Total Army Analysis 2009 (TAA09) - A Critical Review
Abstract
This report examines critically the process by which the Army establishes the force structure it will use as the basis for its program submission and budget. This report focuses on the Total Army Analysis 2009, which provided the basis for the Program and Budget for FY2003. This is a follow-on effort to an earlier IDA study that focused on TAA03, and part or the project was to determine what the Army had done in response to previous observations. The report is organized into five parts. Part One provided an overview of the TAA process, explains the forces acting on that process, and notes the special features of TAA09. Part Two discusses how the Army established for TAA09 the number and mix of combat units. This discussion explains the allocation of required units among multiple missions and the way that the Army establishes the combat units it believes are required to carry out the strategy. Part Three explains how the Army determined the numbers and mix of combat support and combat service support units needed for the combat units. This part includes a discussion of allocation rules that provide a means to estimate support units based on estimated theater consumption of supplies. Part Four examines the actions taken to reconcile the required list of units with anticipated manpower and funding constraints. Part Five provides observations on the nature and validity of the TAA process as revealed in the report.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 2003
- Accession Number
- ADA418503
Entities
People
- John C. F. Tillson
- John R. Brinkerhoff
- Robert Magruder
Organizations
- Institute for Defense Analyses