Discriminate Use of Force
Abstract
Within a short time there has been markedly greater acceptance of the doctrine of governing military campaigns by discriminate use of force. Until very recently derided by some as an oxymoron, it has now been put forward by the President. As he said in his remarks aboard the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, "With new tactics and precision weapons, we can now achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians." Our concept of DUF strongly aligns with much of the current thinking about effects-based operations (EBO). The coming of age of these concepts is influenced both by opportunity and need. DUF brings new concepts for collaboration and massing of effects, which are joint in character and integrated among joint force echelons and components. It is enabled by new weapons; improved intelligence. surveillance, and reconnaissance; shared situation understanding; improved individual and collaborative training; greater agility; smaller footprints; and other emerging capabilities of the U.S. military that allow more timely and precise use of force than heretofore possible. The need is driven by the nature of current military campaigns. A striking feature of these campaigns is tension among multiple strategic and operational objectives: cause regime change, destroy a terrorist organization, decapitate leadership but preserve infrastructure, don't wage war on a people, hold an international coalition together, etc. This report identifies DUF's critical enablers (beyond new tactics and precision weapons) and some of the challenges to its wide-scale operationalization. An appendix contains reviews of the viewpoints and themes of 13 papers that have contributed to DUF's evolution and relevance.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jul 01, 2003
- Accession Number
- ADA418917
Entities
People
- Joshua Lederberg
- Ted Gold
Organizations
- Defense Science Board