The Role of the Joint Force Commander in Synchronizing Operational Fires
Abstract
Poor decisions by the JFC regarding command relationships and synchronization procedures will inhibit effective employment of operational fires given the compressed time, greater mobility, and enhanced lethality of twenty-first century warfare. The trend toward a smaller force structure, diminished acceptance of collateral damage and increased involvement by political leaders makes the modern battlefield less forgiving to errors in command relationships, apportionment, targeting, and fire support coordination. Operation Desert Storm (ODS) proves that improper command relationships, incorrect apportionment, absence of a JTCB, and poor placement of the FSCL will prevent accomplishing the desired end state even with a harmonious Operational Design. Operation Allied Force (OAF) demonstrates that success is elusive and operational fires are ineffective with incoherent national policy objectives, poor COO analysis, unsuitable command relationships, fruitless apportionment, and a nonexistent JTCB. This analysis suggests that U.S. Joint Doctrine should mandate that JFCs construct a coherent Operational Design, designate component commanders, and use appropriate synchronization procedures to effectively employ operational fires for any campaign or major operation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 16, 2003
- Accession Number
- ADA420281
Entities
People
- George D. Kramlinger
Organizations
- Naval War College