

**STRATEGIC PROVOCATION:
EXPLAINING TERRORIST ATTACKS ON AMERICA**

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A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF
THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES
FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIRMENTS

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
JUNE 2002

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Report Documentation Page

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OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE 00 JUN 2002		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Strategic Provocation: Explaining Terrorist Attacks On America				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images.					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 82	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to Dr. Rick Andres and Lt. Col. Forrest Morgan for their advice and encouragement on a subject I would have never thought to tackle. I would also like to thank my wife, Jennifer, and our children, Justin and Nicole, for their patience and assistance.

ABSTRACT

On 11 September 2001, the acts of war that Americans experienced were far worse than anything we have seen since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Successful attacks against the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the loss of thousands of lives ripped away American illusions of safety from international terrorism. The horrific attacks perpetrated by Islamic terrorists associated with the Al-Qaeda organization caused Americans to ask why it happened. Why do Muslims hate America? Why didn't we know? Moreover, what could we have done to prevent such a barbaric act?

The attacks of September 11th are not the first attacks by Islamic terrorists on America or American interests. Al-Qaeda terrorists are also responsible for terrorist attacks on service members in Somalia, destruction of the Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and attacking the USS Cole. Osama bin Laden's decree to kill Americans and their allies' signals dynamic challenges to American security. Developing strategies against terrorism requires a discerning review of the causes and proximate reasons why Al-Qaeda terrorists attacked American interests.

I argue that the Al-Qaeda strike on the United States was part of a strategy designed to topple pro-Western Arab governments, eject the US from the Middle East, and ultimately threaten the survival of Israel. The strategy by which bin Laden sought to accomplish these goals is as follows: the attack would provoke an American reprisal that he could portray as a Western crusade against Islam. Such a crusade would polarize the Islamic masses and galvanize their efforts to attack Western interests and remove moderate Arab governments. Islamic states would replace moderate, secular regimes, and force the US, its resolve already weakened by a rising tide of terrorism, to physically and politically withdraw from the Middle East. With the US defeated, the Muslim world would be free to turn its attention to the destruction of Israel.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed. Our country is strong. A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shatter steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve. America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.

President George W. Bush
Tuesday, September 11, 2001

On 11 September 2001, the acts of war that Americans experienced were far worse than anything we have seen since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Successful attacks against the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the loss of thousands of lives ripped away illusions of safety from international terrorism. The three-hour ordeal, from the first hijacking to the collapse of the World Trade Center's north tower, left Americans standing in disbelief and horror. Destroyed in the carnage by the end of the day were both towers of the World Trade Center, portions of the Pentagon, four hijacked commercial jets, thousands of lives, and America's belief in its ocean-guarded invulnerability against international terrorists.¹ The horrific attacks perpetrated by Islamic terrorists associated with the Al-Qaeda organization caused Americans to ask why it happened. Why do Muslims hate America? Why didn't we know? What could we have done to prevent such a barbaric act? Moreover, why did the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, knowing that American's would demand a reprisal, attack United States?

The attacks of September 11th are not the first attacks by Islamic terrorists on America or American interests.² Al-Qaeda terrorists are also responsible for terrorist attacks on service

¹ More than 3000 people were killed or injured as suicide-hijackers flew two planes into the World Trade Center towers, one into the Pentagon, and a fourth plane crashed into a field south of Pittsburgh after passengers fought off the hijackers.

² The Federal Bureau of Investigation lists Usama Bin Laden as one of their ten most wanted fugitives for "murder of U.S. Nationals outside the United States; conspiracy to murder U.S. Nationals outside the United States; and attacks on a federal facility resulting in death." The FBI's Ten Most Wanted Fugitive poster cautions that, "Usama Bin Laden is wanted in connection with the August 7, 1998, bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. These attacks killed over 200 people. In addition, bin Laden is a suspect in other terrorist attacks throughout the world." Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitive, poster revised November 2001; available from <http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/topten/fugitives/laden.pdf>; Internet; accessed 28 November 2001.

members in Somalia, destruction of the Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and attacking the USS Cole.³ Osama bin Laden's (Usamah Bin Mohammad Bin Laden) decree to kill Americans and their allies signals dynamic challenges to American security. Bin Laden is now a familiar name to nearly every American. Since the terror attacks on 11 September 2001, Western media has portrayed him as a mindless religious zealot out to destroy the United States and Western interests. Deterring future terrorist attacks requires understanding dissident movements, terrorism, and why dissidents use terrorism to achieve their goals and strategies. Developing strategies against terrorism requires a discerning review of the causes and proximate reasons why Al-Qaeda terrorists attacked American interests.

I argue that the Al-Qaeda strike on the United States was part of a strategy designed to topple pro-Western Arab governments, eject the US from the Middle East, and ultimately threaten the survival of Israel. The strategy by which bin Laden sought to accomplish these goals is as follows: the attack would provoke an American reprisal that he could portray as a Western crusade against Islam. Such a crusade would polarize the Islamic masses and galvanize their efforts to attack Western interests and remove moderate Arab governments. Islamic states would replace moderate secular regimes and force the US—its resolve already weakened by a rising tide of terrorism—to physically and politically withdraw from the Middle East. With the US defeated, the Islamic fundamentalist world would be free to turn its attention to the destruction of Israel.

Bin Laden believed that expelling American military forces from Saudi Arabia and the whole Gulf Region was essential to his mechanism for establishing extremist Islamic governments in Egypt and the Gulf Arab States. His strategy to achieve that aim was to rally Muslims by provoking a Western reprisal on Islam that he could portray as immoral American attacks. Bin Laden calculated that the United States would retaliate in response to his attacks. He envisioned an uprising against American interests by complementing the reprisal with a

³ According to the Department of State, Report of the Accountability Review Boards, "The vehicular bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania on 7 August 1998 were terrorist incidents cost were terrorist incidents costing the lives of over 220 persons and wounding more than 4,000 others. Twelve American USG employees and family members, and 32 Kenyan and 8 Tanzanian USG employees, were among those killed. Both chanceries withstood collapse from the bombings, but were rendered unusable, and several adjacent buildings were severely damaged or destroyed." The Accountability Review Board determined that the terrorists intended to destroy the two Embassies, kill or injure the US Government employees, and damage US prestige, morale, and diplomacy. United States Department of State, Report of Accountability Review Boards: Bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dares Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998; available from http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/board_overview.html; Internet; accessed 4 April 2002.

Muslim crusade to polarize the Islamic world and generate support among Arab states for unity against the West. Since the end of the Cold War, well-financed religious zealots have struggled to transform traditional Islamic sects into a more extremist Islamic faith following 7th Century traditional beliefs and practices. The provoked reprisal would infuriate the masses of Islam and push them into that extremist group. Bin Laden would then use his terrorist alliance and available resources in a call for *Jihad* (struggle) for the cause of spreading Islam and revolting against American presence in the Middle East. Bin Laden believes Americans are weak-natured and lack a capability for perseverance.⁴ Economic interests and force protection concerns overshadow American foreign policy strategies. The additional terrorist strikes caused by Western retaliations would thereby discourage America from its continued involvement in Muslim regions of the world. Thus, attacking the United States was a provocation directed at seeking Western reprisals to polarize the Islamic world and cause an uprising intended to remove American influences from the Middle East. Bin Laden calculated that with the American presence gone, Muslims would overthrow the reigning Saudi regime and establish extremist Islamic governments in Egypt and Gulf Arab States.

Building an effective propaganda campaign strategy that complemented and reinforced accusations of immorality against the West required capitalizing on existing Islamic fears. Most Muslims view the presence of American interests as Western infringement on Islamic culture and its values. The information age and globalization brings the American icons of today's youth and glamour lifestyle delivered by Coca-Cola, Nike, Disney, and MTV directly to households for the price of a satellite dish. America evolved within the information age as the world's largest service industry focusing on changing the minds and spirits of the world's youth to sell not just American products, but its popular culture. Muslim leaders are concerned about the spread of American culture. They fear the national openness brought about by the information age and democracy exposes their societies to Western values that potentially corrupt the foundations of Islam.⁵

Islam's worry of corruption by the American pop culture is inconsistent. On the one hand, Islamic fundamentalist teachings are incompatible with Christians and Jews, yet on the other hand, Western Muslims avoid fundamentalist teachings so as not to offend Western

⁴ Osama bin Laden, "To Terror's Source," interview by John Miller, *Camera* (May 1998): 2; available from http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/terror_1stperson_980612.html; Internet; accessed 2 December 2001.

⁵ Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld*, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996) 23-117.

civilization. The Islamic faith does not permit freedom of choice regarding religion. Instead, Islam encourages Muslims to influence others to accept Islam. In the strict sense of the Islamic faith, Muslims are to fight until the non-believers acknowledge Islam as the religion of truth.⁶

Bin Laden believed that Israel was intent on conquering the Muslim world, and America was acting on behalf of Israel and the Jewish people. He promoted *Jihad* as a religious duty against United States because of its support for Israel and the moderate Arab states. Bin Laden envisioned gaining additional support from disgruntled Muslims by denouncing the formation of Israel and condemning the Saudi Government for handing over Palestine. It is plausible that bin Laden envisioned Arab armies rising to destroy Israel once American influences were out of the Middle East. Thus, the attack on America was an indirect attack against Israel and a catalyzing action directed at removing American interests from Egypt and the Gulf States.

The explanation I suggest differs from the position taken by many publicists and policy makers. Nicholas Lemann and Michael Doran present two alternative positions on why bin Laden attacked United States. Lemann portrays the Western media view that bin Laden or terrorists in general do not work from a strategic purpose, but instead engage in maniacal killings.⁷ The attacks perpetrated by bin Laden were simply irrational acts (global rage) directed at America. This opinion assumes that bin Laden was not using terrorism as a method to obtain his goals or a particular outcome. Thus, Bin Laden did what he called upon every Muslim to do in his 1998 *fatwah* or religious ruling: to take up arms and kill Americans, their allies, and destroy Western interests in any country. He did not nest his attacks within a particular strategy, nor did he synchronize them with other terrorist networks. Bin Laden unjustly killed because of hate and the desire to die a martyr and was guided by his belief that he would go to heaven by killing the crusaders. Lemann's theory is incorrect though, because of its basic assumption that terrorism is not a method used to achieve a purpose and that terrorists do not have the desire for life and prosperity. Michael Doran contends that Bin Laden pulled America into a civil war between Islamic extremists and Arab moderates, a civil

⁶ Annis Shorosh, *Islam Revealed*, (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1988), 34-39; Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 43-49, 403-412.

⁷ Nicholas Lemann, "What Terrorists Want," in *The New Yorker: Fact*; available from <http://www.newyorker.com/PRINTABLE/?fac/011001fa>; Internet; accessed 19 December 2001.

war over Arab and Muslim identities in the modern world.⁸ Bin Laden's primary goal was an Islamic revolution similar to what Iran experienced in the late 1970's and 1980's.⁹ According to Doran, bin Laden envisioned United States pressuring Saudi Arabi to fully support Western attacks on Taliban forces, creating a deeper chasm between fundamental and moderate Muslims. Thus, bin Laden attacked the United States to topple moderate Islamic regimes. Doran's theory is misleading because of its basic assumptions that American political pressure on Saudi Arabia to support Western attacks would lead to civil uprising and naturally force a change in government policies or Muslim leadership. Pressure on Saudi Arabia may be a necessary condition for an uprising but it certainly is not conclusive.¹⁰

I contend that Bin Laden used terrorism as method to support the achievement of his political and religious goals. His attacks on the United States were far more than irrational acts perpetrated against Americans. I do not believe bin Laden envisioned that popular support for Western interests in the Arabian Peninsula could be shattered by directly attacking American symbols of power. Using American airliners as weapons to destroy Western symbols of power was not Bin Laden's mechanism for getting United States out of the Middle East. Bin Laden attacked the United States because he wanted something in return. Though he was concerned that Islamic differences would stalemate his fundamentalist movement against the West, the

⁸ Michael Scott Doran, "Somebody Else's Civil War," *Foreign Affairs*, January / February 2002, Vol. 81, No. 1, 22-42.

⁹ Marilyn Marks, "Doran: America not bin Laden's primary target," Princeton-Weekly Bulletin; available from <http://www.fromcetpm/edi/pr/pwb/02/0114/1b.shtml>; Internet; accessed 25 February 2002.

¹⁰ Walter Pincus, "Zawahiri Urged Al Qaeda to Let Fighters Escape for Jihad's Sake," *Washington Post*, 1 January 2002, sec. A.13: Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: The Free Press, 2001) 20: Forrest Morgan, "Attack on America—Global Insurgency," email message, 27 September 2001: Osama bin Laden, "To Terror's Source," interview by John Miller, *Camera* (May 1998): 2; available from <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/terror1stperson980612.html>; Internet; accessed 2 December 2001: Osama bin Laden, "EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW: Conversation with Terror," interview by Rahimullah Yusufzai, (January 1999): 2; available from <http://www.time.com/tinme/asia/news/printout/0.9788.174550.00.html>; Internet; accessed 22 November 2001: CNN.com, "Chronology: Bin Laden on videotape," *War Against Terror*; available at <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIAL/2001/trade.center/binladen.section.html>; Internet; accessed 29 March 2001: Osama bin Laden, *Prerecorded statement in response to military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan* (Al-Jazeera Arabic satellite station: Pakistan, 7 October 2001); Transcript, *Osama bin Laden: Response to Start of Military Action in Afghanistan*; available from http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/strike_binladentrans011007.html; Internet; accessed 9 October 2001: Osama bin Laden, "Transcript of Osama Bin Laden interview," interview by Peter Arnet, *Camera* (March 1997): 2; available from <http://www.ishipress.com/osamaint.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 December 2001: *United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden et al.*, S (7) 98 Cr. 1023, New York, N.Y., 6 February 2001: 34; available from <http://web.elastic.org/~fche/mirrors/criptome.org/usa-v-ubl-02.htm>; Internet; accessed 9 February 2001: Michael Dobbs, "Inside the Mind of Osama Bin Laden: Strategy Mixes Long Preparation, Powerful Message Aimed at Dispossessed," *Washington Post*, 20 September 2001, sec. A1: Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, Shaykh Mir Hamzah, and Fazlur Rahman, *Jihad Against Jew and Crusaders: World Islamic Front Statement*; available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>; Internet; accessed 18 February 2002: John L. Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 90: Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on American* (California: Prima Publishing, 2001) 151-159.

attack simply was to set the conditions. Al-Qaeda terrorists attacked United States to provoke an American retaliatory attack which bin Laden calculated he could use to remove American interests from Egypt and the Gulf, and then turn on the destruction of Israel. Bin Laden calculated that, like the 1998 Embassy bombing reprisals, Americans would demand a reprisal in response to his attacks.¹¹

The purpose of this thesis is to present an argument that explains why Al-Qaeda (Osama bin Laden) attacked America. In doing so, I answer such questions as a theoretical and historical background on terrorism, rationale on the Islamic fundamentalist movement, an organizational framework of Bin Laden's strategic alliance, why Bin Laden attacked United States, and a summary chapter on probable engagement strategies. I open my argument with background information clarifying the relevance and importance of this study, a "road map" to my conclusions, alternative views or positions, and how I reached my theories. Chapter 2 follows with an analysis of terrorism theories, how the meaning of terrorism has changed over time, and why dissident groups use terrorism. Chapter 3 examines Bin Laden's terrorist alliance, his goals and probable strategies, his terrorist network, Al-Qaeda, and his modus operandi. Chapter 4 directly addresses why Bin Laden attacked the United States. Chapter 5 takes a broad stroke view at addressing an engagement strategy for neutralizing or mitigating Islamic extremists.

¹¹ President Bush stated, "Make no mistake: The United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts." David S. Cloud and Neil King, "Death Toll, Source of Devastating Attacks Remain Unclear; U.S. Vows Retaliation as Attention Focuses on bin Laden," *The Wall Street Journal*, 12 September 2001, sec. A, p.1.

Chapter 2

THE METHOD OF TERRORISM

We—with God’s help—call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim *ulema*, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan’s U.S. troops and the devil’s supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.

Usamah Bin Mohammad Bin Laden
Text of *Fatwah* urging Jihad against Americans
Published in Al-Quds al-‘Arabi on February 23, 1998

Most people draw their understanding of terrorism from media interpretations of current events put in context of their limited knowledge of Middle East affairs. Although most Americans have a general understanding of terrorism, they fail to understand that terrorism is a method of attaining some goal or political aim. Making things worse are the numerous theories that define terrorism as virtually any perceived barbaric act. What then is terrorism and why do dissident groups so frequently resort to using it? I argue that terrorism is a tactic that non-state actors use to coerce states. Dissidents use this method of combat to attain political, religious, or ideological goals by creating and exploiting the psychological effects of fear.¹² Throughout the centuries, terror and the use of terrorism changed more in who applied it—terrorist states verses state sponsored, non-state actors, or rogue dissidents—than the purpose it was used to achieve. The aim of this chapter is to present a brief explanation on what terrorism is and why dissident groups use it.

History of Terror

The use of terror evolved through history as a method used in seizing and gaining political power and, as such, is not a new phenomenon. States use terror to repress indigenous

¹² See for instance: Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories, and Literature* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988); Mark Irving Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995); and Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001).

populations and to coerce other states. Non-state actors use terrorism to attract attention, gain adherents, and coerce states and other non-state actors.

Both states and non-state actors use terror to achieve political, ideological, or religious goals. As such, the classification of those using terror takes on numerous forms: terrorist states, state-sponsored terrorism, non-state sponsored terrorism, and terrorism used by dissidents. Terrorist states use terror (state terror) both for repressing their own population and for coercing other states. States sponsoring terrorism harbor terrorists and use their linkages between state actors and terrorist organizations to achieve political goals. The United States Department of State has identified Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as states sponsoring terrorism.¹³ Non-state sponsored terrorism is the use of terrorism by non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Dissidents are individual actors who use terrorism to support achievement of their political goals. Timothy McVeigh and the bombing of the Oklahoma Federal Building is an example of terrorism used by an individual dissident.

Terrorism became a particularly prevalent tool for revolutionary movements in the 20th Century. Toward the beginning of the century the increase in Nationalism resulted in the creation of new states, rising military alliances and capabilities, and fear of changes in power. Marxism emerged as a reformist ideology to combat the European social-economic changes and exploitative conditions.¹⁴ As European powers used the Balkans for political ends, the Ottoman Empire came under severe strain during this period. A dissident group consisting of young university students and Bosnian Serb intellectuals called Mlada Bosna or Young Bosnians, formed with the purpose of expelling Habsburg influences from Bosnia. The dissident movement began because of discontent and a thirst for change. On 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Young Bosnians, assassinated the Habsburg Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo.¹⁵ The Young Bosnians had used violence as a method to achieve their political goal of eradicating the Habsburg authority. Terrorism emerged aligned with revolutionary movements as a method directed against state political interests, its leaders, and those opposing the movement.¹⁶ After the Second World War, terrorism used by non-state actors supporting revolutionary causes returned as the method of implementing terror, and although the Information Age spurred the growth of globalization and global dissidents, the use of terrorism generally

¹³ United States Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism-1999*, April 2000; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/1999>; Internet; accessed 27 December, 2001.

¹⁴ Whereas nationalism was concerned with state interests over international considerations, Marxism sought to combat imperialism (capitalism) through the maximization of Class interests.

¹⁵ Hoffman, 21.

¹⁶ Ibid, 17.

remains connected to revolutionary movements.¹⁷ The uses of terrorism by revolutionary movements broadened in the 1960s and 1970s, according to Hoffman, to include nationalist, religious, and ideologically motivated movements.¹⁸ In the 1960s technological enhancements in media and transportation leveraged terrorism's effects. The hijacking of the Israeli El Al flight in July 1968 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was the genesis of global terrorism.¹⁹ The attack on an Israeli international transportation asset was a symbolic attack on the state of Israel and, as such, was a calculated political statement. Its purpose was to create international fear and force Israel to negotiate directly with the terrorists, thus acknowledging success of the movement. The secondary effects were immense. Dissident movements were now able to instantaneously gain attention through mass media and carry their message and terror internationally through public transportation.²⁰ Terrorism retained its revolutionary associations, but now had global associations because it no longer was confined to territorial state boundaries. With that said, what is terrorism, why do dissidents use terrorism, and is there a difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare?

The Terrorism Theory

There are competing definitions of terrorism but, for the most part, people who study the subject agree that terrorists use violence to create fear in order to obtain an envisioned goal. Terrorism is a method of combat that national and international dissident movements use to attain political, religious, or ideological goals using fear created by violence. Simply put, terrorism is a tactic that non-state actors use to coerce states. Over the last decade, terrorism became a cliché for violence defined by geographic location and current media events. Terrorism has evolved through history as a method of seizing political power, and is generally tied to achieving a higher-level purpose.

There is no universally accepted theory of terrorism. Some political violence experts confuse the difference between definition and theory when discussing terrorism. They simply provide a definition but fail to discern why terrorism is used. These definitions range widely

¹⁷ Ibid, 27.

¹⁸ Ibid, 26.

¹⁹ The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is a Marxist-Leninist group formed in 1967 under the PLO umbrella. The PFLP terrorist organization is linked to terrorist attacks in Paris, Vienna, Stockholm, London, and Germany. United States Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism-1999: 111*, 30 April 2000; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/1999/index.cfm?docid=2419>; Internet; accessed 27 December 2001. Hoffman, 67.

²⁰ Hoffman, 68.

from exclusive categories that include general criminal behavior to contextual uses of unlawful political violence. Walter Laqueur contends, "the absence of an exact definition does not mean that we do not know in a general way what terrorism is; it has been said that it resembles pornography, difficult to describe and define, but easy to recognize when one sees it."²¹ The "know it when I see it" description, reflects a non-codified theory of terrorism that has allowed institutions to spin both the meaning and explanation of terrorism to fit their particular needs.

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Alex Schmid identified in his book, *Political Terrorism*, 22 word categories present in the 109 different definitions of terrorism he researched.²³ Schmid defined terrorism as:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of

²¹ Walter Laqueur, "Reflections on Terrorism," in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Fall 1986), 88. Dr. Walter Laqueur is the Cochairman of the International Research Council and an expert on political violence. Laqueur does not provide a usable theory of terrorism. He argues that a detailed definition on terrorism does not exist and probably will not surface in the near future. Laqueur concurs with most political violence theorists that terrorism is the use or threat of violence directed at achieving certain goals by inducing a state of fear; terrorism does not conform to humanitarian norm. Lacking a theory, Laqueur instead offers what a terrorism definition should include: Ideally, there should be agreement as to whether terrorism is violence in general or some particular form of violence; whether the emphasis should be on its political aims or its methods of combat or the extra-normal character of its strategy; whether its purposive, systematic character should be singled out or, on the contrary its unpredictability and its symbolic aspect or perhaps the fact that so many of its victims are innocent. Laqueur's "what it should look like" definition falls short in offering solutions to the practitioner. It simply does not address the "why" question. It does provide a general framework for comparative analysis of terrorism theories in the attempt to separate terrorism from the other forms of violence.

²² Laqueur's description only addresses the meaning of terrorism—what terrorism is—not why terrorism is used. A good theory explains why something happened, thus educating the practitioner's judgment in anticipating potential events. The difference between a definition and a theory is more than semantics. Definitions provide a meaning (what something is), whereas theories provide an explanation (why it occurred). The tangible proof is the quality and type of results that each provides. Knowing why something happens allows the practitioner to attack the correct problem. A practical theory has five functions: (1) provides a definition or statement of meaning; (2) categorizes the various historical pieces; (3) explains why the event occurred or why it would go away; (4) provides connectivity to surrounding elements or events; (5) and allows the user to anticipate future trends. Admiral J.C. Wylie in his book, *Military Strategy* (1968) observed that, "theory serves a useful purpose to the extent that it can collect and organize the experiences and ideas of other men, sort out which of them may have a valid transfer value to a new and different situation, and help the practitioner to enlarge his vision in an orderly, manageable, and useful fashion—and then apply it to the reality with which he is faced." Clausewitz wrote that "theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry." A good theory, above all, answers the question of why—not who, what, when, where, or even how. Once the practitioner understands why, he can anticipate the direction of future trends thus getting a marginal advantage. Once the practitioner brackets why something occurred, he can then determine who, what, when, where, and how. J.C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1968) 31. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) 141.

²³ Among the definitions he surveyed, Schmid discovered four common characteristics: (1) terrorism is an abstract concept with no essence; (2) a single definition cannot account for all the possible uses of the term; (3) many different definitions share common elements; (4) and the meaning of terrorism derives from the victim. Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A research guide to concepts, theories, databases, and literature* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1984): 76-77, quoted in Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 39.

violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat—and violence—based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.²⁴

Schmid's original definition was just that, a definition not a theory. It lacked a consistent purpose: why dissident groups or rebellious individuals would use terrorism. Schmid portrayed terrorism as maniacal killings against a class of victims with a single purpose of instilling fear and nothing to follow by not addressing the higher-level purpose. Schmid failed to answer what happened after fear and terror was present in the targeted class of victims. Was there a certain political, religious, or ideological change the dissidents were looking to achieve? If so, that implied that terrorism had a higher-level purpose aimed at the achievement of some goal. In the second edition of his book—after mailing out some 100 questionnaires concerning terrorism—Schmid's adjusted definition recognized terrorism as a method used in achieving a higher level purpose.²⁵

Bruce Hoffman argued in his book, *Inside Terrorism*, "The terrorist is fundamentally a violent intellectual prepared to use and indeed committed to using force in the attainment of his goals."²⁶ Hoffman defines terrorism as:

The deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, wider 'target audience' that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little.²⁷

²⁴ Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A research guide to concepts, theories, data bases, and literature* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1984) 111

²⁵ Schmid's revised definition resembles a theory that explains the purpose of terrorism. Terrorism is a method; it addresses how to accomplish a planned activity in support of a higher purpose. Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, databases, theories, and literature* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988) 28.

²⁶ Hoffman, 43.

²⁷ Ibid.

Hoffman defines terrorism as a tactic used to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Terrorists use terror or the threat of terror to generate publicity and then leverage that publicity into national or international power as means of achieving political change.²⁸

Both the United States Department of Defense and Department of State define terrorism as having a higher-level purpose. The Department of Defense defines terrorism as, "The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological."²⁹ Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (d) defines terrorism as, "The term 'terrorism' is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."³⁰

The core principle of terrorism brought out in nearly all definitions and theories is that terrorism is a method of using violence to create fear in order to attain a defined goal. Terrorism is a means—calculated, planned, and methodical—to carry out an organizational strategy. The use of terrorism in war and peace, by dissident groups and rebellious individuals, and against nation states, individuals, and social classes frequently changed as history evolved.³¹ Though terrorism changed in who applied it—religious versus secular—its use in achieving a higher-level purpose has not. So, why do dissident groups use terrorism?

Dissent Movements

Dissident movements are the progression of orchestrated activities by individuals actively engaged in coercing changes in political policy, institutional actions, or governmental organizations at the national or international level.³² Dissidents are

²⁸ Ibid, 44.

²⁹ United States Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) 428.

³⁰ United States Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism-2000*, 30 April 2001; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/index.cfm?docid=2419>; Internet; accessed 27 December, 2001. The United States Department of State acknowledges in its *Patterns of Global Terrorism-2000* report that there is no universal accepted "definition" of terrorism.

³¹ Hoffman, 15

³² Lichbach in his book *The Rebel's Dilemma* defines dissident movements as collective dissent. "Collective means individuals participating in some group activity. Dissent means that the individuals' objectives are to change government institutions, policies, and/or personnel. Dissent also involves the use of unconventional methods. Participants go beyond voting and interest group activities; that is, they typically threaten and/or employ physical coercion and/or other illegal activities." Mark Irving Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995) 3.

individuals seeking political changes through conventional and unconventional means. Dissident groups use violent and non-violent means to obtain their ideological, political, social, or religious goals. Movements are a progression of orchestrated activities by an organized group working toward a particular ideological, political, social, or religious goal. Dissident movements—and their respective goals—had generally been associated with intra-state rebellious actions before the Information Age. The proliferation of information produced international dissident movements capable of networking information to proponents, geographically dispersed cells, and spreading the message of their causes.

A rising movement is an instrument of change, and participation requires that the benefits, tangible and intangible, outweighed the costs. Mass movements often breed fanaticism, enthusiasm, fanatical hope, hatred, and intolerance, and they frantically search for and recruit zealots.³³ Individuals involved in a dissident movement seek a new start, a chance to acquire or maintain the power that goes with pride, confidence, hope, and a sense of purpose.³⁴ Negative perceptions of an individual's surroundings and want for change fuel dissident movements. The cost of precipitating change is the action and self-sacrifice. The degree of costs, though, is unknown. Most dissident groups never materialize, and those that do, struggle with maintaining constituents, sympathizers for direct support, involved activists, and militants or true believers.³⁵ Dissident groups often use violence to mobilize their supporters. Extremists use violence to radicalize their struggle for power, provoke reprisals, polarize the undecided masses, and mobilize supporters.


Dissident movements attempt to effect societal change through political action within a sphere of influence that incorporates a spectrum of activities from conventional politics to political violence (see Figure 1).

³³ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Harper & Row, 1951) xi.

³⁴ Hoffer, 12.

³⁵ Lichbach, 17.

Figure 1. Political Acton Sphere of Influence



Source: Schmid, Political Terrorism, Table 1.13. The Spectrum of Political Action

Conventional politics and political violence act as primary forces inside the sphere but at different ends of the spectrum. Conventional politics is a passive threat intended to convince states or individuals to accept a particular political change. Political violence is an active threat, intended to make states or individuals either stop or start a particular political action. Political violence attacks the will of an adversary through the local population. It attempts to change and adversary's assessment by raising his cost of resistance above his expected value of benefits. Unconventional politics or swaggering is an escalation inhibitor positioned between the gray area of conventional politics and political violence. Outside the sphere at opposite poles are limited war and peace.

The genesis of dissident movements is the presence of hope, faith in the future, that changes will take away the deprivations and frustrations of the present. Lichbach argues that cognitive and emotional psychological processes turn deprivations into dissent:

Frustration over wants and necessities which cannot be satisfied; a lack or discrepancy between what is entitled and actually received; a lack of equity and distributive justice because inputs into the system far exceeded the outputs; relative deprivation vis-à-vis more advantaged groups; alienation from government and a belief that the government is illegitimate because of policy dissatisfaction and lack of system responsiveness; lack of support for government due to political cynicism and the absence of political trust; class or racial consciousness; or radicalism and the identification with dissident groups that promise to end the deprivations.³⁶

³⁶ Lichbach, 17.

Dissident groups form because of common preferences, beliefs, and perspectives on personal deprivations. The existence or the perception of extreme conditions within the dissidents' surroundings is common with each movement. Eric Hoffer argues in his book, *The True Believer*:

For men to plunge headlong into an undertaking of vast change, they must be intensely discontented yet not destitute, and they must have the feeling that by the possession of some potent doctrine, infallible leader or some new technique they have access to a source of irresistible power. They must also have an extravagant conception of the prospects and potentialities of the future. Finally, they must be wholly ignorant of the difficulties involved in their vast undertaking.³⁷

Hence, a rising movement is an instrument of change, and participation requires that the benefits, tangible and intangible, outweigh the costs.³⁸ Of course, some want change, but never really act on those thoughts. Dissident movements are organized individuals actively engaged at coercing political policy or institutional changes.³⁹ Misery and oppression are the proximate causes of mass movements, not the cause of terrorism. Dissident movements begin when individuals perceive a need for change, and they sometimes use terrorism to achieve calculated strategies.

Persistent action in manifesting change is generally irrational for individuals, thus making change difficult. Even though many supporters will claim their allegiance to the movement, few will contribute resources, and fewer will actively support the causes. Lichbach asserts there are four reasons that collective dissent does not manifest. First, many dissident groups simply do not form. In spite of commonalities between dissenting individuals, oppressive conditions, and perceived potentialities of the future, groups do not naturally unite. Second, if a group does form, many of its potential supporters do not join. Most groups do not move past their formulation stage, and thus lose their potential supporters. Any group that does form generally contains a small supporting nucleus that does all the work, while the remaining dissidents take on the role of "free riders." A few enthusiasts, zealots, and activists conduct rebellious actions until they alone are sharing all the costs, while the free riders are receiving the benefits. Third, if a dissident group does form, only a few are active of those that

³⁷ Ibid, 11.

³⁸ Lichbach, 4.

³⁹ Ibid, 3.

join. Most members do not participate, attend the public rallies, or share in the costs. Eventually the group becomes nonexistent after it settles into a routine of apathy and passivity. Finally, dissident movements are not long-ranged activities. Dissident movements require persistent action in order to maintain momentum. Low costs and high benefits are the motivating factors in dissident movements and thus they become essential in a dissident's decision calculus. Many dissident movements are short-ranged campaigns, exhausted because of high cost and little benefits over the long period.⁴⁰ Time is a dissident's weapon; he only needs to survive to win.

Lichbach contends that four levels of involvement or commitment exists within dissident groups: constituents, sympathizers, activists, and militants.⁴¹ Constituents according to Lichbach are those members of a nation's population whom the dissident movement claims to represent. However, the Information Age no longer confines constituencies to a single nation, thus making it necessary to expand Lichbach's definition. The Islamic fundamentalist movement is an example of an international constituency, representing networked constituents in Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Kashmir, Libya, Pakistan, Philippines, Syria, Turkey, Tajikistan, United States, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, and possibly a host of other countries.⁴² Sympathizers are constituents who directly support the dissident movement because they believe they will directly benefit from its cause. Sympathizers generally provide resource backing versus directly participating in the dissent activities. Activists are individuals actively involved in the dissident group. They are not full time members, but are on the cusp of being zealots and generally participate in the dissent activities. Militants are true believers. They are the dissident group's zealots and participate if not devote their entire time to the cause. It is plausible that, because of the Information Age and the escalation of violence in terrorism, that the fourth level has spilt into true believers and hardcore militants or extremists. Thus, five levels of involvement possibly exist: constituents, sympathizers, activists, true believers, and militants. True believers now comprise the fourth level and, like the original definition of militants, are full time members devoted to maintaining the dissident movement's

⁴⁰ Lichbach, 16-17.

⁴¹ Ibid, 17.

⁴² Jane's, Osama bin Laden's Global "Al-Qaeda" Organization: Its Strategies and Issues Cut Down to Size in Authoritative Report; Internet; http://www.janes.com/press/pc010813_1.shtml; accessed 20 August 2001. According to the Council on American-Islamic Relations, there are approximately 1.2 billion Muslims in over 122 different countries. The Islamic faith representing over 20 percent of world religion totals. Council on American-Islamic Relations, *About Islam and American Muslims*; Internet; <http://www.cair-net.org/asp/aboutislam.asp>; accessed 15 February 2002.

momentum. Militants, now the fifth level, operate in violence; they are the suicide bombers and hardcore zealots, extremists who have placed the sanctity of their life as an acceptable cost in the dissident movement.

Dissident groups and their respective participants have two choices in terms of their resistance: act or do not act. The dissident group may choose to attack, knowing that the regime might retaliate, or remain passive. Their final decision encompasses an evaluation (cost and benefits) of the choices against the possible outcomes and expected responses. There are four possible outcomes to the dissident group’s decision, with four separate yet related costs and benefits.⁴³ Table 1 (Terrorist Dilemma) represents those choices, and its associated costs and benefits.

		Notional Regime’s Choices	
		Reprisal Attack	No Reprisal Attack
Dissident Movement’s Choices	Attack	<p>Benefits: Portray the reprisal as a crusade against the movement. Polarize constituents and sympathizers. Galvanize the movement’s efforts. Martyr status for those killed, injured, or arrested by the regime. The cause becomes politically powerful, thus the movement reflects success.</p> <p>Cost: Death, injury, or long-term imprisonment for participants of the dissident movement.</p>	<p>Benefits: Without a reprisal, the dissident movement is unable to “spin” the attacks into a crusade. However, the regime loses leadership prestige and opens the door for additional terrorists’ attacks.</p> <p>Cost: The dissident movement bears the entire cost. Without a reprisal, the attacks by the dissident movement are perceived as a failure. International constituents see the dissidents as rogue crime elements.</p>
	Do Not Attack	<p>Benefits: Factions aligned with the dissident movement continue their rebellious actions without the dissident group. If the regime attacks without provocation, the crusade yields a great benefit to the movement. However, the regime has no reason to attack.</p> <p>Cost: The dissident movement and its participants have no personal costs except for persecution from previous attacks. Even though dissidents continue to support anti-movement rhetoric, the group is associated as “free riding.” The dissident movement remains at a status-quo, neither gaining nor losing strength.</p>	<p>Benefits: Status Quo is safe.</p> <p>Cost: The Dissident Movement loses momentum and becomes powerless. The regime achieves a victory against the Dissident Movement. Thus, the dissident movement its participants are not relevant in history.</p>

Table 1. Terrorist Dilemma
Source: Lichbach, Exhibit 1. Jane’s Dilemma, 5

⁴³ Lichbach, 5.

The method of combat that a dissident group chooses depends on the support of the population, the legitimacy of the movement, and the capability of the group. Dissident movements approach change in different fashions. Those that act on their motivations have strategic choices in achieving their goals. Dissidents weigh the costs and benefits in their decision to act or not act, and use both nonviolent and violent methods to achieve their goals, and depending upon their military strengths will choose between conventional or guerrilla warfare tactics.⁴⁴ A nationalist or religious movement may first use terrorism to show success in the movement, followed by guerrilla warfare to maintain the movement's momentum after it has gained adequate constituent support. Note that terrorism is not guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is predominately used on military forces with the intent of keeping the adversary in a defensive posture, unable to maneuver to an offensive role. Guerrilla forces often use terrorism as a method to inflict fear and terror on local populations and military forces and to show success in the revolutionary movement, thus bringing greater legitimacy to the movement.⁴⁵

Successful Uses of Terrorism

Historically, terrorism has worked quite often and there are numerous examples of dissident groups using terrorism to achieve their political objectives. In many cases, dissident movements used terrorism and the threat of additional terror to parlay their efforts into tangible benefits. The Jewish terrorist organization, Irgun Zvai Le'umi (National Military Organization, Irgun) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the partitioning of Palestine and development of the Palestinian resistance, provide such examples.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ According to the Department of Defense, Guerrilla warfare is, "Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous force." Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001) 181.

⁴⁵ Colonel Roger Trinquier wrote in his book, *Modern Warfare*, "The goal of modern warfare is control of the populace, and terrorism is a particularly appropriate weapon, since it aims directly at the inhabitant. In the street, at work, at home, the citizen lives continually under the threat of violent death. In the presence of this permanent danger surrounding him, he has the depressing feeling of being an isolated and defenseless target. The fact that public authority and the police are no longer capable of ensuring his security adds to his distress. He loses confidence in the state whose inherent mission it is to guarantee his safety. He is more and more drawn to the side of the terrorists, who alone are able to protect him. The intended objective, which is to cause the population to vacillate, is thus attained." Colonel Trinquier commanded the French 1st Colonial Parachute Battalion in Indo-China and the legendary 3rd Colonial Parachute Regiment in Algeria. He retired from the French Army in 1961. Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, ed. Daniel Lee, reprinted by U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1985 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1961) 16.

⁴⁶ Palestine came under British control after the First World War when the Ottoman Empire fell. By 1935, Palestine was in a state of internal turmoil as Arabs and Jews expressed their aggravation and anger over the years of frustration with

Creation of the Jewish sovereign state of Israel in 1949, following the Arab Uprising reflects an example of Zionist revolutionary forces using terrorism to obtain a political goal.⁴⁷ Jewish leaders in Palestine pushed forward their Jewish nationalist movement to expel Great Britain from Palestine as the Second World War ended. Jewish leaders used the restrictions Britain had placed on Jewish refugees entering Palestine during World War II as a *cause celebre* to maintain revolutionary momentum and create a sovereign Jewish state. Using violence and terror, the Jewish right wing Irgun Tzvai Leumi Zionist group, led by Menachem Begin, executed a strategy to expel British influence and establish an independent Jewish state. Irgun used terrorism as its method of achieving political change, and as such became the objective in British deterrence efforts. The British High Command attempted to reduce Jewish dissident attacks by arresting, detaining, and destroying sources of funds, training sites, and operations. Irgun was a dissident movement legitimized by British imperial oppression. As a non-state actor having no conventional military forces, Irgun used terrorism as a tactic against British forces.

For Irgun, the effects of being cornered resulted in two choices: violent resistance or surrender. The Jewish Zionist movement had come to a standstill, and the Irgun leadership perceived it was forced into a do or die decision. Irgun leaders realized after a cost and benefit analysis that the Jewish Zionist movement was on verge of stalemate if they chose a passive method of resistance.⁴⁸ Stalemate meant status quo and the continuation of British rule, signifying a British victory. The strategy of any attack was to attract international attention and move those "sitting on the fence" to the Jewish side.

British administration and the ineffectiveness of Arab leadership. The Arab Uprising soon followed when the Palestinian leadership demanded an end to Jewish immigration, a halt to the sale of land to Jews, and the replacement of British rules with an Arab government. The Peel Report, a British commission established in 1936 concluded that Arabs and Jews could never live together peacefully in one state and recommended that Britain partition Palestine into two states—one Jewish and one Arab—with an international enclave around Jerusalem, including Bethlehem.⁴⁶ Arab violence against Jewish settlements and British security forces increased and within six months the casualty list included 89 Jews killed, and over 300 wounded. The Arab Uprising against British colonial authority in Palestine resulted in approximately 2,287 Arabs, 520 Jews, and 140 British citizens killed. On May 1936, the British high command announced they were no longer approving immigrant certificates, thus once again succumbing to Arab terrorism tactics. J. Bowyer Bell, *Terror Out of Zion: Irgun Zvai Leumi, LEHI, and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977) 30. Hoffman, 48-85.

⁴⁷ Bell, 169-173.

⁴⁸ Menachem Begin noted in his autobiography how the Jewish Zionist movement was in a pivotal survival point by the end of 1945, and his terrorist organization Irgun reacted. The Zionist movement had come to a standstill, and Irgun did not possess the immediate means of helping. According to Begin, "we [Irgun] did not possess the immediate means of helping. Just then we were suffering from a double lack. Our treasury was empty and we had no explosives in stock. Retaliation for this sort of thing needed more than a few shots. How could we deliver a big blow? We gritted our teeth. Days and nights passed without action. The people wondered what had happened to the Irgun." Menachem Begin, *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun*, (New York: Henry Schuman, 1951), 37, 196 & 208.

Menachem Begin described how Irgun planned simultaneous attacks against British rule in his book *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun*.

According to Begin:

The following were the operations officially approved by the United Forces: the attack on the airfields; a widespread sabotage attack in the south; the blowing up of trains on the three main lines of the country; the F.F.I. attack on the railway workshop at Haifa; and our attack on the King David Hotel. But there were two more operations carried out during that period by the 'dissident' which were approved only 'unofficially' by the Haganah. One was the attack on the Jerusalem Prison carried out by our Assault Force and the F.F.I. and aimed at freeing captive members of both organizations.⁴⁹

Irgun signified their choice for action when they bombed Jerusalem's King David Hotel located in British-occupied Palestine in 1946. Great Britain used the hotel as a political and military base for British rule in Palestine, and as such, the hotel became a symbolic target. Irgun had made a direct attack on the government of Great Britain by destroying the hotel and hundreds of people. According to Begin, "the toll of lives was terrible. More than two hundred people were killed or injured. Among the victims were high British officers."⁵⁰ The psychological impacts of the United Resistance Movement's simultaneous attacks were immense. Both the British and Palestinian governments lost confidence in their abilities to provide protection and maintain order. The King David Hotel attack, combined with additional terrorist attacks committed by associated dissident groups on 17 Arab villages between December 1947 and April 1948, succeeded in producing a political change.⁵¹ Great Britain ceased its rule over Palestine on 15 May 1948,

⁴⁹ The United Forces or United Resistance Movement formed in 1945 as a Jewish Zionist umbrella to coordinate and synchronize dissident movement actions in support of establishing an autonomous Jewish State. Operating within the alliance were the three terrorist organizations, Irgun Avai Leumi, the Stern Group (F.F.I.) and Haganah. Begin noted, "The Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Group, they wrote in their document, would carry out acts of terrorism. Later the Haganah would join them and possibly unit with the Irgun." Menachem Begin, *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun*, (New York: Henry Schuman, 1951), 37 & 196.

⁵⁰ Begin, 220.

⁵¹ Abdallah Frangi notes that, "From 12 December 1947 to 20 April 1948, at least 17 Arab villages or town were attacked. The method was always the same: the Jewish immigrants surrounded the villages and shot all the inhabitants or else blew their houses up with them inside. These attacks often occurred when the men were at work, so that the victims were mostly women and children. About 600 Palestinian civilians were killed in these attacks. Hundreds of houses were blown up and thousands of people injured." Thurston Clark conveyed in his book, *By Blood and Fire*, "The most notorious Irgun operation directed against Arabs took place in April 1948, when Irgun and Sternist units attacked the Arab village of Dir Yassin killing 254 men, women, and children...Begin claimed that the village had been a legitimate military objective." Abdallah Frangi, *PLO and Palestine* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 81; Thurston Clarke, *By Blood and Fire: The Attack on the King David Hotel* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1981) 257.

thus establishing the State of Israel. The violent use of force, creating terror and fear to obtain a political goal, helped support the rebirth of the Jewish State of Israel.⁵²

In 1964, the regimes of the Arab League led by Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser founded the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The Palestinians witnessed their villages destroyed, were forced from what they believed to be their homelands, and became a nation in exile between 1948 and 1949. After the Israelis bombed Gaza in 1956, Palestinians were no longer content to rely on fellow Arab nations for their protection. In 1955, the National Unity Front al-Fatah (*Harakat al Tabrir al Watani al-Falestiniya Fatah*) was formed as a common Palestinian front against Israel. Al-Fatwah's immediate aim was to gain legitimacy for their Palestinian dissident movement and secure active Palestinian commitment (constituents, sympathizers, activists, and militants). Their method to achieve success, and thus gain additional supporters, was terrorism. Al-Fatwah launched its first terrorist raid against Israel in January 1965 and immediately galvanized Palestinian refugees after twenty years of resistance inactivity. The turning point for Palestinian resistance efforts was in 1968 after the Battle of Karameh in which al-Fatwah, led by Yasser Arafat fought off nearly 15,000 Israeli troops in Jordan. Successes at Karameh resulted in the Palestinian dissident movement gaining substantial legitimacy and Yasser Arafat being elected president of the newly formed PLO executive committee. Designed as an umbrella organization to control the numerous dissident cells, the Palestinian Liberation Organization's primary objective was to liberate Palestine. By 1970 the PLO was the dominate resistance group, yet the Palestinian cause remained an unknown.⁵³

The Black September Organization (BSO), a loosely-knit terrorist organization operating under the PLO umbrella, kidnapped and killed eleven Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games in an attempt to gain global attention for Palestinian causes.⁵⁴

⁵² According to Eliot A. Cohen, Menachem Begin the 6th Prime Minister of Israel, winner of the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, remains a hero of Israel even after his death in 1992. The Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee noted in his speech when awarding the Nobel Prize for 1978 to both Anwar al-Sadat and Menachem Begin that, "we only know of one previous peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. This, as Israeli scholars have revealed, took place some 3,000 years ago; it was the peace concluded between King David's son, wise King Solomon, and the Egyptian Pharaoh." Aase Lionaes, *The Nobel Peace Prize for 1978*; available <http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/1978/press.html>; Internet; accessed 30 December 2001.

⁵³ Frangi, 94-112 and Edgar O' Balance, *The Palestinian Intifada* (Great Britain: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998) 3-7.

⁵⁴ Abdallah Frangi notes, "Black September evolved from the Civil War in Jordan in 1971, in which 30,000 Palestinians were killed. Black September's primary objective was to punish those responsible for the bloody massacre in Jordan using violence. Their secondary objective was liberating Palestinian prisoners from the cells of the Jordanian secret service." Frangi, 120; Hoffman, 71; Schmid, 638.

Black September's method was terrorism, the target was Israel's Olympic athletes, its audience was the world, and its purpose was to gain unprecedented exposure and publicity. In September 1972, eight Black September terrorists stormed into the Olympic dormitory killing two Israel athletes and taking nine more hostages. During deliberations, Black September offered to exchange the hostages for 236 Palestinians imprisoned in Jordan, Israel, and Germany, and safe passage to any Arab country.⁵⁵ German authorities agreed to transport Black September and the hostages to Furstenfeldbruck as part of a negotiated settlement, where the terrorists would board a Lufthansa airplane for Cairo. When the two helicopters landed, German snipers fired on the terrorists killing three of the eight kidnapers. The remaining terrorists immediately began killing hostages, and after a tense standoff, one of the terrorists lobbed a hand grenade into the helicopter killing all nine hostages. In the end, Black September had killed all eleven hostages, and only three of the eight terrorists survived. The hostage rescue was a debacle, but the terrorist strike was a success, in that it had gained substantial media attention.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Hoffman, 71.

⁵⁶ Hoffman, 71 and Frangi 120.

Chapter 3

OSAMA BIN LADEN'S GLOBAL TERRORIST ALLIANCE

The assumption was that the average suicide bomber was a psychologically damaged 19-year-old with a limited education. What is extraordinary about this episode is that these people were preparing for other mission for months, leading normal lives with wives, taking the garbage out, taking kids to McDonalds, taking flying lessons, living in comparatively pleasant places, all the while knowing that on some date they were going to kill themselves and thousands of people.

Brian Jenkins, RAND
Washington Post, 16 September 2001

Osama bin Laden and the “Brotherhood of Muslims” created the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders in 1998 as a strategic alliance of Muslim reformists.⁵⁷ He envisioned the strategic alliance and its networked tentacles achieving global influence for the Islamic movement. His alliance reached to nearly 40 different countries.⁵⁸ Its collective goal was expelling Western influences and moderate Arab governments from Muslim lands, thus purifying Islam. His audience was the masses of Islam. His modus operandi was terrorism supported by Al-Qaeda’s financial arm, his personal inheritance, and Islamic fundamentalist constituencies. The purpose of this chapter is to explain Osama bin Laden’s terrorist alliance and structure by examining

⁵⁷ The Brother Hood of Muslims is a concept, that Osama bin Ladens uses in an attempt to rally Muslims as one large society. It is not the Muslim Brotherhood formed by Hasan al-Banna in 1928. According to the Qur’an (al-Hujuraat 49:10), “Indeed the believers are but brothers.” Creation of the International Islamic Front for the Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders by Osama bin Laden; Ayman al-Zawahiri, amir of the Jihad Group in Egypt; Abu-Yasir Rifa’i Ahmad Taha, Egyptian Islam Group; Shaykh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan; and Fazlur Rahman, amir o the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh was a physical formation of the concept. When bin Laden acknowledge the formation in his 1998 interview with John Miller, he also referred to the brotherhood working “toward liberating the Holy Land and coordinate efforts between Muslim masses in the area.” He is in essence saying that all Islamic believers are brothers and therefore must come together and “carry out jihad against the Jews and the crusaders.” Osama bin Laden, “To Terror’s Source,” interview by John Miller, Camera (May 1998): 5; available from http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/terror_1stperson_980612.html; Internet; accessed 2 December 2001.

⁵⁸ Rohan Gunaratna notes that Al-Qaeda had presence in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Jordan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria, Xinjiang in China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Dagestan, Kashmir, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia, and in the West Bank and Gaza. Rohan Gunaratna, “Cutting Al-Qaeda Down to Size,” in *JANE’S Intelligence Review*, Vol. 13, No. 8, August 2001: p.42. Additional articles suggest the alliance is networked into 55 countries. One of those publications Yonah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam, *Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network* (Ardsey, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2001) 30.

Islamic fundamentalism, the origin of his strategic alliance, and Al-Qaeda. Discerning bin Laden's terrorist alliance starts with an understanding of his ideological base as a Pan-Islamic Muslim.

Islamic Fundamentalism

Islamic fundamentalism evolved through the centuries as a religious movement in which dissidents associated with the movement used terrorism to achieve and sustain legitimacy, express political opposition and social discontent, and polarize masses in support of political options.⁵⁹ Islamic reformation conveys the message of deep-rooted social concerns within the Islamic community. The same social, economic, and political changes accepted by secular institutions in the twenty-first century, has directly alienated Islam. Globalization and its advances in communication and transportation technology effectively reduced barriers in commercial market expansion. Nearly every nation and culture in the world became touchable by western influence and its discrete call for global changes. Legitimate changes in Islam however, occur only if there is a need for morale improvement in the Muslim community. Muslims believe that because God created Islam, a change within its religious structure implies changing God's original design. Hence, changes in Islam occur because of the need to purify Islam from the misinterpretations of the past and present, with the intent of restoring Islam to a state in which Muhammad left it.⁶⁰

Most Muslims view American interests as Western infringement on Islamic culture and its values. As the world's largest service industry, American businesses focuses on changing the buying attitude and behavior of the world's youth, selling not just American products, but its popular culture. Global communication networks and mass media create a worldwide culture beyond the unique national cultures to achieve that goal. The Information Age brings globalization of American icons reflecting prosperity, youth, and glamour. Coca-Cola, Nike, and Disney deliver those icons directly to households for the price of a satellite dish. Nearly every country in the world receives the American television networks CNN, MTV, HBO,

⁵⁹ Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, *Islam and Power* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981) 5.

while watching thousands of Hollywood films. Muslim leaders are concerned about the spread of the American culture. They fear that Western influences contributed by the Information Age and open governments are corrupting the foundations of Islam. Bin Laden used these fears to arise as a self-proclaimed defender of Islam, much like the 12th Century Islamic freedom fighter Salah'adin.⁶¹

Bin Laden's recorded statement suggest he believes he is following in the footsteps of Muhammad by expelling Western influences from Muslim lands, thus reforming Islam to its original state (*salafiyya*). Bin Laden stated in an interview with John Miller, "Allah ordered us in this religion to purify Muslim lands of all non-believers, and especially the Arabian Peninsula where the *Ka'bah* is."⁶² To bin Laden, calling for all Muslims to kill Americans where they can, when they can, was a justifiable act in purifying Islam. Michael Doran reminds us that *salafiyya* (the restoration of traditional beliefs and practices) dates back to the 7th Century with Muhammad's conquest to reform Mecca and destroy the stone idol *Hubal*, located in the *Ka'bah*.⁶³ Islam prescribes that each Muslim turn towards Mecca in their daily prayers to honor God through the Black Stone located in the *Ka'bah*. Mecca sits on what was the Red Sea trade route between the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. Mecca became breeding ground for pagans worshiping stone idols during the 7th Century. The transformation of Mecca—Ishmael's Holy City—to a pagan city occurred because of influences from trade travelers and their less disciplined religious beliefs. Arabs living within the city developed a religious lifestyle of believing and worshiping more than one god in the form of stones. The greatest of which was

⁶⁰ Thomas Naff, *Towards A Muslim Theory of History in Islam and Power*, ed., Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981) 28.

⁶¹ Salah'adin Al Ayoubi (1137-1193 A.D.) was a 12th Century Islamic freedom fighter who liberated the city Jerusalem (Al-quds Al Sharif) from the Christian Crusaders on 2 October 1187 A.D. Arabic News.com, *ISESCO calls Muslims to mark anniversary of Jerusalem liberation by Salahadin Al-Ayoubi*; available from <http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/990917/1999091730.html>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2001.

⁶² John Miller's 1998 Interview with Osama bin Laden, 2

⁶³ Ka'bah is a small stone building located in the court of the great mosque at Mecca, allegedly built by Abraham and Ishmael. For many its beginnings are traced back to the creation of man. Inside the Ka'bah is the Black Stone that Gabriel gave to Adam, and was later found by Abraham prior to reconstruction of the Ka'bah. Once the construction was completed God ordered Abraham to publicly proclaim that all must complete a pilgrimage (later known a Hajj) to complete their rituals, and perform vows to God and the sacred house Ka'bah. *Hubal* was one of the many pagan gods worshiped by Arabs gone astray from the original teachings. Most Islam sources tend to agree that God ordered Abraham to build the structure as a sanctuary for Islam. Peters contends, "For hundreds of millions of Muslims, the Ka'bah is the holiest building in the world, and like the Station of Abraham and the sequence of pilgrimage rituals [Hajj] to the vicinity of Mecca, derives from their connection with Abraham, the biblical patriarch." F.E. Peters, *The Hajj: The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 10. Michael Scott Doran, "Somebody Else's Civil War," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2002: 24.

Hubal, a red agate in the form of a man with his right hand broken off.⁶⁴ Muhammad fled from Mecca to Yathrib (Medina) in 622 A.D after a decade of persecution from the Meccans for advocating a traditional Islamic faith (*salafiyya*) and destruction of *Hubal*. The Muslim migration (*Hijrah*) to Medina united Muslims into an international Muslim community (*ummah*) governed by Islamic fundamentalist law (*shari'ah*).⁶⁵ Muhammad and the Islamic movement entered the city of Mecca unchallenged seven years later, destroyed *Hubal* and the other pagan idols surrounding the *Ka'bah*, thus purifying Muslim lands.⁶⁶ Doran notes that, "When bin Laden calls America 'the *Hubal* of the age,' he suggests that it is the primary focus of idol worship and thus it is polluting the Kaaba, a symbol of Islamic purity."⁶⁷ Bin Laden perceives Western influences (United States) as the modern *Hubal*, and as such intends to destroy the United States just as Muhammad destroyed the *Hubal*.

The separation of Islam into its numerous sects placed Muslim and Arab identities against each other. Muhammad died leaving no guidance as to who should succeed him as the next *Khalifah*—head of the Islamic movement—or how future successors should govern the territorial empire that he had consolidated.⁶⁸ A civil war ensued over the leadership of Islam in 656 A.D. between the followers of Muhammad's two son-in-laws.⁶⁹ At this point Islam split into two factions: *Shi'a* or *Shiite* and *Sunna* or *Sunnis*.⁷⁰ *Shiite* Islam (party of Ali) matured in

⁶⁴ F.E. Peters, *Muhammad and the Origins of Islam* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994) 24.

⁶⁵ Ummah is the community of Muslims. In the early days of Islam, Ummah represented the population of Mecca; it now appears to represent Islamic true believers, with the intent of portraying unity. Outside the Islamic faith, ummah signifies a community.

⁶⁶ Peters, 235-238.

⁶⁷ Doran, 24.

⁶⁸ According to Shorosh, "Muhammad predicted that his followers would become divided into seventy-three sects, the religion professed by himself and his companions. However the number of Islamic sects, now over 150, has far exceeded Muhammad's prediction." Anis A. Shorosh, *Islam Revealed: A Christian Arab's View of Islam* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1988) 35.

⁶⁹ Ali ibn Abu Talib and Uthman ibn Affan were Muhammad's two son-in-laws. Ali ibn Abu Talib who was regarded as the "first of Muslims" and Uthman ibn Affan the third *Khalifah*. Egyptians later murdered Uthman in 656 A.D., at which time Ali was elected the fourth *Khalifah*. In 661 A.D. Islamic Kharajis (outsiders) murdered Ali because of his fundamentalist methods in 661 A.D.

⁷⁰ There appears to be no significant doctrinal or ritual differences between the two sects in basic beliefs and practices of Islam. There is a difference of interpretation of Islamic law between the two sects. Sunni Muslims are conformists, in that they believe Islamic law is absolute and cannot be changed beyond its basic texts as written by the Prophet Muhammad. Shiite Muslims on the other hand, believe Islamic law is adaptable to current needs. Sunni Muslims believe that elders can pass on leadership of the religion after the prophet Muhammad only through election, whereas the Shiite Muslims believe the leadership is passed to Muhammad's nearest living male relative. The Sunni sect makes up roughly 85 percent of Muslims worldwide, while Shiites live mostly in Iran and Lebanon. Anis Shorosh contends there are over 150 different Islamic sects. Vahid J. Majd and Ali Abbas, *Islamic Sects and Followings: Shi'ite Beliefs and Practices*; available from <http://www.islamicpaths.org/Home/English/Sects/Shiite/Chapter 9 Part01.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 April 2002; Anis A. Shorosh, *Islam Revealed: A Christian Arab's View of Islam* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1988) 35-39. Lewis

Persia while, *Sunni* Islam prevailed in the Arab countries from Egypt to Iraq.⁷¹ *Shiite* Muslims maintain that Ali ibn Talib (one of Muhammad's son-in-laws) was the true successor to Muhammad, and only an Islamic spiritual leader can give divine guidance. The more prominent and widespread *Sunni* Muslims, are "followers of tradition." *Sunni* Muslims are generally viewed as extremists of the two original sects, notwithstanding the *Wahhabis* sect.

Osama bin Laden belongs to the Pan-Islamic sect, an extreme faction of the *Wahhabis* sect. The *Wahhabis* are a spin-off of the strict *Sunni* sect based in Saudi Arabia, and are a more fundamentalist sect advocating for *salafyya* (a traditional Islamic faith). The *Wahhabi* movement originated in the eighteenth century focused on purifying Islam within the Arabian Peninsula.⁷² The movement spread throughout the Peninsula subdividing into additional factions, over time. In the 1940s and 1950s under the direction of Sayd Qutb, an Egyptian fundamentalist, the sect took on a violently anti-Western role.⁷³

Shaping of the Global Terrorist Alliance

The International Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders is a strategic alliance structure organized around bin Laden and his original terrorist network Al-Qaeda.⁷⁴ Bin Laden formed the alliance under the auspice of the Brotherhood of Muslims, to express commitment for continuation of the Islamic movement, by sharing or transferring decision-making power to bin Laden, without changing his terrorist organization. Bin Laden emerged from the Russian-Afghanistan war as a reflection of Islamic extremists whom influenced his

B. Ware, "An Islamic Concept of Conflict in Its Historical Context," in *Conflict, Culture, and History* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1993) 62-76.

⁷¹ Naff, 26.

⁷² Steven Emerson, *American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us* (New York: The Free Press, 2002) 22

⁷³ Emerson, 22.

⁷⁴ Groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda include: Ulema Union of Afghanistan - *Afghanistan*; Armed Islamic Group (GIA) - *Algeria*; Salafist Group for Proselytism and Combat (GSPD) - *Algeria*; The Groupe Roubaix - *Algeria*; al-Jihad - *Bangladesh*; al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) - *Egypt*; al-Jihad - *Egypt*; Bayt al-Imam - *Jordan*; Partisans Movement - *Kashmir*; Asbat al Ansar - *Lebanon*; Hezbollah - *Lebanon*; Al-Badar - *Pakistan*; Harakat ul Jihad - *Pakistan*; Jaish-i-Mohammed - *Pakistan*; Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan - *Pakistan*; Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUM) - *Pakistan*; Hezb ul-Mujahedeen - *Pakistan*; al-Hadith - *Pakistan*; Laskar e-Toiba - *Pakistan*; Hamas - *Palestinian Authority*; Islamic Jihad - *Palestinian Authority*; Moro Islamic Liberation Front - *Philippines*; Abu Sayyif - *Philippines*; Abu-Ittihad - *Somalia*; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan - *Uzbekistan*; al-Jihad Group - *Yemen*; The Advice and Reform Committee; Talaa al Fath (Vanguards of Conquest); Lebanese Partisans League; Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. Yohah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam, *Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network* (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc.) 30; U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999*, available from http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/fto_1999.html; Internet; accessed 21 December 2001.

path. Al-Qaeda emerged with bin Laden after recruiting, training, and supporting thousands of Arab *Mujahedeen* rebels opposing the 1979 Soviet invasion. Based in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda drew on the goals, interests, and perceptions of sustaining members within the alliance to further a common ideological belief of purifying Islam. Osama bin Laden orchestrated the actions of Al-Qaeda and became a driving force behind the International Islamic Front due in part to the influence he received by activists and scholars. Most studies on Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda describe his terrorist organization as a mystical network resembling the Lerna Hydra with 100 serpentine heads. To fix ideas, consider looking at bin Laden's strategic alliance in common business language. Osama bin Laden is CEO of the multinational holding company International Islamic Front, which Al-Qaeda is one of its small business units; an influential voting board member of the Brotherhood of Muslims; and a sustaining member of the Islamic revolutionary foundation.⁷⁵

Five Islamic fundamentalists shaped Osama bin Laden's ideological views: (1) his father Mohammad bin Awdah bin Laden; (2) Dr. Abdullah Azzam an Islamic preacher; (2) Muhammad Qutb an Islamic Scholar associated with Azzam; (4) Prince Turki bin Faisal bin Abdelaziz, the Chief of Security of Saudi Arabia; (5) and Ayman Zawahiri, bin Laden's religious mentor.⁷⁶ Most profiling on Osama bin Laden fails to acknowledge the informative role that his father and family had. Mohammad bin Laden played the largest role in forming Osama's values and ethics toward Islam. Peter Bergen notes that the Hadramawt area where

⁷⁵ Osama bin Laden is the son of Mohammad bin Awdah bin Laden of Hadramawt, Yemen. He was born on 10 March 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Osama was the seventeenth son of a family consisting of fifty sons and daughters and several wives. The bin Ladens' emigrated from southern Yemen to Saudi Arabia in the early 1930s, with some of the soon to be prominent families of Saudi Arabia. Mohammad bin Laden's first job after immigrating to Saudi Arabia was working as a porter in the small province of Jeddah next to Mecca. He later established a contracting company in 1931 after his arrival in Saudi Arabia and assisted other Hadramawts as they migrated north. As the bin Ladens prospered, so did those that migrated with him. Muhammad played an influential role in the reigning King Saud's decision to relinquish his throne in 1964 to King Faisal. Later, Mohammad's contracting company became "the King's private contractor" in 1964 after King Faisal appointed Mohammad as the minister of public works. The bin Ladens grew in prestige after their reconstruction of the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem and renovation of the holy places in Mecca and Medina. Mohammad bin Laden died in a plane crash in 1967 and his estate—consisting primarily of the family company—was divided between each of his children. The bin Laden construction company grew into a conglomerate organization chaired by Salem, Osama's older brother. Salem died from a plane accident like his father in 1988 while at San Antonio Texas. By the end of the Afghanistan-Russian war the bin Laden group had grown into a \$5 billion organization employing over 37,000 people. In many ways, bin Ladens' represented Barber's *Jihad vs. McWorld* contention of "Jihad not only revolting against but abetting McWorld, while McWorld not only imperils but re-creates and reinforces Jihad." While the bin Laden family lived and prospered with Western influences, Osama bin Laden endeavored to purify Islam of those very same measures. Peter Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.* (New York: The Free Press, 2001) 41-46; Rohan Gunaratna, *Cutting Al-Qaeda Down to Size*, in *JANE'S Intelligence Review*, Vol. 13, No. 8, August 2001: p. 42; and Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995) 5.

⁷⁶ Bergen, 41-17; Gunaratna, 42-43; and Yonah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam, *Usama bin Laden's al-Qauida: Profile of a Terrorist Network* (Ardley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2001) 3-5.

Mohammad grew up was extremely conservative in its views toward Islam, and those migrating to Saudi Arabia retained that conservative culture.⁷⁷ The basis for Osama's conservatism lies within his family. Osama's loyalty to both his family and religion is a direct reflection of his father's values. Mohammad reportedly made continual contributions to Hadramawt, Yemen, his hometown, some thirty years after he and his family departed. Mohammad bin Laden died when Osama was 10 years old. In many ways, bin Laden endeavored to gain his fathers acceptance and believed he had achieved that goal by following in Muhammad the Prophets footsteps. Bergen notes that in an interview with a Pakistani journalist bin Laden stated, "My father was very keen that one of his sons should fight against the enemies of Islam. So I am the one son who is acting according to the wishes of his father."⁷⁸

Dr. Sheikh Abdullah Azzam and his Islamic extremist values influenced Osama bin Laden more than anyone else, except for bin Laden's father.⁷⁹ Azzam, a Palestinian from Jordan, was an influential member of the Brotherhood of Muslims and founding father of the Hamas terrorist group.⁸⁰ Bin Laden first met Azzam, and an associated colleague Muhammad Qutb while attending the Jeddah King Abdul-Aziz University.⁸¹ Azzam reportedly was one of the first Arabs to join the Afghan Jihad against Russia where he stated, "Jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiations, no conferences, and no dialogues."⁸² Azzam established the *Mektab al Khidemat lil-mujahidin al-Arab* (MaK) service in Peshawar Pakistan to support fellow Arabs in their struggle against Russia. Bin Laden funded Azzam's efforts until an ideological disagreement broke off the partnership, at which time bin Laden established his own "House of Supporters" called *Beit al-Ansar*.⁸³ Assassinated in Pakistan in 1989, Azzam's extremist *salafyya* views remain in the *azzam.com* anti-Western website dedicated to his memory. According to *azzam.com*, Azzam contended, "Jihad must be carried out until the *Khalifah*

⁷⁷ Bergen, 42.

⁷⁸ Hamid Mir, interview by author, Islamabad, Pakistan, September 1998, quoted in Peter Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.* (New York: The Free Press, 2001) 52.

⁷⁹ Gunaratna, 42.

⁸⁰ Gunaratna, 42.

⁸¹ Bin Laden received a degree in economics and public administration from the Jeddah King Abdul-Aziz University in 1981. Bergen, 47.

⁸² Sheikh Abdullah Azzam; available from <http://www.azzam.com>; Internet; accessed 24 February 2002.

⁸³ Bergen, 51.

(Islamic Rule) is established so the light of Islam may shine on the whole world.”⁸⁴ Muhammad Qutb, an Islamic scholar associated with Azzam believed that only Jihad against the enemies of Islam delivered an Islamic society run according to strict Islamic principles (Islamic order).⁸⁵ Qutb, according to *azzam.com* significantly influenced the Islamic Jihad movement and, like Azzam, shaped bin Laden and future Muslims toward their struggle with purifying Islam.

Prince Turki bin Faisal bin Abdelaziz, the Chief of Security of Saudi Arabia was bin Laden’s primary connection to the Saudi regime during the Afghanistan-Russian war. Bin Laden was the conduit between the Afghan freedom fighters and the Saudi Kingdom during the Russian-Afghanistan war because of his family’s fortune. Bin Laden allegedly had direct contact with Prince Faisal thus giving bin Laden, security information on the Saudi and Egyptian governments, the Muslim Brotherhood network, and fundamentalist movements against the Saudi Regime. According to Howard Schneider of the Washington Post Foreign Service, “Prince Turki al Faisal helped nurture the Afghan resistance movement that begot the country’s Taliban leadership.”⁸⁶ Prince Faisal acknowledged bin Laden as “another Saudi veteran of the anti-Soviet Afghan war”⁸⁷ in his outgoing speech. Five weeks after his dismissal with 24 years of service to the House of Saud, Prince Faisal stated in the *Shark al-Ansat* newspaper, “God help us from Satan. You [United States] are a rotten seed like the son of Noah, peace be upon him. And the flood will engulf you like it engulfed him.”⁸⁸ Prince Faisal is an important influence to bin Laden because of the persistent extremist information and identical ideology they shared. Bin Laden had access to information and influencing factors on the House of Saud that most Arab’s did not have. Prince Turki al Faisal became one of the important “hydra heads” that influenced bin Laden during the critical decade after the Afghanistan-Russian war.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ Sheikh Abdullah Azzam; available from <http://www.azzam.com>; Internet; accessed 24 February 2002, quoted in Bergen, 51.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Howard Schneider, *Saudi Missteps Helped Bin Laden Gain Power: Kingdom Funded Taliban, Predecessors*, Washington Post, 15 October 2001, sec. A1.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Gunaratna, 42; and Economist.com, *The Spider in the Web*, 20 September 2001; available from http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=788472; Internet; accessed 24 February 2002.

Ayman Al-Zawahiri,⁹⁰ a physician and founder of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad became Osama bin Laden's closest and prevailing religious advisor.⁹¹ Al-Zawahiri's Islamic Jihad terrorist group assassinated President Anwar Sadat in 1981, for which he served a prison term on a weapons charge. The 50-year-old surgeon currently has a \$5 million price on his head for allegedly masterminding the 11 September 2001 attacks. Al-Zawahiri and bin Laden's paths first crossed in Afghanistan when Al-Zawahiri was providing medical attention to injured Afghan freedom fighters and working to reestablish the Islamic Jihad. Al-Zawahiri continued to influence bin Laden's extremist direction and appeared in 1998 as one of the signatories of the International Islamic Front for the Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders *fatwa*. *JANE'S Intelligence Review* reported, "While Bin Laden has the charisma and the funds that built Al-Qaeda (The Base) network of Islamic fundamentalists, mainly from the men who followed him during the fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, al-Zawahiri is widely seen by counterterrorism and Islamic specialists as the intellectual and ideological driving force behind the organization."⁹² Al-Zawahiri was reportedly next in the Al-Qaeda chain of command to replace bin Laden.

Al-Qaeda⁹³ (Arabic for "The Base") emerged from the *Mektab al Khidmat lil-mujahidin al-Arab* (MaK)⁹⁴ service in Peshawar Pakistan after the Afghanistan-Russian war around 1989 and serves as the foundation for bin Laden's strategic alliance.⁹⁵ Al-Qaeda formed as a makeshift Muslim government directly supporting Islamic fundamentalism. Continuing the Jihad outside

⁹⁰ CNN.com, Egyptian Physician with a \$5 Million Price on His Head; available from <http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/people/shows/Zawahiri/profile.html>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2002.

⁹¹ David S. Cloud, "Slaying the Hydra: Eliminating bin Laden Cuts off One al Qaeda Heads, but Not All," *The Wall Street Journal*, 28 November 2001, sec. A, p. 20.

⁹² Ed Blanche, "Ayman al-Zawahiri: Attention Turns to the Other Prime Suspect," *JANE'S Intelligence Review*, Vol. 13, No. 11, November 2001: 18.

⁹³ The Al-Qaeda terrorist group is linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 1993 attacks on U.S. service members in Somalia, 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa, attacks on the USS Cole, and the successful attacks destroying the World Trade Center towers and portions of the Pentagon. Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitive, poster revised November 2001; available from <http://www.fbi.gov/mostwanted/topten/fugitives/laden.pdf>; Internet; accessed 28 November 2001.

⁹⁴ The Mektab al Khidmat (MaK) service was an office run by Azzam and bin Laden during the Russian-Afghanistan war to transition Afghan rebels as they came from the various region into the front lines. It was at the MaK that many of the Afghan rebels first met bin Laden and developed a combat bond through pre-war training and preparation of their fights against the Soviet Army.

⁹⁵ Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, a Saudi dissident and key government witness in the U.S. embassy bombing federal trials, "Mektab al Khidmat office Mektab al Khidmat is office run by Dr. Abdallah Azzam and Abu Abdallah, Usama Bin Laden, and it helps the new people when they came to Afghanistan help the Afghani people against Russia. This office help[s] them for training and gives them some money and some support." *United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden et al.*, S (7) 98 Cr. 1023, New York, N.Y., 6 February 2001: 34; available from <http://web.elastic.org/~fche/mirrors/cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-02.htm>; Internet; accessed 9 February 2001.

of Afghanistan with the purpose of purifying Islam was its task. Al-Qaeda was a terrorist organization resembling a current day matrix structure organized by functions and product teams.⁹⁶ Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl testified in court that Al-Qaeda consisted of five basic committees: *Shura* Council (Consultation); Military committee; Money and Business (Finance) Committee; Fatwah and Islamic Study (Religious-Legal) Committee; and the Media Reporting and Newspaper Committee.⁹⁷ Commanding the terrorist network, acting as a CEO of a function-product matrix organization was Osama bin Laden, the *Emir*.⁹⁸ Operating as functions within the matrix are the four action committees (Military, Finance, Religious-Legal, and Media). Operating as product teams are the three types of dissident groups supported by bin Laden: (1) groups fighting regimes controlled by Muslim rulers; (2) groups fighting regimes oppressing Muslim populations or masses; (3) and groups fighting to establish their own Islamic state.⁹⁹ Dissident groups associated with Al-Qaeda fought for the Islamic fundamentalist cause, thus endeavoring to further the movement.

Al-Qaeda's core elements remained intact as originally conceived, even though it had expanded since its conception in 1989. Bin Laden's top advisors (command group) resided in the *Shura* Council. The *Shura* Council under guidance from bin Laden determined the strategic direction of Al-Qaeda. Its members were comprised of former combat veterans from the Afghanistan-Russian war, all sharing the same ideological beliefs. The Military Committee was responsible for training and operations, logistical support, procurement, and recruitment. It functioned in comparison to a standard military plans and operations staff section. Its principle duties included developing operational plans; reconnaissance and surveillance; civil-military training; allocation of military resources to include personal, equipment, and information. The Military Training Committee trained Islamic terrorist groups at Al-Qaeda's Khartoum farm in Sudan.¹⁰⁰ The Finance Committee's task was to financially resource Al-Qaeda and its associated

⁹⁶ A matrix structure is an organizational structure that groups people and resources by function and by product. Employees are grouped into functions, allowing them to learn from one another and become more skilled and productive. Employees are also grouped into product teams consisting of members from different functions working together to develop a specific product. The result is a network of reporting relationships among product teams and functions that makes the matrix structure very flexible. For a more critical review of matrix structures, refer to Ronald H. Ballou, *Business Logistics Management: Planning, Organizing, and Controlling the Supply Chain* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999) 614.

⁹⁷ *United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden et al.*, S (7) 98 Cr. 1023, New York, N.Y., 6 February 2001, 46-53.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 12.

⁹⁹ Gunaratna, 43.

¹⁰⁰ *United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden*, 66.

activities. Maintaining the controlling relationships Al-Qaeda had over international criminal activities, charities, commodities, and the front companies was an essential task for the committee. The Finance Committee would not have controlled bin Laden's \$300 million, but it is plausible that they made recommendations to him on possible expenses he should fund. The Religious-Legal Committee was responsible for advising and justifying bin Laden and Al-Qaeda's fundamentalism. A secondary task was development and research of *Fatwahs* in support of bin Laden's strategic goal, and research on clerics supporting the Islamic movement. The Media Committee was responsible for disseminating current Al-Qaeda civil-military activities and support of an overarching information campaign to dispel Western influences. Al-Qaeda used its daily newspaper *Nasbrat al Akhbar* (Newscast), internet sources such as Azzam.com, and European based Press and Public Relations cells as information tools. Al-Qaeda drew from a 50,000 Afghan veteran population of the Afghanistan-Russian war and military conflicts in Tajikistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kashmir, Mindanao, Chechnya, Lebanon, Nagorno-Karabakh, Algeria, and Egypt to form its base of sympathizers, activists, and militants.¹⁰¹ Understanding the Islamic ideology and the actors that influenced bin Laden, helps one discern *why* he attacked United States. Understanding his strategic alliance's support structure and modus operandi helps one discern *how* he was able to attack United States.

Support Structure

Osama bin Laden's support network raised and distributed funds and resources to ensure survivability of the strategic alliance, Al-Qaeda, and supported terrorist cells. According to an article in *JANE'S Intelligence Review*, "The financial arm of Al-Qaeda operates like a foundation, with high-ranking members selecting suitable applicants, such as newly-established Al-Qaeda cell or a like-minded radical Islamist group, and providing financial assistance for terrorist activities."¹⁰² Bin Laden generated funding through criminal activities, charities, commodities, front companies, and his diminishing personal wealth.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Gunaratna, 43; and *United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden*, 43-56

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Brian Joyce and Trifin J. Roule, "Investigators Seek to Break up Al-Qaeda's Financial Structure," *JANE'S Intelligence Review*, Vol. 13, No. 11, November 2001: 8.

At the top of bin Laden's financial arm were banking institutions that both knowingly and unknowingly laundered Al-Qaeda's multimillion-dollar transactions. Al-Qaeda hid its illicit profits through money laundering efforts at banking institutions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Philippines, United Arab Emirates, United States, Germany, Great Britain, and a host of other countries. The Dalah al Baraka Group and its subsidiaries across the Middle East and Asia, reportedly supported bin Laden's financial transactions.¹⁰⁴ Gold played an important role in hiding Al-Qaeda's assets and illicit transactions because of its exemption from international reporting requirements—unlike hard currency. Using the *hawala* money-transfer system, millions of dollars shuffled between the Middle East, Asia, and North America.¹⁰⁵ Over \$5-million per day was laundered out of Afghanistan using gold and the *hawala* system. Officials in Pakistan estimated, "\$2 million to \$3 million a day is usually hand-carried by couriers from Karachi, Pakistan, to Dubai, mostly to buy gold, and by late last year that amount increased significantly as money was moved out of Afghanistan."¹⁰⁶

The criminal activities branch resembled a current day international organized crime syndicate. Associated with illegal market enterprises, the criminal branch actively trafficked and smuggled drugs, extorted arms, laundered money, and perpetrated international fraud involving travel documents and credit cards. What made bin Laden's criminal activity branch successful was its ability to control distribution of illegal goods, not its ability to control the manufacturing of those goods. An exception was Opium produced in Afghanistan. Drug trafficking was a major financial income source for Al-Qaeda. The U.S. State Department reported that drug trafficking in Afghanistan netted the Taliban ruling officials and Al-Qaeda some \$40 million annually.¹⁰⁷ Both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda produced thousands of tons of opium in Afghanistan on an annual basis. Al-Qaeda then smuggled the narcotics through Central Asia to distribution centers in East Africa. According to INTERPOL and the World Customs Agency, Afghanistan was among the 28 major drug producing and transit countries in the

¹⁰⁴ Glenn R. Simpson and Rick Wartzman, "U.S. Investigates Big Saudi Banking Group," *The Wall Street Journal*, 2 November 2001, sec. A. p. 2.

¹⁰⁵ The *Hawala* money transferring system is the traditional Middle Eastern banking system. Instead of moving money through traceable mechanism such as wire transfers, money is literally transferred from hand to hand. When the transaction is complete, all records are destroyed, thus leaving no traceable records.

¹⁰⁶ Douglas Farah, "Al-Qaeda's Road Paved with Gold," *The Washington Post*, 17 February 2002, sec. A. p. 1.

¹⁰⁷ Charles Porter, Drug Trade is Primary Income Source for Taliban, DEA Says, U.S. Department of State International Information Program, 3 October 2001; available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01100311.htm>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2002.

world. Afghanistan drug efforts attributed to an international drug seizure total of 3,837 tons of narcotics in 1998, and 4,256 tons in 1999. Bin Laden gained the heroin wealth of Afghanistan for his strategic alliance.

Drugs were not the only illicit commodity being smuggled by Al-Qaeda operatives though. Daniel Pearl and Robert Block of *The Wall Street Journal* reported on Al-Qaeda cells in Tanzania actively smuggling Tanzanite gems from Tanzania to free-trade havens in Dubai and Hong Kong.¹⁰⁸ In 1996, United States imported approximately \$380 million of Tanzanite jewelry. Not surprisingly, the same Al-Qaeda cell responsible for bombing the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania in 1998 was also responsible for smuggling gems out of Tanzania to the open market. Diamonds from Sierra Leone and the Republic of Congo, tanzanite from Tanzania, heroin from Afghanistan and the Philippines, and other illicit commodity trafficking became the backbone of bin Laden's financial arm.¹⁰⁹

Osama bin Laden created a series of front companies throughout the Middle East to support Al-Qaeda's criminal activities, its associated money laundering challenges, and movement of personnel and resources.¹¹⁰ Al-Qaeda conducted terrorist training at its three farms in Sudan using explosives bought by its Al-Hijra construction company. Bin Laden's two investment firms became essential in money laundering operations between sympathizers in various banking institutions. Al-Qaeda terrorists were paid annual salaries and travel stipends from either Taba Investments or Ladin International in cash to support their activities and loyalty. At times, terrorists drew salaries from two or three different front companies, varying by month on the financial condition of Al-Qaeda.¹¹¹

Al-Qaeda used charitable donations as a front for transferring large sums of money from Islamic sympathizers to the strategic alliance. Wealthy Arab executives, donated large sums of money through charities to support bin Laden's Islamic movement efforts in Bosnia,

¹⁰⁸ Robert Block and Daniel Pearl, "Underground Trade: Much-Smuggled Gem Called Tanzanite Helps Bin Laden Supports," *The Wall Street Journal*, 16 November 2001, sec. A, p.1. Daniel Pearl, a Jewish reporter for *The Wall Street Journal*, was kidnapped and brutally murdered in Pakistan by Islamic terrorists in February 2002.

¹⁰⁹ Farah, 1.

¹¹⁰ Front companies owned and operated by Al-Qaeda included: the foundation company Wadi al Aqia; three agribusinesses (1-salt farm in Port Sudan, 2-Al Themar al Mubbraka sesame and peanut farm, and 3-fruit and vegetable packaging company); Taba Investment firm; Import/Export company (Ladin International); Hijra Construction Company; and Al Qudurat Transportation. *United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden*, 81-88; and Brian Joyce and Trifin J. Roule, 9.

¹¹¹ *United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden*, 81-98; and Brian Joyce and Trifin J. Roule, 9

Chechnya, Kosovo, Kashmir, and Croatia.¹¹² Bin Laden reportedly used the unknowing Arab executives to finance his objectives against Western influences. Islamic humanitarian organizations located in Afghanistan and the Philippines channeled funds and resources to terrorist cells working within the respective geographical area. Brian Joyce and Trifin Roule contend, “The Afghanistan-based Al-Wafa Humanitarian Organization allegedly purchases equipment and weapons for Al-Qaeda, and performs only minor legitimate humanitarian work in the region.”¹¹³ Bin Laden’s inheritance was significantly reduced by operational costs and expenses related to Al-Qaeda relocation to Sudan after the Afghanistan-Russian war. Charitable donations and illicit funds from his criminal branch were soon floating the entire strategic alliance.

A trend emerges in Al-Qaeda’s operations over the last decade as a *modus operandi*. First, the strategic alliance did not constrain itself to geographical areas. Operating in roughly 40 different countries, bin Laden supported efforts against regimes having compromised Islam, oppressed Muslims, and attempting to establish Islamic states. Second, Bin Laden entered an area of operations with a loosely defined organization or small terrorist cell. He refined that particular cell through training and indoctrination camps and front line experience with terrorist contingencies in other area of operations. The terrorist cell was then refined with small terrorism attacks to show success and build legitimacy in the fundamentalism movement, thus gaining more sympathizers and activists. In time, the terrorist cell completed operations that were more sophisticated and began to network itself into smaller terrorist cells. Finally, the cell achieved maturity and carried out attacks such as the World Trade Center bombing in 1993; the U.S. Embassy bombings in 1998; suicide bombing of USS Cole in 2000; and destruction of the World Trade Center towers in 2001. The basic defining character of bin Laden and his strategic alliance is its use of violence to expel Western influences from Islamic states. Osama bin Laden used the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and

¹¹² Glenn R. Simpson, “Clinton Told Saudis of How Charities Funded al Qaeda,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 25 October 2001, sec. A. p. 2.

¹¹³ Brian Joyce and Trifin J. Roule, 9

Crusaders to gain further legitimacy for the Islamic fundamentalist movement, and provide an organizational structure to his growing terrorist alliance.

Chapter 4

STRATEGIC PROVOCATION

I knew all along that we could not allow this to become anything other than good versus evil. And a lot of my language early on was painting the man for what he is. He's an evil man. He represents no religion, no ideology except for hate. I really view this man as a barbaric guy. I view him as one of the most cynical, corrupt-type individuals. Bold...very diabolical.

President George W. Bush
December 20, 2001

Previous chapters established a theoretical and historical background on terrorism, reasoning for the Islamic fundamentalist movement, and the organizational framework of bin Laden's strategic alliance. The purpose of this chapter is to address why bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda terrorist organization would attack United States, knowing that Americans would demand a reprisal. I argue that bin Laden attacked the United States as part of a calculated strategy designed to topple pro-Western Arab governments, eject the US from the Middle East, and ultimately threaten the survival of Israel. Bin Laden estimated that the attack would provoke an American reprisal that he could portray as a Western crusade against Islam. Such a crusade would polarize the Islamic masses and galvanize their efforts to attack Western interests and remove moderate Arab governments. Islamic states would replace moderate secular regimes, and force the US—its resolve already weakened by a rising tide of terrorism—to physically and politically withdraw from the Middle East. With the US defeated, the Islamic fundamentalist world would be free to turn its attention to the destruction of Israel.

Ayman Zawahiri wrote a 100-page thesis on Islamic fundamentalist and the establishment of an Islamic nation, in the mist of the American led air campaign on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda organizations.¹¹⁴ Zawahiri argues in that thesis, according to Pincus, "If the successful operations against Islam's enemies and the severe damage inflicted on them do

¹¹⁴ Walter Pincus reported that Zawahiri's writings were smuggled out of Afghanistan in December 2001, just prior to his disappearance. Zawahiri is widely seen by counterterrorism and Islamic specialists as the intellectual and ideological driving force behind the organization, and is reportedly next in the Al-Qaeda chain of command to replace bin Laden. Walter Pincus, "Zawahiri Urged Al Qaeda to Let Fighters Escape for Jihad's Sake," *Washington Post*, 1 January 2002, sec. A.13.

not serve the ultimate goal of establishing the Muslim nation in the heart of the Islamic world, they will be nothing more than disturbing acts, regardless of their magnitude, that could be absorbed and endured, even if after some time and with some losses.”¹¹⁵ Attacking the United States was a provocation directed at seeking Western reprisals to polarize the Islamic world, cause an uprising intended on removing American influences from the Middle East, and threaten Israel.

The underlying assumption of why bin Laden attacked the United States was that he had a choice. Lichbach contends, “collective violence gives the dissident four potential strategic advantages: collective violence permits dissidents to enter conventional politics, disrupts the conventional politics from which they are excluded, lets them enter the struggle for resources, and allows them to sort out their friends and enemies.”¹¹⁶ After first addressing his terrorist dilemma, bin Laden would tap into each of these advantages.

Terrorist Dilemma

According to the theory of terrorism presented in Chapter 2, bin Laden’s dilemma regarding the West was whether to attack the United States knowing that Americans would demand a reprisal, or remain passive and risk the dissident movement becoming stagnated. Bin Laden sought to achieve a political change by destroying the will of the American people first. Bin Laden believed he gained the greatest benefit with minimal costs by attacking to provoke an American reprisal. However, if the attack did not produce a retaliatory strike, the Islamic fundamentalist movement stood a chance of becoming idle. Bin Laden based his knowledge of the American strategic culture on analogies of Western historical events and recent experiences with United States. He selected the method of attack that offered the greatest ability to seize power for the Islamic fundamentalism movement. Bin Laden needed a method of preventing the fundamentalist movement from failing and entering into a status-quo situation. Collective violence, terrorism, became bin Laden’s method of provoking an American reprisal attack.

Islamic fundamentalism is an international dissident movement, in which bin Laden was the dissident leader. Bin Laden is a religious extremist who envisioned uniting the Muslim

¹¹⁵ Pincus, A13.

¹¹⁶ Lichbach, 55

community (*ummah*) into one supreme authority governed by Islamic fundamentalism.¹¹⁷ Al-Qaeda is just one of the many dissident groups participating in that movement. Bin Laden, a religious extremist,

Bin Laden had grandeur goals for his movement and the main impediment to reaching them was the United States' presence in the Middle East. Bin Laden's political goal was to establish the conditions for the *Khalifah's* (political leader) resurrection, and unite Muslims into an international *ummah* governed by Islamic fundamentalism under the Prophet Muhammad.¹¹⁸ He envisioned his regenerated Islamic world occupying the heart of the Middle East, the Mesopotamian Region from Tunisia to Indonesia.¹¹⁹ His Islamic Empire would range from Spain across North Africa and the Middle East to Central Asia and Northern India. Bin Laden believed the presence of American interests had desecrated the Islamic culture and its values. Western influences and the American icons of prosperity, youth, and glamour drew attention to Islamic suffering from poverty and political disadvantage. Islamic extremists believed that Western influences had watered down, obscured, or omitted the call of Islamic faith. Hence, bin Laden believed a precondition for their prosperity was the downfall of the Western culture.

It is likely bin Laden saw himself as having two choices regarding Western influences: either attack the United States (Western influences) knowing that Americans would demand a reprisal, or remain passive and watch the fundamentalist movement wilt away. His dilemma was choosing to act, or not act against America, the regime he fashioned as his adversary. His final decision encompassed evaluating (cost and benefits) the choices against the possible outcomes and expected responses. His decision calculus centered on four possible outcomes, with four separate yet related benefits and costs.¹²⁰ Table 2. (Bin Laden's Dilemma) represents those choices.

¹¹⁷ Ummah is the community of Muslims. In the early days of Islam, Ummah represented the population of Mecca; it now appears to represent Islamic true believers, with the intent of portraying unity. Outside the Islamic faith, ummah signifies a community.

¹¹⁸ According to the Islamic-World Net, Khalifa is an Islamic word meaning "one who replaces someone else who lived or died." The Muslim Khalifa is the Prophet Muhammad's successor (in a line of successors) as the political, military, and administrative leader of the Muslims. The Khilafa (a related Islamic word) is the government of the Muslim state. Hence, the Khalifa is the state head of a Khilafa. Islamic World-Net, *Definition of Khalifah/Caliph*: Internet; <http://islamic-world.net/khalifah/definition.htm>; accessed 27 January 2002.

¹¹⁹ Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: The Free Press, 2001) 20.

¹²⁰ Lichbach, 5.

		America's Choices	
		Reprisal Attack	No Reprisal Attack
Osama Bin Laden's Choices	Attack	<p>Benefits: Portray the American reprisal as a Western crusade against Islam. Polarize Islamic masses. Galvanize his efforts in attacking Western interests and remove moderate Arab governments. Martyr status if he is killed. Because the Islamic fundamentalist cause becomes politically powerful, the movement reflects success, and Al-Qaeda is not perceived as rogue crime elements.</p> <p>Cost: Bin Laden most likely did not expect to die. However, it is plausible he was willing to be a martyr.</p>	<p>Benefits: Without the American reprisal the bin Laden and the Islamic fundamentalist movement is unable to “spin” the attacks into a crusade. America loses leadership prestige and opens the door for additional terrorists’ attacks.</p> <p>Cost: Bin Laden and the Islamic fundamentalist movement bears the entire cost. Without a reprisal, the attacks by Al-Qaeda are perceived as a failure. Islamic international constituents see the Al-Qaeda as rogue crime elements. Bin Laden loses power with no international reprisal attack.</p>
	Do Not Attack	<p>Benefits: Islamic fundamentalist factions continue their rebellious actions without bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, and his strategic alliance. If the United States attacks without provocation, the crusade yields a great benefit to the movement, however, United States has no reason to attack.</p> <p>Cost: Bin Laden has no personal cost except for prosecution for his previous attacks. Even though bin Laden continues to support anti-Western rhetoric, he is associated as “free riding.” The Islamic fundamentalist movement remains at a status-quo, neither gaining nor losing strength.</p>	<p>Benefits: Status Quo is safe. America achieves a victory against the Islamic fundamentalist movement.</p> <p>Cost: Islamic fundamentalist movement is exhausted and becomes powerless. America achieves a victory against the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Bin Laden is not relevant in history.</p>

Table 2. Bin Laden's Dilemma
Source: Lichbach, *Exhibit 1. Jane's Dilemma*, 5

Option AA. Bin Laden chooses to attack United States. America retaliates with a large diplomatic, informational, military, and economic concerted attack (represented in block AA). The reprisal portrays a Western crusade against Islam, polarizes the Islamic masses, and enlists Muslim sympathizers into the role of Islamic activists and militants, thus, galvanizing bin Laden's efforts to attack Western interests and remove moderate Arab governments. Bin Laden may suffer the personal cost of death, but in doing so becomes an Islamic martyr and furthers the fundamentalist movement. It is plausible that Bin Laden believes the benefits are greater than the costs in this option, thus attacking United States and the American reprisal that follows is politically powerful to the Islamic fundamentalist movement.

Option DA. Bin Laden chooses not to attack United States, but continues to support anti-Western rhetoric while America expends state efforts in prosecuting bin Laden for his previous attacks (represented in block DA). Rogue cells conduct limited terrorist actions on Western interests because of apathy in the Islamic fundamentalist movement. The Islamic fundamentalist movement remains at a status quo, neither gaining nor losing power. Bin Laden bears no personal costs (except for the previous attacks) nor does he receive additional recognition. Bin Laden's dwindling constituents see him as a "free rider" in the Islamic international movement. The benefits are minuscule. Though there are no direct costs, bin Laden loses prestige in this option.

Option AD. Bin Laden chooses to attack United States. America does not retaliate with a military attack, but uses a combination of diplomatic, economic, and limited air strikes to deter future terrorist attacks (represented in block AD). America loses leadership prestige with its limited prosecution efforts, and opens the door for additional terrorist attacks. Without an American reprisal, bin Laden is unable to portray a Western crusade against Islam. International constituents see bin Laden and his Islamic extremist organization as rogue crime elements. Bin Laden is unable to trigger Muslim sympathizers into taking an active and militant role as the Islamic fundamentalist movement begins to exhaust itself. His efforts to attack Western interests and remove moderate Arab governments are defeated as the Islamic fundamentalist movement loses power. It is likely that bin Laden believes the costs outweigh the benefits because America did not retaliate.

Option DD. Bin Laden chooses not to attack United States but continues to support anti-western rhetoric. America does not retaliate against bin Laden and, over time, reduces its persecution efforts against bin Laden for his previous attacks (represented in block DD). Rogue cells conduct limited terrorist actions on Western interests, but dwindle off as the Islamic fundamentalist movement disbands. Bin Laden believed a relative deprivation vis-à-vis between Islam and Western cultures would become the status-quo in this option. The Islamic fundamentalist movement is exhausted and becomes powerless, thus America achieves a victory. There are no benefits and costs for bin Laden. Status quo signals the end of the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Bin Laden had invested nothing and received nothing in this option. He is no longer relevant in history.

Bin Laden likely believed that the Islamic fundamentalist movement had become stagnated in part due to Western influences. Thus bin Laden's calculus was finding a way to

destroy Western influences while simultaneously motivating the Islamic fundamentalist movement before it became irrelevant. Attacking the United States to jump-start the movement, or finding a passive non-violent means of motivating the Islamic movement, became his terrorist dilemma. The cost of participating in bin Laden's dilemma was high and involved the highest risk of all—injury or death. The benefit of participation, if the attack was successful and produced an American reprisal which bin Laden could use to the dissident movement's benefit, was greater relevance of the Islamic fundamentalist movement.

Topple Pro-Western Arab Governments

Rallying Muslims worldwide by provoking a Western reprisal on Islam that he could portray as American immoral attacks was essential to bin Laden's plan of toppling pro-Western Arab governments. Bin Laden attacked the United States after estimating that Americans would demand a reprisal attack. It is likely that he believed the precondition for establishing extremist Islamic governments in Egypt and the Gulf Arab States was expelling American military forces from Saudi Arabia and the whole Gulf Region. He predicted an uprising against American interests by complementing the reprisal with a crusade to polarize the Islamic world and generate support among Arab states for unity against the West. The provoked reprisal would infuriate the masses of Islam and push the "free riders" into that extremist group. Bin Laden would then use his terrorist alliance and available resources in a call for "Jihad" (struggle) as a catalyst for spreading Islamic fundamentalism thereby toppling pro-Western Arab governments and expelling the United States from the Middle East.

Provoking an American Reprisal

Bin Laden likely believed he gained the greatest benefit with minimal costs by attacking United States to trigger a Western retaliatory strike. Bin Laden based his decision on previous knowledge, intelligence estimates, and experiences with United States, thus forming his view of the American strategic culture. He rationalized that American's would retaliate predominantly with air attacks, which he and his strategic alliance could wait out. The World Trade Center and the Pentagon were terrorist targets because of their symbolic relationship to Western

economic strength and military power.¹²¹ By successfully attacking the Western symbols of power, bin Laden validated the existence of the Islamic fundamentalist movement, and forced world leaders to recognize his agenda. If America responded with a brutal attack to punish Afghanistan, Iraq, or other Muslim communities, America became exactly what bin Laden predicted—the enemy of Islam.¹²²

American Strategic Culture

The American strategic culture regarding war addresses not only how America fights as a nation, but its entire approach to war.¹²³ Americans regard war as a fight with established political and military objectives, measurable, and always in a forward motion. Although the American strategic culture is generally perceived as not attacking first, Americans would seek a retaliatory effort if attacked severely enough, and expect that effort to result in a quick conclusion. Americans have come to expect quick solutions to military conflicts, thanks to technology and sophisticated weapons. As a Western society, America has a distinctive Western way of waging war, in that it is comfortable with fighting a war of attrition.¹²⁴ Even though Desert Storm was not a war of attrition, it did produce an indelible print on the American psyche that all wars are winnable with precision guided munitions, airpower, and American superiority.

Political or strategic cultural is how a nation addresses its strategic process and methods of waging war. Frederick Downey and Steven Metz contend, “Every nation has a political culture which comprises the context of strategy. It is the source of the nonrational

¹²¹ The World Trade Center opened for business in 1975 and soon become one of New York’s greatest landmarks, challenging the Statue of Liberty and the Empire State building. The Pentagon represents the strategic military nerve center for the United States. By directly striking American symbols of power, Bin Laden made an international statement on the capabilities he held as a dissident movement leader, offered as proof that the Islamic fundamentalist movement was very much alive and growing. Bin Laden’s successful terrorist attacks gained International attention, and he forced the Islamic fundamentalist movement into the Western agenda. Bin Laden calculated the economic effects of his attack would add one more reason why America would retaliate.

¹²² Forrest Morgan, “Attack on America—Global Insurgency,” email message, 27 September 2001.

¹²³ According to Todd Zachary, “A nation’s specific strategic culture, encompassing its attitudes and beliefs concerning war, has a profound effect in determining its focus and conduct. Culturally colored restrictions imposed upon the conduct of war are those based on values that may transcend a national assessment of what is in the best interest of the nation.” Todd M. Zachary, “Wearing the White Hat: The Effect of American Strategic Culture on Implementing National Strategy,” (paper presented as a Thesis requirement to the Faculty of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 2000), 3 and 36-60.

¹²⁴ The American strategic culture is a product of the early American culture and direct threats to its national security during the 19th and 20th Century; as such, America became comfortable with fighting a war of attrition. Zachary, 33.

criteria for strategy formulation and is composed of preferences, values, and proclivities derived from the nation's historical experience, ideology, and political and economic organization."¹²⁵ Todd Zachary argues in his study, *Wearing the White Hat: The Effect of American Strategic Culture on Implementing National Strategy*, the presence of characteristics regarding Western views on war:

- War is essentially used as a problem solving tool;
- Identifiable soldiers under strict command and control fight war;
- Collateral damage is to be avoided unless necessary for the prosecution of the just war. Even then, it must be limited proportionally to the importance of the objective; and
- The rights of the individual must be protected. War is not made on the wounded or unarmed. A surrendered enemy is protected.¹²⁶

Carl von Clausewitz, perhaps the premier military theorist, observed that war is a continuation of policy by other means.¹²⁷ In book one (*On War*), Clausewitz states, "The political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."¹²⁸ Politics are not the planning factor for battles and engagements, but are the purpose for campaigns and wars. According to Clausewitz, "the political object—the original motive for the war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires."¹²⁹

The American military wages war as a product of the American political culture. American military forces are well known for their use of overwhelming combat power (firepower and maneuver) linked to a military objective that is feasible, attainable, and suitable. Zachary argues, "Americans, once provoked into war want to adopt an 'all or nothing' approach. This view, combined with the American tendency to see the US position as absolutely right and the adversary's as absolutely wrong, fosters a mindset within the American public that not only typically demonizes an enemy, but also molds the campaign into a moral crusade."¹³⁰ Thus,

¹²⁵ Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly, September 1998: 1; Internet; <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1988/downey.htm>; accessed 22 March 2002.

¹²⁶ Zachary, 34.

¹²⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 81.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, 87.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, 81.

¹³⁰ Zachary, 45.

bin Laden probably deduced that although America would not attack first, Americans would seek a retaliatory effort if attacked severally enough and expect that effort to result in a quick conclusion.

Bring the Fight into Afghanistan

Bin Laden's strategy was not to defeat American or Western military forces in a war of attrition, but instead provoke an attack in Afghanistan. At such time, bin Laden would either wait out the air attack, or fight American forces using a combination of terrorism and guerilla warfare tactics. Bin Laden calculated that the United States would retaliate with air attacks similar to Israeli attacks in Southern Lebanon in 1983, air strikes on Iraq since Desert Storm, and the cruise missile strikes on Al-Qaeda terrorist camps in 1998. It is plausible that bin Laden drew analogies from those three events, combined with Americans' love for technology to deduce the reprisal would primarily be a short-lived air attack. Bin Laden was neither a state actor nor a military commander and therefore did not have the militia capability to attack American forces. Bin Laden did not have the ability to launch insurgency forces onto American or Saudi Arabian soil with the intent of de-legitimizing the two governments, thus removing Western influences. The best bin Laden could do was draw American forces into Afghanistan and attrite the American will by using Al-Qaeda dissidents and Taliban forces to kill American service members.

Bin Laden drew on similarities when Al-Qaeda destroyed the Kenya and Tanzania US Embassies in 1998, the retaliatory cruise missile attacks in response to Al-Qaeda's actions, and the American civil court proceedings that followed to form his perceptions.¹³¹ President Clinton ordered an American reprisal attack in 1998, in which United States launched cruise missiles against the suspected terrorist camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan.¹³² Bin Laden survived the attacks, and merely because he survived, his revolutionary popularity increased within the fundamentalist movement. Bin Laden described the air strikes in his 1999 interview with TIME Magazine:

¹³¹ Bin Laden has denied responsibility, but prosecutors allege he was responsible or at least had culpability because of the faxes sent by his London Cell to three international media sources, and statements made by alleged embassy bombers as members of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization. Peter Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.* (New York: The Free Press, 2001) 105-126.

The American bombardment had only shown that the world is governed by the law of the jungle. That brutal, treacherous attack killed a number of civilian Muslims. As for material damage, it was minimal. By the grace of God, the missiles were ineffective. The raid proved that the American army is going downhill in its morale. Its members are too cowardly and too fearful to meet the young people of Islam face to face.¹³³

Bin Laden was indirectly saying, as he did in other interviews: “If the Americans are so brave they will come and arrest me.”

Essential to bin Laden’s grand strategy then was provoking an American attack in Afghanistan where he would naturally wait the air attack out, or turn the fight over to Taliban officials and experienced Afghanistan combat veterans such as Ayman Zawahiri—bin Laden’s second in command. Bin Laden did not possess the experience or expertise in military command and control.¹³⁴ He could only establish the conditions for an Islamic fundamentalist war against Western military forces in Afghanistan. Bin Laden believed an American response would come as air attacks, or possibly more cruise missiles. If the Islamic fundamentalist movement

¹³² CNN.com, *Bin Laden, millionaire with a dangerous grudge*; available from <http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/12/binladen.profile/index.html>; Internet; accessed 23 February 2002.

¹³³ Osama bin Laden, “EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW: Conversation with Terror,” interview by Rahimullah Yusufzai, (January 1999): 2; available from <http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/printout/0,9788,174550,00.html>; Internet; accessed 22 November 2001.

¹³⁴ Reports on Bin Laden’s activities during the Russian-Afghanistan war confirm his presence, but generally do not confirm combat experience or expertise in military operations. Stanley Bedlington contends in an article for the *Washington Post* that Bin Laden is not a fighter, and simply uses resources and staged publicity settings to exemplify a myth of himself as a combat warrior. According to Bedlington: “CIA operatives, who ran the covert campaign to arm the Mujahedeen, or guerrilla forces, against the Soviets in the 1980, tell another story: The Arab volunteers bin Laden joined made no great contribution to the battle; the fighting fell mainly to the Afghans. At best, CIA operatives say, bin Laden may have fired a few rounds in self-defense. They attest instead to the wealthy Saudi exile’s proclivity for the role he plays today—which has been to raise money and use it to provide construction equipment and logistics and to fund and advance his terrorist campaign.” During a 1998 interview, John Miller asked Bin Laden to describe how he got the Russian AK-47 and if the legendary story of hand-to-hand combat with Russians were true. In response, bin Laden neither confirmed nor denied the story, but instead resorted to story-telling depicting organizational heroes and villains. By all indications, Bin Laden spent the majority of his time, if not all his time, during the Russian-Afghanistan war providing training and logistical support to Afghan Freedom Fighters as they transitioned to the front lines. According to Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl during his court testimony, “Osama bin Laden helped the new people when they came to Afghanistan to help the Afghani people against Russia. . . . Abdallah Azzam, he runs office, and bin Laden, he gives them the money for that, for running the Mektab al Khidemat.” It is plausible that because bin Laden controlled the Mektab al Khidemat, nearly every Afghanistan Freedom Fighter heading to the front lines saw him. Bin Laden became a recognizable face, who simply absorbed combat stories, filtered them with his own twist, and used them to further the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Bin Laden was not a military commander and as such could not win military campaign against Military forces. At most, bin Laden was a master logistician, with the financial resources and will to make the difference. Stanley Bedlington, “Not Who You Think/Bin Laden’s Ultimate Ambition Is Even More Alarming Than The Warrior Image He Projects”, *Washington Post*, 28 October 2001, sec. B1; available from <http://nl13.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?action=doc&p docid=0EF6FBB3068E>; Internet; accessed 17 March 2002; Osama bin Laden, “To Terror’s Source,” interview by John Miller, *Camera* (May 1998): 2; available from <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/terror1stperson980612.html>; Internet; accessed 2 December 2001: *United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden et al.*, S (7) 98 Cr. 1023, New York, N.Y., 6 February 2001: 34; available from <http://web.elastic.org/~fche/mirrors/criptome.org/usa-v-ubl-02.htm>; Internet; accessed 9 February 2001; Osama bin Laden, “Transcript of Osama Bin Laden interview,” interview by Peter Arnet, *Camera* (March 1997): 2; available from <http://www.ishipress.com/osamaint.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 December 2001; 2.

could wait out the air attacks or limited ground maneuvers, then just by surviving, the movement gained success—similar to what happened during the 1998 cruise missile attacks.

Portray an Immoral Western Crusade against Islam

Bin Laden's strategy was portraying the American reprisal as an immoral Western crusade against Islam to ban the Muslim masses against United States. One of bin Laden's characteristic traits, was his use of the media in propagandizing military reprisals as immoral Western attack. More than likely, his intent was two fold. First, using sympathetic international media, bin Laden would "spin" the loss of lives, extended sufferings, and property damages caused by the American reprisal attacks as horrendous effects caused by the immoral superpower against the Islamic community. Second, he would relate the military strikes to analogies of past western losses due to risk adverse American policy makers and Western populations. In both strategies, the purpose was to destroy the will of the American people, which bin Laden calculated would force a political change.

Islamic Mufdhi (Muslim leaders) are concerned that exposure of Islamic societies to Western values has corrupted the foundations of Islam. Bin Laden capitalized on Islamic fears by building an effective campaign strategy that reinforced accusations of American immorality attacks against the Islamic community. In the Middle East, primarily among Islamic governments, modernization is slow and somewhat stagnated. Globalization—mass media, TV, radio, internet, and real-time information flow—brought both positive and negative changes. Information resembled a "double edge sword" for Bin Laden. Better control, synchronization, and spread of the Islamic fundamentalist message represented the positive side. Whereas, vivid comparisons between Western and Islamic cultures, thus revealing disparities between the "haves and have nots," represented the negative side.¹³⁵ The information age compared the Islamic fundamentalist way of life to an established Western society. Through the internet lens came the animation and portrayal of a better livelihood in the West. Hence, bin Laden relied on "faith in the future," founded on Islamic belief as an essential component to his grand strategy. Bin Laden deflected Islamic deprivation,

¹³⁵ Hoffer contends, "those who are awed by their surroundings do not think of change, no matter how miserable their conditions. When our mode of life is so precarious as to make it patent that we cannot control the circumstances of our existence, we tend to stick to the proven and the familiar. We counteract a deep feeling of insecurity by making of our existence a fixed routine. We hereby acquire the illusion that we have tamed the unpredictable." Hoffer, 7.

discontentment, and overall frustrations onto the West because he could not eradicate the information age. His mechanism for transferring the blame of Islamic frustrations was rallying Muslims against Western influences by portraying a Western crusade against Islam.

Bin Laden brought this tactic to light during his first interview in 1997 with Peter Arnet, when he propagandized the Israeli bombing of Southern Lebanon in 1983, bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War, and American combat operations in Vietnam, Beirut, Aden, and Somalia and horrendous events.¹³⁶ Prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks, bin Laden established the tactic as a characteristic trait in interviews with Peter Arnet (CNN), John Miller in 1998 (ABC), and Rahimullah Yusufzai (TIME) in 1999. Bin Laden kicked off his media campaign immediately following the initial American and British air strikes. In a televised statement (most likely made before the 11 September 2001 attack) with the Al-Jazeera Arabic satellite station and the Islamic fundamentalist website azzam.com, bin Laden reverberated his “cookie-cut” tactics.¹³⁷ According to Kenneth W. Stein, “The man [Osama bin Laden] understands marketing. He’s trying to combine the emotion of the words with what he thought would be an emotional response to the physical attacks. He didn’t say it three days before or three days after. He did it within hours in order to take advantage of Muslim lands being attacked by the West.”¹³⁸ The difference between bin Laden’s pre and post 11

¹³⁶ During his first television interview in March 1997 with Peter Arnet, Osama bin Laden addressed his perception of immoral American actions, “With a simple look at the US behaviors, we find that it judges the behavior of the poor Palestinian children whose country was occupied: if they throw stones against Israeli occupation, it says they are terrorists whereas when the Israeli pilots bombed the United Nations building in Qana, Lebanon while [it] was full of children and women, the US stopped any plan to condemn Israel.... Wherever we look, we find the US as the leader of terrorism and crime in the world. The US does not consider it a terrorist act to throw atomic bombs at nations thousands of miles away, when it would not be possible for those bombs to hit military troops only. These bombs were rather thrown at entire nations; including women, children, and elderly people and up to this day, the traces of those bombs remain in Japan. The US does not consider it terrorism when hundreds of thousands of our sons and brothers in Iraq died for lack of food or medicine.” Bin Laden continues in the same interview with propaganda on how Arabs killed US troops in Mogadishu, Somalia: “After a little resistance, The American troops left after achieving nothing. They left after claiming that they were the largest power on earth. They left after some resistance from powerless, poor, unarmed people whose only weapon is the belief in Allah the Almighty, and who do not fear the fabricated American media lies. We learned from those who fought here, that they were surprised to see the low spiritual morale of the American fighters in comparison with the experience they had with the Russian fighters. The Americans ran away from those fighters who fought and killed them, while the later were still there. If the U.S. still thinks and brags that it still had this kind of power even after all these successive defeats in Vietnam, Beirut Aden, and Somalia, then let them go back to those who are awaiting its return.” Osama bin Laden interview with Peter Arnet, 4 and 6.

¹³⁷ Osama bin Laden, *Prerecorded statement in response to military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan* (Al-Jazeera Arabic satellite station: Pakistan, 7 October 2001); Transcript, *Osama bin Laden: Response to Start of Military Action in Afghanistan*, available from http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/strike_binladentrans011007.html; Internet; accessed 9 October 2001.

¹³⁸ Kenneth W. Stein is an Emory University professor and Middle East fellow at the Carte Center. Geraldine Sealy, *Mixed Messages: Bin Laden Tries to Push Button of Muslims Worldwide With Appeal to History*; available from http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/dailynews/strike_messages011009.html; Internet; accessed 9 October 2001.

September 2001 media campaign was his attempt to rally a sympathetic Muslim worldwide audience. Bin Laden, as he has done in the past, used the reprisal attacks in a media spin effort to enhance his call for “Jihad” against American presence in the Middle East.

Bin Laden’s well-planned media rebellion was an attempt to gain Palestinian support and rally Muslims worldwide in an Islam versus West fundamentalist war:

Let the whole world know that we shall never accept that the tragedy of Andalusia would be repeated in Palestine. We cannot accept that Palestine will become Jewish...And with regard to you, Muslims, this is the day of question. This is a new (inaudible) against you, all against the Muslim and Median...I say these events have split the whole world into two camps: the camp of belief and the disbelief. So every Muslim shall take—shall support his religion”¹³⁹

Immediately after the American led air strikes and Bin Laden’s pre-recorded televised statement, about 1000 Palestinian students from the Islamic University of Gaza (Hamas stronghold) rioted on Palestinian streets displaying pro-bin Laden posters and chanting anti-American slogans.¹⁴⁰ Demonstrations led by Palestinian supporters of bin Laden, crowded the Gaza Strip streets attacking Arafat’s security forces in response to bin Laden’s televised statement. According to Lee Hockstader of the *Washington Post*, “The demonstrations were triggered by the U.S.-led attack on Afghanistan and Palestinian sympathy for bin Laden, the suspected terrorist mastermind who praised the Palestinian cause in a taped statement broadcast around the world after the attacks began Sunday night.”¹⁴¹

Polarize the Islamic Masses and Galvanize Their Efforts

Bin Laden most likely thought a Western crusade against Islam would polarize the Islamic masses and galvanize their efforts to attack Western interests and remove moderate Arab governments. Such a crusade was the mechanism he needed to enrage Islamic masses; thus, motivating the “free riders” associated with the Islamic fundamentalist movement to a more active role. Bin Laden recognized the civil strife between Islamic extremists and Arab moderates, and even though America had been pulled into that struggle, it was not the purpose

¹³⁹ Osama bin Laden’s pre-recorded televised statement, 7 October 2001.

¹⁴⁰ Lee Hockstader, Pro-Bin Laden Palestinians Attack Arafat’s Forces: Police Open Fire on Rioters in Gaza, *Washington Post*, 9 October 2001, sec. A1.

¹⁴¹ Hockstader, A1.

of bin Laden's attack on America. Bin Laden envisioned a Muslim uprising against Western interests and moderate Arab governments. It is plausible that bin Laden coordinated his efforts with other terrorists organizations associated with the Islamic strategic alliance in order to put continued pressure on Western interests and expand Muslim efforts against the West. Bin Laden lashed out at the United States for its attack against Afghanistan, and targeting of innocent Muslim civilians, and at associated Arab countries not associated with his movement in his second televised broadcast on 3 November 2001 in an attempt to rally the "fence sitters."¹⁴² In that interview, bin Laden directly attacked Muslims not sympathetic to his cause and referred to them as *infidels*. It is plausible that bin Laden believes he is backed into a corner, thus in as a last ditch effort, he attacked his probable constituencies, hoping to push them off the fence and into his camp. Bin Laden goals is to remove pro-Western Islamic regimes, yet he needs them to support his fundamentalist movement. By directly attacking those Muslim regimes, bin Laden gave credit to the provocation argument and revealed that the American led air campaign was unraveling his strategic plan. According to Nabil Fahmy, Egypt's ambassador to the US, "Mr. bin Laden has been trying to take advantage of Islam, distort Islam, to take on moderate regimes in the Middle East, to take on civilized society in the West and in different parts of the world. But it's a distortion. Islam has nothing to do with what he is propagating."¹⁴³ Bin Laden's identification of moderate Islamic states as *infidels* produced evidence of the nearly 1,400-year old Islamic civil war.

Michael Doran contends that Bin Laden pulled America into a civil war between Islamic extremists and Arab moderates, a civil war over Arab and Muslim identities in the modern world.¹⁴⁴ The resurgence of a fundamentalist Islam and its varying manifestations and interpretations is partially because of oil riches and breakdown of the bi-polar world. Islam is a system which endorses the struggle (*Jihad*) to spread or defend Islamic faith, and therefore is a breeding ground for extreme interpretations.¹⁴⁵ Populist Islam, consisting of extreme traditionalists including the overarching Muslim Brotherhood, emerged as an opposite of the

¹⁴² Osama bin Laden, televised statement (Tape No. 2), 3 November 2001, broadcasted by the Arabic-language television network Al-Jazeera, Pakistan.

¹⁴³ Nabil Faymy, on CBS's "Face the Nation," reported in *Arab Leaders, Rejecting Criticism, Deny bin Laden Speak for Muslims*, The Wall Street Journal, 5 November 2001, sec. A17.

¹⁴⁴ Doran, 40.

¹⁴⁵ John L. Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4; Annis Shorrosh, *Islam Revealed*, (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1988), 34

more moderate Islam in the *Shi'a* or *Shiite* faction.¹⁴⁶ During the late 1980s and early 1990s Islamic fundamentalism experienced growth in Algeria, Syria, Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. According to James Bill, “Populist Sunni Islam is a potent force in the Gulf countries, representing a particularly strong challenge to the social and political status quo. Yet unlike the Shi’i movement, it is views with tolerance by the ruling governments who are reluctant to embark on any form of confrontation.”¹⁴⁷ Bill contends the Islamic fundamentalist movement is, in reality, Islamic reassertion. According to Doran, “The war between extremist *Salafis* and the broader populations around them is only the tip of the iceberg. The fight over religion among Muslims is but one of a number of deep and enduring regional struggles that originally had nothing to do with the United States and even today involve it only indirectly.”¹⁴⁸

Bin Laden recognized the civil strife between Islamic extremists and Arab moderates, and though it may be a proximate cause for why he attacked, it was not the primary reason. In his 1997 interview with Peter Arnet, Bin Laden contended, “The influence of the Afghan *jihad* on the Islamic world was so great and it necessitates that people should rise above many of their differences and unite their efforts against their enemy.”¹⁴⁹ Bin Laden was concerned that an Islamic civil war would stalemate his movement against the West. Though he used America as a pawn to polarize the Islamic world and generate support among Arab states for unity against the West, his primary goal was to rid the Arab Peninsula of Western influences. After destroying the “twenty-first century *Hubal*,” Islamic extremists could then further their *salafiyya* movement in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and throughout the Arabian Peninsula.

Bin Laden calculated he could use the American reprisal to widen the chasm between the Islamic world and the West, into two Islamic factions—believers and non-believers. Bin Laden attempted in a series of controversial videos to reach out past his characteristic non-secular traits in order to gain a sympathetic audience.¹⁵⁰ His appeal to pity and authority was an

¹⁴⁶ According to James Bill, “three major Sunni fundamentalist movements rest at the core of Populist Islam: the most extreme is the al-Salafi (traditional / ancestral) movement; slightly less dogmatic is al-Islah (reform) fundamentalism; and even more accommodating to traditional fundamentalism are the new al-Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) groups. James A. Bill, “Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 1, Fall 1984: 110.

¹⁴⁷ Bill, 111.

¹⁴⁸ Bill, 108.

¹⁴⁹ Osama bin Laden interview with Peter Arnet, March 1997, 3.

¹⁵⁰ At the writing of this thesis, five controversial videos recorded by Bin Laden and broadcasted by the Arabic-language television network Al-Jazeera in Pakistan were released after the 11 September 2001 attacks. Tape 1, released on 7 October 2001 only hours after the initial American led air strikes on Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan, where according to CNN reports; “bin Laden was taunting the United States.” In Tape 2, released on 3 November 2001, Bin Laden lashed out at United States for its Western reprisal attack against Afghanistan and targeted civilians. In Tape 3,

attempt to rally Muslims worldwide. Within hours after the initial Western air strikes on Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces, bin Laden began tapping into deep-seated Muslim emotion against the West by relating his actions in support of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.¹⁵¹ In his pre-recorded videotape, bin Laden diverted from his traditional sermonizing directed at Islamic activists, to a more political or secular campaign, most likely directed at increasing the number of Islamic sympathizers.

Eject United States from the Middle East

Bin Laden deduced that the American reprisal would trigger additional terrorist attacks on Western interests, causing an economic downturn, thereby discouraging American will to fight; and thus to force them to pull out of the Middle East. Bin Laden drew on analogies of how America reacted to terrorist attacks in the past. He believed that Americans were weak-natured and lacked the will to pursue a long-term struggle.¹⁵² He concluded that economic interests and force protection concerns were the primary drivers of American foreign policy strategies. Thus, bin Laden rationalized the additional terrorist strikes caused by Western retaliations would discourage America from continuing its involvement in Muslim regions of the world. With the United States gone, the fundamentalist movement would establish extremist Islamic governments in Egypt and the Gulf Arab States.

Call for Jihad

Key to bin Laden's plan was that an American crusade would trigger additional terrorist attacks by dissident Islamic states on Western interests, thereby discouraging Americans from

released on 13 December 2001, Bin Laden is seen in what the Bush administration calls the "smoking gun" tape, bragging in a story-telling atmosphere about the brutal attacks on America. In Tape 4, released on 27 December 2001, he accuses America of hating Islam and like the first tape, bin Laden reverts to a secular message. In Tape 5, recorded during Al-Jazeera's interview with bin Laden in October 2001, Al-Jazeera released the tape after US complaints about Al-Jazeera with holding information. All five the tapes, plus Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda recruitment tape can be seen at CNN.com, "Chronology: Bin Laden on videotape," *War Against Terror*; available at <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIAL/2001/trade.center/binladen.section.html>; Internet; accessed 29 March 2001.

¹⁵¹ Geraldine Sealey, Mixed Messages: Bin Laden Tries to Push Buttons of Muslims Worldwide with Appeal to History, ABC News.com, 9 October 2001; available from http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/dailynews/strike_messages011009.html; Internet; accessed 9 October 2001.

¹⁵² Osama bin Laden, "To Terror's Source," interview by John Miller, Camera (May 1998): 2; available from http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/terror_1stperson_980612.html; Internet; accessed 2 December 2001.

remaining in the Middle East. The additional terrorist actions were more than likely the combination of coordinated and intended consequences from a well thought out media and terrorist campaign plan. An element of bin Laden's strategy was that Islamic terrorist organizations would be motivated by fundamentalist publicity and frustrations over Western and Israeli retaliatory strikes. By inciting all Muslims to attack Americans when they could and where they could, Bin Laden offered opportunities for other organizations to strike at Western interests and moderate Arab regimes, hoping to infuriate "mob style" tactics. Bin Laden was relying on the additional terrorist strikes to validate success within the Islamic fundamentalist movement by weakening Western resolve.

Evidence suggests that Bin Laden coordinated his efforts with around 30 terrorist organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah located in the Palestinian Authority and Iran, to place additional pressure on Western interests and further incite the Islamic world against the West. Possible strikes on Western interests in Saudi Arabia by Al-Qaeda were uncovered in July 2001, as two suspected bin Laden operatives were arrested trying to enter Saudi Arabia. David Cloud reported, "Osama bin Laden's organization was planning attacks inside Saudi Arabia that may have been timed to occur just before the Sept. 11 attacks in the U.S."¹⁵³ Since 11 September 2001, there had been over two dozen Palestinian terrorist attacks in Israel. More than 40 Israeli civilians were killed in a series of attacks perpetrated by Hamas and the Fatah Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades around the Jewish Passover holiday.¹⁵⁴ Israel, as predicted, responded with tit-for-tat retaliatory strikes. Roughly nine companies of the Israel Defense Forces were deployed to help in the protection of city centers against potential terrorist attacks. Attacks on Israel by the Hamas and Hezbollah terrorist organizations would naturally provoke reprisal attacks by the Israelis. The combination of American and Israel retaliatory attacks, even though they were structured as a global war on terrorism, would present the appearance of Western superpowers directly targeting Arabs and the Islamic faith.

It is plausible that if Palestinian terrorists generated enough friction in an already fragile Israeli-Palestinian peace process, America under the auspices of the United Nations would intervene militarily. At that point, the West becomes exactly what Bin Laden sermonized in his 1997

¹⁵³ David S. Cloud and Rick Wartzman, "Bin Laden Group Also Planned Attacks in Saudi Arabi," *The Wall Street Journal*, 8 October 2001, sec. A11.

¹⁵⁴ Ra' Anan Gissin, spokesperson for Ariel Sharon, stated on NBC's TODAY Show that Israel had experienced 120 deaths from terrorist aggressions since the attacks on America in September 20001. Hassan Abdel Rahman, Chief

interview with Peter Arnet, and in his pre-recorded televised statements.¹⁵⁵ Such an intervention and the potential of American service members killed in Israel, is exactly what the Islamic fundamentalist wanted: to further strain the American will to pursue its interests in order to remove Western and moderate Arab governments from the Arabian Peninsula.

Targeting the American Economy

Targeting the American economy to defeat the United States and cause American military forces to withdraw from the Middle East was a main theme in Bin Laden's fourth tape, broadcasted on 26 December 2001.¹⁵⁶ When Bin Laden stated, "This economic hemorrhaging continues until today, but requires more blows. And the youth should try to find the joints of the American economy and hit the enemy in these joints, with God's permission,"¹⁵⁷ he was both claiming responsibility for causing the American economic recession and appealing to Muslims worldwide to continue fundamentalist attacks. Bin Laden attempted to recruit additional youth activists by referring to the 19 hijackers as martyrs in attempts to destroy the American economy. According to bin Laden, "They [19 secondary school students] shook the throne of America, and struck the American economy in its heat and hit the biggest military power in its heart, by the grace of God."¹⁵⁸ Bin Laden believed that by attacking and motivating further attacks on American economic interests, America would pull out of the Middle East to protect its own economy. According to Bin Laden, "If their

Palestinian Representative to U.S., noted that over 1,175 Palestinians were killed by Israeli attacks since 11 September 2000. NBC, *The TODAY'S Show*, 1 April 2001.

¹⁵⁵ Bin Laden stated during his interview with Peter Arnet, "There is no doubt that the treacherous attack has confirmed that Britain and America are acting on behalf of Israel and the Jews, paving the way for the Jews to divide the Muslim world once again, enslave it and loot the rest of its wealth." He again reverberated that idea during his pre-recorded statement within hours after the initial American led air strikes, "These events have revealed many important issues to Muslims, It's very clear that the West in general, and American in particular, have an unspeakable hatred for Islam." Peter Arnet interview with Osama Bin Laden, 3; Osama bin Laden, televised statement (Tape No. 1), 7 October 2001.

¹⁵⁶ Osama bin Laden, televised statement (Tape No. 4), 27 December 2001, broadcasted by the Arabic-language television network Al-Jazeera, Pakistan. Excerpts seen at CNN.com, "Chronology: Bin Laden on videotape," *War Against Terror*; available at <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIAL/2001/trade.center/binladen.section.html>; Internet; ABC News.com, "Terminal Proclamation: Bin Laden Rallies Muslims While Alluding to his Demise"; available at http://www.go.com/sectionos/world/DailyNews/Strike_binladentape011227.html; Internet; accessed 1 April 2002; CNN.com, Bin Laden says U.S. Economy was Target; available at <http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/12/27/ret.bin.laden.tape>; Internet; accessed 31 March 2002.

¹⁵⁷ Osama bin Laden, televised statement (Tape No. 4), 27 December 2001.

¹⁵⁸ Osama bin Laden, televised statement (Tape No. 4), 27 December 2001.

economy is finished they will become too busy to enslave oppressed people.”¹⁵⁹ Bin Laden rationalized that under the backdrop of a failing Western economy caused by Islamic aggressions, Americans would naturally demand a withdrawal from the Middle East.

We may never know why bin Laden chose 11 September to attack. It is reasonable that bin Laden was monitoring the American economic condition and closely followed the economic downturn indicators that became evident after March 2001. A massive economic strike would logically place the American economy, which was already beginning to slide into a recession, into greater economic turmoil. The initial estimated economic damages were placed at \$100 billion for 2001, which did not include tens of billions in property damage and loss of human life.¹⁶⁰ During the initial weeks following the terrorist attacks, most economists were forecasting an immediate recession, but expected a full recovery within the next year.¹⁶¹ By the end of November 2001, economists had declared the United States was in a recession that began in March 2001.¹⁶² Ben Bernanke, chair of the economic department at Princeton University stated in an interview with *The Wall Street Journal*, “In this case, the recession came from a change in popular, and business, expectations about the near-term profitability of the Internet and related technologies, which caused the drop in investment spending.”¹⁶³ Hence, it is unlikely that bin Laden’s attacks caused the economic recession, and even though it may have pushed the American economy further into a recession, the American economy would recover.

Withdrawal of American Interests

Bin Laden drew on analogies of how America withdrew from Somalia in 1993, responded to the destruction of American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and terrorist attacks on the USS Cole in 2000 to deduce that America would not stay committed to a long-term

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Jon Hilsenrath contended, “Before the attacks, economists were expecting gross domestic product to grow at an annual rate of slightly more than 1% in the 2001 second half. Now they expect the U.S.’s \$10 trillion economy to shrink by nearly 1% instead. That estimate doesn’t even encompass what’s to come next year.” Jon E. Hilsenrath, “Terror’s Toll on the Economy,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 9 October 2001, sec. B1.

¹⁶¹ Jon Hilsenrath reported that forecasts of the five least and most bearish respondents to a Wall Street Journal survey of 26 economists. Of those surveyed, all agree that, “The terrorist attacks are feeding through the economy in myriad of way. Consumer confidence was heading down even before Sept 11, and now appears to have been hit harder.” Jon E. Hilsenrath, “Economist Say Recession Is in the Card,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 26 September 2001, sec. A2.

¹⁶² Greg Ip, “It’s Official: Economy Is in a Recession,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 27 November 2001, sec. A2.

¹⁶³ Ip, A2.

terrorism fight.¹⁶⁴ An essential element of bin Laden's strategy was the fundamental premise that killing Americans would drive the United States out of the Middle East.¹⁶⁵ Bin Laden believed that Somalia was a political and military failure for America, and as such, America did not have the stomach to send military forces into the war torn country of Afghanistan. It had been ten years since Russia's defeat in Afghanistan, and seven years since America withdrew from Somalia. Bin Laden rationalized that Afghanistan, with its history of anarchy, civil war, and defeat of Russian forces, would be America's twenty-first century Somalia.

In every written or televised statement Bin Laden made, he attempted to leverage the perception of "American cowardice" in his advocacy against United States. His examples included the American withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983 after a truck bomb destroyed the Marine barracks in Beirut killing 283 service members, the American withdrawal from Somalia in 1993 after the killing of 14 service members in Mogadishu, and attacks on the USS Cole by suicide bombers in 2000.¹⁶⁶ Bin Laden rationalized that America would destroy herself by attacking the Islamic community. On the verge of defeat, America would withdraw from the Middle East, thus allowing Islamic fundamentalist to turn on Israel.

Both Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Zawahiri believed each Islamic state would rise against the American tide, and because America did not have the strategic will for a protracted fight, it would ultimately withdraw from the Middle East. Moderate Islamic states such as Saudi Arabi, Palestine, and Iraq would then crumble under the rising Islamic fundamentalist movement. With the United States gone and moderate Islamic states replaced by extremist Islamic governments, Israel could then be destroyed. Throughout bin Laden's speeches is a reflection of his beliefs that, "Jews and Christians as part of a historic battle or Crusade connected with European colonialism and Zionism, and they regard Israel as a Trojan horse of the West, a fifth column within Muslim societies."¹⁶⁷ Esposito's argues that many Muslims believe that

¹⁶⁴ Khong brings a perspective on decision makers using history (experiences) for use in foreign policy development. According to Khong, analogies are cognitive devices. His Analogical Explanation (AE) focuses on six diagnostic tasks that decision makers run before using an analogy: define the nature; assessment of stakes; prescriptions; prediction of their success; moral rightness; and associated risks. Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 6-10.

¹⁶⁵ Peter D. Feaver, "To Maintain That Support, Show us What Success Means," *Washington Post*, 7 October 2001, sec. B1.

¹⁶⁶ Michael Dobbs, "Inside the Mind of Osama Bin Laden: Strategy Mixes Long Preparation, Powerful Message Aimed at Dispossessed," *Washington Post*, 20 September 2001, sec. A1.

¹⁶⁷ John L. Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 90

Jewish Zionism and the Judeo-Christian West intend to divide the Muslim world with the purpose of destroying Islam.¹⁶⁸

Zawahiri, founder of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al Jihad) and bin Laden's top lieutenant, has repeatedly announced that his aim is to overthrow the government of Egypt in order to turn the country into a fundamentalist Islamic state. Five Islamic Jihad terrorists were sentenced to death in April 1982 for their involvement in the assassination of President Sadat. Zawahiri did a 3-year prison term on a weapons charge associated with the assassination.¹⁶⁹ When the bin Laden and his associates, which includes Zawahiri, call on "Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson," they are in fact advocating for political change in moderate Islamic states.¹⁷⁰ Bin Laden confirmed his intentions of the Islamic movement taking over Saudi Arabia during his 1997 interview with Peter Arnett. When asked about the Islamic movement taking over Arabia, bin Laden replied, "We are confident...that Muslims will be victorious in the Arabian Peninsula and that God's religion...will prevail in this peninsula."¹⁷¹

Threaten the Survival of Israel

Bin Laden's final goal after banishing the Judeo-Christian enemy from the Arabian Peninsula, and replacing moderate Islamic regimes, was supporting the removal of Israel from Palestine. At this point, bin Laden would have fulfilled a common goal of creating a true Islamic society by restoring the Muslim world (through Jihad) to the fundamental path of Islam. Removing Israel is an enormous effort for any state, let alone a non-state actor residing outside the Israeli territorial boundaries in Afghanistan. There may be existing classified evidence that directly connects Bin Laden with the Hamas and Hezbollah terrorist organizations, but otherwise the Embassy bombing trials is the only direct evidence that establishes ideological and

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 91.

¹⁶⁹ CNN.com, *Egyptian physician with a \$5 million price on his head*; available from <http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/people/shows/zawahiri/profile.htm>; Internet; accessed 11 February 2002.

¹⁷⁰ Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, Abu-Yasir Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, Shaykh Mir Hamzah, and Fazlur Rahman, *Jihad Against Jew and Crusaders: World Islamic Front Statement*; available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>; Internet; accessed 18 February 2002.

¹⁷¹ Osama bin Laden interview with Peter Arnet, March 1997, 1.

organizational links. Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), the aggressive Palestinian based terrorist organization, is actively pursuing its suspected goals toward the achievement of one Islamic society.¹⁷² Hezbollah, (Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine) is the Lebanese Shiite terrorist organization supported by the Islamic government in Iran. Like Hamas, its goal is the creation of an independent Islamic society in Lebanon and the destruction of American, Israeli, and Southern Lebanon forces preventing achievement of that goal.¹⁷³ It is plausible that bin Laden adopted the removal of Israel as a part of his overall strategic goal because it was the only way he could rally all Muslims, Shiite and Sunni, into expelling America from the Arabian Peninsula.

Yossef Bodansky, director of the House Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, suggests the connection between bin Laden, Hamas, and Hizballah was the creation of Hizballah International and its coordinating committee—the Committee of Three.¹⁷⁴ Established in 1996 under the guidance of Tehran, Hizballah International's purpose, according to Bodansky, was to “destabilize the [Persian] Gulf area and to weaken the countries of the region.”¹⁷⁵ Guiding Hizballah International was the Committee of Three, consisting of bin Laden, Imad Mughaniyah (Lebanese Hizballah' Special Operations Command), and Ahmad Salah (head of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad). Even more important was the list of members attending a terrorist summit in June 1996 for the transformation of Hizballah into Hizballah International. According to Bodansky, those attending included:

¹⁷² Terrorist Research Center, *Terrorist Profiles: Hamas*; available from <http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism/HAMAS.shtml>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2002. According to the Yoni Figchel and Yael Shahaar of www.ict.org, “Although the Hezbollah is a Shia Muslim organization, and Al-Qaida, a Sunni Muslim group, there is substantial evidence of a working alliance between the two groups dating back to the early 1900s. The trial of Al-Qaida militants in the United States has revealed not only ideological links, but also operational connections between Hezbollah and Al-Qaida.” Yoni Figchel and Yael Shahaar, “The Al-Qaida—Hezbollah Connection,” 26 February 2002: 2; available from <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=425>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2002. The Hezbollah terrorist organization was one of the first dissident groups to use suicide attacks during bombing of the American embassy in Beirut in 1983. The Terrorism Research Center, “Terrorist Profiles: HAMAS,” *The Terrorism Research Center: Next Generation Terrorism Analysis*; available from <http://www.terrorism.ciom/terrorism/HAMAS.shtml>; Internet; accessed 31 March 2002.

¹⁷³ Terrorist Research Center, *Terrorist Profiles: Hizballah*; available from <http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism/Hizballah.shtml>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2002.

¹⁷⁴ Yossef Bodansky provides an extraordinary amount of detailed evidence that is plausible, but unfortunately he does not cite any of his sources. More than likely, Bodansky possess the authoritative sources, but either cannot release those documents or chooses not to. Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on American* (California: Prima Publishing, 2001) 151-159.

¹⁷⁵ Bodansky, 158.

Ramadan Shallah (Palestinian Islamic Jihad; Ahamad Salah, also known as Salim (Egyptian Islamic Jihad); Imad Mughaniyah (Lebanese Hizballah's Special Operations Command); Muhammad Ali Ahmad (a representative of Osama bin Laden); Ahmad Jibril (head of the PFLP-GC, or Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command); Imad al-Alami and Mustafa al-Liddawi (HAMAS); Abdallah Ocalan (head of the Kurdish People Party, the terrorist organization fighting against Turkey); an envoy of Turkey's Islamic party, Refah; and a representative of George Habbash (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine).¹⁷⁶

Bodansky contends that the first indications of a coalition between Al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah came with the bombing of the US barracks in al-Khobar, Dhahran, stabbing of the US female diplomat, and downing of TWA 800.¹⁷⁷

Bin Laden attempted to rally Muslims worldwide against America, moderate Islamic states supporting America, and Israel in each of his pre-recorded televised statements. During his interview with John Miller in 1998, bin Laden confirmed his strategic purpose of removing Western interests from the Arabian Peninsula. According to bin Laden:

“We predict that the Riyadh leader and those with him that stood with the Jews and Christians and forfeited Al-Haramien, the holy shrines, to Jews and Christians with American identities or others will disintegrate. We predict that like the Iran Royal family, the Shah, they will disperse and disappear. After Allah gave them property on the most sacred land and gave them wealth that is unheard of before from oil, still they sinned and did not value Allah's gift. We predict destruction and dispersal after they are in a great devastation against the Muslim nation, especially what happens to the Muslim people of Iraq.”¹⁷⁸

Bin Laden calculated that his strategic alliance, the International Islamic Front for the Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, would coordinate the efforts of the supporting Muslim nations to defeat the Jews and the Western crusaders.¹⁷⁹

Most evidence suggests one of bin Laden's goals was the destruction of Israel, and though there are not direct links to support that premise, it is extremely plausible. Linking bin Laden to Hamas and Hizballah indicates an underlying connection between bin Laden and

¹⁷⁶ Bodansky, 157.

¹⁷⁷ Bodansky argues that even though the official investigation of the mid-air explosion of TWA flight 800 has failed to determine the actual cause, substantial evidence strongly indicates it was a terrorist bombing. Bodansky, 158.

¹⁷⁸ Osama bin Laden interview with John Miller, May 1998, 4.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 5.

Iran.¹⁸⁰ According to the US State Department, Khamenei continues to refer to Israel has a "cancerous tumor" that must be removed.¹⁸¹ In the same report, the US State Department quotes the Iranian Expediency Council Secretary Rezai as saying, "Iran will continue its campaign against Zionism until Israel is completely eradicated."¹⁸² Iran has a history of supporting terrorist organizations such as Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad. Each of these terrorist groups share a common goal of establishing a single Islamic society on the Arabian Peninsula, and that goal requires the removal of Israel.

Summary

Bin Laden represented a new breed of terrorism, because he was an international dissident actor seeking to destroy the will of people first before seeking a political change. Prior dissident movements sought a political change within their sovereign nation by using repeated terrorist acts to de-legitimize their local government and erode its political will.¹⁸³ Because Bin

¹⁸⁰ The United States Department of State has identified Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as states sponsoring terrorism. United States Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism-1999*, April 2000; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgrtpt/1999>; Internet; accessed 27 December, 2001.

¹⁸¹ United States Department of State, "Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism," in *Patterns of Global Terrorism-2000*, 30 April 2001; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgrtpt/2000/2441.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 April 2002

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ The lethality of terrorism and its use by religious dissident movements had increased over the last decade, while state-sponsored terrorism had declined. According to the U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism-2000*, a record 565 international terrorists attacks were recorded in 1991, followed by 363 in 1992, 431 in 1993, 322 in 1994, 440 in 1995, 296 in 1996, 304 in 1997, 274 in 1998, and 392 in 1999. The recorded amount for 1998 (274) was the lowest in twenty years, with the high reaching 666 in 1987 (figure 2). The number of international terrorist's attacks has generally decreased while the number of U.S. citizen casualties (dead or wounded) per attack increased. In the same Department of State report, 11 casualties were reported for 1994, 70 for 1995, and high of 535 for 1996. Next years report will include the 11 September 2001 attacks as a nation high estimated at nearly 3000 deaths. Barton Gellman of the Washing Post reported, "It took 267 attacks in the United States to kill 23 people in the 1980s. The 10 years that followed saw many fewer attacks—on 60—but nearly nine times the casualties—182. A single bombing on April 19, 1995, which ripped the face off the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, accounted for 168 of the dead. The same trend held overseas: fewer attacks, more lives lost." The increase in lethality was likely caused by two major events. First, dissident groups believed they had to use a more violent means in gaining greater public recognition, because of the public's callused view on horrific events. Second, there had been an increase in religious dissident movements over the last two decades. Since the Islamic revolution in Iran, religious motivated dissident groups had increased from 2 in 1980, 11 in 1992, 16 in 1994, 26 in 1995, and 13 in 1996 (figure 3). Some of the major terrorism acts initiated by religious motivated dissident groups include the 1993 bombing of the New York Trade Center, attacks on service members in Somalia, destruction of the Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and attacks on the USS Cole. Each of the terrorism acts used violence toward obtaining political change or a religious goal. Each had a higher order purpose. U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism-2000*, Introduction. Bruce Hoffman, *Terrorism Trends and Prospects*, in *The New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999) 11-21. U.S. Department of State, *Total International Terrorist Attacks, 1980-99* in *Appendix C: Statistical Review Charts*, in *Patterns of Global Terrorism-2000*.¹⁸³ Ibid., *Total US Citizen Casualties Caused by International Attacks, 1994-1999*; Hoffman, *Terrorism Trends and Prospects*, 12; Hoffman, *Figure 2—Religious Versus Other Terrorist Groups*, in *Terrorism Trends and Prospects*, 16, in *The New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999) 11-21. Barton Gellman, "Struggles Inside the Government Defined Campaign," *Washington Post*, 20 December 2001, sec. A1.

Laden is not a state actor, and does not directly control revolutionary military forces, and he is located outside both the country he wishes to influence and the location of that activity, bin Laden is forced to leverage the only fulcrum he can—the will of the American people. In essence, Bin Laden must wear down the American will, thus promoting a political change. However, bin Laden must be careful not to galvanize the America spirit, while simultaneously galvanizing that of the Islamic masses.

His method of choice was a calculated large-scale terrorism activity to shake American policy makers into a brute force mentality, which he could spin to the Islamic fundamentalist movement's benefit. Unlike Hamas, Islamic Jihad (Jihad Group) or other internal state terrorist groups who use repeated terrorist activities to de-legitimize the Israeli government, bin Laden must be selective and sparing in his terrorist targets.¹⁸⁴ In the past, terrorists sought political change through negotiated settlements. With Bin Laden, there is no room for negotiations. Bin Laden's world is very black and white: either America leaves the Arabian Peninsula, or it must be destroyed. Bin Laden's objective was to bring the United States into the fight, were he could ambush the will of the American people. By directly striking American symbols of power and causing thousands of casualties and billions in damages, Bin Laden made an international statement—come and get me if you can. Before making that statement, Bin Laden drew on analogies of how America reacted in previous wars and previous terrorist attacks in deciding how America and other Western governments would retaliate.

In nearly every statement made by Bin Laden, is a reflection or mirror image of United States. Bin Laden viewed United States as a Western terrorist in the same fashion that Americans viewed him as an Islamic extremist. Bin Laden used each media opportunity to argue the same point—atrocities committed by Americans in the occupation of Saudi Arabi, starving of over one million Iraqi children because of U.N sanctions, the withholding of arms to Bosnian Muslims, the wholesale killing of Muslims in Somalia—and the dropping of nuclear bombs on Japan. Bin Laden's mistaken premise was that the American public would not accept risks, or

¹⁸⁴ According to the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, the Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) attacked Israel or Israeli related interests: 18 times in 2001; 3 times in 2000; 4 times in 1999; and 10 times in 1998. In those four years, Hamas killed 83 persons and injured approximately 730. ICT International Terrorism Database; Internet; <http://www.ict.org.il/>; accessed 25 March 2001.

accept a costly war.¹⁸⁵ Bin Laden's analogies of past American experiences were wrong. Peter D. Feaver argues:

Since the Persian Gulf War (though the seeds can be traced as far back as Vietnam), a myth has taken root among policymakers that only the costs matter—that the public will only support policies that are 'cheap' in the sense of not costing American lives. According to this view, the public rejected U.S. intervention in Somalia because American soldiers died, while it accepted our actions in Kosovo because no Americans died. This is a myth of the casualty-phobic public—a canard that genuinely casualty-phobic policymakers have found expedient, but which has left America vulnerable to exactly the kind of terrorist attack we just witnessed.¹⁸⁶

Americans were not guilty of shying away from potential risks. Policy makers wrongfully believed the American public would not tolerate dead service members for any cause. What the American public wanted was military campaigns that were a function of costs and benefits. Military campaigns that were feasible, acceptable, and suitable. According to a RAND Research study on public support for American military operations, “public support for U.S. military operations and public tolerance for casualties are based on a sensible weighing of benefits and costs that is influenced heavily by consensus (or its absence) among political leaders.”¹⁸⁷ Americans are willing to sacrifice their sons and daughters if the cause is just, and according to RAND, “Americans rely on their leaders to illuminate just how compelling and promising these causes might be.”¹⁸⁸

Al-Qaeda attacked the United States because they wanted something in return. Using American airliners as weapons to destroy an economic icon was not Bin Laden's mechanism for getting United States out of the Middle East. The attack simply was to set the conditions.

¹⁸⁵ Peter D. Feaver, “To Maintain That Support, Show Us What Success Means,” *Washington Post*, 7 October 2001, sec. B1.

¹⁸⁶ Feaver, B1.

¹⁸⁷ Eric V. Larson, “Public Support for U.S. Military Operations,” *RAND Research Brief*, March 1996; available from <http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB2502/RB2502.html>; Internet; accessed 31 March 2002.

¹⁸⁸ Larson, 1

The Al-Qaeda terrorist strike on United States was directed at provoking an American reprisal. Bin Laden calculated that like the 1998 Embassy bombing reprisals, Americans would demand a reprisal in response to his attacks.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS

Wars between clans, tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, and nations have been prevalent in every era and in every civilization because they are rooted in the identities of people. These conflicts tend to be particularistic, in that they do not involve broader ideological or political issues of direct interests to nonparticipants, although they may arouse humanitarian concerns in outside groups. They also tend to be vicious and bloody, since fundamental issues of identity are at stake. In addition, they tend to be lengthy; they may be interrupted by truces or agreements but these tend to break down and the conflict is resumed.

Samuel P. Huntington
The Class of Civilizations

Osama bin Laden is likely the most dangerous terrorist Americans have ever experienced. Bin Laden is the leader of an extremist, Islamic fundamentalist movement. He is more than an anarchist with a pathological desire to kill Americans; he is a strategist within the fundamentalist movement who envisioned the creation of a single Islamic state controlling the Arab New East.

Summary of Findings

This study began by asking why the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, knowing that America's would demand a reprisal, attacked the United States. Though the question is the basis for my argument, addressing it required a discerning view of terrorism, the Islamic fundamentalist movement, and bin Laden's strategic alliance. The basic assumption throughout this argument is that bin Laden had a choice in whether to attack the United States. His dilemma was choosing to act or not act against America. His decision calculus encompassed evaluating the choices against the possible outcomes and expected responses. Bin Laden concluded that if he attacked the United States, America would retaliate, which he could spin into a crusade against Islam to polarize the Islamic masses and galvanize his efforts to remove Western interests and moderate Arab governments. Bin Laden thus attacked the United States to provoke an

American reprisal because he calculated that he would gain the greatest benefit with minimal costs. But why did bin Laden use terrorism against United States?

Bin Laden is not acting on behalf of a state, and therefore he does not possess military assets or capabilities to engage in traditional state versus state political and military interaction. Bin Laden terrorized the United States because he wanted something in return. Terrorism is a tactic that non-state actors use to coerce states. Bin Laden, like other dissidents, uses this method of combat to attain political, religious, or ideological goals by creating and exploiting the psychological effects of fear. Terror and the use of terrorism has changed throughout the centuries more in who applied it, religious versus secular dissidents, then the purpose it sought to achieve. It is plausible that many Muslims view the Islamic fundamentalist moment as an instrument of change. Because mass movements breed fanaticism, enthusiasm, and hope, they also endure hatred, intolerance, and extremism. Bin Laden is not a maniacal killer; he is, though, an Islamic extremist with strategic goals, who uses terrorism because he has no other means of accomplishing his religious and nationalist goals. Has bin Laden's method of terror worked in the past? Unfortunately yes, and Israel and the Palestinian authority are prime examples.

This study found that bin Laden and the "Brotherhood of Muslims" created the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders in 1998 as a strategic alliance of Muslim reformists. Its strategic goal was eliminating Western influences and moderate Arab governments from Muslim lands, thus purifying Islam. Its audience was the masses of Islam. Al-Qaeda, a member of the alliance, drew on the goals, interests, and perceptions of sustaining members within the alliance to further a common ideological belief of purifying Islam. Bin Laden orchestrated the actions of Al-Qaeda and became a driving force behind the International Islamic Front due in part to the support he received from activists and scholars. To achieve its political goals, the strategic alliance operated in over 40 different countries opposing regimes it believed had compromised Islam or oppressed Muslims and supporting groups attempting to establish Islamic states.

Was bin Laden's goal to rid the Middle East of Americans and American interests, or did he simply want to topple Egypt and dynastic order in the Gulf States? I contend that bin Laden believed the pre-condition for establishing extremist Islamic governments in Egypt and the Gulf Arab states was eliminating American military forces in the Arabian Peninsula. Bin Laden probably deduced that he could generate an uprising against Western interests by

portraying American reprisals to terrorist attacks as a crusade against Islam. He believed he could polarize the Islamic world and generate unified support from Islamic sects in his struggle against the West. With the moderate Muslims brought into the extremists camp, his terrorist alliance would continue to champion the Islamic fundamentalist cause, and over time, an Islamic revolution would topple pro-Western Arab governments and expel the United States from the Middle East.

Bin Laden drew on analogies of previous American reactions to terrorist attacks to deduce that Americans would not pursue a long-term struggle against his Islamic fundamentalist revolution. He likely believed that additional terrorist acts, specifically targeting for economic effects, would discourage Americans from continuing their involvement in the Middle East. Hoping to incite “mob style” tactics, bin Laden coordinated his efforts with 30 or more terrorist organizations attempting to direct their rage into additional attacks on Western interests.

Bin Laden wanted to bring the war on terrorism to Afghanistan. He likely envisioned that American operations there would be similar to Soviet operations during the Russian-Afghanistan war. Attacking the United States was a risky move, but bin Laden had more to lose by not attacking the United States. He may have believed the Islamic fundamentalist movement was moribund, neither gaining nor losing strength. A terrorist attack on the United States would focus attention on the movement. Otherwise, the movement might soon be exhausted and powerless. More importantly, given his many *fatwas*, unless bin Laden could act in bold way, America would be perceived as victorious and he would no longer be relevant in history. The stakes were high for bin Laden. He probably believed that, like Somalia and the bombings of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Americans would respond with military means. He deduced that America would destroy herself by attacking the Islamic community.

The final leg of bin Laden’s strategy involved working towards the removal of Israel from Palestine. It is doubtful that bin Laden actually believed his actions would directly defeat Israel. However, it is likely that he used the Palestinian-Israel issue as a wild card to gain Muslim support worldwide. He needed to rally all Muslims, Shiite and Sunni, to expel America from the Arabian Peninsula. By touching the Palestinian button, he likely gained additional support.

In light of these reasons, I believe that the Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States were part of a grand strategy designed to topple pro-Western Arab governments, eject the US from the Middle East, and ultimately threaten the survival of Israel. The basic elements of bin Laden's strategy was 1) the attack would provoke an American reprisal that he could portray as a Western crusade against Islam, 2) a Western crusade would polarize the Islamic masses and galvanize their efforts to attack Western interests and remove moderate Arab governments, 3) Islamic states would replace moderate secular regimes and force the United States to both physically and politically withdraw from the Middle East, and 3) with the United States defeated, the Islamic fundamentalist world would be free to turn its attention to the destruction of Israel.

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