

Fog, Friction and Force Caps

**A Monograph
by
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Force caps and related command and control issues had a considerable influence on the conduct of operations in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. This paper attempts to answer the question, "Did force caps prevent ground component commanders from prosecuting this war according to the Army's doctrinal concept of overwhelming force?" The significance of this paper is that the military will in all likelihood be called upon to operate with the constraint of force caps again in the future, and there are lessons to be learned from the way forces were implemented in Afghanistan. The methodology that brought the author to choose this topic was interviews with planners and operators who had first hand knowledge of the issues of the campaign and who identified force caps and command and control as the greatest issues of the campaign. Further research was then conducted using additional sources identified and discussed in Appendix-1-Literature Review. The paper starts with examples of how operations and logistics were impacted due to force caps and includes an account of the U.S. Marine's insertion into Forward Operating Base Rhino in Southern Afghanistan in November of 2002. The author describes how force caps created an ad-hoc force structure. This structure resulted in the generation of an overwhelming amount of requests for forces. These requests for forces went through many layers of lengthy approval processes. The author discusses the dangers of piecemeal commitment using the historical example "Task Force Smith" which occurred in July 1950 at the outset of the Korean War. The flattened command and control structure, the risks involved in limiting the amount of force, and issues of command relationships are also addressed. Reasons for the force caps are presented, including the strategic context that contributed to the limit on the number of forces. Recommendations are offered toward resolving issues associated with force caps. The ultimate finding is that we should deploy intact forces based on a troop to task analysis, but in the likely event that we are not able to do so, we should be prepared to be flexible and able to improvise. This flexibility and improvisational ability can be developed through training that required and encourages those attributes. The concept of both a standing joint task force headquarters and a rapid deployment force as envisioned in the 1970's is explored. Furthermore the importance of defining command relationships is discussed. Perhaps the most important finding of this research was that positive relationships between individual commanders and staffs of separate organizations greatly influence the effectiveness of operations.

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Abstract

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“One expects friction from the results of enemy action, but to do it to ourselves is another matter altogether.”¹ LTC Steven Russell, Combined Forces Land Component Command Planner

INTRODUCTION

The intent of this research was to discover if there were any operational level lessons learned by U.S. Army land forces planners in the Afghanistan Campaign of Operation Enduring Freedom. The initial methodology was primarily to conduct interviews with participating planners and operators. The aim of this approach was not to direct discussions toward specific areas or issues but for planners to speak to the issues that were of greatest importance to them. Clearly, command and control was the overriding concern among interviewed planners and operators. Specifically, force limits and organizational structures and command relationships were the issues raised most often and seemed to cause the most consternation. Meeting mission requirements while working within force cap limits proved to be extremely difficult. As such, this paper addresses the question, “Did force caps prevent ground component commanders from prosecuting Operation Enduring Freedom according to the Army’s doctrinal concept of overwhelming force?”

The research presented here explains how force cap constraints influenced the campaign in Operation Enduring Freedom. The decision to implement force caps created what Carl Von Clausewitz refers to as fog and friction. The caps resulted in many unforeseen second and third order effects. Effects caused not by the enemy, but rather by the decision to implement a limitation to the number of forces allowed in theater. Specifically, the force caps influenced operations, force structure, and logistical support. In order to overcome these issues, requests for forces, known as RFF’s, were initiated but the process could not respond quickly enough to meet the needs of commanders. The situation could have easily lent to a piecemeal commitment

¹ LTC Steven Russell, interview by author, written, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., November 12, 2002

situation creating problems similar to that of Task Force Smith during the Korean War. Force caps not only lent to the creation of an ad-hoc force structure but also created a flat command and control structure. There were both operational and strategic rationales for the force caps. There was also a trade off between risk and limiting the amount of forces. The research further demanded a close look at the designation of command relationships and the need for the joint world to consider this when determining command relationships. Finally, some recommendations are offered regarding these issues. These recommendations include: the utilization of intact forces, the necessity of a troop to task analysis, the need for developing the ability to improvise, ways to overcome some of the pitfalls of ad-hoc organizations, designating command relationships, and the possibility of a standing JTF headquarters as well as a rapid deployment force.

THE IMPLICATIONS

The Marines Land...sort of

On the twenty-ninth of November 2002, Marines and sailors from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) of Task Force 58 (TF 58) were inserted into forward operating base Rhino in Southern Afghanistan. The plan was for the 15th MEU to secure the base, followed by the 26th MEU which would immediately move to gain the Kandahar area lines of communication. While the buildup was underway, commanders of Central Command (CINCCENT) and Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) told TF-58 that only 1,000 (later raised to 1,400) Marines and sailors would be allowed at Rhino. The force size limit imposed during the insertion caused a pause in operations and stopped the buildup of combat power. Planners had to reexamine and prioritize which personnel and equipment to transport.

The 15th MEU returned 102 staged personnel and equipment back to the *USS Peleliu*. The majority of the 26th MEU's personnel and equipment was retained aboard the *USS Bataan*.²

The sudden limit to the size of force allowed to go ashore resulted in a number of second and third order effects. Subordinate commanders who, during this operation, should have been able to focus on the task at hand, instead spent inordinate amounts of time determining which Marines and sailors to swap out, in order to bring in those whose skills were most critical. Furthermore, the force cap caused TF 58 to tradeoff support assets for combat power, because of the uncertain security situation and because CENTCOM also wanted to get coalition forces into the fight. This caused TF 58 planners to continually assess and modify the flow of material into Rhino. The decrease in logistical assets available to TF 58 subsequently reduced the number of forces, such as SOF and coalition forces, that could be sustained from Rhino. Forces ashore had to assume more risk because the commander had to depend on force protection and reserve from shipborne forces 350 miles away. In future operations, and in order to accomplish the mission without impediment, the Marines ultimately chose to ignore the force caps, and CENTCOM conveniently did not bring the subject up.³ This is but one illustration of how force caps influenced the operational mission in Operation Enduring Freedom: Afghanistan.

Force caps presented challenges not only for the Marines, but also for the planning and execution of operations of other American forces throughout the Afghanistan theater. In operations that commenced on the first of December, in the White Mountains around Tora Bora and Milawa, an estimated several hundred to several thousand al-Qaida were able to escape to neighboring Pakistan. There had been too much reliance on Afghan allies and air strikes rather than on the employment of a larger U.S. conventional force. This operation resulted in a proposal by General Franks to use "several hundred" conventional forces as a blocking force. Some

² Russell Interview

³ Ibid.

conventional Army troops from the 10th Mountain Division (Light) as well as the Marines were available for the mission. Although contingency plans for the operation were prepared by both the 10th Mountain Division headquarters, then serving as the CFLCC (Forward) in Uzbekistan, and the 15th MEU, they were not implemented. General Franks, however, did not abandon the idea of using conventional troops for missions in the future.⁴

Conventional forces including elements of the 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne Divisions, which had arrived in October/ December 2001 and January / February 2002 respectively, also had to contend with the challenges imposed by the force cap, even as they were preparing for Operation Anaconda. The force caps lent to the following challenges: an ad-hoc command and force structure, lack of troops and force capabilities to meet mission requirements, the utilization and overuse of a cumbersome Request for Forces (RFF) process in order to meet force and capability shortfalls, and finally a flat organizational structure (devoid of subordinate headquarters). Furthermore, taskings continued to increase even as force caps continued to be imposed.

Ad-hocisms

One outcome of the decision to apply force caps was that an ad-hoc force structure was created in which forces did not deploy as they had been trained or organized. This was evident with the organizational structure of forces put together for the execution of Anaconda. As shown in Figure1, the 10th Mountain Division Headquarters, re-designated as CJTF Mountain, received operational control of the 3d Brigade Combat Team from 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), that was task organized with battalions from the 101st, 10th Mountain and the Canadian Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. None of these forces or their staffs had worked or trained together before. The comment from a planner was that it seemed the might and effort of the

⁴ Bonin, "A Case Study: The First Year: US Army Forces Central Command During Operation Enduring Freedom," 12; COL Gray, interview by author, written, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., November 1, 2002.

United States could somehow find a way to deploy and fight an intact, coherent brigade combat team. The 187th BCT was just that, prior to deployment, but was not allowed to deploy and fight as the intact unit that stood ready at Ft. Campbell. “One expects friction from the results of enemy action, but to do it to ourselves is another matter altogether.”⁵ Although it was necessary to get troops on the ground quickly in Uzbekistan in order to provide force protection for critical forward operating base, as was the situation for the 10th Mountain Division, the 187th had enough time to be able to have been deployed intact.⁶




Figure 1. Force Structure.

Planners had to pick “eaches” based on what they thought might be the requirements of the mission, discovering later how leaving something behind influenced the fight down the road. For example during Operation Anaconda there was not a fully manned ammo transfer point at Bagram. Although the 530th Corp Support Battalion improvised to meet the situation, the lack of

⁵ Russell, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., November 12, 2002.

⁶ Ibid.

qualified personnel to man the ATP affected the distribution, storage, and accountability of ammunition as the Anaconda operation unfolded.⁷

An even more significant impact on combat operations occurred when the Army's 187th (101st Air Assault) Brigade Combat Team arrived in theater without its organic artillery and with very few Apache gun ships. The thought was that high angle mortars would suffice, and that air support could be provided from high altitude aircraft such as AC-130s. Although there was limited usable airfield space and no ports, planners still felt that the Brigade Commander could have benefited from the use of these organic assets, and that they should have been available to him. One planner stated, "The commander should get what he needs based on his experience, the training of his habitual units, and the synergy this creates."⁸ Ultimately, the commander wanted Apaches and was given only a precious few. The fight with al Qaeda was so close that close air support (CAS) by high-altitude, fast moving aircraft was unfeasible. Apaches became the only feasible fire support available to ground commanders. The proximity of the fight between ground forces and al Qaeda limited close air support (CAS) in some cases. Apaches could have provided a responsive alternative fire support for ground commanders.

Additionally, the force was now fighting without all of the tools they were used to utilizing during their combined arms training. This can be a serious detriment to the confidence of the force; a force that has trained with all of its combined arms capabilities, and then is suddenly fighting in a battle without being able to utilize all of those same elements of combat power. This causes doubts in the minds of the soldiers, because they must now operate differently from the way they have trained and because they are not as sure about how to fight when doing so without all of their battle operating systems.

⁷ COL David Gray, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Ks., December 15, 2002.

⁸ Russell, interview by author, November 12, 2002

Furthermore, there were few forces available initially for the planning and execution of Anaconda. Many soldiers were also tied up providing security for a number of airfields in theater. Subsequent infantry units had to be brought in from Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and even Kuwait in order to be able to mass additional fighting force as the battle escalated and the enemy reinforced his own forces and used the cave system for protection.

Impact on Logistics

As stated in the ARCENT Initial Impressions Report, the overarching fact that impacted logistics support inside Afghanistan and surrounding countries was the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) limit on forces that could go into each country. This forced CFLCC to make a conscious decision to deploy partial units with only the specific capability required to meet the mission's minimum requirement in order to stay within the force cap limitations emplaced by higher headquarters and the civilian leadership. This resulted in partial units often being deployed without the flexibility to do additional tasks. In many cases, CFLCC decided to take the risk of not having the capability available in country in order to stay under the force limitations.

Support units were affected in that, not only were there less people to do the job, but their ability to provide support was also limited by the requirement to provide for their own base camp security. They were required to provide support to Special Operations Forces (SOF) who have little to no internal logistics support, such as organic CTA and life support. SOF depended on conventional forces to support them, thus contributing to a greater burden for these limited support units.

A higher headquarters or a movement control center, corps movement control center, theater movement control agency, and a Joint Movement Center (JMC) usually direct movement control. Due to the strict force size limitations and limited forces being deployed, CFLCC did not put any of these in place to execute or direct movement control as a central location. The lack of

organic long distance communications was also a factor preventing CFLLC from putting additional movement control oversight in place. The lack of central direction affected in-transit visibility, order ship times, and the ability for CFLLC to effectively influence movements underway.⁹

Force provider is a series of living and support modules designed to set up in a recreation area to provide living support to primarily transient personnel. Modules provide climate controlled living areas, dining facilities, laundry, and bath/shower areas. According to the ARCENT CAAT IIR, there were difficulties with the planning deployment, employment staffing and maintenance of force provider. Karshi Khanabad was not operating at the same level as Manas. Manas was set up in a deliberate “text book” doctrinal fashion and was set up and fully operational quickly. In contrast, Karshi Khanabad suffered from inadequate site preparation and planning due to force caps and transport constraints. Due to the force caps Force Provider personnel arrived in- theater well after the FP equipment and remained understrength. The situation prevented Force Provider personnel from providing adequate maintenance, and support services.¹⁰

The report also explains that logistical support overall was extremely austere, but expectations for support were high. Some senior leaders believed troops should live out of rucksacks, while others said the Army should provide a much higher quality of life, one that is equitable to the life style afforded members of the Air Force.¹¹ One planner stated, “It’s difficult

⁹ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *ARCENT CAAT Initial Impressions Report (IIR)* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 2002 Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2002), 146-147

¹⁰ Ibid. 139

¹¹ Ibid. 133

to explain to your soldiers, who are part of the world's greatest military, why they are eating MRE's while the Allied forces operating next to them are provided good hot meals.”¹²

Requests for Forces

Requirements for personnel increased as new operations developed. These included taskings from CENTCOM, such as “conduct detainee operations” and “sensitive site exploitation.” RFFs were generated in order to meet the requirement for specific forces with the capabilities to meet these taskings. These requests went through joint channels to the Army and still had to remain within Department of Defense established force caps. This RFF process for acquiring forces was extremely cumbersome. RFFs were initiated from Ground Unit Commanders and forwarded to the CFLCC, then to the CINC, to the Joint Staff, to Joint Forces Command, to Department of the Army, to Forces Command (FORSCOM), to Corps, and finally to Major Subordinate Command.¹³ Each level had to approve these requests. There were thousands of RFFs and these took weeks to process. Sometimes these requests were critical to the mission, as was the request for Apaches in preparation for close proximity fights with al Qaeda. The request was not only critical to providing fire support, but also for preventing the escape of the enemy. Neither were there enough forces available to conduct a pursuit, nor for a reserve. As one planner stated, “If a commander feels he needs something, he should get it.”¹⁴ Obviously, a cumbersome and bureaucratic request process is an unacceptable reason for not meeting the needs of the commander.

Ultimately, the RFF process used for Operation Enduring Freedom took too long, and by the time the units were deployed, the mission had changed and more or less force was required.

¹² Gray interview

¹³ CFLCC Brief, OEF/NE Initial Impressions Conference

¹⁴ Russell Interview

The slow process led to many unrealistic required delivery dates (RDDs) and latest arrival dates (LADs) in TPFDD (see figure 2).




Figure 2. JOPES TPFDD/RFF Process.¹⁵

¹⁵ Source: Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Chapter 6 Logistics/Deployment Topic C: JOPES /RFF," in document ARCENT CAAT Initial Impressions Report (IRR) , p 136

JOPEs TPFDD/RFF PROCESS (Continued)




Figure 3. JOPEs TPFDD/RFF PROCESS (cont.).¹⁶

Piecemeal Commitment

The force caps for Operation Enduring Freedom could well have led to piecemeal commitment. “Piecemeal commitment” is defined in FM 3-90, *Tactics*, as the immediate employment of units in combat as they become available instead of waiting for larger aggregations of units to ensure mass or as the unsynchronized employment of available forces so that their combat power is not employed effectively.¹⁷

Task Force Smith in Korea, 5 to 19 July 1950, provides an example of the dangers of such piecemeal commitment. This force dealt with many of the same issues the Army contends with today: disjointed command and control structures, limited communications, artificial restraints on

¹⁶ Ibid, 136

¹⁷ FM 3-90 *Tactics*, Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-90, *Tactics*. Washington, D.C. 4 July 2001, para 2-24.

operational plans, weather and terrain, opposing ground actions, and application of airpower. Major General William F. Dean, 24th Infantry Division Commander, intended to conduct a series of delays along the corridor on Highway 1 between Seoul and Taejon in order to aid in the arrival of his remaining forces. He sent a task force from his 21st Infantry Regiment named for the Battalion Commander in charge, LTC Bradley Smith. Lack of air transportation pared Smith's Battalion to a small two company, one artillery battery task force. Smith placed his forces east and west along the high ground overlooking Highway 1 at Juk Mi Pass, but North Korean tanks were able to overcome the small Task Force who withdrew and all captured US wounded were executed. Close air support had been nonexistent due to earlier fratricide incidents. They had effectively delayed the North Koreans for only seven hours.¹⁸

While this battle was taking place the 1/34 Infantry, 24th Infantry Division was digging in about ten kilometers south of Osan. The 34th Infantry Regiment had been rushed from Japan to backup TF Smith along Highway 1. On the sixth of July the North Koreans encountered the 1/34th Infantry. 1/34th Infantry encountered the same problems as TF Smith had as they had no anti-tank weapons that could stop T34s, nor could they tie in flank defenses. They fought for three hours before withdrawing. Fearing envelopment, the 3/34th which was to defend Ansong in a parallel position to the east of the 1/34th, withdrew without fighting.¹⁹

On the seventh of July, the Fourth North Korean Peoples Army Infantry Division left Pyongyang moving south toward Ch'onan. By evening they were in Ch'onan. The 3/34th

¹⁸ Edwin Kennedy Jr., Ed. Colonel Lee J. Hockman "Force Protection Implications: TF Smith and the 24th Infantry Division, Korea 1950," *Military Review*, Vol. LXXXI No. 3, (May-June 2001) 87-92 and T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind Of War*. (Brassey's Washington D.C., 2000), 65-100.

¹⁹ Ibid.

Infantry successfully engaged the 4th NKPA ID reconnaissance elements north of town, then withdrew into Ch'onan.²⁰

The bulk of the 24th ID had arrived and continued the same small engagements and battles in a similar manner, as they were committed piecemeal against the North Koreans. They fought at Chonui, the Choch'iwon, the Kum River Line, and Taejon where the division Commander was captured. While these fights were taking place, the 1st Cavalry Division was boarding ships for Korea.²¹

As forces in Anaconda were without all of their tools including Apache gunship helicopters and artillery, so was the 24th Infantry Division limited in its war-fighting capabilities. The 24th had artillery but no close air support, and they had only old powerless bazookas and 57-millimeter recoilless rifles with shells that bounced off the enemy's Soviet armor.²² Neither were the forces that were brought in adequate for the operation, as was the case for Operation Enduring Freedom. The 24th was limited in the size of its force due to inadequate transportation assets which was also one of the reasons given for the limit on the size of the force in Afghanistan, but CENTCOM's constraints were also political and mostly self imposed.

Flattened Command and Control Structures

Although some might argue that a flattened centralized command structure worked in China for Stillwell, this was mostly due to the environment in which he operated. For CENTCOM, the imposed force cap resulted in a flat command and control structure in which the CFLCC had direct command of too many subordinate units, rather than establishing enough intermediate commands to take over many of those responsibilities. Units, such as the 377th

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

Theater Support Command and the 416th Engineer Command (USAR), reported directly to ARCENT rather than to theater-level specialized commands. ARCENT also had direct oversight of logistical and medical assets who were themselves operating with a limited amount of forces and little host-nation support or contractors.²³

In fact, the CFLCC initially had no subordinate corps or division-level headquarters but requested and received a Division Tactical Assault Command (DTAC) to assist in controlling operations, which resulted in 10th Mountain deployment. The CFLCC required units to continue to report to its headquarters, and did not task organize in a way that allowed lines of command such that the CFLCC (Forward) was provided the authority to direct and carry out ground operations. The CFLCC operated into the tactical level, even down to squad and detachment operations. The CFLCC actually operated at all levels of war, not only controlling the tactical level, but also conducting operational and even strategic missions including strategic reconnaissance and establishing an Office of Military Cooperation to rebuild the Afghan Army. In reality, units up and down the chain of command were operating across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war without command guidance. In order to fulfill both their doctrinal role of ARCENT Headquarters, while also acting as the tactical headquarters, many augmentees, well above what was required for their doctrinal role, were required.²⁴

Furthermore, information operations were intended to give the commander more situational awareness, but in reality the outcome in Operation Enduring Freedom was that more personnel were required in order to process information. If the numbers required are also a part of the counted force in theater, situational awareness may be gained at the expense of boots on the ground for the warfight. Perhaps the Joint Forces Headquarters should look to have a

²³ Bonin, "A Case Study: The First Year: US Army Forces Central Command During Operation Enduring Freedom," 11.

²⁴ Center for Army Lessons Learned, "ARCENT CAAT Initial Impressions Report (IIR)" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned: 2002)

complimentary force where the tactical should have some equity in collaboration with the HQ. Should the balance of forces and decision go to the HQ with the highest rank, or should there be a complimentary balance of input from and forces to, the tactical level?

Another result of the flattened structure was that it meant information sometimes went directly to the highest levels, thwarting the chain of command, and generating requests for information (RFIs) that should not have been made. The CFLCC was out of the loop and had to respond to these RFIs that, in many cases, could have been resolved at a lower level.²⁵

This structure, where the CFLCC was operating at all levels of war, is contrary to doctrine and spreads the CFLCC HQ too thin to do the job well. According to FM 3-0, *Operations*, operational commanders conduct offensive campaigns and major operations to achieve theater-level effects based on tactical actions. They concentrate on designing offensive land operations. They determine what objectives will achieve decisive results; where forces will operate; the relationship among subordinate forces in time, space, and purpose; and where to apply the decisive effort. Operational commanders assign area of operations to establish command and support relationship among tactical commanders. Tactical commanders direct offensive operations to achieve the objectives of destroying enemy forces or seizing terrain that produce the theater-level effects operational commanders require.²⁶

The CFLCC should not directly supervise the fight; rather, this should be left to subordinate commanders at corps and division levels or in this case the CFLCC (forward). The CFLCC should conduct operational-level tasks, such as those indicated in the previous paragraph. As for the organization of the CFLCC, it may have been best if there had been subordinate commands empowered with Operational Control (OPCON) over subordinate units. For example

²⁵ Ibid., 2-4.

²⁶ Headquarters Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-0 Operations*, (Washington, D.C. 14 June 2001). Para. 2-3 to 2-13

the CFLLC (forward), who was operating in theater should have had OPCON over most, if not all, ground forces working in the area of operation.

Why Force Caps?

The question thus emerges, Why did the US military depart from doctrine? According to a case study by Colonel John Bonin, General Tommy Franks, the Combatant Commander for Central Command wanted to avoid the mistakes made by the Soviets during its war in Afghanistan. He sought to avoid appearing as an occupying force and did not wish to provide additional targets for the enemy. Thus, the number of forces throughout the theater was kept to about 7,000.²⁷

According to the ARCENT CAAT Initial Impressions report, limited strategic lift assets, limited infrastructure in the area of responsibility, and the concern for force protection were what drove the U.S. Central Command Commander to impose strict limits on the numbers of personnel deployed within the AOR.

Sometimes there were operational reasons for not committing troops. For example, a planner said,

At the time of Tora Bora LTG Mikoloshek, CFLCC Commander, felt that the risk in using TF 58 far exceeded its benefits as we had every indication that Anti-Taliban Afghan General Ali would quit the field if large numbers of U.S. forces arrived. Politically, this could have been a disaster as a forced liberation of Kandahar by U.S forces would not have provided the catalyst necessary for pro-Karzai tribal support in the mostly Pashtun region. Without that, I personally don't believe we would have seen a Loya Jirga (new national government agreed to by all the tribes) only 6 months later. Operationally the need to let the Afghans liberate their own territory for the follow on ops was essential. This was the major reason that TF-58 was 'held' for contingencies--postured at Bagram or Jalalabad for clearing ops based on enemy disposition. The unique unconventional nature of the war, combined with the impacts of introducing large numbers of conventional force, weighed heavily on the decisions made by the leadership. But as to the numbers that they could introduce at Rhino, this seemed to us to stem from force caps imposed by GEN Franks to reduce the footprint or

²⁷ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *ARCENT CAAT Initial Impressions Report (IIR)*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2002), 19.

perception of large conventional forces in a region that we still hoped would generate its own friendly forces for a better post-conflict make up.²⁸

Strategic Political Considerations

A further question arises, Did strategic political considerations play a role in the desire to limit the forces in Afghanistan? Although many planners felt that these decisions were being made at the Combatant Commander level, the reality may be otherwise. Bob Woodward's book *Bush at War* reveals that the Bush administration was also concerned about appearing as an occupying force, and that there was a concern about getting bogged down in Afghanistan, as had the British in the nineteenth century and the Soviets in the twentieth. This concern led the administration to think about military action elsewhere. The author describes Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, as being concerned about "100,000 American troops bogged down in mountain fighting in Afghanistan where in contrast Iraq was a brittle, oppressive regime that might break easily."²⁹ Andrew Card proposed the "build up of troops big time [in the Persian Gulf Region] so that they would be in a position to strike Iraq later on."³⁰ Cheney recommended strengthening the Northern alliance and hitting the Taliban--but not necessarily in a massive way at first; rather, knocking out air defenses and their airpower at the start and then putting in Special Forces. Bush ultimately decided that they should continue to work plans for military action in Iraq for a later date. Perhaps a large number of forces would be required elsewhere.³¹

A more likely reason for limiting forces was that the Central Intelligence Agency leader George Tenet had recommended the use of opposition tribes to do the work. In order to accomplish this, he felt they needed to "underscore that the US had no desire for territory or

²⁸ Russell Interview

²⁹ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 90

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., 90-99

permanent bases in the region.”³² “We want to structure it as Afghanistan versus outsiders...we are not invading. We are not occupying.” Bush agreed saying, “This should be a template for our strategy. We should use the Afghans in this struggle.”³³ When the Central Intelligence Agency approached the Southern tribal leaders they assured them, as they had successfully convinced Northern Alliance leaders, that we did not have territorial ambitions or a desire for a permanent presence in Afghanistan.³⁴ Tenet said, “We have to avoid looking like a US invasion. That message is even more important in the South, to get the Pashtuns to rise.”³⁵ So the plan from a strategic political level was for opposition forces, especially the Northern Alliance, to do most of the ground fighting, thus avoiding the mistakes of the Soviets who invaded with a large land force.³⁶

Furthermore, the US needed the support of other countries in the region including: Pakistan, Russia, and Uzbekistan. They primarily needed Uzbekistan as a jumping off point to Afghanistan. As Uzbekistan had been a former member of the Soviet Union and now had strained relations with Russia, Bush felt that Putin “needed reassurance that this [using Uzbekistan] was not a play to establish a long term military presence in what was former Soviet territory.”³⁷

The current administration desires a smaller, highly technological, rapidly deployable force. Is it possible that the administration limited the amount of troops in theater in order to force these changes upon the military, and the army in particular? Certainly those accusations

³² Ibid., 122

³³ Ibid., 128

³⁴ Ibid., 147

³⁵ Ibid., 183

³⁶ Ibid., 193

³⁷ Ibid.

were made against this administration, and in particular, the Secretary of Defense, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the war that began while operations in Afghanistan were still ongoing. According to Lawrence Korb of the Council of Foreign Relations, who worked as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, “Rumsfeld basically cut in half what the army said that it needed for the war. Basically, he has the view that the Army is too big, too heavy, too cumbersome.”³⁸ According to the *New York Times* article, Rumsfeld has a vision of a military liberated from its Cold War past, with smaller, swifter forces, highly technological weapons, and airpower and special operations. Ralph Peters shared the sentiment that Rumsfeld was limiting forces in theater in Iraq in order to “prove a point”. In his *Washington Post* article entitled “Shock, Awe and Overconfidence” Peters suggests that “Rumsfeld has a vision of the future that is shaped by technocrats and the defense industry—ground forces can be cut drastically in order to free funding for advanced technologies.” According to Peters, “this war was supposed to prove the diminishing relevance of ground forces, while shock and awe attacks from the air secured a swift victory. Instead the plan had to be rearranged so that ground forces could rush into Iraq to prevent economic and ecological catastrophes—you cannot seize ground, prevent sabotage, halt genocide and ethnic cleansing, or liberate anyone from the sky.”³⁹ Both authors of these articles offer evidence indicating that the administration desires to operate with less ground forces. Each argues for enough ground forces to meet the capability needs of the mission. The operations in Iraq and in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, did not have adequate enough force to meet the necessary tasks and requirements of the campaigns.

³⁸ Nina Bernstein, “The Strategists Fight a War About the War”, *The New York Times* April 6, 2003.

³⁹ Ralph Peters, “Shock, Awe and Overconfidence,” *Washington Post*, Tuesday March 25, 2003., Page A09

Risks

Seizing ground, preventing sabotage, halting genocide and ethnic cleansing, as well as the liberation of a country are important elements of what is at stake when our military uses less ground forces. The risks also include preventing escape of the enemy. Just as many al Qaeda were also initially able to flee to Pakistan, much of the Iraqi leadership fled to Syria, perhaps along with their weapons of mass destruction. Safety among our forces was also compromised as less forces were called upon to do more. Troops get less rest and are thereby much more prone to accidents. Peters points out that although our forces are performing superbly in Iraq, another division should have conducted a forward passage of lines with the 3rd Infantry Division before the final push to Baghdad, giving the 3rd Infantry Division a chance to rest, rearm and reequip before returning to battle.” Furthermore, their extended lines of communication were not always secure.

Command Relationships

This monograph would not be complete without a discussion of Command relationships. Unity of command is one of the primary tenets of the Army’s doctrine and a principle of war. Through unity of command Joint Forces achieves unity of effort. However, unity of command seems one of the most difficult of principles to put into practice, and the Operation Enduring Freedom campaign in Afghanistan proved no exception. The command structure and command relationships employed did not support unity of effort. This situation was only overcome through personal relationships.

According to the ARCENT IIR, at the strategic level JFLCC believed the CENTCOM staff to be Air Force centric. The staff looked at the theater with an eye toward targets, through a ninety-six hour window. If an operation was not to happen within ninety-six hours, it was not a priority. Neither did the JFLCC staff have much understanding of the requirements of ground operations. They gave a ninety-six hour response time for planning air strikes and in the same

message gave an infantry force only four hours to be on the ground after an air strike on a sensitive target. The ARCENT report summarizes with this, “An infantry force cannot be dropped onto a target as fast as one can drop a bomb. Such a force must be protected and resourced, not just for a few minutes over the target but for hours and days.”⁴⁰ At the strategic level the staff needs to give thought and effort to long-range problems, allowing the development and provision of good guidance to components commands, thus allowing each the time it needs to properly react.

The JFLCC staff believed they did not have adequate access to the Combatant Commander in order to confirm planning guidance. Several planning processes took place at Central Command Headquarters under the direction of senior staff officers and along with their subordinate planners. Three groups conducted operational planning: the operations planning element (OPE), the future planning element (FPE), and the long-range planning element (LRPE). Component commands, acting on information from these staffs, proceeded with parallel planning. This worked well when the commander’s intent was understood, but in the early days of the campaign, the rapid pace of events precluded waiting for plans from CENTCOM. ARCENT would often publish plans in advance of CENTCOM, so as to remain operationally agile, only to have those plans sometimes not be executed. The results of higher headquarters planning must trickle down to subordinate headquarters in order to achieve effective parallel planning, and this was not always the case.

Command relationships were not clearly defined at all levels. This was most apparent in that SOF forces did not operate harmoniously with conventional forces. The CENTCOM commander retained OPCON of SOF. This prevented the CFLCC from coordinating through his CFLCC Forward with SOF forces in the AO, thus impeding the planning and execution of

⁴⁰ Center for Army Lessons Learned. ARCENT CAAT Initial Impressions Report (IIR). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2002.5-9

efficient operations. SOF elements would not share information or locations with CFLCC staff or with other conventional forces operating in theater. Since the SOF was under tactical Control (TACON), not operational control (OPCON), to the CFFLC forward, SOF claimed that only immediate CFLLC operations affected them and that they could continue to withhold information that could be useful to planning. Conventional force commanders and staffs were mostly in the dark as to SOF operations taking place in their AO. Not only did this affect the ability to plan operations, it also compromised safety, and, in the end may well have impacted mission success.⁴¹

According to the ARCENT CAAT Initial Impressions Report, using TACON in Afghanistan created situations where safety was compromised: aircraft flying routes directly over and through active mortar firing positions, aircraft from multiple units transiting CFLCC airspace without procedural control, and no communications while flying over various ground elements in contact with the enemy.

CENTCOM was not the only higher headquarters guilty of retaining control at an unusually high level. A CFLCC (forward) headquarters was placed in Afghanistan but, until ANACONDA, did not have any units assigned to this command, instead CFLCC retained control of ground forces in theater. Even when units were finally subordinated to the CFLCC forward, units continued to report, via battle update briefing video teleconference, directly to the CFLCC, bypassing the CFFLC forward level of command. One interviewee said of this dynamic, “They need to decide if they are going to trust me.”

⁴¹ Ibid. 7-9 The entire paragraph is a summary of the source text.




Figure 4 CFLCC Command and Control⁴²

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are two schools of thought as to US Army's military organizational structure and its approach to war-fighting. Some strongly believe that the Army should fight as it has trained and organized. This requires a good troop to task analysis to pair troops with mission requirements. Others believe the Army needs to become more flexible and that if it is going to fight ad hoc, it should also train that way. This type of approach requiring flexibility and adaptability calls for training that encourages improvisation. Furthermore, the best way to overcome issues associated with "ad-hoc" organizations may be through already established

⁴² John A. Bonin "A Case Study: The First Year: US Army Forces Central Command During Operation Enduring Freedom," prepared for the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations 1 November 2002.

personal relationships and clearly defined command relationships. Finally, the concept of a standing JTF headquarters and perhaps a quick reactionary force may be appropriate for implementation in future operations, especially in this post cold war environment.

Intact Forces

In operations there are inherently many situations lending to fog and friction. To add to this friction, putting together ad-hoc or piecemeal teams, especially for combat, only adds to the complexity. Here is what one planner had to say:

Combatant Commands have no combat forces and must put together pick up teams when the hotspots are in their area of operation. Although there are contingency plans on the shelf, each combatant Commander goes after the A-team when they have a job to do. For example, the 101st is on nearly everyone's TPFDD across the globe. As it happens, units get deployed on other contingencies or day-to-day Army missions that preclude immediate deployment for events unforeseen. It would be better to go after an intact unit that is already ready, than parts of one you would like to have. The Command and Control and relationship factor, I believe, would overcome many obstacles. Our units are made up of many soldiers and leaders that have served in all those other units anyway with a broad base of experience. Units can figure out how to get the job done with the right tools---like an intact fighting force---even if their patch is different than the TPFDD.⁴³

Russell further stated, "The marines, navy and air force all fight with intact deployment packages and rarely break up their organizations to deal with force caps. The fact that 'Rhino' was so foreign to them with regard to limitations on numbers of troops reinforces the argument. In this vein, I make the case that the army should be allowed to do the same as the other services."⁴⁴ The army has well-trained, cohesive organizations already established. This is what it should use. That said, perhaps units should be more "modularized" in order to more easily fit mission requirements while maintaining unit cohesion. Current doctrine actually allows for modularization through task organization, i.e. Battalion Task Force or Brigade Combat Teams but force caps affected this process as well.

⁴³ Russell Interview

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Furthermore, by utilizing intact forces, the demand on the RFF process is diminished, as necessary elements are mostly already a part of that packaged unit. The use of intact units prevents TPFFD conferences cutting this and that, and agonizing commanders' decisions over who to leave behind.⁴⁵ Picking parts of individual units, or parts of units, is difficult. One does not always know in advance what to bring because future taskings are unknown and unpredictable. Most forces operate well as a package. Whenever practicable it is much better to ask for the type and size of unit required for the mission and task it.

Troop to Task Analysis

Troop-to-task analysis may be difficult when the tasks are not clear and when troops needed to be there yesterday. To do this requires that military leadership reinforce troop to task methodology instead of lift constraint methodology. In this case, the box was narrowly defined without thinking about how it fits the in long term. Force constraints, request for forces procedures, and mobility constraints forced a departure from a doctrinal approach to resourcing and commanding the campaign but this did not preclude a good troop-to-task analysis. Commanders and campaign planners should reinforce troops to task methodologies for resourcing the operation.⁴⁶ Better to determine the tasks and then have planners come back with the capabilities necessary to provide for that, rather than having planners guess individual parts of units needed for the mission based on tasks unknown. A good troop-to-task analysis would have proved helpful, because it provides evidence for requirement for more forces and prioritizes tasks if forces are not adequate.

What did preclude a good troop-to-task analysis was a poor understanding of what the tasks were to be. This started at the strategic-political level where the mission was not clearly defined. According to Bob Woodward in his book *Bush at War*, eighteen days after 11

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ CALL, Initial Impressions Conference

September the administration was developing a response, an action, but not a strategy.⁴⁷ In order to determine what forces are required one must understand what must be accomplished. In Afghanistan, there was no well-defined campaign plan; therefore, there was no clearly stated mission. Thus, it was difficult to determine tasks required to meet that mission and subsequently, difficult to do a troop-to-task analysis. One cannot easily determine forces required without the benefit of being able to define or predict what tasks will be required.

Force constraints, request for forces procedures, and mobility constraints caused a departure from a doctrinal approach to resourcing and commanding the campaign. Some believe the Army should depart from doctrine for solutions only when required due to threat, mission, and desired end states. Rather planners should reinforce troops to task methodologies for resourcing the campaign.⁴⁸

Of course the best option is to fight as the Army has trained, with the intact combined arms teams it is accustomed to, rather than as ad hoc organizations, missing parts of their combined arms team. In operations there inherently exist too many opportunities lending to fog and friction. To add to this friction by putting together pick-up teams, especially for combat, only adds to the complexity. The Army has well-trained, cohesive organizations already established and should use them. This, of course, would be the ideal option.

The Art of Improvisation

If the Army is not going to utilize intact forces then it must ensure that leaders, staffs and soldiers are able to be flexible and able to improvise. In future operations the Army will not always be able to operate as the neat combined arms elements it has trained as and is familiar with. It is likely there will be force caps and ad hoc structures in future operations. That so many found planning for, and working within, this operational constraint to be a dilemma may mean

⁴⁷ Bush at War

⁴⁸ CALL, Initial Impressions Conference

that the military is not as good at improvising as it should be. Indeed, those interviewed were able to improvise as their success in the operation showed, but pointed out that the real issue underlying constant improvisation is the degree of risk incurred by the fighting forces as a result. The degree of risk incurred will be situational and depend on the quality of the enemy force and will.⁴⁹

In order to encourage leaders to better overcome problems such as force caps we must design training that encourages innovative thinking and the ability to adapt. Much of the Army's training has been structured to follow prescriptive programs, such as ARTEPs (Army Training and Evaluations Program) CTCs, BCTPs (Battle Command Training Program), MDMP (Military Decision Making Process), and computer simulations that do not always support creative thinking and solutions. While these programs provide ways for leaders and staffs to approach problems, and in fact may help to provide synchronicity, programs that rely too much on the evaluation of proper procedures create an environment which limit the very outside-the-norm type of risk-taking decision making the military may really need. Leaders and staffs ought to feel free to develop creative or innovative approaches to problems. Regimented training programs rarely present the unusual and realistic types of problems our military often finds itself contending with today--like having to make do without a particular system or segment of a combined arms team. Rather, the Army needs to construct training that causes leaders, planners, and soldiers to think innovatively in order to find solutions to problems such as force caps.

Another way to encourage innovative thinking is with less evaluative oversight, perhaps in favor of more teaching. The Army culture is one that says the only good training is evaluative training with operator-controllers looking over one's shoulder. The cultural thinking is that without operator controllers, it is not really training. Such evaluative training tends to stymie necessary creative thinking and risk taking. The learning point should be more outcome based,

⁴⁹ Gray Interview

rather than doctrine based, where one might ask, Did it work? rather than an OC asking, Did it work in accordance with this pub or that pub? Furthermore, the Army needs a setting where discovering that a possible selected option for a solution did not work was also part of the learning process and is not seen in a negative light, for in experimentation and failure commanders, planners and soldiers have also learned. In order to encourage innovative thinking the Army must allow a training environment that gives commanders and staffs more opportunity for risk taking in their decision-making. This should be an environment where risk taking is encouraged and rewarded. One planner stated, “Leaders should be held accountable for training the units that they will fight. This includes their being able to conduct their own honest after action reviews and evaluations of their unit training as sometimes we get too wrapped up in outside observations.”⁵⁰

As for logistics, in the Army’s desire to be a smaller more rapidly deployable force, it must find the right balance between living as minimalists in austere conditions (which would no doubt have secondary influences on morale) versus having everything one might need and more. Obviously, the more forces and battle systems one has, the more support is required. The question becomes where does one draw the line? Rommel said, “The battle is won by the quartermaster before it ever starts”.⁵¹ In the Army’s efforts to be a lean, quick to react force, expectations for support remain high. This will require a mindset change in the Army, a cultural shift, but as a learning organization the Army must find the best balance.

As for the RFF process, under this innovation construct, one might recognize that the RFF process is slow and leads to unrealistic RDDs and LADs in the TPFDD. The joint staff would be able to find a way to refine the crisis action RFF and DEPORD process to make it

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Col Stephen F. Garret. “Synchronizing Battlefield Logistics” *Military Review*, March-April 1997

faster. Some believe that it is too dependent on the traditional TPFDD methodology and that a push system rather than a pull system is required.

Overcoming “ad hockery”

Forces in theater were able to overcome much of the ad hoc nature of the force structure due to three factors: doctrine, collaborative planning, and personal relationships.

Colonel Gray, C3 for CFLCC (Forward) stated,

Despite occasional disputes over the meaning of some definitions, joint doctrine provided a framework that our planners could turn to as an aid in structuring the CJTF, and as the basis for the Joint Operations they were going to do. The commonality of people knowing, at least in the U.S. services, how this was going to work helped. As for the major allies who were going to get into the fight, the Australians, the Canadians and later the Brits, they were NATO partners. Our processes are not too far apart so we, by and large, understand how to operate together. A second way the CJTF overcame was through collaborative planning. The key was involving all the subordinate headquarters in the planning process right up front. Their planners and S3's were coming into the planning bays and helping us. They got a voice in the plan's development. That the principle subordinate units collocated a forward command posts at Bagram greatly benefited teambuilding and better contributed to a common understanding of the operation. Finally, the role of personality in war is huge. Although the various units had never worked together previously, various commanders and staff members knew their key counterparts in higher headquarters and throughout the major subordinate units. For example, I had worked together with the CFLCC C3 – COL Mike Hawrylak – during a previous assignment. Our and a couple of CFLCC planners knew each other from SAMS. MG Hagenback knew COL Wiercinski as well as some of the Aussies and special ops folks from past assignments. . . . They knew each other and each other's capabilities, and it helped make Anaconda work.⁵²

This speaks to the importance of a common operating picture provided by doctrine and the value of all forces being well schooled in that joint doctrine, as well as the importance of providing opportunities for networking and building relationships via exercises, attendance at residence schools (instead of distance learning). In fact, the greatest outcome of school attendance may be in the opportunity to network and build relationships.

⁵² Gray Interview

Command Relationships

Command and control structures, with a lack of clearly defined command relationships, present the most difficulty. Echelons of command should be doctrinally employed to meet command and control requirements and support requirements of subordinate elements. That said, perhaps units should be more modularized in order to more easily fit mission requirements while maintaining unit cohesion. However, the trend is toward less Headquarters elements. This may be possible, but requires the Joint Forces Commands, and the Army, to relook carefully command structures as they exist now, and perhaps rebuild organizational structures in order to meet this new design trend. Even so, Joint Forces Commands and the Army should not forego what works for what may appear, on the surface, to be more efficient. The centralization of control requires more people and spreads the focus across different levels of war. Furthermore, during World War II centralization of command was shown to be an ineffective and undesirable way to operate as learned by the French at the outset of World War II. Contrast that with the German Army where decentralization and initiative was the desirable approach. Regulations supported this: “Independence of action of the lower commanders . . . is of decisive importance at all times . . . The Germans recognized that while strategic or grand tactical concepts had to be formulated by higher level commanders, the success of these concepts depended upon the lower-level commanders having the flexibility and freedom to capitalize on any momentary advantages they might gain.”⁵³

⁵³ Robert A Doughty. *The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939*. Connecticut: The Shoestring Press, Inc. 1985, 6.

JTF Headquarters and Revisiting the Rapid Deployment Force

A standing plug-and-play-type JTF HQ, with both soundly thought out subordinate structures and clearly defined subordinate command relationships and a willingness to decentralize authority to subordinate HQs may be a more efficient model. This idea will have to overcome service cultures and requires additional training methodologies to create effective joint task forces.

The concept of a standing JTF HQ along with a standing rapid reaction force was explored during the Carter administration with an eye toward focusing for low-intensity conflict utilizing conventional forces. The thought was to develop a light infantry suitable for rapid deployment to overseas trouble spots. Special forces would make up a small part of this. In 1977, the post-Vietnam strategy envisioned the use of a general-purpose force outside the NATO framework to provide a fast and flexible response to an overseas crisis. The concept was to develop forces that could operate independently, with neither forward bases nor friendly nation facilities, such as Korea, the Persian Gulf region, and the Middle East. Implementation was underway in January 1979, when the fall of the Shah of Iran caused a more rapid realization of this goal. The assignment of units to a combined services force was reportedly concluded by mid-1979, and President Carter ordered the formation of the first Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) on 1 October 1979. Initial operational plans were in response to the crises of the moment (Iran, Central America). Preparations for deployment centered on the Persian Gulf and Caribbean. By 1980 the command structure of the new forces were underway with Marine General Kelley assigned to command the first RDF at the Headquarters at McDill Air Force Base. RDF joint force was innovative, as it required tight interservice cooperation in a streamlined command structure. The concept was that a JTF would be brought together rapidly when required, but would not be brought together on permanent standby. Only an RDF nucleus was on permanent

standby including the 15,000-man 82nd Airborne Division, and three infantry brigades on permanent high state of readiness for rapid deployment. The Army's role in the Rapid Deployment Forces was performed largely through light infantry divisions, formations that had been phased out in 1944, but were revived for their rapid deployability and as a show of force, particularly where there were low-to-mid-level intensity conflict threats and for the prevention of the outbreak of war. Army Chief of Staff General John Wickam felt that there was value and "battlefield utility" of "highly deployable, hard hitting combat units." Ultimately, however, the concept of an RDF was shelved. The Army swung back to a more conventional, higher intensity role for light divisions. Army doctrine, FM 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict*, assigned Special Operations the role of counterinsurgency and low-intensity conflict, with conventional forces on call for reinforcement and shows of force when needed. In the 1980's Special Operations Forces gained acceptance because of international terrorism, the Iranian revolution and the ideological romanticism of Ronald Reagan and the New Right. In the seventies the force of choice had been conventional forces with commando skills. This resulted in the 1974 creation of two Ranger battalions. The poor performance of the special warfare elites in Grenada resulted in the creation of a third ranger battalion. The 1978 study of elite forces suggested that the Ranger Model would replace Special Forces as the Ranger Battalions fit the specialist model of a small force trained for missions, such as hostage rescues. "The special forces were, for a time, unfashionable for their tendency to proliferate, to circumvent the chain of command, to grandstand with romantic stunts, indiscipline, and autonomy, and, even worse, to threaten the apolitical foundations of the military. The Ranger battalions, in contrast, provided neat packages of skilled personnel with most of the desirable qualities of elite units and none of the liabilities. According to Cohen, the reactivation of the Rangers, in short, was an expression of "the Army's intention not to repeat its unpleasant experiences with the Green Berets.""⁵⁴ In fact, the prediction could hardly have been more

⁵⁴ "Carter and the Special Operations Elite" <http://www.statecraft.org/chapter13.html>

inaccurate. Under the Carter administration, the revival of the Special Forces was already underway.”⁵⁵

Command relationships and architectures need to be delineated clearly to all from the outset, providing commanders as much control as possible to ensure the greatest possible effectiveness during combat operations. Because command relationships should be clearly delineated for war, they should also be clearly defined for training, so that commanders and staffs may frequently practice: structuring forces, working within a soundly designated command relationship, but mostly so that operational control (OPCON) becomes a less of a dirty word, but rather, a familiar way to conduct operations. Exercises should be conducted as commanders most desire our command and control relationships to look for the fight, and OPCON provides the most effective command relationship for operations. Without clearly defined command relationships the planning and execution of operations will flounder.

CONCLUSION

There are many issues and risks associated with limiting the amount of forces to conduct a campaign or operation. In the case of Operation Enduring Freedom both operations and logistics were affected due to force caps. This was apparent in the account of the Marines insertion into Forward Operating Base Rhino, the ad hoc nature of the force, and the overuse of the cumbersome Request for Forces Process. Task Force Smith provided a look at one of the dangers of an operation that could lead to piecemeal commitment. The reasons for the force caps included both operational and strategic considerations. The ultimate finding was that Joint Forces and the Army should deploy intact units that are doctrinally organized and trained cohesively. In the likely event we are not able to do so, we should be prepared to be flexible and innovative. This should start with training that requires flexible and innovative approaches. Perhaps the most

⁵⁵ Ibid.

important finding of this research was that positive relationships between individual commanders and staffs of separate organizations greatly influenced the effectiveness of operations, and the Army should therefore encourage relationship building and networking within the Army community, as well as with our sister services, multinational partners, and interagency personnel.

Did force caps prevent ground component commanders from prosecuting this war according to the Army's doctrinal concept of overwhelming force? Obviously the answer to this question is "yes." Combatant and Army Commanders and planners, as well as our political leadership, must consider how self-imposed constraints may have far reaching implications that are in conflict with achieving the stated doctrinal goal of "overwhelming decisive victory." In this Afghanistan Campaign, the latest model for war fighting, there was a tradeoff between political considerations and the above stated goal. Ultimately our military must be able to be flexible in the way it operates and responds to any missions that may transpire, especially if the trend toward force caps is to be the norm. In this case the army need not pretend that we will fight as doctrine states, with overwhelming force, but rather, our country and our leadership at all levels must understand, and be willing to accept the trade-off required in terms of risks and impacts, and there are many, associated with this trend toward utilizing less force. In this case the required flexibility can only be achieved through situational training that requires improvisation, and well-designed organizational structures, as well as the aforementioned relationship building.

APPENDIX – 1 LITERATURE REVIEW

The research materials for this study included case studies, reports, briefings, news articles, and interviews and correspondence with planners and operators who had firsthand experience with the issues associated with this monograph. The following is a review of each of the documents and interviews associated with the writing of this report.

The first document is a case study entitled *The First Year: US Army Forces Central Command During Operation Enduring Freedom* by Colonel John A. Bonin, USA (Retired) of the Military Heritage Foundation. He describes some of the challenges faced by U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) / Third U.S. Army in providing “full-spectrum land power” to General Tommy Franks during the first year of Operation Enduring Freedom. Specifically, he focuses on ARCENT’s planning and conduct of operations in what he describes as “the constrained environment of a small scale contingency.”⁵⁶ In this study Bonin discusses the unplanned number of missions required to be performed while also remaining within the force cap constraint. He also describes staff tailoring, as well as the flat organizational structure where many units reported directly to Army Central Command (ARCENT). The document also provided an excellent chronology of events, which occurred between 5 September 2001 and 11 September 2002 that proved helpful to gaining an understanding of the sequence of events.

The ARCENT Combined Arms Assessment Team Initial Impressions Report (IIR), published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Chapter 1, addresses limitations placed on the Army Service Component Command. The introduction of this chapter explains that restrictions imposed by limited strategic lift assets, limited infrastructure in the area of responsibility (AOR), and the concern for force protection drove Central Command to impose

⁵⁶ John A. Bonin, “A Case Study: The First Year: US Army Forces Central Command During Operation Enduring Freedom,” Prepared for the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, 1 November 2002, 1.

strict limits on the number of personnel deployed within the AOR. The outcome was that the commander of CFLCC (Combined Forces Land Component Command) had to create a command and control structure that had no intervening corps or division headquarters, requiring the CFLCC to operate in the tactical realm down to squad and detachment operations. The lessons outlined in this chapter focus on how the CFLCC attempted to overcome the problems associated with a radically altered battle command structure as well as identifying staff training and design weaknesses inherent in the current ASCC Table of Equipment and Organization (TO&E)⁵⁷. Chapter 6 of this same document contains a synopsis of logistics and deployment challenges. The report states that “the overarching facts that impacted logistics support inside Afghanistan and the surrounding countries was the United States Central Command limits on forces that could go into each country.” It goes on to explain how partial units were deployed, and that these units had little flexibility to do additional tasks. The chapter also addresses the lengthy request for forces (RFF) process.⁵⁸

Another product out of CALL was a briefing for the Defense Science Board entitled, “Emerging Lessons, Insights and Observations: Operation Enduring Freedom,” 25 June 2002. Of interest was a bullet statement under the slide entitled Issue: Deployment, where again the lengthy RFF process is addressed. Furthermore, there are a number of relevant issues addressed in the slide entitled, Issue: Command and Control including: force constraints, troop-to-task methodologies, nondoctrinal ad hoc structures and solutions, C2 structures, peacetime manning policies, and command relationships.

CFLCC and CFLCC (Forward) planners and operators also provided firsthand insight into force cap and command and control issues. Interviews and correspondence with these staff

⁵⁷ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *ARCENT CAAT Initial Impressions Report (IIR)* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 2002 Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2002), 1.

⁵⁸ Author unknown, *Execution 25 November to 25 December*, n.d., [article on-line]; available from <http://www.strategy page.com/articles/tf58/execution.asp>; internet accessed Nov 2002.

members were, in fact, the impetus for this study. Once these overriding concerns were discovered, efforts were focused on obtaining input from these officers as to why force caps were in place, the resulting command and control structure, the RFF process, and how the mission was affected by the force caps.

The fourth of June 2002 issue of the *Washington Post* contains an article, “War Report Criticizes Distant Command.” In this article, the author discusses the problems associated with CENTCOM’s distant command and, more relevant to this study, raises the issue of force caps. The Marines had to return forces to ships. This was done without much knowledge of the rationale for the force cap.

The likely basis for that particular article was two Marine Reports, *Execution, 25 November to 25 December* and *Sustainment, 25 November to 26 February 2002*. The reports discuss the Marine operation as part of Task Force 58 and specifically their insertion into forward operating base Rhino, as well as the impact of force caps on their operations. It also discusses the Marines relationship with CFLCC.

Bush at War, by Bob Woodward, provided a strategic political background for this paper, and the background as to political and diplomatic constraints that would come to influence the way the forces would be used. This book describes the George W. Bush administration’s reaction to the events of 11 September, 2001. Of particular interest for the writing of this subject were: (1) the administrations development of achievable military goals, and (2) how the military element of power was to be utilized in order to achieve those strategic objectives.

Seymour Hersh’s article in the *New Yorker*, “Offense and Defense,” and Ralph Peters article “Shock, Awe and Overconfidence,” further provided insight into the administrations desire to change the Army force into a leaner, more technologically driven fighting force. The articles relate to the war plans for Operation Iraqi Freedom where Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was said to have pushed Army leadership toward using less forces than the leadership believed would

be adequate for the operation. The articles apply to this paper as they offer perspective as to why the administration would desire to limit force.

Gaining historical examples and perspectives was also important to the writing of this paper. *The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939*, by Robert Allen Doughty explains the reasons for France's inability to effectively fight the Germans in World War Two principally that they had trained, organized and equipped, developed their doctrine, and strategized for the wrong type of war. This is contrasted with the success of the German Army who had made leaps in their approach to warfare. The significance of this book to the writing of this paper is in the lessons to be learned from the German Army Command and Control system. The Germans were able to operate with flexibility and also saw the benefits of, and were effective at, decentralized decision making.

There were two principal sources regarding Task Force Smith which offered a historical example of piecemeal commitment. Task Force Smith was a 540 man battalion sized task force of the 24th Infantry Division under Lt. Col Charles Smith, that was rushed from Japan to Korea in 1950 in order to slow the drive to Pusan by the 4th Division of the North Korean People's Army. The first source was in the May June 2001 issue of the *Military Review*. It contains an article by Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L. Kennedy Jr., U.S. Army, retired, entitled "Force Protection Implications: TF Smith and the 24th Infantry Division, Korea 1950." The second was Chapter 9, "Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950," by Roy K. Flint in the book, *Americas First Battles*. Both discuss the piecemeal commitment of the 24th Infantry Division to the Korean Peninsula in order block the enemy advance. This historical event has many implications for the Army of today as it is still contending with many of the same issues the 24th faced during their mission.

"Carter and the Special Operations Elite" is an article that included information about attempts in the late 1970s to put together a rapid reaction force. This was to include a standing

headquarters along with standby conventional forces of airborne and light infantry, as well as some special forces. The concept was beginning to be realized, but was shelved when a change of administration caused a return to a more traditional larger force that would continue to give focus to the Cold War, and a reliance on special forces for counterinsurgency missions. The concept is explored more deeply in this paper as it seems worthy of further investigation for a possible way to construct forces and conduct operations in the future.

Field Manuals (FMs) 3-0, *Operations*, and 3-90, *Tactics*, provide doctrinal definitions and principles relevant to the subject topic. FM 3-0 defines the roles of commands at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It further discusses the principles of war including mass.

All of the above references proved helpful to this project, but a few in particular were especially of value. *Bush at War* was especially useful as it provided the strategic context for this paper. *The First Year: US Army Forces Central Command During Operation Enduring Freedom* by John A. Bonin Colonel, USA (Ret.) was a well written paper that documented many of the events of the Operation in Afghanistan. The CALL paper from the Initial Impressions conference was especially useful in that it brought out many of the lessons learned in the campaign that related well to this paper. The Marine reports were also helpful in that they provided an example of the issues discussed here. Finally, and probably the most useful, were the interviews with the planners and operators who as earlier stated were the impetus for this study.

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