Innovation: Past and Future
Abstract
We have entered a period of uncertainty where threats are indeterminate even as changes in technology accelerate. Rapid innovation-apparent in the impact of stealth and precision weaponry in the Gulf War-appears likely to continue. Yet the Armed Forces are not apt to receive anything close to the resources enjoyed during the Cold War. With less money and greater ambiguity on the nature of opponents and wars in the future, we must innovate. Recent case studies of innovation in a similar period the 192Os and 193Os when military institutions confronted great international uncertainty, relatively low support, and substantial technological change, offer views on how one might view innovation in the next century. Many difficulties confront historians in drawing guidance from the past. It is impossible to replicate conditions of war in peacetime, while war itself is so permeated with fog and friction that it is difficult for military organizations to determine what has actually happened on the battlefield. Since we prepare for and fight war in the real world rather than on computers, military innovation and adaptation reflect the complexity of that reality one in which, as science increasingly reveals, chance and nonlinear factors dominate. For the analyst of innovation, complexities of the process make it extraordinarily difficult to recover the past in a simple, digestible form. Relations among technological innovations, fundamentals of military operations, and changes in concepts, doctrine, and organization that drive innovation are essentially nonlinear. Changes in inputs such as weapon systems large or small-may not yield proportionate changes in outputs or combat dynamics. And the impact of changes on doctrine or the education of an officer corps is almost incalculable.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA423155
Entities
People
- Williamson Murray
Organizations
- National Defense University