The Combatant Commander and Effective Operational HUMINT: Lessons From the Double Cross System of World War II and the CJ2X of Operation Joint Guard
Abstract
Within the intelligence battle-space operating system, there is human intelligence (HUMINT). It frequently fails. The question is why? What HUMINT organizational and human dynamics impede effective and consistent operational-level results? What are the two most important steps that the combatant commander must take to ensure effective and consistent HUMINT within his theater? Although politics, turf wars, and structures all impede progress, the combatant commander can still achieve effective and consistent HUMINT by co-locating functions into a single staff of equal partnerships; and then aligning assets into a singular unity of effort. The first step overcomes broad differences in HUMINT focus, function and skill. It results in increased competence and effectiveness. The second step mitigates turf driven and fractured HUMINT unity of effort due to diverse organizations, jurisdictions, limited resources, and biases. It results in increased efficiency and operational-level payoff. The Double Cross System of World War II and the CJ2X employed during Operation Joint Guard during Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia took both steps. In turn, they were highly successful. Today, they both serve as viable combatant commander models for achieving effective and consistent operational HUMINT.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 19, 2003
- Accession Number
- ADA420278
Entities
People
- David B. Kneafsey
Organizations
- Naval War College