Amphibious and Special Operations in the Aegean Sea 1943-1945. Operational Effectiveness and Strategic Implications
Abstract
The Aegean Sea during the Second World War drew the attention of both the Allies and the Axis. However, although historians have chronicled the fall of Greece and Crete in the spring of 1941, little attention has been given to the war in the Aegean after 1941. From the early days of the Mediterranean war, Churchill especially believed that the elimination of the Italian occupation of the Dodecanese islands, would facilitate British operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and help to convince Turkey to enter the war on the Allied side. When, in the autumn of 1943, Churchill sought to realize these goals, he succeeded only in creating an operational disaster and provoking a minor crisis between the Western Allies. For the British, the Italian surrender of September 1943 provided a window of opportunity to thrust through the Aegean into Greece and the Balkans. The Amen cans firmly rejected Churchill's proposals for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean as designed to serve British imperial interests rather than those of the rapid defeat of Germany. Despite failure to secure U.S. support, Churchill nevertheless proceeded with operations against Kos and Leros, with disastrous results. However, the British were more fortunate in conducting special operations in the Aegean and against Crete in 1943 and 1944 to the end of the war. This thesis follows the main events that affected the Aegean Sea in the war, stressing issues of inter-allied relations, peripheral strategy, tactical solutions to strategic problems and special operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2003
- Accession Number
- ADA420541
Entities
People
- Panagiotis Gaartzonikas
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School