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14. ABSTRACT The United States fights in conflicts as a joint military force. Recent experience in joint operations has demonstrated shortcomings in the Joint Force Commander's ability to optimize and integrate logistics in the planning and execution of those operations. Existing laws, doctrine and regulations that pertain to logistics support at the operational level of war do not identify clear responsibilities to provide the best possible logistical support to Joint Force Commanders during future conflicts. The United States is transforming the form and structure of its military forces as well as the war fighting doctrine and functions that those forces will perform to meet the challenges associated with future threats to the Nation. Now is the time to examine and explore new methods of providing logistics support to future Joint Force Commanders. The Joint Force Commander needs a dedicated and centralized logistics support organization that is capable of immediately performing the full range of logistics command and control functions at the outset of future conflicts. A single logistics entity in the Department of Defense responsible to the Joint Force Commander should					
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Beans, Bullets and Black Oil...Are We Delighting the Joint Force Commander?

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

16 May 2003

Introduction

“As we select our forces and plan our operations...we must understand how logistics can impact on our concepts of operation...Commanders must base all their concepts of operations on what they know they can do logistically.” Lt Gen Alfred Gray, Jr., Marine Corps Gazette, July 1987

The need for outstanding logistics support at the operational level of war during joint and coalition military operations is not new. From World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States has conducted complex and diverse military operations that ranged in the spectrum of conflict from limited to total war, in campaigns involving multiple Services and Allies, each with a requirement for a logistics system that was able to provide effective common support for the duration of the conflict. The planners supporting these operations had to answer this question - how can we provide integrated, efficient and timely logistics support to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to enable the successful outcome of the conflict? While the operations themselves met with varying degrees of success or failure for various reasons, in each case the planners were forced to devise and implement an ad hoc logistics system in order to provide integrated support to the JFC at the operational level of war. In order to effectively plan for and execute joint military operations, the JFC needs timely, accurate and useful logistics information and material support. Ideally, logistics support should be an integral and realistic part of existing operational plans, and that support, as part of those plans, should be exercised regularly through war games and actual exercises prior to the beginning of a conflict. However, the ad hoc nature of logistics support of the joint military operations of the past sixty years, while mostly successful and/or effective largely through the individual efforts of those involved, failed to meet the needs of the applicable JFC and failed to provide a level of support that enhanced the chance of operational success.

Since 1945, various efforts such as the National Security Act of 1947, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and the recent designation of the U.S. Joint Forces Command as the single Combatant Commander responsible to discover, develop and deliver joint war fighting capabilities¹ in the joint community have done much organizationally to improve the ability to plan and execute joint operations. Today, the Department of Defense is actively involved in the transformation of the form and structure of U.S. military forces, the culture and war fighting doctrine supporting those forces, and the streamlining of the military functions that those forces will perform to meet the new challenges associated with future threats to the Nation. Despite this ongoing “Revolution in Military Affairs,” current military doctrine, organization and practice still largely reflect the conduct of operations to meet a Cold War threat. Existing laws, doctrine and regulations that pertain to the responsibilities for logistics support at the various levels of war, and particularly at the operational level, still do not identify clear joint logistics responsibilities and organizations that will enable the development and application of support structures that integrate the capabilities of the various agencies and organizations that provide logistics support to the JFC. In the current environment of transformation to meet new and future threats, now is the time to examine and explore new means and methods of delighting the JFC and meeting his or her logistics needs.

This paper will briefly review the issues and lessons to be drawn from recent conflicts, outline the current responsibilities, doctrine, guidance, concepts and programs for joint logistics, identify the future joint operational logistics requirements of the JFC, and provide a rationale and recommendation for satisfying those requirements.

¹ Joint Forces Command, “About Us”, <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/about1.htm>, [9 April 2003]

Lessons from Recent Conflicts

“Throughout the struggle, it was in his logistic inability to maintain his armies in the field that the enemy’s fatal weakness lay. Courage his forces had in full measure, but courage was not enough. Reinforcements failed to arrive, weapons, ammunition and food alike ran short, and the dearth of fuel caused the powers of tactical mobility to dwindle to the vanishing point. In the last stages of the campaign they could do little more than wait for the Allied advance to sweep over them”. Dwight D. Eisenhower, British Army Doctrine Publication, Volume 3, Logistics (June 1996)

The United States has fought as a joint force in the nation’s wars since the Civil War. However, while each of the Armed Services has combined its efforts to help win those wars, the quality and unity of effort has varied greatly. Since Goldwater-Nichols, the conflicts that the U.S. has waged have been truly joint affairs, mainly and logically to leverage and capitalize on the unique capabilities of all Military Services. But, from a logistics standpoint, how well were the Joint Force Commanders supported?

During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, due to the size, complexity and lack of time associated with planning and executing the mammoth effort to deploy and sustain the forces earmarked to participate in the operation, General Schwarzkopf as the JFC decided to depart from existing Army logistics doctrine by designating a single manager of logistics, Lieutenant General Pagonis, for the duration of the operation². It was obviously Schwarzkopf’s intent to narrow the theater logistics chain of command and assign a single individual to have broad authority over theater Air Force, Navy and Army logistics assets. Under joint logistics doctrine, Schwarzkopf had the authority to task organize his theater logistics organization. In order to deal with the challenges associated with the effort, Pagonis implemented an ad hoc organization designed to expedite the decision-making process and to

² Brad D. Lafferty, Richard Huhn, Ghoneim M. Al-Shabaini, Judith B. Moses, Mario Reyes, Todd E. Behne Joyce P. Napier, Debra Shattuck, Margaret M. Curran, Walter S. Nessmith, Brian D. Tri, James E. De Temple, Kathleen J. O'Regan, Terry A. Wilkins, Douglas Railey, "Gulf War Logistics: Theory Into Practice," (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL: 1995).

encourage innovation by his subordinate commanders. While this theater organization was largely successful in developing and implementing successful new ways to provide logistics support to forward-deployed units, and overcame the myriad of problems associated with such a large effort, they struggled mightily to do so. Instrumental in the success of the operation was the length of time allowed to the coalition to build up the necessary logistics support without active enemy intervention, as well as tremendous levels of host nation support and infrastructure. Despite their best efforts, long term issues were highlighted, including the optimal mix and timing of logistics and combat units in the deployment flow and the control and visibility of the vast flow of unit equipment and resupply material into theater. The JFC and his logistics commander were hard pressed to know what “stuff” they had on hand or en route, and this lack of information and the lack of control of external events affecting their theater hamstrung their planning efforts and the overall logistics effort for this operation.

In Bosnia, logistics support for Operation Joint Endeavor again was built around an ad hoc system that relied on spur of the moment planning to deal with complex issues from the very beginning of the operation.³ Due to a lack of NATO doctrine, policies, regulations, laws or precedents for such an operation, the commander for support (C-SPT) was challenged to rapidly establish an organization skilled in the coordination and consensus building necessary to deal with multinational issues across the spectrum of theater logistics. C-SPT had no preexisting staff, history of performance or track record with the JFC, or his staff, and had to start from scratch in building a team with the skills necessary to do the necessary planning to deploy and sustain the force and to gain credibility with its customers.

³ William N. Farnen, "Ad Hoc Logistics in Bosnia", Joint Forces Quarterly, (Autumn/Winter 1999-2000): 36-42.

Problems were encountered with contracts for commodity support, ports and facilities, often under the control of different nations attempting to provide unilateral logistics support of their troops. That the operation was successful is largely a tribute to the teamwork and work of a few C-SPT personnel who overcame the various obstacles, but could also be equally attributed to the relatively benign theater and the short and robust lines of communication from across Europe. With a more dynamic and dangerous theater of operations, the planners might not have succeeded in overcoming the inherent slow start in providing logistics support of the operation.

Recent conflicts have not put logistics at the operational level under great and enduring stress, and the U.S. has had the freedom of action and the time necessary to build up ad hoc logistics organizations and support infrastructure in the absence of serious enemy air, land or sea threats. However, the danger of operational culmination in future conflicts due to logistics considerations is real if future adversaries actively attempt to interdict and target U.S. logistics support. In the future the U.S. may not have the luxury of time to establish the necessary logistics organization and infrastructure to support the JFC.

Current Doctrine & Responsibilities

“Logistics is the foundation of combat power.” Joint Publication 4-0

The basic authority, responsibilities and direction for logistics support for the Combatant Commanders and within the Department of Defense comes from U.S. law, specifically Title 10, United States Code (USC). These legal responsibilities are further codified and promulgated in DoD Directive 5100.1, which establishes the common functions and responsibilities of the Military Departments, and directs them to “administer Service

forces; to provide logistic support for Service forces, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense; to develop doctrines, procedures, tactics, and techniques employed by Service forces.” and “to provide, as directed, administrative and logistic support to the headquarters of the Combatant Commands, to include direct support of the development and acquisition of the command and control systems of such headquarters.”⁴ Basically, each of the Military Services supports the Unified Combatant Commanders by providing primary logistics support to the Service forces assigned to the JFC during a military operation. This support often occurs using resources that are geographically separate from the theater of operations, and involves logistic support systems, procedures and processes developed and implemented independently, primarily to support the war fighting vision and doctrine established by each Military Service.

Each of the Services has published unique doctrine and plans for the logistics support of their particular forces during operations. Additionally, the Joint Staff publishes joint logistics doctrine “to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for U.S. military involvement in multinational and interagency operations.”⁵ In joint doctrine, within a specific area of operations, the Combatant Commander exercises directive authority for logistics. This authority is designed to “ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans, the effectiveness and economy of the operation, and the prevention or elimination of

⁴ Department of Defense, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, DoD Directive 5100.1 (Washington, D.C.: 1 August 2002), paragraphs 6.4 and 6.5.

⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, Joint Pub 4-0. (Washington, DC: 6 April 2000).

unnecessary facility duplication and overlapping functions,”⁶ and allows the JFC to shift logistics resources as necessary within the theater. However, consistent with DoDD 5100.1, the same joint doctrine allows that “the implementation and execution of logistics functions remain the responsibility of the Services and the Service component commanders” and “each service is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces, except when logistics support is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies or allies, or by assignments to common, joint or cross-servicing,” further “subject to combatant commanders’ responsibility and authority, commanders of the Service component commands are responsible for logistic support of their forces and direct communication with appropriate headquarters on all supply matters.”⁷ In a joint operation, the Military Services and Service component commanders provide the primary logistics resources to the JFC and are responsible to implement and execute actual logistic support to the Service forces assigned to the JFC, while the JFC plans for the use of those resources and ensures it supports the overall concept of operations, and exercises directive authority within the theater to make this happen.

Current Programs/Initiatives

“Logistics...as vital to military success as daily food is to daily work.” Captain A.T. Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration, 1912

“DoD must recognize that logistics transformation is in fact a big deal...a very big deal”. Defense Science Board Summer Study, 1998

How do the Military Services fulfill their Title 10 responsibilities for logistics in support of the JFC? They do so through broad intermediate to long range logistics strategies and/or transformation plans that are closely linked to the unique mission, vision, concepts

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

and doctrine for war fighting developed by that particular Service. These initiatives are each designed to address and rectify the various logistical shortcomings identified by that Service in recent conflicts. Per OSD guidance,⁸ in support of the goals and objectives established in the DoD Logistics Strategic Plan, each of the Military Services are to pursue the “rapid” transformation of the existing DoD logistics system, and are to attain common objectives as they pursue their separate initiatives. These four objectives are: (1) accelerating progress in implementing Customer Wait Time as the common measure of logistic system performance; (2) adopting a simplified priority system based on time-definite delivery driven by the customer’s stated Required Delivery Date; (3) achieving total asset visibility through use of automatic identification technology and transformed business practices; and, (4) fielding a web-based shared data environment providing seamless, interoperable, real-time logistics information. The Service transformation plans serve as vehicles for aligning various initiatives, obtaining resources, and documenting the approach for achieving the Strategic Plan goals and objectives. However, other than seeking to attain these four objectives in transforming the existing DoD logistics system, the Services are free to develop and implement logistics plans designed to support their own forces in future conflicts.

The Navy’s logistics transformation strategy is called “High Yield Logistics,” which defines logistics as “the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces.” The strategy seeks to deliver the highest quality of service to the Navy’s forward-deployed forces while reducing the Navy’s total ownership costs.⁹ The goals of this strategy are to optimize funds through best value, customer support and communication, process

⁸ DEPSECDEF Memorandum “Department of Defense Reform Initiative Directive #54 – Logistics Transformation Plans”, (Washington, D.C., 23 March 2000).

⁹ U.S. Navy. High Yield Logistics Transformation Plan for FY00. (Washington, DC: 2000).

innovation and workforce productivity, and its objectives include “extraordinary support to the Warfighter, strategic sourcing of the Navy supply inventory, infrastructure, maintenance and Service functions where it makes sense, and optimizing retained resources to increase effectiveness and reduce redundancy within the remaining infrastructure.”¹⁰ The Navy’s strategy is a compilation of preexisting initiatives from the various logistics providers and acquisition commands throughout the Navy. The common theme is improvement of the support provided to the Fleets (as primary customers) as measured by readiness and performance metrics while reducing logistics infrastructure and support costs. It is a strategy based in a reality of declining budgets and the urgent need to identify funds to pay the future modernization costs for the overall force.

The Marine Corps’ “Precision Logistics” strategy is designed to support and complement existing Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare operational concepts and doctrine and emerging and future war fighting concepts such as Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and Sea Based Logistics (SBL). These concepts seek to exploit the sea as maneuver space, involving projecting and sustaining forces directly from the sea onto operational objectives well inland, obviating the need to seize and secure a beachhead and build up a support base ashore before pushing out to accomplish inland objectives.¹¹ The Marine Corps logistics vision and strategy seeks to ensure that field commanders are confident that required support will be provided when and where it is needed. It emphasizes speed and information as a means to reduce logistics mass, footprint and inventory. By enhancing distribution capabilities, improving logistics command and control capabilities,

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Naval Studies Board. Report on Naval Expeditionary Logistics...Enabling Operational Maneuver From the Sea, (Washington, DC: 1999).

reducing the demand on maintenance capabilities, reducing inventory requirements, and reducing the logistics footprint, the sea based strategy seeks to support a war fighting doctrine which will emphasize an agile, flexible force that is capable of a broad range of military objectives and is able to deploy rapidly and sustain itself for extended time periods. It emphasizes that future war fighting concepts will be either defined by the logistics capabilities or by its limitations, and that its success will not be measured by cost savings and reduction in structure.

The Army's Strategic Logistics Plan (ASLP) provides a strategy to achieve an ongoing Revolution in Military Logistics (RML) with a vision of putting a medium-weight (brigade-sized) combat force capable of dominating at any point on the spectrum of operations anywhere in the world, including austere environments, within 96 hours.¹² The ASLP features the transformation of Army logistics from a system based on redundancy and mass to one based on velocity, mobility and information, supported by a single system employing shared situational awareness to facilitate real-time logistics control across all levels of operations (from the factory to the foxhole). Like the Navy's High Yield Logistics initiative, the ASLP is a compilation of many initiatives designed to modernize and streamline existing logistics processes, and seeks to use a systematic approach to transforming the logistics support to Army forces by capturing logistics efficiencies underway in business process reengineering and commercial best practices, reducing fragmentation of effort and the supporting in-theater footprint while increasing overall system agility, responsiveness and survivability.

¹² U.S. Army. Army Strategic Logistics Plan: Enabling Strategic Responsiveness Through a Revolution in Military Logistics, (Washington, DC: 2002).

The Air Force's strategy for transforming logistics support of its forces is "Agile Logistics", which features a redesigned support system that is smaller, highly mobile, technologically superior, robust, responsive, flexible and fully integrated with operations to fully support an operational warfare concept featuring expeditionary capabilities. Underlying this transformation is the ability to operate anywhere, thus the Air Force is focusing on combat support capabilities to sustain highly mobile expeditionary forces. In response to the logistics requirements of deployed commanders, the future Air Force logistics system will seek to minimize the mobility footprint, streamline inventories, feature accurate command and control, provide time-sensitive transportation, reduced repair cycle times and reduce overall costs.

Finally, an integral part of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Joint Vision (JV) 2020 and the ongoing transformation of the armed forces is the joint strategy for meeting the logistics needs of the JFC. "Focused Logistics", one of the four operational conceptual pillars of JV 2020, is "the fusion of information, logistics, transportation technologies to provide rapid, joint crisis response, to deliver, track and shift units, personnel, equipment and supplies while optimizing support to the war fighter across the spectrum of military operations."¹³ Focused Logistics is based on two ongoing initiatives – logistics transformation (as embodied in the transformation efforts of the Military Services discussed previously) and future logistics enterprise (FLE). FLE is a vision to accelerate logistics improvement, enhance support to the war fighter, and align logistics processes with the operational demands of the twenty-first century. It consists of six separate initiatives: (1) Depot Maintenance Project – empowering DoD organic depots to develop partnerships with the commercial sector; (2) Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) – inserting new technology

into new and legacy weapon systems to support improved maintenance capabilities and business processes; (3) Total Life Cycle Systems Management – holding program managers responsible and accountable for meeting war fighter performance requirements in the management of the weapon system life cycle; (4) End-to-End (E2E) Distribution – streamlining war fighter support by providing material from the source of supply to the point of use on a worldwide basis; (5) Executive Agents (EAs) – assign and align EA designations in support of war fighting requirements; (6) Enterprise Integration (EI) – accelerating the use of commercial enterprise resource planning and commercial off-the-shelf tools for modern, integrated solutions to complex information requirements.¹⁴

Economic factors underlie each of the Service and Joint strategies for improving logistics support to their forces in future conflicts. With no clear, capable enemy identified as a result of winning the Cold War, there has been enormous pressure to reduce the defense budget. This pressure has resulted in the significant reduction in force structure and has driven extensive and ongoing efforts to modernize the remaining forces. In order to fund future force modernization, economies are necessary in infrastructure and operations, and thus smaller, more responsive logistics approaches that require less investment and funding to operate are being aggressively pursued. While this is both logical and perhaps necessary, it does not necessarily result in a logistics system that is optimal and/or capable of meeting the needs of the JFC in future conflicts.

¹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Focused Logistics Campaign Plan, (Washington, DC: 2002).

¹⁴ Ibid.

The JFC Perspective

"Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point." General Antoine Henri Jomini, *Precis de l'Art de la Guerre* (The Art of War), 1838

What does all of this mean to the JFC? Each of the Military Services have legal responsibilities to support its forces during conflicts, and each has developed sophisticated logistics doctrine, strategies and initiatives that are closely linked to the war fighting doctrine of the individual Services to fulfill those responsibilities. On the whole, these strategies are designed to replace mass and redundancy with rapid and accurate response to material requirements and to provide logistics commanders at all levels with an increased situational awareness of that response. But does this optimize the logistics support to the JFC during a conflict? Or does it represent sub-optimized support that will not satisfy the basic requirements during a conflict?

To answer these questions, one must first do an assessment of the logistics needs of the JFC. Joint doctrine says that "logistics is a function of command. This principle is met through the Combatant Commander's authority to direct logistics actions and resources necessary to meet mission and operational taskings assigned to the command. To exercise control at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war, subordinate joint force and theater level Service component commanders must also exercise control over their respective logistics resources subject to the directive of the CINC."¹⁵ The key word in this quote is "control", and control cannot be exercised without timely and comprehensive information. In fulfilling his command responsibilities, the JFC needs reliable and accurate information

¹⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, Joint Pub 4-0, (Washington, DC: 6 April 2000), p. II-5.

about what is on the battlefield, in the theater, and what is flowing into the theater from elsewhere. The JFC needs real time information about the readiness of the various major platforms in the theater, and information about how logistics factors are affecting the current operations or will affect the alternative future courses of action that are under constant consideration by the JFC during a conflict. To adequately plan for a pending operation, or to monitor the status of an ongoing operation, the JFC must have rapid access to information about the sustainability of the assigned forces. And, finally, once the need arises to "influence" the logistics posture of the assigned forces, the JFC needs the authority to directly control events affecting his mission that are occurring outside of the theater as well as those occurring within the theater.

In the current and planned environments, can the JFC obtain this information in a timely and accurate manner? Based on the results of recent conflicts, the basic needs of the JFC are not being met. In each case, the JFC was compelled to rapidly establish an ad hoc logistics organization that was incapable, for many reasons, of providing the required information in a satisfactory manner. The JFC did not have the full time staffing necessary to efficiently conduct the complex coordination necessary for large scale operations. The systems were not available to the theater logistics organization to capture, process and provide the necessary information to the JFC. While the JFC had the authority to reallocate theater logistics assets to support the operational plan, he did not have the authority necessary to influence and control the flow of material support to the theater. Furthermore, while the current logistics strategies and initiatives designed by the Military Services to support their forces in future conflicts can be expected to achieve efficiencies and reduce the Service logistics infrastructure, they are not being developed to satisfy the specific needs of the JFC,

and they represent sub-optimized and independent attempts to support their own forces and war fighting doctrine.

Recommendations

"Logistics must be simple - everyone thinks they're an expert." Anonymous

So how best to structure the logistics "system" to meet those needs? First of all, the JFC needs access to a full time logistics command and control organization to function as a centralized logistics support command. The ad hoc nature of establishing logistics support organizations in recent conflicts is a dangerous way to do business and may negatively affect the conduct of future conflicts. Future conflicts can be expected to be characterized by a high operational tempo and a rapidly changing and fluid environment that will require the JFC staff to be capable of swiftly coordinating complex actions and to interact effectively and immediately with a number of coalition partners and civilian organizations. Ad hoc organizations simply will not be able to handle the requirements. The current logistics staffing available to the Combatant Commanders is insufficient, in terms of both the number of personnel and personnel with the logistics skills necessary to cope with the myriad of coordination, monitoring and synchronization functions and responsibilities involved in planning and executing large scale and multinational operations. A dedicated logistics organization responsive to the needs and direction of the JFC should be manned full time by highly trained and professional logisticians who actively participate from the beginning in all joint operational planning evolutions involving the theater. This organization should be given the opportunity to build internal synergy and external relationships by working closely with the other staff elements and the JFC in deliberate planning and supporting joint

exercises prior to the beginning of a conflict. Finally, this organization must be given the clear responsibility for performing all theater logistics command and control actions in support of a particular operation.

Secondly, the responsibility for controlling the logistics pipelines external to the theater which are providing support to the JFC during times of conflict, needs to be clearly defined. Currently, Combatant Commanders have the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders and exercise command authority over assigned logistics forces in theater, but the Services and the Service components are responsible for the overall logistics support of their own forces¹⁶. Furthermore, many external commands and agencies have responsibilities to support the JFC during a conflict, but the JFC has little or no authority or ability to directly influence their activities. This has resulted in sub-optimized planning and execution of support that has not satisfied JFC requirements and has resulted in large stockpiles of sometimes unneeded material in theater. This total absence of a means of control by the JFC over what "stuff" is coming into the theater creates an urgent need to designate a single logistics entity in the Department of Defense to be responsible to either work for or with the JFC in managing the flow of material during a conflict. The JFC needs to have direct authority over this single entity. This action will require modification to current laws, regulations and joint and service doctrine.

Thirdly, an approach is needed to identify, procure, and implement a single command and control information system that is specifically designed to provide the logistics information requirements of the JFC. Information systems that exist today or are planned to support future logistics transformation are or will be capable of providing portions of the

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, Joint Pub 4-0, (Washington, DC: 6 April 2000), p. vi.

required information, such as the readiness status of personnel, equipment and units and the location of supplies. The Services are each developing information systems that will provide an enhanced ability to perform logistics functions and that will support their individual logistics initiatives. The Joint Community uses the Joint Operations, Planning and Execution System (JOPES) to plan for the deployment of forces during an operation and the Global Combat Support System (GCSS) to provide interoperability across combat support functions. However, for logistics, what is needed is a single system available to the JFC that is able to rapidly plan, track and predict logistics information pertaining to planned or actual operations.

Conclusion

"I don't know what the hell this "logistics" is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it." Admiral E.J. King

Logistics has been and will remain a main constraint in joint force military planning, and as such is a central part of the operational and tactical levels of warfare. In planning at the operational level of war, joint force commanders must plan not only for the deployment and employment of assigned forces, but also for the sustainment of those forces. Currently, due to a lack of unity of effort in the ongoing transformation of defense logistics and because the necessary tools are not available to accomplish this function, it is difficult for the JFC to effectively integrate logistics into operational planning. Although there is some integration of logistics in the planning process, the system must be transformed to be more receptive and adaptive to the changing needs of future conflicts. Failing to do so will have potential serious implications.

To address the complexities associated with planning and executing future conflicts, the JFC needs a dedicated and centralized logistics support organization that is capable of immediately performing the full range of logistics command and control functions at the outset of future conflicts. Current law and doctrine states that the Military Services have the responsibility of sustaining their forces. However, the JFC has a vital interest in ensuring that the logistics support will meet the operational plan. The law and doctrine must be modified to allow for a single entity to manage the overall logistics support of the JFC during future conflicts. Finally, to plan, monitor, and execute future conflicts, commanders, not just logisticians, will need access to real time and accurate logistics information. A single command and control system is needed that has specifically been designed to support the JFC informational needs.

In the wake of the Cold War, the United States lacks a peer competitor that can challenge its military capabilities. As we transition and transform to meet future threats, a clear opportunity is present to identify, fund, develop, test and implement the changes that are necessary to ensure that future joint force commanders are provided the means to meet their needs. However, we must ensure that we are developing the proper means that will maximize the chances of future operational success. In the current environment of transformation, now is the time to delight the JFC.

Abstract

BEANS, BULLETS AND BLACK OIL...ARE WE DELIGHTING THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER?

The United States fights in conflicts as a joint military force. Recent experience in joint operations has demonstrated shortcomings in the Joint Force Commander's ability to optimize and integrate logistics in the planning and execution of those operations. Existing laws, doctrine and regulations that pertain to logistics support at the operational level of war do not identify clear responsibilities to provide the best possible logistical support to Joint Force Commanders during future conflicts.

The United States is transforming the form and structure of its military forces as well as the war fighting doctrine and functions that those forces will perform to meet the challenges associated with future threats to the Nation. Now is the time to examine and explore new methods of providing logistics support to future Joint Force Commanders. The Joint Force Commander needs a dedicated and centralized logistics support organization that is capable of immediately performing the full range of logistics command and control functions at the outset of future conflicts. A single logistics entity in the Department of Defense responsible to the Joint Force Commander should be designated to manage the flow of material to a theater of operations during a conflict. The Joint Force Commander needs a single information system that is able to rapidly plan, track and predict logistics information pertaining to planned or actual operations.

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