

THE NEW TERRORISM:
THE NATURE OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM

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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.

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Major Michael W. Kometer was born and raised in Kohler, Wisconsin, where he graduated from High School in 1984. He completed the U.S. Air Force Academy program and received his commission in June, 1988. Graduating from Undergraduate Navigator Training as an Electronic Warfare Officer training in May, 1989, he was assigned to the 16 SOS at Hurlburt Field, Florida, where he served as an Electronic Warfare Officer on the AC-130H Spectre Gunship. His duty with the 16 SOS included operations during conflict in Panama, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia. While flying with the 16 SOS, he was assigned to the Special Missions Operational Test and Evaluation Center (SMOTEC), to perform operational flight test of AC-130s, MC-130s, HC-130s, and MH-53s. In 1994 he was one of four USAF officers selected to attend Georgia Institute of Technology for a masters degree tailored to test and evaluation. Upon graduation, he was honored as one of the top ten graduates of the School of Engineering. In 1996, he was assigned to a classified location as a Special Projects Test Director, and subsequently served as flight commander and operations officer for the 89-person unit. Major Kometer is a senior navigator with approximately 1000 flying hours. He received his bachelor's degree from the Air Force Academy in Engineering Sciences, a master's degree in Industrial/Systems Engineering from Georgia Institute of Technology, a master's degree in Military Arts and Sciences as a distinguished graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, and a master's degree in Airpower Arts and Sciences from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies.

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ABSTRACT

This study defines the nature of the War on Terrorism by assessing the changing nature of terrorism itself. The author develops an analytical framework within which to assess the strategies of terrorist groups. He then goes on to compare the strategies of “old” terrorist groups, namely the Red Army Faction, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the Irish Republican Army, to the “new” terrorism, which he calls the militant Islamic movement. The conclusion is that there is indeed a “new terrorism” that is not merely terrorism but a global insurgency. The strategy of this new movement requires an aggressive war on terrorism as a counter-strategy, but not necessarily the war that the United States is trying to fight. The writer develops guidelines for military strategy against the insurgents, using the same analytical framework he used to assess the insurgents’ strategy.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Those who slaughtered more than 3,000 persons on September 11 and who, by their own admission, want nothing more than to do it again, constitute a clear and present danger to all people of good will everywhere in the world, not just the United States. Such acts are a pure example of naked aggression against innocent human life, a world-threatening evil that clearly requires the use of force to remove it.

- by a group of 60 American Scholars, "What We're Fighting For"

Five months after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, this carefully worded statement by 60 intellectuals summed up a position that most Americans can support. The letter that contained the statement acknowledged America's shortcomings yet rejected the notion that these shortcomings somehow gave justification to the terrorists that committed the attacks. It deftly pointed out the moral differences among the terrorists' beliefs, American beliefs, and mainstream Islamic beliefs. In short, it represented a well-thought-out justification for the declaration of war on terrorism that the United States government issued on September 11.

Those who issued the original declaration of war were not given the luxury of the same five months to develop their rationale for the stand they took. At 8:48 A.M. on 11 September 2001, American Airlines Flight 11, carrying 92 people from Boston to Los Angeles, crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center. Eighteen minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175, carrying 65 people on the same route, tore through the south tower. Then at about 9:40 A.M., American Airlines Flight 77, carrying 64 passengers from Dulles to Los Angeles, destroyed four of five rings in a section of the Pentagon.

Meanwhile, United Airlines Flight 93, carrying 45 people from Newark to San Francisco, had crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, where it had been heading in the direction of Washington. In the next hour, both towers of the World Trade Center collapsed, burying thousands of victims with them.¹

The immediate reaction of officials everywhere was volatile. General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, promised, “I will tell you up-front, I have no intention of discussing today what comes next, but make no mistake about it, your armed forces are ready.”² Other officials declared a state of “total war” existed.³ Instantly, the media began making comparisons that put the attacks into the same category as the conflicts in the total war era, World War I and II: “Just as Japan on Dec. 7, 1941, destroyed America’s longstanding belief in its ocean-guarded invulnerability, now Sept. 11, 2001, joins that date to live in infamy...”⁴ Overseas, foreign diplomats also stoked the fire by declaring a new age of terrorism. British Prime Minister Tony Blair promised Britain would stand “shoulder to shoulder” with America in fighting these mass terrorists, whom he called a “new evil in our world.”⁵ Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared, “This is a turning point in the international war on terrorism. This is a war between good and evil. The fight of the free world against the forces of darkness.”⁶ As United States government officials were trying to deal with the disaster and its aftermath, the rest of the world was narrowing their policy options for them, by declaring

¹ Michael Grunwald, “Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead,” *Washington Post*, 12 September 2001, A1.

² Rowan Scarborough, “Military Officers Seek Swift, Deadly Response,” *Washington Times*, 12 September 2001, A1.

³ Ibid., the remarks from Alabama Senator Richard Shelby.

⁴ John Fialka and Jackie Calmes, “Attacks on Symbols of U.S. Power Mark a Second ‘Day of Infamy,’” *Wall Street Journal*, 12 September 2001, A1.

⁵ George Jones, “We Will Help Hunt Down Evil Culprits,” *London Daily Telegraph*, 12 September 2001.

⁶ “Israel Calls For War Against Terrorism,” *Washington Times*, 12 September, 2001.

a state of war and even declaring the nature of that war. By the time the war cabinet met that night, there really were no policy options.

No matter what the initial inclinations of President Bush's staff, the forgone conclusion was that the United States would be at war. While the events were unfolding, President Bush was onboard Air Force One for security. When the plane landed at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, Bush said only that, "The United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts."⁷ But by that evening, the tone had changed slightly: "America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism." This statement, in peaceful times, could be taken to mean an ongoing struggle similar to that waged against drugs or crime—"war on drugs" or "war on crime."⁸ But not that night. When told that the suspect, Osama bin Laden, was a global threat whose reach included about 60 countries, President Bush replied, "Let's pick them off one at a time."⁹ Three days later, during a speech at the national funeral, Bush firmly planted the notion of a war with a foreseeable end: "'This conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others,' he said. 'It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing.'"¹⁰ In the furor of the world's shock at the devastation of September 11, this could only mean total war against terrorism—whatever that means.

The meaning of the statement "war on terrorism," is the subject of this study. A declaration of a "war on terrorism" (versus a war against a single terrorist group, or an ongoing struggle against terrorism) is unprecedented, and as such it is a concept that cannot be grasped by referring to existing paradigms. Normally, wars are declared on political entities, and terrorism is, well, not that at least. Supposedly, one of the factors in

⁷ George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President Upon Arrival at Barksdale Air Force Base," Barksdale Air Force Base (AFB), La., 11 September 2001, accessed 5 December 2001. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-1.html>.

⁸ Michael Howard, "What's in a Name?: How to Fight Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February, 2002), 8.

⁹ Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, "America's Chaotic Road to War: Bush's Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in First Frantic Hours After Attack," *Washington Post*, 27 January, 2002, A1.

¹⁰ Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, "A Day to Speak of Anger and Grief: After Bush's Pivotal Speech and New York Visit, Time to Decide Strategy," *Washington Post*, 30 January, 2002, A1.

declaring this type of war for the first time in history is the notion that there is a “new terrorism.” This, in turn, implies that there was an “old terrorism,” and that the nature of terrorism has changed so that today’s terrorists must or should be defeated through total war, rather than classic counter-terrorist measures. If that is the case, then lessons learned in the past may not be applicable to today’s war.

Whether or not it is the case, the fact still remains that the United States is at war with terrorism, and as Carl von Clausewitz tells us, understanding the nature of the war is the first step in developing strategy.¹¹ This paper will lend clarity to the war on terrorism by determining whether there is a “new terrorism” by defining and comparing the nature of “old terrorism” with that of “new terrorism.” In doing so, it will consider whether the nature of terrorism (new or not) has implications for the American strategy in the war on terrorism, and whether it can incorporate any of the old lessons.

Chapter two will describe terrorism according to the classic experts, illustrate how its nature has changed throughout history, and list the characteristics that, according to these experts, makes today’s terrorism new. It will also limit the scope of terrorism in the context of the war on terrorism. Chapter three will develop a method for analyzing the nature of terrorism. It will propose a strategic framework for identifying the characteristics of terrorist groups, and then develop a method for turning these characteristics into an assessment of the groups’ strategies. Chapter four will analyze three “old” terrorist groups using this methodology. This chapter will go through each group’s history and break its observable characteristics into the four categories of the analytical framework. It will then assess the actual strategy of each group in hindsight. It

¹¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88

will show how effective the governments' counter-terrorist strategies were against these strategies and then characterize the overall nature of terrorism as a threat to national security during the time period of these groups. Chapter five will use the same analytical framework to analyze "new terrorism." This chapter will identify this phenomenon and go through its history, again breaking it down into the four categories. It will then derive the actual strategy of the "new terrorism," this time based not on hindsight but on extrapolation of the analysis. Chapter six will then draw conclusions about whether there is indeed a "new terrorism," and whether the nature of this phenomenon (new or not) warrants a war like the current war on terrorism. It will also discuss the implications of the analysis of the current terrorist adversaries for our strategy against them.

Chapter 2

The Nature of Terrorism

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by [the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them] the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.

- Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

Clausewitz's admonition about determining the nature of a war points to the very issue that makes our declaration of a war on terrorism problematic. What is the nature of this war? Even before September 11, terrorism experts were advocating a more proactive policy toward terrorism, while at the same time admitting that "the nature of the conflict is still to be defined."¹² There are precedents for using military force to combat terrorist groups. Certainly Great Britain and France have had experience with this, and there have been a number of South American countries that have had to resort to the armed forces to combat terrorism. But in each of these instances, the enemy was a particular group. The fact that the United States has declared war on terrorism implies that there is a definable nature to a conflict against "terrorism" itself. It also implies that this nature has changed—that we're dealing with a "new terrorism"—since, in the past, experts have warned against escalation in counter-terrorism.

This chapter will challenge these two implications. It will briefly go over the history of terrorism, to show that the changing nature of terrorism has added to the

¹² Take, for example, Stephen Sloan, *Beating International Terrorism: An Action Strategy for Preemption and Punishment* (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 2000). On page 60, he declares: "It is time to declare war on terrorism." However, he warns that our policies at the time (during the Clinton Administration) came nowhere close to this level of aggressiveness, and so, if we did, we would have to define the nature of the conflict, page 79.

inability to define it. It will discuss the evolving view of a “new terrorism” and the characteristics that define it. It will show the problems that scholars have had in categorizing and defining terrorism as a phenomenon. Finally, the chapter will present a more practical way to analyze the nature of the war on terrorism: to limit the scope to the enemy in this war, thereby limiting the potential that the war will grow beyond control.

There is a real danger in misreading and therefore overreacting to terrorism, a danger that is “not in terrorist acts *per se*, but in triggering off a wider and more dangerous armed conflict.”¹³ One danger in this wider conflict is, of course, that there may be more destruction and loss of human life due to the escalation than there ever would have been due to the terrorists themselves. However, there is an additional danger that the overwhelming use of force can actually be damaging to the society in general, possibly even aiding the terrorists’ cause. This can best be understood by examining an actual example.

The Tupamaros were a Uruguayan insurgent group whose movement to overturn the Uruguayan government lasted almost a decade and, though it ended in the group’s destruction, had devastating effects on Uruguayan government and society. In 1961 Raul Sendic unionized the sugarcane and sugar beet cutters and marched on the capital, Montevideo, to demand land expropriation and redistribution. Imprisoned in the resulting riots, Sendic started the Tupamaro National Liberation Movement.¹⁴ The Tupamaros saw the problems with the Uruguayan economy as stemming from the basic system of capitalism on which the economy was based. They claimed this system was doing nothing but making the rich richer and the poor poorer, while at the same time

¹³ Walter Laquer, *The Age of Terrorism* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1987), 321.

¹⁴ Arturo C. Porzecanski, *Uruguay’s Tupamaros* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1973), 3.

making Uruguay more indebted to imperialist nations like the United States. The government was unwilling to solve these problems, because the individuals running it were profiting from the existing system.¹⁵ The Tupamaros wanted a Uruguay that was independent of the industrial nations, fiercely nationalistic, and run by a socialistic government—not necessarily a strict copy of other Marxist-Leninist countries, but tailored to Uruguay’s particular conditions.¹⁶ Their strategy was to use violence, the very thing their government held most critical to the survival of its power monopoly, to seize power from the government. The Tupamaros planned to break down and demoralize the government forces through the selective use of violence in the city, create a mass uprising of the people to take power, and then implement their ideological objectives.¹⁷ They sought to create a “power duality,” where the Tupamaros would be immune to the government’s power and the people would see them as another, parallel source of power.¹⁸

Their operations were chosen to create this condition. They tried to avoid indiscriminate killing, and were “genuine idealists; some of the best of the young generation belonged to them.”¹⁹ They made their enemies finance their cause by stealing from sources that they saw as supporters of the elite, explaining: “the bourgeoisie’s property is our natural fountain of resources and we have the right to expropriate it without compensation. [Our] revolution puts to use the surplus of the privileged.”²⁰ The Tupamaros kidnapped officials they accused of corruption or wrongdoings (like torture of

¹⁵ Porzecanski, 4-5.

¹⁶ Ibid., 7-8.

¹⁷ Ibid., 14.

¹⁸ Ibid., 17.

¹⁹ Laquer, 138.

²⁰ From the document “Rules of the Organization,” published in O. Costa, *Los Tupamaros*. (Mexico City: Era, 1971), 92, in Porzecanski, 40

prisoners), in order to blackmail the government and demonstrate their power. They bombed and killed other corrupt officials to intimidate. In one case, they even broke into an illegal loan company, took records, and forwarded them to a judge who convicted the company.²¹ With this context in mind, it is clear the government's reaction was critically flawed.

The government's policy in this struggle eventually led to the collapse of all democratic institutions in Uruguay. In the beginning, combating the Tupamaros was the job of the national police. President Jorge Pacheco Areco ruled the effort with an iron hand, imposing wage freezes and press censorship in an effort to control the situation. In 1968 he gave himself emergency powers so he could quell demonstrations and silence opposition. When the police proved unable to handle their job, Pacheco militarized them. When the bankers struck in 1969, he militarized them.²² In 1970, during one month alone, he ordered extensive searches of over 20,000 homes, many without warrants.²³ Then in 1971, after the Tupamaros rescued over 100 of their prisoners (and subsequently imposed a unilateral cease-fire for the elections), Pacheco ordered the armed forces to take charge of the entire operation. The army got the congress to declare a state of internal war and started a powerful, ruthless campaign that wiped the Tupamaros out. In the process, however, the army also came face-to-face with the corruption in the Uruguayan government (with the help of some prodding from the imprisoned Tupamaros). In 1973, the military seized power from President Bordaberry, and any pretense of democracy in the country was gone.²⁴ By many classic measures, the

²¹ Porzecanski, 44-46.

²² Ibid., 57.

²³ Ibid., 56.

²⁴ Porzecanski, 74.

Tupamaros had lost the war—they were completely destroyed. However, the government had misjudged the nature of the war. It had fought a brutal war of attrition, as if the security of the state was at risk, when actually the things at risk were the freedom of the people and the legitimacy of the government. To keep this from happening, the United States needs to do a better job of determining the nature of the war it is fighting.

One reason this is so difficult is that the term “terrorism” has been used to refer to many technically different phenomena throughout history. In fact, when trying to determine whether there is a “new breed” of terrorist, one might question whether that is important, since terrorism has changed so many times. Its origin is often traced (although not by the name ‘terrorism’) back as early as the Zealots of the first century time period.²⁵ Later, the Assassins were a Persia-based group that spread throughout the Mid-East in the 11th through the 13th centuries. Although the group was driven by political aims on the strategic level—they were fighting the Crusaders—these killers seem to have been motivated by a millenarian vision, the notion that murder was a sacramental act of duty, and the possibility of martyrdom.²⁶ But when the term ‘terror’ was used first, it referred to the efforts of the new government in France to suppress its enemies immediately following the revolution in the 1790s.²⁷ In the mid-to-late nineteenth century, groups that are now labeled anarchists began using violence to try to overthrow governments they viewed as corrupt, especially in Russia. This represented a 180-degree shift in the nature of terrorism.²⁸ Some Marxists attempted to spread revolution through the use of terror following the Soviet revolution at the end of World War I. Then, following World War

²⁵ Ibid., 12.

²⁶ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 89.

²⁷ Laquer, 11.

²⁸ Ibid., 11.

II, ethnic groups started to see that campaigns of terrorism were sometimes effective at convincing colonial powers to abandon their colonies to self-rule.²⁹ However, most writers agree it was really the 1960s that spawned the modern age of terrorism, and it is this modern age that will be studied in this paper. The youth of the '60s were raised by the conservative generation for whom World War II had been the formative years. Nurtured by the teachings of liberal- or Marxist-minded university professors, these modern (as opposed to “new”) terrorists rebelled against what they saw as oppressive economic strategies and the abuse of the third world in the Cold War struggle.³⁰ They introduced a new form of conflict that included the targeting of innocent civilians in hijackings, skyjackings, bombings, and kidnappings that grabbed headlines and made governments look powerless. In this paper, the terms “old terrorism” and “new terrorism” both refer to the period between 1960 and the present. Yet even in this limited time period, defining the nature of a war on terrorism is a difficult task.

One of the reasons the nature of a war on terrorism is elusive is that “terrorism” is a perjorative term that is used whenever it is convenient. It is a vaguely defined term. To place it in general categories, we would have to start with the fact that terrorism involves violence—the use of violence (and the threat of more) by a certain group to instill terror in a certain population. It can be considered a form of warfare, just like conventional warfare and guerrilla warfare.³¹ In more abstract terms, it can be considered a form of

²⁹ Hoffman, 65.

³⁰ For a much more in-depth explanation of this emergence, see Beau Grosscup, *The Newest Explosions of Terrorism: Latest Sites of Terrorism in the 1990s and Beyond* (Far Hills, N.J.: New Horizon Press, 1998). Grosscup actually proposes it was the neo-conservatives—disillusioned liberals-turned-conservatives during the 1960s—that developed this view of the emergence of terrorism in the 1960s and thereby helped develop our terrorist stereotypes. Grosscup suggests this may be detrimental to understanding terrorism. Nevertheless, it is provided here as the most-often cited reason for the emergence of the modern terrorism (including “old” and “new” terrorism) studied in this paper. For example, see Laquer, 206 or Hoffman, 80.

³¹ Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism* (New York: Brassey's, 1990), 24.

communication—a type of theater.³² Terrorists perform shocking acts in order to communicate a message to some target audience. All of these categorizations have something to do with a means to achieving an end. But it is only used to describe one's enemies. Those who practice what others call terrorism claim their methods are necessary to accomplish a worthy cause.

This is a distortion—the use of terrorist methods is recognizable and wrong. However, in order to combat terrorists, it is useful to realize this is not a black and white issue in the minds of the entire world. Terrorists have a morality of their own.³³ They believe they are fighting for a cause worth the destruction they are causing. The 19th century German anarchist Karl Heinzen proclaimed killing was justified by its very necessity—terrorists have no other way to achieve their aims. His point was that once governments had made killing acceptable, the only question in its justifiability was whether it would achieve its aims.³⁴ This is not to say, however, that terrorists are the moral equivalent of law-abiding citizens. In war between states, the Just War tradition facilitates judging the justness of a war, and similar judgments can be made regarding terrorists' wars. Governments have sovereignty within their territory granted by the consent of the people. In order to merit violent action, an enemy must have vastly overstepped the accepted boundaries of its authority to determine rights in the common good of its citizens.³⁵ Some judgment along this line would validate whether the terrorist cause is a moral one— whether the war is just (*jus ad bellum*). Then, however, the

³² Brian Michael Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict." In David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), *International Terrorism and World Security* (London: Croom Helm, 1975), 16.

³³ Personal interview with Dr. Lewis Ware, Professor of International Studies at the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., November 7, 2001.

³⁴ Heinzen. "Murder," in Laquer, Walter (ed.), *The Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology* (New York: Meridian, 1978), 56-57.

³⁵ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 54-55.

judgment must be made whether the means are just (*jus in bello*). Michael Walzer agrees that some past terrorists might be considered honorable in that they only committed ‘just’ assassination. However, he then declares that after states introduced terror to war during the bombings of World War II, terrorists switched from assassinating responsible officials to targeting innocent civilians.³⁶ This moved them into the category of violators of *jus in bello*, regardless of the justness of their cause. And no matter how just the cause, there is considerable doubt about whether the terrorism can really bring about lasting social change, even if the terrorists get their way.

Resolution of the issue that a given terrorist group points to as the cause of its actions is not necessarily a cure for terrorism. It may seem that to develop a security strategy, the United States needs first to envision a desired societal end state and then work towards that end state, instead of working for its own state interests. If the world could be rid of all the conditions that cause gaps between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots,’ then there would be no reason to resort to terrorism. This is an infeasible if admirable goal, and even if it were feasible, many writers disagree. Walter Laquer proposes that if everyone who claimed the right to autonomous rule could be given their own state, this would only increase the amount of conflict over borders and diaspora. Furthermore, he claims, terrorism is least survivable in states with effective dictatorial regimes.³⁷ Appeasement is not the answer.

Besides, the cause is not always the driving factor. Kachig Tololyan presents a convincing argument that political and psychological analysis of terrorism is meaningless without the corresponding analysis of the cultural milieu that gives them meaning. In his

³⁶ Ibid., 203.

³⁷ Laquer, 6.

example of the Armenian culture, terrorism was the result not of ethnic repression, but “the manifestation of a desire to give one’s individual life an iconic centrality in the eyes of the community, which professes to value certain forms of behavior articulated in narratives.”³⁸ It was not that the Armenians were repressed at present, but they were carrying on the fight because of stories and legends of their forefathers. Martha Crenshaw agrees that, although some groups, which she calls *instrumental*, use terrorist acts to achieve defined goals, others, termed *organizational*, use terrorism as a means to ensure survival of the group. For these groups, terrorism is simply a means to attract support and maintain viability. The groups offer incentives that require violent activity regardless of the cost, and the ideological purpose is only one of the incentives.³⁹ However, the fact that the cause is not the driving force does not mean it can be ignored.

The cause or ideological purpose of a terrorist group may become an important battleground. In a terrorist group’s struggle to be seen as a legitimate authority with legitimate power, the group must remain true to the cause. The strategy to defeat them must not add fuel to what may be the causal fire, or it will only make matters worse. The mindset of those who live in states is often much different than that of those who consider themselves outside of states. While states are concerned with positions and interests, others may be driven by worldviews, and the two are bound to collide.⁴⁰ The cause may

³⁸ Kachig Tololyan. “Cultural Narrative and the Motivation of the Terrorist,” in David C. Rappaport (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organizations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) 227.

³⁹ Martha Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches”, in David C. Rappaport (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organizations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 24.

⁴⁰ Interview with Maj Vicki Rast, PhD, former course director at Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, October 10, 2001. This refers to a model for conflict that Rast taught at the school. While rational or realist organizations like states may fight to protect positions and interests, the more culturally driven an organization is, the more it will be motivated to defend values. Moving further away from states in mindset, small groups or individuals are often driven by worldviews or even needs. When two groups operating on different parts of this spectrum collide, there will often be no way to communicate or compromise, and conflict is inevitable.

indeed be an important pillar in the terrorists' strategy—terrorists and their audiences obviously believe they are in the right by fighting against some kind of evil. Whether or not the cause is the driving factor, sensitivity to this cause is an important factor in maintaining the legitimacy to fight against terrorism—at least in the past.

Writers since the late 1980s have been heralding the arrival of a change in the nature of terrorism that could nullify some of these principles. Amir Taheri claimed the exportation of the fundamentalist Islamic revolution from Iran in 1979 had started the “new kind of terrorism.”⁴¹ According to Taheri, while all terrorist movements in the past have been driven by political goals, these Islamic terrorists would be insulted if described as political. Their ultimate aim is the conversion of all mankind, by choice or by force, to the teachings of Muhammed.⁴² RAND Corporation analysts have come to broader conclusions. Brian Michael Jenkins, who in 1975 made the oft-quoted statement “terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, but not a lot of people dead,”⁴³ now advises a proactive strategy that includes military response and counters to possible spread of weapons of mass destruction.⁴⁴ In a 1999 study, RAND experts proposed that the new terrorism is marked by different motives, different actors, different sponsors, greater lethality, and a flatter, less hierarchical structure.⁴⁵ Another RAND expert, Bruce Hoffman points out that the ambition, coordination, security, and dedication necessary for 19 suicide bombers to pull off four suicide hijackings

⁴¹ Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror*. (Bethesda, Md.: Adler & Adler, 1987), 9.

⁴² Taheri, 10.

⁴³ Brian Michael Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict.” In David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), *International Terrorism and World Security* (London: Croom Helm, 1975), 15.

⁴⁴ Brian Michael Jenkins, forward to Ian O. Lesser et al, *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1999), xi-xii.

⁴⁵ Ian O. Lesser et al, 1.

simultaneously and under total secrecy are unmatched in history.⁴⁶ The fact that the hijackings killed over 3000 people adds to this factor.⁴⁷ He also points out that the planning for the September 11 attack probably overlapped the execution of the November 1999 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Aden, pointing to the existence of a multi-track organizational capability.⁴⁸ Laquer, who formerly resisted categorizations, admitted that a new category of terrorist now exists—one with an apocalyptic vision, nationalist or racial elements, and access to weapons of mass destruction.⁴⁹ Unlike Taheri, however, most recent writers point to more than just the Iranian revolution as the facilitator of this new kind of terrorist. Harmon points out that the end of the Cold War may have terminated support from some former government sponsors of terror, but it also produced regional and domestic tensions that can now spawn terrorism.⁵⁰ Beau Grosscup goes further in proposing that the end of the Soviet Union's hold on these regions enabled these tensions to finally find violent expression.⁵¹ But he points out that it was the Gulf War in 1990-91 that thrust the new, post-Cold War terrorist, the militant Islamic terrorist, into the limelight.⁵² Despite the subtle differences, there is much support for the existence of a “new terrorism.” Nevertheless, there are also signs that this is nothing more than a logical extension of past forms of terrorism.

⁴⁶ Bruce Hoffman “Re-thinking Terrorism in Light of a War on Terrorism.” Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. House of Representatives, 26 Sep. 2001, 2.

⁴⁷ “A Nation Challenged; Dead or Missing,” *New York Times*, January 8, 2002. As of January 4, official estimates were that 3,119 persons had been killed by the September 11 attackers, including 2,895 in New York, 184 in Washington, and 40 in Pennsylvania. This does not include the 19 hijackers.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴⁹ Walter Laquer, “The New Face of Terrorism,” *The Washington Quarterly* 21:4 (1998), 176.

⁵⁰ Christopher C. Harmon, *Terrorism Today*, (Portland: Frank Cass, 2000), 3.

⁵¹ Grosscup, 386.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 387-8.

Terrorism has gone through so many transformations throughout history that it seems almost pointless to declare that there is a “new terrorism.” Indeed, Hoffman himself compares modern militant Islamic terrorism to the 11th and 12th century Assassins, also a radical Islamic sect. The Assassins not only saw violence as a form of struggle to vanquish their Christian enemies, but also a ritual duty that was meant to cleanse the perpetrator and hasten the arrival of the new millennium.⁵³ Karl Heinzen wrote of the desirability of acquiring weapons of mass destruction: “We need instruments of destruction which are of little use to the great masses of the barbarians when they are fighting a few lone individuals but which give a few lone individuals the terrifying power to threaten the safety of whole masses of barbarians.”⁵⁴ It is possible that some past terrorists would have been just as fanatical and lethal as current terrorists had they possessed the means. This is an important issue. To develop the proper strategy for an unprecedented war on terrorism, a strategist must know whether any of the lessons from past counter-terrorism campaigns are applicable. To this end, the paper will determine whether there is a “new” terrorism by analyzing old and new terrorism in a consistent manner, starting with a good definition.

Scholars have struggled with the issue of defining terrorism for decades and they do not seem to have made much headway. In 1974, Jenkins defined it as “the threat of violence, individual acts of violence, or a campaign of violence designed primarily to instill fear.”⁵⁵ He pointed out that the real target of terrorism is the people watching, not the victims of the attack, so that the object is not mass murder.⁵⁶ Hoffman does an

⁵³ Hoffman (1998), 89.

⁵⁴ Heinzen, 62

⁵⁵ Heinzen, 14.

⁵⁶ Heinzen, 15.

admirable job of presenting a definition based on distinguishing terrorism from other forms of violence, like guerrilla warfare, ordinary crime, and lunatic assassinations. His final definition of terrorism is “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”⁵⁷ Laquer resists giving a definition, saying instead that ideally all studies of it would have a clear definition, but the lack of such a tool does not mean terrorism cannot be identified or studied.⁵⁸ He prefers ‘interpretations’ of terrorism, of which his favorite is “the use of covert violence by a group for political ends,” admitting it is usually directed against a government, but can also be against an ethnic group, class or party.⁵⁹ Of course, those concerned with policy or law need a definition. The United States State Department has used a consistent definition of terrorism since 1983, which is the definition contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). According to the code, terrorism is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”⁶⁰ Here *noncombatants* is taken to include military personnel not on duty at the time of the attack. It should really include anyone not formally engaged in an armed conflict. Details like this are the source of the disagreements over the definition of terrorism.

But while most publications and authors do struggle admirably to come up with a definition, what is really necessary in order to prosecute a war on terrorism is a clear conception of the enemy in this particular case. Given the trouble these scholars have had with the subject, an all-inclusive definition may be self-defeating. What is important

⁵⁷ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 43.

⁵⁸ Laquer (1987), 142.

⁵⁹ Laquer (1987), 72.

⁶⁰ United States Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999*, April 2000, i.

is not mastery of the entire spectrum of terrorism, but pointing out the portion of the spectrum with which we are currently dealing.

Since this study aims to inform American and allied decision makers in their development of strategy in the war on terrorism, it will refine the nature of this particular war by studying statements by the Bush Administration. On 20 September, after the dust had settled from the initial statements in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, President Bush expounded on his view of the nature and aims of the war:

“Our war on terror begins with al-Qaidah, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated...”

These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way.

We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions -- by abandoning every value except the will to power -- they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies...

Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.⁶¹

So the president had set out an extremely tough aim for the war—the defeat of every terrorist group of global reach. This was a good morale boost for the public, but an

⁶¹ George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” the United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20 September 2001, accessed 5 December 2001. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

extremely ambitious and ill-defined objective. A joint statement by the United States and the European Union the same day echoed that the aim was to “eliminate international terrorism -- its leaders, its actors, its networks. Those responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable.”⁶² The campaign in Afghanistan lent some clarification in that the military was used to augment diplomatic efforts, freezing of financial assets, and legal efforts by shutting down a government that would not cooperate in America’s efforts to capture terrorists.⁶³ Then in January President Bush gave further guidance:

Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world.⁶⁴

In the same speech, he named three states, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, to a special category called the “axis of evil,” that could potentially supply terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.⁶⁵

From this trail of statements, a number of things become clear. First, the United States considers terrorism a threat to its national security and its way of life. Bush declared that the terrorists had started a war against the United States and all who believe

⁶² Richard Boucher, “U.S.-E.U. Ministerial Statement on Combating Terrorism,” press statement at the United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20 September 2001, accessed 5 December 2001. Available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/4975.htm>.

⁶³ George W. Bush, presidential address to the nation on the eve of the Afghanistan war, the White House, Washington, D.C., 7 Oct. 2001, accessed 5 December 2001. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html>.

⁶⁴ George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” the United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 29 Jan. 2002, accessed 20 February 2002. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>

⁶⁵ Ibid.

in its ideals in order to bring about the collapse of these societies. Second, this threat is great enough to warrant sending its military to a foreign country, where the United States does not have any appreciable interests, to fight a war. Third, the aim of the war is to eliminate all terrorist groups of “global reach.” Bush implied terrorism is comparable to fascism, Naziism, and totalitarianism, and would be rendered ineffective and undesirable just like these ideologies had been. Finally, the strategy for accomplishing this is to use the combined instruments of America’s power to solidify all states in a worldwide coalition that gradually eliminates any support to terrorists, while simultaneously capturing and bringing to justice known terrorists. The war thus becomes one of a coalition of legitimate states defending the peace and security of their citizens against non-state actors and their state allies who together threaten to disrupt that peace and security in order to impose some wide-reaching change. In pragmatic terms, this limits the scope of study to those groups who have the ability to operate in the international arena and will therefore be acknowledged as a threat by enough of the coalition states to keep the coalition together.

This is an important step in the study because of what it rules out, as much as anything. One common barrier to a global understanding of terrorism is the notion that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” This is a false dichotomy, since the term ‘freedom fighter’ deals with the ends sought, while terrorism is a category of the means used.⁶⁶ In any case, the type of terrorism being studied is narrowed to the enemies of legitimate governments, and especially the coalition in the United States’ war on terrorism. Admittedly, this ignores the possibility that some current terrorists may have a legitimate grievance against a current government that they believe may have used

⁶⁶ O’Neill, 7.

terrorism to gain or solidify its position of power, as in the case of the Palestinians. This paper will not examine terror used by a state to compel its own citizens to adopt its policies. It may not consider some indigenous terrorist groups that affect only a limited area, and thus are “somebody else’s problem.” It will not examine conventional warfare between equivalent political entities, where the participants are well identified and remain within established norms. The terrorists, by contrast, are usually not equivalent as political entities, are anonymous, and go well outside accepted norms of warfare.⁶⁷ But so do guerrillas.

Drawing a distinction between guerrilla warfare and terrorism as a form of war is not necessary in this type of analysis. Both are forms of insurgency, or rebellion against authority—the difference is in the methods the insurgents use in each case. Bard O’Neill notes that guerrillas target “the government’s armed forces, police, or their support units and, in some cases, key economic targets, rather than unarmed civilians.”⁶⁸ But even he admits there are many grey areas and groups that use a combination of guerrilla and terrorist means.⁶⁹ Laquer puts a slightly different twist on the matter, insisting it is a straightforward matter to separate the guerrillas from the terrorists. He claims the distinction should be made by looking at the ultimate strategy. The guerrilla aims at “building up ever-growing military units and eventually an army, and establishing liberated zones in which an alternative government can be put up and propaganda openly conducted.”⁷⁰ Laquer claims guerrillas have often used terrorist strategies, but the reverse is almost never true, because of the difficulties of creating safe havens in the

⁶⁷ Laquer (1987), 3.

⁶⁸ O’Neill, 26.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 26.

⁷⁰ Laquer (1987), 5.

urban setting.⁷¹ Here Laquer reflects the positions of Mao Tsetung, who envisioned three phases of war: strategic defensive, stalemate, and strategic counter-offensive.⁷² The purpose of guerrilla warfare, according to Mao, was to support regular warfare and to eventually become regular warfare.⁷³ Part of this process was to “arouse the masses to arm themselves, and wage guerrilla warfare in co-ordination with the masses.”⁷⁴ In other words, the guerrillas conduct a campaign to gain the people’s support and new recruits. The guerrillas did not kill the civilians, they recruited the civilians. They concentrated on winning small military victories to secure one area at a time until they had control over enough area and enough support from the people to transition to a strategy of offensive conventional warfare. In Mao’s type of warfare, the military would know they were involved in a conflict, albeit with an enemy they could not normally locate. There wouldn’t be a question of whether or not to fight the guerrillas militarily, as there is with terrorists. Thus, the technical distinction between terrorist and guerrilla is not as important in this war as the determination that the group is an insurgent, non-state actor recognized as a threat to the security of a legitimate state and its citizens. However, labeling a group a terrorist group rather than a guerrilla force may have strong implications in the propaganda war.

Determining the nature of a war on terrorism is a difficult but important task. The government of Uruguay proved that misreading the threat, and therefore the war, can lead to disaster for the government and the society. But the nature of terrorism itself has changed so much through the centuries that it cannot easily be defined. It is violence, a

⁷¹ Ibid., 5.

⁷² Mao Tsetung, *Six Essays on Military Affairs* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1972), 237.

⁷³ Ibid., 302.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 303.

form of war, a strategy, a form of communication, a means to an end. But that end is not always readily discernible; therefore, even solving all the world's problems would not necessarily rid the world of terrorism. Nor is the cause always the driving force in terrorist groups. Nevertheless, there is always a cause, and that cause cannot be ignored, because it will form an important battleground. Although the nature of terrorism has changed throughout history, modern terrorism has increasingly involved acts that can be considered immoral: seemingly indiscriminate attacks against innocents for purposes that do not warrant this force. The fundamentalist revolution and the end of the Cold War have created a world where radicals have an increasingly permissive environment for their extreme methods. In fact, the extreme nature of terrorism in the 1990s, culminating with the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, has caused many to warn of the arrival of a "new terrorism." The United States has responded by declaring a war on this new terrorism. But what does that mean? How can a state declare war on a form of warfare?

The state must transform it into a war against some political entity or entities. It is a war of unequals in more ways than one. For the states involved, it has become a war to rid the world of a major threat to their security. The strategy is to simultaneously hunt down and punish terrorists while dividing the states of the world into two camps, with one eventually eliminating the other and thus cutting off all support for terrorism. This narrows the scope of "terrorism" to those groups that will simultaneously be acknowledged as threats to the security of (or at least not favored by) the entire coalition. This leaves out some forms of terrorism, like a state's repression of its own citizens or indigenous terrorism where it only affects one state. On the other hand, it eliminates

some of the need to distinguish between some other categories, like those who may have a legitimate cause and those who may technically be classified as guerrillas. But more importantly, it transforms the struggle into one of state powers defending their interests. This is a convenient way to enable the states to use their instruments of power against the terrorists, but is it wise? Has terrorism become a new phenomenon that warrants a war against it? Or is the United States government totally misreading the nature of this war and condemning the effort to failure or even a disaster similar to, but on a larger scale than the Uruguayan tragedy?

Chapter 3

How to Analyze Terrorist Strategies

Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy...

Therefore I say: 'Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.'

- *Sun Tzu*, The Art of War

The way to answer the questions at the end of the previous chapter, according to Sun Tzu, is to analyze and counter the strategy of the enemy in this war. But strategies are nebulous things to analyze, so in order to do this objectively, this paper needs a systematic method of analyzing and terrorist groups' strategies. This chapter will explore the most common method of comparing terrorist groups: the typology. It will explain why this method is not deep enough for analyzing and comparing strategies. Instead, it will develop what it calls an analytical framework, consisting of factors cited by scholars as those most important to consider when analyzing terrorist groups. Finally, it will explain how this framework can (and will) be used to develop an assessment of a terrorist group's strategy.

One way of attacking the problem is by grouping the terrorist organizations within a typology. A terrorist typology is merely a classification system that attempts to delineate the different types of terrorism. For instance, some classify groups entirely by ideological motivation, which generally yields the classes anarchism, communism,

fascism, nationalism/separatism, religion, and pro-state.⁷⁵ Others include “catch-all” categories for groups that do not quite fit, like “Latin American,” or “new world.”⁷⁶ The classes or types within the typology are usually driven by the purpose of the analysis. To adequately represent the spectrum of terrorist groups, one would have to develop a multi-dimensional typology that differentiates with respect to all variables that are significant to the analysis. For instance, the claim that there is a “new terrorism” suggests a typology with the classes “new” and “old.” But this is not entirely useful, because undoubtedly there would be differences among the old groups and among the new groups. A comparison strictly based on this two-class typology would stand little chance of finding a difference. To be effective, the typology would have to have sub-classes under each, and the sub-classes should be the same for “old” and “new.” The weakness of this approach is that it implies the nature of terrorism is stable. It is entirely possible, if there is a new terrorism, that none of the new groups would fit within the sub-classes of old terrorism. In order to compare, however, an analyst would be tempted to fit the groups within these categories anyway, and this would blur reality.⁷⁷ If the purpose of the classification is to determine the nature of the terrorist threat to states and to tell whether this threat has changed, this type of classification exercise is not nearly deep enough.

Nevertheless, the factors that produce these classes and subclasses are a good point of departure. If ideology is important enough to have inspired entire typologies,

⁷⁵ See Christopher C. Harmon, *Terrorism Today*, (Portland: Frank Cass, 2000), 4-34 and Crozier’s typology as presented in Jonathon R. White, *Terrorism: An Introduction*. 2nd Ed. (Belmont, California: West/Wadsworth, 1998), 12.

⁷⁶ Walter Laquer, *The Age of Terrorism* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1987), 203 lists separatist-nationalist, Latin American, urban terrorism by the New Left, and extreme right or semi-fascist. Ian O. Lesser et al, *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1999), 68-71 classified terrorists by the paradigm the terrorists used to come up with their overall strategy, leading to three classes: coercive-diplomacy, war, and new world.

⁷⁷ White, 11.

then it is a factor that should be considered in the analysis. Similarly, other factors that may be used to differentiate groups should be considered as well. This paper will develop an analytical framework consisting of the factors that are important in determining the nature of the terrorist threat. The difference between this analytical framework and a typology is that the paper will make no attempt to put names to the different variations of each factor. It will not call one group a left-wing group and another a right-wing group, as a typology would. Rather, it will perform a more difficult subjective assessment.

Developing this analytical framework is difficult due to the diversity of terrorist groups. Like snowflakes, no two are identical, so to ignore a nuance may be to incorrectly understand the threat a group imposes. Understandably, very few experts have actually developed comprehensive analytical frameworks. O'Neill proposes the way to determine the nature of the insurgent group is to first identify its goals, then the means, or form of war, it uses. For a terrorist group, the means would be terrorism, as opposed to guerrilla or conventional war. The next step is to identify the strategy being used. These strategies would differ with respect to six factors: environment, popular support, organization, unity, external support, and government response.⁷⁸ A Rand Corporation study identified ten categories of terrorist group attributes that could be used to analyze terrorist groups and answer broad analytical questions. These categories were organization; leadership; demography; ideology, doctrine, and goals; psychology, mindset, and decision-making; funding and logistics; operations and modus operandi;

⁷⁸ Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism* (New York: Brassey's, 1990), 27, and e-mail from the author, 11 December, 2001.

communications; external relations; and environment and government response.⁷⁹ Chapter 1 showed that most writers who claim there is a “new terrorism” point to factors that have something to do with the lethality of the terrorist acts, the functional organization of the group, the ideological motivation for the group, and the support the group receives, in terms of both material and moral support.⁸⁰ Some also include strategy in the list. At first glance, it may seem that these analytical frameworks have little in common.

However, they can all be stripped to a common core of factors. For the moment, remove strategy from consideration. Strategy relates means to ends, so it will be addressed later as the overarching link among all other factors. The group’s desired ends are often difficult to discern, given that the group may not have explicitly stated them and in fact may have stated false ends just to cloud the issue.⁸¹ In fact, as our exploration of the nature of terrorism showed us, often the ends are only one of many methods a group will use to motivate its members and target audience. Therefore, any stated ends can be considered in the same category as ideological motivation during the analysis. The rest of the factors in each of the above frameworks relate to a group’s means. When placed side by side, the factors can be massaged into four categories that form a simple, four-factor analytical framework as follows:

⁷⁹ Brian Michael Jenkins and others, *A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups*. (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1985), 3.

⁸⁰ Slone, e-mail from the author, 14 November, 2001, said to examine both old and new terrorism in terms of the things that make “terrorism” run, which he enumerated as motivation, tactics, strategy, organizational doctrine, and support.

⁸¹ O’Neill, 35.

Table 1
Comparison of Analytical Frameworks

O'Neill	Rand	Analytical framework
Environment	Operations and modus operandi; Environment	Operations
Goals	Ideology, doctrine, and goals	Motivation
Organization, Unity	Leadership; Organization; Psychology, mindset, and decision-making; Communications	Organization
Popular Support, External Support	Popular Support; Funding and logistics; External relations	Support

The first factor, “Operations,” refers to the type of acts the group carries out. The analyst must look at the types of tactics the group uses, the frequency of its attacks, and the number and type of targets it attacks. A group that attacks mostly material targets has a different strategy than one that attacks mostly people. A group that assassinates public officials with whom it disagrees has a different strategy than one that drives a planeload of people it does not know into a building of more people it does not know. O’Neill proposes that this has much to do with the type of environment in which the group is operating.⁸² For instance, the Tupamaros showed that an urban campaign is possible within the proper societal context. The choice of the urban campaign revealed that the Tupamaros 1) wanted close proximity to the more politically-active city-dwellers, 2) wanted to be near the more lucrative political targets, and 3) knew that the city was a better environment from which to resist any military intervention.⁸³ These are little bits that can aid in piecing together the group’s strategy. The increasing lethality of modern

⁸² O’Neill, e-mail from the author with a handout he uses to link grand strategy to the analytical framework in the book, 11 December 2001.

⁸³ Arturo C. Porzecanski, *Uruguay’s Tupamaros* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1973, 15-16.

terrorist acts, and the fact these acts are committed on seemingly innocent bystanders is probably the most oft-cited factor in the determination that today's terrorism is new.

The second factor, "Motivation," is another factor that is considered to have undergone a revolutionary change. In the context of this framework, "motivation" refers to the driving force that motivates the collective group, not the psychological motivation of the individuals. Whereas older groups usually had a political objective in mind (as well as a matching political ideology), many experts say today's groups are interested in causing total world chaos in order to usher in a new world order.⁸⁴ That this will have an impact on the terrorists' strategy is evident from Taheri's summary of the Islamic ideology used by many modern terrorist groups: "Considering itself as an expression of Islamic revival which must, by definition, lead to the conquest of the entire globe by the True Faith,...it is clearly conceived and conducted as a form of Holy War which can only end when total victory has been achieved."⁸⁵ This motivation is an important factor in understanding the group's strategy, because it is the message that the group must transmit to its target audience in order to gain and maintain its legitimacy and therefore sustain moral and material support.

This support is the third factor in the analytical framework. There are basically two types of support the groups need: material and moral. In the past, especially during the Cold War, external relations with states were common sources of funding and weapons. That should have been a hint to these states that these ties were a potential starting point for counter-terrorism: "It is a curious anomaly of covert warfare that governments understand the importance of financing groups they support, but fail to

⁸⁴ Lesser et al, 71 probably puts this in a nutshell the best.

⁸⁵ Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror*, (Bethesda, Md.: Adler & Adler, 1987), 14.

appreciate how vital cash is to the terrorist forces they oppose.”⁸⁶ Obtaining this material support forms a major portion of the terrorists’ strategy. But just as important is obtaining the moral support of followers. “Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims.”⁸⁷ The tough question here is, “Which people watching are the terrorists aiming to influence?” For example, when the airliners slammed into the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, citizens of the United States were angry. President Bush proclaimed in a speech that evening that:

The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding anger. These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed; our country is strong.

A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve.⁸⁸

Whether the terrorists correctly predicted the American public’s reaction to the attacks on the World Trade Center is a matter for hypothesis. But more important is the fact that Americans were probably not the target audience for the attacks. It is quite possible the attacks were meant to show others in the world that the terrorists were in fact carrying out their sacred duty to fight against the evil West, no matter what the cost. In that case the strong response could in fact play right into the terrorists’ strategy. In order to correctly understand the terrorist group’s strategy, the analysis must correctly identify the target

⁸⁶ James Adams, *The Financing of Terror*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 14.

⁸⁷ Brian Michael Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,” in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), *International Terrorism and World Security* (London: Croom Helm, 1975), 16.

⁸⁸ George W. Bush, presidential address to the American public, the White House, Washington D.C., 11 September, 2001. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html>.

audience. Usually, the audience is one that, if properly influenced, will increase the group's material and moral support.

Once all the means are in place, the terrorists have to organize in order to put them into action. In organizing, the group needs to satisfy several somewhat conflicting needs. There is a need to maintain covertness, but also a need to maintain contact with the target audience in order to proselytize. There is a need for cooperation among members, but also a need for anonymity in case one member gets arrested. There is a need for functional specialization, but also a need for duplication of some efforts. And there is a need for control from the top, but also a need for freedom at the operations level. The Basque ETA solves these needs by organizing along three different lines: a basic cell structure, where a handful of individuals who do not know each others' names are responsible to a single individual; a division into legals, illegals, and supporters in order to maintain some covertness and some overtness; and a committee structure which assures the various functions like finance, politics, and military operations are accomplished.⁸⁹ As "new terrorism" evolves, organizations are increasingly becoming flatter, less hierarchical, and capable of forming a matrix with other organizations. This indicates a much different strategy in that this type of organization would be capable of operations on a much larger, global scale, with the possibility of multiple operations at once. Advanced technology communications would allow all the operations of a large network of terrorists to be effectively controlled by a single command section.

Identification of these terrorist means and ends does not constitute assessment of the group's strategy. A strategy is a much more esoteric, subjective thing that one might describe as: "a product of the mind and will that adapts and distributes available means to

⁸⁹ Harmon, 99.

attain desired ends in an atmosphere of uncertainty.”⁹⁰ It is rarely written down in one place while it is being executed. In fact, even the very top members may not be able to clearly communicate how the available means will translate to the desired ends. Therefore, it is not an easy task to discern the group’s strategy. But doing so is critical to determining the appropriate counter-strategy. The problem in Uruguay was that the government did not understand the Tupamaros’ strategy and ended up playing right into it. Identifying the four factors in the analytical framework is the first part of identifying a terrorist group’s strategy. The next part is identification of the mechanism that turns these factors into a strategy.

In this context, a mechanism is an intellectual explanation for the translation of force, applied on a given target set, into political change.⁹¹ It is the theoretical reason for the success or failure of a given method to produce a desired outcome. Since this is the esoteric part of strategy, this is the part that must be surmised. Sometimes in retrospect, terrorists may hint at a mechanism in their writings. Carlos Marighella was a Brazilian legislator turned terrorist in the late 1960s who wrote a practical manual on how to conduct an urban terrorist campaign. Since then, many groups have adopted his methods. His basic mechanism was that spontaneous and random violence combined with a propaganda campaign would convince the government and the people that the government had lost control. This would cause the government to crack down with some type of martial law that took away the people’s freedoms and showed how repressive the

⁹⁰ This definition comes from a classmate of mine at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), Michael Hays. He wrote it for an unpublished paper on the nature of war, and derived it from several sources, the most prominent being Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2d ed. (London, Faber & Faber, 1967), 321 and Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 104, the principle of uncertainty in war.

⁹¹ Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 56.

government really was. At this point, the “urban guerrillas,” as Marighella called them, would be the underdogs, victims of the same repression that the people were experiencing, but willing to fight on in spite of it. The people would turn away from the government and join the guerrillas.⁹² Presumably, Marighella aimed at then increasing the terrorist forces through recruitment of the people until the government forces could be overthrown, although this is not clear from his manual. Another possibility would be that he expected the pressure of public opinion to force the government to give in to his demands.

A similar mechanism had worked for another group twenty years earlier—the Israeli group Irgun, led by Menachim Begin.⁹³ The Irgun had used violence, although mostly in the form of attacks on British government forces, to induce the British to impose military discipline on the Palestinian region. At the same time, the violence and counter-violence gained international recognition for the Irgun’s cause. Finally, outcry from the British public and other countries, including the United States, forced the British to acquiesce to the formation of an Israeli state in Palestine.⁹⁴ Lacking strategic foresight, the British played right into the Irgun’s strategy. Since then, the strategy has been ineffective, even though many groups have followed Marighella’s writings and used his method to spread terror in different parts of the world.⁹⁵ This points out the need to identify a terrorist group’s overall strategy, including its mechanism, when determining the strategy to use in countering the group.

⁹² Carlos Marighella, “Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla,” in Robert Moss (ed.), *Urban Guerrilla Warfare*. (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), 40.

⁹³ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 52.

⁹⁴ Hoffman, 52-56.

⁹⁵ White, 55.

However, identifying a mechanism in a terrorist group's strategy is not as simple as putting oneself in another's shoes. The tendency when assessing a mechanism is to treat the enemy as a single, rational individual, when that is not the case at all. Not that terrorists are not rational, but no organization of human beings can be counted on to act like a single, rational human being in all of its actions. We tend to think that an organization's actions are the results of its leaders' choices. In fact, an organization is a black box that covers many smaller organizations that may be performing according to their own rules and procedures, or that may be serving goals that are only partially compatible with the organization's overall goals.⁹⁶ This agrees with Crenshaw's observation that many terrorist organizations espouse ideological goals only as a way to appear legitimate. These organizations commit terrorist acts because that is what they do—violence attracts more recruits, who are trained to commit more violence, in a self-perpetuating cycle. Many of these organizations could be considered criminal in nature, and there may be no higher mechanism than tactical *modus operandi*. This is why the analyst must first identify the organization's operations, ideological motivation, support, and organizational structure and infer from them the nature of the group's strategy. Any incongruence among these factors could signal an incomplete or irrational strategy.

The task of defining the nature of the terrorist threat in order to determine whether there is a "new terrorism" is a complex one. It involves much more than simply developing a typology that classifies terrorist groups by one or even several characteristics of the group. This paper will follow Sun Tzu's advice and attempt to

⁹⁶ Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (Boston: Harper Collins, 1971), 5-6 explains that the way we usually think about decisions is a rational actor model, which he calls Model I. This thinking is useful but must usually be supplemented or even supplanted by two alternative conceptual models, the Organizational Process Model (Model II), and the Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Model (Model III).

assess the strategy upon which the terrorist groups are staking their hopes of success. The first step in this two-step method is the development of a consistent analytical framework that completely describes the means at the disposal of a terrorist group. This study will use a framework that is a hybrid of those used by several terrorist experts and consists of four primary factors: operations/lethality, motivation, support, and organization. The second and more difficult step is determining the mechanism by which these four factors could possibly translate into success for the terrorist group. The two steps, taken together, will form an assessment of the terrorist group's strategy—a strategy that the group may or may not even be able to articulate among themselves. This assessment of strategy will form the foundation of the analysis of the nature of the threat posed by terrorist groups and the appropriate strategy to defeat them.

The remaining chapters will analyze a small sample of “old” and “new” terrorist groups using this process to determine whether the nature of the “new” terrorist threat holds implications for our strategy in a war on terrorism. The delineation between “old” and “new” will be that the “new” groups will be those who have been influenced by both the Islamic fundamentalist revolution and the end of the Cold War—groups that have begun their terrorist activities in the 1990s and have ideologies that deal with worldwide struggle and conversion.

Chapter 4

“Old” Terrorism

...the basic dynamics of the underground. The revealed truth generates the energy necessary for a classical armed struggle that must be hidden by a congenial ecosystem—the underground—that offers security at the price of competence. All such constructs are special and each is different.

- J. Bowyer Bell, *The IRA 1968-2000: Analysis of a Secret Army*

In one statement, J. Bowyer Bell encapsulated the idea of analyzing terrorist strategy spelled out in the previous chapter. The “revealed truth” is the group’s motivation, in terms of ideology and goals. This allows the group to continue its operations—the “armed struggle,” in its “ecosystem,” which is the underground organization and its material and moral support. Communication of the motivation is the “energy” to maintain this support. This chapter will analyze three of the “old” terrorist groups: the Red Army Faction, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Irish Republican Army. It will do this using the method outlined in the previous chapter, by analyzing each group’s motivation, operations, organization, and support in whatever order tells the story best. It will then use these four factors to derive each terrorist group’s actual strategy, including the apparent mechanism that drove that strategy. Finally, it will lay out a few of the lessons learned by the government’s response to the terrorists. The reader should keep in mind that many times, a terrorist group’s actual strategy and mechanism may be different than the group’s stated or intended strategy. The ultimate purpose of this method of analysis is to determine the nature of the threat these groups pose—the actual, not intended, threat.

Red Army Faction (RAF)

The RAF of West Germany was a good example of what most terrorist experts would label ideological or left-wing terrorism. They were born of the anti-everything movements that predominated in the West in the 1960s, when students with a social conscience were protesting the Vietnam War and the perceived repression of the Third World by the United States in the name of anti-communism. As Hoffman puts it, “Perhaps the unprecedented economic prosperity of these years allowed the luxury of introspection and self-criticism that, in more radical political circles, generated a revulsion against the socioeconomic inequities endemic to the modern, industrialized capitalist state.”⁹⁷ The RAF evolved into one of the more dangerous European groups of the modern era, committing spectacular acts of terrorism against high-visibility targets, rising from the ashes twice when their entire leadership was imprisoned, and attempting to organize a European-wide anti-imperialism front by combining with Action Directe of France in 1984 and the Red Brigades (PCC Faction) of Italy in 1988.⁹⁸ But the fall of the Wall in 1989 started the process of politically marginalizing the group by taking away their ideological relevance, and the group declared a truce in 1992. As such, they make an excellent group to study to learn the nature of the “old terrorism.”

The RAF evolved from a group formed by two German college students. On April 3, 1968, two Free University of Berlin students, Andreas Baader and his girlfriend, Gudrun Ensslin, set fire to two department stores with incendiary bombs. Their subsequent radical actions gradually drew the attention of the politically engaged,

⁹⁷ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 80.

⁹⁸ Dennis A. Pluchinsky, “An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany’s Red Army Faction Terrorist Group,” in Yonah Alexander and Dennis A. Pluchinsky, editors, *European Terrorism Today and Tomorrow*. (New York: Brassey’s, 1992), 44.

disaffected Berlin youth, including Ulrike Meinhof, a journalist-turned-political activist who became one of the group's core members.⁹⁹ Andreas and Ulrike became the founders of the Baader-Meinhof Group (BMG). Then in 1970, Baader, Ensslin, and Meinhof and six others fled Germany to a terrorist training camp in Jordan, where they were trained by Palestinians. Although they were kicked out after two months, they had learned enough to go back and start their own terrorist group, now called the Red Army Faction.¹⁰⁰

Organization

The best place to begin understanding the RAF is with their organization, because that provides a foundation for understanding all other facets of the group. The structure that evolved over the years was an organization of four levels: the commando level, the resistance level, the sympathizer level, and the prison level. The commando level included the hard-core, clandestine members who performed the most tactically difficult and risky acts. The resistance level members were those who lived legal, open lives but carried out low-level, less risky and demanding terrorist acts in support of the commando level. It was from this level that the RAF recruited new commando members. Sympathizers supported the RAF with demonstrations and propaganda, but were unwilling to become militant. The prison level were all the former commandos who had been arrested and put in prison, where they continued the struggle.¹⁰¹ This structure was basically an adaptation created by necessity when the original BMG members were all arrested in June 1972. The group would have fallen apart had the leaders not worked through their attorneys to maintain direction from prison. They established a

⁹⁹ Jonathon R. White, *Terrorism: An Introduction*. 2nd Ed. (Belmont, Calif.: West/Wadsworth, 1998), 190.

¹⁰⁰ Hoffman, 82.

¹⁰¹ Pluchinsky, 52-53.

communication system and developed former supporters into the next generation of the RAF, with the primary objective of getting the leaders out of prison.¹⁰² Some of the other supporters started carrying out smaller attacks in response to the prisoners' or commandos' actions, with the intent to cause material damage instead of casualties, and the RAF members began to see these "resistance" members as an integral part of the strategy.¹⁰³ However, the commando level always maintained a distance from the resistance level for security purposes.¹⁰⁴ In 1991, the German police estimated that there were 12-20 commandos, and the total strength of the group was approximately 200-300.¹⁰⁵ This organizational structure had a major impact on the types of operations the group undertook.

Operations

The RAF in its infancy was a small organization that answered only to its own whims. Up until 1972, most of the operations by the group were thefts and bank robberies. On May 11, 1972, the original RAF members began their first and only campaign with a bomb attack on the United States Fifth Army Corps officers' mess at Frankfurt that killed one and injured thirteen others.¹⁰⁶ In rapid succession between then and May 24, the group pipe bombed the Augsburg police headquarters, car bombed the Bavarian criminal investigation department in Munich, planted a bomb in a German High Court judge's car, set off three bombs in the Springer Publishing firm in Hamburg, and car bombed the European headquarters of the United States Army in Heidelberg. In all,

¹⁰² Ibid., 46.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 47.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 48.

¹⁰⁵ Frederick Kempe, "Deadly Survivors: The Cold War is over, but Leftist Terrorists in Germany Fight On --- 'Red Army Faction' Keeps Refining its Operations and Eluding Authorities," *The Wall Street Journal*, 27 December 1991, A1.

¹⁰⁶ Hoffman, 81.

these attacks killed four and injured 59.¹⁰⁷ Then the entire leadership of the group was arrested and imprisoned, and the campaign was disrupted. The next generation would be entirely different.

As the RAF organizational structure evolved, different but related RAF operations were accomplished at each of its four levels. After its resurrection by the imprisoned leadership, the commando level began a campaign of operations to obtain the release of the prisoners. The most sophisticated of these was the kidnapping of Dr. Hans-Martin Schleyer. As president of the Employers' Association of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federation of German Industry, board member of Daimler-Benz, and personal friend of Chancellor Helmut Schmit, Schleyer was a conspicuous capitalist target. The RAF nabbed Schleyer from an armed motorcade on September 5, 1977. In coordination with their communiqué demanding the release of the RAF prisoners, on October 13 a Palestinian terrorist group member named "Martyr Halimeh" hijacked a Lufthansa airliner with 91 people on board. He flew the plane to Mogadishu, Somalia and also demanded compliance with the RAF's demands.¹⁰⁸ The German government refused to cave, and executed a counter-terrorist operation that freed all the passengers and captured or killed all the hijackers. When the RAF leaders in prison learned this elaborate scheme had failed, they committed suicide. But the RAF commandos, insisting the prisoners had been murdered, killed Schleyer.¹⁰⁹ This marked the end of the last major campaign of the RAF's career.

From 1978 until 1991, the RAF struggled for its existence. Able to muster only one or two attacks per year, the group relied on a parallel operations strategy to generate

¹⁰⁷ Pluchinsky, 58-59.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 62.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 46-47.

excitement among public supporters. All four levels would activate simultaneously, resulting in: 1) an assassination and communiqué by the commando level, 2) a hunger strike to the death by the prisoners, 3) low-level bombings by the resistance, and 4) protests and arson by the sympathizers.¹¹⁰ For example, in December 1984, about 30 RAF members in prison began a hunger strike that lasted until February of 1985. During this period, there were about 60 terrorist strikes, one of which was the assassination of Ernst Zimmerman, chairman of a major industrial corporation.¹¹¹ The other strikes were made in Germany, France, and Greece, signaling another trend in RAF operations. On January 15, 1985, the RAF and a French Group, Action Directe, announced in a joint five-page statement that they were setting up a united political-military front in Western Europe, to oppose NATO employment and operations in Western Europe.¹¹² Although the RAF tried a similar arrangement later with the Italian Red Brigades, neither arrangement amounted to much. For the RAF, the 80's was a decade of a struggle for viability.

The overall record of the RAF is not terribly frightening as a threat to security. In the years 1972-1991, there were 24 commando-level attacks. Of these, eleven were directed at facilities and thirteen at people. About 45 percent of the attacks were successful, but even many of the unsuccessful ones were audacious. The RAF did not shy away from attacking heavily defended targets, attempting six assassinations of

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 54.

¹¹¹ Roger Thurow and Peter Gumbel, "Blunt and Brutal, the Chill of Terrorism Again Descends Upon Western Europe," *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 February, 1985, A1.

¹¹² Thurow and Gumbel, A1.

heavily guarded individuals.¹¹³ In the entire period, a total of 23 people were killed and 100 injured by the commando level attacks, including the 1972 attacks.¹¹⁴

Support

The RAF used various methods of ensuring the material support necessary to maintain their two-decade war. The early group's actions resembled those of Marighella and the Tupamaros in that they tried to expropriate everything they needed from their enemies. They robbed banks to finance their activities and stole cars—BMW's were their trademark—to pull off the robberies.¹¹⁵ As mentioned above, they attended Palestinian training camps in 1970 to get training. In fact, the PLO group al-Fatah also sold the RAF weapons.¹¹⁶ Then later, they obtained valuable support from East Germany. In 1980, the RAF met with the East Germans to discuss strategy and gain intelligence. Then in 1981, the East Germans trained three RAF members to operate rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).¹¹⁷ Arrests in East Germany in 1990 uncovered that the RAF was receiving money, weapons, intelligence, and safe haven from their eastern brothers.¹¹⁸ Yet this material support could not guarantee the RAF's vitality.

Maintaining the support of the public, or at least enough to continue to recruit, was the toughest part of the RAF's struggle. German intelligence officials estimated the number of sympathizers had been over 1,000 in the 1970s, but by the mid-1980s the number had dropped to about 150.¹¹⁹ From this size pool, it is difficult to maintain a

¹¹³ Statistics from Pluchinsky, 55.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 57-78.

¹¹⁵ White, 190-1.

¹¹⁶ Hoffman, 83.

¹¹⁷ Kempe, A1.

¹¹⁸ Pluchinsky, 81.

¹¹⁹ Thurow and Gumbel, A1.

steady stream of recruits. This struggle for support is most indicative of the group's lack of ideological strength and resilience.

Motivation

The biggest weakness of the RAF was a profoundly unprofound ideology. The group seemed to be anti-everything:

“There are thousands of unresolved problems that are crying out for a solution and that will lead all mankind into a catastrophe unless they are tackled soon and solved. All these problems sprang up as a result of the capitalist principle, according to which the only thing that counts is profit and power, and where people and nature play only a subordinate role.”¹²⁰

In the early years, this meant fighting the United States because of its involvement in Vietnam. After Vietnam, the RAF had to look for another cause and latched onto the Palestinian struggle.¹²¹ But throughout the majority of its existence, the RAF was focused on the liberation and civil rights of its imprisoned members, continuing a line of propaganda that the prisoners were being tortured and isolated.¹²² In fact, in 1992, German Justice Minister Kinkel put it more bluntly: “Without the prisoners, there would be no RAF.”¹²³ Added to this, several of the group members, notably Andreas Baader himself, showed by their lifestyle that they were motivated as much by the sex and drugs that were loose and free in the group as by the save-the-world ideals.¹²⁴ This haphazard mixture of aims severely diluted any Marxist-Leninist ideology the group may have used to reach its supporters.

¹²⁰ Dennis A. Pluchinsky, “Germany’s Red Army: An Obituary,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 16 (1993), 147.

¹²¹ Hoffman, 82.

¹²² Pluchinsky, 142.

¹²³ *Der Spiegel*, April 20, 1992, p. 19, as quoted in Pluchinsky (1993), 143.

¹²⁴ Hoffman, 80

But even this Marxist-Leninist ideology was doomed. The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 took away the RAF's cross border sanctuary, terminated support from all communist sources, and started the process of politically marginalizing the RAF.¹²⁵ In the group's own words, "The collapse of the socialist states...has had a disastrous effect on the millions of people throughout the world, and now all those who are fighting for liberation all around the globe have to rely solely on themselves."¹²⁶ But the "millions of people" were not willing to join the RAF in a struggle without the support of the socialist states. Two communiqués in 1992 set the stage for the dismantling of the RAF, and by 1998 they were completely disbanded.

The true RAF strategy was much different than the one that any group member may have recited during its existence. The organizational structure developed around the prisoners, with even the commandos usually following their lead. Their tendency was to try to get themselves out of jail, or at least obtain access to each other in jail so they could communicate. These goals took priority over and diluted any higher calling. True, the group did accomplish some impressive feats that, in quantity, could have caused NATO and the "imperialist" nations enough headaches to change policy (this is the only possible "mechanism" for success). But the RAF did not accomplish these in quantity. The main purpose of the operations was to maintain moral support from the public and material support from the socialist nations. In fact, the central theme of the RAF strategy was that of group maintenance—in Crenshaw's terms, they were an *organizational* type group. The label 'criminal' may have even fit them better than 'terrorist', and the West German

¹²⁵ Ibid., 84.

¹²⁶ From the text of the RAF's June 2, 1992 communique, in Pluchinsky (1993), 148.

government's response to them reflected this. The Germans simply refused to negotiate with the RAF, most notably in the case of the combination Schleyer kidnapping-Lufthansa hijacking.¹²⁷ The government kept the RAF in check by arresting and prosecuting its leaders—in June 1972 and November 1982 they arrested all the leaders. Although the group came back from these setbacks, they were never able to pose a serious threat to national security. When the Wall fell in 1989, there was no higher cause to drive them and no support to sustain them, so they expired.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

Analyzing the PLO as a terrorist organization requires some explanation, because many would object that the PLO is not and has never been a terrorist organization. Having evolved into the Palestinian Authority, which today is the governing body of a territory, it could now be considered a government. The PLO has always been an umbrella for many factions and groups, most of which have been terrorist in nature. But while the PLO was more than just these terrorist groups, it would have been nothing without them. The terrorist groups took control of the PLO, put it in the world public opinion limelight, and brought in enough recruits and support to sustain its struggle toward their vision of a Palestinian-controlled state in the territory controlled by Israel. The PLO provided the framework and organizational structure within which these groups could claim a unified front toward a common goal, even if they had different methods for achieving that goal. In this respect, the PLO was no different than the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which also had a central structure but had no real control over the individual actions of its constituent groups. So the PLO should be viewed as an organization with a

¹²⁷ Pluchinsky (1992), 63.

strategy that, from the beginning, included the use of terrorism through its constituent groups to achieve its ends.

The “beginning” of the PLO was 1964. But even the beginning of the modern-age part of the struggle was long before this. The British had promised the Palestinians they would become their own state after World War I. Instead, the Middle East was carved up and divided among the imperial powers and the Arab tribes. Then after World War II, the Jews who had flocked to the area managed to gain control of the state of Israel from the British through U.N. mediation (and after a terrorist campaign of their own).¹²⁸ The Arabs attacked the Israelis, but were defeated and 500,000 Palestinians were forced to leave their homes and live in refugee camps in nearby areas, especially Lebanon.¹²⁹ In these camps, the Palestinians built new lives, but never gave up hope of eventually regaining their homes. They sent their children to get educated in western universities, they used their education to set up successful businesses, and they prospered when merchant families in the unstable, oil-rich countries (Libya, Iraq, Iran, South Yemen, and Syria all underwent revolutions, but were rich from oil exports) hid their money in Lebanon.¹³⁰ Then in 1964, Egypt’s Nasser organized a Pan-Arabic convention that formed the PLO.¹³¹ But the formation of an organization could not assure the unity of the Palestinians.

Organization

As discussed above, the PLO was an umbrella organization for many other groups. The PLO itself was organized into three departments at the highest level: the

¹²⁸ White, 107-8.

¹²⁹ James Adams, *The Financing of Terror*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 54.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 84.

¹³¹ Ely Karmon, “Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,” 25 November 2000, accessed 20 February 2002. Available at <http://www.ict.org.il>.

Palestine National Council, the Executive Committee, and the Palestine National Fund (PNF).¹³² The Executive Committee was a group of fifteen men, of whom Yasser Arafat was appointed chairman in January 1969, riding a wave of popularity due to his survival of a battle with the Israelis at Karamah.¹³³ The PNF was eventually given total control of all the PLO's finances, although many of the groups received funds directly from external sponsors who did not want their influence watered down by a common funding pot. The PLO attempted to develop unity through the holding of the Palestinian National Congress, of which there were eighteen between 1968 and 1990.¹³⁴ But the amount of influence the PLO had over these groups was debatable, since each of them had its own internal organization, ideology, and support.

The two main groups in the 1960s were Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The Fatah was led by Yasser Arafat, who had started his career with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. When President Nasser destroyed this group, Arafat moved elsewhere and formed Fatah. At the time of the PLO's formation, Fatah was already planning to begin military operations against the Israelis, and thus gained the momentum which eventually made them the most powerful group within the PLO.¹³⁵ George Habash formed the PFLP as a counterweight to Fatah. There were other factions, and many more were to come later. In fact, the history of the PLO is one of continuous splits among splinter groups.¹³⁶ The organization of the individual groups is not as important to the overall strategy of the PLO as is the fact that the PLO was under the constant tension of having to try and integrate its own actions with those of the

¹³² Adams, 109.

¹³³ Karmon.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Walter Laquer, *The Age of Terrorism* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1987), 215.

groups, who sometimes played along and sometimes did not. But their fate was ultimately tied to the fate of the PLO because of their common goal and the fact that the PLO was the organization that the rest of the world recognized as the authority over the smaller groups.

Motivation

The driving force behind the PLO, and the only thing nominally holding the different factions moderately together was, as its name implies, the desire to liberate the Palestinians. In 1964, the resolution that initiated the PLO stated, “Palestinian people must play a part in liberating its country, and in achieving self-determination.”¹³⁷ Fatah under Arafat saw the armed struggle as a transcendent cause requiring the organization to abandon all ideological and social divisions. True, the groups had ideological leanings. In 1974, Arafat admitted that Fatah saw the Palestinian struggle as one piece in the worldwide struggle against colonialism and imperialism.¹³⁸ The PFLP was even farther to the left. In Marxist-Leninist style, the PFLP believed it would be a revolutionary party that could ignite a revolution (the liberation of Palestine from Israel) that would unite the entire Arab world.¹³⁹ But it was the memories (and, among the youth, the tales) of the injustice and devastation of the exodus in the late 1940s, the hunger for their own land, that drove the Palestinian people. This is what basically drove the PLO—most of the time.

The factor that complicated the PLO’s organizational dynamics is that the Arab states had other goals, and they also had money and other forms of support the individual factions within the PLO needed. But in return for this support, these sponsors often

¹³⁷ Karmon.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ From a basic PFLP doctrine document called “The Military Thinking of the Front,” quoted in Karmon.

spurred the groups to undertake operations against other Arab states or even other groups within the PLO. This often gave the illusion that the groups were simply fighting to maintain support from the Arab states. For example, the Lebanese civil war in 1975-76 saw Palestinians fighting with the left-wing Lebanese against Syrians. In its aftermath, Anwar Sadat of Egypt made overtures to Israel and the United States to start a peace process. Iraq, dreaming of a Pan-Arabic state under Iraqi control, hired Abu Nidal, a PLO terrorist group, to make strikes against moderate PLO members and against Syria, its political enemy. Thus, Fatah found itself fighting Iraq, other Palestinians, and Syria at once.¹⁴⁰ In 1982, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Fatah was expelled from Beirut by the Israelis, then from their refugee camps by the Christian Falange group, and then from the Tripoli area by the Syrians and the Lebanese Shiites, sponsored by Iran.¹⁴¹ The one thing the Palestinians and the Arab states had in common was the desire to remove Israel from the lands occupied in the six-day war of 1967. But the political dealings of the states got the PLO involved in operations that exacerbated the internecine nature of its groups. Nevertheless, the PLO found out along the way that they did not need the material support of the Arab states as much as they had thought and, in fact, found other ways to support themselves.

Support

Since the beginning, state support to the PLO has been unreliable. In 1971, only \$40,000 of \$10 million promised by Arab states was delivered to the PLO. This spurred the PLO to demonstrate, through spectacular feats of terrorism, that it still held credibility in the war against Israel. Then in 1975, the PLO made a tour of the Gulf States to coerce

¹⁴⁰ Karmon.

¹⁴¹ Laquer, 218-9.

them into paying up. Only Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates could be counted on.¹⁴² In fact, the individual groups under the PLO umbrella got donations directly from the Arab states, who could then take advantage of the differing ideological leanings of the groups for their own purposes. Syria financed Saiqa and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) to the tune of between \$50 to \$100 million. At different times, Abu Nidal was “hired” by Syria, Iraq, and Libya to do their bidding, which included assassinations of PLO representatives in the late 1970s and an attempt on Arafat’s life in 1974. Libya had actually made its debut into terrorism by stuffing \$1 million into the PFLP’s coffers in 1971. Still, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the PLO never received less than \$100 million per year from the Arab states, and it usually received closer to \$250 million. The problem was that their operating budget alone was over \$500 million by 1987. This is why the PLO had to turn to self-financing.¹⁴³

Most of the efforts of the PLO and its groups in this endeavor were criminal. In the middle of the Lebanese civil war, on 20 January, 1976, the PLO teamed up with one of its enemies in the war, the Christian Militia, and the Mafia to pull off the largest bank robbery of all time. They robbed the British Bank of the Middle East for what was estimated at \$100 million.¹⁴⁴ In 1972, the PFLP hijacked a Lufthansa plane and flew it to South Yemen, where they were subsequently paid \$5 million as ransom for the crew and the plane. The PFLP also ran a very profitable document forging business.¹⁴⁵ In Lebanon, where the Palestinians essentially dictated the rules, robberies, looting, and

¹⁴² Adams, 56-7 and 97 (for the PFLP and Libya).

¹⁴³ Ibid., 59.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 93-4.

¹⁴⁵ Adams, 98.

pass-through taxes were commonplace.¹⁴⁶ In general, the PLO only made an effort to appear legal when it needed to for political purposes. However, it still needed to obtain the moral support of its target audiences.

The PLO was as adept at communicating to these target audiences as it was at ignoring the opinions of its non-target audiences. In 1970, the PLO established Samed, or the Palestine Martyrs Work Society, under Arafat's Fatah. The organization's objectives were to develop skilled Palestinian workers, get them in jobs, and develop a thriving, self-sufficient economy that would allow the Palestinians to continue the revolution. Samed was basically the economic arm of the PLO. It started by manufacturing basic necessities, then expanded to become both a major institution with industrial, cinematography and informational, agricultural, and general commercial branches.¹⁴⁷ The PLO had a captive, motivated audience in the refugees. But it did not take their loyalty lightly. Besides Samed, the PLO also worked on instilling unity and loyalty to the cause in generations of Palestinians through a social welfare system that included free schooling, free medical care, and generous compensation to the families of anyone killed or injured in the fight against Israel.¹⁴⁸ The PLO had no intention of losing the support of this target audience. Yet there was another target audience—the international community. For this type of communication, the PLO spoke with its terrorist operations.

Operations

The most famous and effective communications with the international community were those acts of international terrorism that vaulted the PLO into the limelight in the

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 99.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 87-8.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 89.

late 1960s and early 1970s. The PFLP, under Habash, saw terrorism as a necessary part of the armed struggle, and consequently the PFLP took the lead in committing 15 acts of international terrorism between 1968 and 1970. At this time, the Fatah saw these acts as reprehensible and only later adopted the methods as desperation measures.¹⁴⁹ The first PFLP incident was the hijacking of an Israeli El Al flight from Rome to Tel Aviv on 22 July 1968. The PFLP held the plane, its crew, and its passengers hostage, demanding the release of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. To its satisfaction, the PFLP found this was an extremely successful way to not only obtain this immediate goal, but to awaken the world to the Palestinian cause.¹⁵⁰ The last of the 15 acts was to have different consequences, however. In early September, 1970, the PFLP hijacked four planes, blew one of them up in Cairo, and blew the other three up at Dawson Field in Jordan in front of the television cameras that were filming the hostage negotiations.¹⁵¹ Because of this act, the Jordanian Hashemite regime began a massacre of the Palestinians in Jordan, forcing the PLO to relocate to Lebanon and spurring the Fatah to adopt more extreme measures in anger and frustration. The Fatah secretly developed an organization called Black September to commemorate the month the massacre occurred.¹⁵² The most infamous act of this organization was the Munich Olympics kidnapping and murder of Israeli athletes. On 5 September, 1972, eight terrorists killed two Israelis and kidnapped another nine from their dormitory. They offered to exchange the hostages for 236 Palestinian prisoners in Israel and some RAF prisoners in Germany and were taken to an airbase to board an aircraft to Cairo. A rescue attempt by the West German police sparked a

¹⁴⁹ Karmon.

¹⁵⁰ Hoffman, 67-8.

¹⁵¹ Karmon.

¹⁵² Ibid.

firefight, and the terrorists killed all nine hostages before the police could kill or capture the terrorists.¹⁵³

This terrible incident showed that even acts that fail to achieve the ostensible objectives can succeed strategically. Although the rest of the world saw the terrorists as despicable, they also saw them as a force with a serious cause. Palestinians saw them as heroic defenders of this cause, able to take incredible risks in its name. Most importantly, less than eighteen months later, Yasser Arafat was invited to address the U.N. General Assembly, and the PLO was accorded special observer status.¹⁵⁴ The PLO successfully used international terrorist operations to reach both its target audiences—the Palestinians and the world public. But these operations are only a small part of the spectrum of the PLOs military activities.

The majority of the PLO's military operations were more 'conventional' guerrilla or terrorist operations or outright conventional warfare. Fatah began its operations against Israel in 1964 with border attacks that drew criticism even from Arab governments. Because of this criticism, Fatah turned to sabotage attacks in an attempt to get the Israelis to go on the offensive. In fact, Fatah's attacks probably contributed to the military developments that triggered the 1967 war.¹⁵⁵ After the six-day war, Fatah tried to secure strongholds along the Israeli border by attacking the Israeli settlements there, but failed because the Israeli forces were too strong.¹⁵⁶ However, when Arafat and Fatah (with substantial help from Jordan) successfully defended one of their bases at Karamah

¹⁵³ Hoffman, 71-2.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 73-5.

¹⁵⁵ Karmon.

¹⁵⁶ White, 125 actually says Fatah attacked schoolchildren, apartment complexes, farms, settlements, and other civilian targets, saying Arafat called this guerrilla war; the Israelis called it terrorism. Laquer, 216 cites the Israeli forces and terrain as the reasons the campaign failed.

from a ferocious Israeli cross-border attack in March 1968, Arafat and the PLO became heroes to the Arab world.¹⁵⁷ Since then, the majority of the operations directed against Israel have been either hit-and-run attacks from across the border against Israeli transport or settlements, bombs, or shelling of Israeli settlements.¹⁵⁸ The groups then turned to the international terrorism mentioned above.

After the Yom Kippur War, the PLO groups, including PFLP, decided the hijackings had outlived their usefulness.¹⁵⁹ As an acknowledged member of the world community, the PLO had to appear more moderate. Besides, conflict in Lebanon would keep them busy for over a decade. In 1975, the Lebanese civil war kicked off, and in the period 1976-1980, almost all of the attacks by the various PLO terrorist groups were against each other or against the traitor Egyptians. Anwar Sadat's 1977 trip to Israel and 1979 Camp David Accords added fuel to the fire, and the use of terrorism as statecraft was in full swing. The only real international terrorist acts between 1976-1980 were those by Abu Nidal against Egyptian and PLO targets, and a couple retaliations by Fatah.¹⁶⁰ By the late 1970s, the PLO was building up its military infrastructure, so that by 1980, Fatah numbered over 20,000 men.¹⁶¹ When the Israelis invaded Lebanon in 1982 to put an end to the terrorist strikes they had been receiving from across the border, Arafat's Fatah was overcome by the weight of a large conventional attack. The PLO would never revisit its old 1970s ways.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 125.

¹⁵⁸ Laquer, 216.

¹⁵⁹ Karmon - In 1976, Waddi Haddad hijacked a Lufthansa plane in support of the RAF. This was the hijacking in conjunction with the RAF kidnapping that was mentioned in the RAF section. However, Habash expelled Haddad from the PFLP.

¹⁶⁰ Karmon.

¹⁶¹ Laquer, 216.

The realities of the international environment forced the PLO to take a more political path. The Soviet Union had not helped the PLO at all, despite the PLO's left-leaning ideologies. Arafat began to see that the United States might be the key to any solution. In order to gain the good graces of the West, the PLO had to appear more moderate. Throughout the mid-1980s, Arafat walked a tight rope between trying to appear moderate to the West and appeasing the extreme factions inside his PLO. While he was officially denouncing terrorism, Fatah committed some terrorist acts, including financing the Palestine Liberation Front in the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985.¹⁶² But Arafat was on a path to political resolution with Israel. Even when the Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza strip started an uprising called the Intifada in 1987, Arafat tried to play the peacekeeper. Rather than encouraging the popular revolt for which he had wished two decades earlier, he tried in vain to maintain the peace.¹⁶³ But the Intifada accomplished much for the cause, as the West saw rock-throwing Palestinians fighting well-armed Israelis. World public opinion, the moderate stance of the PLO, and the active part of the United States led to the Oslo Agreement of 1993.

The Oslo Agreement was not the end of the conflict, by far. But it did establish a Palestinian state, with the former PLO, now the Palestinian Authority, as government. The PLO had come a long way toward achieving its goals. However, the goals had changed—the original aim was to remove the Israeli state and get the 1967 lands back.

¹⁶² Karmon reveals the actions of Arafat in the 1980s. A 1983 PNC allowed a political solution with Israel, and in 1985, Arafat and King Hussein of Jordan signed an agreement to try and form a Palestinian state to coexist with Israel. Yet Karmon also tells that Fatah re-started terrorist attacks against Israel in 1983, although they were within the Fatah's existing policies on international terrorism. The Achilles Lauro hijacking, in October 1985, is better described in Adams, 23-4.

¹⁶³ White, 131.

The Oslo Accord did not do this. This shift in aims is indicative of the overall strategy of the PLO, if such a thing could be formulated.

The PLO was a politically motivated organization that used a number of coercive methods to gain its political aims. It was able to accommodate diverse groups under an umbrella organization. It developed a self-sufficient financial arm to provide for the welfare of its people. It used both legitimate and illegitimate methods to obtain the resources to take care of its people and defend itself. It did not rely on terrorism, but was able to use terrorism to its advantage to gain worldwide recognition and support, while mounting more conventional military campaigns at the same time. Finally, the PLO was willing to compromise in the end to obtain an end state that was slightly short of its original aims, but one that was sufficient to put the PLO in power as a legitimate authority. All these are the signs that the ultimate strategy of the PLO (whether they knew it or not at any given time) was to obtain this legitimacy and power to govern its constituents using coercive methods where necessary. The mechanism by which the PLO sought to accomplish this was the raising of its enemy's assessment of the costs involved in resisting its demands. Cross-border attacks would impose high blood and treasure costs on Israel, international terrorism would vault the PLO into the international limelight, and a moderate stance would convince the world (including the Israeli public) the PLO could be trusted. The result would be material, human, and political costs that Israel simply could not handle. It is not clear how this mechanism could have led to an Israeli abandonment of its land, but the mechanism was sufficient to obtain a reasonable compromise.

The Israeli counter-strategies were most certainly not devised with compromise in mind. To the Israelis, the PLO constituted a national security threat. Mindful of their inability to absorb losses of territory and people, the Israelis have always had a distinctly offensive military doctrine, and the counter-insurgency campaign against the PLO was no exception. The Israelis have used a combination of regime targeting, selected airstrikes, widespread artillery bombardments, limited land incursions, and full-scale combined operations.¹⁶⁴ The Israeli security forces get much of the credit for the failure of the guerrilla campaigns of 1967. The Battle of Karamah in 1968 was an Israeli mechanized assault designed to wipe out one of Fatah's main bases in Jordan. It was swift and ferocious, but the Jordanians came to Fatah's rescue.¹⁶⁵ In 1978, Israel invaded again, Lebanon this time, an attack which was eventually halted by U.N. resolution 425, calling on Israel to completely withdraw and allow U.N. forces to stabilize the region.¹⁶⁶ The resolution did nothing for Israel's security. In 1981, Israel started shelling Southern Lebanon in retaliation for the shelling of Israeli settlements. Then in 1982, Israel began Operation Peace for Galilee, an invasion of Lebanon with the declared intent to destroy the political and military infrastructure of the PLO. The invasion, led by Sharon, covered the planned 45 kilometers so quickly that the Israelis decided to press on to Beirut. However, they were unable to wipe out the PLO forces (although Arafat's Fatah fled the country), and in the process ignited resentment among the Shi'ites. Surgical airstrikes

¹⁶⁴ Clive Jones, "Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and the War in South Lebanon 1985-97," in *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 8:3 (Winter 1997), 86.

¹⁶⁵ White, 125.

¹⁶⁶ Jones, 88.

were unable to protect the Israeli troops from terrorist harassment, and the Israelis had to pull back closer to the Israel border.¹⁶⁷

The Israeli dilemma is a difficult one, promising rewards for neither hard line nor soft. They dealt with the PLO from a position of insecurity throughout the entire struggle. Since the PLO's stated objective precluded the presence of an Israeli state, this was quite understandable. But they were facing an enemy that learned to use world public opinion very effectively, a skill the Israelis neglected. They never attempted a "hearts and minds" campaign, and consequently missed opportunities to put the PLO on the defensive and also to make allies out of the Shi'ites in Lebanon.¹⁶⁸ Instead, they have made bitter enemies. But they did enter into the peace process, sign the Oslo Agreement, and even withdraw from disputed territory. Possibly too little too late. Now, the PLO has become the PA, and Arafat won elections in 1996, but there is still no peace. The Islamic Hamas commands enough support, and the PA and Israel enough distrust, that the Palestinian people are divided as to which way is the road to satisfaction.¹⁶⁹

Irish Republican Army (IRA)

The foregoing cases provide good examples of the application of this study's analysis framework and process, but of course they, in themselves, do not completely define the nature of the "old" terrorism. While such a complete definition may be out of reach in this forum, no discussion of modern terrorism is complete without some mention of the IRA. In many taxonomies, the IRA's struggle would be categorized with the

¹⁶⁷ Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., "Falcons Against the Jihad: Israeli Airpower and Coercive Diplomacy in Southern Lebanon," (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 3-4 and 21-5.

¹⁶⁸ Jones, 86-7.

¹⁶⁹ Khalil Shikaki, "Peace Now or Hamas Later," in *Foreign Affairs*, (Jul/Aug 1998), 42-43.

PLO's, because both are struggles for an ethnic nation. In truth, there are quite a few similarities, but a quick analysis of the IRA reveals many differences as well.

Although the Irish conflict has cultural roots that extend back centuries, the struggle was rejuvenated in the late 1960s. This modern-day period began in 1969, when the Catholic civil rights campaign in Northern Ireland sparked violence. Since the formation of an Irish free state with British protection in Northern Ireland in 1921, the northern government had systematically reduced civil rights for Catholics living in the North. In the 1960s, these Catholics started a major civil rights movement to improve housing and education. In January 1969, participants in a four-day civil rights march from Belfast to Derry were gassed and beaten. Then in August, at the annual Protestant Apprentice Boys celebration, violence erupted and sent Belfast and Londonderry up in flames.¹⁷⁰ The British sent in the Army to make peace. However, the Army, under Gen. Frank Kitson, tried to implement some of the measures that had been successful in its Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960. This resulted in a security policy that was "repressive enough to continue the alienation of working-class Catholics but not repressive enough to actually defeat the Provisional IRA."¹⁷¹ The Army implemented internment, torture of prisoners, and house-to-house searches in order to try and control the situation.¹⁷² Then on January 30, 1972—"Bloody Sunday"—the Northern Ireland

¹⁷⁰ White, 173-4. He also gives a good historic background for the conflict, which includes the fact that in the 1500s and 1600s, the Protestant Reformation was imposed upon an unwilling Ireland by Henry VIII and his daughter, Elizabeth. She created the Plantation of Ulster, which displaced Irish peasants from their homes. When they revolted, Oliver Cromwell put them down with a massacre. Then, in the seventeenth century, the Catholic James II revolted against William of Orange, then King of England. The Apprentice boys held out against a long siege of Derry by James and, in August, 1689, were relieved by the English. Thus, every August, the Protestants celebrate this victory with a parade marked by taunting and the wearing of orange, p. 169.

¹⁷¹ John Newsinger, "From Counter-Insurgency to Internal Security: Northern Ireland 1969-1992," in *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 6:1 (Spring, 1995), 93.

¹⁷² Newsinger, 94.

Civil Rights Association (NICRA) marched on Derry. Part of the crowd advanced on a British barricade, and violence broke out. The British paratroopers eventually opened fire, killing 13 and wounding 14 others.¹⁷³ The events of 1969 through 1972 were enough to completely rejuvenate the IRA, inactive since 1962, and the war was on.

Motivation

The Irish conflict is a good example of Tololyan's culturally-based struggle, discussed in Chapter 2. The IRA has been described as "a dream working."¹⁷⁴ The ideology of the movement is not analytical or political or even well-encapsulated, it is merely shared—"the perception assured by the dream."¹⁷⁵ There is a political ideology espoused by Sinn Fein, but that is definitely not the ideology that has driven the movement. The IRA's training manual, 'The Green Book,' takes one small paragraph to mention that the objects of the movement are to establish a sovereign, Socialist Irish Republic, with civil rights for all and the Irish language as its official language.¹⁷⁶ In fact, the IRA's motivation defies intellectualism and appeals instead to the masses who share the dream. The dream is a unified Ireland, and it requires sacrifice and struggle, not for vengeance against the evil Protestants, but for unity with mis-guided Irish.¹⁷⁷ It is perpetuated through rituals, especially funerals that transform the dead into martyrs,

¹⁷³ The IRA official history of the events of Bloody Sunday is the most precise account of this incident, its precedents, and aftermath. It describes the route of the march, exact times and locations, and even estimates the number of participants (3,000 to 5,000 people). It admits that what is in dispute is whether the British were fired upon at the scene of the shooting. Although there was a fire fight elsewhere, at the scene where the 13 were killed no bombs or bullets were found, and no British troops were hurt. This report is available at <http://sinnfein.ie/index.htm>, accessed 20 February 2002.

¹⁷⁴ Bell, 146.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 62.

¹⁷⁶ "The Green Book," Appendix to Martin Dillon, *The Dirty War: Covert Strategies and Tactics Used in Political Conflicts*, (New York: Routledge, 1990), 447.

¹⁷⁷ Bell, 57.

rather than through indoctrination.¹⁷⁸ Thus, the Irish see their problems stemming from the invasion of outsiders, passed down to them for generations in stories, and necessitating a constant struggle.

Operations

The struggle was a violent one for sure. From 1969 through 1998, there have been 3,289 killed (2,332 civilians) and 42,216 injured (27,238 civilians) as a result of the fighting.¹⁷⁹ Although the IRA tries to avoid and then apologizes for casualties to innocents, these happen frequently. The IRA's tactics could have been designed by Mao or Sun-Tzu: strike hard and then disengage, mass again where the enemy least expects it, then strike again, always keeping him off guard.¹⁸⁰ For example, on 27 August, 1979, the IRA accomplished a spectacular double feat of terror. At Warrenpoint in Ireland, they set off a bomb that blew up a British military patrol truck, and then a second one where the soldiers took cover and the rescue helicopter was landing. This killed 18 soldiers. On the same day, they assassinated Lord Mountbatten, on holiday in his boat off Mullaghmore.¹⁸¹ Whether assassination or guerrilla warfare, it was always certain that the gun was the primary means of continuing the struggle—until 1981.

In 1980-81, the IRA learned that communicating their cause could gain political headway. On their own initiative, ten prisoners died from hunger strikes when the British refused to negotiate or concede to their demands. This brought attention to their cause from the Irish and from the world that the IRA command had not counted on and opened

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 60.

¹⁷⁹ Sydney Elliot and W. D. Flackes, *Conflict in Northern Ireland: An Encyclopedia*, (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 1999), 681-682.

¹⁸⁰ Harmon, 222.

¹⁸¹ Bell, 228-9.

up a new battleground.¹⁸² Sinn Fein got one of the hunger strikers, Bobby Sands, to run for Parliament. Sands was elected, and when he died, a Sinn Fein representative took his place.¹⁸³ Since then, the IRA and Sinn Fein have collaborated, although not without conflict, in a policy Gerry Adams laid out in 1977 as “the bullet and the ballot.”¹⁸⁴ It has been a tough road, with internal dissension, but has gotten them closer to peace and to their goal. The main problem with any policy in the IRA, however, is the ability to enforce it throughout the organization.

Organization

The IRA organization has evolved, but the basic essentials have been again shaped by the struggle and Irish culture. In the early 1970s, the IRA was organized as a conventional army, with brigades that were given geographic responsibility in Ulster. These brigades were too large, and therefore easy for the British to penetrate. In 1977, the IRA adopted a cell structure, with limited contact among cells for security.¹⁸⁵ These cells provided the desired security, but also made it harder to coordinate operations. The local commanders were the ones who decided when and where to act. This led to blunders, but it allowed the movement to keep unity, where tactical micromanagement would only have invited schism.¹⁸⁶ The British estimated in 1984 there were about 300 hard core members, plus several thousand sympathizers.¹⁸⁷

There was a hierarchy to the organization: the Army Convention, Army Executive, Army Council, Chief of Staff Northern Command, and Chief of Staff

¹⁸² Ibid., 210-1.

¹⁸³ Adams, 164.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 163.

¹⁸⁵ “IRA: Tough Nut to Crack,” *The Economist*, September 1, 1979, 19.

¹⁸⁶ Bell, 161.

¹⁸⁷ Adams, 131.

Southern Command. But these positions did not carry with them the ability to control the cells. They mainly concentrated on marshalling the resources to continue the struggle.¹⁸⁸

Support

Throughout the years, marshalling the resources became a big business. Certainly the most highly publicized way the IRA obtained material resources was through the Irish Northern Aid (Noraid), established by Michael Flannery in 1969.¹⁸⁹ Although Noraid did contribute over 50 percent of the IRA budget in the early 1970s and managed to set up major fund raisers like an annual fund-raiser dinner in New York, their support has waned over the years. This is because the British recognized that the United States was a major battleground in the moral support campaign. The British tried to counter the strong Irish lobby by playing on America's guilt for helping to finance and arm the perpetrators of atrocities.¹⁹⁰ For example, after the murder of Lord Mountbatten and the 18 British troops, the *Economist* spewed,

The killers were partly financed by citizens of the United States, and most informed Britons thought that the Carter administration's decision four weeks ago to delay arms sales to Ulster's police (so as to please some Irish American voters) would encourage the IRA into another murderous heave. This last effect was not merely forecastable, it was forecast.¹⁹¹

After this murder, the United States finally yielded to British pressure. The FBI set up a special squad just to interrupt the flow of cash and arms to the IRA. This resulted in a

¹⁸⁸ Bell, 142.

¹⁸⁹ Adams, 135. Flannery was a member of the old Black and Tans who harassed the British back in 1919. When the Irish Parliament accepted the British offer of dominion in 1922, he saw this as appeasement, and participated in a civil war that landed him in jail. He left for the United States in 1927, and came back in the limelight when the IRA approached him for funds in 1969. His personal check was returned, so he decided to start Noraid as a more subtle way to support the movement.

¹⁹⁰ Adams, 136.

¹⁹¹ "After Mountbatten," *The Economist*, 1 September, 1979, 11.

series of court cases in the 1980s that essentially took Noraid down.¹⁹² But the IRA was already evolving to a more self-sufficient method of support. They started by forging tax-exempt certificates for building contractors in the early 1970s, and eventually worked their way into the security business, the taxi business, and the nightclub business. The security business was a particularly devious one—the terrorists would approach a potential customer and offer security protection for a monthly payment. If the client refused, he was guaranteed to be involved in security incidents that convinced him he needed the protection.¹⁹³ The IRA has basically been able to get its hands into any part of the market it wants, so it has not missed the Noraid money. Seemingly, it has not even missed the moral support that Noraid represented in the United States. The key to the IRA had always been, “the intensity of the faith and only incidentally the assets and even capacity of the underground.”¹⁹⁴

Even the IRA did not maintain the intensity of this faith forever. The 1990s were a decade that saw the IRA switch from a policy of the primacy of the bullet to one of the primacy of the ballet. On Good Friday, 1998, the IRA signed an accord that settled for less than an independent, unified Republic. Instead, they got political checks and balances on the Northern Irish Republic that they hope will eventually lead to a unified Irish Republic.¹⁹⁵ Obviously everyone was not satisfied—in October 2001, IRA members were arrested while working with terrorists in Columbia. The resulting outrage

¹⁹² Adams, 145. He goes through the cases on pp. 145-153, but the essential bottom line is that the cases showed beyond doubt that Noraid was supplying cash and arms directly to the IRA, contrary to its position in the 70s that all money went to humanitarian causes in Northern Ireland, p. 154.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 167-174. Actually, the Catholics let the Protestants dominate the security business, in exchange for a cut of the profits, p. 172.

¹⁹⁴ Bell, 317.

¹⁹⁵ “Northern Ireland: From Process to Procession,” *The Economist*, 18 April, 1998, 19.

by the United States caused Sinn Fein to demand and receive a start to the disarmament process within the IRA.¹⁹⁶ Whether this is really the end of the IRA is another story. It is difficult to believe “the dream” that was kept alive for so long by violence could find resolution in a manner so devoid of drama.

The reason this is so hard to believe is that the IRA’s entire strategy to this point was one of simply maintaining a struggle. The IRA knew the dream of an independent, united Ireland was beyond its grasp. Even if it could force the British to leave, it would have to fight its Protestant brothers in Northern Ireland. Yet this dream still propelled its members. It propelled them to the point that they made themselves totally independent of outside support. Their operations were not spectacular—just a few killed here and there. Their organization kept its members to a life of isolation, but exercised very little control over them. The key was always to maintain consensus, maintain the faith, and maintain the struggle. The only mechanism for success was to simply outlast the enemy, imparting costs that the enemy could not handle. The IRA had the opposite problem that the RAF had—instead of too little focus, the IRA had too much. Ireland became a quagmire where an unstoppable force met an immovable object, resulting in eternal tension. Exhausted by this process, the IRA switched to the political solution. But the process also confounded the British counter-strategy.

The British search for an effective counter-strategy has produced more lessons in what not to do than in what to do. In 1976, the British stopped trying to treat Ireland as a repeat of Malaya and turned to a policy of internal security, where the Army played a

¹⁹⁶ Marc Champion, “In ‘Unprecedented Move,’ IRA Says Disarming Has Begun --- Blair and Trimble Praise Act, Which Could Remove Old Roadblock to Peace,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 24 October, 2001, A16.

supporting role to law enforcement.¹⁹⁷ They ended internment and turned increasingly to the judicial process to prosecute the terrorists. However, the British Special Air Service still used harsh tactics that at times included killing rather than arresting the IRA. Although they were effective at containing the IRA, it is probable that these tactics undermined the legitimacy of the British efforts and increased support for the IRA.¹⁹⁸ The British also failed to recognize the fact that the Protestant paramilitaries were terrorist groups, too. By responding only to the IRA and giving the Protestants latitude, the British allowed the Protestants to terrorize the Catholics, further legitimizing the IRA as the only protection the Catholics have. The other problem with British policy was a lack of cooperation between the politicians, the police, the Army, and the Dublin government. Each saw its role in a different light and missed the effectiveness that could have been gained by cooperating to pass effective legislation, enforce the legislation, aim effective intelligence toward that enforcement, and patrol the north-south border.¹⁹⁹

There were fundamental differences among the “old” terrorist groups. The RAF’s ideology centered around global revolution, where that of the IRA and the PLO were focused on territorial and nationalistic objectives. However, the RAF’s organization was extremely limited by its focus on the imprisoned leaders. The RAF did not have the resources and leadership to link up with other groups who had similar goals. The IRA’s organization was also isolated, but very decentralized. Where the lower levels of the RAF took their cues from the prisoners, the lower levels of the IRA were fairly autonomous, leaving its leadership to worry about forming a coherent strategy based on

¹⁹⁷ Newsinger, 99.

¹⁹⁸ Newsinger, 103.

¹⁹⁹ Adams, 182-3.

tactics that were out of that leadership's control. The PLO leadership also had very little control over its constituent groups. Nevertheless, the PLO played a key strategic role in managing both the material and moral support for the Palestinian cause. It arranged for funding from the Arab states and organized independent financial operations (legal and illegal). Similarly, the IRA took donations from Noraid, but eventually had to learn to support itself after the British won the propaganda war with the Americans. Both the PLO and the IRA benefitted from solid moral support among their target audiences because of the historical roots of the struggles. The RAF, on the other hand, struggled for moral support. They obtained material support and sanctuary from East Germany and relied on the existence of the Soviet Union to prove their ideological relevance. When the Soviet Union dissolved, the group lost its ideological resilience. All the RAF's operations, consisting of parallel hunger strikes, bombings, kidnappings, and demonstrations, had to be aimed at developing moral support. The IRA and the PLO used operations to develop support as well—especially the PLO's dramatic hijackings. However, these two groups were also involved in a more "guerilla" type war as well—targeting the enemy to wear him down and gain military advantage. The PLO at one time had an army of almost 20,000 soldiers in Lebanon. It is therefore difficult to say that "old terrorism" had any observable nature at all.

However, the strategies of all these groups had something in common. Although each professed to be after an absolute victory, they were each really about outlasting the enemy to achieve some type of political change. In the RAF's case, the strategy was more to ensure the survival of the terrorist group than to achieve any particular policy change, despite the group's stated aims. The PLO showed itself to be a political body,

willing to use terrorism to coerce and communicate, but also willing to compromise if necessary. The IRA was a stubborn, tunnel-visioned group bent on carrying on a two-century-old conflict that had always been about violent struggle. But in the end, even they were worn down by the potential for political gain.

In the background loomed the sponsorship of states, but in the world of the terrorist, the state became more of a nuisance than an aid. Unwilling to accept the strings attached to the support they got from states, terrorist organizations developed their own resources. This, of course, came too late to stop the debacle of Lebanon, where in the late 1970s and early 1980s it was difficult to determine whether the terrorists were more of a threat to each other or the legitimate states. It also did not stop Libya from provoking violent confrontation with the United States in 1986. But by 1987, state sponsorship amounted to only about two percent of the PLO's budget, and three percent of the IRA's budget.²⁰⁰ The state support simply did not fit with their overall strategies. Still, both the states and the terrorist groups had in mind some sort of coercion to change to the policies of another political body. Each hoped its enemy would see the costs of the current policies as too high and give in to the terrorist group's agenda. The nature of "old terrorism" was that of coercion—threats to the policies of governments more than the security of its people.

While all this was taking place, the beginnings of the "new terrorism" were already taking root. Samuel Huntington noted that while western cultures, styles, and habits were becoming increasingly popular among the masses of people in non-western countries, the elites of these non-western countries were becoming increasingly vocal

²⁰⁰ Adams, 34.

about rejecting western values.²⁰¹ This has created conflict along the borders of what Huntington called the “fault lines between civilizations.”²⁰² Although not all civilizations have reacted violently, some have. “Islam has bloody borders.”²⁰³

²⁰¹ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs*, 72:3 (Summer 1993), 27.

²⁰² Huntington, 35.

²⁰³ Huntington, 35.

Chapter 5

“New” Terrorism

The Muslim World has found itself at a historical crossroads. Its encounter with Western Civilization seems to have failed despite the unprecedented wealth accumulated by the elite. Attempts to consolidate modern regimes brought about widespread repression and impoverishment of the masses, creating popular tension for which the state system has no solutions and that further modernization can only exacerbate. ...And so, starting in the late 1970s, Islamist thinkers could see no way out of the crisis of Islam except for an all-out confrontation with the West that would be incited once an excuse legitimizing the outbreak of violence was provided.

- Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America*

There is no doubt that the major distinguishing feature of today's terrorism is the existence of militant Islamic groups throughout the world. In *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999*, the United States State Department states, “The primary terrorist threats to the United States emanate from two regions, South Asia and the Middle East. Supported by state sponsors, terrorists live in and operate out of areas in these regions with impunity.”²⁰⁴ The groups the State Department lists as the primary threats from these two regions are the Hizb’allah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad from the Middle East, and “Usama Bin Ladin and a host of other terrorists loosely linked to Bin Ladin” in Afghanistan.²⁰⁵ In the descriptive list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), 13 of the 41 groups have militant Islamic ideologies.²⁰⁶ But, although these groups share certain common characteristics, an in-depth look at any one of them would

²⁰⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999*, April 2000, iv.

²⁰⁵ *Patterns 1999*, v.

²⁰⁶ *Patterns 1999*, 67-98.

mask the true nature of the threat. The RAF tried to unite terrorist groups in Europe in a weak effort at global revolution. The IRA was only concerned with Ireland and thus cared little what the rest of the world did, except insofar as it affected their struggle. The PLO, on the other hand, had to attempt to unite all the Palestinian groups in order to have any chance at legitimately controlling Palestine. But none of these comes close to the scope of militant Islam. Even Osama bin Laden's al-Qaidah group is just part of the system. As Yossef Bodansky put it, "Bin Laden has always been—and still is—part of a bigger system, a team player and a loyal comrade at arms. The terrorist operations in several parts of the world now attributed to bin Laden were actually state-sponsored operations perpetrated by dedicated groups of Islamists."²⁰⁷ During the 1990s, militant Islamic groups crossed barriers that before had seemed impenetrable, such as Sunni-Shi'ite (the two biggest sects of Islam—this barrier will be explained later) and African-Arab-Asian barriers. As a result, a new transnational actor has emerged that has both state and private support, but is eclectic and unpredictable. This chapter analyzes militant Islamic terrorism with the same analytical framework used to analyze the old terrorist groups, assesses the strategy of this "new terrorism," and reveals the nature of the threat it poses. But first, in order to fully explain the dynamics involved, it will outline the history of the emergence of this phenomenon.

Militant Islam

Violence is not new to the Islamic world. Three out of four of the Caliphs who succeeded the Prophet were assassinated because they were considered "weeds," or

²⁰⁷ Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America*, (New York: Random House, 1999), x. The Prophet is Muhammed, to whom Muslims believe God revealed the Koran.

enemies of the faith.²⁰⁸ Systematic assassination as a method of shaping the Islamic world probably had its beginning with Hassan Sabbah in the middle ages. Sabbah was a revolutionary who planned to take power from the Turkish Seljuk Dynasty. In 1090 he established a base at the fortress of Alamut in Rudbar, took over power, spread his propaganda throughout the countryside, and recruited *fedayeen*—those prepared to sacrifice their lives for Allah. The *fedayeen*, who killed with poisoned daggers, became such heroes in Islam that their name has been carried into the 20th century by the PLO and others.²⁰⁹ Sabbah indoctrinated his killers, giving them glimpses of paradise in special gardens, where they were intoxicated by natural beauty and hashish, which grew in the fertile valleys of the Elburz mountain range. It was from this practice that the group got their nickname *hashasheen* (smokers of hashish), which was later translated “assassin.”²¹⁰ During the Crusades, Sabbah and his men turned their daggers against the Christians, infiltrating their camps on assassination missions that were often so obviously fatal that they could be considered suicide missions.²¹¹ However, there are great differences between the terrorism of the assassins and today’s terrorism.

The Muslim world is headed in a completely different direction today than it was in Sabbah’s time. Sabbah fought to reform the faith, but in the direction of progress.²¹² During the amazingly rapid spread of Islam throughout the Byzantine and Persian empires, the Arab invaders conquered mightily, driven by their faith and the desire for conquest and booty. But they did not impose conversion or any other constraints upon

²⁰⁸ Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror*, (Bethesda, Md.: Adler & Adler, 1987), 35.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 38.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 41-2.

²¹¹ Ibid., 41.

²¹² Fereydoon Hoveyda, *The Broken Crescent: The “Threat” of Militant Islamic Fundamentalism* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998), 41.

surrender. Instead, they opened themselves to the culture of the conquered lands, creating an atmosphere of relative freedom that really was “tantamount to liberation” from the harsh rule of the Byzantines and Persians.²¹³ What happened then was what Fereydoun Hoveyda calls “a collective cultural suicide triggered mainly by the use of fundamentalism as an instrument of ‘legitimacy’ in the political race for power.”²¹⁴ Although the Arabs allowed the conquered peoples to continue with their lives, the Arabs assumed the positions of power in the governments—positions the non-Arabs coveted. In order to gain power over the Arabs, who claimed the Koran had been revealed to them, the non-Arabs had to become more Muslim than their Muslim teachers. This set in motion a competition for orthodoxy that condemned creativity and science.²¹⁵ Rulers, anxious to avoid being seen as “weeds” in the faith, allied themselves with the fundamentalist clerics and spread fundamentalism throughout the world of Islam.²¹⁶ It was against this wave of fundamentalism that Sabbah fought. Militant backlashes have occurred in cycles throughout Islamic history ever since the 12th century, whenever fundamentalists think modernization is threatening the faith.²¹⁷ Today’s militant Islamists may be part of such a cycle.

The 20th century backlash was created by the fact that the Muslim world, so long in isolation because of fundamentalism, has been penetrated and subjugated by the West in the last two centuries. The collapse of the Turkish empire and subsequent redrawing

²¹³ Ibid., 45-6.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 48.

²¹⁵ Hoveyda, 47, cites the fundamentalist Ash’ari and his disciple, Ghazali, of the Seljuk dynasty, as instrumental in “closing the Muslim world.” He says Ash’ari’s thesis was that man should not try to grasp the laws of nature, because these were merely momentary manifestations of God’s will, which God could change in an instant. Man should aim at eternal life, not life on earth, so science and philosophy were just a waste of time.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 48.

²¹⁷ Personal interview with Dr. Lewis Ware, Professor of International Studies at the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., November 7, 2001.

of its borders by the imperialist powers after World War I culminated a process that probably started with Napoleon's arrival in Egypt in 1789.²¹⁸ After the Great War, when British and French carved up most of the Ottoman Empire, western influence began to grow throughout the Muslim world. The Suez Canal Company provided about 90 percent of Egypt's foreign earnings and spawned cities around the canal that were westernized and extremely prosperous.²¹⁹ In one of these cities, Ismaili, in March 1928, Hassan al-Banna and six of his followers started the Muslim Brotherhood.²²⁰ Originally a peaceful teacher, Shaikh Hassan was influenced by King Abdul-Azziz of Saudi Arabia and the Fascists in Europe to choose a mantle of action rather than ideas.²²¹ His plan banked on an Axis victory in World War II, combined with a heavy propaganda campaign, to bring down the government of Egypt. As the Axis defeat became apparent, he turned to terrorism in hopes of seizing power through a coup d'état. His *fedayeen* attacked cinemas, restaurants, hotels, inappropriately dressed women, and especially political leaders.²²² This terrorism did indeed shake up the country enough for a military coup in 1952. However, the Brothers did not receive a share of the power. In fact, Col Nasser, apparently a former Brother, became fearful of their power, turned toward socialism, and ordered a major crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.²²³ But the group did not die out—it provided fuel for the militant Islamic movement for decades.

This fuel was sometimes in the form of trainees and disciples, sometimes in the form of enemies. For example, the Sunni-Shi'ite gulf was the reason Shaikh Hassan

²¹⁸ Bodansky, xii.

²¹⁹ Taheri, 46.

²²⁰ Ibid., 44

²²¹ Ibid., 50-1.

²²² Ibid., 52.

²²³ Ibid., 53-4.

could not work with Sayyed Muhammed Nawab-Safavi, who later took Islamic terrorism to Iran to try to overthrow the Pahlavi Dynasty. The group was eventually defeated, but not before they introduced a young mullah named Sayyed Ruhollah Khomeini to the power of militants connected with Islamic authority.²²⁴ Khomeini also developed strong ties to Mussa Sadr, a Shia cleric Iran sent to Lebanon in 1967. Iran needed to shore up support for the Shi'ite population there or lose all power to the Sunnis and Maronite Christians.²²⁵ Sadr organized the Shi'ites in Beirut, created a populist movement called Amal, and established ties with the PLO to train militants that would later aid Khomeini's revolution.²²⁶

Thus, when Khomeini took power in Iran in 1979, he was well prepared to do what was necessary to hold and expand that power. Most sources cite 1982 as the year the Party of Allah, or Hizb'allah, was created. Yet a group by that name already existed at the time, albeit in another form. In 1973, when Ayatollah Mahmoud Ghaffari was tortured to death in prison in Qom, he created the party with his last words.²²⁷ Then, in 1979, Khomeini revived the name when he ordered all Islamic groups to band together in defense of the newly established government. At first they were nothing more than gangs in the streets throwing rocks and cans, but then Khomeini established training camps where children were sent as a precursor to service either in the cities or at the Iran-Iraq

²²⁴ Sayyed Muhammed Nawab-Safavi, later known as Ostad Nawab, tried briefly to work with Shaikh Hassan in 1938, but differed significantly in his beliefs. Sayyed Muhammed believed only a small, pure, group of Shi'ites could reform (read: covert *back* to fundamentalism) Islam, while Shaikh Hassan found the Shi'ites too arrogant to work with. In any event, Sayyed Muhammed, a victim of oppression by Reza Shah, was more interested in attacking Iran than Egypt anyway. Taheri, 61-65. While the "Fedayeen of Islam," as his group was called, were active in Iran, they became a radical arm of Khomeini, whose death sentences the group carried out, pp. 64-5. This is the same Khomeini who would lead the revolution in 1979.

²²⁵ Taheri, 73-4.

²²⁶ Hoveyda, 79.

²²⁷ Taheri, 86.

front.²²⁸ Then in 1982, the Israelis invaded Lebanon to put an end to PLO guerilla and terrorist attacks. At first, the Shi'ites welcomed the Israelis. But when it began to look as if the Israeli presence might become permanent, Khomeini sent 500 members of his Hizb'allah force (which at the time numbered about 20,000) to fight with and organize the Shi'ites in Lebanon. They became the Lebanese Hizb'allah that fought the Israelis and terrorized the West in South Lebanon for the next two decades.²²⁹

While the Shi'ites were busy exporting their revolution, the Sunnis were building momentum of their own. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan spurred Sunni Muslims from Saudi Arabia to issue a *fatwah*, or religious ruling, designating the war a holy war for which every Muslim was responsible. One of the Muslims who spread this word through his writings, Abdullah Azzam, set up an organization called *Makhtab al Khadimat*, the Office of Services, to finance the immigration of holy warriors from all over the Arab world. He took on a wealthy business partner named Osama bin Laden who helped finance the organization and run military affairs.²³⁰ In 1986, the two split up after a disagreement over the vision for the organization. Mr. bin Laden wanted to train soldiers for a global *jihad* against the West, while Mr. Azzam wanted to focus on creating a Muslim state in Afghanistan and then expand.²³¹ Osama bin Laden founded a group called *al-Qaidah* (the base) in 1988 and set up a training camp for Persian Gulf area Arabs. But Afghanistan was not the only hot area for Sunni Muslims in the late 1980s.

²²⁸ Ibid., 88-92.

²²⁹ Edgar O'Ballance, *Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1979-95: The Iranian Connection*, (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 58.

²³⁰ Stephen Engelberg, "One Man and a Global Web of Violence," *New York Times*, 14 January, 2001, A16.

²³¹ Ibid., A16.

The fight against Israel was also heating up. As discussed earlier, in 1987 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip started a spontaneous uprising called the Intifada. During this uprising, a small nucleus of Muslim Brotherhood members banded together to form the group HAMAS (an Arabic acronym for the Palestinian Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement). HAMAS aimed to emulate the Shia Hizb'allah group in its struggle against Israel.²³² HAMAS's zeal and fundamentalist leanings attracted Iran's attention, and in 1991 they obtained support from Tehran. This made it easier to reject Yasser Arafat's pleas for HAMAS to join forces with the PLO. HAMAS wanted victory through armed struggle, not appeasement.²³³ In December 1992, Israel assured the group would gain international attention when it deported 415 HAMAS members and sympathizers to Lebanon, where they were essentially left homeless for months. The international community took notice, and the UN passed a special resolution (UN Resolution 799) in hopes of resolving the situation.²³⁴ HAMAS has since become feared for its extremist tactics, including suicide bombing missions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas.

Another hotbed for Sunni Muslims was the Sudan. In 1989, middle-rank military officers took over the government of Sudan in a coup. With no unifying ethnicity, culture or language, the leaders turned to a popular Muslim leader named Hassan al-Turabi to design the government.²³⁵ Turabi had established a Sudanese chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s, an organization that is now called the National Islamic

²³² O'Ballance, 166.

²³³ Ibid., 167-169.

²³⁴ O'Ballance, 171-2.

²³⁵ Milton Viorst, "Sudan's Islamic Experiment," *Foreign Affairs*, 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): 46.

Front (NIF).²³⁶ After the 1989 coup, he set about developing a state that would be unified by Islam, although a much more lenient, tolerant version than that of the fundamentalist Arab states.²³⁷ Nevertheless, here was an emerging Sunni Islamic state to match the Iranian state in its authority, if not its fundamentalist zeal. In 1991, in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, Sudan held a conference of militant Sunni organizations from 55 countries to organize an assault against the West in revenge for the war on Iraq.²³⁸ The big surprise was that Iran openly acknowledged the NIF as a legitimate Sunni Muslim organization and even supplied high-technology communication equipment to facilitate its operations in the future.²³⁹

With this big step, the Sunnis were completing a major consolidation. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 had released thousands of trained “Afghans,” who were militant Islamists with experience in the Afghan war. These “Afghans” had gone to Afghanistan in the late 1980s to get experience that they could use elsewhere. They had endured a final, unnecessary, bloody battle for Jalalabad that they viewed as a joint United States-Pakistan set-up, but they were now ready for action elsewhere.²⁴⁰ Osama bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia a hero. However, it was not long before he clashed with the Saudi government. When the Saudis invited the United States military onto its soil in 1990 to defend against the Iraqis, bin Laden argued strenuously against the move. He offered to donate construction equipment and recruit Saudi “Afghans” for the defense. He warned that inviting infidels onto the sacred ground would desecrate the holy places

²³⁶ Viorst, 46.

²³⁷ Ibid., 46.

²³⁸ Bodansky, 36.

²³⁹ Ibid., 36-37.

²⁴⁰ Bodansky, 25-27 claims between 16,000 and 20,000 militant Islamists from around the world went to the Pakistani training camps in the late 1980s. He describes the battle of Jalalabad, which occurred after the Soviet withdrawal, as a massive suicidal frontal assault that the Pakistanis engineered in order to leave a power vacuum for the establishment of the Taliban.

and cost the Saudis their Islamic legitimacy. This could have dire consequences for its position in the eyes of the militant Islamics.²⁴¹ But the Saudi government ignored bin Laden, and eventually forced him and his family into exile in Sudan after the war.²⁴² The Sunnis now had a Muslim state in the Sudan, two charismatic leaders in Turabi and bin Laden, and unprecedented support from a Shia nation, Iran. A new, united militant Islamic movement was emerging. In order to understand how such a remarkable union could occur and where this movement is heading, this analysis will begin by examining its motivation.

Motivation

Muslims consider their faith predestined to animate the entire planet.²⁴³ The difference between militants and less extreme Muslims is that the militants believe force is a necessary part of that predestination. Indeed, *jihad* was the force that created the Muslim empire, and *jihad* is exactly what many fundamentalists are calling for today.²⁴⁴ In Arabic, the word has several meanings, all of which are used in the Koran. It can mean “effort,” “striving,” or “struggle,” as in the obligation of a Muslim to live up to the stringent requirements of his religion.²⁴⁵ But militants focus on its connotation of “holy war.” And even though *jihad* is not an article of faith in the Koran, militants consider it a personal duty, as though it were a sixth pillar of the faith.²⁴⁶

The concept of holy war comes from some fundamental principals on which all Muslims agree. Islam’s traditional view of existence is that the world is divided into two

²⁴¹ Bodansky, 29.

²⁴² Ibid., 30-32

²⁴³ Hoveyda, 56.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 56.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 154.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 154. The five pillars of the faith are shahada, (the two testifications: “There is no God but Allah, and Muhammed is His Prophet,” Taheri 292), prayers, alms, fast, and pilgrimage.

camps—the City of Faith and the City of War. The City of Faith, or *Dar al-Iman*, refers to all areas where Islam reigns supreme and its rules are obeyed. The City of War, or *Dar al-Harb*, refers to the rest of the world.²⁴⁷ Relations between the two places cannot be anything but hostile, because Islam has to strive to eventually bring the whole world in line with the right path. Yet, as long as the two cities are easily recognizable and separated, there could be a truce, and conflict would occur only at the boundaries. However, this is not the case. Muslim society has been invaded by western values and materialism, so that even Muslims must be divided into the two cities.²⁴⁸ But the West is not the only culprit.

Islam itself has always been divided. There are many sects, but the two largest, the Sunnis and the Shi'ites, comprise the vast majority of all Muslims. Although these sects agree on most of the fundamental tenets of Islam, their differences are grave and ingrained by historical conflicts. From the dawn of Islam, its leadership was subject to violent struggle. Three of the four successors of the Prophet Muhammed were assassinated, including Ali Ibn Abi-Taleb, the fourth *caliph* and the son-in-law of Muhammed.²⁴⁹ Ali's murder gave birth to the split between the Shi'ites, who saw Ali as the rightful, divinely inspired successor to Muhammed, and the Sunnis, who believe no man since Muhammed has ever been a divine messenger from Allah.²⁵⁰ Shi'ites recognize twelve *imams* who were descendants of Muhammed and supposedly also endowed with his power of interpreting the Koran and thus revealing the truth. The twelfth *imam* disappeared as a child and, according to Shi'ites, went into occultation to

²⁴⁷ Taheri, 20.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 21

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 35.

²⁵⁰ Bodansky, 409-410.

re-appear at any time.²⁵¹ This difference between the two sects, along with some other doctrinal disagreements, creates a schism that precludes the definition of a single “City of Faith,” and thus there is constant conflict even within Islam itself.

This difference between the two sects also dictates their respective views about government. Sunnis view the nation-state as a fact of life on this earth, to be accepted and used for the good of Islam. To a Sunni, the first order of business is to establish a government that is obedient to *shari’ah*, or Islamic law, and then use that government to expand the boundaries of the Muslim world. The Shi’ites, on the other hand, view government as an un-Islamic entity.²⁵² To a Shi’ite, the *Imam* is the only legitimate ruler on earth. All government is therefore the property of the missing twelfth *imam*, and all Muslim clergy should avoid involvement in government, instead supporting all Islamic causes equally. Shia clergy can tolerate rulers and advise them in keeping with the *shari’ah*, but cannot participate.²⁵³ Because of this, Shia writings have advocated Islamic government without specifying the details of how such a government would be run. Some Sunni writings, on the other hand, have gone into detail on how *shari’ah* should be applied to the administration of a state. Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi, a Pakistani Sunni theologian, laid out the specifics of how the people would elect a ruler of an Islamic state. This ruler would be a “just despot,” who would create a “monolithic institution that upholds one ideology, which is Islam, and uses all its enforcement agencies to ensure that Islamic principles are respected by everybody in all walks of life.”²⁵⁴ Although the Shi’ites would shun this practice of laying out how a government should work, they

²⁵¹ Hoveyda, 38.

²⁵² Bodansky, 34.

²⁵³ Hoveyda, 75.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 68.

would probably agree with the principles on which the Sunnis' ideal government was based.

In practice, militant fundamentalists blur this line even further. Militants have little use for many of the doctrinal differences between the sects, preferring instead to stick to basics. Both Sunni and Shia fundamentalists insist that the government be run by a spotless ruler and that it strictly obey *shari'ah*.²⁵⁵ Khomeini, a Shi'ite, obviously had a different view of the clergy's involvement in government than the majority of Shi'ites. The success of his revolution (and his military thugs) probably shielded him from criticism.²⁵⁶ Once in power, he went to great lengths to ensure the government was run in accordance with *shari'ah*. Khomeini thought that children were innocent and therefore better able to decide right from wrong. In view of this, he installed children as supervisors throughout his government, with the authority to blow the whistle on any untoward dealings they saw and even overrule important decisions.²⁵⁷ In the Sudan, Turabi talks of a moderate application of the *shari'ah*, but his government's record of punitive practice is a lot stricter than his propaganda.²⁵⁸ In the end, both Sunni and Shia militants are all aiming at the same thing—spreading Islam's power by whatever means necessary with the final aim of an entire world subject to the laws of Islam.

The statements of the Islamic terrorist groups bear witness to this. In a 1988 statement, the Hizb'allah in Lebanon delineated their objectives: 1) to eliminate the Americans, the French, and all other imperialists from Lebanon, 2) to punish the Phalangists for all crimes against the Lebanese, and 3) to permit the Lebanese to choose

²⁵⁵ Taheri, 264.

²⁵⁶ Hoveyda, 76.

²⁵⁷ Taheri, 94.

²⁵⁸ Viorst, 54.

their own government. However, the Hizb'allah called on the Lebanese to choose Islam, which "alone, is capable of guaranteeing justice and liberty for all. Only an Islamic regime can stop any further tentative attempts of imperialistic infiltration into our country."²⁵⁹ The charter of HAMAS is more forthright. Although it, too, promises liberty for all people, it explains that "Safety and security are possible only in the shadow of Islam, and recent and ancient history is the best witness to that effect."²⁶⁰ Furthermore, it warns that peaceful solutions are no longer possible: "Once the enemies usurp some of the Muslim lands, Jihad becomes an individual obligation for every Muslim."²⁶¹ Even though the charter admits the PLO is made up of its Palestinian fathers, brothers, and sons, it declares that, until the PLO accepts Islam as its sole theology, HAMAS will not cooperate.²⁶² But these two groups are focused mainly on the struggle with Israel.

Osama bin Laden's vision is much more global, integrating all Islamic issues in a common struggle. In 1998, bin Laden issued his third *fatwah*, an edict that religious authorities issue to guide followers on a particular issue and obliges them to take whatever actions it specifies. Bin Laden's 1998 *fatwah* claimed that the United States' occupation of Saudi Arabia, blockade of Iraq, and support of Israel in the Arab-Israeli struggle constituted a declaration of war on Allah. Because of this, he proclaimed that it was every individual Muslim's duty "to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and

²⁵⁹ Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, "Nass al-Risala al-Maftuha allati wajahaha Hizballah ila-l-Mustad'afin fi Lubnan wa-l-Alam", translated by ICT in "The Hizballah Program," accessed 25 March 2002. Available at http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm.

²⁶⁰ "The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS)," in Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 195.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 184.

²⁶² Ibid., 193.

soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.”²⁶³ Bin Laden’s 1996 and 1998 *fatwahs* became the stated motivation for the 1996 bombings in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh and al Khobar Towers in Dhahran) and the 1998 bombing of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, respectively.²⁶⁴ This highlights several important points about the looseness of the organizations involved, but also the fact that bin Laden’s vision is a motivating force. Militant Islamists respond to his words with dedication due only the highest authorities. He communicates a message that touches the hearts of a broad range of radical organizations, and they answer his calls. However, lest the analysis indicate all operations are undertaken with the apocalyptic vision as their inspiration, remember there are states and organizations involved, and these actors have interests.

The states and organizations involved often act because they are in a struggle for legitimacy and power. When the United States entered Somalia in November, 1992, Sudan and Iran held a conference in Khartoum to analyze the situation. A committee of intelligence officials from both countries proposed that “humanitarian aid” was a pretext to allow the Americans to strengthen their presence in the Gulf region. The Americans would gain control of the oil grid in Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Yemen; install a pro-American government in Somalia; and then enter the Sudan to wear down the Sudanese

²⁶³ Osama bin Laden, “Jihad against Jews and Crusaders: World Islamic Front Statement,” 23 February, 1998. Translated by the Federation of American Scientists, accessed 25 March 2002. Available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>.

²⁶⁴ Bodansky, 266-8. The Saudi Arabia bombings were claimed in the name of the Liberation Army of the Islamic Sanctuaries—“a kind of military wing” of bin Laden’s International Front. Bin Laden himself admitted only to having “instigated” these attacks in an interview with ABC’s John Miller (accessed 25 March 2002, available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html>). The embassy bombings in 1998 were claimed by the Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Places, who cited only inspiration, not direct support, from bin Laden. Bodansky thinks this may have been done to shield bin Laden.

the way they were attempting to wear down the Iraqis. The committee assessed that the direct cause of this aggression was the failure of the Islamists to solve the Islamic and Arabic problems. They decided on a long-run, joint Sudan-Iran effort to train and supply guerilla fighters in Mogadishu and an immediate, indirect strike elsewhere—in Yemen.²⁶⁵ In the case of the 1998 bombings, the groups received Iranian and Sudanese support because it was in both nations' strategic interests: Sudan because of its regional location and Iran because of its desire to remain the most influential Islamic state in the region.²⁶⁶ At the same time, there was a surge of militant Islamic fever sweeping the Arab world. Even Egypt was publicly warning that it appeared the United States was pressuring Iraq in order to gain an opportunity to strike Iraq militarily. With anti-American rage at a high pitch, the militant organizations would have lost legitimacy had they not acted when they did.²⁶⁷

What emerges from this is a picture of militant Islam that is not a structured organization, but certainly a movement that acts in a semi-coordinated way. Its followers are motivated by an ideology that crosses some historical doctrine divides, but the leaders involved are also subject to organizational pressures based on identity and bureaucratic interests. It is not an easy task to define this “organization,” but it is a necessary task nonetheless.

Organization

Because of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, Osama bin Laden's group is thought of as the umbrella organization for all Islamic terrorism today. Most sources say the group al-Qaidah, whose name means “the base,” was created in the

²⁶⁵ Bodansky, 68-70.

²⁶⁶ Bodansky, 207-8.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 230.

late 1980s and has financed the training of over 5,000 personnel from over 50 countries worldwide.²⁶⁸ It is described as a loose network that holds together organizations like Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Algeria's Armed Islamic Group, HAMAS, Hizb'allah, and various groups in Pakistan, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and the Philippines.²⁶⁹ In actuality, al-Qaidah was probably just a financial vehicle, starting as a network of charitable organizations that took donations and funneled them to militant Islamists.²⁷⁰ Militant Islamists trained by bin Laden return to outposts in countries around the world to perform in small cells that have at best indirect ties to al-Qaidah, including possible financing arrangements. Many are veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war, and some are members of other rogue terrorist organizations.²⁷¹ Bin Laden set up the financial networks and even established propaganda organizations in London that could provide information on and explanations for militant Islamist operations without taking the blame.²⁷² Now that the network is established, removal of any of its leaders would probably not debilitate the operations of its pieces.²⁷³ But bin Laden gives the movement its overall direction. Along the way, bin Laden worked closely with the head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a man named Ayman Al-Zawahiri. The two became the key personnel to organize, support, and direct operations in such places as Somalia and Bosnia. In June 1998, the two co-chaired a conference of over 100 Islamists from organizations around the world and came up with a strategic plan of action for all who would be members of a worldwide front. The front was named the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and

²⁶⁸ Daniel Pearl et al., "Moving Target: Bin Laden's Network, Far-Flung and Fanatic, Challenges Retaliation—Any Strategy Must Account For the Number of Cells, Likelihood of Backlash—'My Ideas Go on Forever,'" *Wall Street Journal*, 14 September, 2001, A1.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Bodansky, 315.

²⁷¹ Pearl et al.

²⁷² Bodansky, 101-2.

²⁷³ Steven Emerson and Daniel Pipes, "Terrorism on Trial," *Wall Street Journal*, 31 May, 2001, A16.

Crusaders, and one of its first public documents, co-authored by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, was the February 1998 *fatwah*.²⁷⁴ So bin Laden's organization is actually an ideological umbrella called the World Islamic Front, which includes loose alliances to many militant Islamic organizations and a complex support network called al-Qaidah, which trains and supports small cells throughout the world. But, as extensive as bin Laden's influence is, there is more to the movement than just him.

The militant Islamic movement is to a large extent state-sponsored, so the organizational picture includes influential ties to Iran, Sudan, and Pakistan. Many militants in countries other than Iran and Sudan view their own governments as corrupt, because they are not strictly obedient to the *shari'ah*. They look to Iran and Sudan for guidance, since these two were successful in developing governments based on Islam. Iran's dominance over the movement was unquestioned during the 1980s, when it was the sole bastion of Islamic government. But Iran is cautious about its use of terrorism, even more so since Khomeini's death in 1989. It often acts through clandestine agents who issue no proclamations, or by supporting other groups like Hizb'allah or HAMAS, who take all the credit for the operations. Iran is interested in maintaining its legitimacy as a state, but also retaining the ability to pressure and shock the world.²⁷⁵ It extends its influence and pressure through its embassies and through the deployment of its "Revolutionary Guards," or Pasdaran, who train militants abroad. It employs the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Internal Security, (MOIS) to terrorize counter-revolutionaries at home and abroad, but also supplies aid to schools and mosques abroad

²⁷⁴ Bodansky, 252-3.

²⁷⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 117.

through charity funds that can be used to funnel funds to militants.²⁷⁶ After the coup in Sudan, Iran supplied support to them like a parent taking a child under its wing. But in the mid-1990s, as Iran's terrorist operations started to draw unwanted attention to Tehran, Iran started to realize the potential of the Sunni militant movement. It organized Hizb'allah International under a committee of three leaders: Imad Mughaniyah of Lebanese Hizb'allah's Special Operations Command, Ahmad Salah of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (al-Zawahiri's group), and Osama bin Laden.²⁷⁷ In this way, Iran tried to deflect attention and show deference to the idea of a unified movement, while still harnessing the authority it felt it rightly deserved.

At the same time, the Sudan was attempting to shore up its own influence over the Sunni movement. Turabi established the first real Sunni Islamist organization, the Popular International Organization (PIO), with a representative from each of the 50 countries where Islamic struggles were taking place. But in a conference in Tehran in 1991, Turabi saw how far behind the Shi'ites his organization was, despite its zeal.²⁷⁸ Iran built up the Sudan with weapons, know-how, and money, but the real progress happened when Turabi got bin Laden to work for him. Sudan was struggling after the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in London, its biggest financial cover, was closed. In exchange for land and business contacts in the Sudan, bin Laden organized a support network that financed militant groups and acted as covers for them.²⁷⁹ The end result was called the Islamist International and its military wing, the Armed Islamic Movement (AIM), which is now a Khartoum-headquartered umbrella for

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 118-9.

²⁷⁷ Bodansky, 157-8.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 36-37.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 40-42.

Sunni militant groups. Osama bin Laden has since departed Sudan, but AIM still spearheads militant Islamic groups, most of whom are former “Afghans.”²⁸⁰ Bin Laden’s 1996 departure from the Sudan, necessitated because of pressure from Saudi Arabia, ushered Pakistan into the spotlight.²⁸¹

Pakistan had considerable influence in the world of militant Islam because of its support of activities in Afghanistan. Following the Soviet withdrawal, the Pakistanis, through their Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), built up the Taliban with weapons and training in order to fill the power vacuum and avoid a collapse of Afghanistan. With the ISI’s help, the Taliban defeated warlords and rogue tribes to secure Pakistan’s access to the major road system from the Indian Ocean to Central Asia.²⁸² The Taliban and ISI maintained training camps where “Afghans” could freely move about and train for operations in their home countries. When Osama bin Laden arrived in the spring of 1996, the Taliban eagerly welcomed him. Pakistan, on the other hand, was more wary of its standing in the world community. The ISI had the Taliban put bin Laden on loose house arrest until Saudi Arabia denied that it wanted bin Laden extradited. Bin Laden was then elevated to the position of emir, in charge of Afghanistan’s terrorism-supporting activities.²⁸³

The struggle for influence in the militant Islamic movement does not end with bin Laden and the states—it also includes some of the larger, established terrorist groups. For example, HAMAS has evolved into an organization with interests of its own. It has a

²⁸⁰ Bodansky, 34-5 and 407.

²⁸¹ Bodansky, 186 explains that bin Laden had actually been arguing with Turabi and General Bashir for some time. Bin Laden was upset about Sudan’s use of the “Afghans” in the Sudanese Civil War instead of other, more worthwhile Islamic causes. This, combined with Saudi Arabia’s pressure due to the bombings in Riyadh and Dhahran, forced Bashir and Turabi to arrange for bin Laden to leave.

²⁸² Ibid., 97-9.

²⁸³ Ibid., 188-90

seemingly hierarchical structure, built around cells, villages, and subdistricts. But it is also well-represented in the Palestinian social arena through departments of education and community services.²⁸⁴ HAMAS has also gotten entrenched in the political realities of its struggle. It now realizes that in order to attain its two divergent goals, that of a complete Islamic state in Palestine with no concessions to Israel and that of a community that lives in peace and harmony, it may have to give in some face-saving way.²⁸⁵ Groups like HAMAS and Hizb'allah need and accept the support of state sponsors and Osama bin Laden, but it is difficult to imagine them being controlled by this support. Rather, it is more probable that sponsors could use the groups as a rheostat—the introduction of more resources would spark additional activity, but on terms chosen by the groups and possibly in line with existing *fatwahs* from legitimate Islamic leaders.

The organizational “structure” that emerges from this analysis of the militant Islamic movement is admittedly amorphous, but no less a reality. Yet the semi-autonomous pieces are bound together more tightly than any terrorist organizations in the past. The RAF failed miserably to unite Communist insurgent organizations in Europe. The PLO had the same kinds of troubles uniting its factions for the struggle against Israel—and they were all focused on the same, very limited regional objective. The Islamic movement is no “Brady Bunch,” either—Islam still has internal struggles.²⁸⁶ But the militant Islamic movement has succeeded in building a loose, global hub and spoke

²⁸⁴ Mishal and Sela, 173.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., 147-172, explains that HAMAS actually has a fluid internal structure, because of the need to avoid the violent internal clashes brought about by its extreme agenda. They have adopted a shifting strategy that at times accommodates political bargaining, even with respect to the existence of an Israeli state, but never outwardly abandons its ultimate aim. The writers think the best solution for HAMAS would be a settlement with Israel negotiated through a third party.

²⁸⁶ Barbara Crossette, “Afghans Ask U.N. to Mediate with Iranians,” *New York Times*, 21 September 1998, A10. In one example of this internecine behavior, Iran was seeking UN support and planning the use of force to retaliate for the killing of nine Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif.

type network. Iran, Sudan, Pakistan, and bin Laden vie for control of the “hub of Islam.”²⁸⁷ The outlying “spokes” can act autonomously but in concert because of their shared vision as elucidated by the *fatwahs* of its leaders. Furthermore, when it is necessary, the spokes have the benefit of support from the hub.

Support

Financing a terrorist organization is a tough job, but it is easier when you are rich. Osama bin Laden inherited a sum estimated at \$300 million from his father, the late construction magnate Muhammad bin Laden. This nest egg has been attacked by his enemies, including the Saudis and the Americans, yet he still has a considerable portfolio of investments in everything from construction to banks to agriculture.²⁸⁸ It was this money that originally allowed him to contribute to the development of the Mujahideen Services Bureau, which imported thousands of Arabs to Afghanistan and then trained them in Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. He also imported heavy construction equipment to build roads, tunnels, storage depots, and hospitals in Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain.²⁸⁹ But these tasks were relatively easy compared to his later feats. In Afghanistan, there was a single fight to support.

Bin Laden’s biggest contribution to materially supporting the militant Islamic movement is his establishment of the financing network that hides and invests the money and funnels it to the militants. His first effort at this began soon after his move to the Sudan. Officials of the Bank of England closed down the BCCI, which Arab states and terrorist organizations used to launder money and finance weapons deals. Officials of the

²⁸⁷ Bodansky, 333.

²⁸⁸ Vernon Loeb, “A Global, Pan-Islamic Network: Terrorism Entrepreneur Unifies Groups Financially, Politically,” *Washington Post*, 23 August, 1998, A24.

²⁸⁹ Loeb, A24.

BCCI kept sparse, if any, records, and embezzled money as payment for their services.²⁹⁰ Turabi and the Muslim Brotherhood had been using this bank heavily to build up their own banking system, on the way to becoming an independent sponsor of Islamist groups. The closing of the bank left them stranded, so they called on their new visitor, Osama Bin Laden. He set up emergency collateral using his money and that of some wealthy supporters, then went to work setting up a financial network to move money through legitimate businesses already owned by wealthy members of a group he called the “Brotherhood Group.”²⁹¹ He upgraded this structure in the late 1990s to a more global network that is even harder to trace—a “highly complex, tangled, and multilayered organizational network that spreads throughout the world and in which bin Laden’s name does not appear at all.”²⁹² Bin Laden’s payment for the work there was in the form of business opportunities in the Sudan, including construction of an airport and highway and ownership of a bank, an import-export firm, and several farms.²⁹³

Of course, money must be funneled into this network to sustain it. One of the ways this happens is through one of the pillars of Islam: alms giving. Wealthy donors give money to Islamic organizations, many of which are part of bin Laden’s network or give directly to terrorist organizations. Islamic states, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan, and Pakistan, also give to these Islamic organizations, either knowingly or unknowingly supporting bin Laden. Another way money finds its way into bin Laden’s coffers is from drug trafficking. Afghanistan has a large opium crop that al-Qaidah militants help export for use in manufacturing heroine and morphine. Not only does this

²⁹⁰ Bodansky, 40.

²⁹¹ Ibid., 42-43.

²⁹² Ibid., 314.

²⁹³ Yael Shahar, “Tracing Bin Laden’s Money: Easier Said than Done,” 21 September 2001, accessed 25 March 2002. Available at <https://www.ict.org.il>

make the network rich, it adds to the degradation of the West by feeding their addictions—a double bonus.²⁹⁴

Money is only one of the important resources the militant Islamic movement needs. United States officials estimate training camps that bin Laden established in Afghanistan alone have been responsible for training over 20,000 militants from all over the world. Based on the materials found in caves, the training camps were highly professional and capable of handling soldiers with extremely diverse language and cultural differences.²⁹⁵ Apparently, bin Laden has even developed contacts for training HAMAS and Hizb'allah in some of these camps.²⁹⁶ When the training camps in the Sudan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Iran are included, it is clear the movement can train a large quantity of militants in a very professional way. Another important role supporters played was arranging the logistics for operations. In 1993, when Sudan and Iran decided to strike at Yemen as a statement against the American build-up in Somalia, bin Laden's job was to round up Yemenite "Afghans" to conduct the operation, recruit Sheikh Tariq al-Fakli to leave his London exile and take charge of the operation, and transfer the money to banks in Yemen.²⁹⁷ Meanwhile, Iran and Sudan were training and arming forces for the eventual clash in Mogadishu. Bin Laden also moved 3,000 of his Yemenite "Afghans" there with heavy weapons in time for the Mogadishu operation.²⁹⁸ He smuggled guerilla warfare experts and heavy equipment into Mogadishu by plane and boat, and established a headquarters from which the experts could direct the fighting.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁴ Shahar.

²⁹⁵ C.J. Chivers and David Rohde, "Afghan Camps Turn Out Holy War Guerillas and Terrorists," *New York Times*, 18 March, 2002, A1.

²⁹⁶ Emerson and Pipes.

²⁹⁷ Bodansky, 71.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 73-4.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., 84.

This type of cooperative support has continued through the present. Recently, Iran has found indirect ways to help bin Laden. During the war on the Taliban and al-Qaidah in Afghanistan, Iran opened its borders to escaping Afghans, allowing them to emigrate to other countries in the Mid-East and Africa.³⁰⁰ Although there is no doubt that hostility exists between the different militant Islamic factions and states, all involved benefit from the increased moral support that the appearance of solidarity brings.

This is because there are two target audiences from which moral support is needed. The first is the world of donors who support the Islamic organizations that funnel money to the militants. The second is the pool of possible militants who may be convinced to support the militant agendas if they perceive the agendas are genuinely inspired. In neither case does the target audience include Westerners. As Edgar O'Ballance put it, "Such fundamentalism can only operate in Islamic countries where a moderate Muslim population is available for conversion, and it does not seek—nor would it have any chance of success if it did, as universal Islam has little appeal to Westerners—a proselytising mission amongst non-Muslims."³⁰¹ As bin Laden put it, "The Western regimes and the government of the United States of America bear the blame for what might happen. If their people do not wish to be harmed inside their very own countries, they should seek to elect governments that are truly representative of them and that can protect their interests."³⁰² Thus, those who propose the main purpose of their terrorist operations is to instill terror in the hearts of the potential victims are off the mark. The victims are not part of the real target audience.

³⁰⁰ Rowan Scarborough, "U.S. Says Iran Helps Al-Qaeda Flee Afghanistan: Officials Cite Underground Terrorist Route to Lebanon," *New York Times*, 3 April, 2002, A3.

³⁰¹ O'Ballance, 213.

³⁰² Osama bin Laden, interview by ABC's John Miller, May 1998, accessed 25 March 2002. Available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html>.

In order to appeal to the world of donors who provide cash donations, the Islamists have full-time propaganda operations. The objective with this target audience is to appear ideologically (in this case, religiously) legitimate. To this end, bin Laden made several trips to London, where he purchased property and set up organizations to act as fronts for the various Islamist groups. The most authoritative of these was the Liberation Party, run by Sheikh Omar Bakri. Throughout the 1990s, these organizations, which had plausible deniability of any involvement in operations, could nonetheless provide accurate data and explanations that would satisfy the Muslim intellectuals.³⁰³ At the same time, the charitable organizations spend large sums of money distributing food, medical services, education, work, religious services, and housing.³⁰⁴ This combination of acceptable intellectual justification and charitable service helps to keep the Islamists legitimate even to moderate Muslims.

To appeal to the pool of potential militants, the Islamists need to show strength and sacrifice—the tougher the message, the better. The attraction for this target audience seems to be the notion that the cause is obviously an inspired one, since so many are willing to die fighting the evil City of War for it. When the United States responded to the 1998 bombings with a cruise missile attack, bin Laden's popularity soared. As the *New York Times* put it, "Attacking Mr. bin Laden with missiles gave him the status of a state—a nation unto himself, as an intelligence official said—in a war with America."³⁰⁵ Victory over the Americans in Somalia gave the Islamists a huge propaganda tool, which bin Laden flaunted in a 1998 interview: "They had thought that the Americans were like

³⁰³ Bodansky, 101.

³⁰⁴ Bodansky, 315-6.

³⁰⁵ Tim Weiner, "Missile Strikes Against bin Laden Won Him Esteem in Muslim Lands, U.S. Officials Say," *New York Times*, 8 February, 1999, A13.

the Russians, so they trained and prepared. They were stunned when they discovered how low was the morale of the American soldier...our boys were shocked by the low morale of the American soldier and they realized that the American soldier was just a paper tiger.”³⁰⁶ As long as there is dramatic action against the evil West, especially the United States and Israel, this target audience gives support whether it sees the actors as victims or as heroes. The key is dramatic action, which is most effectively achieved through terrorist operations.

Operations

This analysis will consider mostly operations against the United States and Israel. However, a great many operations against governments that are sympathetic to the West, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have been part of the same strategy. In fact, Osama bin Laden’s energy was directed mostly at Saudi Arabia from the moment it invited Americans onto its sacred soil until bin Laden helped the Islamists triumph over the United States in Somalia. It is the Muslim’s duty to identify those who deviate from the *shari’ah* and to punish them or pressure them to reform. Of course, this is also a way for militants to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the faithful. Either way, it is a fact of life with militant Islam.

During the 1980s, the Sunnis were busy fighting the Afghan war while the Shi’ites were fighting the battles of Lebanon. Hizb’allah carried out numerous hijackings, kidnappings, and assassinations aimed at Israeli and western targets throughout the 1980s, but perhaps the most disturbing development was that of the suicide bomber. Hussein Mousawi, a break-away Amal commander, and Imad Moughniyeh, the Hizb’allah operations director, led the development of this

³⁰⁶ Interview by Miller.

devastatingly effective terrorist tactic. On 18 April 1983, Moughniyeh's men (who called their group Jihad al-Islami, but were effectively working with Hizb'allah) drove a van with about 440 pounds of explosives into the American Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 and injuring 120.³⁰⁷ Then on 23 October 1983, Hizb'allah suicide bombers simultaneously truck-bombed French and American bases in Beirut, causing 300 deaths (including 241 United States Marines) and many more injuries.³⁰⁸ Here was something new. When the IRA killed 18 British soldiers and Lord Mountbatten in a single day, that was the Irish group's biggest strike, and they aimed it at parties they held responsible for their plight. The PLO directed their hijackings at innocent people, but tried not to kill them—instead using them to gain political advantage. But here were people who cared so little for life that they would kill themselves along with all the innocent people they could. The militant Islamic movement has kept this as one of its trademarks to this day.

But the movement has proved to be capable of more than terrorism. During Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in 2002, the United States uncovered documents that showed that the training camps prepared militant Islamists in diverse skill sets via a multi-level training program:

Implicit in the split levels of training was the Islamic groups' understanding of the need for different sets of skills to fight on several, simultaneous fronts: along trench lines against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan; against armor or helicopter assaults from conventional foes in Chechnya; as bands of foot-mobile insurgents in Kashmir, Central Asia or the Philippines; and as classic terrorists quietly embedded in cities in the Middle East, Africa, the former Soviet Union and the West.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁷ O'Ballance, 66.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., 67.

³⁰⁹ Chivers and Rohde.

This training had its roots back in the 1980s, when the Afghans had been trained to fight the Soviets in many different ways. When the Americans arrived on Somali soil in 1993, Iran and Sudan thought it was the perfect opportunity to put these skills into practice again. As mentioned above, while training and supplying the Somalis, they ordered an indirect strike on enroute American troops in Yemen. This strike was merely an attempt to make a statement quickly—although the strike was a tactical failure, it was sufficient to express the Islamists’ rage at the American presence.³¹⁰ Meanwhile, the Islamists were building up forces in Mogadishu. Al-Zawahiri led the operation to ambush the United States Rangers on 3 October 1993, that led to the withdrawal of the American troops. First, he got Mohammed Farrah Aideed, the local warlord the troops were pursuing, to leak a tip that hung two of his aids out for the Americans to pick up. Then, using “Afghans” trained by Iranians and Iraqis, he set up an ambush that downed three American helicopters and trapped the soldiers in Mogadishu for the night under intense fire.³¹¹ Although the helicopters were most likely downed by Aideed’s men, they used weapons modifications and techniques taught by the Islamists.³¹² The resulting withdrawal was a major victory for the Islamists, who would later set up similar operations to oppose the United Nations forces in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords and the Russians in Chechnya.³¹³ The militant Islamists, far from being strictly terrorists, would use whatever techniques or methods suited their purpose at the time.

Terrorist operations were, however, usually the chosen *modus operandi*. On 13 November 1995, Saudi “Afghans” bombed the Military Cooperation Building in Riyadh,

³¹⁰ Bodansky, 72-73.

³¹¹ Ibid., 85-86.

³¹² Paul Watson and Sidhartha Barua, “Somalian Link Seen to Al-Qaeda,” *Los Angeles Times - latimes.com*, 25 February, 2002

³¹³ Bodansky, 155-6 and 385-6.

Saudi Arabia, a military training center run by the United States for the Saudis. The operation was very professionally planned. A special van had been “cleaned” of all identification. The bomb was controlled by a sophisticated timing device, with remote-control backup. The timing was perfect—11:40 a.m., when Americans were eating lunch in the snack bar. To top it all off, a second, anti-personnel bomb exploded in the parking lot, killing some of those who came to help.³¹⁴ Then on 25 June 1996, an even more complicated job was accomplished at the Khobar Towers complex, a facility that was used to house American airmen in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. A combination of Saudi Afghans, Iranian intelligence officials, Hizb’allah terrorists, and Syrian experts performed preparations for months to plan the job and smuggle the explosives, incendiaries, and electronics into the country. They constructed a sophisticated, shaped-charge, fuel-oil incendiary bomb on site in a stolen tanker truck, which they then parked outside a security fence, well within the powerful bomb’s range of the barracks. The bomb took off an entire side of a 4-story building, killing 19 and wounding 515.³¹⁵ Two years later, on 7 August 1998, militant Islamists blew up American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on the eighth anniversary of the American deployment to Saudi Arabia to fight Iraq. The simultaneous explosions were both vehicle bombs, and again the operation involved smuggling in experts and parts and assembling the bombs on site. Yet each team had knowledge only of its own operation.³¹⁶ This time, about 300 people were killed and 5,100 injured.³¹⁷ Another two years later, on 12

³¹⁴ Bodansky, 135-7.

³¹⁵ Ibid., 171-2.

³¹⁶ “Details Emerge of Network Behind Nairobi Bombing,” 19 August, 1998, accessed 25 Mar 2002. Available at <http://www.ict.org.il>.

³¹⁷ U.S. Department of State, “Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2001,” 28 September 2001, accessed 28 May 2002. Available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm>.

October 2000, Yemeni Islamists performed a suicide mission in an explosive-laden refueling boat that blew a gaping hole in the U.S.S. Cole, killing 17 and injuring 39. Yemeni officials had less than two weeks advance notice that the Cole would make the stop, pointing to a highly proficient, flexible, and possibly indigenous capability.³¹⁸ And these are just the headliner missions.

There are plenty of other examples. The bombing of the World Trade Center, numerous attacks in Egypt, the Philippines, and Saudi Arabia, and numerous failed attacks can be traced to militant Islamists who are tied together in one way or another—usually through bin Laden.³¹⁹ Palestinian groups started conducting suicide operations in 1994, and now groups like HAMAS say the suicide bombers are their most effective weapon against the overwhelming Israeli military forces.³²⁰

Taken in the context of these operations, the attacks of 11 September 2001 were actually typical, though extreme, in their characteristics. The operatives had been living in the United States for up to seven years, most in their own names. The pilots trained at American flight schools. One even attended an Air Force professional military school. Each probably knew only a limited amount of information on the overall operation.³²¹ Thus, some of the operatives were probably living in the United States, in isolation, watching the operations in Kenya and Tanzania and the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, and awaiting their chance. The planners meticulously laid out all the details to get all the operatives through security and on board the right flights at the right times so the

³¹⁸ “US Warship Targeted by Suicide Attack in Yemen,” 13 October, 2000, accessed 28 May 2002. Available at <http://www.ict.org.il>

³¹⁹ Loeb, A24.

³²⁰ “Israeli Military Drive Seen Spurring Suicide Bombers,” *Chicago Daily Herald*, 5 April, 2002, A1.

³²¹ “Conspiracy Shows Signs of Following Classic bin Laden Doctrine,” 17 September, 2001, accessed 25 March 2002. Available at <http://www.ict.org.il>.

geographically separated attacks would occur near-simultaneously. The new part was the substitution of the fuel-filled aircraft for sophisticated bombs—a deviously creative combination of hijacking and suicide bombing.

When taken together, this analysis shows a disturbing picture of the nature of the “new terrorism.” The Iranian Revolution set the stage for this phenomenon. Khomeini’s message that the only good government was the *shari’ah* and that it was every Muslim’s duty to spread this revolution, by force if necessary, was the basic fuel for the fire. But it wasn’t until the Sudan became an Islamic state, the “Afghans” returned from the war with the Soviets, and Saudi Arabia asked for the United States’ help in defending against Iraq that the movement truly gained momentum. Finding itself the lone superpower in the world, the United States had to take action in the unstable Mid-East and Africa for its own security. The resultant meddling played right into the Islamists’ portrayal of the United States as the “Great Satan” bent on destroying Islam. Despite the traditional Sunni-Shi’ite gulf, the militant Islamic movement developed into a pseudo-united organization. The organization has a hub, consisting of Iran and Sudan and Osama bin Laden’s World Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. It also has spokes, which are the militant groups that now have access to resources from the hub (through the al-Qaidah network and training camps in numerous countries) and to some extent take direction via their *fatwahs*. And the organization is global—but not universal. The target audience does not include those who are in the City of War, as the message is not conducive to converting them—only conquering them. The message is conveyed by the operations of the militant Islamic movement, which do not aim at coercion but victory.

Where possible, the militants confront the West's military. Where necessary, they simply kill its infidel citizens.

All four factors in the analysis, therefore, add up to a strategy of violent worldwide insurgency by confrontation.³²² The mechanism for success is that violence on the militant Islamists' terms will lead to strength in their movement and weakness in the West. This happens in two ways. First, terrorist attacks and attacks on the American military (like the U.S.S. Cole and the Rangers in Somalia) show the militants' ability to weaken the "paper tiger" that is the West. Second, these attacks provoke violent reactions from the West that the militants can characterize as attacks on Islam. In these two ways, the movement's strength will increase until Islam will finally confront the West from a position of military strength and overpower it. Then the whole world will be ruled by *shari'ah*. The mechanism is flawed in that the Muslim world is slipping farther behind the West in social, economic, and military strength. But the elegance is that all the Islamists have to do for now is survive.³²³

Counter-strategies in the past have aided the Islamists' cause. To appeal to their target audiences, the Islamists need to maintain their Islamic legitimacy, and they need to appear strong. The latter can be accomplished simply by surviving an attack by a powerful enemy, but defeating this enemy in military confrontation is even better.³²⁴ Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States knew the enemy they were facing in Afghanistan or Somalia, respectively. But the fact that the militant Islamists were able to defeat both of these superpowers significantly bolstered the movement. The United

³²² This characterization was actually inspired by an email from Lt Col Forrest Morgan, PhD, Professor of Strategic Studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 27 September 2001.

³²³ "The Al Qaeda Doctrine," *Stratfor.com*, 11 March, 2002. Accessed 11 March 2002 through *The Early Bird* at <http://www.ebird.dtic.mil>.

³²⁴ Ibid.

States responded to the 1998 embassy bombings by launching cruise missiles at the Ahawar Kili terrorist camp in Khost, Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan. The Clinton Administration had intelligence indicating there would be a meeting of top bin Laden officials at the Afghanistan camp, and they suspected the Sudan plant of developing chemical weapons.³²⁵ However, though bin Laden did nothing but survive the attacks, he still gained hero status because of them.³²⁶ The Israelis have tried both appeasement and destruction. In June 2000 the Israeli Army pulled out of the Lebanese territory it had occupied since the 1982 invasion. Although this could be seen as admitting defeat by the Hizb'allah, it allowed the Israelis to withdraw to a "morally defensible position, from which they'd be better able to fight if the need arose."³²⁷ Yet the Hizb'allah are again harassing the Israelis across the border.³²⁸ The all-out military offensive the Israelis launched in the West Bank at the end of March appears to have increased the number of volunteers for martyrdom among young militant Islamists.³²⁹

The conundrum is that this makes it appear there is no way to defeat the terrorists but to destroy them—all of them. In short, win a total war against "terrorism." But how can victory ever be claimed in that type of war, whose aim is the total destruction of clandestine units throughout the world? If victory is claimed and then there is another terrorist act, the "victor's" reputation is destroyed. If victory is never claimed, it is damaged just the same.³³⁰ Is this really the only way?

³²⁵ James Risen, "U.S. Says It Has Strong Evidence of Threat Justifying Retaliation," *New York Times*, 21 August, 1998, A11.

³²⁶ Weiner, A13.

³²⁷ Daniel Klaidman, Joanna Chen, Carla Power, and Christopher Dickey, "Retreat, Regret, Relief: Israel's Lebanon Withdrawal has Echoes of Vietnam," *Newsweek*, 5 June, 2000, 6.

³²⁸ Richard Beeston, James Bone, Roland Watson, "UN Fears War Will Engulf the Arab World," *London Times*, 3 April, 2002, A1.

³²⁹ "Israeli Military Drive Seen Spurring Suicide Bombers," A1.

³³⁰ Stratfor.com (11 March 2002).

Chapter 6

Conclusions and Implications

War is always a matter of doing evil in the hope that good may come of it, and it is very difficult to show discrimination without failing in determination. Moreover, the cautious line is usually a mistake in battle, where it is too commonly followed, so that it rarely receives credit on the higher plane of war policy, where it is more often wise but usually unpopular. In the fever of war, public opinion craves for the most drastic measures, regardless of where they may lead.

-Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy*

It would seem that the United States is embarked upon a war whose aim is the total destruction of all terrorist groups of global reach. But contemplating the end state of this type of war should give policymakers pause. Even if one could imagine a world where no terrorism existed, where all terrorist groups had been destroyed, and where terrorism as a strategy had been shown ineffective so no new groups would emerge, it is difficult to imagine having the operational ability to accomplish the destruction in the first place. Such an operation, “would involve simultaneous strikes against al Qaeda’s network in dozens of countries, as well as strikes against manufacturing and storage facilities for weapons of mass destruction in countries that might be willing to share them with al Qaeda. The strikes could include attacks against the leaders of some of these countries.”³³¹ The purpose of this paper was to define the nature of a war on terrorism through an analysis of the changing nature of terrorism itself. This chapter will sum up

³³¹ “The Al Qaeda Doctrine,” Stratfor.com, 11 March, 2002. Accessed 11 March 2002 through *The Early Bird* at <http://www.ebird.dtic.mil>.

the findings on this task and propose the implications of these findings for the proper strategy in the war on terrorism.

Conclusions

This war on terrorism is a war between a coalition of states and an opposing insurgency that poses a threat to the national security of that coalition. That is the most useful way to analyze terrorism in this context, because terrorism is not a phenomenon that can easily be defined. It is a strategy, or a means to an end—an end that is not always readily discernible. Defeating terrorism is not a matter of solving social problems or even distinguishing between right and wrong, although injustice, right and wrong will form a major battlefield in the war. Defeating terrorism is a matter of national security. The fundamentalist revolution and the end of the Cold War have created a world where radicals have an increasingly permissive environment for their extreme methods. In fact, the extreme nature of terrorism in the 1990s, culminating with the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, has caused many to warn of the arrival of a “new terrorism.” The United States has responded by declaring a war on this new terrorism.

Defining the problem as a national security threat to states narrows the scope of “terrorism” to those groups that will simultaneously be acknowledged as threats to the security of the entire coalition. This leaves out some forms of terrorism, like a state’s repression of its own citizens and indigenous terrorism that only affects a limited area. It also eliminates some of the need to distinguish between some other categories, like those who may have a legitimate cause, and those who may technically be classified as guerillas. The war becomes one of states against a global insurgency. The

appropriateness of this point of view depends on whether the nature of the threat warrants it.

Defining the nature of the threat requires detailed analysis of the strategy upon which the terrorist groups are staking their hopes of success. This study developed a framework that is a hybrid of those used by several terrorist experts, consisting of four primary factors: operations/lethality, motivation, support, and organization. The second and more difficult step was the subjective process of determining the mechanism by which these four factors could possibly translate into success for the terrorist group. The two steps, taken together, illuminate the terrorist group's strategy—a strategy that the group may or may not even be able to articulate among themselves. This process, therefore, transforms an operational analysis into the strategic threat posed by a group. Only when this strategy has been assessed can the true nature of the threat be determined, and only then can appropriate counter-strategies be developed.

With this type of analysis, it is possible to compare the nature of “old” terrorism and “new” terrorism in a meaningful way. One of the big differences was the congruency (or lack thereof) of all four factors. The RAF had a vision of worldwide revolution, but its organization and support revealed that its strategy was actually built around ensuring the survival of the group. Whenever the group needed an adrenaline shot, it combined hunger strikes by the prisoners, bombing by the commandos, and demonstrations by the sympathizers to provide a spark. But the viability of the group's Leninist-Marxist revolutionary vision was dependent on the existence of a mother state that could provide the political base for the revolution. When the Soviet Union dissolved, the group faded away. The PLO showed itself to be a political body, willing to use terrorism to coerce

and communicate, capable of developing a large army, but also willing to compromise if necessary. The simplicity of its cause gave it a huge support base and made it resilient enough to withstand the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. But the diversity of the groups that belonged to the PLO forced Arafat to be a chameleon, striving for progress through compromise. This compromise led to the Oslo Agreement, but that appears to be far from the end. In the latter part of the 1990s, Arafat came under intense pressure from groups like HAMAS, for whom compromise was unacceptable. At this writing, Arafat is a prisoner in his own headquarters building in Ramallah, an acknowledged terrorist but still an important player in the peace process.³³² The IRA was a stubborn, tunnel-visioned group bent on carrying on a two-century-old conflict that had always been about violent struggle. Its loose organization seemed to add to its effectiveness—the authority of the local commanders ensured the primacy of the bullet over the ballet, and Sinn Fein was mainly afforded the role of post-operation apologist, rather than strategist. But the IRAs vision for a united Ireland seemed to be incongruent with its moral support base, which did not include part of that same Ireland. The IRA was also forced to compromise, and reverse the primacy to the ballet. The tenuous peace from the Good Friday Accord still exists today.

The mechanisms are difficult to categorize, due to the incongruence. Additionally, during this period, state sponsorship loomed in the background, but in the world of the terrorist, the state became more of a nuisance than an aid. Unwilling to accept the strings attached to the support they got from states, terrorist organizations developed their own resources. The state support simply did not fit with their overall

³³² Tracy Wilkinson and Richard Boudreaux, “U.S. Brokers a Surrender at West Bank,” *Los Angeles Times*, 3 April, 2002, A1.

strategies. Still, the mechanisms of both the states and the terrorist groups were based on some sort of coercion to change the policies of another political body. Groups like the IRA posed only internal security threats in their own countries. The RAF theoretically aimed at being a worldwide national security threat, but given the weakness in its organization and support, posed only an internal security threat as well. The PLO arguably posed (and continues to pose) a national security threat to the existence of Israel, which could be destabilizing to the region. There are many insurgent groups in the world today whose strategies resemble this type of coercion. Many of these do not pose a security threat to the world's states and are, therefore, not the enemy in the war on terrorism.

The militant Islamic movement is not focused on coercion and poses a much broader security threat. It is focused on world domination by force. The Iranian Revolution, the Soviet- Afghanistan war, the emergence of the Sudanese Islamic state, and the Gulf war all contributed to the rise of a global movement. The strategy of the movement is congruent in all four factors. Its motivation is an extreme form of fundamentalist Islam that promises the domination of the world by Islam—through force, if necessary. Its organization is global, uniting nations and sects that have never worked well together. The hub and spoke network provides support for the militant groups while allowing them autonomy and security; yet their devotion ensures they follow strategic direction in the form of *fatwahs*. The material support for the movement comes through this al-Qaidah network from both private and state sponsors. The movement does not worry about moral support from anyone who disagrees with its methods, because in theory they will be overcome in the end, unless they convert. It does, however, take

pains to explain its actions to the Islamic elite in order to maintain legitimacy. Finally, the movement is capable of accomplishing operations over a spectrum of violent measures, including conventional warfare, guerilla warfare, and terrorism. Its members are willing to die for the cause—intentionally if necessary. It takes little imagination to picture a scenario where the group would use weapons of mass destruction. In fact, the biological attacks in the United States after 11 September may have been such a scenario. All four factors are congruent, in that they all are appropriate for the same mechanism.

The mechanism is that of a global insurgency. Like Mao, the militant Islamists envision being able to concentrate force in a limited time and space to perform tactical actions on their terms. Unlike Mao, the militant Islamists do not care about the support of the people who are victimized, because these people are not the target population (unless the attacks occur in a Muslim country). Each of these actions that is successful weakens the enemy to a small extent, because it shows the government is not strong enough to protect its citizens. This also makes the Islamists look like heroes in the eyes of their target population. Counter-attacks by the government can also make the Islamists look like heroes, as long as they survive the attacks. In this way, the movement theoretically builds up strength by surviving, shoring up Muslim support, and striking until it can eventually fight from a position of strength.

The real difference between “old” terrorism and “new” terrorism is the congruency of the operational factors in forming a strategy. There are differences between the old and the new in each of the four areas, but none of these by themselves warrant an unprecedented counter-strategy like the current war. There are also similarities. Militant Islam’s motivation is vaguely similar to that of the RAF in that its

aim is world revolution. Its organization is vaguely similar to that of the PLO in that it is a loose and sometimes internecine conglomeration of diverse groups. Its moral support requirements are also vaguely similar to those of the PLO in that its target audience is not in the population where its operations occur. The real difference is that for the militant Islamic movement, the strategy is a coherent one, where all four operational areas—motivation, organization, support, and operations—are congruent in that they point to the same mechanism: global insurgency that gradually builds strength for a final takeover of the world. This is the nature of the war on which we are embarked.

Implications

The fact that today's terrorism is significantly different than the terrorism of the last few decades does indeed suggest a new counter-strategy. The enemy is not a single group whose aims are focused on a limited political objective. This is why limited strikes like the cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan failed. It is why military campaigns that were not backed up by the resolve to succeed, like the campaign against Aided in Somalia, did more damage than good. It is why Israel, which is focused only on its own survival, cannot possibly make progress by itself no matter how forceful its actions. The threat from today's terrorism is different. But since there are limited similarities with old terrorism in the four operational areas, there may be lessons from past efforts against terrorism that can be incorporated into this war.

The RAF may have taught us a lesson about dealing with ideologies of worldwide revolution. The lesson is that by itself, this type of ideology is not enough to sustain a global revolution. Without an organization and support that are also worldwide, the RAF needed to point to a powerful state (the Soviet Union) whose existence validated the

ideology. When this state disappeared, the ideology was discredited. But the Soviet Union was not conquered, it was beaten in the arena of ideologies. Had the United States conquered the Soviet Union militarily, there is no guarantee the same effect would have been achieved. On the contrary, this may have fueled the fire of revolutionary groups like the RAF to continue indefinitely.

This lesson only applies to the current conflict if there is some way to discredit the militant Islamic ideology of world domination by showing that the ideology has failed in the states where it took hold. This “failure” should not be measured by the standard of living of the people in the states, but by the adherence of the governments to *shari’ah*. In truth, the ideologies espoused by Khomeini and Turabi represent deviations from several accepted tenets of fundamental Islam. Khomeini’s assertion that Islamic clergy should participate in the government was a departure from the beliefs of many Shi’ites. Turabi’s moderate application of *shari’ah* could be considered offensive to many fundamentalist Muslims. Certainly, Islamic clerics would not condone many of the ruthless methods used by both men and by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Therefore, the information war must be a major front in this war.

The Israel-PLO struggle revealed several lessons about dealing with a loose organization of diverse-minded groups. The Israelis tried several different strategies, including diplomacy, invasion, surgical strikes and regime targeting. The invasion of 1982 was extremely effective militarily, but when the Israelis continued after achieving their initial, limited goals, they created another enemy in the Hizb’allah. Surgical strikes and regime targeting have been of limited use because there are no targets that are valuable enough to cause the collapse of the entire organization. Diplomacy has at times

seemed successful, as in 1993 with the Oslo Accord. However, militant Islamic groups, who will not accept compromise, have attacked Arafat because of the political nature of his strategy.

This is how the conflict in the Middle East has become inextricably linked to the global conflict. Israel cannot defeat the security threat it faces on its own. If Arafat could be isolated and protected from groups like HAMAS, Israel would be able to deal with him diplomatically. But these groups are part of the global insurgency in the militant Islamic movement and cannot tolerate the existence of the state of Israel in the midst of the Holy Land. This is a place where the frontiers of Islam meet the frontiers of the West. The only hope of solving the problem is to find a way to isolate and destroy the terrorist groups while still recognizing the legitimacy of the cause of the Palestinian people. Again, the information war is a major part of this effort.

The British struggle against the IRA can teach lessons about the coordinated use of different national instruments. The IRA as a movement bears little resemblance to the militant Islamic movement, except that it was forced to develop a covert support system with overt fronts in order to finance itself without relying on outside help. The British counter-strategy treated the legal and military aspects of the fight as separate, compartmented operations, and as a result lost any hope of synergy between the two. The war on terrorism is even more complicated in that there are multiple fronts—military, economic, legal, political, information—but also a coalition of multiple states involved. A lack of cooperation among states could lead to the loss of opportunities to arrest important suspects. More importantly, if the United States is perceived as fighting the war by itself, it will lose a major battle on the legitimacy front. This would add

credibility to the Islamists' claims that the United States is the "Great Satan" that is out to get Muslims.

The important task is to develop a strategy in this war that incorporates only the lessons from the past that have been adjusted for the nature of this war. The nature of the war is that of the world's states fighting against a global insurgency, so the strategy should keep this in mind at all times. The strategy must be developed to defeat the insurgency's strategy, not to prosecute a war in a certain manner just because that is the way the states normally operate. The way to accomplish this is to develop the strategy using the analysis framework, working backward from the insurgency's strategy mechanism to the four operational factors, developing an effective counter that is congruent at every level.

The strategy of the militant Islamists is to gradually dominate the world by conversion and force, building up support from militants through tactical successes and survival, while maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of fundamentalist Muslims. That is what the counter-strategy should be designed to defeat. The mechanism by which the coalition could achieve this defeat is the growth of the coalition until, in the end, the material and moral support for the militant Islamic movement are gone, any small groups that exist are isolated from the "hub" of Islam, and—or, possibly, because—the militant ideology is discredited as being "un-Islamic."

The organization of the coalition will be ad hoc. Forums like the United Nations can be used to shore up support in the court of world public opinion, but the majority of the effort will consist of behind the scenes diplomatic overtures to ensure solidarity of the coalition. Unfortunately, this may involve giving up the ability to call all the strategic

shots. The important thing is to maintain the coalition's solidarity while disrupting the insurgency's already loose organizational solidarity. It is not necessary to stick to an arbitrary definition of terrorism to determine the enemy. Instead, the enemy is any organization that is seen as a threat to the security of the coalition. For example, it is possible to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Palestinian cause and the security of the state of Israel and yet condemn the extreme methods used in pursuit of each. It is also necessary to identify those groups that are acting outside the bounds of legitimacy, like HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and combine efforts with the two legitimate authorities in the region, the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Even though Oslo is as good as dead and Arafat is an acknowledged terrorist, keeping him on the side of the coalition would do the most good for the coalition. One good example of this "coalition-building" is the Bush administration's successful courtship of the Pakistanis prior to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. This amounted to "asking Pakistan to help destroy what its intelligence service had helped create and maintain: the Taliban."³³³ Yet Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf supported the United States fully in each of its seven ultimatums.³³⁴ This was a strategic victory that took a notch out of the "hub" of the militant Islamic movement, and it shows the type of organization the coalition will have.

Besides coordinating strategic activities, the coalition governments will need to develop the capability to coordinate operational level activities as well. For instance, there must be legal methods for any country to aid another in its pursuit of known, declared terrorists in the latter's territory. This will require that each state involved have

³³³ Dan Balz, Bob Woodward, and Jeff Himmelman, "10 Days in September: Inside the War Cabinet – Afghan Campaign's Blueprint Emerges," *Washington Post*, 29 January, 2002, A1.

³³⁴ Balz, Woodward, and Himmelman, A1.

an organization with a single authority that can cross bureaucratic lines to make resources available as a team in support of the war on terrorism. Each state's committee for the war on terrorism would have to have knowledge of the state's operations on each front in order to coordinate them among the coalition states.

The motivation of the coalition is the peace, security, and prosperity of the states involved. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlined this in ordinary terms in a February interview: "The ultimate victory in this war is when everyone who wants to can do what everyone of us did today, and that is get up, let your children go to school, go out of the house and not in fear, stand here on a sidewalk and not worry about a truck bomb driving into us."³³⁵ However, this statement portrays a war of total elimination of terrorism itself, which is a long-term—and probably infeasible, although admirable—goal for a continuous conflict, like the "war on drugs" or the "war on crime." When the Bush administration outlined its intentions to eliminate all terrorist groups of global reach, it shaped the war in a different light. As Michael Howard put it, "To declare that one is at war is immediately to create a war psychosis that may be totally counter-productive for the objective being sought. It arouses an immediate expectation, and demand, for spectacular military action against some easily identifiable adversary, preferably a hostile state—action leading to decisive results."³³⁶ Indeed, in the initial strategy discussions at Camp David, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz pushed hard for including Iraq in the initial phase of the war, while the opportunity to strike was hot.³³⁷ The media also took up this cry in some places.³³⁸ The problem with this is that it

³³⁵ Donald Rumsfeld, interviewed by Toby Harnden, "Rumsfeld Spells Out What US Victory Would Mean," *London Sunday Telegraph*, 24 February, 2002, A1.

³³⁶ Howard, 9.

³³⁷ Balz, Woodward, and Himmelman, A1.

feeds right into the insurgency's motivation. Arab and Muslim public opinion of Americans turned venomous when the United States bombed Iraq for non-cooperation in the UN weapons inspection in December 1998, and there is a high probability it would again.³³⁹ The United States and the coalition need to avoid aiding the militant Islamists in polarizing the world into the "City of Faith" and the "City of War." Instead of making the enemy states "un-Islamic," this would make them look more legitimately Islamic.

The strategy must take into consideration coalition material and moral support and insurgent material and moral support. The coalition obviously has a major advantage in the area of material support. The terrorists cannot match the resources of the coalition states, even with state support from the rogue states. But coalition resources will only be available as long as the governments dedicate the resources to the effort. For the United States, the declaration of war in the wake of the devastation of 11 September provided all the impetus needed to gain support from Congress, which was in turn guaranteed the support of the American people. As the war drags on, this moral support may be harder to obtain. As conditions in the Middle East heated up at the end of March, 2002, even American analysts were already questioning Bush's ability to keep up what they called a "good vs. evil" view of the war on terrorism.³⁴⁰

While the coalition is worrying about keeping its material and moral support going, it must attack the insurgency's support as well. Difficult as it is to attack the material support, there have already been successes—161 coalition countries have

³³⁸ William M. Arkin, "Should Iraq be Next?" *Washingtonpost.com*, 3 December, 2001 stated the point pragmatically: "If Kosovo and Afghanistan teach us anything, it is that decisive military action can be taken with relatively few civilian deaths-many fewer than are caused by the embargo that is imposed because Saddam Hussein refuses to let in U.N. inspectors."

³³⁹ Bodansky, 352-3.

³⁴⁰ Dan Balz and Dana Milbank, "Bush Doctrine Begins to Blur: Mideast Complicates Good-vs.-Evil Approach," *Washington Post*, 3 April, 2002, A1.

combined to block \$104.8 million of terrorist assets.³⁴¹ Another, more dramatic way to separate the militant groups from material support is to eliminate or deter the groups' state sponsorship. The war in Afghanistan was undoubtedly a big step, as it eliminated a major training ground and a major portion of the global network. The United States-led force took pains to avoid making this war a moral support victory for the insurgency. Obtaining Pakistan's support and concentrating on humanitarian aid were a huge part of that plan. This revealed to the world the fact that the Taliban, who claimed to be a fundamentalist Islamic organization, were unworthy of the authority they had taken as government of Afghanistan. For Muslims, to side with the Taliban was to admit corruption as a part of Islam. But a big part of the moral support front will depend on how well the coalition plans its operations.

The coalition operations need to be aimed at defeating the insurgency while denying it moral victories. Obviously, homeland defense is a big part of this, as long as it does not go so far as to erode the freedoms that are essential to our way of life. How to conduct offensive operations is not quite as obvious. The military can be a big part of these operations, as in Afghanistan. But the operations have to be guaranteed successes with limited objectives. If the operation fails, the insurgents claim a major victory. If the operation is tactically successful but falls short of its strategic goal and the insurgents survive, the insurgents also claim victory. But if the coalition forces are seemingly able to accomplish any mission they undertake, they retain the appearance of strength even if the insurgents survive. For example, in Afghanistan, had the objective been to transform the state of Afghanistan into a state that is hostile to terrorism, the objectives would have

³⁴¹ Taken from the White House's official web site for America's response to terrorism, accessed 28 May 2002. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/response/financialresponse.html>.

been met before Operation ANACONDA began. The operation could have been avoided, and even though some enemy soldiers would have survived in caves, they would have been insignificant—and acknowledged as such. If, however, the objective is to round up and capture or kill all enemy soldiers, any enemy troops that escape represent a significant moral victory for the insurgency. If there are other objectives that are important enough to warrant the operation, then state them. For example, perhaps the intelligence that was gained from the caves was worth the risk of putting soldiers down to go in after it. Perhaps the sheer act of intimidation that comes from being able to kill them wherever they go is the object. The important thing is to limit the objectives to those having strategic effects.

This may mean that the armed forces play a supporting role to other instruments of power. The United States armed forces may be placed in the position where they must provide intelligence to civil law enforcement officials from other countries. American space assets, airborne reconnaissance assets, and special forces may be particularly well suited to these tasks. The Air Force may be used extensively to provide humanitarian assistance and supply of foreign and covert agents. Army and Marine ground forces may spend a lot of time doing peacekeeping while law enforcement officials perform the direct actions involved in apprehending the enemy in situations where it is appropriate for this kind of action. These are missions that can have strategic effects. As Major General David Deptula, author of the air strategies in the wars in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, put it, “The biggest piece of this war could very well be the information

piece.”³⁴² It may be that there are few opportunities for the armed forces to be used in a destructive manner as they were in Afghanistan.

But in Afghanistan, the American forces fought on the side of an insurgency against an authority. In this scenario, even in a small war, a conventional force can be successful using regular tactics. This principle applied in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 as well. It also applied in North Vietnam after the Easter Offensive of 1972, during LINEBACKER I and II. However, in Vietnam before 1968, the United States tried to use conventional force (especially an airpower strategy of conventional targeting) against an insurgent force and was not successful on the strategic level.³⁴³ The Israelis have shown the same tendency, using conventional force against the PLO in Lebanon, which gave them tactical and even operational success, but was a strategic failure. They drove the PLO out of Lebanon, but gained a new enemy in the Hizb’allah, and merely forced the PLO to relocate.³⁴⁴ When there is an opportunity to eliminate a dangerous resource that could potentially be used by the insurgency, such as weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a state that has ties to terrorists, conventional warfighting operations may be appropriate. But this should only happen when the conditions have been set so that the actions will be decisive and legitimate in the eyes of the coalition.

As Pericles warned the Athenians 2,433 years ago: “I have many other reasons to hope for a favorable outcome, if you can consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the conduct of the war, and will abstain from willfully involving

³⁴² Personal interview with Maj Gen David Deptula, 31 January, 2002 at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

³⁴³ Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam*, (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 205-6.

³⁴⁴ Clive Jones, “Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and the War in South Lebanon 1985-97,” in *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 8:3 (Winter 1997), 82-83.

yourselves in other dangers; indeed, I am more afraid of our own blunders than of the enemy's devices.”³⁴⁵ This war is a war of states protecting their security from a global insurgency that does not have the strength to do major damage to them at this time. The insurgency's strategy relies on the hope that Allah will eventually honor their efforts by making them strong enough to overpower the evil “City of War,” and the entire world will be run according to his will. In the interim, they must work from a point of weakness. That very weakness is to their advantage in that they do not need to accomplish much in order to gain support. Survival is sometimes enough. However, limited victories are even better. The strategy that will defeat them depends on gradually growing a coalition that cuts off material and moral support for militant groups that will then be isolated and illegitimate in the eyes of Islam. This will take cooperation among the states of the coalition and among these states' instruments of power. It will not lead to a classical, decisive victory that eliminates “terrorism,” but to a long struggle that marginalizes the insurgents and makes terrorism an undesirable strategy for all others. The coalition must maintain its own moral support in the form of public opinion, which assures material support for the war from the governments. It must also cut off material support to the insurgents without increasing the moral support to them. This may mean that decisive action by the armed forces is not the chosen venue of action most of the time. The armed forces may be more useful performing indirect operations that have strategic effects on the information front. All use of force (civil or military) should be decisive and limited in its objectives, so that the objectives are achieved as effortlessly as possible. When it is necessary to use conventional warfighting operations, the conditions

³⁴⁵ Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, in *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, Edited by Robert B. Strassler (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 83.

should be set so that the actions are seen as legitimate in the eyes of the coalition. This is a war that can be lost much easier than it can be won. American leadership is essential, but leadership implies someone to lead, and in this war, those who are following may make all the difference.

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