

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE GOAL IS ACCESS: SECURITY COOPERATION IS THE MEANS

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ABSTRACT

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America requires access and a physical military presence to prevent conflict in the non-linear, volatile environment in which we live and expect to build our economy. By a commitment to our own policy of global engagement through various security cooperation programs, we can not only set the conditions for successful intervention in locations unknown to us today, but can also prevent upheaval in other locations. Full utilization of our security cooperation program will set the conditions for access to countries where conflict was not preventable.

Security Cooperation must be at the forefront of our long-range approach to the current international system. This is consistent with a capability-based strategy for our armed forces. An active security cooperation program aimed at areas deemed vital to American national interests will foster growth in stable governments and establish a mutual basis for cooperation that will likely induce states to support American interests during times of instability.

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THE GOAL IS ACCESS: SECURITY COOPERATION IS THE MEANS

To fortify its economy and way of life, the United States requires access and a physical military presence to prevent conflict in the non-linear, volatile environment of today's world. By commitment to our own policy of global engagement through various security cooperation programs, we can not only set the conditions for successful intervention in locations the United States is involved in today, but can also prevent upheaval in unstable regions of the future. Full utilization of our security cooperation program can set the conditions for access to countries where armed conflict could not be prevented. This paper proposes the employment of security cooperation as the means for the United States to ensure access to regions of the world where American national interests may require the use of its national elements of power.

Forward presence has been a part of America's global strategy since the forward looking writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan inspired the nation's leaders to believe that our future could not be secured from our shores. To protect national interests, the United States had to move outward. Our contemporary forward presence in the form of service members on the ground, in the air, or on the water, is consistent with our present National Security Strategy in its support of a capability-based force.¹ The most recent Quadrennial Review also supports forward positioned forces. Security cooperation began when America began its forward presence, a presence more relevant today than in the 1800s when Mahan published his writings and the nation began to expand.

Mahan foresaw the need for American bases around the globe; primarily to support his vision of the grand navy that America needed to build and maintain. The navy's purpose would be to secure passage for American trade on the open seas. Trade was the future of the young industrial nation and was the catalyst for a growing economy. Mahan was inspired by the prospect of the steam ship and the trade it could bring to the nation. Almost all trade was, and still is reliant on the sea for the transport of goods. The Nation had to have a large navy for control of the seas, to maximize trade routes, and ensure freedom of movement. A large navy patrolling the sea-lanes needed coal and other supplies positioned outside the Nation's borders and that meant forward bases.

Mahan defined overseas bases as "ports of refuge" where ships fall back to for refuge, repairs, and supplies.² He firmly believed that posts in foreign lands, alone, do not "confer control," but that ships are needed to support them.³ In that same context, having presence alone in a host nation does not ensure successful engagement with that host nation. America must also have an appropriate application of security cooperation options, tailored to the

uniqueness of the host nation for an engagement program to be effective. Security cooperation options include forward deployed service members to “help allies and friends create favorable balances of military power in critical areas of the world to deter aggression or coercion.”⁴ Correctly applied, the program will meet the desired end state to support national interests. We now live in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) world where America will commit its elements of national power on a routine basis to secure its national interests. The forward stationing of American service members is more crucial today than it was in the 1800s when America began its efforts to secure its national interests from outside its borders.

Following World War II, our forces remained in Europe as a force of occupation and to deter further aggression by the Soviet Union. American forces in Europe were focused on war plans to defeat the former Soviet forces if their government used them to establish the remainder of Europe as an extended buffer zone against its democratic enemies. Our forces were dispersed not only between a number of nations but also spread out within the nations. The purpose was not only to take advantage of existing facilities at former enemy bases but also to disperse our forces in the face of a nuclear weapon threat. At the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, our forces were dramatically reduced in the European theater. Even today, the inefficiencies of numerous bases, specifically in Germany, are a result of a Cold War strategy. The European Command is changing its footprint from many dispersed locations in Germany and Italy, to a few permanent strategic bases that will support forward operating bases⁵ and forward operating locations⁶. Forward operating bases and forward operating locations will be semi permanent installations that will be used by rotational forces. This type of reduced forward presence is consistent with a capability-based strategy.

Overseas presence is changing to meet the requirements of the VUCA world environment in which we must operate. The change in overseas presence is synchronized with our strategy, which is evolving from a threat-based force to a capability-based force. This capabilities based force must be rapidly deployable and have access to hot spots around the world. To increase our reaction time it is important to know where a hot spot is developing and have military assets close-by if needed. The best way to know that a situation in another nation is deteriorating is for that nation to tell us about it. Building positive relations with nations in possible hot spots is critical to our access to information regarding the current political situation in that nation. This relationship is best developed through our security cooperation program and operationalized by U.S. military participation in combined joint training with host nations. While stationed in host nations or participating in combined joint exercises in a host nation, U.S. military forces provide real presence that is seen as an actual commitment by the U.S. to that host. The actualized

commitment demonstrates U.S. concern for the stability and future prosperity of that host nation and the citizens within it.

Host Nation engagement in the form of military-to-military interaction and security cooperation must be applied to strategically important states. Our finite resources will go a long way toward building stabilization in regions of national interest, but only if applied with those interests in mind. The National Security Strategy requires overseas involvement in the forms of foreign aid, military presence, supporting and building economies, and diplomatic actions to support democracy.

America is engaged in a fight it has only begun to recognize. The unwaged fight is the battle to improve its image across the globe with its common citizens. We know that information is available to citizens of the world in unprecedented quantities. The overwhelming hegemon is no longer seen as the conquering hero but as the big bad bully. The National Security Strategy makes mention of this issue by stating, "Just as our diplomatic institutions must adapt so that we can reach out to others, we also need a different and more comprehensive approach to public information efforts that can help people around the world learn about and understand America."⁷ We must assess this global perception and use security cooperation assets to correct this public opinion misconception. The importance of fixing this issue will increase as the world grows into the global economy we are destined to become. The will of the American people may soon be very closely tied to the will of the citizens of the world. Forward presence, both permanent and rotational, affords the opportunity for the people of the world to interact with our quality service members, who have always been our best ambassadors. We must continue to be forward deployed in stable and troubled areas of the world to promote stability and democracy while developing relationships that afford access to information and sovereign space if required.

ENGAGEMENT DEFINED

In 2002, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency published the *Defense Security Cooperation Security Plan 2003-2008*. This was only the second iteration of their plan. The first plan was published in 1998.⁸ This recent updated plan states that:

Security Cooperation efforts influence the behaviors of a wide array of potential adversaries and develop the capacity of allies and friendly nations to ensure regional stability. A particular aim of DoD's Security Cooperation efforts is to ensure access and interoperability, while expanding the range of pre-conflict options available to counter coercive threats, deter aggression, or favorably prosecute war on U.S. terms. Our planning in Security Cooperation must adapt to and reinforce changes in the U.S. global military posture as well as support efforts to render U.S. forward forces, in concert with our security partners, capable of swiftly defeating aggression.⁹

The vision of the Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency is to "...create trust and influence, while promoting access and interoperability vital to U.S. national security." ¹⁰

The Army Strategic Planning Guidance addresses global engagement and states:

Force Stabilization for brigade units of action and other modular and scaleable forces will provide Combatant Commanders with more combat-ready formations. We will define and develop a plan to implement Force Stabilization concepts into the Army beginning in FY 04. Army-wide implementation will complement a rotation-based system of sustained global engagement. This system will also take the Well-Being of Soldiers and families into account. Home basing will stabilize Soldiers and their families at installations for extended tours. While some Soldiers may be sent on unaccompanied tours, they will then return to their Home base.¹¹

DoD Security Cooperation Guidance provides further direction to execute the U.S. Defense Strategy and replaces broad-based theater engagement. DoD Security Cooperation involves all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to mostly effectively advance U.S. security interests and build the right defense partnerships for the future.¹²

The National Security Strategy addresses a major subcomponent of security cooperation, which is security assistance¹³:

As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists.¹⁴

These national level documents provide our Armed Service and Combatant Commanders the guidance they require to plan and execute their security cooperation requirements.

REGIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDS

No other nation on the face of the earth since the time of the Romans has divided the known world and placed flag officers in charge of each region. The Unified Command Plan designates the land and sea portions of the world that each of the Combatant Commanders over see.

The primary mission for the regional war fighting Combatant Commanders is first to prevent wars in their Areas of Responsibility (AOR) and then to fight and win the Nation's wars when called upon to do so. The following are the mission statements of our regional war fighting Combatant Commanders:

- United States European Command is a unified combatant command whose mission is to maintain ready forces to conduct the full spectrum of military operations unilaterally or in

concert with the coalition partners; to enhance transatlantic security through support NATO; to promote regional stability; and advance U.S. interests in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.¹⁵

- Ready and preparing for tomorrow, the United States Pacific Command enhances security and promotes peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region by deterring aggression, responding to crises and fighting to win.¹⁶
 - United States Northern Command's mission is homeland defense and civil support, specifically:
 - o Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility
 - o As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations.¹⁷
 - United States Southern Command is to conduct those military operations and security cooperation activities in support of the War on Terrorism that assure our allies and friends, dissuade our adversaries, deter any aggression or coercion, and if necessary, decisively defeat any adversary in order to protect and promote U.S. national interests and objectives.¹⁸
 - United States Central Command, with our components and standing Joint Task Forces, and in partnership with the Joint Staff, Department of Defense and regional partners will:
 - o Focus shaping in the Central Region through integrated engagement and forward presence that enhances regional security and stability, promotes peace, and deters aggression
 - o Remain ready to selectively respond to the full-spectrum of military operations and, when necessary, fight and win our nation's wars
 - o Prepare our command and families for the challenges and opportunities of an uncertain future through modernization and transformation
- ... throughout the Central region in order to promote and protect United States' interests.¹⁹

The mission statements of our regional Combatant Commanders accurately reflect their obligation to prevent war, to varying degrees, through their security cooperation programs. European Command (EUCOM) addresses regional stability in its mission statement but is more focused on having trained units available to conduct the full spectrum of military operations in the theater.

The Pacific Command (PACOM) mission statement is broad based and focused on enhancing security in its AOR by deterring aggression, responding to crises, and winning its fights.

Although Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) AOR contains the countries of Canada, Mexico, and Cuba, its mission statement is focused on its primary mission. The command will provide security cooperation to Canada and Mexico in the form of military exchange of officers and other programs.

Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has used security cooperation over the last four decades to bring security to Central and South America. From the 1950's through the 1980's, SOUTHCOM has successfully used various aspects of security cooperation to stabilize the numerous countries in the region while professionalizing the militaries of these struggling democracies. Direct military intervention in Panama and Haiti was required but the intervention was brief and U.S. service members spent the minimum amount of time on the ground before passing responsibility of the respective nations to their governing bodies. The SOUTHCOM mission statement accurately reflects their continued focus on security cooperation.

FROM ENGAGEMENT TO SECURITY COOPERATION

Until 2001, our policy for positive interaction with other nation states to promote stability was referred to as "engagement". Dr. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich captured the intent for the move from engagement to security cooperation in her book by stating, "The rhetorical shift from "engagement" to "security cooperation" was meant to signal a major change in DOD's approach to military diplomacy."²⁰

Although primarily a shift in terms, the program still includes "multinational exercises, military exchanges, military training, and military education."²¹ The doctrinal shift from the old term of global engagement to security cooperation is a manifestation of the current administration's intent to focus on world stability. Although the word engagement has moved off the headline page, it is still the lexicon when referencing the national desire to directly interact and have open dialogue with other nation states.

Embedded within our security cooperation program is security assistance to foreign nations. Security assistance is defined by the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as, "A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives."²²

It engages foreign nations in the development of their armed services and their governments, prevents war and allows a greater possibility to form a coalition when war is required. This potential is a double edged sword in that other nations will desire our help when they wish to exercise their military element of power as we will want their assistance when it is time to exercise ours.

APPLICATIONS OF SECURITY COOPERATION

Three of the premier programs of America's security cooperation program are the IMET program, the conduct of combined exercises, and the Foreign Military Sales program. All contribute greatly toward regional stabilization, development of formal relationships, and the professionalization of friendly militaries.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET)

One of America's greatest tools for the training and professionalization of foreign military personnel is the IMET program. America has funded this program to primarily bring officers, and some senior noncommissioned officers, to various schools to enlighten them in ways that plant the seed of democracy while exposing them to doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures they can utilize to train and professionalize their own forces. This program is funded by the Department of State and administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.²³ The program has had a positive worldwide impact through the almost 600,000 foreign military personnel trained since 1950.²⁴ During the last fiscal year, personnel have come from 130 countries and attended 275 different military schools.²⁵

In 1991, the IMET program was expanded to include civilian defense officials, legislators, and a select group of other civilians involved in the defense of their states.²⁶ This subset of the IMET program is called the Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) program.²⁷ As the United States has key civilians working within, setting policies for, and working with our armed forces, other countries do the same. The E-IMET program is a natural and fitting extension of the IMET program.

The classroom training provided by the IMET program does much to expose foreign defense personnel to our defense program. Conducting combined exercises with other nations provides the benefits to many more individuals and touches all the way down to the service member level of other national defense forces.

COMBINED TRAINING EXERCISES

Training exercises build country relations from leader interface as well as personal interface at the service member level. The good will between our service members and local populations is another very powerful relationship building aspect of combined training with other host nations. PACOM's annual "Foil Eagle" combined exercise brings a brigade combat team into the port of Pusan, Korea to incorporate the full reception, staging, onward movement, and integration process, and then participates with the South Korean units in a force-on-force exercise. This exercise develops common tactics, techniques, and procedures for our combined forces for use in the Korean theater or elsewhere in the world. In addition, combined tactical training exercises in host nations will typically involve a U.S. contingent of engineers to build a Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) project such as a school or a clinic in an poverty stricken region in the vicinity of the training area.

Medical teams are also traditionally deployed into local communities to provide needed vaccinations, basic medical aid, and possibly tooth extraction. A good example of medical and dental teams visiting a country for an exercise is EUCOM's annual MEDFLAG exercise. In fiscal year 2003, this exercise deployed upwards of 90 service members into Morocco for two weeks in September of 2003 to provide services to needy portions of the population.²⁸

The third type of team that may deploy in support of a HCA mission in conjunction with a training exercise is a veterinary team. These teams come into a host nation and move into the farmlands to treat the domestic animals. They will set up separately or in the same town as a medical team or where engineers are operating. The veterinary team will set posted hours and the local inhabitants bring animals in need of treatment to the makeshift clinic. In some nations, these veterinary clinics frequently have a greater turn out than the medical clinics.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS)

The United States is the largest weapons dealer in the world. The U.S. Foreign Military Sales program not only covers weapon systems but also covers the sale of "services, training, and other military equipment".²⁹ In many cases, friendly foreign governments are given foreign aid money from the United States with the stipulation that they can only spend the funds for U.S. assistance through the FMS program. This is found to be mutually beneficial to both countries involved. There are many other stipulations regarding the resale of equipment and weapon systems but as the sales are to responsible friendly governments, these stipulations are not seen as major inhibitors. The FMS program enhances friendly nation defense capabilities and fosters a greater interoperability capacity between nations. Most sales are accompanied with a

training package. While U.S. service members or U.S. contracted trainers are providing instruction on the new equipment, relations between our two nations continue to grow. These aspects of the FMS program significantly contribute to our security cooperation goal of building relationships that may provide access to the region when needed.

SECURITY COOPERATION SUCCESS

In recent years, the United States has seen numerous benefits of its security cooperation program. Our long established program with Pakistan provided a coordinated and cooperative effort during Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan was our staunch ally during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Through the Pakistani government, the United States and other allies assisted the rebel fighters in Afghanistan in their battle to resist the expansion of Soviet Communism. As history reflects, the Soviet forces eventually left Afghanistan. Our security cooperation with Pakistan continued and our relations were strong enough that when it came time to remove the Taliban and Al Queda from Afghanistan we called upon Pakistan to provide access to their land locked neighbor. Pakistan once again proved that our relationship, built through our security cooperation program, was strong. Pakistan assisted and participated in the coalition to remove the rule of the oppressive Taliban and fight the terrorism of Al Queda. The coalition's success and the continued progress in Afghanistan would not be as possible as it has been, without the access, intelligence, and sharing of common goals with Pakistan. One of the latest aspects of our continued cooperation is the foreign military sale of 40, Bell-407 helicopters to Pakistan. These helicopters are to assist with the security of their border with Afghanistan.³⁰ The needed helicopters are part of the \$3 billion assistance program with Pakistan government that will be implemented as part of the multi-year agreement.³¹ The agreement included Foreign Military Sales as well as combined training exercises.³²

The United States' close relationship was also crucial to its ability to defuse the tension between Pakistan and India. The Kashmir Province dispute brought these two nuclear powers very close to a conventional war that had potential for nuclear escalation. In this case, America's relationship with both countries was developed through years of focused security cooperation. These enduring relationships support a fragile peace that continues to be solidified.

After many years of security cooperation focused on the countries of central and Western Europe, European Command is now focusing its efforts to the south and east. The "Train and Equip" program in the Republic of Georgia dedicates assets to an emerging ally with the intent

of establishing security to a volatile area of the world. Known terrorists threaten the friendly government of Georgia as well as its neighbor, Russia. Assistance and relation building with the Georgian government in their time of need may allow future access to information and access for our forces if the situation should require it in neighboring countries. The natural resources of the Caucasus, which are just now beginning to make an impact on the world market, also increase the U.S. interest in the region. The potential for the region's natural resources elevate the potential for dispute. Although President Eduard Shevardnadze of the Republic of Georgia has recently resigned from power, it was the will of the people and not a military coup that brought about change. This demonstration of a non-violent change of government is encouraging and may reflect a modicum of influence through security cooperation.

The Georgia "Train and Equip" program (GTEP) was developed and implemented as the administration's answer to Georgia's request for assistance.³³ Georgia requested that the United States provide training for its own forces against their internal terrorist threat.³⁴ The first units from this landmark program graduated in December of 2002.³⁵ The GTEP has been largely possible from, and capitalizes on the significant military-to-military relationship that has been fostered since the collapse of the Soviet Union.³⁶

SECURITY COOPERATION EXPANSION

EASTERN EUROPE

Engagement with the nations of Europe in the form of security cooperation has influenced the current growth in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO is the world's largest formal alliance and expansion of the security blanket it provides, enhances not only the region covered by the member nations but extends around the globe. Security cooperation in the form of military exchanges and exercises, as well as IMET and FMS with the now invited nations such as Romania and Bulgaria, greatly influenced their desire to join NATO and also played a significant role in obtaining the request from NATO to join.

Richard L. Kugler captured a basic element for the necessity of security cooperation in the form of overseas basing. "Some years from now, nonetheless, U.S. forces may be deployed overseas mainly to preserve peaceful stability and to promote related strategic objectives, rather than to guard against specific threats."³⁷ Now just six years after Kugler's initial observation, forward presence is even more critical than it was just a few years ago, as we face a versatile and cunning terrorist enemy on a global basis.

AFRICA

Before the attacks of 11 September 2001, the majority of overseas presence in the form of forward stationed service members was primarily in Southwest Asia, the Pacific Rim, and in Europe (discounting Hawaii and Alaska). Today, while Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom continue, the overseas force array remains the same, except for a much higher concentration of forces in Southwest Asia. Even after victory is declared in Iraq and Afghanistan, our presence on the ground has great potential to remain high. This continued presence is having, and will continue to have a great impact on our availability for the conduct of combined training exercises and officer exchanges to other regions we would like to see stabilized.

The vast continent of Africa, with its warring nations and tribal massacres, continues to be of great interest as a trading partner, but its volatile environment greatly inhibits economic investment. Service members presently obligated to the Pacific Rim and Southwest Asia are not available to participate in security cooperation efforts in the region. CONUS-based forces that have either just returned from overseas deployment or are preparing for future deployment are also not available. The result is a current limitation on U.S. ability to expand security relationships in the region.

The National Security Strategy provides direct guidance regarding engagement on the African continent when it states:

An ever more lethal environment exists in Africa as local civil wars spread beyond borders to create regional war zones. Forming coalitions of the willing and cooperative security arrangements are key to confronting these emerging transnational threats. Africa's great size and diversity requires a security strategy that focuses on bilateral engagement and builds coalitions of the willing.³⁸

The instability in Africa has become a breeding ground for terrorist activity. This has gained the continent some attention from the United States because it is related to the global war on terror. An expansive security cooperation program is needed in Africa if the United States is to open this continent to democracy and the world economy.

"VIRTUAL PRESENCE IS ACTUAL ABSENCE"³⁹

Are present resources sufficient for the American military to actualize an effective global security cooperation program? A capability based force structure should include as one of its missions, the establishment of a requirement to maintain active forces for engagement purposes as part of a security cooperation program. Decisions should be made regarding the appropriate size of units needed to conduct combined training and military exchanges. Then it

should be determined at the national level, which regions the nation requires these units to be engaged in. Although the analysis should be conducted on a joint basis, the Army will be the focus of analysis for the following example.

If it was determined that a brigade sized unit is best suited for the requirements of engagement and it was also determined that there were fifteen locations⁴⁰ in the world we would need to have an Army brigade size element involved with security cooperation activities, then we would plan a force structure that would provide fifteen forward deployed brigades simultaneously. As the majority of the exercises and training the forces would be executing as part of the security cooperation strategy are war fighting focused, the skills for the conduct of war on all spectrums will be continually honed. Permanently stationed and rotational forward deployed units will continue to be used to support Theater Security Cooperation Plans while being closer to potential hot spots around the world.

For rotational units, length of time deployed is a primary concern. The U.S. Air Force has learned through experience over the last ten years that to keep a unit together and not break it physically or mentally, deployment rotations that do not exceed ninety-day are optimal. Using the Army's training cycle model, the engagement brigade could conceivably go through a cycle of a ninety day engagement deployment followed by a ninety day regeneration cycle, that would be followed by a ninety day support cycle, and then a ninety day training cycle to set the conditions for another ninety day engagement deployment somewhere in the world. If this cycle were adopted, three brigades would be required for every one that is on an engagement cycle. With that logic accepted, the Army would require sixty active brigades to support fifteen simultaneous brigade engagement deployments.

Our current force structure, reflected in Table 1, has a total of thirty-four active ground maneuver brigades.⁴¹ This total includes four airborne brigades, three air assault brigades, and six light infantry brigades for thirteen non-heavy maneuver brigades. Based on an assumption the Army would keep this special brigade structure and the existing twenty-one heavy and medium brigades, another twenty-six heavy or medium ground maneuver brigades would have to be added to the force structure to meet the needs for the stated engagement intent of sixty brigades.

Units	Ground Maneuver Brigades
82 nd Airborne Division	3
101 st Air Assault Division	3
10 th Mountain Division	2
1 st Cavalry Division	3
1 st Armored Division	3
1 st Infantry Division	3
2 nd Infantry Division	3
3 rd Infantry Division	3
4 th Infantry Division	3
25 th Infantry Division	3
2 nd Armored Cavalry Regiment	1
3 rd Armored Cavalry Regiment	1
11 th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1
173 rd Airborne Brigade	1
172 nd Infantry Brigade (Light)	1
Total	34

TABLE 1. EXISTING ARMY BRIGADES BY DIVISION

It is expected that the Opposing Force brigade at the National Training Center and the two brigades in Korea would not be available for engagement deployments, a total of twenty nine new ground maneuver brigades would be needed, equaling an addition of six new heavy or medium divisions to the force. Five of these new divisions would have the new five ground maneuver brigade structure and one would have a four-brigade structure. Table 2 depicts the Army force structure to supply a fifteen engagement deployment concept with adequate force structure.

Units	Ground Maneuver Brigades
82 nd Airborne Division	3
101 st Air Assault Division	3
10 th Mountain Division	2
1 st Cavalry Division	3
1 st Armored Division	3
1 st Infantry Division	3
2 nd Infantry Division (Korea)	2*
2 nd Infantry Division (CONUS)	1
3 rd Infantry Division	3
4 th Infantry Division	3
25 th Infantry Division	3
5 x New Divisions	25
New Division (-)	4
2 nd Armored Cavalry Regiment	1
3 rd Armored Cavalry Regiment	1
11 th Armored Cavalry Regiment	1*
173 rd Airborne Brigade	1
172 nd Infantry Brigade (Light)	1
Total	63
	<u>- 3*</u>
	60

TABLE 2. FIFTEEN ENGAGEMENT FORCE STRUCTURE
(* Not available for engagement deployments)

A total capability based active force structure founded on the ability to have brigade sized units of action available to conduct engagement deployments as part of our security cooperation efforts to provide stability, quantifies the units of action needed for active duty. The determination of locations in the world that require unit of action engagement will fluctuate as the dynamics of the world change but the calculation of needed units is a constant. This system will provide adequate forces to meet the primary missions of our Combatant Commanders to stabilize their areas of responsibility while providing adequate forces trained to win the Nation's

wars when called upon to do so. A force structure of sixty units of action is much larger than our present force structure. These assets would require a significant adjustment to our Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

WAY AHEAD

The recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq could not have been conducted without the availability of access to adjacent countries. Through its many various facets, American security cooperation programs have been a major facilitator for required access to adjacent countries. This process takes many years of relation building and cannot be done overnight. A force structure robust enough to provide for our security cooperation requirements will also provide a robust active force for combat operations when required.

Security cooperation must take the forefront of our long-range approach to the world environment. Focus on security cooperation is focus on the prevention of armed conflict while developing trained forces and international relationships required for the conduct of the full spectrum of conflict if required. It is consistent with a capability-based strategy for our military forces. An active security cooperation program aimed at areas America deems vital to its interests will foster stable governments that will likely provide allies when instability in surrounding areas requires American intervention.

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ENDNOTES

¹ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 30.

² Allan Westcott, Ph.D., ed., *Mahan on Naval Warfare: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1948), 71.

³ Ibid., 287.

⁴ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 2001), 11.

⁵ European Command defines a forward operating base as a semi permanent asset used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities. Can be scalable, and may be used for an extended time period. May contain prepositioned equipment. Backup support by a main operating base may be required.

⁶ Forward operating locations are defined by EUCOM as an expeditionary asset similar to a forward operating base, but with limited in-place infrastructure. May contain prepositioned equipment.

⁷ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 31.

⁸ Tome H. Walters Jr., *Defense Security Cooperation Agency: Strategic Plan 2003-2008* (Arlington: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, December 2002), 2.

⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰ Ibid., 5.

¹¹ Peter J Schoomaker, *The Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2006-2023*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 November 2003), 8-9.

¹² Department of the Army, *The Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2006-2023*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, November 2003), 16.

¹³ Security assistance is further defined and addressed in the section of this paper titled From Engagement to Security Cooperation.

¹⁴ George W Bush. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 7.

¹⁵ U.S. European Command, "U.S. EUCOM History," available from <http://www.eucom.mil/directorates/ecpa/presskit/eucom%20history.doc> >; Internet; accessed 23 November 2003.

¹⁶ U.S. Pacific Command, "Home Page, About Us," available from <<http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml>>; Internet; accessed 25 November 2003.

¹⁷ U.S. Northern Command, "Home Page," available from <http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_mission>; Internet; accessed 25 November 2003.

¹⁸ U.S. Southern Command, "Home Page, Facts," available from <<http://www.southcom.mil/pa/Facts/Mission.htm>>; Internet; accessed 25 November 2003.

¹⁹ U.S. Central Command, "Frequently Asked Questions," available from <<http://www.centcom.mil/aboutus/faq.htm>>; Internet; accessed 25 November 2003.

²⁰ Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *Promoting Professionalism Through Security Cooperation: A Look at the European and Latin American Regions* (Arlington: Association of the United States Army, 2003), 12.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Joint Publication 1-02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," 5 June 2003; available from <<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/>>; Internet; accessed 23 November 2003.

²³ Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *Promoting Professionalism Through Security Cooperation: A Look at the European and Latin American Regions* (Arlington: Association of the United States Army, 2003), 21-22.

²⁴ Ibid., 22.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., 23.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ United States European Command, "MEDFLAG 03," available from <<http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/index.htm?http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/Exercises/main.htm&2>>; Internet; accessed 27 December 2003.

²⁹ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Foreign Military Sales," available from <http://www.dsca.osd.mil/home/foreign_military_sales.htm>; Internet accessed 27 December 2003.

³⁰ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Pakistan – Bell 407 Helicopters," 24 September 2003; available from <<http://www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/36%2Db/092403/pakistan%5F03%2D25.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2003.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ U.S. Department of Defense, "Georgia "Train and Equip" Program Begins," 29 April 2002; available from [http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi? http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/b04292002_bt217-02.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/b04292002_bt217-02.html)>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2003.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ U.S. Department of State, "Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP)," 1 February 2003; available from <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/pix/events/b/eur/18737pf.htm>>; Internet; accessed 27 December 2003.

³⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, "Georgia "Train and Equip" Program Begins," 29 April 2002; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil.news/Apr2002/b04292002_bt217-02.html>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2003.

³⁷ Richard L. Kugler, *Changes Ahead: Future Directions for the U.S. Overseas Military Presence*, Document No: MR-956-AF. (Santa Monica: Rand, 1998), 1.

³⁸ George W Bush. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 11.

³⁹ J. Michael Johnson, "When Virtual Presence Equals Actual Absence," Spring 1998; available from <<http://www.tailhook.org/Carlos.html>>; Internet; accessed 28 December 2003.

⁴⁰ 4 – EUCOM, 4 – PACOM, 4- CENTCOM, 3 – SOUTHCOM

⁴¹ Joseph Stefula, "US Army Divisions and Separate Brigades: Deployments and Missions, July 15, 2003," 20 July 2003; available from <http://www.orbat.com/site/us2002/files/6/usarmy_divisions&brigades_july152003.html>; Internet; accessed 4 December 2003.

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