Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars?
Abstract
Rational deterrence theory provides scholars with an explanatory framework which specifies the requirements for the success and failure of deterrence. Yet, conclusive empirical evidence that deterrence successes occur has eluded deterrence theorists. According to Richard N. Lehow and Janice G. Stein, the main critics in the most recent challenge to deterrence theory, the empirical evidence suggests that deterrence rarely succeeds. They argue that a review of international incidents over the last ninety years reveals only three cases of extended immediate deterrence success. Based on this review, as well as on their own empirical investigations, Lebow and Stein conclude that deterrence rarely succeeds and that leaders, because of political vulnerabilities, challenge deterrence even when the defender's threats are credible. Lebow and Stein argue that "among the most important findings with respect to the dependent variable is the seemingly elusive and fragile nature of the success of immediate deterrence."
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA422013
Entities
People
- Elli Lieberman
Organizations
- National Defense University