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THE JOINT FIRES ELEMENT: AN INITIAL SOLUTION

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

THE JOINT FIRES ELEMENT: AN INITIAL SOLUTION

The 21st Century joint force will be the centerpiece for a wide range of military operations that will emphasize gaining operational and strategic effects against the enemy force. Modern systems, sophisticated communications, sensors and unprecedented battlefield awareness make more decentralized and independent operations easier to plan, coordinate and execute. As the joint task force assumes the role as the primary deployment arm of the military instrument, its commander must be capable of managing a multitude of operational level activities across a battle space that continues to change its shape and become less defined. The addition of the Joint Fires Element to the JTF provides the commander with a dedicated staff to ensure that the joint force is capable of successfully accomplishing the joint fire support tasks and allows component commanders to focus greater attention to planning and execution of assigned missions. Simply stated, there is a compelling need for a standing joint fires element at the joint task force headquarters to plan, coordinate and integrate joint fires into the commander's concept of operations. This paper briefly summarizes the need to modify current doctrine, presents the current state of staff roles and functions to manage joint fires, identifies where doctrine has attempted to appease its critics but fallen short of adequately addressing the key issues, and finally presents a suggested organization at the joint task force level to plan, coordinate and execute effective joint operational fires.

Successful joint military operations depend in large part on the ability of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to arrange the multitude of tasks and operational level activities that when properly synchronized result in a robust and fluid operational design. The overarching goal of this effort is to achieve the desired operational and strategic effects on the enemy force, its logistics structure, its command and control network and its leadership. Ideally, joint operations should be able to achieve decisive results in the most efficient and effective manner. This entails delivering synchronized joint fires in a mutual supporting role with operational maneuver of land, air and maritime forces. The effective and efficient employment of joint forces describes in part the essence of the effects-based operations concept which is slowly finding its way into joint doctrine to describe how the future joint force should conduct combat operations.¹ Joint Forces Command defines effects-based operations as *a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or "effect" on the enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.*² At its root, this concept captures the true intent of joint operations. It describes a means of attacking the enemy in simultaneous fashion to disrupt and destroy his capacity to wage war. While many assets and capabilities are available to the JFC, joint doctrine identifies six critical functions that complement the actions of major joint combat forces and require careful consideration in the commander's efforts to shape and influence all facets of enemy operations. One of the most important of these functions is operational fires. At the operational level of war, these fires are synonymous with the term *joint fire support* as it appears in current doctrinal publications.

To avoid disagreement over the exact definition of the term, it is helpful to rely on doctrine to provide a common language on which to base this analysis. Joint fire support are those lethal and non-lethal fires originating from air, land, sea, special operations forces (SOF), and space assets against surface targets anywhere in the joint area of operations (JOA) and bounded operating areas for the land, maritime, or amphibious force.³ The exact definition differs among sources but one meaning seems to capture the intent of fire support to the joint task force: the application of firepower to achieve a desired impact on the outcome of a campaign or major operation.⁴ Operational fires encompass the lethal and non-lethal means capable of influencing all aspects of joint operations through the breadth and depth of the battle space. In order to limit the scope of pertinent issues in this paper, future reference to joint operations will mean major combat forces employed in a mid to high intensity conflict to achieve operational and strategic objectives designated by the JFC and governing combatant commander. The various means and associated capabilities of a wide range of systems require detailed planning and coordination among critical staff elements in the joint task force to ensure that fires are effective and efficient in creating the desired operational and strategic effects. The current library of joint and service doctrinal publications devotes significant effort to develop roles and functions for staff elements and command and control cells to plan, coordinate and execute operational fires. However, this subject continues to cause friction among service and component members of the joint force. Specifically the disagreement centers on how the joint force commander should organize his staff and component commands to fulfill his responsibilities to plan, coordinate, and synchronize joint fires with other operational functions in support of the campaign plan. Standard practice has acknowledged that the air component executes the majority of

operational fire support for the joint force and is organized to provide the requisite command, control and communications in this capacity. The challenge is to integrate all sources of joint fires in a synchronized manner and achieve the desired effects against the enemy capabilities without loss of operational tempo and momentum.

Joint operations in the 21st century have created a two-edged dilemma for the commander. On one hand he now has access to more resources capable of delivering accurate and effective fires throughout the depth and breadth of the battle space. This enhanced flexibility to shape the campaign and influence enemy actions without having to engage in decisive combat operations, however, invites a more pressing requirement to manage the timing and placement of fires. The argument for better coordination and centralized planning is not new, but nonetheless far from settled. Its manifestation has been an ongoing disagreement between the army and air force on how to exercise command and control of assets within the boundaries established in fire support coordination measures. The substance of this issue is however greater than a discussion of permissive fire control measures and how they should divide component responsibilities. This paper is not an effort to resolve the dispute, nor is it intended to prolong the argument. Its purpose is to focus attention on the real issue of what doctrinal changes would be in the best interests of the joint force and its commander. Simply stated, there is a compelling need for a standing joint fires element at the joint task force headquarters to plan, coordinate and integrate joint fires into the commander's concept of operations. This paper briefly summarizes the need to modify current doctrine, presents the current state of staff roles and functions to manage joint fires, identifies where doctrine has attempted to appease its critics but fallen short of adequately

addressing the key issues, and finally presents a suggested organization at the joint task force level to plan, coordinate and execute effective joint operational fires.

The justification for centralized planning and coordination of joint fire support arises from drastic changes in the geometry of the battle space, the rapid technologic advances in weapon systems capabilities, and the migrating character of military operations. As the scope of military operations continues to grow, the joint task force assumes greater responsibility for a battle space that lacks precise definition and hosts a number of near simultaneous military actions that may extend well beyond the traditional boundaries of passive fire control measures. Joint doctrine encourages decentralized operations that translate into greater flexibility for component forces. No longer are military operations confined to linear combat aimed at applying overwhelming conventional force to attrite and eliminate the enemy's forces. The broader dimension of the operational environment forces the JFC to devote more time and effort to coordinating his fire support plans and enhances his ability to achieve and maintain unity of effort during operations. Technology and changes in war fighting provide further evidence to warrant more disciplined joint fires coordination. Improvements in the range, precision and lethality of weapons systems have expanded the number of assets capable of delivering operational fires. Virtually all fighter and bomber aircraft in the US Air Force inventory are capable of precision guided attacks against point targets. The Navy's sea-based aircraft, naval gunfire and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) add to this arsenal for precision strike. The Army's improved Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS), Tactical Missile System (TACMS), and Apache attack helicopters are capable of striking targets at greater ranges that have historically been vulnerable to air interdiction alone. These assets enabled by an integrated intelligence

network and a resilient command, control and communications system form a decisive capabilities based force. As the means available to the Joint Task Force (JTF) continue to improve, the ways of employment evolve as well. Recent operational experience in Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the contributions of special operations forces and psychological operations units in joint fire support. Their presence 'dirty' the landscape in the Joint Area of Operations (JOA) because of the nature of their missions and the noncontiguous boundaries defining their respective areas of operation. The JTF commander faces the challenge of matching joint fires capabilities of any or all of these lethal and non-lethal means to a set of desired effects on the enemy in order to accomplish his operational objectives. These forces weigh heavily in the development of the maneuver scheme, have a direct influence on the timing of critical events, and are essential to ensuring unity of effort among members of the JTF.

While the need to formalize joint fires management exists, current joint doctrine has only offered partial solutions to the problem based on input from operators, combatant commands and detailed review of organizations in the joint task force. Beginning in 1988, efforts to incorporate a joint fires element or the position of a joint force fires coordinator into joint doctrine have suffered due to ongoing differences between the army and air force on terminology and duty descriptions.⁵ Operation Desert Storm motivated numerous articles and research efforts on the topic of joint fires coordination. Literature espousing both pro and con arguments on the relative merits of the JFE blankets many of the professional military education book shelves. As one would expect, the army owns the majority of the pro cases, while the air force claims the preponderance of the dissenting opinions. A review of some of these leaves the author doubting that the services will ever agree to a practical and

functional JFE organization. The result is that the issue is not settled and still requires attention. In his monograph on joint fires coordination and unity of effort, LTC Eckert discusses how ineffective fires coordination between the air and ground components in Desert Storm resulted in compartmented fires information and two independent subordinate campaigns.⁶ This observation runs counter to the purpose and benefits of joint operations and is one of a number of situations where the task force staff did not successfully integrate joint fires. A dedicated joint fires coordination group would be in a better position to link resources to campaign objectives and maintain visibility on the current priorities with the goal of efficient mission assignments and integration of assigned assets in support of the plan. These and other like illustrations spawned an interest to investigate the issue further. In November 1996, the J7 Directorate of the Joint Staff initiated a formal study to evaluate the validity of creating a position of the joint force fires coordinator (JFFC) in Joint Publication 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. The Joint Warfighting Center from the Joint Forces Command investigated the advantages and disadvantages, long term implications and the impact on joint doctrine and joint targeting procedures of adding a joint forces fire coordinator to the task force staff. Their research included service and joint doctrinal publications, reviews of standard operating procedures from multiple combatant commands, personal interviews with senior leaders and former chairs of joint targeting control boards, numerous documented joint lessons learned, and other literature and papers on the topic of joint fire support and coordination. In general, the study concluded that the increased complexity of joint task force operations requires a devoted staff element to perform the necessary planning and coordination functions of all joint fires for the force commander.⁷ Specifically, the study team stated that improved joint operations efficiency through

synchronization of joint fires with other elements such as maneuver, information operations, and logistics was the overriding factor in weighing the pros and cons of the JFFC concept.⁸ Since then, changes in joint doctrine, service/component experience, and continued reliance on well known fire control support measures have guided the state of current practice in planning and coordinating joint fires.

Current joint doctrine has attempted to incorporate some of these observations and has established guidelines, roles and functions for staff and component members with regard to joint fire support. The JFC retains overall responsibility to synchronize and integrate operational fires. At his discretion, the commander may designate a Joint Targeting Control Board (JTCB) to perform a set of specified tasks that include oversight of the targeting process and formal review of the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) to ensure they are consistent with the campaign plan.⁹ Often, the deputy JFC heads the JTCB and its major function becomes an integrating center for target identification and prioritization. Its members include the J2, J3, J5, command representatives from the joint force component commanders (JFACC, JFLCC, JFMCC, JSOCC, and JPOTF) and other force elements as necessary. Normally, the board reviews plans for operations over the next 24-48 hours and works to validate the joint fires plan for execution out to 72 hours with primary emphasis given to target development. Finally, the board makes recommendations for future targeting and this information is sent to all members of the joint force.¹⁰ The J-3 role centers on integrating the fires plan with maneuver and other operational functions. One of his key functions is to make recommendations to the JFC on the location and timing of fire control measures which in theory provide the necessary clarity to de-conflict ground and air space management to prevent fratricide. An optional element for the J-3 is the formation of a joint

fires element (JFE) which provides a dedicated team (from within the J3 proper) to interact with the JTCB and other staff elements in the targeting process. While not specifically designated, it seems logical that the lead of the JFE should be the JFFC as suggested in the 1997 JWC study. In addition to the joint force staff elements, each service/component provides staff cells to plan, coordinate and control the execution of joint fire support. They are too numerous to include here, but all play important roles in their respective positions.

While the joint force appears to have the necessary organization and framework for fulfilling its joint fire support functions, there is still substantial evidence to suggest that current joint doctrine is less than adequate and has not provided authoritative direction to the tasks of joint force fire support. In after action comments from the Command Post Exercise (CPX) Unified Endeavor 98-1, then US Atlantic Command's operations staff suggested a shift in emphasis for the performance of the JTCB in fulfilling its doctrinal functions. Chaired by the Deputy JFC, the board concentrated on operational issues affecting the JTF rather than devoting available time on targeting and related tactical level operations.¹¹ Recall that the majority of current joint doctrine aligns the roles and functions of the JTCB with the targeting process rather than with the broader role of integrating joint fire support into the campaign's operational scheme. While target selection and prioritization for engagement are important steps in the targeting cycle process, they are tasks that are more closely related to component planning and execution stages in the joint fire system. These steps are essentially those taken at the highest tactical levels of component commands to plan and execute the fires plan and should not account for the majority of the tasks and workload assigned to the formal board process. This situation is one that doctrine sidesteps to some degree by making the JTCB an option for the JFC and by stating its functions in broad, non-specific terms. Fire

support doctrine refers to the responsibilities of the JTCB as typically including target information review, developing targeting guidance and priorities, and preparing and refining joint target lists.¹² In a related set of comments, the USACOM operations staff made a case that the designation of a Joint Fires Element (JFE) in the J3 section of the joint force staff should not be optional. They assessed the JFE as an effective means of aiding in the management of the joint fires process. They concluded that joint doctrine should develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the JFE to include specific details on its possible organization, structure, and assigned responsibilities.¹³ After Exercise Blue Flag 97-1, the J3 Plans from the US Central Command commented on the JTCB board actions in a slightly different context. The primary discussion centered on how the board functioned as a "total coordination forum which allowed the components and staff to coordinate and ensure current and future operations conformed to the guidance issued by the Joint Forces Commander."¹⁴ The board in this case appears to have functioned as a 'brief back' session between component commanders and the JFC which is typically not one of the board's primary functions in current joint doctrine. The Air Combat Command (ACC) offered a different perspective on the appointment of a joint force fires coordination cell based on their experiences in CPX Unified Endeavor 97-1. The main observation from working with the XVIII Airborne Corps JFFC was that its organization and functions mirrored that of the joint air operations center (JAOC) and duplicated Joint Pub 3-5's description of JFACC responsibilities.¹⁵ These observations all raise valid points about the relative merits of a joint fires element (joint force fires coordination cell). Some favor the benefits of a dedicated staff to integrate fires, the latter comment brings into question why the duplication of effort exists.

The air component executes the majority of joint fires because of its capabilities to strike targets at greater ranges with precision guided munitions in shorter periods of time. Additionally, the air component exercises operational control over much of the airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets that are so essential to effective target detection and engagement. If one overlays the additional roles of the primary airspace manager and the theater air defense coordinator to the JFACC and air operations center, the potential for exceeding staff capacity increases. At the same time, such a difference in perspective illustrates why there is such an overwhelming demand to simplify centralized control of joint fire support so that components that are responsible to execute their respective share of the fires plan may focus on those missions. Even though the nature and mission scope of designated joint task forces depends on national and theater level command direction and strategic direction, the composition of the JFE should reflect balance and uniformity in order to provide the requisite planning, synchronization and coordination of the joint fires plan and its integration into the commander's operational concept.

The JFE should become a fixed organization at the JTF level with a prescribed set of roles and functions that to the greatest extent possible do not interfere with, disrupt or duplicate planning, command and control, or execution at the component level. The first four phases of the six-phase joint targeting process provide the necessary framework upon which to build the JFE and its primary working arm, the Joint Fires Coordination Board (JFCB). The commander's estimate and initial sessions of the joint planning group (assuming in this case that one has been designated for the JTF) will accomplish the first step in the joint targeting cycle: *Commander's Objectives, Guidance, and Intent*. The initial session of the newly designated JFCB will review this information to ensure complete

understanding among JTF members of how the commander envisions bringing all necessary assets to bear in accomplishing assigned objectives. This board, chaired by the Deputy JFC and run by the JFE Chief (Deputy J3) would review and revise as necessary the integration of the joint fires plan with the operational scheme by working through the phases of the campaign or major operations plan. At each phase, the JFE will describe how joint fires will enable the supported commander to create the desired military end state conditions that will facilitate seamless transition to follow-on phases. Inherent in this explanation is an explicit (or implicit) assignment of component responsibilities for the execution of fires. This guidance would remain at the operational level and avoid tactical level issues whenever possible. Information exchange and candid discussions on the roles that each component will play in the joint fires plan will result in a broader understanding of the scheme and its assigned objectives. The major product from the JFCB should be a conceptual plan for the next phase of the operation to include the desired effects joint fires will have on the enemy forces, command and control and logistics functions, and how the essential details of synchronization and de-confliction of battle space management will occur. This is the forum where component planners work out the activation, location and movement of the fire support coordination measures (e.g. FSCL, no-fire areas, restricted fire areas) as they relate to decisive points in the current operational phase.

In order to develop a coordinated fires plan, the JFE must also address the next three phases of the targeting process: *Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization, Capabilities Analysis, and Commander's Decision and Force Assignment*.¹⁶ This involves parallel planning at both the JTF and component levels. This part of the planning and coordination assures that the competencies and experience resident in the JTF

components play lead roles to ensure that the fires will have the desired operational effects. Their purpose is to match capabilities analysis and possible force assignments coincident with the development of the joint fires plan. After the initial JFCB, each component begins (or continues as the situation dictates) respective staff actions to prepare a target list that satisfies the operational requirements for the current and subsequent phases of the campaign. For examples, within the air component's air tasking cycle, the staff prepares its CIPTL (*component integrated prioritized target list*) for submission to the JFE and continues development of a draft master air attack plan focused on execution of its missions in the current operational phase. Completed in succession, these products become the major input into the joint air tasking order for the JTF.¹⁷ This is a prime example of how the centralized planning and control of joint fires (JFE) might free component commanders to prioritize their efforts on planning and executing joint fire tasks in support of the plan. Recall one of the joint lessons learned focused on the duplication of effort between a designated JFE and the JAOC. The formation of the JFE in the JTF will centralize planning functions for the operational commander and provide clearer guidance to components on the comprehensive joint fires plan. Its acceptance promises to enhance the commander's ability to create synergy among task force components, which as a whole will exceed the sum total of their individual contributions. To accomplish this task, the JFE should consist of key staff elements from JTF components and refocus the efforts of a JFCB toward assuring the synchronization and effectiveness of the joint fires plan with the commander's phased campaign plan.

The JFE should consist of planners from each of the major components as well as other key members of the JTF planning staff. Figure 1 presents a sample organization for the




Figure 1 – Organization of the JFE

JFE. Its structure should remain flexible to allow for augmentation depending on the nature of the JTF mission. The JFE Chief will be the Deputy J3. His primary functions would be to direct the development of the fires estimate and to provide the conceptual framework to link fires with other operational functions. The JFACC representative should be the Deputy Chief of the Combat Plans Division (CPD) who possesses vast experience and understanding of planning future joint air operations.¹⁸ The JFLCC representative should be the senior fire support coordinator (FSCoord) from the predominant land force (army or marine). The maritime component representative may come from either the Marine Ground Combat Element (GCE) fire support coordination center (FSCC) or from the Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC) depending on the JTF mission and task organization. These elements provide critical links to amphibious and sea borne operations during each phase of the campaign. Their inclusion in the JFE captures the knowledge and experience of how the maritime component complements and makes use of joint fire support and provides coordination and control of all organic and non-organic fires within the operational area in support of the amphibious force.¹⁹ The special operations (SOLE) and psychological operations (POLE) liaison elements need not perform functions both in the JFACC and the JFE. As components to the JFC (JTF), their priority of effort should be to the coordination of

their contribution to joint fires as well as the synchronization of their missions with other components. In addition to the components, the JTF staff provides representation across all operational functions to integrate effective and efficient use of limited resources and assess the impact of joint fires on their respective areas. This organization provides the JFC with a comprehensive means of formulating and evaluating the fires plan to ensure that it maximizes the commander's ability to achieve the desired effects against the enemy. The following is a list of primary responsibilities for the JFE:

- *Develop the joint fire support plan in concert with the Joint Force Commander's operational scheme.*
- *Prepare the agenda for and convene the Joint Fires Coordination Board to present a fires concept that includes initial assessments of component responsibilities for phased execution.*
- *Recommend passive fire support control measures that maximize effective synchronization of joint fires during each phase of the campaign.*
- *Conduct initial capabilities analysis and make recommendations to the JFC on apportionment of assets.*
- *Develop the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL) based on input from components (Component Integrated Prioritized Target List).*

Working in close association with the JFE is the JFCB. Its primary emphasis needs to shift from the development and integration of specific targets to a validation and verification role in assuring that the fires plan complements the maneuver plan for each phase of the operation. This also entails a review of the supported commander's phased objectives and how well the apportionment, timing and concept of joint fires supports the JTF main effort. Figure 2 presents an example of a JFCB. Based in part on input from the JFFC study




Figure 2 – Joint Fires Coordination Board

and other joint lessons learned, the following is a recommended list of responsibilities for the JFCB.

- *Review and validate the final JIPTL recommendation for the JFC.*
- *Review fires concept and advise the JFC on recommended changes in the apportionment, timing and method of achieving desired effects.*
- *Review and de-conflict fire support control measures for each phase of the operation.*

Its traditional role of identifying and prioritizing targets should shift to the components as they prepare respective CIPTL for consolidation at the JTF level. One possible exception to this idea would be the assignment of specific weapon systems to a unique high-value target. It is evident that the process needs to free itself from decisions and discussions that are better served at the component levels where execution planning is the priority.

The future acceptance of the JFE and JFCB depend in large part on the willingness of the services (namely the army and air force) to acknowledge the necessity to centralize the planning and coordination for joint fire support within the joint task force staff. More importantly however is the explicit recognition that the joint force commander retains the

responsibility for effective and efficient employment of joint force assets. While the air, ground and maritime components will all contribute to the achievement of decisive effects against the adversary, their execution of joint fires complements other critical operational functions and allows the commander greater flexibility in delivering joint fires throughout the battle space. The JFE concept would be a prime candidate for an implementation test at the Joint Force Command Joint Experimentation Center. There are numerous opportunities available to evaluate how well the concept works, and what manning and structural changes might be necessary. One possibility might be to incorporate the JFE in one of the Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters (SJTFHQ) options. At a minimum, the joint community should not dismiss the idea based on terminology or service paranoia alone.

The 21st Century joint force will be the centerpiece for a wide range of military operations that will emphasize gaining operational and strategic effects against the enemy force. Modern systems, sophisticated communications, sensors and unprecedented battlefield awareness make more decentralized and independent operations easier to plan, coordinate and execute. As the joint task force assumes the role as the primary deployment arm of the military instrument, its commander must be capable of managing a multitude of operational level activities across a battle space that continues to change its shape and become less defined. The addition of the Joint Fires Element to the JTF provides the commander with a dedicated staff to ensure that the joint force is capable of successfully accomplishing the four basic fire support tasks: provide timely and effective fire support to forces in contact, support the commander's concept of operations, synchronize all fires and sustain these operations over the course of a phased campaign.²⁰ A reorientation of the JFCB to integration and synchronization at the operational level will achieve better coordination

among components and in turn allow the JFC to bring forces to bear in order to achieve the desired effects. The introduction of the JFE to the joint task force staff represents a major opportunity to make a positive impact on the joint force commander's ability to prosecute operations with greater speed and effectiveness. The time has come to put down the writing instruments and build the solution.

ENDNOTES

¹ Edward Mann, Gary Endersby and Tom Searle, "Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Operations," Aerospace Power Journal, 15 (Fall, 2001): 94.

² "Glossary of Terms." <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm> [27 March 2003].

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 12 May 1998), I-7.

⁴ Milan Vego, Operational Warfare (Newport: Naval War College 2000), 239.

⁵ Jay M. Vittori, "Fighting Fires with Fire – An Airman's Perspective on the Development of Joint Publication 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support," (Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University, Air War College, 1999) 4-6.

⁶ Gregory M. Eckert, "Joint Fire Support: How to Achieve Unity of Effort," (Fort Leavenworth KS, US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1995), 20.

⁷ Joint Forces Command, Study Report on the Joint Force Fires Coordinator, (Washington, DC: 1997), IV-1.

⁸ Ibid., IV-1.

⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Joint Pub 3-09 (Washington, DC: 12 May 1998), I-4.

¹⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, Joint Pub 3-60 (Washington, DC: 17 January 2002), III-12.

¹¹ JULLS, "Operation of a Joint Targeting Control Board," 20840-60987, 4 November 1997.

¹² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Joint Pub 3-09 (Washington, DC: 12 May 1998), I-4.

¹³ JULLS, "Formation of a Joint Fires Cell," 20840-17030, 4 November 1997.

¹⁴ JULLS, "JTCB Process," 41858-30813, 3 April 1997.

¹⁵ JULLS, "Inappropriate Use of Joint Forces Fire Coordinator," 68248-54519, 18 December 1996.

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, Joint Pub 3-60 (Washington, DC: 17 January 2002), II-2.

¹⁷ Ibid., C-7.

¹⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 3-56.1 (Washington, DC: 14 November 1994), C-1.

¹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, Joint Pub 3-02 (Washington, DC: 19 September 2001), VII-2.

²⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Joint Pub 3-09 (Washington, DC: 12 May 1998), III-2.

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