

Abstract

Doctrinal Lessons from Non-State Actors by Major Robert A. Forte, 50 pages.

The mode of warfare is changing. State on state conflict is no longer the primary approach to war. A phenomenon known as Gray Area War is on the rise. Gray Area War is defined as a conflict where at least one of the antagonists is a non-state entity and the method is combining elements of traditional war fighting with organized crime. This method of warfare is eclipsing state on state conflict.

The world is changing at an alarming pace. Alvin and Heidi Toffler outline the cause of these changes and attribute them to the Third Wave. The Third Wave is built upon the information revolution and globalization. The shrinking world is causing fractures and divisions in many states throughout the world. Not only are states in decline, but so is the mode of warfare that states traditionally wage. Though state on state conflict is decline, warfare will continue.

The new approach to warfare, Gray Area Warfare, has risen for many reasons. Fractured states are prime breeding ground for a disenfranchised population. The disenfranchised are susceptible to many messages of hope. The message becomes a rallying point for many followers to start a mass movement. The mass movement becomes the non-state actor who is prepared to wage Gray Area War.

The non-state actor is changing the way western forces understand warfare. The mental and moral approach used by this entity is a radical departure from the state on state view of the recent past. The non-state actor is less accountable and more willing to violate current laws and conventions to achieve its aims. Without accountability the non-state actor maintains freedom of action in dislocating state military forces. The dislocation is accomplished by the manipulation of perceptions of the uncommitted, loyal followers and opponent. The ability to manipulate perceptions is the strength and effectiveness of the non-state actor.

The non-state is more networked, non-linear and self-organizing. These characteristics give strength to the non-state actor that is difficult to counter. As we enter the Third Wave the strengths of the non-state will make this threat more powerful in the near term. Understanding the effects of self-organizing, networked operations, and non-linearity are a point of departure to assess FM 3-0.

The foundation for the defense of the United States is state on state based. The belief is the main threat for this nation is from another state. This symmetrical view of war is also missing the larger system changes in warfare. FM 3-0 is a good lead into the current mode of warfare. There are many aspects that are timely and relevant. Unfortunately the manual does not go far enough to understand the effects of Gray Area War. The new chapter on information operations requires more work along with better assessment on how and when to self-organize.

By taking this approach, we can prepare the United State Army for the complex battlefield of the future. In so doing the role of the military and the United States Army can once again shift to effectively deterring and protecting the United States from threats within and without.

Doctrinal Lessons from Non-State Actors

**A Monograph
by
Major Robert A. Forte
United States Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
AY 01-02**

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Robert A. Forte


Title of Monograph: Doctrinal Lessons from Non-State Actors

Approved by:




Robert Epstein, Ph. D.

Monograph Director



Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

Professor and Director
Academic Affairs,
School of Advanced
Military Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree
Program

Accepted this 14th Day of May 2002

Abstract

Doctrinal Lessons from Non-State Actors by Major Robert A. Forte, 50 pages.

The mode of warfare is changing. State on state conflict is no longer the primary approach to war. A phenomenon known as Gray Area War is on the rise. Gray Area War is defined as a conflict where at least one of the antagonists is a non-state entity and the method is combining elements of traditional war fighting with organized crime. This method of warfare is eclipsing state on state conflict.

The world is changing at an alarming pace. Alvin and Heidi Toffler outline the cause of these changes and attribute them to the Third Wave. The Third Wave is built upon the information revolution and globalization. The shrinking world is causing fractures and divisions in many states throughout the world. Not only are states in decline, but so is the mode of warfare that states traditionally wage. Though state on state conflict is decline, warfare will continue.

The new approach to warfare, Gray Area Warfare, has risen for many reasons. Fractured states are prime breeding ground for a disenfranchised population. The disenfranchised are susceptible to many messages of hope. The message becomes a rallying point for many followers to start a mass movement. The mass movement becomes the non-state actor who is prepared to wage Gray Area War.

The non-state actor is changing the way western forces understand warfare. The mental and moral approach used by this entity is a radical departure from the state on state view of the recent past. The non-state actor is less accountable and more willing to violate current laws and conventions to achieve its aims. Without accountability the non-state actor maintains freedom of action in dislocating state military forces. The dislocation is accomplished by the manipulation of perceptions of the uncommitted, loyal followers and opponent. The ability to manipulate perceptions is the strength and effectiveness of the non-state actor.

The non-state is more networked, non-linear and self-organizing. These characteristics give strength to the non-state actor that is difficult to counter. As we enter the Third Wave the strengths of the non-state will make this threat more powerful in the near term. Understanding the effects of self-organizing, networked operations, and non-linearity are a point of departure to assess FM 3-0.

The foundation for the defense of the United States is state on state based. The belief is the main threat for this nation is from another state. This symmetrical view of war is also missing the larger system changes in warfare. FM 3-0 is a good lead into the current mode of warfare. There are many aspects that are timely and relevant. Unfortunately the manual does not go far enough to understand the effects of Gray Area War. The new chapter on information operations requires more work along with better assessment on how and when to self-organize.

By taking this approach, we can prepare the United State Army for the complex battlefield of the future. In so doing the role of the military and the United States Army can once again shift to effectively deterring and protecting the United States from threats within and without.

Table Of Contents

Table Of Contents.....	1
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	2
Lebanon	2
Chapter 2: Decline of State on State Conflict.....	4
Third Wave:	4
Decline of the State.....	5
Failed States.....	6
Interstate Conflict Waning.....	7
War Continues	8
Chapter 3: Rise of Gray Area War.....	10
Decline of Order and the Ascendancy of Chaos.....	10
Building a Message.....	10
Cultivating a Following	12
Action.....	13
Chapter 4: The Non-State Actor: Domination through Perception.....	15
Accountability.....	16
Dislocation.....	17
Perception	18
Chapter 5: Characteristics of the Non-State Actor.....	20
Self-Organizing.....	20
Network.....	24
Non-Linearity.....	26
Chapter 6: Failures of Field Manual 3-0 Operations	31
Self-Organizing.....	32
Network.....	37
Non-Linearity.....	39
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations.....	41
Conclusions.....	41
Recommendations.....	41
Self-Organizing.....	42
Network.....	42
Non-Linearity.....	43
Bibliography	46

Chapter 1: Introduction

Lebanon

In October 1983, a truck bomb exploded outside the United States Marine Corps Barracks in Lebanon. The attack shocked the nation and emphasized the fanatical nature of those who opposed American policies. The attackers were not soldiers from another nation state. They were part of a growing phenomenon known as the non-state actor.

In the end, 241 Marines were dead. Throughout America, the feeling of helplessness and frustration was great. Strategically, this was an impressive attack. The citizenry expected action from the government. The government withdrew American forces from Lebanon in 1984.¹

This attack demonstrated that small but determined groups have the potential to disrupt the policies of a super power. In Lebanon, one such group dislocated the military might of the United States by attacking America's resolve to remain in Lebanon. The ability to bypass military power and attack domestic resolve is the strength of the non-state actor. This approach allows the non-state actor to pose a significant threat to the United States.

This monograph argues the following:

- Warfare has changed and United States Army doctrine has not kept pace with these changes.
- In the new mode of warfare the non-state actor is supreme.
- For the United States to remain secure, America's Army can learn from the successful non-state actors.

For the scope of this monograph the term for the new type of conflict is Gray Area War. The definition is a combination of two types of conflict defined by Steven Metz in his paper *Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and Post-Modern Warfare*. Metz calls

¹ Kenneth F McKenzie JR. *The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR*. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University: 2000. 8/9.

the first type of conflict Informal War, which he defines as conflict with at least one of the antagonists is a non-state entity.² Objectives of this type of conflict may be autonomy, separation, and outright control, of the state or a change of policy. The other type of conflict he defines is Gray Area Conflict, which combines the elements of traditional war fighting with those of organized crime.³ For the purpose of this paper the similarities between the two is close enough to combine them. Gray Area War will refer to the evolving method of warfare, defined as a conflict where at least one of the antagonists is a non-state entity and the method is combining elements of traditional war fighting with organized crime.

The ongoing nature of Gray Area War makes it difficult to identify a valid case study for analysis. Examples of the new mode of warfare are apparent throughout the world. Chechnya, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, Columbia and Israel are only a handful of the many continuing conflicts. Fighting persists with the results still undetermined. This monograph will focus on ascertaining trends from non-state actors that are applicable to the current environment.

²Steven Metz. *Armed Conflict In The 21st Century: The Information Revolution And Post-Modern Warfare*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000. 48.

³Metz. *Armed Conflict In The 21st Century: The Information Revolution And Post-Modern Warfare*. 56.

Chapter 2: Decline of State on State Conflict

The world is undergoing a drastic change in the way it operates. On the macro scale global interaction is evolving from an industrial base to an information base. This in turn is a cause for the decline of the effectiveness and in many places the fracturing of the state. One of the derivatives of that decline is the end of mass interstate conflict. This does not correlate to the end of war. It is only the end to current method of waging war, which another mode will replace.

Third Wave:

Alvin and Heidi Toffler in *War and Anti War* discuss their theory about the impact of the information revolution. They hypothesize that the world has experienced three waves of change. The first was the agrarian revolution. With the expansion of farming, man was able to stockpile food and become wed to the ground he settled upon. From the stationary lifestyle man developed cities and armies. The next wave was the Industrial Age. In this wave, man created mass systems to maximize production and efficiency. As each wave evolved, it violently tore down the social, political and economic norms of the previous wave. Where the waves collided, conflict followed.

According to the Tofflers, the world is entering the Third Wave. This wave is defined with the information revolution and the de-massification of systems.⁴ It is a knowledge-based society that grows and flourishes on the intangibles of information. The hallmark of this wave is the strength of the small and the many dominating the large and the few of the Second Wave. Those who fail to change are destined to fall, but the failure will not be quiet. As with other waves, they predict conflict as the newest wave flows over the previous ones. Part of the fallout of the Third Wave is the creation of powerful non-state actors.

⁴ Alvin and Heidi Toffler. *War And Anti-War: Survival At The Dawn Of The 21st Century*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1993.

In the Third Wave, conflict may no longer be waged primarily with tanks and artillery. Soldiers are no longer the primary warriors. States are no longer the primary adversaries. Victory is no longer defined exclusively by material destruction. With de-massification there will be smaller adaptable organizations waging conflict for specific interests at a specific point in time. They have the potential to defeat a large adversary by adapting and reacting faster to the changing situation.

Intertwined with the Third Wave is Globalization. Thomas Friedman defined this term as integration of markets, nation-states and technologies—enabling anyone the ability to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before.⁵ Globalization is driving the Third Wave changes by making the world a smaller place. The world is more interconnected and interdependent and the effects of geographic boundaries such as oceans and mountains are no longer pertinent.⁶ A minor action in a remote part of the world may now have international repercussions. Actions from the United States have a ripple effect throughout the world. The Third Wave supports increased range and lethality of non-state threats. Their attacks focus on manipulating the will of nations and the uncommitted to their cause. This smaller world dissipates power through the manipulation of perceptions.

Decline of the State

As power is dissipated, information is taking over the physical means of power as the precursor to global influence. In the past, the wealth of nation states allowed them to control the elements of force. In turn, this gave the wealthy the means to gain greater power and use force to impose their will.⁷ Through these means the nation state evolved over the last half millennium.

⁵ Thomas L. Friedman. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, New York, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999. 9.

⁶ Anthony C. Zinni. "A Military for the 21st Century." *Strategic Forum*, No. 181, July 2001, 1-4. 2

⁷ Martin L. Van Creveld. *The Rise and Decline of the State*. New York: Cambridge Univ Press, 1999. 157

Wealth and the high cost of armies and weapons contributed to maintaining state power into the 21st Century. The world is witnessing a breakdown of nation state hegemony. States will only have power as long as they can protect the citizenry in a legitimate manner.⁸ Loss of power and legitimacy is occurring for many reasons and from organizations such as the United Nations. These outside sources now possess the right to judge sovereign states about their actions in their own territory.⁹ Whether it is the European Court dictating flight patterns in London or NATO directing requirements to Yugoslavia, the result is the same. The inviolability of state sovereignty is fading, and with it so is the power of the state. Unfortunately the same organizations that are judging the state are not always picking up the mantle of responsibility to control the problems that the state was attempting to correct. Internally, states are challenged to conduct their affairs in a legitimate manner that their people accept.¹⁰ Failing to do so will lead to the fall of numerous governments.

Failed States

The failing of states will continue to be a conundrum for nation-state interaction. Failed-states - the inability of the state to provide for the needs of its citizens - possess challenges that the state is ill prepared to cope with.¹¹ Not only is there a concern about the impact of failed states, the current volume of prospective candidates has the potential to overwhelm much of the world. Of the current members of the United Nations, roughly a third are threatened from significant rebel movements, dissidents, or governments in exile.¹² The world is growing more complex and components of this complexity are evident in failed states such as Somalia and Afghanistan and

⁸ Martin L. Van Creveld. *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press; Toronto: Collier Macmillan Canada; New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991.198.

⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash Of Civilizations And The Remaking Of World Order*. New York: Touchstone, 1997. 35.

¹⁰ Martin L. Van Creveld. "The Fate of the State." *Parameters*, Spring 1996, 4-18. <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96spring/creveld.htm>

¹¹ Rachel Stohl and Michael Stohl. "Fatally Flawed? U.S. Policy Toward Failed States." *The Defense Monitor: Center for Defense Information*, Volume XXX, Number 8, October 2001. <http://www.cdi.org/dm/2001/issue8/dm8-2001.pdf>, 1

¹² Toffler, *War and Anti-War*. 242.

restrictive regimes like North Korea. The increase in international problems is paralleled by the rise in the power of the non-state actor. The problems are occurring when states that lack the power to assert a monopoly on violence within their borders. The failed state no longer possesses the means to provide for or protect the citizenry. Other nation-states no longer have the ability to politically interact with the failed state. There are limited means through diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power to influence actions in a failed state. The military arm of national power is even more hamstrung. The failed state does not control a viable military to engage and defeat. There is no government to deter or coerce with the threat of military force. In places such as Somalia the power is broken down to individual warlords who control separate areas with no coherent higher entity. Failed states are redefining international relations.

Not only is the nation-state unable to work with failed states; they now are bearing the brunt of the failure. The problems of failed states overflow into other countries, with the potential to destabilize the region. Ethnic violence, refugees, disease are only the tip of the iceberg. The failed state becomes a sanctuary for criminals, malcontents and revolutionaries from other countries. The examples of Afghanistan and Georgia are all too representative. The threats from such locations are too great to be ignored. The tenuous grip that many states hold upon their population is weakening. The increase of failed states and their effect upon the global environment is only one more strike at the life of the state.

Interstate Conflict Waning

Warfare is changing and state on state conflict may be on its last gasp. The massing of physical systems and soldiers is part of a passing epoch of conflict that may not appear again for the foreseeable future. Interstate conflict in the form of nations massing arms and armies has been in decline since its apex in 1945. With the introduction of nuclear weapons in August 1945 a new dynamic of warfare occurred. According to Martin Van Creveld, the traditional chain

between self-preservation and victory was broken.¹³ The increase of nuclear weapons, beginning with a few hundred in 1950 rising to over 30,000 in the 1980's made the likelihood that some warheads would survive an initial attack from an opponent.¹⁴ This in turn gave an enemy that was almost completely annihilated the opportunity to strike and destroy the victor thus breaking the tie of self-preservation and victory. Without the security of self-preservation major war has consistently been avoided and the decline of interstate warfare has followed.

The decline of conventional warfare has been no less interesting. Examples of decline include the Soviet Navy rusting away and the United States Navy going from a 1945 wartime high of 100 Aircraft Carriers to a current level of 12. The more fascinating example is in regards to both the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and Falkland Islands War. The effect of precision weapons achieved a tremendously high hit rate in both conflicts. The expected lesson to be learned was that high attrition would demand large number of forces. In many first and second world nations the opposite effect has occurred and instead of massing systems and soldiers there is a steady decline in armies; as seen with the United States Army reduction from eighteen divisions to ten during the 1990s. Though massed interstate war may still occur in the future, the record appears to convey that the future of such conflicts is bleak.

War Continues

Paraphrasing Clausewitz, the renowned 19th Century military theorist, "War is a chameleon" rings true for the 21st Century.¹⁵ Man will fight and risk his life for something he believes in. Even though the United States is a super power, there is no basis to assume that those who disagree with U.S. policy will acquiesce to her wishes. The probability of man adapting and

¹³ Van Creveled, *The Rise and Decline of the State*. 338.

¹⁴ Van Creveled, *The Rise and Decline of the State*. 339.

¹⁵ Carl von Clausewitz. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, c1976. 89.

using violence to influence actions and policies remains as long as conflict is about imposing one's will on another.¹⁶

The world is evolving from an industrial base to an information base. The Tofflers have identified that knowledge, though always a part of the economy is now occupying a central position, through ideas, innovation, ethics, imagination, symbols, and metaphors.¹⁷ Paralleling this evolution is growing influence of the non-state actor. Many of these organizations are seeking or already possess the power to achieve their aim by manipulating perceptions. They manipulate through the use of force or the threat of force, usually against innocent civilians.

States have maintained the monopoly on collective violence since 1648. That era is ending and with it so is the methods of western mode of warfare reigning supreme. Warfare is now taking a brutish, bloody path that is leaving the state behind. As the world continues to be complex and splintered we can expect the rise of Gray Area War to continue.

¹⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*. 75.

¹⁷ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ed. *In Athena's Camp: Preparing For Conflict In The Information Age*; foreword by Alvin and Heidi Toffler. Santa Monica, Calif: Rand, 1997. xiv.

Chapter 3: Rise of Gray Area War

Decline of Order and the Ascendancy of Chaos

As the state continues to decline the mode of warfare that was attributed to states is also on the decline. While this is occurring, chaos and disruption are creating a new level of power and strength. The world environment is moving towards the irregularization of war. The Third Wave is ushering in a new mode of warfare. It begins with the creation of myths, which then translate into a coherent message to build a following. The following is converted into the executors of Gray Area War. Greater anarchy throughout the world facilitates the executors striking in numerous ways. The attacks are harsh and bloody dislocating conventional forces in the pursuit of manipulating perceptions. Perceptions are more important than physical destruction, meaning those who win the battle of perceptions are winning the wars. They are best able to exploit the growing global dissatisfaction

Building a Message

Much of the global dissatisfaction can be attributed to the fractured states throughout the world. The difficulty with many of the modern fractured states occurs if they never reach a post disruption steady state.¹⁸ Post Revolution equilibrium allows the country to stabilize in a new form. Without stabilization splintering occurs in countries as diverse as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Columbia. The countries begin to fracture and as they fracture, people tend to align towards tribal and ethnic groupings.¹⁹ The Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians who were neighbors

¹⁸ Crane Brinton.. *Anatomy of Revolution*. New York: Vintage Books, 1965.

Brinton analyzed four revolutions (English, American, French and Russian) and asserts that Revolution is similar to a fever with the final stage reaching a new level of functional equilibrium. The current fracturing is following the fever analogy, but does not reach the steady state of post revolution equilibrium.

¹⁹ Ralph Peters, "Constant Conflict." *Parameters*, Summer 1997, 4-14, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97summer/peters.htm>. Peters outlines that the United States is an inclusive society. Most societies are more exclusive: They only accept others with similar backgrounds. As the situation gets worse people are more inclined to align with others who are more like them.

for life were now mortal enemies. These former neighbors and new enemies began to propagate myths against each other. This in turn strengthened the hold that they have on their own clan or ethnic group. Ralph Peters makes it clear that man will fight for such myths.²⁰ The myths evolve into the message, which then resonates and binds the new system. Insurgency on the primal stage begins. When battling myth, the state system will find it virtually impossible to gain legitimacy.²¹ Logic no longer applies and every wrong perceived becomes a slight that is irreconcilable. The myths and wrongs build into the message that people follow. Hatred is the unifier that quickly ties an organization together.²² For hatred to be successful it must have a basis. Osama Bin Ladin, identifying America as the "Great Satan," is only one of many current examples. Action goes hand in hand with hatred bringing people together.²³ As the movement strengthens through hatred and action, myth and faith become intertwined creating the new message of hope. These intangibles of faith and moral value are a challenge to the West.²⁴ The initial problem is with the "rising revolution of expectations" defined as the demands of the people of the Third World growing at a rate that is faster than the government's ability to meet those demands, creating frustration.²⁵ The devotion to an ideology capable of exploiting the rising revolution of expectations is one that will hold great weight throughout the world. These factors contribute to creating individuals groomed for action.

The non-state actor is a complex networked system and an outgrowth of the inability to reach societal steady state. The message is the glue keeping the system together. Many factors have collaborated to create the conditions for these systems to exist and flourish. The irrationality of

²⁰ Ralph Peters. "Our New Old Enemies." *Parameters*, Summer 1999, 22-37.

<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99summer/peters1.htm>

Men fight for myths not the truth. "Men will fight to the death to cling to a just bearable past rather than embrace a less certain future, no matter its potential."

²¹ Steven Metz. *Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995.23. [698]

²² Eric Hoffer. *The True Believer: Thoughts On The Nature Of Mass Movements*. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, c1951. 86.

"Hatred is the most accessible and comprehensive of all unifying agents...mass movements can rise and spread without belief in a God, but never without belief in a devil."

²³ Hoffer. *The True Believer*, 111-112

²⁴ Grant T. Hammond. "Paradoxes of War." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 1994, 7-16.

myths is evident in the February 2002 poll taken of nine Muslim countries. The majority of respondents do not believe that Arabs had anything to do with the September 11th attacks on the United States in spite of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.²⁶ The United States is now threatened by such myths propagated by many of these primal insurgencies.

Cultivating a Following

Propagating a myth requires a ready and willing following. Overpopulation and failed states contribute to the potential pool of believers.²⁷ The Third Wave makes it difficult for the emerging world to turn burgeoning populace into productive society. Instead the population is becoming a burden that is collapsing the state. When people lack the basic requirements for survival, their options are limited. They can either do nothing, hoping the situation gets better through external assistance; or they can take resources either peacefully or aggressively, from those who have them. The flow of war is traditionally from those devoid of items of value towards those who possess something of value.

Globalization is simplifying the movement of people, resources and information across international borders.²⁸ As movement becomes easier, interactions between diverse people are increasing. These interactions are causing complex problems throughout the globe. Perceived Relative Deprivation (PRD) occurs in countless places. Many of these people are part of the revolution of rising expectations. Through an ever-expanding media, those who are less fortunate realize their predicament.²⁹ This situation has also led to a belief that there is an "intrusion" from the United States on their culture.³⁰ Thomas Freidman in his work *Lexus and the Olive Tree* identified this problem as a combination of both economic and cultural backlash towards

²⁵ Metz, *Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability*, 2-3

²⁶ Andrea Stone, "In Poll, Islamic World Says Arabs Not Involved In 9/11." USA Today, February 27, 2002. 1.

²⁷ Laurent Murawiec and David Adamson ed. *Concept, Demography and Security: Proceedings of a Workshop*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000. <http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF169/CF169.pdf>

²⁸ Paul R. Pillar. "Terrorism Goes Global Extremist Groups Extend Their Reach Worldwide." *Brookings Review* Fall 2001 Vol. 19 No. 4. 34-37.

²⁹ Metz, *Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability*. 2.

³⁰ Pillar. "Terrorism Goes Global Extremist Groups Extend Their Reach Worldwide." 34-37.

Globalization.³¹ He identifies the economic backlash occurring from lost jobs and a stagnating economy. The cultural backlash is putting images of America and the west of the same living rooms of these people without the jobs. The ability to understand why they are in the current situation is too confusing and difficult to define. The easier solution is to find someone like America to blame. Globalization is accelerating the clash of cultures. As this clash occurs opportunists will use these negative views as a polarizing agent.

Globalization is challenging the resources, traditional infrastructure, and family ties of many regions of the world. One example is in the Muslim world, where the populace is younger, less educated and more urban. Samuel Huntington in *Clash of Civilizations* identified the percentage of youth (15-24 years old) in the Muslim world as hovering around 20% from 1980 and projected to remain at that level past 2010. The United States and Europe on the other hand, are both steadily declining and are not expected to ever pass a rate of 14% in the next twenty-five years.³² This high proportion of Muslim youth is colliding with the quandary of unmet rising expectations. These shortfalls facilitate the non-state actor manipulating people as a prime resource. The dispossessed, uneducated young are ripe for any message of hope.

The believers pursue a cause. They are fully capable of disrupting those who oppose them. Whether it is a truck bomb in Lebanon or a shoe bomb on an airplane, these people do not require advanced training. They are part of the large pool of disenfranchised who follow a message that resonates with them. There has always been population of the willing, but now they possess the means to assail the west and specifically the United States.

Action

Gray Area War is more than angry men with stones. It is taking the proliferation of information and the primal level of man, combining them into the new form of warfare. The

³¹ Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. 344-45.

³² Huntington, *Clash of Civilization*. 118.

method of success combines dislocation with manipulation of perceptions. Dislocation focuses on nullifying conventional forces by rendering them meaningless. The typical approach is attacking a civilian target such as Pan Am Flight 109 that was blown up over Scotland. The intent is to create an action that is so shocking and grievous the government of the aggrieved nation will change its policies. This occurs through manipulating perceptions. Here the message is directed to shock and compel the citizens of a nation to demand change.

Man has shown a willingness to sacrifice and fight for any cause that he deems worthwhile. This willingness transcends economic, ethnic, and political lines. Man has the inclination to cross boundaries and threaten those who challenge his beliefs. The more that treaties have been signed to craft laws and conventions controlling the use of state force the more the non-state has gained strength by exploiting these restrictions. Martin van Creveld wrote, "The only way to develop perpetual peace is to eradicate man's willingness to take risks up to and including death."³³ The nature of man has not changed and man remains an aggressive animal. We can expect war to continue to occur in our lifetimes. It will not be the Western view of war.

Over the past five hundred years, the Western world has dominated warfare. The world is entering a new age and with it is the ascendancy of Gray Area War. The new combatants are an evolution of a complex and fractured world that has created the right conditions for this mode to thrive and prosper. Not only are the conditions right, but also the non-state actor will exploit certain strengths that are ideal in the Gray Area War.

³³ Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*

Chapter 4: The Non-State Actor: Domination through Perception

In the Industrial era the roots of power were in natural resources, but in the Third Wave it is the free access to information that is the key to power.³⁴ Those who understand this will be the masters of the new battlefield. The current technique of mastery involves dislocating the enemy by manipulating perceptions. The non-state actor does this well because it lacks accountability for its actions. Without accountability, it can achieve its aims through the most direct action it judges necessary. Effective non-state actors comprehend how to convert physical action into cybernetic results. In locations as varied as Somalia and Lebanon the victory did not go to those who dominated the battlefield, it went to those who built the perception of success.

Currently the non-state actor is unsurpassed in perception manipulation by preying on the weaknesses of the state. This non-state actor is defined as an independent and non-territorial organization that has the means and will to strike globally without the trappings of statehood. The organization can cross international boundaries. Laws, morality and conventions that nation-states live by do not restrict it. It succeeds in achieving its aims through dislocating state forces and manipulating perceptions. The non-state actor evolved into a leader of Gray Area War.

Though the non-state actor is very successful in their current endeavors they are not always victorious. States have always searched for ways to hold the non-state actor accountable. The most obvious case is with Israel, who reserves the right to for a preemptive strike against any entity that they consider a threat.³⁵ Though this could be considered a positive technique the current spiraling situation would contradict such views. The United States typically looks for the sanctuary and state sponsor. When the connection is made as it was with the West Berlin nightclub attack in 1986, the United States will make a retaliatory strike. In this case it was

³⁴ Toffler, *War And Anti War*. 202

³⁵ Eric Hammel. *Six Days in June: How Israel Won the 1967 Arab-Israeli War*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992. 60. In his work Hammel outlines one of the cornerstones of Israeli doctrine, which is the use of preemptive strikes into enemy held lands. This concept stood Israel well in its many conventional wars, but is now failing to achieve the same results.

against Libya with F 111's and appeared to have worked against that threat.³⁶ There are many historical examples of holding the non-state actor responsible for its actions. It is challenging to achieve these results due to the lack of traditional characteristics of states – territory, populations and clearly identifiable resources. William Lind summed it up well when comparing the effects of Western War and the new mode of warfare. The point was that the fighters of the new mode could ignore adapting the Western view of warfare and continue to succeed where the case was not true for Western Armies in comparison to the new mode of warfare.³⁷

Accountability

The non-state actor is redefining warfare. Its success is predicated on a lack of accountability for its actions. These entities operate on the seams and do not adhere to the laws and conventions of societies. Without these limitations, they are free to identify any potential weakness and attack it. Their ability to be opaque minimizes the information that others have about them. The current environment is similar to the analogy of a criminal and police officer. The criminal is free to operate in any manner considered necessary in pursuit of its aims. The most heinous crimes and actions are well within its purview. On the converse, the conduct of the police is highly restrictive. They are directed to protect and serve within the constraints of the law of the land. The public will not tolerate police abuses of these laws. The departure from the analogy occurs when the non-state actor is acting in an extreme manner while the state organizations are still focusing on curbing outdated threats. The actions of the non-state actor have been so severe that state counters are not in place.

³⁶ Centre for Defence and International Security Studies. *Terrorism: 1980-89. CDISS 1999*. Available at: http://www.cdiss.org/terror_1980s.htm

³⁷ William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), "The Changing Face Of War: Into The Fourth Generation" *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1989, 22-26.

Dislocation

The lack of accountability allows the non-state actor to strike in any manner it deems necessary through dislocation. Dislocation is the art of rendering the enemy's strength irrelevant. When a force is dislocated, it is essentially set aside; it becomes insignificant to the military outcome.³⁸ The non-state actor attacks the popular will or the consensus of leadership through the manipulation of information, which was not available to the same degree earlier in the 20th Century. The synergy between the lack of accountability and dislocation creates the effectiveness of the non-state actor. The state protects society primarily through laws and conventions. The non-state actor's disregard for these same conventions creates a plethora of targets to attack. The non-state actor in pursuit of its aims consistently bypasses the capabilities of the state.

The American hostages seized by Lebanese militias in the 1980s highlights these points. No state endorsed this action, or was accountable for them. The United States did not know exactly who to hold responsible in this case, or even with whom we could negotiate to get the hostages free. Terry Allen was one of the first hostages taken in 1985 and not released until 1991. He was well known in the region and renowned for his deep attachment to the region.³⁹ Typically men like Allen were left alone, but in Lebanon over thirty Westerners were taken hostage in a ten-year period.⁴⁰ Though it was believed the Hezbollah was responsible for most of the kidnappings, this could not be proved. Many of the kidnappers were pleased with the increased status they received by having a hostages. The action by an amorphous entity nullified the typical protection by invalidating the conventions and laws of the land. The American military remained on the sideline, in effect, it was dislocated and the United States no longer had a viable military option.

³⁸ Robert Leonhard. *Fighting By Minutes: Time And The Art Of War*. Foreword by James R. McDonough. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994. 12.

³⁹ Christine M. Helms. *Arabism And Islam: Stateless Nations And Nationless States*. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University: 1990. 4.

⁴⁰ Public Broadcasting Station. *Terrorist Attacks On Americans: The Attacks, The Groups, And The U.S. Response*. PBS, Frontline 2001. Available at: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html>

Without that option, America was forced to resort to limited diplomatic means, which finally succeeded after a years of global humiliation.

Perception

Dislocation of enemy strength is directed to achieve a specific result through perception. The non-state actor uses physical violence at a time and place that renders state strengths meaningless. Their goal is to achieve global effects through the transmission of mass media. This allows the message they are sending to be heard and seen throughout the world. The non-state actor focuses on manipulating the perceptions of their own followers, their enemies, and the uncommitted. The move to the cybernetic realm allows the non-state actor to achieve disproportionate results to their actions by manipulating others to modify their behavior.

The events of 3-4 October 1993 are one such example. Before the engagement that killed eighteen soldiers, the American people had the perception that the mission in Somalia was for humanitarian purposes. The President and his advisors failed to identify the growing scope of the campaign to include the finding and capturing of Mohamed Farrah Aidid.⁴¹ The perception of the American people was not in concert with reality. The public was now vulnerable to snap-back, the mental event of realizing that an individual's view is significantly dissimilar from reality. The individual has two alternatives: accept the new view or attempt to change the world to their view. Aidid had the proper conditions to achieve his aims. For Aidid the opportunity to engage American forces and instill a belief of defeat was now possible. Graphic images of dead Americans dragged through the streets were all the public needed for snap-back. Once the video footage reached CNN, the fate was sealed. In the aftermath " The public was outraged, and Congress was demanding a withdrawal."⁴² The outcry was so great that on October 7th. President

⁴¹ Mark Bowden. *Black Hawk Down: A Story Of Modern War*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999. 94.

⁴² Bowden,. *Black Hawk Down*. 308.

Clinton ended the mission of Task Force Ranger and identified March 31, 1994 as the withdrawal date for American forces.⁴³

The Somalis lost hundreds dead and over a thousand of their fighters wounded on that fateful night.⁴⁴ Tactically they were defeated: Two of Aidid's lieutenants were captured and the Task Force though bloodied achieved its purpose. The Somali ability to use physical violence at a specific place achieved the result of manipulating the perceptions of the American people and Congress, which compelled the United States to withdraw their forces. Strategically the non-state actor, the warlord Aidid, defeated the United States and achieved his aim of withdrawal of American forces.

The propagation of Gray Area War has brought the non-state actor to the forefront. The non-state actor succeeds because it is better able to leverage the evolving Third Wave through perception manipulation. In the Third Wave, war will be a "brain-force war" where soldiers use their minds fighting in new ways and defining the weapons they will need.⁴⁵ The abstract components of warfare will encompass the domain of the mind. Those who understand this realm will dominate. Currently the successful operators in Gray Area War and the ones who will remain for the near future are the non-state actors. They will kill and appear to kill indiscriminately, but the end-state is achieved by determining the perceptions of the followers, uncommitted and victimized people. Through these means the non-state actor is able to thrive.

⁴³ Daniel P. Bolger. *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990's*. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995. 327.

⁴⁴ Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*. 331.

⁴⁵ Toffler, *War and Anti-War* 10-11.

Chapter 5: Characteristics of the Non-State Actor

The supremacy of the non-state is a guide for those who want to find a path to success. There are specific characteristics that support this success. These characteristics align with John Boyd's view of conflict. Boyd, the creator of the OODA Loop, argued that all entities strive to survive and survive on their own terms. The competition of limited resources to achieve these aims forces us to diminish our adversary's capacity to survive on his own terms.⁴⁶ The non-state characteristics of self-organizing, networked operations, and non-linearity allow the non-state to pursue its aims in that manner. Self-organizing allows the non-state actor to survive. Operating as a network insures that he can survive on his terms. Non-linearity is how he pursues his aims by diminishing his opponent's ability to survive. The three of these elements collectively create a synergistic effect that allows the non-state to thrive in the chaotic global environment.

Self-Organizing

All entities, social as well as biological, must adapt to their environment to survive. Though all entities self organize to a certain degree, the ability of the non-state actor to rapidly execute the internal changes required is essential to its continued survival in the global environment. When the non-state is threatened on the physical and mental plain it self-organizes. Self-organizing allows the non-state actor to internally create new patterns freeing it up to operate in the changing environment.⁴⁷ Self-organization could be as simple as creating cells that do not know the existence of each other or as complex as infiltrating a hostile country and using the resources of the host to achieve their aim.

The methods of the non-state actor are directed towards the weaknesses of their opponents.

⁴⁶ John Boyd. *Patterns of Conflict*. Unpublished Paper, December 1986. Available at <http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/pdf/poc.pdf>.10.

⁴⁷Scott Camazine, Jean-Louis Deneubourg, Nigel R. Franks, James Sneyd, Guy Theraulaz, and Eric Bonabeau. *Self-Organization in Biological Systems*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ Press, 2001. 7.

Non-state actors operate and exploit the seams existing in the hierarchal legal systems. Since hierarchal operations are organized along functional or geographic lines, non-state entities possess the flexibility to exploit the gaps caused from not sharing information. Law in its simplest form protects the weak and non-state entities abuse these protections in pursuit of their aims.⁴⁸ They understand the rule of law and the constraints of governments. This freedom allows them to operate where and when they want.

Adapting to the legal threat takes on many forms. As seen in Great Britain recently when members of the Irish Republican Army were captured and put on trial, other followers examined the court documents determining how their organization was compromised. The group then changed its structure to minimize the legal threat in the future.⁴⁹ Counter tactics include creating cells that do not know the existence of each other, using amateurs with little knowledge of the organization, and compartmentalizing operations. Adapting to the legal framework that threatens them has allowed non-state organizations to survive and adapt their tactics in pursuit of their aims.

Legal adaptation is part of the larger path of survival through insurgency. The definition of insurgency is an organized movement designed to overthrow a constituted government by the use of subversion and armed conflict.⁵⁰ The difference with the modern non-state actor is the insurgency can be directed towards overthrow of the current international system. By conducting an insurgency they are attempting to change the existing order, whether regional or global. For an insurgency of this nature to survive it must require sanctuary, funding, technological parody, and a message that unites the organization.⁵¹ Without these basics the insurgency cannot endure.

⁴⁸ Harlan K Ullman. *In Irons: U.S. Military Might In The New Century*. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995. 55.

⁴⁹ Ian O Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, and Brian Michael Jenkins. *Countering the New Terrorism*. foreword by Brian Michael Jenkins. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1999. 1.

⁵⁰ US Department of Defense. *Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics*. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 30 September 1997

⁵¹ John T. Broom. "The Counterinsurgency Paradox." *Military Review*, Volume LXXVII, July-August 1997, NO 4: 42-50. <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/julaug97/broom.htm>

The standard form of defense in an insurgency is sanctuary. In the past sanctuary was a physical location that the opposition could not reach. An evolution of the Third Wave is the formation of cybernetic sanctuary based on moral protection. The use of moral strength has minimized the impact of both physical and mental isolation in the pursuit of defeating the non-state actor. The non-state entities such as Hezbollah have adapted a strong moral basis allowing them to operate independently for prolonged periods of time in hostile territory.

Additionally, many of the amenities of the western world are exploited. One example is the exploitation of free trade and free travel.⁵² The executors of the September 11th 2001 attacks operated in this fashion. Sixteen of the nineteen suicide bombers entered the country legally. While in the United States a private business trained the terrorists to fly, enabling them to pilot the commercial airplanes used in the attack.⁵³ This flexibility allows the non-state actor to move about unimpeded. They are able to survive for extended periods of time in a hostile country and use the resources available to prepare for missions against the state infrastructures. Protection is achieved through immersion in the targeted society.

The non-state entities adapted not only by immersion but also by morphing and mixing between transnational crime, terrorism and ethnic war. In Columbia, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) is waging its guerilla movement through funding of the drug trade.⁵⁴ Is the FARC a drug cartel, insurgency, or terrorist organization? If it is hard to determine what it is, it is infinitely more difficult to determine how to combat and defeat it. To combat the growing conflict in Sierra Leone, the UN has passed resolution 1306 to prevent the illegal trade of diamonds to fund the RUF guerillas.⁵⁵ Again, the questions is raised what exactly is the organization, and is it a legal or military solution that is required to combat these threats. As

⁵² Pillar, "Terrorism Goes Global Extremist Groups Extend Their Reach Worldwide." 34-37.

⁵³ Kelli Aren. "Hijacking suspects quietly entered United States" September 20, 2001
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/inv.howtheygothere/index.html>

⁵⁴ Michael G. Roskin. "Crime and Politics in Colombia: Considerations for US Involvement." *Parameters*, Winter 2001-02, 126-34. <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/01winter/roskin.htm>

⁵⁵ United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1306 (2000)*. Adopted by the Security Council at its 4168th meeting, on 5 July 2000, Available at: <http://www.un.int/usa/sres1306.htm>

the non-state continues to merge and morph into each other, these adaptations will make it increasingly more difficult to find and defeat these opponents.

The most challenging adaptation of the non-state is the attempt to validate forms of behavior that western societies consider to be criminal or morally corrupt.⁵⁶ This adaptation is obliging states and specifically western nation-states to reconsider their current values and methods in defense against this threat. Failure relinquishes the moral future to those who are currently attacking it - the non-state.⁵⁷

As crime and terror are mixed, the moral framework that the western world has come to consider as universal is getting torn down as quickly as the organizations are changing. Attacks on innocents continue. To the non-state actors outsiders are not innocents, but rather potential adversaries. Without concern for the current conventions they have dislocated the West. In Columbia recently the FARC went on a rampage killing civilians who they perceived as disloyal upon their withdrawal from the security zone.⁵⁸ The message was clear: if you do not support us, you will die because the government is not capable of protecting you. Non-state actors are willing to commit these atrocities with little accountability operating outside the conventional moral norms.⁵⁹ This adaptation has allowed non-state actors to redefine conflict and wage it on their terms.

In these types of conflicts the moral, political and cultural norms of non-state actors opponents are greatly different than America's.⁶⁰ An organization no longer concerned about legitimacy with the outside world can easily escalate to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or genocide.⁶¹ The ethnic nature of the Hutu majority in Rwanda killing nearly 800,000 Tutsi and

⁵⁶ Robert J. Bunker. "Epochal Change: War Over Social and Political Organization." *Parameters*, Summer 1997, 15-25. <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97summer/bunker.htm>.

⁵⁷ Bunker, "Epochal Change: War Over Social and Political Organization."

⁵⁸ Juan Forero, "Rebels Go On Killing Rampage", New York Times February 27, 2002

⁵⁹ Louise Richardson. "Transnational Terrorism." *Harvard International Review*, Fall 1998. <http://www.hir.harvard.edu/archive/articles/pdf/Richar1204.html>

⁶⁰ Charles J Dunlap Jr. "21st-Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths." *Parameters*, Autumn 1997, 27-37, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97autumn/dunlap.htm>

⁶¹ Aaron Weiss. "When Terror Strikes, Who Should Respond?" *Parameters*, Autumn 2001, 117-33. <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/01autumn/Weiss.htm>

politically moderate Hutus in 1994 demonstrates how far some will go.⁶² In the end the non-state entities that are gaining in power succeed with their ability to shock and disable the West through sheer savagery.

The non-state entity has shown a Darwinian approach to survival. The greater the threat to it's existence, the quicker and more intelligent the adaptation. The adaptations evolved from bypassing legal restraints, to creating new mental frameworks, and finally the attack on the moral foundation of their opponents. Those who rapidly self-organize will pose the greatest challenges on future battlefields. Since all complex adaptive systems anticipate the future, it will be essential to determine who's future is correct.⁶³ The self-adapting nature of the threat strengthens the capability to achieve its aims by redefining the battlefield.

Network

Once it is able to survive the non-state actor attempts to increase its own freedom of action. It does this is by operating as a network. A major difference between the state and non-state is the difference between hierarchal and networked organizations. The traditional state system is hierarchal originating from the Second Wave. The non-state organization is more networked and more in line with the Third Wave and the information age.

A network is a linkage of groups and organizations with no distinct leader or chain of command. The tie that binds these elements is unity of effort from a shared message. The broader and more universal the message, the greater the following will be. It is amorphous and difficult to defeat. In many ways it is like the Hydra of Greek mythology; as one head is cut off, others grow.

The state, being a hierarchy, has a clear chain of command and organization. Its strength is in

⁶² Robert Kaplan. "Bystanders to Genocide." *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 2001, Volume 288, No. 2; 84-108. <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/09/power.htm>

⁶³ M. Mitchell Waldrop. *Complexity: The Emerging Science At The Edge Of Order And Chaos* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993, c1992. 145-147.

the unity of effort brought forth by the leadership. Hierarchical organizations are slow to adapt and it is difficult to effect change in the system. Information is stove-piped and predominately flows from top to bottom with minimal cross-fertilization of ideas.

As the information revolution continues, networked organizations will become more prevalent. Networks thrive with information availability. Hierarchies slow with the proliferation of information. Hierarchies attempt to manage all information, which in turn overloads the system. The network uses specific information from any sources that are available. If the nation state continues to be hierarchical, the networked non-state actor will gain power.⁶⁴ Disparate groups coming together based on shared ideas are a standard network tactic. Events such as the 1993 World Trade Center attack are now the model and are expected to occur more frequently.⁶⁵ The shared enmity of an outside source such as the United States is usually strong enough to bring disparate organizations together for a period of time.⁶⁶ Networks thrive on adapting to attack any threat that presents itself.

Because the nature of the network is grounded in the message, the followers are usually amorphous and transitory.⁶⁷ The intensity of following the message depends on the individual. Each individual will choose how involved with the network they will be, making identification of network followers extremely difficult. Their strength is their invisibility, nullifying many of the intelligence techniques of the state.

The battle for the uncommitted is a major part of the Third Wave. Networks make responsibility hard to pin point. During conflict, the clearly identifiable state can and is accused of all kinds of atrocities, through manipulation of information and perceptions. The recent accusations by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson against the United States action in Afghanistan are an example. Robinson alleges that the U.S.

⁶⁴ Metz, *Armed Conflict in the 21st Century*, 13.

⁶⁵ Pillar, "Terrorism Goes Global Extremist Groups Extend Their Reach Worldwide."

⁶⁶ Louise Richardson, "Transnational Terrorism."

⁶⁷ Pillar, "Terrorism Goes Global Extremist Groups Extend Their Reach Worldwide."

has caused too much killing of innocents.⁶⁸ Any attempts to do the same against Al Quida were meaningless and ineffective due to the opaque nature of the organization. The goal of the networked non-state actor is to take away the credibility of the state.

The non-state elements have used networks to protect their organizations and exploit weaknesses of state organizations. The networked system of the non-state actor is a major threat to the state systems. In order for the networked system to operate there is a need for people to follow the message. Many of the possible recruits can be linked to the exploding populations in the emerging world. Operating as a network is an adaptation of the non-state entity that allows it to thrive on its own terms.

Non-Linearity

The ability to limit the freedom of action of others is what makes the non-state so threatening. They do this by fear, unpredictability and manipulating perceptions. Non-linearity thrives on disorder, taking a holistic view, allowing the non-state actor to gain an unbalanced advantage over state adversaries. In the military realm it includes, but is not limited to friction, mass, surprise and decentralization and is based on both temporal and geographic situations. Non-linearity is understood as follows:

Non-linearity is not proportional, additive, or replicable and the causes and effects are ambiguous. Inputs and outputs are not proportional. The whole is not quantitatively equal to its parts, or even qualitatively recognizable in its constituent components. Results cannot be assumed to be repeatable; the same experiment may not come out exactly the same way twice.⁶⁹

In the non-Linear environment, it is not possible to extrapolate, change scale or project information. The erratic nature thwarts planning and control. Determining the future is difficult, but applying the aspects of non-linearity also reaps great rewards.

⁶⁸ Associated Press. "UN Critical of US Action in Afghanistan" *Newsday*, March 6, 2002

⁶⁹ Tom Czerwinski. *Coping With The Bounds: Speculations On Nonlinearity In Military Affairs*. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1998. 10.

Non-linearity allows belligerents the opportunity to get disproportionate results. With the non-state actor the goal is to invalidate the strengths of the state. A historical example is the PAVN and Viet Cong limiting the impact of ten United States Army divisions in South Viet Nam. The mass of United States firepower and soldiers were swallowed up and marginalized in that conflict. North Viet Nam won the war of perceptions at home, abroad and in the United States. The disproportionate results minimized the success of U.S. actions compared to the large expenditure of inputs. In the end billions of dollars were spent, millions of American committed and over 58,000 died, and America completed its withdrawal in 1973. By operating in a style that minimizes the strength of the state while maximizing the potential outcome of their actions, the non-state actor is capable of using force to achieve their aims.

Aspects of non-linearity are evident in the non-state actor's use of terrorism for surprise, shock and disruption. The intent is keep their opponents off guard, never letting the victim know where or when an attack will occur. Thriving in the current disorder, non-state entities typically will use terrorism as their only channel to achieve their aims. In recent years, there has been a decline in the number of terrorist attacks, but an increase the lethality of these attacks.⁷⁰ In 1991 only 14% of documented terrorist attacks resulted in fatalities; that percentage steadily increased to reach 24% in 1996.⁷¹ The growing deadliness of terrorist assaults displays the adaptive nature of the attackers. In pursuit of their aims, they have found a need to alter methods towards greater shock and surprise through greater death and carnage. The current trend support the terrorists increased concern with sending specific messages to their own followers and to their victims.

Along the same lines, William Lind an American military theorist, identified mission orders, small maneuverable units, and the goal of collapsing the enemy from within as the direction of future warfare, which is inherently non-linear. These methods are evident in recent assaults. The

⁷⁰ Ian O Lesser. Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, and Brian Michael Jenkins. *Countering the New Terrorism*. forward by Brian Michael Jenkins. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1999.13-14.

⁷¹ Hoffman, *Countering the New Terrorism*. 12.

attack on the USS Cole with two terrorists maneuvering an explosive laden motorboat into the American ship highlights these approaches. In the port Aden, the Cole stopped for refueling where it was stationary and vulnerable. The American Rules of Engagement limited the sailors' freedom to engage the approaching motorboat. The boat pulled up close enough to Cole when it detonated almost sinking the ship and killing seventeen Americans.

The tactics were in line with Lind's projections. Mission orders were simple - close with an American ship and attempt to destroy it. The terrorists operated in small cells. A small element supplied the explosives and others drove the boat.⁷² The apparent aim was to use the impact of the small and the many to minimize the possibility of disruption. The final and biggest aspect is the attempt to collapse the enemy internally. Here the end state is difficult to define. What is clear is the United States is compelled to use greater efforts in force protection and reassess current policies. A small attack did achieve the results of limiting the freedom of action of a great power such as the United States of America.

Small disruptions are part of the larger non-linear concept of friction. A message never received, a unit lost, a leader sick: if any of these events occur at the wrong time defeat can follow. Boyd identifies the need to increase friction on an opponent to limit his ability to achieve his aims.⁷³ Since the typical response to friction is greater control in hierarchal organizations opponents can gain a significant advantage by increasing the friction on state organizations. As an organization increases its control in order to diminish friction, it will naturally limit its own freedom of action. If a non-state actor can succeed in increasing the friction of an opponent to a high degree, the weight of internal controls will facilitate the opponent's collapse from within.

Just as small disruptions from friction give, a non-linear advantage so does the impact of mass. Though mass systems are a product of the linear Second Wave, the true essence of mass is

⁷² US Department of Defense, *USS Cole Commission Report: Executive Summary*. 9 January 2001. Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/cole20010109.html>

⁷³ John Boyd. *The Strategic Game*. Unpublished Paper, June 1987. Available at <http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/pdf/strategy.pdf> 51.

non-linear. Mass maintains unrelenting pressure upon an opponent with the goal of dissipating enemy focus to the point where he is incapable of preventing the decisive blow when it occurs. Mass in the physical realm will still be vital but mass in the intellectual realm is the new frontier. The mass of ideas and weapons of mass effects will slowly replace physical mass of soldiers and systems and the use of WMD.⁷⁴ The mass of ideas is creating a sheer volume of possibilities and approaches in which there is no way to plan of all of these eventualities. The non-state actor will use the mass of information and ideas to create inordinate dilemmas for the states. At this point of time the Director of Homeland Defense, Tom Ridge, is fighting this battle with funding. "The President's budget nearly doubles funding for a sustained strategy of homeland security, focused on four key areas: bioterrorism, emergency response, airport and border security, and improved intelligence."⁷⁵ If the government ignores any of these potential areas, it may become the sought after weakness for the non-state actor to exploit.

The non-state maintains the ability to limit the freedom of others through non-linear methods. The non-state is able to take a systems approach to the problem and look to gain maximum output from minimum input. Their success is predicated on how they understand and apply the dynamics of the global system. The preferred method is by fear, unpredictability and manipulating perceptions.

The non-state actor is a system. There is an interrelationship between components to make up a unique outcome. Whether it is a terrorist organization, insurgency or drug cartel, they all operated in a non-linear fashion. The results of the outputs in attacks by non-state actors typically were disproportionate to the inputs. Each type of entity was self-organizing when struck from the outside. Given enough time, they were able to regenerate and continue operating in some form. When receiving input from the outside that threatened them, each organization showed the

⁷⁴ Brian Michael Jenkins, *Countering the New Terrorism*, vi.

⁷⁵The White House. *The President's Plan to Strengthen Our Homeland Security*. Washington, DC: The White House, February 2002. Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020204-2.html>

capability to adapt to the threat and change the interactions within the system to survive.

Currently the non-state actor is capable of surviving on its own terms while limiting the freedom of action of others. The method of approach is the strength of this entity. As long as it can self-organize slightly faster than those who attempt to destroy it do, it will survive. As long as it can convey its message through a network unimpeded it will survive on its own terms. As long as it can exploit the characteristics of non-linearity such as mass and friction by getting disproportionate results it will continue to limit the freedom of action of its opponents. The true strength of these entities is the synergistic results gained when elements of their strengths are combined. As long as state organizations fail to consider these strengths, they will be relegated to play catch up.

Chapter 6: Failures of Field Manual 3-0 Operations

As others adapt to Gray Area War so must the United States Army. Doctrine is the vehicle that the Army uses to understand warfare. The characteristics of the non-state are a start point to look for change in the Army's approach to conflict. Though the recent edition of FM 3-0 is considered a bridge to future warfare it has not gone far enough in addressing the impact of Gray Area War and the Third Wave. By addressing the characteristics of self-organization, networked operations, and non-linearity presents a framework to guide the assessment of FM 3-0.

Even in times of great change, most things stay constant. The assessment of FM 3-0 is no different. A cursory look at the manual maintains the basic nature of war has not changed. The Spectrum of operations is still a valid framework to understand where and when Army units will be employed. The outline of the offense and the defense will remain applicable for the foreseeable future. The new additions on Battle Command, Information Operations and Non-Contiguous/Non-Linear operations are timely and relevant. The doctrinal gaps are a derivative of a failure to fully embrace the current trends in Gray Area War. The non-state actor's approach to Gray Area War is changing the landscape and there are areas that the Army needs to address in order to stay current.

The United States Army is a system. The doctrine that guides the Army requires a systems approach. The initial failure with this methodology occurs by the creation of a separate chapter designated for Information Operations. Information is intertwined in all that the United States Army does, just as it is for the non-state actor. The non-state actor did not stovepipe his actions into separate categories. The Third Wave clearly establishes the linkage between information and conduct of operations. The non-state understands this linkage as he takes a holistic view to support his efforts of achieving dislocation through perception. Chapter 11 and the addition of information to combat power are a superb start towards addressing the impact of the Third Wave, but they do not take the dynamic interaction of information far enough.

Self-Organizing

FM 3-0 looks at aspects of self-organizing when it discusses being adaptive for particular situations. It fails to address the holistic aspect of self-organizing, and in turn the decision point that will compel an organization to change its internal patterns. In the past change on this scale occurred only after catastrophic failure. Two major historical examples come to mind: the Prussians after the humiliation of Jena and the United States with the advent of Air Land Battle in the Post-Viet Nam era.⁷⁶ If failure remains the only mechanism for true change, the Army will face great challenges in the future. Under this construct, the ideal time for self-organization is when all things are going well.

The scope of Army self-organizing is limited. Title X, the guidance for the Army, limits what the Army can do. Radical organizational shifts are also challenging because of budget constraints. The least encumbered method to change is through doctrine. The freedom to create new approaches, within the bounds of the current system is only limited by the human mind.

The Army, just like the non-state actor, is a system within the larger system of conflict. Many times in a system, due to the complex nature of the interacting parts it is difficult to determine the impact of a specific input.⁷⁷ The time lag is too great and the adjustments of the enemy are hard to determine. The United States Navy Submarine campaign against the Japanese outlines the impact of specific inputs upon a system in regards to a time lag. The United States sent out single patrols of submarines to destroy the Japanese merchant fleet. Success was measured in individual ships sunk and the cumulative effects of the submarine campaign. By the end of 1944, about half of all Japanese merchant ships and two-thirds of the tanker fleet were

⁷⁶ Walter Goerlitz. *History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945*. translated by Brian Battershaw. New York: Praeger, 1967, c1953. Ch 2. Goerlitz outlines the cause and effect of the Prussians revolution in the General Staff in the aftermath of Jena. Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. *War And Anti-War* 54-55. The Tofflers discuss the renaissance of ideas occurring in the wake of Viet Nam. Both cases studies outline the unity of effort gained from catastrophic failure. The cumulative realization of the collective group is that radical change is in order. The ability to get others to change without such a catalyst is difficult.

⁷⁷ Ludwig von Bertalanffy. *General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications*. New York : Braziller, 1993, c1968. 30-53.

destroyed by American submarines.⁷⁸ The Japanese never adapted to this threat. This occurred for a myriad of reasons, but the greatest impact was the Japanese did not consider commerce protection in prewar plans nor understand the ramifications until it was too late.⁷⁹ The Japanese system failed to comprehend and react to the specific input of United States submarine attacks. The non-state actor will attempt to gain similar advantages through the use of time and understanding how an opponent will use time is essential to successful Army operations.

The non-state and other opponents will use time to study the methods employed by the United States Army. This will be similar to the actions of the Mujahideen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980's. The Mujahideen would attempt to determine the methods of Soviets forces and establish counter techniques. A main Mujahideen area of attack was on supply convoys. The convoys moved on the same routes for years. The Soviet tactics of using armor and aerial protection were known and understood. The Mujahideen waited for the air recon to pass and then destroyed the armor elements of the convoy; once this was completed they were free to destroy the softer, more lucrative logistic targets. Eventually the Soviets started sending attack aviation units to disrupt the ambush. The Mujahideen watched and determined the flight time of support and ensured that they were out of the ambush area prior to arrival of Soviet reinforcements.⁸⁰ The lessons of the Mujahideen showed that identifying certain patterns lead to formulating a level of predictability. Predictability leads to determining strengths and weaknesses, which will facilitate how they attack enemy forces. The goal for Army forces should focus on preventing the enemy exploiting the time horizon. Doctrinally the Army counter would reflect and increased emphasis on changing methods and tactics before the enemy successfully discovered the Army's current patterns. This is obviously easier said than done. In FM 3-0 there

⁷⁸ Ronald H. Spector. *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan*. New York, Vintage Books, 1985. 478-486.

⁷⁹ David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology In The Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. 439.

⁸⁰ Ali Ahmad Jalali, and Lester W. Grau. *The Other Side Of The Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics In The Soviet-Afghan War*. Introduction by John E. Rhodes. Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, Studies and Analysis Division, 1999.

are two areas that fail to address the benefits of self-organizing to the proper degree.

Chapter 11 addresses Information Operations (IO) to bridge the current doctrinal gap. Early in the chapter the issue of information superiority is raised. Can the United States Army truly achieve information superiority? Section 11-2 of FM 3-0 identifies Information Superiority "in its essence, information superiority is about Army forces being able to see first, understand first, and act first."⁸¹ In the current environment media organizations, such as CNN, will broadcast troop movements. One such event occurred during the Haiti landing on September 19, 1994. Members of CNN were on the ground filming the lead soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division while they were dismounting Blackhawk helicopters in Port-au-Prince.⁸² Not only will troop movements likely be compromised, potential adversaries can read Army doctrine on line; all that is required is a computer with Internet access. Moving a military force logistically takes time. Under these circumstances information superiority will be a challenge. Likely deployments into hostile regions compound this problem. In such region where cell phones and the Internet exists, US movements will be well known throughout the Area of Operations. Information superiority is still something that the Army should aspire to achieve, but should also consider the ramifications if it is not achieved.

Doctrinally the Army will need to counter an enemy that possesses information superiority. In regards to information superiority the antithesis should be what if they "see me first, think they understand me, and will act first." This construct creates exploitable opportunities to disrupt and defeat the enemy. The enemy will probably know the movements of much of the friendly force and this is not necessarily always negative. It is more important to understand that the enemy does have this knowledge. Methods that are applicable to these circumstances include deceiving the enemy by lulling him into a false sense of security and taking actions that confuse an enemy.

⁸¹ US Department of Defense. Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, June 2001. 11-2.

⁸² Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John Fishel. *Invasion, Intervention, Intervision: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998. 104.

Grant's Vicksburg Campaign highlights these points. During the winter of 1862-63 Grant made many creative attempts to seize Vicksburg. Though the initial attempts failed, John Pemberton, the Confederate commander, was lulled into a sense of security, believing that the Union forces were going to attempt more of the same operations in the bayous or a northern approach to Vicksburg. Grant, in essence stretched time to confuse the enemy. In late April 1863, Grant sent two of his three corps south to attack Vicksburg from a new direction. While this was occurring he kept Sherman's corps in the north as a deception operation. The deception succeeded in keeping enough of Pemberton's army occupied in the north allowing the Union army to land unopposed fighting its initial battle against a significantly inferior foe.⁸³ Though Grant was in hostile territory, he succeeded in using the knowledge of the enemy to deceive, lull and confuse the enemy to achieve his aims.

The enemy will look for patterns to form a line of predictability. The commander should consider what methods maintain a level of unpredictability so that the enemy will find it difficult to determine what exactly the friendly unit is attempting. Opportunities present themselves when the enemy believes he knows friendly actions and seeks a chance to strike friendly forces. The conditions are set for effective counter action that has the potential to be decisive. The enemy can be set up to strike at the time and place that he believes is of his choosing. Information superiority is critical, but the understanding of who has information superiority is just as critical.

Risk management is another area that does not adequately address the aspects of self-organizing. Risk management is "the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors, and making an informed decision that balances risk cost with mission benefits."⁸⁴ The nature of self-organizing is to change patterns internal to the system. To be effective in Gray Area War, the ability to rapidly self-organize will be a necessity. Risk

⁸³ Warren Grabau. *Ninety-Eight Days: A Geographer's View Of The Vicksburg Campaign*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2000.

The author outlines Pemberton's concern with Grierson's cavalry raid in his rear and the belief that Grant's movement south was reinforcing the Army of the Cumberland.

⁸⁴ FM 3-0. 6-6.

Management, by its definition will squelch self-organizing. When risks are assessed and at times over controlled, actions become predictable. Predictability through risk mitigation was the hallmark of United States Army operations in Viet Nam by 1970. Risk management occurred in the form of self-contained artillery firebases. The reliance on the firebase led infantry units to consistently remain within supporting range while executing operations.⁸⁵ The enemy knew the range of the howitzers and was now free to operate outside of the range fan. The goal to mitigate risks will naturally minimize creative approaches to an operation.

The integration of Risk Management with section 6-60 of FM 3-0 Adaptive Combinations may work better in the area of self-organizing. Section 6-60 addresses Area of Operations and type of operation. Combining Risk and Adaptive Combinations will guide the commander to seek unpredictability through risk. The greater the combination of forces and systems the fewer options are available to the commander. This is similar to a filter that establishes a litany of requirements. The more requirements the fewer options will come out of the filter. The employment of a mechanized division in offensive operations highlights this point. The employment of all available units creates a limited number of potential combinations. The logistics tail is so great that the amount of MSR's are limited, the sheer size of the force will restrict how far it will go, the employment of an Aviation Deep Attack will occur in a particular pattern. An alternative will allow the commander to seek risk through unpredictability, by not using all of his available forces in the operation. This will give him the freedom to attack the enemy in a manner and time and place that the enemy is ill prepared. By increasing the emphasis on seeking risk to achieve the mission, the guidance will be clear to be creative and unpredictable in actions instead of prescriptive.

The battlefield will be different in Gray Area War. The necessity to self-organize before the enemy identifies patterns and achieve a decisive victory over Army forces will be critical.

⁸⁵ Shelby L. Stanton. *The Rise And Fall Of An American Army: U.S. Ground Forces In Vietnam, 1965-1973*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985. 343.

Doctrinally the Army will need to address ways to operate in an environment that, if not hostile is certainly not friendly to United States forces. Focusing on methods to maintain unpredictability will allow the force to continue to self-organize.

Network

The non-state actor is able to exist on its own terms through the use of networked operations. The United States Army is considerably more hierarchal than many non-state actors, but there are glimmers of hope in this arena. The focus on mission type orders should not cease. The Commander's Intent is the bounds for the operation. Both of these approaches facilitate the subordinates working towards the mission in a decentralized manner. Unfortunately, there is still much room for progress to remain viable in Gray Area War.

Information flow is a limiting factor. As discussed earlier in a hierarchy the increase in information will slow decision-making. The solution to this problem is Information Management in section 11-28. The definition is " The provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate situational understanding and decision-making."⁸⁶ The problem again is the construct. Relevant information and management of information assumes certain individuals know what is significant. The greater objective should focus on information availability. Information availability makes information available to who ever needs it. The concept is similar to the Internet. No one manages the Internet. Information is out in cyberspace, and as long as a person has access to the Internet they can find whatever pertinent information they need. By focusing on making information available, the Army can leverage its people to get better results. This will override the likely slowing of decision making in a hierarchal organization as it attempts to take in all the possible information and determine who needs what information.

⁸⁶ FM 3-0. 11-11.

Empowering the soldiers is a networked approach that can be accomplished within the framework of Rules of Engagement and the larger moral and values of the Army. Individual soldiers on the ground make or break the success of an operation. Untrained ill-disciplined troops such as the 11th Brigade of the Americal Division in Viet Nam possess the potential to strategically cripple an operation. The exploits of William Calley, was only one part of a greater problem of poorly trained soldiers who were in one of the more populous regions of Viet Nam.⁸⁷ To overcome this type of impact, the goal should be to produce more empowered soldiers creating greater latitude in employing them in combat operations. Section 6-27 of FM 3-0 addresses ROE well, focusing at the tactical level. A higher-level emphasis of the networked benefits of Army Values support greater latitude for the commander. The end state is achieved by inculcating soldiers with the proper moral framework to make the right decision on the ground. This autonomy permits the commander freedom of action through the flexibility in the employment of his force. The larger benefit is a correlation of greater number of men executing within the commanders framework to best accomplish the mission. A solid background allows soldiers to understand the larger scale implications of the operation and the impact of perceptions at the strategic level. This will facilitate the men making wise choices in the conduct of their operations.

Ensuring the subordinates have the foundation to operate independently is key to networked operations. Networked operations are in many ways part of the Army. The goal with a network is to empower as many people as possible to achieve a certain objective. By focusing on doctrinal changes the Army can achieve some of these aims.

⁸⁷ Shelby L. Stanton. *The Rise And Fall Of An American Army*. 196, 284. The 11th BDE was a hastily organized unit slated for duty in Hawaii, when it was diverted to Viet Nam. This brigade never fully recovered from the shock of hastily entering combat operations. The Area of Operations for the 11th BDE was laced with civilians, which was another ill-planned action for poorly trained soldiers.

Non-Linearity

Non-linearity allows an opponent to achieve disproportionate results within a system. It can do this by attacking the opponent's aim while attempting to achieve the friendly aim. In FM 3-0 the method of denying the enemy his aim occurs through initiative, momentum, and pressure. All three of these notions concentrate on speed. FM 3-0 neglects stretching time to advantage.

Non-state actors, and asymmetric enemies will use time to assess and determine a pattern so that they can find vulnerabilities to attack. The enemy is attempting to deny their opponent the ability to achieve his aims. This may be through disruption, harassment or another technique, but the emphasis is to increase the friction on the opponent. Doctrinally the Army denies the enemy his aims by compelling him to react to friendly actions. This is a good approach, but should not be the only method. The commander should seek other methods to deny the enemy the ability to achieve enemy aims. Disrupting the enemy is not something that should be left to the Information Officer and leaflet drops. Techniques that slow the enemy by increasing his internal control and compelling him to increase his security posture are some methods. The benefits of denying the enemy his aims far outweigh the possible losses of manpower and resources it may take.

Operational Planning remains linear and less effective than desired. Too many attempts to control and synchronize all aspects of combat power on the battlefield diminish the ability to achieve disproportionate results at a selected place and time. The goal of planning should be on creating options and flexibility, in the same way the Napoleon's Bataillon Carré did this for his operations.⁸⁸ The purpose of that formation was not to get to a specific location faster than the enemy; it was on mutually supporting corps moving in a short period supporting any unit in contact. Find the enemy and mass faster was the intent, rather than trying to pinpoint the exact

⁸⁸ Gunther E Rothenberg. *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978. 147-149

The corps formations were pulled closer together to be one-day march from each other. After one corps engaged and fixed the enemy other corps would move in for the decisive action.

location of action. Current guidance on planning in FM 3-0 is more linear than non-linear. The ability to adjust to a rapidly changing situation becomes more difficult and less likely to achieve under the current planning direction.

FM 3-0 was written as a bridge from the United States Army previous method of war fighting to the modern era. The shape and scope of warfare have changed to such an extent that aspects of FM 3-0 should be reconsidered. The successful characteristics of the non-state actor are only one method that may work as a blue print for where the Army needs to go.

Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

The Third Wave is bringing many changes to the world, to include the mode of warfare. Gray Area War is becoming more prevalent. With the rise of this phenomenon, those who wage war are changing. The non-state actor is an example of the ever-adaptive nature of conflict. The lessons from the non-state actor bring out characteristics that are applicable to the Third Wave. These are the lessons for the United States Army.

Warfare is holistic and all of the parts are integrated. The interrelationship of the elements will determine the effectiveness of the whole. Currently the Army is focused on a reductive cause and effect approach methodology to warfare. The Army has started down the road to change with the recent edition of FM 3-0, but should do better. The three non-state actor characteristics: self-organizing, networked operations, and non-linearity are starting points to determine possible areas for doctrinal change in the near term.

The strength of doctrine is the universal understanding that it brings to the Army. Every school, which a soldier attends, every training event that a unit conducts, and every combat mission the Army executes is interwoven with doctrine. Through doctrine, the soldier and the commander gain the common understanding required for effective fighting. It is critical for doctrine to maintain its currency in regards to the execution of conflict.

Recommendations

The Army has an opportunity to consider the impact of recent events and determine a near term path. Objective Force is on the horizon, but the Army is currently involved in a war and requires doctrine that will give universal understanding to all who will apply it. Within the

framework of self-organizing, networked operations and non-linearity are many opportunities to create a doctrine for today's force and today's fight.

Self-Organizing

Self-Organizing offers the opportunity to change and create continued vitality for the organization. In the complex environment of Gray Area War the Army must adopt doctrinal methods to increase the emphasis on self-organizing. Two areas that were discussed earlier focused on the areas that the Army failed to capitalize upon.

Things going well traditionally meant there was no need for change. The new model questions what actions should be taken when things are going well. This is the time for friendly adaptations. The enemy will adapt to friendly actions and is conceiving of a counter while executing his current mission. Both sides will attempt to gain information superiority. The recommended solution is to maintain the section on information superiority, but add a section on how to operate in an environment where the enemy has information superiority.

Network

James Schneider, Professor of Theory for the School of Advanced Military Studies, wrote extensively on the moral effects of the empty battlefield. He theorized that with the increase dispersion of battle, soldiers were losing the moral support to carry out missions and hazard their lives to the degree that earlier generations did.⁸⁹ Non-state actors are overcoming this challenge through moral strength of their message. This allows their followers to be grounded in something greater than self in times of physical isolation. There is no reason the United States Army cannot follow the same type of networked approach. The greater the moral strength of American soldiers the greater methods of employment. As our society becomes more networked, our

⁸⁹ James J Schneider. "The Theory of the Empty Battlefield." *JRUSI*, Sept. 1987.

soldiers will grow accustomed to dispersion. If we build in them the moral strength to operate independently, they also have the potential to overcome the physical limitations

The Army has greater challenges than the non-state actor in this regard. All soldiers are representatives of the state and their actions reflect directly on the legitimacy and justness of the state. This constraint identifies the bounds of soldier behavior. The doctrinal framework for networked soldier operations requires a strong moral and ethical leaning. The doctrine that allows soldiers to operate independently and maintain the legitimacy of state actions will focus on the expectations of the soldier from the state, in the same way that a police officer understands the expectations of the municipality in regard to his duty.

The tension between freedom of action and unity of effort will continuously be a challenge to the commander. The evolution of the Third Wave creates a greater emphasis on freedom of action at the lowest level. The recommended change to doctrine will need to emphasize greater latitude for subordinates in the accomplishment of their missions. The right approach will overcome many of the challenges of tactical engagements creating a strategic effect.

The ever-adaptive nature of the enemy will lead them to any means necessary to minimize the impact of the United States firepower. The likely consequence will be an increase in operational hugging. The enemy will move to places such as highly populated areas reducing the impact of many friendly systems. This eventuality supports the increased emphasis on soldier level values as a doctrinal foundation. The ability to bring trained and disciplined soldiers into urban areas will be key to the success of future operations.

Non-Linearity

There are many ways to conduct war fighting, while in pursuit of friendly aims, the commander must also deny the enemy his aims. The current doctrinal approach for the United States Army denies the enemy his aim by attempting to have the enemy react to friendly actions. Though effective, it is also one-dimensional. Doctrinally the Army requires greater emphasis on

denying the enemy his aims. This can be accomplished through greater integration in the planning process of the enemy intent and the best methods to deny him the ability to accomplish his aim. The goal of achieving the friendly aim is paramount, but without consideration of denying the enemy his aim, critical gaps in mission planning may occur.

The enemy is a system and to defeat a system there is a requirement to breakdown multiple parts of the system simultaneously denying the enemy time to self-organize. To achieve system collapse, the doctrinal approach requires greater emphasis on disrupting and breaking down the enemy by compressing time or stretching time. The influence of time drives all operations. Currently, the Army focuses on speed as the primary mechanism to impact time. Time is neutral, but can be used to advantage regardless of duration.

Martin Libicki has written extensively on the future of warfare. He postulates that the best approach on the future battlefield will be to use preemption, dislocation and disruption against the enemy.⁹⁰ This combination focuses on denying the enemy the ability to achieve his aim, while still pursuing the friendly aim. The combination of preemption, dislocation, and disruption which minimizes the enemies ability to conduct hostile operations allow the commander to discern the most effect means to engage the enemy. The recommendation is to replace initiative focused doctrine with the above listed approaches denying the enemy his aim.

Collectively there will be many factors that impact the current and near future battlefield. A comprehensive assessment of the nature of potential conflict was published in *Swarming and the Future of Conflict* written by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt.⁹¹ Many of the networked, self-organizing and non-linear concepts of the non-state actor are apparent in their writing. The authors recommend "formations based on the dispersed deployment and robust internetting of myriad, mostly small units of maneuver, some dedicated to close-in combat and others to distant

⁹⁰ Patrick M Cronin, ed. *2015: POWER and PROGRESS*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996. Martin C. Libicki. Ch 4

⁹¹ John Arquilla, and David Ronfeldt. *Swarming and the Future of Conflict*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000.

fire."⁹² Another recommendation is for the United States Army to pursue the effects of swarming and attempt to integrate these aspects into doctrine.

Gray Area War is unclear and imprecise. It is more in-depth than the past understanding of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Some of the areas that still apply are legitimacy and proportionality. The large population of the uncommitted and the worldview of United States execution of military operations lends to the increased emphasis of both terms. The recommendation is to add both terms to FM 3-0 for the conduct of operations. In view of the increased oversight from other agencies, the need for the Army to conduct actions in a legal and just manner is increasing as the United States becomes more involved in Gray Area War.

The Army is going through a great period of change concurrently with a global war on terrorism. The evolution into Gray Area War potentially will leave the United State Army behind. To keep up in the current global environment change is required. Doctrinal change directed towards a holistic approach in conflict is one method to address these changes.

⁹² John Arquilla, and David Ronfeldt. *Swarming and the Future of Conflict*. 85

Bibliography

- Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David ed. *In Athena's Camp: Preparing For Conflict In The Information Age*; foreword by Alvin and Heidi Toffler. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1997.
- Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David. *Swarming and the Future of Conflict*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000.
- Aren, Kelli "Hijacking Suspects Quietly Entered United States." *CNN*, September 20, 2001. Available at: <http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/inv.howtheygothere/index.html>
- Beckerman, Linda P. "The Non-Linear Dynamics of War." Science Applications International Corporation ASSET Group, April 20, 1999. Available at: http://www.belisarius.com/modern_business_strategy/beckerman/non_linear.htm
- Bolger, Daniel P. *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990's*. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995.
- Bowden, Mark. *Black Hawk Down: A Story Of Modern War*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999.
- Boyd, John. *Patterns of Conflict*. Unpublished Paper, December 1986. Available at: <http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/pdf/poc.pdf>.
- Boyd, John. *The Strategic Game*. Unpublished Paper, June 1987. Available at: <http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/pdf/strategy.pdf>.
- Broom, John T. "The Counterinsurgency Paradox." *Military Review*, Volume LXXVII, July-August 1997, NO 4: 42-50. Available at: <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/julaug97/broom.htm>
- Brinton, Crane. *Anatomy of Revolution*. New York: Vintage Books, 1965.
- Bunker, Robert J. "Epochal Change: War Over Social and Political Organization." *Parameters*, Summer 1997, 15-25. Available at: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97summer/bunker.htm>
- Camazine, Scott Jean-Louis Deneubourg, Nigel R. Franks, James Sneyd, Guy Theraulaz, and Eric Bonabeau. *Self-Organization in Biological Systems*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ Press, 2001.
- Centre for Defence and International Security Studies. *Terrorism: 1980-89. CDISS 1999*. Available at: http://www.cdiss.org/terror_1980s.htm
- Clausewitz, Carl von *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, c1976.
- Cronin, Patrick M ed. *2015: POWER and PROGRESS*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996.

- Czerwinski, Tom. *Coping With The Bounds: Speculations On Nonlinearity In Military Affairs*. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1998.
- Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, And Technology In The Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997.
- Dunlap, Charles J. Jr. "21st-Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths." *Parameters*, Autumn 1997, 27-37. Available at: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97autumn/dunlap.htm>
- Friedman, Thomas L. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, New York, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999.
- Goerlitz, Walter. *History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945*. Translated by Brian Battershaw. New York: Praeger, 1967, c1953.
- Grabau, Warren. *Ninety-Eight Days: A Geographer's View Of The Vicksburg Campaign*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2000.
- Hammel, Eric. *Six Days in June: How Israel Won the 1967 Arab-Israeli War*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992.
- Hammond, Grant T. "Paradoxes of War." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 1994, 7-16. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/jfq0404.pdf
- Helms, Christine M. *Arabism And Islam: Stateless Nations And Nationless States*. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University: 1990.
- Hoffer, Eric. *The True Believer: Thoughts On The Nature Of Mass Movements*. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, c1951.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash Of Civilizations And The Remaking Of World Order*. New York: Touchstone, 1997.
- Jalali, Ali Ahmad and Lester W. Grau. *The Other Side Of The Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics In The Soviet-Afghan War*. Introduction by John E. Rhodes. Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, Studies and Analysis Division, 1999.
- Kaplan, Robert. "Bystanders to Genocide." *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 2001, Volume 288, No. 2; 84-108. Available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/09/power.htm>
- Kretchik, Walter, Robert F. Baumann, and John Fishel. *Invasion, Intervention, Intervention: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998.
- Leonhard, Robert. *Fighting By Minutes: Time And The Art Of War*. With a foreword by James R. McDonough. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994.

- Lesser, Ian O. Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, and Brian Michael Jenkins. *Countering the New Terrorism*. Foreword by Brian Michael Jenkins. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1999.
- Lind, William S. Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), "The Changing Face Of War: Into The Fourth Generation" *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1989, 22-26.
- McKenzie, Kenneth F. JR. *The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR*. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University: 2000.
- Metz, Steven. *Armed Conflict In The 21st Century: The Information Revolution And Post-Modern Warfare*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000.
- Metz, Steven. *Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995.
- Murawiec, Laurent and David Adamson ed. *Concept, Demography and Security: Proceedings of a Workshop*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000. Available at: <http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF169/CF169.pdf>
- Peters, Ralph. "Constant Conflict." *Parameters*, Summer 1997, 4-14. <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97summer/peters.htm>.
- Peters, Ralph. "Our New Old Enemies." *Parameters*, Summer 1999, 22-37. Available at <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99summer/peters1.htm>
- Pillar, Paul R. "Terrorism Goes Global Extremist Groups Extend Their Reach Worldwide." *Brookings Review*, Fall 2001 Vol. 19 No. 4: 34-37. Available at: <http://www.brook.edu/press/REVIEW/fall2001/pillar.htm>
- Public Broadcasting Station. *Terrorist Attacks On Americans: The Attacks, The Groups, And The U.S. Response*. PBS, Frontline 2001. Available at: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html>
- Richardson, Louise. "Transnational Terrorism." *Harvard International Review*, Fall 1998. Available at: <http://www.hir.harvard.edu/archive/articles/pdf/Richar1204.html>
- Roskin, Michael G. "Crime and Politics in Colombia: Considerations for US Involvement." *Parameters*, Winter 2001-02, 126-34. Available at: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/01winter/roskin.htm>
- Rothenberg, Gunther E. *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978.
- Schneider, James J. "The Theory of the Empty Battlefield." *JRUSI*, Sept. 1987.

- Singer, P. W. "Caution: Children at War." *Parameters*, Winter 2001-02, 40-56. Available at: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/01winter/singer.htm>
- Spector, Ronald H. *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan*. New York, Vintage Books, 1985.
- Stanton, Shelby L. *The Rise And Fall Of An American Army: U.S. Ground Forces In Vietnam, 1965-1973*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985.
- Stohl, Rachel and Michael Stohl. "Fatally Flawed? U.S. Policy Toward Failed States." *The Defense Monitor: Center for Defense Information*, Volume XXX, Number 8, October 2001. Available at: <http://www.cdi.org/dm/2001/issue8/dm8-2001.pdf>
- Sun Tzu, *The Art Of War* translated by Samuel B. Griffith; with a foreword by B.H. Liddell Hart. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.
- Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. *War And Anti-War: Survival At The Dawn Of The 21st Century*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1993.
- Ullman, Harlan K. *In Irons: U.S. Military Might In The New Century*. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995.
- United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1306 (2000)*. Adopted by the Security Council at its 4168th meeting, on 5 July 2000, Available at: <http://www.un.int/usa/sres1306.htm>
- US Department of State. *Patterns of Global Terrorism-2000*. Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counter terrorism April 30, 2001. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2444.htm>
- US Department of Defense, *USS Cole Commission Report: Executive Summary*. 9 January 2001. Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/cole20010109.html>
- US Department of Defense. Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, June 2001.
- US Department of Defense. *Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations*. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 31 May 1997.
- US Department of Defense. *Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics*. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 30 September 1997.
- Van Creveld, Martin L. *The Rise and Decline of the State*. New York: Cambridge Univ Press, 1999.
- Van Creveld, Martin L. "The Fate of the State." *Parameters*, Spring 1996, 4-18. Available at: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96spring/creveld.htm>
- Van Creveld, Martin L. *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press; Toronto: Collier Macmillan Canada; New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991.

Von Bertalanffy, Ludwig *General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications* New York: Braziller, 1993, c1968.

Waldrop, M. Mitchell *Complexity: The Emerging Science At The Edge Of Order And Chaos* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993, c1992.

Weiss, Aaron. "When Terror Strikes, Who Should Respond?" *Parameters*, Autumn 2001, 117-33. Available at: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/01autumn/Weiss.htm>

The White House. *The President's Plan to Strengthen Our Homeland Security*. Washington, DC: The White House, February 2002. Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020204-2.html>

Zinni, Anthony C. "A Military for the 21st Century." *Strategic Forum*, No. 181, July 2001, 1-4.