidents described above reflect some level of commitment to change. Furthermore, there is historical precedence for implementing major social change (both policies and practices) which produced a paradigm shift in the American military. Perhaps most notable was President Truman’s 1948 executive order which mandated the end of segregation by requiring “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.”⁹⁵ Interestingly, this unpopular social change was implemented with little public consensus or military support. The catalyst of such drastic social change was civilian leadership—initiative and oversight by civilian leaders were necessary to implement unpopular change (similar to today’s changing policies regarding homosexuals in uniform or women in combat). Yet this event showed the military’s ability, as an institution, to adapt to social change, and ultimately to adopt a paradigm shift regarding race relations in the profession of arms.

Such historical precedence provides insight into implementing major social change and a paradigm shift in today’s US military.⁹⁶ Generally, dramatic social change and a paradigm shift in the American military will be most successful when the following list of recommendations, which are prescriptive in nature, are considered.⁹⁷

- Senior leaders (military and civilian) are active agents of social change. Without their direct involvement and commitment, successful implementation of social change (especially that which is unpopular) is unlikely. And without fundamental social change, there can be no paradigm shift. They must assume the role of paradigm pioneers. The message of change (e.g., personnel drawdown, women in combat, homosexuals in uniform, or zero-tolerance harassment policy) is unambiguous, consistently delivered, and uniformly enforced. There can be no doubt about new policies and acceptable practices and behaviors. For example,

zero tolerance of racial or sexual harassment must be clearly conveyed and consistently enforced.

- The proposed change (via policy and practice) is implemented quickly and decisively. Incremental change (e.g., women in combat) reflects unresolved conflictual views and opinions about the change, thus reducing the chances for successful change. Once the nation or military (as a servant of society) is committed to change, leaders must act swiftly to implement such change.
- Training is conducted to teach and sensitize people about changing policies and attendant practices. Training should emphasize changes in expected behaviors rather than entrenched attitudes and values, so to reduce the emotionalism associated with unpopular change. In addition, training must be initially focused on the leaders who must implement and enforce the new policies and practices. While leaders cannot change attitudes and values, they can control behaviors and actions.
- Civilian oversight monitors implementation of policies and practices. Without strong civilian oversight, resistant military leadership can undermine social change. The recent policy change regarding homosexuals in uniform illustrate the need for civilian oversight for implementing unpopular policies and practices.
- Team spirit is fostered thus enhancing unit cohesion, inclusion, and a sense of responsibility and accountability. A focus on inclusion (i.e., an integrative, whole team) rather than on exclusion (i.e., in- and out-groups) reduces majority/minority dynamics and tribalism. Additionally, focusing on task cohesion and commonalties (versus social cohesion and differences) will reduce divisiveness along social lines.

Institutional Action

Monolithic organizations resist social change. In particular, the military is averse to social change (i.e., change in its traditions, customs, and culture).⁹⁸ Moreover, externally imposed social change (e.g., homosexual conduct policy) further challenges the military's acceptance of an inclu-

sionary paradigm that many may view as detrimental and/or unnecessary. In fact, some characterize such change as social experimentation rather than military necessity. Columnist Ross Mackenzie wrote, “Driven by sexual politics, the military appears less directed toward combat readiness and mission accomplishment and more toward becoming a sociological lab for redressing of perceived gender differences.”⁹⁹ Given such hostility toward social change, successful implementation of a cultural paradigm shift rests simultaneously with the military institution and its members. To meet the challenge of ongoing social change, military members both collectively and individually must embrace a paradigm that complements the social world of the future, not the nostalgic culture of the past.

Successful adoption of an inclusionary military paradigm lies with the institution and its leadership. Senior military and civilian leadership must assume a proactive role, continually removing structural barriers that segregate its members. Table 2 highlights structural changes toward an inclusionary military that have occurred in the last 50 years. The institution, via its senior military and civilian leaders, must continue to institute policies that promote inclusion rather than exclusion. Recent policy changes that opened up combat arms opportunities to women reflect such structural change at the institutional level. However, structural change is only one element to fundamental social change and a paradigm shift.

The military as an institution (via its leadership) must also enhance a social climate where team spirit flourishes and cultural barriers diminish. Senior leaders are key to lasting cultural changes so that Tailhook incidents are truly relics of the past CMW world. The services’ recent zero tolerance policy on harassment is a step in the right direction in cultivating a healthier work climate for all its members, including women, blacks, and homosexuals. Leaders’ enforcement of such policies (e.g., punishing members who display sexist and racist behaviors) also will signal strong institutional commitment to a culture of inclusion rather than exclusion. Leaders must let their behaviors speak for the institution—don’t say one thing (i.e.,

lip service to a policy) but do another action (e.g., tolerate “ism” attitudes or behaviors).

The military as an institution of US society is the primary architect and agent of social change in the military and its leaders are key to successful adaptation of an inclusionary paradigm. Many leaders are beginning to recognize the need for social change, a new cultural paradigm. They recognize that social change is inevitable and the military must adjust its own paradigm to reflect changing times. They accept the fact that it is not whether the military will accommodate inclusion and diversity, but rather a matter of when it will accept social change and alter its cultural paradigm. Senior leadership's strong advocacy and unequivocal actions are crucial to this paradigm shift. Equally important are individual actions.

Individual Action

Each service member must also embrace social change and a paradigm shift. Each person must accept military policies (whether they agree with them or not) and be held accountable and responsible for his or her actions, including violations of policies and rules. Education and training of new policies must be conducted so individuals understand the policies and consequences of their actions. Training is essential to individual acceptance of social change (e.g., unpopular homosexual conduct policy). However, the training must emphasize professional conduct (e.g., proper behaviors) rather than empathizing with minorities' positions which one may disagree with—a focus on behaviors versus attitudes is key to successful adaptation to social change. Individuals must also uniformly enforce proper conduct and correct those who transgress. Service members cannot tolerate colleagues who tell racist or sexist jokes. Nor can they tolerate sexual misconduct, whether heterosexual or homosexual conduct. In short, they must police themselves and others so to promote a culture of diversity and inclusion.

Individuals must focus on the task at hand rather than on people and their differences. In military work, service members must emphasize professional conduct rather than ascribed, arbitrary attitudes and standards (e.g., sex,

race, sexual orientation, military rank, or combat arms status). By imposing arbitrary standards of conduct (e.g., “flying is man’s work”), one discriminates against others and whole groups of people are dismissed based on class status (e.g., sex) rather than on performance. In particular, service members must desexualize the professions of arms—focus on members’ performance and contributions rather than on their sex or sexual orientation so to control inherent biases and prejudices in the workplace.

In 1995, Air Force chief of staff General Fogleman outlined three core values of all airmen: integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do.¹⁰⁰ If service members approach their work with these values in mind, many interaction problems associated with the CMW paradigm will diminish. If we act with integrity, we are less likely to discriminate against and exclude others and more likely to act in a professional manner. If we place service before self, we will focus on work and professional conduct rather than on arbitrary differences that do not matter in the workplace. And if we strive in excellence in all we do, we will build task cohesion and team spirit (i.e., inclusion) because we are all working toward a shared goal. Over time, a paradigm of inclusion will evolve to replace the exclusionary CMW paradigm.

As a servant of American society, the military (and its members) must reflect changing societal norms and values. “Commanders are under pressure to bring the military into line with the emerging norms of civilian culture . . . Americans both inside and out of the services don’t expect the military to be a model of democratic freedom. But at the same time they are uncomfortable with a warrior class that drifts too far from the civilian mainstream.”¹⁰¹

If America expects its military to reflect society, it is imperative that the military adopt an inclusionary paradigm of culture. The success or failure of a paradigm shift rests with the military. Together its leaders and members are the catalysts for permanent social change—they are the paradigm pioneers who can institutionalize a cultural paradigm characterized by an inclusive whole rather than a paradigm personified by an exclusive few.

Summary

As expressed in the introductory quote by John Updike, military culture is at the crossroads of two worlds—the old (exclusion) and the new (inclusion). Historically, the military has been comfortable with the old world with its CMW paradigm and complementary traditional model of culture that excluded others. But this old world is collapsing in the rapid flurry of social change. In response to growing egalitarian societal attitudes and increasing social pressures, the military is reducing its exclusionary personnel policies and practices. In its place, a new world is arising—greater integration of others, including women in combat and homosexuals in uniform.

This transformation process has encountered many obstacles, both past and present, evident by the ongoing paradigm/model battle. This battle reflects the value clash between conservatives and liberals in both American society and its military. Traditionalists view the military from one prism (CMW paradigm) to construct reality, while evolutionists see the military from another prism (egalitarian paradigm) to construct their reality. This battle will continue indefinitely because the evolving military culture of inclusion contradicts and undermines the military's fundamental CMW paradigm or belief system.

As demonstrated by the two current social battles (women in combat and homosexuals in uniform), the military is still tinkering at the margins rather than implementing fundamental social change that it disapproves. Throughout this century, the military has resisted integrating women by severely limiting their numbers, restricting their military roles, condoning prejudice and discrimination, and now delaying implementing policy that increases their participation in combat arms. While the military boasts of equal opportunity and treatment for all members, actions suggest otherwise. During the last decade, the military has fought equally hard to exclude gays—spending millions of tax dollars kicking out homosexuals and fighting a legal war to maintain its ban on gays. Why does the military work so hard to preserve the old world of exclusion and rebuff the new world of inclusion? The answer lies in its paradigm.

The real war of military culture centers around its future paradigm. Given that social change is inevitable but often-times unpopular, will the military work feverishly to preserve its CMW paradigm (and continue to promote a culture of exclusion); or will it reform its identity and adopt a more egalitarian paradigm (thus embrace a culture of inclusion)? Without a paradigm shift, lasting and permanent social change in military culture is doomed because tribalism and exclusion will continue to flourish.

Assuming that the military seeks a paradigm shift for its culture, it must reduce its tribalism tendencies and adopt an inclusionary paradigm that complements its evolving cultural model (see table 1). The key to implementing such fundamental social change rests with paradigm pioneers who demonstrate the required intuition, courage, and commitment to effect a lasting culture of inclusion. Specific strategies to facilitate this paradigm shift include: (1) alter the military's prevailing combat, masculine image and identity which fosters exclusion rather than inclusion; (2) proactively embrace and manage ongoing, major social change; and (3) accept both institutional and individual commitment and responsibility for this paradigm shift. These strategies (and more) will enhance the smoother transition from the old to the new world of military culture.

Notes

1. Karen O. Dunivin, "Military Culture: Change and Continuity," *Armed Forces and Society* 20, no. 4 (Summer 1994): 531-47.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 533-34.

4. See, for example, Martin Binkin and Shirley S. Bach, *Women and the Military* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977); Cynthia Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives* (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1983), 7-15.

5. Judith H. Stiehm, *Bring Me Men and Women* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1981), 65-66; Michael L. Rustad, *Women in Khaki: The American Enlisted Woman* (New York: Praeger, 1982); and Enloe.

6. Dunivin, 535.

7. Prior to President Truman's Executive Order in 1948, black service-men were segregated from whites and performed primarily combat-support jobs.

8. Judith H. Stiehm, *Arms and the Enlisted Woman* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1989), 40.

9. For a comprehensive review of history of military policy regarding homosexuality, see *Sexual Orientation and US Military Personnel Policy: Options and Assessment* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993), chaps. 1 and 11.

10. Dunivin, 537–40.

11. *Ibid.*, 540–43.

12. Quoted in Jeanne Holm, *Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution*, rev. ed. (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1992), 470.

13. *Report to the President, November 15, 1992: The Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), iii.

14. As a servicewoman with a vested interest, I attended the commission proceedings as time permitted. I followed the proceedings through various media sources (both conservative and liberal). I also carefully read the report to understand the commission's process and role in formulating and implementing future policy and law regarding the assignment of women in the military.

15. Silvana Rubino, "When Gender Goes to Combat" (paper presented at the 1993 Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminary on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, Md., October 1993).

16. *Report to the President*, 100.

17. *Ibid.*, 103.

18. *Ibid.*, 114.

19. *Ibid.*, 116.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*, 117–19.

22. Barton Gellman, "Panel Asks Women Held from Combat," *Washington Post*, 4 November 1993, 3.

23. *Report to the President*, 104.

24. *Ibid.*, 98–99.

25. *Ibid.*, 48.

26. Rowan Scarborough, "US Panel Says No to Women in Combat," *Washington Times*, 4 November 1992, 1.

27. Gellman, 3.

28. Quoted in *ibid.* General Herres was correct in his assessment. One year after the presidential commission report, the secretary of defense directed the military services to open both combat aircraft and ships to women, and Congress repealed laws that barred women aboard combatant vessels.

29. Quoted in Gellman, 3.

30. M. C. Devilbiss, "The Tailhook Debacle: Sex Discrimination and Military Values" (paper presented at the 1993 Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, Md., October 1993), 32.

31. *Sexual Orientation*, 3.

32. Laura L. Miller, "Fighting for a Just Cause: Soldiers' Views on Gays in the Military" (paper presented at the 1993 Biennial Conference Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, Md., October 1993), 1.

33. Stiehm, *Arms and the Enlisted Woman*; Cynthia Enloe, "Women, Men and Soldiering after the Cold War" (paper presented at the Military Conference at the US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., September 1993).

34. Devilbiss, 37.

35. Quoted in *Sexual Orientation*, 338.

36. For a comprehensive review of military laws and policies regarding homosexuals in uniform, see *Sexual Orientation*, chaps. 1 and 11.

37. For a summary of recent public attitudes toward homosexuals, including those in the military, see *Sexual Orientation*, chaps. 1, 6, and appendix F.

38. *Sexual Orientation*, appendix F.

39. Ibid.

40. *Wall Street Journal* survey, cited in *Sexual Orientation*, table F-27.

41. Cited in *Sexual Orientation*, 203.

42. *Sexual Orientation*, 24.

43. *Los Angeles Times* survey, cited in *Sexual Orientation*, 210-14.

44. John Lancaster and Michael York, "Court Reinstates Gay Midshipman," *Washington Post*, 17 November 1993, A-7.

45. Quoted in *ibid.*

46. John Lancaster, "Administration Decision Not to Defend Homosexual Ban Is a Retreat of Sorts," *Washington Post*, 31 December 1993, 12.

47. Kevin Sack, "Ruling Bans Recruiters of Military from SUNY," *New York Times*, 19 November 1993, 1.

48. Les Aspin, "Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces," *SecDef Policy Memorandum*, 19 July 1993.

49. Beatrice Dohrn, "No More Exclusions," *Washington Post*, 29 November 1993, 19.

50. See, for example, Dana Priest, "Army Sergeant with HIV Feels Deserted by Policy," *Washington Post*, 1 February 1996, 3; Rowan Scarborough, "HIV-Positive Troops Lose Special Treatment," *Washington Times*, 5 March 1996, 3. Interestingly, the military services do not support the legislation. For example, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen John M. Shalikashvili, denounced the legislation as unfair and wasteful ("Military AIDS Concerns," *USA Today*, 6 March 1996, 2).

51. Thomas W. Lippman, "Pentagon's Studies on Gays Conflict," *Washington Post*, 27 August 1993, 10.

52. *Sexual Orientation*.

53. *Ibid.*, xxiv.

54. Quoted in John Lancaster, "Final Rules on Gays Set," *Washington Post*, 23 December 1993, 10.

55. *Washington Times*, "Rand's \$1.3 Million Question," 30 August 1993, E-2.

56. *Ibid.*

57. *Syracuse Post Standard*, "Missing Evidence," 28 August 1993, 6.

58. For an interesting discussion of the concepts of paradigm and paradigm shift in contemporary America, see Stephen R. Covey, *The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 23-32.

59. William C. Levin, *Sociological Ideas* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1991), 26–31.

60. Cynthia Enloe, “Women, Men and Soldiering after the Cold War” (paper presented at a military conference titled “A Military of Volunteers: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., September 1993).

61. Stiehm, *Arms and the Enlisted Woman*.

62. Devilbiss.

63. *Ibid.*, 42.

64. *Ibid.*, 41–42.

65. *Ibid.*

66. Enloe, “Women, Men and Soldiering.”

67. A. J. Bacevich, “Clinton’s Military Problem—And Ours,” *National Review*, 13 December 1993, 36.

68. Jim Wooten, “Don’t Make Military a Laboratory,” *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 11 April 1993, G-5.

69. Quoted in Susanne Fields, “When the Uniform Is Not Cut to Fit,” *Washington Times*, 8 April 1993, G-1.

70. See Section II of *Report to the President*.

71. Les Aspin, “Policy on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces,” *SecDef Policy Memorandum*, 28 April 1993.

72. Les Aspin, “Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule,” *SecDef Policy Memorandum*, 13 January 1994.

73. “Assignment of Women in the Military” (briefing viewgraphs), Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 3 August 1994.

74. “Secretary of Defense Aspin Expects to Open New Opportunities for Women with New Direct Ground Combat Rule,” news release (Washington, D.C.: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, 13 January 1994).

75. Jean Appleby Jackson, “Statement before the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces,” 10 September 1992), 11–12.

76. Lawrence Korb, “New Roles and Missions for Military Personnel” (paper presented at a military conference titled “A Military of Volunteers: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., September 1993).

77. Quoted in Eric Schmitt, “Calm Analysis Dominates Panel Hearing on Gay Ban,” *New York Times*, 1 April 1993, 1.

78. *Sexual Orientation*, 385–90.

79. M. C. Devilbiss, *Women and Military Service: A History, Analysis, and Overview of Key Issues* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1990).

80. Quoted in Holm, *Women in the Military*, 402.

81. Dr. Robert Wood, speech on US national security at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1 December 1995.

82. Social change is the avenue for any paradigm shift. Through social change, new models of culture emerge (e.g., the evolving model of military culture), thus cultural practices (i.e., behaviors) start to change. Over time, fundamental paradigms (i.e., assumptions, beliefs, attitudes) begin

to change, reflecting the social change. A simple example is found in the history of racial integration in the US military in this century.

83. Quoted in John Lancaster, "Accused of Ridiculing Clinton, General Faces Air Force Probe," *Washington Post*, 8 June 1993, 1.

84. For the purpose of this analysis, "assimilation" is synonymous with the "Americanization" tradition where minorities adopt the majority group's culture, giving up minority cultural traits and traditions. The problem, though, is that some minorities do not want to be assimilated. In contrast, "pluralism" occurs when diverse cultures coexist peacefully, maintain their unique cultural heritage, tolerate each other's differences, and mutually respect each other, see James W. Vander Zanden, *Sociology: The Core*, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 191.

85. This phrase is borrowed from Joel A. Barker's film, *Paradigm Pioneers* (Burnsville, Minn.: Chart House, 1994).

86. *Ibid.*

87. Janice H. Laurence, "The Military: Purveyor of Fine Skills and Comportment for a Few Good Men" (paper prepared for the National Center on the Educational Quality of the Work Force, University of Pennsylvania, 1993), 3.

88. Les Aspin, "Report on the Bottom-Up Review," *SecDef Report*, October 1993, 11.

89. Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, 14 June 1993; Barton Gellman, "Army's New Doctrine Manual Sees High-Tech, Distant Battles," *Washington Post*, 15 June 1993, 19.

90. William Matthews, Sean D. Naylor, and Jim Tice, "The Clinton Army," *Army Times*, 13 September 1993, 3.

91. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House), February 1996, i.

92. Quoted in John Lancaster, "Tailhook Probe Implicates 140 Officers," *Washington Post*, 24 April 1993, 1.

93. Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, "Air Force Direction: Team within a Team," speech to the Air Force Association Symposium, Los Angeles, Calif., 28 October 1994. Speech was published in *Defense Issues*, vol. 9, no. 85.

94. *Ibid.*, 5.

95. *Sexual Orientation*, 163.

96. For a comprehensive discussion of implementation strategies, see *ibid.*, chap. 12.

97. This list of recommendations is prescriptive in nature and is not an inclusive list by any means. It presents some potential suggestions to reflect over and ponder—Do the suggestions offer tangible ways to shift toward inclusionary thinking? I composed this list from several sources, including *Sexual Orientation*; Miller; George C. Wilson, "A Few Easy Lessons to Prevent New Tailhooks," *Navy Times*, 7 March 1994, 33; and Alma G. Steinberg, Beverly C. Harris, and Jacquelyn Scarville, *Why Promotable Female Officers Leave the Army*, Study Report 93-04 (Alexandria, Va.: US Army Research Institute, 1993).

98. Carl Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

99. Ross Mackenzie, "Sexual Politics Are Harming Combat Readiness," *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, 6 March 1994, F7.

100. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-5, *Command Policy: Quality Air Force*, 1 August 1995, 5.

101. "Shrinking the Military," *Newsweek*, 30 August 1993, 30.