Tactical Success is Not Enough: The French in Algeria 1954-1962

Abstract

This paper focuses on why France a country with tremendous advantages in resources and military strength was defeated by a group of poorly equipped and largely untrained Algerian insurgents who mainly operated in groups of ten to twenty men and probably never had over fifteen thousand active fighters inside the borders of Algeria. The crux of the issue is that France failed to understand the nature of the war and why the Algerians were fighting. This failure led the French to misidentify the Algerian strategic center of gravity and by their actions to make French centers of gravity, their legitimacy to rule and their will to fight vulnerable to attack. Demonstrated by analyzing French and Algerian will intelligence and civil-military relations.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Feb 09, 2004
Accession Number
ADA422710

Entities

People

  • James R. Rogers

Organizations

  • Naval War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Biomedical
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Center Of Gravity
  • Ethnic Groups
  • Governments
  • Health Care
  • Information Operations
  • Insurgency
  • Low Intensity Conflict
  • Military Operations
  • North Africa
  • Personnel Management
  • Propaganda
  • Security
  • Students
  • Terrorists
  • United States
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Fields of Study

  • History

Readers

  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Political Violence and Terrorism Studies.