The Inadequacy of Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations for Winning the Peace and Securing the Homeland
Abstract
United States participation in conflicts requiring extensive civil-military operations (CMO) for "winning the peace" after the conflict is concluded has become more and more commonplace for the U.S. military. As the conflict in Iraq winds down the post-conflict actions to win and sustain the peace are ramping up on almost a daily basis. Most if not all U.S. military conflicts since Operation URGENT FURY (Grenada 1983) have been characterized by relatively short periods for planning not just for the military operations but for the post-conflict CMO as well. Since future operations similar to recent operations (e.g. Haiti, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Iraq etc.) are probable is current CMO doctrine sufficient to accomplish the myriad of tasks that fall into the CMO realm and confront the operational-level commander on the ground? With the Global War on Terrorism having a domestic component does CMO doctrine adequately address requirements for the United States Northern Command regarding homeland security? Joint CMO doctrine has been improved significantly over the past the years with the issuance of Joint Publications 3-57 and 3-57.1. These two documents draw upon the many lessons learned from the numerous domestic and combat operations in which the United States engaged during the 1990s. However there are still shortfalls in CMO doctrine to be addressed consolidation of publications that could be made and additional efforts required to provide the complete and comprehensive doctrine needed for today's environment.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 15, 2003
- Accession Number
- ADA419813
Entities
People
- Robert K. Grubbs
Organizations
- Naval War College