China's New Leadership and a Taiwan Confrontation: Implications for Deterrence
Abstract
Sino-U,S, ties continue to strengthen in an era where the two countries share increasingly common interests in trade and economic development, combating the war on terrorism, and securing stability in East Asia; however, the Taiwan issue remains a primary point of contention, and one that could lead to military conflict, U'S, military strategists are intuitively concerned with how, when, and why this standoff could evolve into confrontation, Furthermore, the U,S defense community also is interested in how the People's Republic of China (PRC) could be deterred from initiating confrontation, as well as escalating a conflict once engaged, This paper focuses on the latter, The analysis assumes that initial deterrence has failed, and that the United States and China are engaged in a confrontation over Taiwan, In any case, this paper focuses on a component that plays a central role in any deterrence equation or escalation framework: what factors inform the Chinese leadership's risk perception and shape its crisis behavior? How does its focus on regime survival inform its decision-making calculus? And particularly in light of the recent ascent of a Fourth Generation of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, would the PRC have the flexibility to deescalate at any point during a confrontation, or would it be willing to run huge risks for fear of dramatic political fallout, including the collapse of the CCP, were it to compromise?
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 2003
- Accession Number
- ADA418474
Entities
People
- Virginia A. Monken
Organizations
- Institute for Defense Analyses