The U.S. Military and the Philippines after 11 September 2001: Why Size, Reform, and Goodwill Still Matter

Abstract

The paper proposes that USPACOM can support a successful counterinsurgency in the Philippines by following a humble, discerning, and patient plan that highlights three lessons learned from the U.S. counterinsurgency effort in El Salvador. These lessons are: (1) a smaller military presence is better, (2) a reform-minded host government is necessary, and (3) goodwill, rather than military defeat of the insurgents, is the most effective goal. Each lesson recognizes that internal, rather than external, forces warrant U.S. military attention. This approach is significant because it (1) appreciates the subtle and not-so-subtle differences between principles of MOOTW and the principles of war, (2) highlights the importance of shaping the environment, and (3) recognizes that treating the insurgency in the Philippines as a Jihad-inspired revolution is simplistic and a detraction from real root causes.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 16, 2003
Accession Number
ADA420388

Entities

People

  • Peter D. Schmid

Organizations

  • Naval War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter WMD
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Central America
  • Counterinsurgency
  • El Salvador
  • Geography
  • Governments
  • Insurgency
  • Lessons Learned
  • National Security
  • Personnel Management
  • Revolutions
  • Terrorism
  • Terrorists
  • United States
  • United States Southern Command
  • Violence
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Joint Military Operations and Doctrine.
  • Political Violence and Terrorism Studies.
  • Theoretical Analysis.