Information Operations And J-3: A Perfect Union
Abstract
Information Operations (IO) during Operation Allied Force proved to be a failure. Since then, former IO planners and military war college students have focused on a lack of unity of command and unity of effort as primary catalysts for this failure. They proposed eliminating the IO cell concept and adopting either an IO task force or a specific IO functional component command. I disagree. Currently, we are experiencing an explosion of change within the IO community. Not only is the utility of IO being embraced among the different services, but also for the first time we have a unified command, U.S. Strategic Command, chartered with the responsibility of organizing and coordinating national-level IO for the regional combatant commands. These changes, along with painful lessons learned, debunk the notional IO task force and component concepts. The nature of IO is often misunderstood. IO is a strategy instead of a force. Thus, the IO organization under the Joint Task Force (JTF) J-3 offers the most effective way to integrate IO into the overall military plan. To plan and execute IO early, the combatant commander should stand up an Operational Planning Team (comprised of theater-specific IO planners from the combatant command as well as support organizations) until a JTF is activated. The JTF soul initially concentrate on shaping the battlespace through IO until sufficient forces are in theater. Finally, joint IO doctrine fails to address how the IO cell should be internally organized. Properly manned disciplines within the different functions of influence operations, physical attack operations, network operations, and support will allow the JFC to execute a timely, deconlicted, and synergistic IO combat plan.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 09, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA422717
Entities
People
- Gregory M. Patschke
Organizations
- Naval War College