



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT

**Realignment and the
Process of Change at the Naval
Postgraduate School**

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December 2003

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POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

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THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE ON CULTURE AT NPS

ABSTRACT

Introduction: Few studies have focused on the effects of change within a military graduate institution where military and academic subcultures coexist. This research focused on the 2001-2002 organizational change at the Naval Postgraduate School. The purpose was to identify how change was approached and implemented, as well to find out what happened during the process of organizational change. The overarching goal of the investigation was to understand organizational change in a complex and dynamic military educational environment.

Methods: Personal interviews with 23 faculty and administration members were conducted, tape-recorded, and transcribed verbatim. Themes were identified using a qualitative thematic analysis technique.

Results: The themes reflected the impact of the change process on organizational subcultures. Our analysis revealed that this change process implemented across the organization affected the intensity of sub-cultural conflict within the organization. In the case of NPS, an authoritarian style of change representing a military approach eclipsed the existing academic subculture. We suggest that this is because the change initiative represented different fundamental aspects from that of the academic subculture. The pressure of a change effort that was not representative of both subcultures increased the intensity of conflict between the military and academic subcultures, which jeopardized the ability for the two to work together.

Discussion: We propose cultural conflict is inherent in the organization and can either be positively or negatively impacted as a result of change. Certain cultural change factors are associated with specific indicators. These indicators reflect the impact of change strategy on fundamental aspects of organizational subcultures. These impacts influence the intensity of cultural conflict within that organization. It is important for change agents to understand how these factors are interrelated so that the intensity of subcultural conflict within an organization can be better managed.

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I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

This paper explores the organizational change initiated by Rear Admiral David R. Ellison in the fall of 2001 at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. This change directly impacted the existing NPS structure in that it transformed a highly decentralized institution into a centralized, four-school system. Previous to the change, different curricula were grouped into departments where department chairs had considerable authority to run their departments or divisions. Following the change, related departments were further grouped into schools, and decision-making power was pushed to higher levels. The change also included the creation of learning and research centers called institutes that were designed to integrate teaching and research, faculty and students, and theory and application.¹ The departments and institutes became linked through a quasi-matrix structure, which was designed to foster both horizontal communication (between departments) and vertical reporting (between different levels of management). The new organizational structure and change strategy are shown in Appendix A (p. 88).

NPS is a multi-cultural institution comprised of military and civilian faculty; American students from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines; foreign nationals from allied countries, such as Chile, Germany, and Turkey; civilian government employees; and active duty military administrators. Within each of these groups are further divisions, each with its own set of norms and values. Norms are defined as a standard against which the appropriateness of a behavior is judged.² Values are qualities that are regarded as useful or desirable.³ On the whole, however, the two dominant subcultures of the institution are military and academic. Culture refers to the set of shared values, beliefs, attitudes, and behavior of a group, and defines a way of thinking.⁴ While these

¹ David R. Ellison, "What NPS Means to DoD: A View to the Future," *NPS Journal*, vol. 1 no. 1 (2001): 5-9.

² G. Moorehead and R.W. Griffin, *Organizational Behavior: Managing People and Organizations* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001), 4.

³ Albert Morehead and Loy Morehead, eds., *The New American Webster Handy College Dictionary*, 3rd ed. (New York: Penguin Books 1995), 718.

⁴ Richard L. Daft, *Essentials of Organization Theory and Design*, 2nd ed. (Cincinnati: Southwestern College Publishing 2001), 135.

sets of underlying values are different in the military and academic subcultures at NPS, the fit between them is important to the success of the organization.⁵

This study is highly relevant to U. S. military officers considering the renewed emphasis on organizational change by the Department of Defense (DoD) as evidenced by the creation of the Office of Force Transformation.⁶ The recent reorganization at NPS provides a unique opportunity to examine the impact of an organizational change process on the staff and faculty at the Navy's premier graduate school. In light of recent events including terrorist attacks, *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, and a rapidly changing global environment that presents new and different daily challenges, we believe the reorganization of the Navy's graduate education system provides great value in attempting to understand different methods of implementing change during uncertain times. Furthermore, this study reveals lessons and results of implementing change within a mixed military/civilian environment in contrast to a solely military command structure. NPS contains both academic and military subcultures woven into a military structure that yields interesting and controversial questions as to how organizational change can best be handled.

This study was initiated to gain an understanding of the process used to implement transformational change at NPS and to explore the ramifications of the realignment on those directly affected. The study was structured to answer several fundamental questions. 1) How did the Superintendent, Rear Admiral David R. Ellison, approach change at NPS? 2) What led him to make the change and what did he consider? 3) Did realignment conform to the transformational spirit of *Joint Vision 2020*? 4) How did it effect the environment and culture at NPS?

The research team conducted interviews at different levels within the organization to gain understanding of the impact of change. The use of personal interviews of those present during the change process enabled the researchers to capture representative perspectives from within the organization and from its leader (Superintendent RADM

⁵ Linda A. Hill, "A Note for Analyzing Work Groups," *Harvard Business School No. 9-496-026* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1995), 16.

⁶ Office of Force Transformation, <<http://www.oft.osd.mil/>> [13 December 2003].

Ellison). From these interviews, emerging themes were developed and analyzed. By learning from organizational members what shaped the change at NPS, the reader can indirectly observe the dynamic volatility of a multi-dimensional organization undergoing organizational change.

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II. BACKGROUND

A. IMPETUS FOR CHANGE

NPS is the Navy's primary source of graduate education for its officers and is the world's largest and most prestigious defense-oriented graduate institution.⁷ More than 1300 students, including commissioned officers from all U.S. military services and nearly 50 countries, are currently pursuing graduate degrees. A fully accredited university, faculty at NPS consists of approximately 200 tenure track faculty, 30 military faculty, and a varying number of other non-tenure-track faculty who support the teaching and research programs.⁸ NPS specializes in advanced education at the Master's Degree level through resident courses and distance learning, and awards a limited number of Doctorates. The school offers an array of programs for continuous learning and executive education. Academic programs provide a unique interdisciplinary defense focus on science, engineering, technology, policy, operations, management, and international relations, not available in the private sector. In the last ten years, however, top-level officials in the DoD have raised questions concerning the relevance of NPS in the rapidly transforming defense environment. We propose that this concern coupled with budget shortfalls and efficiency efforts placed the school on Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) lists. Debate over the relevance of NPS to DoD interests has thus raised questions concerning the long-term worth and survival of NPS.

Rear Admiral Ellison faced this concern upon taking the reins of NPS and assuming the leadership position as the 22nd Superintendent on September 4, 2000. Prior to arriving at NPS, Ellison served on the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Assistant Secretary of Defense, and was the Executive Assistant to the Vice CNO. He was therefore intimately aware of the negative perception NPS had acquired during his tour at headquarters in Washington. After assessing NPS for himself during the first few months of his three-year tenure, the Superintendent became convinced that the

⁷ "Framework for the Future, Strategic Plan 2003-2005," (Naval Postgraduate School brochure, Naval Postgraduate School Foundation, Monterey, CA: 2002), 1.

⁸ Naval Postgraduate School Website, <<http://www.nps.navy.mil/nps/faculty.htm>> [10 December 2003].

institution indeed added value to the DoD.⁹ This assessment was the impetus for the Admiral's vision to better align NPS with the needs of the DoD.¹⁰ The change was needed to dispel the perception of decision makers in Washington D.C. that NPS was an inward-looking enclave that lacked credible fiscal oversight.¹¹ Unless NPS could demonstrate a unique contribution to the DoD to separate itself from civilian institutions, Ellison believed that NPS would be shut down. To prevent this, NPS would have to demonstrate its value in a timely manner, and dispel fiscal skepticism and insecure financial integrity.¹² A brief by the Superintendent providing his frame of reference and strategy for the change is included in Appendix B (p. 89).

Ellison's vision articulated the need for massive reorganization.¹³ He proposed that the institution transform from an advanced military education facility into a premier academic center of excellence in order to properly align itself with the rapidly changing world of transformation outlined in the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan for the future, *Joint Vision 2020*. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared,

...we must transform not only our Armed Forces, but also the Department that services them by encouraging a culture of creativity and intelligent risk taking. We must promote a more entrepreneurial approach to developing military capabilities, one that encourages people, all people, to be proactive and not reactive.¹⁴

According to Ellison, NPS embodied this approach as "... a leading change agent and center of innovation serving as the corporate university for the Naval services."¹⁵ He saw the need to offer a context where students and faculty could place themselves in preparation for their role in the world of uncertainty. He also envisioned this transformation would embrace new developments spawned by recent revolutions in

⁹ RADM David Ellison, Superintendent of Naval Postgraduate School, interview by authors, 9 September 2003, tape recording, Naval Postgraduate School, Hermann Hall, Monterey, CA.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ David R. Ellison, "Perspectives in Military Education," *NPS Journal*, vol. 2 no. 2 (2003), 3.

¹⁵ Ibid.

business, military, and educational affairs. Working on advanced concepts in areas ranging from organizational management and operational analysis to technology, information, and joint warfare applications, the Admiral firmly believed the Navy stood at the intersection of these three movements. In order to sustain its role as a leader of transformation, the Navy needed to cultivate a world class, customized educational system focused on meeting the challenges and military requirements of the future.¹⁶

To accomplish this, the Admiral set out to achieve a revolution in educational affairs (REA) by realigning NPS and its supporting research programs to achieve three goals:

- Creating and sustaining academic programs that are nationally recognized and support the current and future operation of the Navy and Marine Corps, sister services, and allies.
- Developing Institutes that focus on the integration of teaching and research in direct support of the four pillars of *Joint Vision 2020* and its enabling technologies.
- Ensuring executive and continuing education programs that support continuous intellectual innovation and growth throughout an officer's career.¹⁷

His vision for the future of NPS realignment included the formation of four schools within the organization including the School of Business and Public Policy, School of Engineering and Applied Science, School of Operations and Information Science, and School of International Graduate Studies. The intent was clearly designed to "...provide the academic structure needed by our students to cope with future challenges," and to provide a more understandable structure to civilian academic institutions.¹⁸

B. CULTURE AT NPS

To understand the impacts of the Superintendent's organizational change at NPS, its predominant subcultures and their interrelationship are defined and examined. Most members of NPS fall into either an academic or military subculture. The faculty

¹⁶ Ellison, "What NPS Means to DOD. A View to the Future," 5.

¹⁷ Ibid., 7.

¹⁸ Ibid., 7.

generally fall into the former while the administration fall in to the latter. It should be noted, however, that a small minority of NPS members have both an academic and military background, and therefore belong to a hybrid group. The Deans and military faculty members are potential members of this third subculture. For the purpose of this paper, however, only the military and academic subcultures will be explored and developed.

C. MILITARY CULTURE

The American military culture at NPS is rooted in the long-standing traditions and norms of the U.S. Armed Forces. In order to fight and win America's wars, its military culture demands discipline, respect for authority, sacrifice, loyalty, and teamwork.¹⁹ Deference to rank and positional power is demanded, despite any personal feelings one has for his superiors. The culture is goal oriented, and centered on mission accomplishment to the exclusion of almost all other objectives. Instant and willing obedience to orders is the required norm.²⁰ Tradition, ceremony, awards, and promotion structure reinforce these values. The manner in which the military is organized also contributes to its norms and attitudes. The culture is influenced by the highly centralized, hierarchical structure that defines the military chain of command. This ensures the flow of information and decision-making occurs in a sequenced manner that is pivotal to ensuring the dissemination of information to those in position to act upon it. Doctrine, standard operating procedures, and formalized processes rigidly channel effort and resources to solve problems. Subservience of self-interests to the welfare of the team, unit, or organization is also a fundamental aspect of the military culture.²¹ These norms and expectations are driven into their marks in virtually every aspect of a soldier, sailor, or airman's career, from training to work-ups to deployments.

¹⁹ John Hillen, "Must US military culture reform?" *Parameters*, vol. 29 no. 3 (Autumn 1999), 10.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

D. ACADEMIC CULTURE

The NPS academic and military cultures are radically different in many respects. The academic culture recognizes research and scholarship as its core values as substantiated by observations found by Duderstadt,²² Rhodes,²³ and Trow²⁴ in their works on non-military academic institutions. These studies go on to define the academic culture in terms of its values and norms. Emphasis on basic research, a highly disciplinary focus, and strong, long-term support for individual investigators are fundamentals. The academic culture values autonomy and the ability to work on their own. Many faculty members seek careers in academia in part because they would have no supervisor giving direct orders or holding them accountable.²⁵ Academics are generally given freedom to do as they wish, for the most part, as long as they are strong teachers, published, and bring in an acceptable amount of reimbursable funding.²⁶ Reward through faculty promotion and tenure boards reinforces these norms.²⁷ Specialization, the conduct of disciplined research in specific fields of expertise or interest, is also valued among faculty.²⁸ Faculty members are extremely process oriented. The academic culture values traditional, tedious, and meticulous research processes because of the belief that quality and academic excellence is of the utmost importance.²⁹

²² James J. Duderstadt, *A University for the 21st Century*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 22.

²³ Frank H. T. Rhodes, "The University and its Critics," in *Universities and Their Leadership*, eds. William G. Bowen & Harold T. Shapiro (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 11.

²⁴ Trow, M. (1998). "On the Accountability of Higher Education in the United States," in *Universities and Their Leadership*, eds. William G. Bowen & Harold T. Shapiro (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 37.

²⁵ Duderstadt, 161.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., 64

²⁸ Ibid. 122.

²⁹ Ibid, 64.

E. CULTURAL INTERACTION

Operation of NPS is dependent upon an interaction between these two groups with divergent cultures. The military owns and runs the institution, and therefore is responsible for its direction and administration. The military way of thinking consequently dominates the formation of the vision, mission, and strategic direction of NPS. At the same time, the university is dependent on civilian faculty with its associated academic culture in order to realize its vision of becoming the world leader in naval and defense related education and research, and to prepare the intellectual leaders of tomorrow's forces.³⁰ This relationship is formally recognized by the administration as an institutional focus vital to achieving academic excellence and focuses on recruiting and retaining outstanding civilian faculty who are leaders in their disciplines. The faculty at NPS seems similarly dependent upon the military component of the school. NPS provides its faculty with facilities and a unique environment to conduct research in support of the DoD. The success of the relationship (prior to the arrival of Ellison) was measured by the thousands of graduates that have departed NPS to apply their knowledge in support of the Navy and other services, and in the body of faculty-led research and projects that have served the U.S. government.

This symbiotic relationship between the academic and military cultures appears to have been effective due to the shared values of commitment to educating military officers and serving the United States through conducting DoD-relevant research. The success of this relationship is also dependent on the academic culture accepting the direction determined by the military culture. Equally critical is acceptance by the military culture of the academic methodology. The question, however, is whether the values, norms, and beliefs of each subculture would remain undisturbed in the upcoming organizational change environment.

³⁰ "Framework for the Future, Strategic Plan 2003-2005," (Naval Postgraduate School brochure, Naval Postgraduate School Foundation, Monterey, CA: 2002), 1.

III. METHODOLOGY

A. TARGET RESEARCH GROUPS AND AREAS

To achieve an understanding of the change process at NPS, we attempted to understand how its values and culture were affected when applying a change strategy to the organization. In examining this change, the team developed an overarching plan to evaluate and gather data from three broad categories of participants in the change process as derived from organizational change theory.³¹ These broad categories are change strategists, change implementors, and change recipients as depicted in Table 1 (p. 27). Change strategists were the visionaries or crafters of the organization's foundation for change. Change implementors were the change agents, and were responsible for the development of steps required to enact the vision. Change implementors coordinated with various parts of the internal organization and managed relationships that defined the internal shape and culture. Change recipients either buy-in or resist the change. Recipients' responses to organizational change determine further actions from both implementors and strategists in attempting to accomplish the desired change objectives.³²

Positions identified within Table 1 (p. 27) indicate formal job descriptions as they relate to target groups within the organization. Change strategists at NPS included the Superintendent, Academic Provost, Executive Directors, and staff responsible directly to the Superintendent on strategic planning and execution. These individuals developed, designed, and guided the strategy for realignment and transformation at NPS. The Deans of the four newly created schools and the Directors of the three research institutes were the change implementors during the realignment at NPS. Finally, the recipients of the change were the faculty members representative of each school.

³¹ Rosabeth M. Kanter, Barry A. Stein, and Todd D. Jick, *The Challenge of Organizational Change: How Companies Experience It and Leaders Guide It* (Cincinnati, OH: South-Western College Publishing, 1992), 12.

³² Ibid.

Table 1. Targeted Research Groups and Areas

Number of Interviews Conducted	Target Group	Position	Target Area
4	Change Strategists	Superintendent Provost Executive Directors/Staff	Communication of vision Method of dissuading dissatisfaction Creating a sense of urgency Strategic methodology Buy-in to organizational vision Cultural Congruence / internal environment Resistance External environment
7	Change Implementors	Deans Institute Directors	Communication of vision Individual change role Cultural/environmental congruence Change process approach Vision vs. Internal environment Resistance
12	Change Recipients	Faculty	Communication of Vision Buy-in to organizational vision Cultural congruence / internal environment Dissatisfaction/sense of urgency Resistance External environment Change implications/effects

Target areas in this study were derived from existing theory as presented during a recent graduate level change management class using a text entitled *Managing Change: Cases and Concepts* by Todd D. Jick and Maury Peiperl.³³ Key target areas were based on a compilation of knowledge, theories and case studies such as “Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change,”³⁴ “Three in the Middle: The Experience of Making Change at Micro Switch,”³⁵ “Implementing Change,”³⁶ and “The Recipients of Change.”³⁷ This background information highlighted several key areas, which we were interested in investigating. Separate questionnaires were developed to conduct personal interviews of each of the target groups and to better understand the target areas of interest. Certain

³³ Todd D. Jick and Maury A. Peiperl, eds., *Managing Change: Cases and Concepts* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2003), 306.

³⁴ Todd D. Jick, “Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change,” in *Managing Change: Cases and Concepts*, eds. Todd D. Jick and Maury.A. Peiperl, (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1990), 128.

³⁵ Todd D. Jick, “Three in the Middle: The Experience of Making Change at Micro Switch,” in *Managing Change: Cases and Concepts*, eds. Todd D. Jick and Maury.A. Peiperl, (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1990), 385.

³⁶ Todd D. Jick “Implementing Change,” in *Managing Change: Cases and Concepts*, eds. Todd D. Jick and Maury.A. Peiperl, (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1990), 174.

³⁷ Todd D. Jick “The Recipients of Change,” in *Managing Change: Cases and Concepts*, eds. Todd D. Jick and Maury.A. Peiperl, (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1990), 306.

aspects surrounding the implementation of change at NPS interested the team when formulating interview questions for various target groups. Common target areas for strategists included communication of the vision, creating a sense of urgency, strategic methodology, and methods for diffusing dissatisfaction. Each area focused on how the strategist translated his vision into action, and whether or not he considered different methodologies for accomplishing this objective. In addition, from the perspectives of implementors and recipients, we wanted to determine if the change strategists attempted to create an atmosphere of excitement about enacting change, or if the change was mandated through authoritative control. Other areas of interest included potential resistance, roles in the change process, cultural congruence, and effects on individual values, behaviors, and attitudes.

B. DATA GATHERING

To accumulate data, interviews were conducted using different questionnaires for each target group, eliciting specific information deemed necessary to understand the process of change at NPS. Once the interviews were completed and transcribed verbatim, a formal process of inductive thematic analysis was applied to the information using guidelines defined in Boyatzis' *Transforming Qualitative Information*.³⁸ The purpose of the formal thematic coding process served as a foundation for development of a model based on informed grounded theory. Inter-rater reliability (IRR) tests were conducted to validate the identification of themes in the transcripts.

Questionnaires were designed to elicit individual perspectives from target groups involved in the change process at NPS as contained in Appendices C, D, and E (pp. 92-94). Questions were developed with the intent to gain insight in the targeted areas described in Table 1 (p. 27), and designed so as not to lead the interviewee. The objective of the interview process was to obtain an individual perspective of the change process. Therefore, general open-ended questions were created to allow the interviewee to discuss issues regarding the change process that were important to his or her own environment. Examples include the following questions from the questionnaires:

³⁸ Richard E. Boyatzis, *Transforming Qualitative Information*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998).

1. How did the faculty respond? How did it go?
2. At the time of the change what were you thinking and feeling?

Interviews were conducted and recorded with a confidentiality clause to facilitate an open discussion in response to the questions. The study probed into sensitive areas of inquiry so particular care was taken to protect participants' confidentiality. Upon transcription, the participants' names were removed from the data. Our goal was to garner an open and personal perspective of the organizational members' experiences during the transformation process at NPS, and the organizational environment. The targeted areas listed in Table 1 (p. 27) aided in creating a protocol that would guide the interviewee in discussing his or her own perceptions regarding the realignment process.

Interview subjects were chosen by targeted selection of individuals from the change implementor and strategist groups, specifically the Deans, Institute Directors, Superintendent, and Provost. These groups needed representation to gain a clear picture of the strategy and implementation of the change process from multiple perspectives. A hand-held tape recorder was utilized to record each interview and assist in accurate transcription. An action research approach was further instituted to ensure validity of responses and establish confidence in data accuracy. The action research method³⁹ entailed providing each interview subject with a copy of the transcript including questions and responses for review. Interviewees were given the opportunity to edit or amend any statement made during the interview to ensure the accuracy and validate previous responses. Most interviewees took advantage of this opportunity, but no significant changes were made. Two follow-up interviews were briefly conducted and re-recorded to ensure the interviewee had the opportunity to add to the previous transcript. Overall, the action research technique proved successful as it added value to the data and was well received by the majority of the interviewees.


³⁹ Bob Dick, "Action Research: Action and Research," *Resource Papers in Action Research*, <<http://www.scu.edu.au/school/gcm/ar/arp/aandr.html>>, [11 December 2003].

IV. CODE DEVELOPMENT AND THEMATIC ANALYSIS

A. DATA DRIVEN APPROACH

Following the transcription process, an inductive method using thematic analysis was used to create informed grounded theory.⁴⁰ The data-driven approach was deemed appropriate, as this method allowed the coder to develop themes directly from the data. The study attempted to gain deeper insight into perspectives of the resultant change at the institution. As such, the development of data driven themes provided the greatest benefit in the development of theory. NVivo qualitative research software was utilized to assist in data management and to facilitate the development of themes. The greatest benefit derived from use of the software was its ability to search documents and group data that were assigned to various themes or labels. The process of developing the code book is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Developing the Codebook



⁴⁰ Ibid., 41.

B. PRELIMINARY CODE-BOOK DEVELOPMENT

To begin, the entire sample of interviews (N=23) was divided into the targeted groups. From the entire sample, two sub-samples of three transcripts apiece were selected. The subsamples were comprised as follows:

Subsample 1: Change Recipients – 3 transcripts (Faculty members)

Subsample 2: Change Implementors – 3 transcripts (Deans)

Change strategists were not used in creating the themes as only four members of this target group were interviewed. In addition, transcripts used to create the code would not be considered in the final data set. Since only four change strategists were interviewed, all of these transcripts were important to include in the final data set. The first subsample was examined numerous times and evaluated for common areas discussed by the interviewees.⁴¹ We focused on the values, beliefs, and behaviors, which were voiced, in order to give us clues about what the participant had experienced as a result of the change process. The first sub-sample from the change recipients' target group generated fifty-one themes. These themes were developed from the transcripts using the NVivo coding function. This function categorized them into groups identifying commonalities stemming from organizational, personal, or professional aspects of each theme. After this categorization analysis, the themes were reviewed again and similar themes were combined to form descriptive themes. The thesaurus function available in Microsoft Word was used to further describe and develop the underlying themes being voiced by interviewees. Finally, the remaining twenty-five themes were listed on chalkboards to uncover or expose hidden relationships between themes. Each theme was redefined and analyzed. The result of this process yielded a total of fifteen themes that surfaced from the first subsample. Upon further development and definition of these themes, a simplified format was applied including identification of labels, definitions, indicators, exclusions, and examples.⁴²

⁴¹ Ibid, 41-44.

⁴² Ibid., 49.

An identical approach was taken with the second sub-sample resulting in seventy-five themes, some of which were the same as those found in the first subsample. The consolidating process was repeated for the second subsample, narrowing the total to seventeen different themes in the same simplified format as used for the first subsample. Next, the two lists of themes from subsamples one and two were compared for similarities and repetition, which resulted in the combining of several themes. Upon combining the themes from the two sub-samples, a final set of 15 different themes was enhanced by assigning labels, indicators, exclusions, and examples in the final draft of the preliminary code contained in Appendix F (pp. 94-99).

C. FINAL CODEBOOK DEVELOPMENT

Two of the researchers coded the subsample of the interview transcripts according to the descriptions of the thematic categories. The two separate results were compared using a percentage agreement on presence approach in which each theme was evaluated by twice the fewest occurrences noted by either coder divided by the total number of times the theme was noted within the document, in the following IRR formula:⁴³


$$\text{Percentage agreement on presence} = \frac{2 \times (\text{no. of times both Coder A and Coder B saw it present})}{(\text{no. of times Coder A saw it present} + \text{no. of times Coder B saw it present})}$$

The goal was 80% agreement between coders. Additional coding directions were developed and agreed upon (as listed in Appendix F, pp. 94-99) to facilitate accuracy and agreement about particular examples contained in context.

Three documents from the initial sub-sample were used for additional training. Both coders proceeded to code the same documents independently and compared coding results as shown in Figure 2.

⁴³ Ibid., 155.

Figure 2 Inter-Rater Reliability Test of Codebook



This process fostered discussion and comprehension of the code. Following the coding of the first document, the results yielded refinement of the thematic code in which four themes were combined and two additional codes were redefined using the presence of themes under a different label. The same process was repeated on the second document from the first sub-sample. Following this process, an additional theme merged and combined completing the development of the final thematic code. A finalized version of the codebook is contained in Appendix F (pp 94-99).

The preliminary codebook contained twelve themes and was tested against a third transcript to ensure agreement at greater than 80% for individual themes before proceeding with the entire sample. This IRR test failed to yield the appropriate percentage agreement on all themes. Documents from the second subsample containing change implementors were used to complete the codebook. Table 2 (p. 33) lists the results from the process. *Lack of confidence in organizational leadership* resulted in .444

IRR. Despite the lower IRR, the coders agreed to include this theme in the final codebook due to the fact that it was coded infrequently (six times).

Table 2 IRR Test for Validating the Codebook

No.	THEME	IRR Score
1	Lack of Confidence in Organizational Leadership	.4444
2	Loyalty & Assurance in the Institution	.7368
3	Authoritative Positional Power and Control	.8571
4	Misalignment of Organizational Processes and Goals	.8889
5	Anxiety towards the Process of Change and External Pressures	.8696
6	Lack of Personal or Positional Power	.8889
7	Cultural Conflict	.8
8	Satisfaction with Status Quo	.9231
9	Institutional Process Ownership – Sense of Shared Purpose	.8333
10	Simpatico with the Vision and Realignment	.7568
11	Academic Insularity and Egocentricity	.7619
12	Organizational Inertia	.7692

The final sample of twenty-one transcripts was coded by each coder, but included data from two transcripts that were also used previously. These transcripts contained data from one Dean and one faculty member, but were necessary to perform appropriate analysis of the data set. Due to the small sample size, it was important to include all four Deans in the final data set in order to have representation from all four schools in analyzing the data. These transcripts were therefore independently recoded along with the remaining transcripts. Although this step is a slight departure from established practice, the importance of including the four primary change implementors was essential in formulating the informed grounded theory resultant of the study of change at NPS.

V. ANALYSIS

The result of the IRR test is shown in Table 3. The reliability scores for theme 8 (Satisfaction with the Status Quo) and theme 12 (Organizational Inertia) did not achieve the goal of 90% agreement. These themes, however, did show presence and agreement above 70% and thus can be further utilized to understand the data and contribute to the development of theory. It is important to note that these themes do not represent an all-inclusive list of the values and norms affected, but rather are indicators of those impacted as a result of the NPS realignment.

Table 3. Inter-Rater Reliability ($n=21$)

No.	THEME	TOTALS		
		Coder 1	Coder 2	IRR Score
1	Lack of Confidence in Organizational Leadership	43	51	0.91489
2	Loyalty & Assurance in the Institution	41	35	0.92105
3	Authoritative Positional Power and Control	56	47	0.91262
4	Misalignment of Organizational Processes and Goals	55	57	0.98214
5	Anxiety towards the Process of Change and External Pressures	45	41	0.95349
6	Lack of Personal or Positional Power	9	11	0.9
7	Cultural Conflict	67	65	0.98485
8	Satisfaction with Status Quo	10	16	0.76923
9	Institutional Process Ownership – Sense of Shared Purpose	66	63	0.97674
10	Simpatico with the Vision and Realignment	122	101	0.90583
11	Academic Insularity and Egocentricity	39	46	0.91765
12	Organizational Inertia	36	21	0.73684

The transcripts were divided into three target groups including change strategists, change implementors, and change recipients. The groups were then compared to one another to determine whether certain themes were more likely to be prevalent in one group or another. Using NVivo software, we generated a report of each theme per person and created a table categorized by target group as shown in Table 1 (p. 27). We investigated the possibility of patterns occurring within and across target groups. As the number of participants within each target group differed, the frequencies within each group were averaged. For example, only seven change implementors were interviewed in contrast with twelve faculty members. The averaged data enabled us to more easily compare results in order to gain insights regarding responses from respective groups.

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VI. RESULTS

The twelve themes that emerged from our data signify various perceptions of the change process and its effect at NPS. A description of each follows.

THEME 1: Lack of Confidence in Leadership

This describes the perception that leadership at NPS is weak. It also describes perceptions of distrust, doubt, and disagreement with the realignment or vision for change.

Highest Frequency: Most prevalent among change recipients.

Lowest Frequency: Least prevalent among change strategists.

Key example: “The leadership on campus does not know how universities work.”

THEME 2: Loyalty and Assurance in the Institution

This describes faith and loyalty towards NPS, the belief that the institution has value, and the belief in the organization’s mission.

Highest Frequency: Most prevalent among change strategists.

Lowest Frequency: Least prevalent among change recipients.

Key example: “NPS has a lot that it can bring to the navy and the services.”

THEME 3: Authoritative Positional Power and Control

This describes negative perceptions of the management or leadership style at NPS, and the perception that a top-down approach is being used.

Highest Frequency: Most prevalent among change strategists.

Lowest Frequency: Least prevalent among change agents.

Key example: “He’s pushed things hard and he doesn’t listen to people very well.”

THEME 4: Misalignment of Organizational Processes and Goals.

This describes perceptions of incongruence between the change process and organizational goals.

Highest Frequency: Most prevalent among change agents.

Lowest Frequency: Least prevalent among change strategists.

Key example: "...its [realignment] caused separations that hadn't been there under the old system..."

THEME 5: Anxiety toward the Process of Change and External Pressures

This describes apprehension due to perceived instability, and additional workload stemming from a perceived chaotic state at NPS while undergoing change.

Highest Frequency: Most prevalent among change strategists.

Lowest Frequency: Least prevalent among change recipients.

Key example: "I honestly don't know whether or not the change will enable the school to survive."

THEME 6: Lack of Personal or Positional Power

This describes the perception of irrelevance or a lack of involvement in the change process.

Highest Frequency: Most prevalent among change strategists.

Lowest Frequency: Least prevalent among change recipients.

Key example: "The faculty has essentially no power here."

THEME 7: Cultural Conflict

This describes conflict arising due to a clash in academic and military values, norms, behaviors, or attitudes.

Highest Frequency: Most prevalent among change strategists.

Lowest Frequency: Least prevalent among change agents.

Key example: “I didn’t have any good feeling about the military particularly.”

THEME 8: Satisfaction with Status Quo

This describes the perception that things were fine the way they were before the change.

Highest Frequency: Most prevalent among change recipients.

Lowest Frequency: Satisfaction with status quo was not mentioned by change strategists.

Key example: “I don’t know why anybody thought it was necessary to realign.”

THEME 9: Institutional Process Ownership - Sense of Shared Purpose

This describes individuals who felt part of the change process in that they were involved in facilitating the realignment either indirectly or directly.

Highest Frequency: Most prevalent among change agents.

Lowest Frequency: Least prevalent among change strategists.

Key example: “...I have interacted...and been involved.”

THEME 10: Simpatico with the Vision and Realignment

This describes understanding the need to change and remain relevant coupled with the perception that the organization is moving in the right direction.

Highest Frequency: Most prevalent among change strategists.

Lowest Frequency: Least prevalent among change recipients.

Key example: “The need for change was correctly perceived.”

THEME 11: Academic Insularity / Egocentricity

This describes selfishness and the showing of little concern for overarching objectives.

Highest Frequency: Most prevalent among change recipients

Lowest Frequency: Least prevalent among change agents.

Key example: “I try to stay insulated from that and stay out of the inevitable tension between the faculty and administration...”

THEME 12: Organizational Inertia

This describes little propensity to change or inconsequential results/effects of change initiatives.

Highest Frequency: Occurred most often in recipients.

Lowest Frequency: Not mentioned by change strategists and change agents.

Key example: “I think life goes on much as it did before.”

The frequency among each of the twelve themes defined and described in the codebook (Appendix F, pp. 94-99) is averaged and evaluated among the three target groups as shown in Table 4 (p. 41). These averaged frequencies resulted from the analysis of the data and enabled comparisons to be made between the three groups. For example, change recipients had the highest frequency (2.5 per person) for theme one, *lack of confidence in leadership*, whereas change strategists had the lowest frequency (.25 per person) for theme 1. We propose this particular result is intuitive since the leadership consists of the change strategists. They would therefore tend not to point out shortcomings in their own leadership capabilities. Further outcomes revealed by the data show similar relationships and the overall results are addressed in the Discussion section.

Table 4. Averaged Frequency of Themes per Target Group

THEMES		AVG FREQUENCY PER TARGET GROUP		
		CHANGE STRATEGISTS (n=4)	CHANGE AGENTS (n=7)	CHANGE RECIPIENTS (n=10)
1	Lack of Confidence	.25	2	2.5
2	Loyalty and Assurance in the Institution	2.5	1.29	.6
3	Authoritative Positional Power and Control	3	1.57	2
4	Misalignment of Organizational Goals	2	2.14	2.1
5	Anxiety Toward the Process of Change and External Pressures	2.5	1.43	1.2
6	Lack of Personal or Positional Power	.5	.43	.3
7	Cultural Conflict	3	1.71	2.9
8	Satisfaction with Status Quo	0	.43	.6
9	Institutional Process Ownership – Sense of Shared Purpose	2.5	3.86	1.3
10	Sympatico with the Vision and Realignment	5.75	4.86	3.9
11	Academic Insularity	1	.57	1.8
12	Organizational Inertia	0	0	1.7
	TOTAL	23	20.29	20.9

A. DISCUSSION

The themes that emerged from the transcripts were reexamined. The Superintendent's interview was also revisited in order to understand how he went about translating his vision into action. We considered his statements about the top-down approach and how he had limited time to cultivate and socialize the academicians. We propose that these statements are at the very heart of the story.⁴⁴ This led us to consider that the changes made at NPS might have impacted the values and norms of the institution's members. We propose that the change did not alter values, but rather

⁴⁴ Ellison, interview.

impacted them in some way. Therefore, in order to examine the link between these emergent themes and the change process, a thorough examination of the interaction of the dominant subcultures at NPS was necessary.

While some aspects of the academic and military subcultures aligned and complemented one another, others worked against each other and resulted in conflict.⁴⁵ For purposes of this study, conflict is defined as interpersonal clashes between the military and academic subcultures at NPS due to perceived differences in values.⁴⁶ We propose that this discord arose when these values clashed or work processes did not fit or work well together. Its presence during this process is a natural part of the human experience, and is especially common in organizations.⁴⁷ Moreover, a certain intensity of conflict is often healthy, in that it prevents stagnation, stimulates interest and curiosity, and is the root of personal and social change.⁴⁸

We propose that several aspects of the Superintendent's change process negatively impacted the academic subculture as evidenced by themes 1, 8, 9, 10, and 11 (see Table 4, p. 41). As the Admiral was a product of the military culture, his methodology was consistent with its norms and behaviors. Consequently, the realignment process and strategy were perceived to be more aligned with the military way of thinking, and therefore had much less effect on military values and attitudes than on the academic ones. While conflict between these mindsets is inevitable due to significant differences in norms, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors,⁴⁹ we propose that its detrimental effect can be mitigated as long as the common characteristics between the subcultures are sufficiently constructive. Further, when a change process affects one or more subcultures, the interaction between them is altered which we propose results in a change in the intensity of conflict between them.

⁴⁵ Charles Moskos, "The Culture of Defense," *Parameters*, vol. 31 no. 3 (Autumn 2001), 164-165.

⁴⁶ Lisa H. Pelled, "Team Diversity and Conflict: A Multivariate Analysis," *Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings*, (Madison, WI: Omni Press, 1994), 2.

⁴⁷ Shari Caudron, "Keeping team conflict alive," *Public Management*, vol. 82 no.2 (February 2000), 5-9.

⁴⁸ Mary Peterson, "Constructive Conflict," *Association Management*, vol. 25, no.1 (August 2002), 7-42.

⁴⁹ Caudron, 2.

The emergent themes indicate that the top-down, authoritative approach adopted by the Superintendent was not aligned with the academic culture at NPS. The Superintendent directed the realignment with little input from the faculty and mandated implementation in order to achieve his goals as rapidly as possible. In his opinion,

There wasn't time to socialize the faculty, do a lot of cultivating and preaching about change, and preaching about culture change. You're not going to change it by having little seminars and talking about culture changes and so forth. It has got to be driven out. It has got to be driven out year after year after year. We're driving out the core culture, the older culture, in favor of a newer culture. And interestingly enough what you find out happening is, when you put a microscope on some things where there's never been a microscope before, they change.

For a culture that valued the ability to choose its course, the lack of ownership in the process was an anathema. This was compounded by the perceived lack of a mechanism to provide feedback to the school's leadership. Several interviewed faculty members clearly disagreed with the Admiral's assessment that NPS must be realigned quickly in order to survive, and greatly resented the authoritative nature of the change process. These perceptions surfaced in the themes of *lack of confidence in leadership*, *cultural conflict*, and *authoritative positional power and control*. The pace at which the realignment effort was administered also contradicted the deliberate process orientation of the academic culture. Comments such as "the faculty here has less power than other faculties" were typical of those faculty members concerned with their relative unimportance, and surfaced in the theme of *lack of personal or positional power*.

Other aspects of the change process conflicted with the academic culture. The realignment called for a close examination of existing practices forcing some faculty to change the way it normally operated. The added emphasis on DoD applicability required a new definition of relevance. Where faculty had once been encouraged to seek out their own sponsors with their compensation tied their ability to secure funding, now the administration was telling them there were degrees of relevance. Most faculty members felt they were already conducting research relevant to the DoD, otherwise they wouldn't be receiving DoD funding. For example, one professor stated, "I think we're doing what we're supposed to do. I think our system of forcing professors to go out as entrepreneurs and bring in half their funding makes them very much aware of what's relevant to the

DoD and we do that across the campus.” Nevertheless, the Superintendent began to steer the research in a direction that he perceived as most valuable to the DoD and away from individual projects. The formation of the institutes was designed around this concept and intended to utilize faculty from disparate fields of expertise to conduct research on the most relevant DoD projects.

In the academic world, however, excellence is achieved in different disciplines through specialized research. Being told how to do their jobs was considered micromanagement by some faculty members who saw their behaviors of autonomy and individual focus threatened. The themes of *lack of confidence in leadership*, *anxiety toward the change process*, *insularity and egocentricity*, *organizational inertia*, and *satisfaction with the status quo* were consistent with these perceptions. The effort to improve the financial management of NPS also placed certain individuals under greater scrutiny. The cultural norm of independence and autonomy was viewed as being violated. Closer supervision and accountability in the form of audits were also perceived as a lack of trust by the administration in regard to the faculty. The conflict between subcultures was therefore escalated.

Another major aspect of the change process that heavily affected the academic culture was the Dean selection process. Traditionally, Deans are selected by the faculty, and are generally people who had established themselves as true academicians with the respect of their associates who select them. Deans in the past were NPS tenure track faculty, and were generally worked their way from associate professor to full professor to department chair. The Superintendent broke this tradition when he appointed four Deans from outside NPS. According to his interview, he held the belief that he would never get any change in an organization that continued to promote from within, and that continuing to do so would promote isolation and stability. By choosing the Deans personally, the Superintendent also insured that the new hires would share in his vision, thus greatly increasing the likelihood that the drive for change would be pursued. All of the new Deans had some degree of military background, and none were perceived to have had any substantial record of research. One Dean lacked a doctorate degree. This directly opposed the promotion process valued by the academic culture. Several faculty members made comments similar to the following:

“In the academic world, to be a dean is an honor that has to be earned by having been a superb professor and then usually a superb department head. To bring deans in who don’t have academic records...I mean it’s a joke. Then they get to vote on other peoples tenure when they’re not even worthy of it themselves?”

As a result, *lack of confidence in leadership, lack of personal and positional power, cultural conflict, and insularity and egocentricity* were observed.

Despite a general tendency of the interviewed faculty to chafe at the top-down style of the change process, a majority agreed with the Superintendent’s vision and had a positive view on the value of NPS as evidenced by the themes of *simpatico with the vision* and *loyalty to the institution*. While this may seem contradictory, it in fact highlights that conflict was created more by the way the Admiral went about implementing the program rather than its objectives. A minority of the interviewed faculty even supported the methods, indicating that it was “time to reinvigorate the place,” and that the “need for change was correctly perceived.” The data also suggests that different schools perceived the change process much differently, perhaps as a function of the degree of involvement members had in the process.

The military culture was impacted to a much smaller degree than the academic one. Though those individuals that identified with a military culture also considered the process authoritative, the highly centralized, team-centered, endstate-focused style was consistent with their values and norms. Where the academic culture bristled at structure and hierarchy, the military culture appears to find comfort in its familiarity and decisiveness.

B. EMERGENT THEMES

As shown above, the themes that surfaced in the transcribed interviews help to demonstrate that a change has occurred as manifest by the intensity of cultural conflict. We propose that these themes can be used by decision makers as indicators to help predict the likelihood of achieving the organization’s desired objectives. Further, they are clues to discerning which aspects of culture are affected, and may therefore provide

insight into mechanisms to restore a more favorable balance. While a certain intensity of cultural conflict is inevitable in this case and indeed healthy in some respects, too much conflict will naturally impede the change process.

We propose that eleven of the twelve emergent themes center on cultural conflict directly, and can be further classified as falling into one of four categories of the intensity of conflict within the organization. These categories, which we call factors, are *Buy-in*, *Power*, *Communication*, and *Resistance*. The remaining theme (*misalignment of organizational processes and goals*) revolves around the perception that one behavior is espoused while a contradictory one is rewarded. Emergence of this theme may be an indicator that organizational change process objectives will not be met in the manner intended. The propensity of these themes to describe the impact of the change process is central to the development of the descriptive model in the next section.

C. LIMITATIONS

The frequency data, contained in Table 4, is inconclusive due to a variety of factors. The small sample size revealed high frequencies for certain themes, and low frequencies for others within the same target group. This makes interpretation somewhat difficult. For example, theme 3, *authoritative positional power*, had an average frequency of three per person for change strategists compared to 1.57 for change agents. This implies that change strategists have a negative perspective of their own leadership style. Another example is theme 6, *lack of personal or positional power*. Table 4 shows an average frequency of .5 for change strategists compared to .3 for change recipients. This implies that the change strategists, NPS leadership, feel they have the least amount of positional power. The results of these examples are counter-intuitive. Hence, the groupings for these themes and target groups were potentially skewed. It is also important to note that each group was asked to focus on several areas within their questionnaire protocol. However, based upon the target group, the questions were slightly varied to attend to their specific experience. Each group was interviewed using different questionnaires, because different target groups within the organization had different roles

and responsibilities with regard to the change process. Finally, when a theme appears, it does not necessarily reflect that individual's perception. Instead, the potential exists where statements made during the interview represent what interviewee's heard from other organizational members.

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
VII. DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMED GROUNDED THEORY

The results provided a framework to model central issues from the coded data. In viewing the presence of several themes and the background of the organization, a narrative, which summarized the change process and its affect on the organization emerged. We propose that the intensity of cultural conflict changes within the internal environment of an organization undergoing transformation. We also propose that consideration of this is pivotal in determining the effectiveness of strategic formulation.

A. PRE-CHANGE ORGANIZATION

Prior to the change instituted by Ellison at NPS, the military and academic subcultures interacted under the organization's pre-change mission and vision as shown in Figure 3. As a result of this interaction, a certain intensity of conflict existed due to differences in values, norms, and behaviors of academic and military subcultures. The military subculture displayed results oriented, team centered, hierarchical, centralized, and structured characteristics in contrast with the academic subculture that exhibited process oriented, specialized, decentralized, independent, and individually focused characteristics.

Figure 3 Subcultural Conflict Intensity Prior to Change Process



B. THE MODEL OF ECLIPSING CULTURES

The *Model of Eclipsing Subcultures* attempts to illustrate an eclipsing effect of the military subculture upon the academic subculture during the process of organizational transformation. We propose that during the implementation of the authoritative, top-down change process, the intensity of cultural conflict increased as indicated by four cultural change factors. These cultural change factors are *power*, *communication*, *resistance*, and *buy-in*. We propose that these four cultural change factors are composed of the emerging themes found as a result of the qualitative analysis (Table 4, p. 41).

1. Power. We suggest that the emergence of this factor directly involves influence within the organization. Although this factor was not considered when formulating our target areas for interviews, the emergence of supporting themes resulted in its inclusion as a factor of cultural change. Sometimes *power* occurs within the rank or position of the individual or group, and is often indicative of the ability to bring about desired outcomes. When perceived as suffering from a *lack of power*, we found that individuals within the organization may feel unimportant or apathetic towards embracing the change. For example, one faculty member stated, "...overall I would say I didn't have much input. The faculty has, essentially no power here."⁵⁰ We propose that by empowering and involving individuals at various organizational levels during the change process, change strategists can effectively elevate perceived power and potentially minimize conflict between cultures.

2. Communication. Communication represents the overall free flow of information in the internal organization that occurs in both the formal and informal organization. Communication was another targeted area of interest common through our interview questions. Due to its emergence from the data, we suggest this factor is important to understanding indications of cultural conflict during change. The model uses this factor to signal the importance of emerging themes that encapsulate the ability to freely share information and ideas, especially in an academic environment. We submit that the presence of themes concerning communication provide strong indicators that cultural conflict may not prevent interrelationships among subcultures. However, we

⁵⁰ NPS faculty member 1, interview by authors, September 2003, tape recording, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

propose that a failure to effectively ensure open lines of communication can result in divergence of relationships and poor communication of vision to recipients. For instance, one interviewee complained that "...he's [RADM Ellison] pushed things hard and he doesn't listen to people very well."⁵¹ This symbolizes a closed communication system indicative of a lack of consideration of feedback within the formal organization.

3. Resistance. This factor is derived directly from the intent to gain insight from several questions posed in the interviews. We propose that *resistance* consists of actions or intent to avoid or oppose the process and vision for organizational change. Important consideration should be placed on norms and expectations for organizational and group behavior when evaluating and attempting to understand how to cope with *resistance* within the internal environment. Although we feel that resistance is present in most organizations attempting to implement change, the appearance of closely related themes suggests it is a strong factor signaling the affects of cultural change within the organization. As evidenced by the following statement, "I try to stay insulated from that and stay out of the inevitable tension between the faculty and administration..."⁵² recipients have become resistant by becoming more isolated instead of seeking to become involved in the process as academic norms would indicate.

4. Buy-in. Buy-in represents the degree to which individuals identify with its leadership or organizational vision. This factor was identified and is common among questionnaires seeking to understand the change process at NPS. Because it appeared in themes pointing to both positive and negative aspects, it was deemed essential to understanding the intensity of resulting conflict during the organizational change process. If proper care is not taken to involve members of the organization at each level, individuals will likely not come to believe in the vision for change, and may even become resistant, presenting roadblocks within the internal environment. Thus, as evidenced by our findings, the data suggests that achievement or failure of *buy-in* indicates a loss or rise in confidence toward leadership and the vision for change. For example, recipients


⁵¹ NPS faculty member 2, interview by authors, September 2003, tape recording, Naval Postgraduate School, Hermann Hall, Monterey, CA

⁵² NPS faculty member 3, interview by authors, October 2003, tape recording, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

responded when asked about vision for hiring new personnel from the outside, “...they’ve [Deans] had particularly little influence...they don’t really know how universities work.”⁵³ In addition, some responded, “Its time to reinvigorate the place...the need for change was correctly perceived” cementing the duality of this key factor.

Figure 4 below, depicts the relationship between the change process, the increase of the intensity of cultural conflict, and the four cultural change factors that indicate an increase of intensity has occurred.

Figure 4 Eclipsing Subcultures during Organizational Change Process



As the goal of any change process should seek to achieve its intended objectives, we submit that its effect on the intensity of cultural conflict must be considered. When

⁵³ NPS faculty member 4, interview by authors, November 2003, tape recording, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

examining the interaction between two subcultures during an organizational transformation, varying intensity of conflict may emerge as competition or rivalry toward accomplishment of a common organizational objective.⁵⁴ We propose that by understanding the effect this change process had on the intensity of cultural conflict, and what the four key cultural factors indicate about the change in intensity, managers can minimize the effect change has on the intensity of cultural conflict and prevent the disruption of critical organizational processes. We further propose that change strategists are more likely to succeed at transforming and sustaining change within organization's by anticipating and evaluating potential sources of resistance, interruption to lines of *communication*, achievement of *buy-in*, and preservation of organizational member empowerment.

⁵⁴ Daft, 178.

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VIII. RELATING THE MODEL TO EXISTING THEORY

To understand what is being depicted in the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures* during organizational transformation, it is essential to develop propositions and relationships to prior existing theory. Contrasting and complementing insights from prior research on organizational open systems theory and change management are presented. A preliminary consideration of prior scholarship in these areas provides evidence of cultural interaction and conflict present in a myriad of organizations. Upon review of this literature, we propose that a thorough understanding of the function, influence, and behavior of organizational culture is imperative to effectively implement and sustain change.

A. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND CHANGE

Organizational culture is widely viewed as a difficult but necessary aspect of managing change. Culture, as depicted in the model presented in this study, is one of eleven dimensions of organizational design.⁵⁵ As discussed in organizational systems theory, organizational dimensions are commonly divided into two types: structural and contextual. Structural dimensions are focused on internal characteristics for measuring and comparing organizations including formalization, specialization, hierarchy of authority, centralization, professionalism, and personnel ratios. In contrast, contextual dimensions embody the entire organization including size, technology, environment, goals and strategy, and culture.⁵⁶ They may indicate commitment, behavior, and ethics, and are represented as deeper reflections in the minds of individuals that make up the organization.⁵⁷ Those values, or core beliefs, that drive the organization during periods of change are largely transparent during daily activities. When an organizational transformation process opposes those basic cultural behaviors and values, the power of the existing culture emerges.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Daft, 9.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 10.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 116

⁵⁸ Jick and Peiperl, 211.

We propose that the objective of a successful change process should generate commitment and support of the vision and strategy for change. Without a belief in the organization's vision for change, change itself can not occur. Although ideas, processes, and even structures are realigned during the transformation, these changes affect the values, beliefs, and attitudes of the organizational culture. The strategic change process, as shown in our *Model of Eclipsing Cultures*, attempts to link organizational objectives with the appropriate type of change through the interaction of two organizational subcultures. The two subcultures represented in the data during the study are academic and military subcultures. These subcultures explain the complexity of organizational culture that exists in many organizations including those with very strong organizational identities.⁵⁹ Subcultures contain commonalities such as problems, goals, and experiences that individuals share. For instance, military units typically possess strong cultural identity sharing numerous experiences during training and operational deployments.⁶⁰ At NPS, the existence of other subcultures helps to uncover the presence of other values, behaviors, and beliefs that may shape the organization during change. Therefore, the influence and affect of these subcultures must be considered when developing and formulating a strategy.

To accomplish successful organizational change, we propose that leadership and change strategists must consider the type of change necessary in order to achieve intended results. Theory suggests four types of organizational change including technology change, product and service change, strategy and structural change, and cultural change as shown below in McCann's model (Figure 5).⁶¹ Organizations possess "unique configurations"⁶² of products and services, strategy and structure, culture, and technology that if appropriately balanced may translate vision into the desired organizational objectives in response to its internal and external environment.⁶³

⁵⁹ Daft, 122.

⁶⁰ Hillen, 10.


⁶¹ Daft, 135.

⁶² Ibid., 134.

⁶³ "The Congruence Model: A Roadmap for Understanding Organizational Performance," *Mercer Delta Organization Architecture and Change*, (Boston: Mercer Delta Consulting LLC, 1998), 3.

Technology changes refer to an organization's production process including knowledge and skills that when combined with a transformation strategy, bring about efficiency and improvement of techniques. Technology changes include focus on methods, processes, and work flow. Product and service changes reflect the outputs of an organization. Innovations to existing processes or new process creation in response to the environment exemplify product and service change. Strategy and structure changes are linked to the administrative domain of the organization. This administrative domain includes supervisory and management positions in the organizational structure. Changes in strategy and structure are designed to impact strategic management, control and reward systems, coordination devices and information management. Top-down, mandated change characterizes strategic or structural change while product and technology changes are frequently generated from the bottom up. Cultural changes result from changes in values, attitudes, beliefs and behavior of individuals within the organization. Cultural change targets a specific mindset or belief rather than a particular technology, structure, or product.

Figure 5 McCann's Model of Types of Strategic Change



McCann's model depicts interdependence between the four types of change that serves as a wedge for leadership to apply its vision in response to needs from the


environment. Therefore, effects present in one type of change are likely to produce effects in the others.⁶⁴ In addition, linkages between these types of change assist in understanding and choosing the type of strategic vision and leadership most likely to achieve desired organizational change objectives. Similarly, during the organizational change process, the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures* presents four factors that emerge as a result of the application of strategic vision to achieve desired organizational objectives. These change factors appear to be interdependent as the effects of change may cause overlapping subcultures. McCann's model illustrates that culture changes play a role in producing change in relation to a given environment. As developed in the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures*, strategy may attempt to target specific change types in order to achieve specific objectives. However, as the interdependence of these change types tends to produce varied effects, myriad factors and themes may emerge in response to the vision applied.

In implementing organizational change, environmental needs and strategic focus play key roles in determining the ultimate organizational objectives. In examining the subcultures involved at NPS during the realignment, a brief adaptation of Denison and Mishra's model of the *Relationship of Environment and Strategy to Corporate Culture* (1993)⁶⁵ helps to illustrate the potential conflict between organizational subcultures in achieving effectiveness.

⁶⁴ Daft, 135.

⁶⁵ Daniel R. Denison and Aneil K. Mishra, "Toward a Theory of Organizational Culture and Effectiveness," *Organization Science*, vol. 6 no. 2 (March-April 1995): 204-223.

Figure 6 Relating Environment and Strategy to Organizational Culture⁶⁶



In their model, Denison and Mishra suggest that two factors, environmental needs and strategic focus, are associated with four categories of culture. By achieving organizational fit between them, a successful balance may be maintained. *Clan culture* is defined as one that favors process ownership and participation of employees in decision making in response to rapid changes in the external environment. *Clan culture* embraces involvement of bottom up control and values employees needs first to achieve lasting commitment to the organization.⁶⁷ This strongly resembles the academic culture as previously defined and follows closely with data found in interviews. In contrast, the military culture at NPS is closely linked with a *mission culture* emphasizing a clear vision, results, and focus on meeting specific customer requirements. Through identified rewards programs and communication of desired objectives, the *mission culture* seeks a stable internal environment to achieve measurable goals and external stakeholder satisfaction.⁶⁸ Similar to the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures*, this illustrates the necessity to balance external and internal factors when developing the organization's strategic focus

⁶⁶ Ibid., 121.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 122.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 121.

and stated goals. Finally, consideration must be given toward the flexible and stable nature of opposing cultures when directly interacting in the internal environment. As evidenced by data found in this study, an organization that fails to achieve congruence between its strategic focus and environmental needs may become unstable, and ineffective,⁶⁹ resulting in an elevation in the intensity of conflict among its subcultures.

B. FACTORS OF CULTURAL CHANGE

The *Model of Eclipsing Cultures* portrays four key factors that result from the interaction of two subcultures during the implementation of an organizational change process. Data and insight gained from thematic analysis and informed grounded theory development generated these factors. These factors included *power*, *communication*, *buy-in*, and *resistance* signifying the emergence of related themes from the data. From the results of the analysis, these factors appeared to signal major themes, or indicators, common in individuals undergoing pressures and effects from various types of organizational transformation. We propose that one culture eclipsed the other, stronger indications of cultural conflict among subcultures appeared to surface. As suggested in change theory, these four factors provide insight into the internal organization and the deep-rooted feelings and beliefs of the individuals who comprise the organization.⁷⁰

1. Power

Power in organizations is largely the result of structure⁷¹ and therefore most influenced by strategic and structural changes. Positional power, or legitimate power, is present in the organization's formal, hierarchical structure. In addition, coercive power, or power to punish, is sometimes granted as positional power. Personal power may be expert or referent in nature. Referent power is generated from personal characteristics admired by peers, supervisors, or subordinates while expert power is associated with skill level in accomplishing tasks.⁷² In organizations, power is an intangible force, which

⁶⁹ Ibid., 120.

⁷⁰ Daft, 116.

⁷¹ Ibid., 181.

⁷² Ibid.

cannot be seen but can be strongly felt. During periods of uncertainty and change, shifts in power may occur resulting in departments engaging in organizational politics or the process of bargaining and negotiating used to overcome conflicts and disagreement in the internal environment.⁷³ Engaging in organizational politics may result in positive or negative forces to obtain desired objectives. Other use of organizational politics can result in self-serving activities, individual interest, and later lead to conflict and dissonance in the internal environment.⁷⁴

The impact on levels of personal and positional power appears to be an essential factor in evaluating the affects of organizational change upon internal subculture interaction. During the process of change, shifting of power distribution among groups and individuals becomes a source of nonproductive political activity stimulated by changes in the informal organization. These activities appear most significantly when core values are affected. As the change process continues, *resistance* also tends to increase when subculture values and traditions are influenced.⁷⁵

2. Communication

The change factor *communication* plays a key role in formulating change strategy to accomplish organizational objectives.⁷⁶ Present in *communication* are aspects of organizational culture as the objectives of communicating are to inform, influence attitudes and affect behavior.⁷⁷ Thus, as defined in the Strategic Model for Government Communication, analyzing situational factors and designing appropriate strategy must be considered in order to convey and accomplish organizational objectives.⁷⁸ The factor of *communication* is interdependent with other factors such as *resistance*, following similar

⁷³ Ibid., 188.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 187.

⁷⁵ David A. Nadler. *Champions of Change: How CEOs and Their Companies Are Mastering the Skills of Radical Change*, (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997), 88.

⁷⁶ Mary Young and James E. Post, "Managing to Communicate, Communicating to Manage," in *Managing Change: Cases and Concepts*, eds. Todd D. Jick and Maury.A. Peiperl, (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1990), 346.

⁷⁷ James L. Garnett, "Applying a Strategic Model to Government Communication," *Communicating for Results in Government*, (New York: Jossey-Bass, 1992), 35.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 36.

conclusions from studies that indicate strategic use of *communication* to address employees concerns. Additionally, anxiety and ineffective communication may result in increased resistance to change initiatives.⁷⁹ Recent studies indicate that in order to improve processes while simultaneously meeting the need for employee assurance and security, effective communication must be employed.⁸⁰ As illustrated in the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures*, themes that surface from the study help to reveal the effects of organizational change on the interaction of subcultures during this process. A recent study on effective communication suggests eight factors that determine the effectiveness of employee communication.⁸¹ These factors, shown in Table 2, exhibit similarities to themes that emerged from the data examined in this study. For example, two-way communication involving top and mid-level managers indicated responses such as “they didn’t listen enough” during organizational restructuring. This occurrence mirrored the presence of the theme authoritative leadership and control in the study of change at NPS. Another example that connects *communication* as a factor of change is dealing with bad news. In communicating bad news during the change process, the organizational culture valued this mechanism and it was institutionalized in formal processes and policy. The relationship between *communication* and culture suggested in Young and Post’s study supports the themes of satisfaction and process ownership that emerged from the realignment at NPS. As a result of this study by Young and Post, *communication* seems to focus upon organizational processes rather than products as its strategic target to obtain desired objectives.⁸² This explains the emergence of *communication* as a key factor in developing a strategy for implementing change.

⁷⁹ Young, 346.

⁸⁰ Young, 348.

⁸¹ Young, 346-359.

⁸² Young, 356.

Table 5. Factors that Determine Effectiveness of Employee Communications

1	The chief executive as communication champion.
2	The match between words and actions.
3	Commitment to two-way communication
4	Emphasis on face-to-face communication
5	Shared responsibility for employee communications.
6	The bad news/good news ratio.
7	Knowing customer, clients, and audiences.
8	The employee communication strategy

3. Resistance

In creating and implementing organizational change, strategists and change agents must expect and be prepared to handle resistance from recipients.⁸³ Five barriers to change, listed below, embody *resistance* during change. They are useful for understanding the emergence of themes that stem from *resistance* and cultural interaction as described in the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures*. These barriers exist at both the individual and organizational levels and can be linked to change implementation strategies.⁸⁴

- a. Excessive focus on costs
- b. Failure to perceive benefits
- c. Lack of coordination and cooperation
- d. Uncertainty avoidance
- e. Fear of loss

These five barriers serve as indications that the change strategy is not properly designed to overcome resistance within the organization. In attempting to accomplish organizational objectives depicted in the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures*, change strategy should consider the interaction of subcultures and the impact of the change upon the change factors. For example, during the implementation of change, organizational conflict may result from lack of coordination and communication. Additionally, a failure

⁸³ Daft, 149.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

to perceive benefits may discourage risk-taking and participation due to the change in rewards system.⁸⁵

Resistance also enters into culture as a normal response of individuals with a “vested interest in maintaining their perception of the current state”⁸⁶ and protecting themselves against loss of power or influence within the informal and formal organizational structure. The strength of the factor of *resistance* indicates the degree to which change impacts values of individuals within the organization. Although *resistance* may manifest as negative attitudes and behavioral difficulties, the actual occurrence of this resistance may be simply defined as frustration. It is important to consider the depth of resistance in comparison to the scope of the change facing the organization. As the scope of the change increases, the effects will be broader and deeper on individuals directly influenced by the change. Therefore, as shown in the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures*, *resistance* may appear within certain localized groups or subcultures as the intensity of the change is felt.⁸⁷

The factor of *resistance* may also surface when a change strategy is applied to an organization experiencing periods of success. Relationships in the internal organization may emerge as resistance to change if visionaries fail to consider perceived benefits. Themes of insularity and egotism, internal focus, arrogance, and complacency appeared during the study of transformation at NPS and follow typical attitudes characterizing resistant behavior found in other organizations when exposed to changes to organizational process.⁸⁸ The appearance of *resistance* when imposing change on a successful organization is referred to as the Success Syndrome. This may lead to disabled learning in which the organization can not respond to new ideas and fails to achieve the objectives set forth by the change strategy.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Jick, “The Recipients of Change,” 306.

⁸⁷ Nadler, 84.

⁸⁸ Nadler, 69-71.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 70-71.

4. Buy-in

The factor of *buy-in* attempts to capture the notion of shared vision among individuals when exposed to organizational transformation. Capturing this concept can take many forms. One method to obtain support for vision among groups is to employ a range of techniques to encourage process involvement from key players in the organization. These include participation, persuasion, incentives, and ventilation.⁹⁰ Each of these techniques contributes to gaining essential support for the change process to continue and successfully accomplish its objectives.

Participation of critical people in the process of transformation may be lengthy and seem wasted. This step, however, is extremely important in achieving overall buy-in within the internal environment. The importance of participation parallels the theme of process ownership and empowerment that appeared in the study of change at NPS. The linkage to individual values within the organizational subcultures helps to substantiate the emergence of *buy-in* as a factor of change. The persuasion technique is used to achieve buy-in from individuals who may not be critical players in designing and implementing the change. Appealing to shared values through persuasive tactics helps to ensure support for the organization's core values. Incorporating incentives, both formal and informal, present additional opportunities to accomplish buy-in. Rewards and new initiatives or the perception of increased stature within the organization effects individual behavior and aligns values and beliefs with organizational objectives. In the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures*, the indicators of belief and confidence in organizational mission and loyalty to the institution seem to embody the effects of incentives on individual values. Isolation encompasses separating important individuals who tend to resist the change initially, but may be persuaded as the transformation gathers momentum. Finally, ventilation is a technique for coping with individuals who do not favor the change and cannot adapt to the new organizational culture. This approach to achieving buy-in within the organization is highly directly in nature and directly affects individual behaviors. Themes surrounding this technique that surfaced in the study at NPS included anxiety,

⁹⁰ Ibid., 95.

lack of power, academic insularity, and authoritative leadership and control during the realignment.⁹¹

C. GOALS, POLITICS, AND CULTURAL CONFLICT

No discussion is complete without addressing the existing relationship of goals, politics, and cultural conflict during the process of organizational change. In order to exist, organizational conflict must contain three ingredients: group identification, observable group differences, and frustration.⁹² In the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures*, these three characteristics are defined as academic and military subcultures, with differentiating values of process vs. results oriented, team centered vs. individual, independent vs. structured, hierarchical vs. decentralized, and frustration exemplified from themes that surfaced from our study including *misalignment of processes*, *lack of confidence in leadership*, *lack of power*, and *academic insularity*. The cultural conflict represented at NPS can be defined as the behavior that occurs among organizational groups when participants in one group perceive the other group may interfere in accomplishing its intended objectives or expectations. Organizational conflict indicates that these subcultures clash directly or contain opposing attributes. Conflict can be confused with competition, which encompasses rivalry in the pursuit of a common objective, but conflict is more closely associated with an impediment to achieving goals.⁹³

Organizational conflict between subcultures may occur horizontally, vertically, or between various levels of the organization as exhibited at NPS. The reason for its existence is especially pertinent in our discussion relative to the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures*. In the following model (Figure 1), sources for organizational conflict include goal incompatibility, differentiation, task interdependence and limited resources.⁹⁴ Goal incompatibility represents the greatest source of conflict in most organizations.⁹⁵ As differing goals of the two subcultures, such as military and academic, the ultimate

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Daft, 178.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Daft, 179.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

objectives of each may oppose one another's intentions. The result is depicted in the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures* in which this study suggests that one group overwhelms or eclipses the other increasing the intensity of conflict. Differentiation symbolizes the differences in cognitive and emotional orientations among subcultures. For example, subcultures with an organization may differ in values, behavior, attitudes and standards of behavior and can lead to an increase in the intensity of conflict.⁹⁶ Several examples surfaced during the study and are exemplified in the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures* by the interaction between academic and military subcultures. Task interdependence signifies the dependence of one group on the other for materials, resources, and information.⁹⁷ While the academic culture depends on the military culture for institutional structure, administration, and organization, the military culture must depend on the academic culture to ensure academic excellence to prepare officers for advanced levels of leadership in future complex assignments. This need for interdependence in meeting organizational objectives increases the potential for conflict between the subcultures that appears during the transformation at NPS.⁹⁸ Finally, limited resources represent a key source of conflict in organizations. While financial needs seem always scarce, each subculture strives to maximize its use and consumption of resources in order to attain desired objectives.⁹⁹ This source of conflict appears frequently in the study of transformation at NPS, in particular in the complex negotiation for research funding and poorly aligned incentives to accomplish organizational objectives.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 54-56.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Daft, 180.

Figure 7 Sources of Conflict and Use of Rational vs. Political Model¹⁰⁰



In addition to the sources of conflict identified in Figure 1, the rational and political models help to illustrate the concept of organizational politics during which organizations adapt to accomplish objectives. For instance, when sources of conflict are low, change strategists tend to use a rational approach to decision making in an attempt to capture the “ideal” or optimal solution. Under the rational approach, goals are clearly defined, alternatives are identified, and decisions are enacted to ensure the highest probability of success. Rational decision-making features centralized power, control and efficiency.¹⁰¹ In contrast, the political model embodies the understanding that multiple groups or subcultures contain various goals, interests, and values. Therefore, power and influence are required to enact decisions. The political model seeks to employ democratic, process-driven methods, and debate in order to implement decisions.¹⁰² Use of a combination of these decision-making processes is required in most organizations. The goal of strategists during the change process is to match the best procedures for enacting change in the given environment to reach organizational objectives.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 179.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 180.

¹⁰² Ibid.

In formulating strategy for implementing organizational change, the use of political activity must also be considered. Organizational politics is defined as the activities through which individuals engage to acquire, develop, and sustain power in order to obtain preferred outcomes where uncertainty or disagreement may exist.¹⁰³ Political behavior can result in both positive and negative outcomes. As organizations change and function, conflict and uncertainty are inevitable.¹⁰⁴ Thus, politics is the tool for finding the middle ground.

As a mechanism for reaching agreement during organizational uncertainty, political activity bridges the use of the rational and political approach for decision-making. Use of politics occurs more frequently at the top of organizations as change strategists and implementors face the most uncertainty in making non-programmed decisions.¹⁰⁵ The *Carnegie Model for Decision Making*,¹⁰⁶ based on the work of Richard Cyert, James March, and Herbert Simon, suggests that both conflict and uncertainty await change strategists when confronted with organizational decisions. To further understand the operation of organizational politics, consider the three domains of political activity: structural change, management succession, and resource allocation.¹⁰⁷ These three domains closely connect with the realignment at NPS and exhibit many similarities. First, structural reorganization is centered between power and authority. Restructuring organizations directly affect tasks and change responsibilities thus impacting organizational power bases. A virtual eruption of political activity follows with negotiation and bargaining as new power bases are created. Second, institutional changes such as hiring of new leadership in key positions, promotions, and transfers generate tremendous political activity. Most significant effects occur at the top of the organization affecting trust, communication, and cooperation. Strategists frequently use hiring or promotion to strengthen alliances and coalitions by placing individuals closely allied with them in essential positions. Finally, resource allocation decisions cause constant political

¹⁰³ Ibid., 188.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993); 165-166.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 188.

activity. Decisions on organizational resources carry the ability to accomplish objectives and affect performance, salaries, and available facilities. Therefore, conflict and uncertainty will naturally surround these decisions.¹⁰⁸ The *Model of Eclipsing Cultures* depicts the conflict present in the three domains as NPS structurally reorganized, reallocated resources, and hired new key personnel. Themes abundantly appeared embodying these three domains of political activity and our model suggests their emergence through the cultural change factor *levels of power*. The interrelationship that appears between politics, conflict, and the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures* offered in this study closely resembles prior research offered herein.

Political tactics are essential mechanisms for accomplishing organizational objectives amidst uncertainty and cultural conflict. Most organizations operate with a moderate level of conflict and must adapt a methodology for attainment of goals during periods of change.¹⁰⁹ An alternative approach employs cooperation and collaboration to gain support for attaining organizational objectives. In particular, the tactics of confrontation and negotiation incorporate collaborating techniques indicative of the process of change at NPS. Confrontation exists when groups in conflict directly engage to solve disputes.¹¹⁰ Negotiation, in comparison, uses bargaining during confrontation to “systematically reach a solution.”¹¹¹ Employing these tactics will increase the respect between subcultures and enhance the future success of collaborative techniques to solve disputes.¹¹² Depicted in Table 3 are negotiating strategies using collaborative political tactics described.¹¹³ The *Model of Eclipsing Cultures* suggests a win-lose strategy was applied during the change process. As exhibited in this study, strategists at NPS forcibly applied a military culture and “eclipsed” the academic culture by forcing them into submission using threats, rigidity of position (“get out of the way or get run over by the

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 188.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 191.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 192.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

train”), *communication* by authoritative leadership, and by defining the problem as a win-lose situation (“NPS will die if we don’t change”).

Table 5 Table of Negotiating Strategies

Win-Win Strategy	Win-Lose Strategy
Define the conflict as a mutual problem.	Define the problem as a win-lose situation.
Pursue joint outcomes.	Pursue own group's outcomes.
Find creative agreements that satisfy both groups.	Force the other group into submission.
Use open, honest, and accurate, communication of groups needs, goals, and proposals.	Use deceitful, inaccurate and misleading communication of groups, needs, goals, and proposals.
Avoid threats (to reduce the other's defensiveness)	Use threats (to force submission)
Communicate flexibility of position.	Communicate high commitment (rigidity regarding one's position.

D. CHANGE, CONFLICT, AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

Two excellent models that encompass various aspects of organizations experiencing changes in vision or strategy are Nadler and Tushman’s *Organizational Congruence Model*¹¹⁴ and Michael McCaskey’s adapted by Linda Hill.¹¹⁵ The latter attempts to link group *Framework for Analyzing Work Groups* effectiveness to an organization’s context, design factors, and culture. The model draws close parallels with effectiveness in subcultures and similar interactions brought about by changes in organizational strategy. The group’s context consists of strategy, history, political/legal, and cultural systems. These directly feed into a trio of design factors, or group architecture, composed of group composition, task design and formal organization. The design factors are interrelated and interdependent suggesting a change in any one will evoke a change in the others. Within the design factors are the specific dimensions that appear to be at the root of cultural interaction during the process of change. In the group

¹¹⁴ David A. Nadler and Michael L. Tushman, “Organization, Congruence, and Effectiveness,” *Organizational Dynamics*, (New York: American Management Association, 1980), 91-106.

¹¹⁵ Hill, 16.

composition for example, demographics, interests, working styles, and values shape the subculture and influence the way it will likely react during stressful periods of organizational change. In addition, the formal organization contains the structure, reporting relationships, and reward systems/compensation that will directly influence struggles for political power and shifts in alliances that surface during transformational periods.¹¹⁶ Task design, including required interactions, activities, interdependencies, variety, and autonomy, heavily influences the organization's subculture.¹¹⁷ The presence of conflict is present in this model because of the need for task interdependence. Task interdependence is defined as the necessity to depend on others for materials, resources, or information, raises the level of coordination and requirement to share information. Thus, as the requirement for interdependence increases, the level of conflict generally follows. During the change process, conflict will likely occur when failure to agree on coordination efforts in the organization¹¹⁸ results in confusion or anxiety during communication of emergent requirements or activities.¹¹⁹ This supports similar findings illustrated in the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures* where emerging themes and factors are generated as a result of the change strategy employed during organizational transformation.

The Framework for Analyzing Work Groups also parallels aspects of the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures* in that the group culture is composed of similar conventions and components. The shared values, norms, and rituals indicative of group culture apply to the organizational subcultures experienced in the formation of the model presented in this study. This model suggests that differing subcultures may become eclipsed by stronger subcultures through the implementation of particular types of strategic change processes. The same is true of the group culture described in the Hill-McCaskey model. The fit of the design factors based on inputs from the organizational context suggests possible incompatibility with the group's culture, thus producing lower levels of shared capacity for learning, poor performance, and group ineffectiveness.

¹¹⁶ Daft, 181.

¹¹⁷ Hill, 6.

¹¹⁸ Daft, 180.

¹¹⁹ Nadler, 90.


In similar fashion, the Nadler-Tushman *Congruence Model* presents an organizational fit concept to obtain desired organizational objectives through task, informal, formal and individual factors during the transformation process. The *Congruence Model* can also be linked to power, anxiety and authoritative control during organizational change. Under conditions requiring a change in administrative structure, use of the top-down strategy typifies the organization's change process.¹²⁰ This tends to create changes in levels of power through shifting political alliances in the informal organization, implications of authoritative control in the formal organization, and increased anxiety and stress levels within individuals.¹²¹ Studies of individual behavior support these indications such as the *Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Instrument* derived from the *Five Conflict Handling Modes*¹²² (see Figure 5). The modes of handling conflict are based on two dimensions of behavior exhibited during situations of conflict: (1) assertiveness or the level which an individual attempts to satisfy personal concerns, and (2) cooperativeness, the extent to which an individual desires to satisfy others. These include competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding, and accommodating as shown in the model below (see Figure 7). Competing individuals are assertive and uncooperative while pursuing power, argumentative, and attempting to win in every situation. Accommodating symbolizes unassertiveness and cooperativeness, self-sacrifice, and yielding easily to another's point of view; it is opposite of competing. Avoiding describes an unassertive and uncooperative individual during conflict in which concerns are not addressed and issues are postponed. Collaborating captures both assertiveness and cooperativeness and is opposite of avoiding. Collaborators strive to work with others to fully satisfy concerns of both and attempt to identify creative solutions to interpersonal problems. Finally, compromising individuals seek intermediate levels of cooperativeness and assertiveness to find a mutually acceptable solution or the middle ground in handling conflict.

¹²⁰ Daft, 146.

¹²¹ Nadler, 91.

¹²² Kenneth W. Thomas and Ralph H. Kilmann, *Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument*, (n.p.: Xicom, Inc., 1974), 9.

Figure 6 The Five Conflict Handling Modes



During periods of change, individuals interviewed in the study from one subculture experienced anxiety and conflict and tended to become more assertive exhibiting competitive or collaborative behaviors. During volatile periods of change and turmoil within the internal environment, individuals from a different subculture also appeared to display unassertive characteristics of avoiding or accommodating behavior. This supports analysis from this study and the *Model of Eclipsing Cultures* that during periods of change, individuals in different subcultures may experience changes in behavior mirroring those described in the *Five Conflict Handling Modes*. In particular, the emergence of the themes *academic insularity*, *anxiety*, and *lack of power* or feelings of unimportance supported the unassertive and uncooperative conflict handling mode of avoiding. These findings support the cultural change factors of *resistance and power* as implications of the change process.

IX. REFLECTIONS

The following is a discussion of our reflections from this study. These reflections serve to illuminate what happened at NPS and attempt to answer the fundamental questions that inspired this research:

- 1) How did the Superintendent, Rear Admiral David R. Ellison, approach change at NPS?
- 2) What led him to make the change and what did he consider?
- 3) Did realignment conform to the transformational spirit of *Joint Vision 2020*?
- 4) How did it effect the environment and culture at NPS?

Our study suggests answers to all but question 3: Did the realignment conform to *Joint Vision 2020*. Our contention is that enough circumstantial evidence exists to allow us to make inferences on each of the research questions posed.

A. WHAT HAPPENED AT NPS

Ellison himself answered the questions from his perspective during his personal interview¹²³ of what led him to make the change, what he considered, and how he approached change at NPS. He stated that he was tasked with evaluating the relevancy of NPS when selected as Superintendent. He also stated that he came to the job with an open mind, equally committed to advocating for the continuity or demise of the institution. Ellison performed an exhaustive analysis in the first four months of his tenure to investigate what NPS offered, how it was perceived, what made it unique, and how effectively it conducted business. Based on this analysis, Ellison became an advocate for NPS, perceiving both its potential contribution to the Department of Defense and its precarious position if major change was delayed. His message was clear: change now or perish. In his eyes, the survival of the institution depended upon fundamental changes to the status quo in a timely manner. In this light, Ellison wasted no time mandating change and initiating his plans based on this perceived crisis. Roughly half of the professors

¹²³ Ellison, interview.

interviewed had doubts that the school's continued existence was at stake. This evidence that a sense of urgency was not established leads us to the conclusion that had a sense of urgency been properly established throughout the entire organization, the Admiral would not have had to jump-start the transformation through sheer force of will.

Admiral Ellison was responsible for creating a vision for the future of NPS once he identified the need for changing its nature, and the degree of urgency. He sought to cultivate a world class, customized educational system focused on meeting the challenges and military requirements of the future. His strategy to achieve this vision hinged on the restructuring of the institution through the formation of four new Schools and the creation of three Institutes, with a renewed focus on serving the DoD customer. The vision was vague in certain details, but was clear in that it effectively portrayed a mental picture of what its future should look like, and the direction it needed to follow in order to get there. There was also a simple quality to the vision, making it easy to understand and follow.

The Admiral appeared to have an innate understanding of the roles in the change process, as evident by his discussions regarding past change theory versus current change theory. He also recognized early in the process that a strong group of change agents was required to ensure that his vision was enacted.¹²⁴ In order for this change to move faster and easier, the change strategist, Ellison, selected individuals that would execute his wishes and take on the role of change implementors. From his perspective, the most critical of these agents were the Deans of the schools and institutes, selected for both their military and academic backgrounds, and their similar beliefs about the impending fate of NPS if something did not change quickly. Admiral Ellison placed tremendous importance on bringing in "new blood" in order to encourage new ways of thinking. We submit that these selections showed excellent fit with the Admiral's vision for the school. To better serve the needs of the DoD he placed military minded people from outside the school (GSOIS excepted) rather than pure academics into positions of authority. We propose this ultimately undermined the values of the academic culture by short circuiting their cherished promotion process. This also indicates that the Superintendent was attempting to drive out the old culture. The new Deans were given more power than their

¹²⁴ Ibid.

predecessors to shape their schools in the way they saw fit. However, this empowerment was only given after the Admiral saw what the vision for their school was, what their specific strategic plan was, and then approved it. This appears to have resulted in restrained power and authority to carry out these plans as they saw fit as evidenced by statements from the transcripts.

We were unable to discern whether the realignment conformed to the transformational spirit of *Joint Vision 2020*. This is because after reviewing faculty transcripts regarding this specific question from the faculty questionnaire (Appendix C, p. 92), it was determined that 66.67% of faculty members interviewed were unfamiliar with the document. This resulted in little to no data that could substantiate an answer to this question. It is our opinion however, that NPS is aligned with Joint Vision 2020 as evidenced by the establishment of institutes whose purpose is to integrate faculty and students in order to work on advanced concepts and capabilities. This integration is meant to ensure that U.S. forces remain dominant across the full spectrum of military operations as called for in the Joint Vision 2020 document.¹²⁵

In answering the question of how the change affected the environment and culture at NPS, evidence suggests that faculty in each school viewed the new appointments of Deans differently from one another. For example, faculty from SIGS felt that they were active participants in the selection of their Dean, as the Superintendent approved their recommendations. But this perception of process ownership only exists because the faculty from SIGS saw that the painful process of change was inevitable. Armed with this insight, they decided to get out ahead of the change and submit proposals they felt he would approve. One SIGS faculty member stated that though they were never actually told the reason why the change was happening, they knew it was going to happen. So their belief was that if they came up with a preferred solution, and handed it to the busy policy maker, he would most likely take it. Their goal was to minimize damage that they perceived would be done by the change. In this way they were able to choose their Dean and avoid what had happened to GSOIS where the Admiral replaced the school's nominee for Dean.

¹²⁵ Ellison, "What NPS Means to DoD. A view to the Future," 8.

It is our belief that while Rear Admiral Ellison communicated his vision on several occasions, including an all hands Superintendent's Guest Lecture (SGL); much more could have been done to institutionalize it at the lower levels. While some professors had a good understanding of what the Admiral was hoping to accomplish, the interviews indicate that the majority of faculty members did not know why the change was taking place. In fact, some faculty members were clearly skeptical about the motives behind the change and believed strongly that the transformation was unnecessary. As indicated by several professors, half of their compensation was a result of soliciting research work from the DoD. They also indicated the belief that they were serving their customer appropriately and that DoD focus was already effectively institutionalized. Only one professor said that the Admiral spoke with them personally about why the change was necessary. Therefore we submit that a breakdown in communication clearly existed as the word from above appears to have been ineffectively passed to those most responsible for making the change take place and "stick."

This lack of communication between the Superintendent and faculty can be partially explained by the Admiral himself. He perceived the situation at NPS as dire enough that the traditional process of bringing everyone together to voice their opinions and to create buy-in would take far too long. In his opinion, change was needed immediately, and valuable time would be wasted convincing people that a change that was going to happen anyway was in the organization's best interest. The issue can also be framed using Peter Senge's application of mental models, which describes the deeply held internal images of how the world works. These images can limit all of us familiar ways of thinking and acting.¹²⁶ For instance, the faculty at NPS is composed of highly intelligent academics spread across diverse fields of study and curricula, each with deeply ingrained beliefs of how the world works. Their professional background, experience, culture, values, and overall way of doing things colored their individual perspectives and makes breaking their mental models extremely difficult. We submit that if Ellison's view of urgency was correct, avoiding the daunting task of breaching these strongly held mental models was appropriate. Conversely, Ellison's own mental model of what is best

¹²⁶ Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 174-186.

for NPS in the future may also be incomplete. By failing to consider input of the groups most responsible for implementing change, as well as those closest to the transformation effort, he failed to capitalize on years of experience possibly resulting in a loss of valuable insight.

Once again, the Superintendent gave his Deans considerable leeway in instituting his vision as long as he approved of their strategic plan. Because the Admiral pursued an accelerated process, obstacles to change, such as the former Deans, were removed. Most professors, however, felt that their jobs were unaffected, and that their roles remained the same despite the transformation process. Almost every professor commented on the top down nature of change implementation, where realignment was mandated and there was no choice or input in the matter. Therefore a perceptions of lost autonomy rather than empowerment resulted.

Overall, it is our contention that Rear Admiral Ellison and his change implementors forced and executed the steps necessary to transform NPS. That said, there appears to be a gross misalignment of long-term goals as evidenced from the themes. The Admiral's vision of military relevance and academic excellence are diametrically opposed. We suggest that this institution will not reach the long term goals of military relevance and academic excellence set by the Admiral because in order for there to be academic excellence, one must have civilian faculty who are leaders in their disciplines. These disciplines are not always aligned with the DoD-relevant issues the Admiral believes are important. In order for NPS to remain a place of learning where human potential is transformed and shaped, wisdom of academic culture is passed from one generation to the next, and new knowledge that creates our future is produced, it is important for scholarship and teaching to remain a top priority.¹²⁷ That being said, the quality and commitment of the faculty determine the excellence of the academic programs at NPS.¹²⁸ By forcing faculty to conduct research in areas that are solely relevant to the DoD, the Admiral is in effect steering faculty away from academic excellence that requires discipline specialization.

¹²⁷ Duderstadt, 10.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

Looking back at the overall transformation effort at NPS, certain aspects of the organizational structure coupled with individual personalities led us to believe that the change may not endure once Admiral Ellison turns over his command. Additionally, a new and extremely relevant question surfaced during our study. Was NPS indeed in danger of dying? We have not been able to answer this question because we have been unable to interview top-level Navy officials who could verify or dispute the Admiral's perception. The fact that he worked so closely with top decision makers in Washington makes him the resident expert regarding their mindset prior to his arrival at NPS. We therefore make the assumption that Admiral Ellison's perception that NPS was dying is correct though this remains unverified. We believe however, the answer to this question provides the key to ultimately determining whether the Admiral's change process was indeed the optimal approach. If NPS was not in danger of dying, the change process implemented at this institution defies everything we have learned is required for change to be successful and sustainable. From translating vision into action through effective *communication*, achieving buy in through means of ensuring a high level of process ownership, or applying the Ten Commandments¹²⁹ of implementing change, it is clear that many of these processes were ignored because of the Admiral's belief that there wasn't time to incorporate these tactics into his strategy. It is arguable that regardless of the perceived crisis, these elements of the change process are critical to effectively implementing a change that will result in the realization of his vision and long-term goals.

Knowing the perception decision makers in Washington D.C. held regarding NPS coupled with his own perception regarding the nature of the academic culture, was there any other way he could have implemented the change as quickly as he did? Arguably, much of the "foot dragging" that appeared to exist as a result of the change process could have avoided if Ellison had conducted an extensive Appreciative Inquiry. An Appreciative Inquiry is a cooperative process to change that focuses on valuing what's

¹²⁹ Jick and Peiperl, 177.

been effective for an organization in the past; the best of ones organization.¹³⁰ The process is meant to enhance well-being in the workplace, as well as give life to and sustain the organization during change.¹³¹ For instance, the Dean of GSBPP conducted a reduced version of a weeklong Appreciative Inquiry for his school.¹³² He started with a faculty offsite and gave a talk to the faculty in order to give them his thoughts on what it was he had observed about them and about the school. He stated that he asked them to participate in an exercise to talk about themselves and see where they were going. He then proceeded to form task forces charged with developing a strategic plan, addressing the organizational component of the school, outlining what the function of the administrative leadership should be, and developing performance and work expectations. Through conducting an Appreciative Inquiry, the Dean took steps derived to instill and infuse value in the change process itself using faculty from inside the organization. The Superintendent did form task groups to develop similar plans, but he did this by using only staff members. In doing so, he did not allow for existing faculty members to bring out “ghosts” that existed at NPS. Therefore, faculty members were unable to voice what they liked or disliked about the institution. The counterargument to this is that if the Admirals perception was appropriate, and NPS was in danger of being closed, the Superintendent’s approach was correct. In that case, using a top-down approach is appropriate because as the top manager, he has the responsibility to direct the change.¹³³ However, it appears the academic culture, for the most part, did not share in his perception of an existing crisis. We believe that though this is an important aspect of successful change, it is not surprising since the Admiral was not concerned with establishing a sense of urgency to begin with.

¹³⁰ Leslie Sekerka, “Exploring Appreciative Inquiry: A Comparison of Positive and Problem Based Organizational Change and Development Approaches in the Workplace,” (Ph.D. diss., Case Western Reserve University, 2002), 42.

¹³¹ Ibid., 249.

¹³² Dr. Douglas Brook, Dean of Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, interview by authors, October 6, 2003, tape recording, Naval Postgraduate School, Ingersoll Hall, Monterey, CA..

¹³³ Daft, 145.

Upon further examination of the transcripts, we submit that the Deans at NPS are caught in the “middle space” that pulls them between the administration and the faculty.¹³⁴ On one hand the priorities of the Superintendent’s staff does all its work focused upwards and then push the requirements down while purely focusing on the outcome. On the other hand, faculty pushed their demands up and the Deans end up being caught in the middle assuming the role of a traffic cop. Applying Barry Oshry’s “Converting Middle Powerlessness to Middle Power: A Systems Approach”¹³⁵, the Deans are effectively disempowered. This disempowerment is amplified by the fact that there are no formalized duties and responsibilities for the Deans and the fact they are not provided a staff of their own. This results in a system where the Deans are very responsible, but lack real authority to implement changes or carry out tasking because they have not been given the resources. We see this as a real flaw in the organizational structure.

Finally, it is our belief that the failure to capture the hearts and minds of the faculty by effectively diffusing dissatisfaction may ultimately prove to be the difference between eventual success, or failure of the Superintendent’s vision. While Ellison clearly felt a need for change based on his own dissatisfaction, it appears, at least at this time, that he failed to effectively diffuse dissatisfaction throughout the entire organization. “When leaders jump directly from being dissatisfied to imposing new operating models, they fail to generate any real commitment to change.”¹³⁶ Top-down commands are the norm in any military organization. However, Ellison was not dealing with a typical military organization. The mandated changes implemented from top management violated the notion of free choice among many faculty members. Many of the faculty members interviewed lacked a sense of ownership of the change process itself. This perceived lack of ownership on behalf of the faculty ultimately impedes their choice to adopt new behaviors required to make lasting change successful.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ Jick and Peiperl, 403.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 404.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 115.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 119.

Though the Superintendent's perception that there was no time to convince people of the necessity for change may be correct, the apparent skepticism on behalf of certain faculty members about his motives indicates a high probability that an unhealthy level of cultural conflict exists. To date, it would appear this level of conflict persists, thus the approach to the implementation process borders on failure to build trust and confidence within the organization. Though not a change objective, the existence of a lack of trust and confidence only serves to amplify the level of unhealthy conflict present due to the forced nature of the change. The majority of faculty interviewed failed to perceive an urgent and obvious need for change, with many perceptions emphasizing that no "real" change has occurred at all.

When applying Bert A. Spector's "strategies for diffusing dissatisfaction"¹³⁸ to the change efforts analyzed at NPS, it was apparent that the sharing of competitive information was a weak link. By failing to properly disseminate pertinent information to lower levels of the NPS organization, it would appear that the Admiral failed to achieve maximum buy-in. Since the faculty we interviewed did not buy-in to the need for change, coupled with the lack of a sense of urgency, does not mean the Superintendent failed in his attempts to implement change. It does imply, however, that his changes may not be permanent and therefore his vision for NPS may not ultimately be realized.

B. WHAT NOW?

During the change process, NPS endured a volatile internal environment brought about as a result of structural realignment, and increased subcultural interaction. This caused an increase in the intensity of conflict between subcultures that must be fully considered by the new administration. By slowing down the process of continuous change, an operational pause would allow the changes that were instituted under RADM Ellison to catch up with the organizational processes at work. A complete standard operating procedures (SOP) manual and a concise formal organization must be defined to. Additionally, actions should be taken to re-engage the faculty in the organizational operations of NPS. For example, the faculty council has virtually disintegrated and must

¹³⁸ Ibid., 115.

once again be empowered and encouraged to ensure faculty participation. Without this participation, the new administration will lose an incredible resource by which to accomplish its organizational objectives.

The next step should encompass the empowerment of Deans. Although they were given some freedom to develop the new strategy for their respective schools, they were given little power over true decision-making. As one Dean mentioned, responsibility was delegated, but without the authority to accomplish the objectives. Finally, the new administration should attempt to create an atmosphere of trust and confidence.

During a crisis, there is no room for democracy due to the time-consuming nature of consensus. An administration must exercise firm, decisive leadership to successfully implement the process of transformation within time constraints. Now that the first stage of the change process has taken effect, it is essential to regroup and build consensus and support from the recipients, and truly empower the change implementers. Key players within the informal organization must also be brought in using methods of persuasion or collaboration as described in this study. By empowering and rejuvenating the informal organization and clarifying formal organizational processes, the new administration can take positive steps toward sustaining the momentum for change and reaching intended goals for future organizational success.

X. CONCLUSION

Based on the data collected from our study, we propose that change processes implemented across an organization ultimately affects subcultures and the intensity of cultural conflict between them. In the case of NPS, forced change negatively impacted the existing academic culture in that it opposed the fundamental aspects of that culture. We propose that this resulted in an increase of the intensity of cultural conflict between the military and academic cultures that must work together in order to provide both military relevance and academic excellence.

The *Model of Eclipsing Cultures* was created from 12 emergent themes found throughout twenty-three interviews. These themes helped paint a picture of how the intensity of cultural conflict present in any organization can be positively or negatively impacted as a result of change. This model goes on to provide a visual explanation of how certain cultural change factors embody specific indicators. We propose these indicators reflect the impact of change strategy on fundamental aspects of organizational subcultures.

Future research should attempt to consider several pertinent areas of inquiry, which emerged from our study.

RESEARCH QUESTION

Do qualities of a change process that oppose fundamental aspects of a given organizational sub-culture, result in an increase in the intensity of cultural conflict within that organization?

Sub Research Questions



1. If themes emerge that exhibit high levels of *resistance* during organizational change, do low levels of *buy-in*, *power*, and *communication* exist?
2. If themes emerge that exhibit low levels of *power* during organizational change, does this mean that an increase in the level of *resistance* coupled with a low level of *buy-in* exist?

3. If themes emerge that exhibit a high level of *communication* during organizational change, does this mean a low level of *resistance* coupled with a high level of *buy-in* exist?
4. If themes emerge that exhibit a high level of *buy-in* during organizational change, does this mean that a high level of *communication and power* coupled with a low level of *resistance* exist?

From this study we were able to create a theory that contributes to the compendium of organizational change and developed literature. Interesting to our final analysis was finding that through the process of developing our own theory, we actually helped to substantiate existing theory that has been primarily deemed highly relevant to organizational change scholarship. It is our belief that this further affirmation of theory, combined with new areas for research inquiry, creates exciting avenues for future investigation. Additionally, we believe that we have provided an important investigation that helped to describe what happened at NPS during the transformation. This information can be beneficial to the future leadership and organizational members of this institution.

APPENDIX A. NPS ORGANIZATION CHART AND STRATEGY FOR REALIGNMENT

Naval Postgraduate School Organization Chart



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APPENDIX B. SUPERINTENDENT'S PLAN FOR REALIGNMENT



The Opportunity

NPS was perceived as:

1. an inward looking enclave in Monterey, CA.
2. lacking credible fiscal oversight



The Strategy

Demonstrate the value added of NPS:

- Published NIP articles describing a REA
- Transitioned to a Corporate University
- Developed a matrix organization
- Brought in new Deans from the outside
- Quickly transitioned to more blended academic programs
- Realigned research efforts with Sea Power 21
- Embedded NPS in the mainstream of unified/fleet efforts
- Encouraged DOD, Unified, OPNAV, Fleet VIP's to visit



The Strategy (contd.)

2. Dispel fiscal skepticism and insure fiscal integrity:
 - A. Established a flat organization of quality administrators
 - B. Challenged all the bureaucratic assumptions
 - C. Leveraged the resources of others through partnerships
 - D. Changed organizational processes
 - E. Subjected the organization to multiple audits
 - F. Held non-Navy customers accountable for support
 - G. Focused resources on the academic mission
 - H. Integrated with mainline Navy programs



The Result

1. Recognition of the value added of NPS is producing more students:
 - A. International students in degree/short course programs
 - B. Air Force students in our master's degree programs
 - C. Army students in resident and DL programs
 - D. Homeland Security Department students in our blended educational programs
 - E. DOD civilian students in our DL programs
 - F. Speculation of more Navy students



The Result (contd.)

1. Recognition of verified fiscal integrity has produced more mission dollars:
 - A. Faculty workload dollars were increased
 - B. Dollars are programmed for EMBA and IP community academic programs
 - C. DOD is providing significant infrastructure support dollars and N8 is supporting the highly valued fleet RSEP
 - D. Congress continues to add CDTEMS dollars



The Challenge & Unfinished Business

The challenge has become:

- A. Managing change in what is now a growth environment

Unfinished business: Focus on the "right" missions

- A. Endeavor to stimulate change in Navy culture
- B. Spin off those functions that can be done elsewhere
- C. Continue to re-engineer internal processes

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APPENDIX C. CHANGE RECIPIENTS QUESTIONNAIRE

Why do you think NPS realigned recently? In your opinion was it necessary? Favorable or unfavorable?

Why?

Do you know what Joint Vision 2020 is? If so, please describe.

Was the change congruent with the environment and culture at NPS?

If not, why?

Has the realignment affected the values of the faculty at NPS? If so how? If not, why?

Has the realignment affected the values of the students at NPS? If so how? If not, why?

Do you think change has occurred at NPS? If yes, what tells you that change has occurred?

Do you think that the institution has reorganized? If yes, is that the main feature of the change?

Did you experience a change in your role as a faculty member? If yes, can you describe this please?

At the time of the change, what were you thinking and feeling?

Were you a part of the process?

What do think is necessary in the future for NPS to survive as a valuable asset while fitting into the unique structure and culture of DoD?

What other thoughts do you have about your experience as a member of an organization, as you were present during this process?

**For us to consider.....According to those you've interviewed, is the Superintendent's vision for the future of NPS correct?*

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APPENDIX D. CHANGE IMPLEMENTORS QUESTIONNAIRE

What is your perception of RADM Ellison's vision for NPS regarding realignment and transformation?

Why do you think you were selected as Dean?

What do you think your role is in transforming the organization?

What direction, if any, were you given from the Superintendent or anyone else?

How did you proceed in creating the change within the organization?

Was this change congruent with the environment and culture at NPS?

What did you hope for as you unveiled your plan to the faculty?

How did the faculty respond? How did it go?

How would you grade the progress of realignment and transformation at NPS to date?

Has the change impacted cross-institutional relationships?

Has the realignment impacted institutional values or the culture at NPS? How?

Given that NPS is a non-traditional academic institution, what would it look like to you if we were completely successful? What would it take to get there, and is it compatible with survivability?

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APPENDIX E. RADM ELLISON QUESTIONNAIRE

The following questions will function as the basis of the interview. These questions are designed to gain a broad understanding and appreciation of the situation before, during, and after change occurred here at the Naval Postgraduate School. It is vital to comprehend the leader's feelings, expectations, and vision when undertaking such a task. In response to the answers provided to these questions, additional points may warrant clarification and/or follow-up questions in order to gain a clear understanding from a strategic decision maker's point of view.

I. Background:

- a. What led you to realize that a change was necessary at NPS?
- b. Think back to when this came about. What was happening at the time in the Navy, DoD and here at NPS?

II. Change Agents:

- a. Upon your decision to begin the change process, who did you select as your change agents, i.e. who was the team that you chose to make this happen and why did you choose them?
- b. What guidance did you give them, if any?

III. The Process

- a. How did it go? What happened?
- b. How did you know this, what represents this outcome to you?

IV. Now and the future.

- a. After beginning this journey, what is your perception of NPS now?
- b. What is necessary in the future to keep NPS aligned with DoD transformation and the goals of *Joint Vision 2020*?

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APPENDIX F. THEMATIC CODE

THEME		DESCRIPTION
1	<i>Lack of Confidence in Leadership</i> Keywords: • Doubt • Poor leadership • Weak • Incompetent	<i>Definition:</i> Weak leadership, distrust, doubt, skepticism of future, unhappy with institutional processes, disagreement with realignment and vision for change. Leadership often undermines or circumvents the change process. <i>Indicators:</i> Feelings of cynicism, doubt, non-support, exhibits disrespect or displeasure with higher authority, not representative of majority, incompetence in leading an institution, lack of academic experience, unsure of extent of authority, the voice of the faculty not represented, "...the vision is probably going to change anyway with the next Admiral," "wait out the Superintendent." Disagreement with the vision and realignment. <i>Exclusions:</i> Leadership concerns external to NPS and its perceptions of value, significance. <i>Examples:</i> "The civilian leadership on the campus has been poor in the last 10 years..." lack of any academic or research experience "they've had particularly little influence," "they don't really know how universities work," "the people that have been chosen are not capable." "...we've got weak academic leadership."
2	<i>Loyalty and Assurance in the Institution</i> Keywords: • Loyalty • Value or valuable • Significance • Purpose	<i>Definition:</i> Faith and loyalty towards organization. Believes in the future success of the institution and sees value in what the organization represents. Focuses on the value of the institution both as an academic entity and to the military. Identifies with the inherent purpose of NPS, i.e. its mission. <i>Indicators:</i> Optimism, pride, and a positive outlook for the future of the institution. Communicates personal perception of institutional worth, meaning, and significance. Believes Navy or Washington leadership lacks understanding or awareness concerning false perceptions of NPS, its purpose and its value. <i>Exclusion:</i> Agreement with the vision for change and success of realignment, faith in leadership. <i>Examples:</i> "... NPS has a lot that it can bring to the navy and the services." "I think the institute is enormously valuable" "...I think its very important to have a solid graduate program in the military." "...Convince the navy of the value of this institution to the navy." "I think the pieces are there for a strong future."
3	<i>Authoritative Positional Power and Control</i> Keywords: • Authoritative • Micro-management • Authoritative • Control	<i>Definition:</i> Negative perspective on management or leadership style, micro-managing, too involved in lower level decision making, controlling, centralized, complete control from the top. <i>Indicators:</i> Forced change, failure to listen or accept feedback, micro-manager, strong personality. <i>Exclusion:</i> Not in reference to decision-making or personal attacks. <i>Examples:</i> "...getting down to too low a level inside the school." "...too detailed a level of involvement." "...injects himself in too many decisions." "He never collaborates with people." "...he's pushed things hard and he doesn't listen to people very well." "He is always in this send mode instead of receive mode." "not a very good listener." "...forced [change] on the organization."
4	<i>Misalignment of Organizational Processes and Goals</i> Keywords: • Incongruence • Misaligned • Discouragement • Interference	<i>Definition:</i> As a result of the realignment, actions are incongruent from organizational goals. Incentives are misaligned - discourages working together on research/curriculum and project development. Structural in nature, causes a unintended divergence in academic relationships <i>Indicators:</i> Vision fails to achieve its desired outcome due to poorly developed processes, compensation structures and interference with internal relationships. Organizational processes are not aligned with desired outcomes. Separation of functions added by new four-school system drives a wedge between academic departments and programs. Perceived interference with academic freedom to work with other departments on projects and research. Certain courses only offered to certain students, no communication between curriculums and schools. <i>Exclusion:</i> Culture conflicts between military and academic values <i>Examples:</i> "...the school is in certain state of internal turmoil..." "we were grouped with the wrong set." "...business school is kept separate from the others" "...the business school... was an example of a restructuring that produced bigger divisions..." "...it's [realignment] caused separations that hadn't been there under the old system..."

5	<i>Anxiety toward the Process of Change and External Pressures</i> Keywords: • Concern • Worry • Turmoil • Chaos	Definition: Apprehension toward the chaotic state of the institution while undergoing change such as organizational instability and additional workload. Uncertainty, future implications, continuous changeover of leadership, external pressures and expectations causes instability. Indicators: Expresses feelings of uneasiness, threatened, or worried. Any instance of refusal to directly address a question. Look for references to survival, unreasonable expectations or pressure from external sources and stakeholders. Believes Navy or Washington leadership lacks understanding or awareness concerning false perceptions of NPS, its purpose and its value. Conveys feelings of discomfort regarding change or too much change, additional workload or hassle, and loss of academic or institutional value. References to BRAC, negative feelings toward recent “DoD transformation” initiatives. Exclusion: These people are not confused by the new organization or disagree with the vision, they are reasonably apprehensive about the effects on the institution and themselves. Examples: “I honestly don’t know whether or not the change will enable the school to survive.” “concern within parts of the campus” “state of turmoil” “...can we survive this BRAC process?” “The new Superintendent will likely bring additional change upon arrival.” “centrifugal forces of worry.”
6	<i>Lack of Personal or Positional Power</i> Keywords: • Power • Unimportance • Stuck • No authority	Definition: Feelings of irrelevance, never asked, responsibility without authority, little freedom to operate, feels pressure from above and below due to lack of positional and personal power Indicators: Convey feelings of lack of involvement in decision-making process, lack of empowerment or unimportance. Specific mention of lack or loss of power. Exclusion: Lacking faith in institutional leadership. Examples: “...overall I would say I didn’t have much input.” “The faculty has, essentially no power here.” “At the navy school, the faculty have less power than other faculties,” “stuck in the middle”
7	<i>Cultural Conflict</i> Keywords: • Military vs. academic • Mixed culture • “Mezzanine”	Definition: Conflict arising in either the external or internal environment in which NPS, academic and military values clash, differences appear in values and goals, or methodology does not fit or work well together. Indicators: differing views of educational responsibility. Value based not structurally based. Use of “they” (for military) and “we” as academics. Mention of “the Mezzanine” or “Mezzanine leadership,” “Us versus them,” Academic values are not respected as compared to other institutions. Exclusion: Superintendent’s leadership style, structural misalignment of institutional processes Examples: “...I didn’t have any good feeling about the military particularly.” “There is not one culture at NPS. There are three cultures.” “...you’ve got three things, three entities, there’s friction between them.” “The Navy thinks....but the academic culture thinks...” “...the case in the academic world...” “another whole level of management on the mezzanine.”
8	<i>Satisfaction with Status Quo</i> Keywords: • Unnecessary • Disagreement • Satisfied • Fine	Definition: Happy with the way things are, things are fine. Individual embraces the pre-change climate. Lacks a sense of urgency to enact any change or resists embracing the new vision. Indicators: Why change? Believes pre-change structure sufficient in satisfying needs of DoD. Displays no sense of urgency, disagrees with the need for realignment. Exclusion: Apathetic, uniformed, egocentric. Examples: “...it was unnecessary.” “not...the first realignment we have had over the years...” “...life goes on much as it did before.” “...a minority of the faculty...thought some changes were needed.” “...have a pleasant time at PG school, you’ll go there for three years and then you’ll leave and nothing will have changed.” “I definitely don’t think it was necessary from my perspective.” “I don’t know why anybody thought it was necessary to realign.”

9	<i>Institutional Process Ownership - Sense of Shared Purpose</i> Keywords: • Empowered • Teamwork • Together • Interdisciplinary	<i>Definition:</i> Individual feels part of the process, part of the organization, has a say or is involved in facilitating the realignment either indirectly by doing a good job or directly as a change agent from a position of formal or informal authority. The realignment has enhanced both formal and informal organizational relationships and communication among individuals at various levels within the organization. <i>Indicators:</i> Unity toward common good of the school, played a role in the change process, able to influence the change in his/her own way, feelings of empowerment, change has improved or increased interdisciplinary relationships. <i>Exclusion:</i> Evaluation of overall change process, agreement with vision <i>Examples:</i> "...I have interacted...and been involved." "...I proposed a major reorganization of the whole division." "I was on the committee," "empowered process ownership," "People are thinking a bit more broadly," "well connected with other departments."
10	<i>Simpatico with the Vision and Realignment</i> Keywords: • Corporate University • Restatement of Vision • Effective Leadership	<i>Definition:</i> Understanding the need to change and remain relevant agreement with the Superintendent, market and promote the institution abroad. Includes dollar conscious (fiscal responsibility), necessary decision to preserve the existence of the school and a need for interdisciplinary studies/differentiation from civilian universities. Believes that the organization is moving in the right direction. Instilled a sense of urgency within the organization. <i>Indicators:</i> The corporate "university concept" mentioned in positive context, individual possesses the big picture, supportive of long term goals. A sense of urgency is present with expressed relief or gladness that the institution is moving forward. Mention of "win-win" situation, restating the vision for change in positive context, agreement with the Superintendent's leadership style, actions, or correct communication and implementation of vision. <i>Exclusion:</i> This does not cite examples of observed behavior of interdisciplinary applications, only agreement that the vision is a positive change and the leadership was correctly applied. <i>Examples:</i> "...each of the institutes is aligned....with some part of the navy's war fighting organization structure," "buy in with the general vision," "Its time to reinvigorate the place," "the need for change was correctly perceived," "the Superintendent saw very clearly and I think communicated that pretty effectively," "it was very critical that he grab the bull by the horns and go forward."
11	<i>Academic Insularity or Egocentricity</i> Keywords: • Insular • Individual • Apathy • Indifference	<i>Definition:</i> Blinkered, insular point of view; showing little concern for overarching institutional goals; individual needs or field of study are more important to this person, selfishness - main concern is with self-gratification/research, short-sighted viewpoint. <i>Indicators:</i> Apathy, indifference, serving personal needs. Inward-focused, connotes "individual or individualism," constant reference or use of "I" where a team effort or "we" could have been used. No initiative to become involved in the organization or processes, disinterest or avoiding participation. Almost outright apathetic towards the change. . <i>Exclusion:</i> Statements of fact. <i>Examples:</i> "I don't care." "It doesn't affect me." "I try to stay insulated from that and stay out of the inevitable tension between the faculty and administration..." "...I'm indifferent." "...it was a hassle to the people involved..." "I'm gonna do it anyway because that's what I do."
12	<i>Organizational Inertia</i> Keywords: • Same • Nothing has changed. • No difference	<i>Definition:</i> No propensity to change, inconsequential result or effects of change initiatives. No momentum or obvious movement toward changing of values, culture, or feelings about vision. Organizational relationships have remained the same. <i>Indicators:</i> The individual is expressing a factual observation to the best of his/her knowledge. No affects in role or behavior noticed. Negligible differences regarding organizational efforts to change or adapt. A simple statement conveying that attempts to transform or change the organization have not affected internal relationships - formal or informal. <i>Exclusions:</i> Apathy. Indifference. Strong feelings of optimism or pessimism. <i>Examples:</i> "I think life goes on much as it did before" "I don't think the realignment really has any affect on them [values]." "I don't think that's changed. I don't think its made it more common or less common."

Rules for applying the code:

1. The sentence will be the smallest unit of coding.
2. All responses do not necessitate application of the code.
3. The code will not be applied to interview questions.
4. Coders will make every effort to preserve continuous thoughts within responses. Responses will be coded with the intention of capturing the entire thought from the interviewee unless a specific keyword or indicator appears as in rule #5.
5. If a paragraph contains text which specifically states a keyword, indicator or very clearly articulates the theme literally, it will be coded unless context determines it irrelevant.
6. Paragraphs or responses from the interviewee will be treated as the basis for new thoughts. Although themes may appear more than once in a single response, it must represent a new thought in order to apply more than one coding instance. Transitions in thought represent appropriate instances to apply more than one theme within the response.
7. In cases where the interviewee is conveying a continuous thought and interrupts or mentions a specific comment, which must be coded as described in rule #5, the entire response or paragraph will be “double-coded” as one thought *in addition to* the specific instance mentioned.
8. Coders should refrain from coding implications or perceptions unless the response explicitly states or captures the interviewee’s feelings as described in the code. Assumptions or implications *without specific mention of keywords or indicators* will not break a continuous thought or expression by the interviewee and thus will not be coded or double-coded.
9. When attempting to code each response, the coder should pay specific attention to the nature and intent of the interviewer’s question. This will assist the coder in understanding which themes are most applicable.

Additional Coding Notes:

THEME 1: Lack of Confidence in Leadership

1. This includes outright disagreement with the vision based on LEADERSHIP context: failure or resistance to the change because of the leadership.
2. Lack of faith more describes competence or loss of confidence in NPS leadership – ignore outside pressures and entities.
3. Include Deans or other individuals referred to as weak or exercising poor leadership.

THEME 2: Loyalty and Assurance in the Institution

1. Easily confused with “Simpatico with Vision.”
2. This could be confused with Anxiety because it can be linked to concern. However, context will denote an expression of pride, protection of territory vs. true apprehension about the future or external pressures from senior Navy leadership.

THEME 3: Authoritative Positional Power and Control

1. This theme is focused solely and squarely upon the Superintendent’s leadership style particularly the forced-micromanaging and unreceptive behavior demonstrated in disseminating his vision throughout the organization.

THEME 4: Misalignment of Organizational Processes and Goals

1. Possible confusion between cultural conflict due to poorly designed organizational process linkages with compensation and intended outcomes. Specifically the design of institutes and lack of congruence in developing and implementing the matrix organization in which academics are encouraged to form relationships and conduct research to ensure annual compensation.

THEME 5: Anxiety toward the Process of Change and External Pressures

1. If anxiety appears in affecting institutional relationships code this as Theme 5
2. If references to the external environment, only code this if “worry, apprehension, concern” are precisely mentioned.

THEME 6: Lack of Personal or Positional Power

1. From the aspect of “power” – the ability to influence decisions, events, etc. This refers to personal views of the individual and his/her place in the organization.

THEME 7: Cultural Conflict

1. Any use of “academic” culture or ways of doing things or comparison between academic and military organizational values.

THEME 8: Satisfaction with Status Quo

1. Disagreement with the vision is based on INSTITUTIONAL context: change is unnecessary because of environmental factors – not leadership. This conveys satisfaction even if not directly.
2. This theme is present in those who disagree and are happy or prefer the current situation. Not necessarily displaying egocentric traits of academia.

THEME 9: Institutional Process Ownership - Sense of Shared Purpose

1. This is NOT agreement with the vision – that is simpatico!
2. Any evidence of interrelationships or feeling like he/she played a role in the change

THEME 10: Simpatico with the Vision and Realignment

1. The individual is clearly conveying his/her agreement with the vision for realignment
2. The individual identifies with the Superintendent's strategy and tactics for enacting change – views this as effective or goal oriented.
3. Any restatement of the vision in a positive context

THEME 11: Academic Insularity / Egocentricity

1. These are personal views or feelings conveyed – not factual or observations.
2. Avoid statements of fact or mere observations such as, “my role really hasn't changed” or “how I do my job, almost nothing has changed.”

THEME 12: Organizational Inertia

1. This is an observation similar to stating fact.

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