

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**TRANSFORMING THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND TO PROSECUTE THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM**

by

Lt Col Tracey S. Skelton
USAF

Col Steve Buteau
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 03 MAY 2004		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Transforming the Command and Control Structure of US Special Operations Command to Prosecute the Global War on Terrorism				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Tracey Skelton				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached file.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 30	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lt Col Tracey S. Skelton

TITLE: TRANSFORMING THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND TO PROSECUTE THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 19 March 2004 **PAGES:** 31 **CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified

Moving into the 21st Century, all the services are going through a transformation to meet the new threats that our country is facing. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is no exception. Transformation is a must for USSOCOM to meet the Secretary of Defense's mandate to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism as the supported commander. To properly command and control the global campaign against terrorism, a major shift in force structure is required for USSOCOM. The main shift needs to be the establishment of a sub-unified command with the sole focus to prosecute the terrorism operations. This organization will be the building block to develop a scalable and deployable command and control team to allow for a dynamic supported command relationship between USSOCOM and the other combatant commanders. To enhance unity of effort, USSOCOM will need to leverage existing initiatives such as the deployable, subject matter expert concept of the standing joint force headquarters. Utilizing the regional expertise and forward presence, the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) will be a force multiplier in fighting a global campaign against terror. The TSOC will be the conduit between USSOCOM and the geographic combatant command enabling the flexibility to achieve the proper command relationship. This building block approach will streamline the C2 process from USSOCOM down through the tactical special operations component. Through an organizational transformation from the top down, USSOCOM will develop a network centric command structure to prosecute the global war on terrorism.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	vii
TRANSFORMING THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND TO PROSECUTE THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM.....	1
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT	1
GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT– TITLE 10 SERVICE-LIKE DEVELOPMENT	3
9-11 - TRANSFORMING INTO A GLOBALLY SUPPORTED COMMAND	4
CENTER FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS	5
STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS	6
THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMANDS – REGIONAL EXPERTISE	8
JOINT TASK FORCE – GLOBAL TERRORISM.....	9
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION COMMAND AND CONTROL.....	11
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR COMPONENT COMMAND	12
REGIONAL JSOAC	14
CONCLUSION	15
ENDNOTES	18
BIBLIOGRAPHY	20

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1. USSOCOM HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE	3
FIGURE 2. CSO ORGANIZATION	5
FIGURE 3. PROPOSED USSOCOM COMMAND STRUCTURE	9
FIGURE 4. JSOAC ORGANIZATION	13
FIGURE 5. PROPOSED AFSOC STRUCTURE	15

TRANSFORMING THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND TO PROSECUTE THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time.¹

— GEORGE W. BUSH

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), through its short history, has attained a high level of competency in dealing with service-like issues. The challenge now is for USSOCOM to create that same fidelity in developing a strategic reach as a global combatant commander. This paper will propose building a subordinate unified command with the sole purpose of prosecuting the global war on terrorism. The organization will develop deployable standing joint force headquarters elements with a world-wide commitment while leveraging existing relationships built by the theater special operations commands with the geographic combatant commands. This modular, flexible command and control team is vital as USSOCOM becomes more of a supported command vice a supporting command. This relationship will be evident from the USSOCOM headquarters all the way down to the individual special operations components in the theater. This proposal gives the greatest adaptability to both USSOCOM and the combatant command regardless of the command relationship, and in this new strategic environment of asymmetrical threats, that adaptability will give the United States the advantage required to aggressively take the fight to the enemy.

After the events on September 11, 2001, the United States' secure, peaceful world was shattered by the hands of a new enemy – terrorism. Military forces jumped into action against this adversary not only in Afghanistan but in countries all around the world. The new threat and its asymmetric form of warfare have forced an exponential increase to the ongoing military transformation. USSOCOM is heavily involved in operations against the new threat. Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Donald Rumsfeld forced a paradigm shift when he mandated that USSOCOM be the lead agency and supported command in the global war on terrorism.²

Transformation was already in the works at USSOCOM but the mandate accelerated the shift in the direction USSOCOM was heading. USSOCOM's 2003 Posture Statement gave direction to begin the transformational shift into a global war fighting command. The leadership and vision is a good start but only a start to an aggressive metamorphosis which will be required to meet the full intent of the SecDef's mandate and the shift to a supported combatant

commander. In today's global environment, asymmetric thinking is vital during unconventional warfare operations, especially when it comes to command and control of special operations forces conducting a plethora of strategic operations from major force engagements to small teams conducting covert actions.

As the supported commander, executing the transformational plan will enhance the opportunity for USSOCOM to be the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with the other combatant commands being in a supporting role. The new operational construct will be situational dependent and may take on many different structures. In a global war on terrorism, the campaign will be fought around the world and across the full spectrum of warfare. The majority of the actions will be against high value targets with both military and political strategic importance. To prosecute numerous operations quickly and efficiently, USSOCOM will employ small unconventional warfare ground teams supported by conventional forces -- predominantly air forces. To meld conventional and special operations forces into an interdependent combat force, USSOCOM must build a modular building block command and control hierarchy from USSOCOM down to the specific components of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) team. This is another paradigm shift in the structure and responsibilities of USSOCOM.

In order to establish the proper command and control network to have a global JFC capability, USSOCOM needs to emphasize a transformation into the supported combatant command function. The transformation for USSOCOM will require a restructuring of current USSOCOM initiatives to follow standing joint protocol. This will enhance the interdependence between USSOCOM, in the supported command role, and the other geographical combatant commands (GCC), in a supporting role. Developing a new sub-unified command as the foundation, a leaner, more modular transformation vision will be proposed. The new organization design will capitalize on existing initiatives like the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) and existing organizations like the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) to be force multipliers in this global campaign.

The transformation will be to a network centric command and control organization capable of global strikes from the United States, precision engagements from forward based forces, and combined operations across the entire spectrum of warfare from pre-crisis activities to major force engagements. This is a major shift from the supporting, service-like headquarters established by congress under the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT– TITLE 10 SERVICE-LIKE DEVELOPMENT

The USSOCOM was established on April 16, 1987 as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In order to provide security for SOF, the Cohen-Nunn Amendment set up a separate budget for special operation specific items, Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11).³ USSOCOM was given service-like authorities under Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 167. Those Title 10 requirements include:

- develop strategy, training, and doctrine.
- validate and establish priorities for requirements.
- prepare and submit to Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget proposals for special operations and other forces assigned to USSOCOM.
- exercise authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds for forces assigned to USSOCOM and for special operations forces assigned to unified combatant commands other than the USSOCOM.
- and develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment.⁴



FIGURE 1. USSOCOM HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE

Today there are 49,848 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and civilians working together in a joint environment across the globe in every geographic combatant command and USSOCOM.⁵

General Peter Schoomaker, when he was the Commander, reorganized USSOCOM into five centers of excellence breaking the paradigm of the joint staff organizational structure. Those centers of excellence are the Center for Command Support (SOCS), Center for Acquisition and Logistics (SOAL), Center for Requirements and Resources (SORR), Center for Intelligence and Information Operations (SOIO), and Center for Policy, Training, and Readiness (SOOP).⁶

Even in force structure, USSOCOM as always has been on the cutting edge. His new organizational structure focused the headquarters staff's attention on the resourcing of SOF. The reorganization enabled the commander to concentrate efforts on strategic and operational priorities as required in Title 10 and the management of MFP-11 funding.

As we move into a world of asymmetric threats and the global war on terrorism, USSOCOM will not only need to maintain its level of service-like fidelity in its management of SOF but will need to enhance its global strategic reach as a world-wide supported combatant command. The threat is real and it is up to USSOCOM to meet that threat.

9-11 - TRANSFORMING INTO A GLOBALLY SUPPORTED COMMAND

The beginnings of USSOCOM's transformation began before the events of 11 September 2001. Initiatives were being developed and exercised from major commands down to specific units. Exercises were being planned to test the interoperability and feasibility of these fledgling ideas. Everything was moving along at a steady pace to ensure the successful integration of these elements into the joint team when the world suddenly changed overnight. The enemy accelerated our Observe-Orient-Decide-Act loop and time for experimentation had accelerated into time for implementation. The exercise scenario would now be combat in the mountain ranges of Afghanistan and the deserts of Iraq.

The emergence of terrorism forced all services to take a different look at transformation to combat the primary threat to our national security. The 2003 Posture Statement stated, "the primary objective of transformation is to increase the margin of our advantage over potential adversaries in all facets of warfare. These facets of warfare include projecting power to any location on the globe at a time of our choosing..."⁷ The Posture Statement lists vectors and attributes for transformation for USSOCOM. The attributes to enable USSOCOM's mission include:

- Precision strike and effects
- Tailored and integrated operations
- Ubiquitous access
- Regional expertise, presence, and influence
- C4ISR dominance
- Technology advancements⁸

USSOCOM, as the primary supported commander in the war on terrorism, is faced with one of the greatest transformation challenges ever - how to go from a functional command with service-like Title 10 responsibilities to a global combatant command fighting a trans-national

enemy. The key link to being a world-wide supported command is a robust command and control system. With limited manpower resources, this system will have to leverage specific expertise from other organizations and subordinate commands. USSOCOM will need to take conventional thinking and institutions and modify them to meet the fluid environment of special operations. Just like Jimmy Doolittle, USSOCOM will need to strip down the peripheral baggage from the current command and control network and develop a leaner and modular solution that will provide robust capabilities to support global counterterrorist operations. That current network is the Center for Special Operations.

CENTER FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS



FIGURE 2. CSO ORGANIZATION

The Center for Special Operations (CSO) is the newest division of USSOCOM. It was established to plan, direct, and execute special operations in the war on terrorism. The CSO has four internal divisions: campaign support group, operations group, joint operations center, and the special operations joint interagency (intelligence) collaboration center.⁹

This was the first major organizational transformation movement by USSOCOM to be a supported command in the global war on terrorism. This paradigm shift to the CSO construct brought with it a shift in force structure and the fiscal requirements needed to standup a new division capable of executing the command and control function. In the President's fiscal year 2004 budget, USSOCOM received a budget increase to \$4.5 billion and a manning increase of 2,563 personnel slots in critical mission areas, many in command and control specialty codes.¹⁰

The CSO is a good start in the transformation to a combatant command for USSOCOM. To concentrate the energy and increase unity of effort, the CSO needs to be separated from the headquarters and the day to day Title 10 responsibilities that the command faces. Coalescing it into a sub-unified command with the autonomy to prosecute the global campaign would demonstrate the resolve USSOCOM has to stay the course over the long haul. The CSO will be subsumed into a sub-unified command called Joint Task Force – Global Terrorism (JTF-GT).

Within the sub-unified command USSOCOM will leverage and modify an initiative started by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the concept of the SJFHQ. This expertise will be linked with the regional expertise of the TSOC. The combination of the concepts will develop the scalable command and control structure USSOCOM needs to be a global supported commander.

STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS

One of the top initiatives for transformation has been the concept of a SJFHQ. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), published shortly after 9/11, listed as one of its four pillars of transformation, “strengthening joint operations through SJFHQ, improved joint command and control, joint training, and an expanded joint force presence policy.”¹¹ JFCOM defines the SJFHQ as a team of operational planners and information command and control specialists.¹² The SJFHQ does not replace the JFC’s staff but augments them by providing a core element that is rapidly deployable in response to any crisis within a combatant commands Area of Responsibility (AOR). This team of experts forms the backbone of the Joint Task Force (JTF) command structure.

The SJFHQ has moved from a conceptual idea to an operational construct. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has directed that each geographic combatant command (GCC) have an operational SJFHQ by fiscal year 2005.¹³ The SJFHQ will be the focal point for GCC crisis action planning. They will develop a working relationship with other commands, government agencies, and coalition partners. The SJFHQ will maintain regional situational awareness to present the GCC with a concise, comprehensive position on the situation and foster the development of courses of action to resolve the situation.¹⁴ Secretary Rumsfeld said, “ We’re going to have, in my view, more standing joint task force capability so that we don’t have to start from a dead start and, in fact, are well down the way in the event that that kind of a capability is needed.”¹⁵

USJFCOM is delivering to each combatant command, doctrine, organization, and procedures to establish their regionally oriented SJFHQ. USJFCOM will provide a joint training team to assist in the initial establishment of the organizations.¹⁶ The SJFHQ Director for USJFCOM, Brigadier General Marc Rogers, stated, “ [The SJFHQ is] the number one enabler to improving the effectiveness of joint task forces and joint warfighting. The SJFHQ is a command and control weapons system.”¹⁷ At USJFCOM, the SJFHQ is organized in four teams – plans, operations, information management, and information superiority. It is a commander centric, effects based command and control element utilizing a collaborative computer system to standardize the information environment.¹⁸ USJFCOM is looking at expanding the SJFHQ

concept to include functional areas such as forcible entry.¹⁹ The transformation into the SJFHQ construct is progressing in other commands as each decides how they want to implement the organization.

The mandated standup of combatant commands SJFHQ is making considerable strides. Currently, Pacific Command (PACOM), Southern Command, and European Command (EUCOM) have operational SJFHQ. The EUCOM Plans and Operations Center (EPOC), EUCOM's SJFHQ, was stood up on October 15, 2003. " [This is] a fundamental change of Europe's strategic footprint. The goal is improved, responsive warfighting capability.",²⁰ said Air Force General Charles Wald, EUCOM deputy Commander. The EPOC will give EUCOM a 24/7 deployable entity to respond to a crisis anywhere within their AOR or the ability to augment a JFC anywhere in the world. The organization will take away the stove piping of information and bring it all into one focal point, focused on full spectrum planning and operations. This provides a more integrated organization so the decision making process is quicker which in turn gets decisions to the deployed warfighter faster to execute the operation.²¹

"This concept allows us to ensure the training and readiness of the headquarters staff is up to par with the combatant soldiers in the field. It's a combat multiplier of the highest order. It doesn't threaten the headquarters; it multiplies the utility of the headquarters,"²² said Army General B.B. Bell.

EPOC is structured into nine divisions: Current Operations, Information Operations, Knowledge Management/Information Superiority, Intelligence, Integrated Resources, Crisis and Contingency Plans, Campaign Plans, Joint Interagency Coordination Group, and Exercises and Training.²³ EPOC will incorporate standardized communications with collaborative software tools to enhance situational awareness across the geographic command.²⁴

The initiative in PACOM is similar to the construct in Europe but still different enough that they are not interchangeable. PACOMs construct, the Joint Mission Force, is structured different than the EPOC. Some of the organizational requirements are based on regional requirement's which is only natural but others are just the desired organization of the current leadership. In a focused joint world, all the SJFHQ would be organized and equipped the same to enhance interoperability. JFCOM will be an invaluable tool in training the JTF-GT as it stands up its SJFHQ.

Utilizing the construct of the SJFHQ will enable USSOCOM to rapidly deploy mission expertise anywhere in the world. The scalable, modular team will have the required technology to reach-back to Tampa for additional subject matter expert support. To complete the

interdependent team, regional expertise will be required. This regional expertise will come from the TSOC.

THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMANDS – REGIONAL EXPERTISE

The TSOCs will be a vital cog in the counter-terrorist machine. They will be the link between the GCC and USSOCOM working with or through JTF-GT. They are the regional expertise that the deployable team from JTF-GT can build upon to form a robust forward deployed headquarters element. Their forward posture allows them to respond rapidly to any situation that arises within their AOR. They will normally be the first on scene, operating under either command of the GCC or USSOCOM. Irrespective of command relationship, the TSOC will be required to communicate situational awareness back to the appropriate command.

The TSOCs require the same upgrades and interoperability in their communications equipment as does the JTF-GT headquarters. The TSOCs need to communicate with USSOCOM, through JTF-GT for operations, and with their day to day operational command, the GCC. The QDR states, "...a joint command and control structure must reside not only at the joint command, but also extend down to the operational service components."²⁵

To offset the new supported command relationship, the TSOCs are scheduled to receive 232 additional personnel positions.²⁶ These positions are slated for the TSOC staffs to increase their command and control capabilities. The TSOC staffs will be a vital link in the Global War On Terrorism as an intermediary between USSOCOM and the GCC. They will function as the regional experts for USSOCOM and the SOF experts for the GCC. In as much, they will be vital in the maturation of the supported and supporting command relationship between USSOCOM and the GCC. To increase interoperability, the TSOCs need to establish within their headquarters a JTF architecture congruent with the architecture of the deployable team from JTF-GT. Currently this compatibility exist only in the Pacific AOR.

Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) has organized its staff to operate as a standing JTF, JTF-510.²⁷ This organizational structure enables SOCPAC to be the lead element employed by the Commander of PACOM for any type of crisis response. The flexibility to have a deployable JTF headquarters provides PACOM a timely initial response to a crisis anywhere within their AOR-an AOR with 105 million square miles and 60% of the world's population.²⁸ PACOM can employ JTF-510 as a lead JTF or as an advance party to facilitate the arrival of a larger task force. The TSOC provides an initial response to a situation--an initial response with a small yet forceful presence.

If the situation dictates that USSOCOM be the supported commander, the TSOC JTF will be the foundation that the USSOCOM SJFHQ team will build upon to establish a robust interdependent organization. This regionally oriented, network centric team will be focused on the prosecution of the world-wide campaign against terrorism. In order to maintain focus, a new sub-unified command under USSOCOM will be charged with the mission of eradication of terrorism around the world. That sub-unified command will be JTF-GT.

JOINT TASK FORCE – GLOBAL TERRORISM

USSOCOM must structure its global terror campaign element along a common joint architecture to increase interoperability with the other GCCs. With the new force structure, USSOCOM would eliminate from USSOCOM headquarters the CSO and incorporate its assets into a new sub-unified standing JTF. The new command would be named the Joint Task Force – Global Terrorism. USSOCOM's organizational chart would have five subordinate elements.




FIGURE 3. PROPOSED USSOCOM COMMAND STRUCTURE

To fully apply the proper force structure to the new sub-unified command, USSOCOM would incorporate the current CSO staff as the core element to build JTF-GT. They would then task the other subordinate commands to staff the majority of the new billets. Combined, they would form the core of a SJFHQ within JTF-GT. This would align USSOCOM with the other GCCs to have a deployable SJFHQ. This construct would allow USSOCOM to prosecute the war on terrorism from the Joint Operations Center (JOC) in Tampa or deploy the SJFHQ element to any theater to conduct operations either as a supported command or a supporting command. Because of the global extent of the campaign and the time constraints of high value strategic targets, JTF-GT will need two deployable SJFHQ elements. The size of these elements will be smaller than the JFCOM model which is attributable to two factors.

The first factor is the reach-back capability the deployed team would have into the JOC in Tampa. Within the JOC there would reside a preponderance of the interagency coordination, intelligence resources, and teams that can plan for follow on operations. The second factor contributing to the smaller footprint is the modular approach to utilizing the TSOCs task force architecture to provide augmentation and regional expertise.

For JTF-GT the organizational chart will be focused to provide a structure with minimal division of tasks. The ability to keep the organization simple is attributable to the narrow focus of the mission, global terrorism, and the desire for a small forward footprint. JTF-GT will be divided into the following divisions: Operations, Strategic Plans, Intelligence/Interagency, Support, and Special Projects. There will also be a JOC manned from personnel from all the other divisions. Interoperability will be garnered through a symbiotic command and control communications network. The network will provide a common operating picture vertically to each division and horizontally to the other commands. This will provide the combat forces and the battle staff a reach-back capability to enhance centralized control and decentralized execution of SOF missions.

Of all the divisions mentioned, the operations division will be the most robust. Under its umbrella will be the aviation, naval, and ground forces; information operations to include psychological operations; and a small compartmented cell to handle covert operations. They will develop courses of action and direct operations from pre-crisis activities through small scale contingencies. The operations division will be the focal point for instituting the supported relationships with conventional forces.

The Strategic Plans division will not only develop the strategic plans but also provide liaison teams to the other combatant commands. The liaison teams will develop the relationships within the GCC staff to avoid any animosity that may arise depending on the supported and supporting command relationship between the two entities. These teams will be part of the deployable SJFHQ to capitalize on that relationship. The liaison teams would work closely with the special operations regional experts; the TSOCs.

These deployable elements would fall in with the TSOC to form the overarching headquarters team. To successfully integrate the different echelons of command and control, every TSOC needs to establish a common JTF organizational construct within their command. SOCPAC is already postured for this but the other TSOCs would need to identify and organize along the same lines. Once this occurs, the JTF-GT element combined with the TSOC JTF will be the forward deployed command and control headquarters to prosecute the operations. This organization fills the need to operate across the full spectrum of control as a JFC, a JTF, or a

Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). This is a scalable, modular approach to command and control that will be required to successfully prosecute the global war on terror. This construct gives USSOCOM a standing command and control network down the chain of command that is tailorable to any situation, anywhere in the world. The commonality of equipment especially communications will provide the USSOCOM or GCC commander with a network centric organization capable of full spectrum special operations dominance.

Within the JTF-GT JOC and subordinate Air Operations Center (AOC), USSOCOM must overcome the joint communications problems that always seem to hamper joint operations. SOF forces operate with discreet equipment and on different cryptological data than conventional forces. This is due to the operational security requirements associated with the strategic nature of special operation missions. With air operations being conducted across the full spectrum of conventional and SOF capabilities, it is imperative to have reliable communications that all players can access regardless of service. JTF-GT will be required to establish joint equipment and data nets that all services can operate given limitations and constraints possessed by each service. Communications have always been the long pole in any operation and the nature, speed, and security of counter-terrorism missions make the common communications network a must.

To develop a global organization of this nature from square one would take more time than the enemy is willing to give USSOCOM. In order to maintain the initiative, USSOCOM will leverage the CSO resources, retain the special operations unconventional mind set, and exploit off the shelf technology modified to meet the needs of the nation. This forward deployed headquarters will have the capability to command and integrate all components of SOF from ground to air. The special operations relationship with the air component is very important and robust due to the nature of the missions. Air support to SOF was a vital link during Operation Enduring Freedom and a link that must be enhanced to ensure the interoperability required for SOF missions and the concept of a modular command and control architecture will bring this to fruition.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION COMMAND AND CONTROL

JTF-GT will allow the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) to develop the air centric command and control system. Currently, AFSOC has an element within its staff system that has been trained to conduct the important function of the JFCOM liaison element. AFSOC possesses a 15-man liaison element that is comprised of three teams which are regionally focused for PACOM, EUCOM, and Central Command.²⁹ All the personnel have been trained in

Air Operations Center procedures and have attended command and control courses taught at Hurlburt Field Florida. This standing Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) is a SOF air centric standing coordination element. USSOCOM will need to establish a similar organization within JTF-GT to provide the necessary link between SOF and conventional air assets.

The importance of this liaison element was brought to the forefront during Operation Enduring Freedom. USJFCOM provided an after action report concerning the inter-action between SOF and conventional forces, primarily air forces, during Operation Enduring Freedom. The coordination between SOF and the Combined Forces Air Component Commander was limited in scope especially when it came to fire support. The report addressed the following areas:

- SOF Joint Training Teams could have done more to improve ground-air fire integration.
- The Combined Forces Air Component Commander needed to provide an improved air support organization to the JSOTF to facilitate fire support.
- The JSOTF commander did not fully understand the extent of his authority within his Area of Operations.
- The lack of fire support organization within the JSOTF/HQ and the SOLE led to limited air support.
- The JSOTF needed a more robust operations center to facilitate all air support.³⁰

The lessons learned need to be incorporated into the transformation of USSOCOM especially as it moves into the role of supported commander. JTF-GT must maintain the ability to leverage conventional combat power to perform strategic high value targets in the global war on terrorism. The majority of non-SOF support will come from air power. This relationship will be orchestrated through the Joint Special Operations Air Component Command.

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR COMPONENT COMMAND

AFSOC will train a Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) and SOLE for the JTF-GT initial cadre. That force will be the foundation of the air operations element within the JTF-GT Operations Division. Other SOF air operators will be fused from Army SOF aviation, either USASOC HQ or the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), and from the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) who have experience in joint air operations through their training and exercise function. The blending of these elements with conventional Air Force and Navy air expertise in the areas of airspace control, joint fires control, mobility, C4ISR, and other significant areas will provide the commander of JTF-GT a functional and competent air

component. In this unit organization, the JTF-GT/JSOAC would be manned and structured to function as the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) for small, short duration operations up to a small scale contingency.




FIGURE 4. JSOAC ORGANIZATION

With USSOCOM being the supported commander, the JTF-GT commander could be identified as the JFC and the JSOAC Commander (JSOACC) the JFACC. The limited number of forces involved and short duration of each operation is well within the scope of the JSOACC's ability to function as the JFACC. The complexity of operations is without question but the majority of the ground and naval assets utilized come from within the SOF community. On the other hand, the air assets will be a mixture of SOF aviation and conventional aviation.

The JSOAC staff is accustomed to controlling both the Air Force SOF (AFSOF) and the Army SOF (ARSOF) aviation assets. A conventional JFACC would have visibility of the SOF missions and control over some AFSOF assets but would not usually have control over the ARSOF elements operating within the JSOA. In this respect the JSOAC as the JFACC actually has a greater degree of centralized control over the entire spectrum of aviation assets operating in the Joint Operations Area. A force multiplier in the command and control environment is the Air Coordination and Control element (ACCE).

To enhance the control and proper utilization, the Air Force, Navy, and, if required, Marines would furnish members to establish the ACCE. This body is the subject matter experts to make inputs to the JSOACC and augment portions of the staff as well as the linkage back to the conventional forces. It is the requirement of the supporting commands to provide the appropriate force structure to support the ACCE. Each individual assigned to the ACCE will have to be trained on current AOC procedures and service specific command and control

caveats. This mutual training magnifies joint interoperability between the SOF forces and supporting air forces. Everyone trained on the same procedures, understanding common vernacular, and operating the same systems can only be a force multiplier. This modular approach works well on the aviation side of JTF-GT. JTF-GT gives USSOCOM strategic speed and surprise while the TSOC gives regional credibility and access to regional assets. This building block approach flows down to the TSOC which would have a regional JSOAC which the JTF-GT air component could leverage.

REGIONAL JSOAC

To follow the modular plug and play approach, each TSOC will establish a JSOAC element. Currently only SOCPAC has a regionally oriented and manned JSOAC. When the 31st Special Operations Squadron closed and was replaced by an element of the 160th SOAR, a joint unit was required to coordinate the air support provided to SOCPAC and PACOM. This function had previously been provided by the 353rd Special Operations Group, an AFSOC unit.

The TSOC JSOAC is the regional expert to coordinate air assets required either from the Special Operations Groups (SOG) or conventional assets regionally controlled such as PACAF or 7th Fleet. All members of the JSOAC will receive the same training as the JTF-GT JSOAC members to facilitate interoperability. Like the larger JTF, the aviation command element of JTF-GT can merge with the regional JSOAC to form the required staff to execute operations as the JFACC. With the required connectivity, the JSOAC acting from Tampa can control a regional air campaign utilizing the TSOC JSOAC as an extension of its staff.

An element of the theater JSOAC will be trained to function as a SOLE. This provides the flexibility for the TSOC to support both USSOCOM, with the JSOAC, and the GCC, with the SOLE, simultaneously within the AOR. In a fluid strategic environment, supported and supporting command relationships may change as the scope of the operation changes. At that point, either JTF-GT or the TSOC could revert to a JSOTF and deploy required liaison elements within the JFACC, JFLCC, and JFMCC staffs.

In the global campaign on terrorism, the preponderance of forces will be SOF and air power. The missions will be short, quick, and decisive in nature. There may be multiple operations being conducted in parallel in different theaters. This type of strategic operation requires USSOCOM to be forward deployed, to increase combat strength, and to concentrate their efforts to prosecute the war as a combatant command. There are plans to stand up a JSOAC in the Special Operations Command – Europe (SOCEUR) area of responsibility. This is only the initial change in force structure that USSOCOM needs to address to bring symmetry

across the globe and increase the forward presence of combat power to quickly and decisively defeat emerging terrorist threats.

USSOCOM has been regionally oriented since its conception. On the aviation side, currently there are SOGs in the European and Pacific theaters. The 16 SOW stationed at Hurlburt Field, Florida is responsible for South America and the Middle East. Over the past decade, the operations tempo in the CENTCOM AOR has been extremely high especially for the SOF aviation assets. To remedy the burden of command and control of the aviation assets, a SOG and JSOAC need to be established within the CENTCOM AOR to align that theater with the other GCC to maintain the premise of commonality.




FIGURE 5. PROPOSED AFSOC STRUCTURE

These initiatives bring us full circle from USSOCOM down to the components in theater. The same process will be applied to the Army and Navy SOF assets as we have demonstrated with the Air component to complete the command and control architecture. Once in place, this modular approach to command and control will afford USSOCOM a flexible yet forceful response to terrorist operations anywhere in the world either as the supported commander or as a supporting commander.

CONCLUSION

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states, "America will focus decisive military power and specialized intelligence sources to defeat terrorist networks globally."³¹ USSOCOM will be the power the United States utilizes to prosecute the global war on terrorism. USSOCOM has to transform into a supported global combatant command while still performing its Title 10 responsibilities. A modular, scalable standing joint task force will enable USSOCOM to fulfill this requirement. Transforming the organizational architecture from top to bottom will afford USSOCOM the versatility to operate from the front lines or from the beaches of Florida.

In order to capitalize on this command and control structure, the heart of the USSOCOM, the soldiers, must be forward deployed.

To see this vision through, USSOCOM must establish a sub-unified command, JTF-GT, with the guidance and freedom to lead the effort against terrorism. This allows the command to concentrate on its service-like responsibilities while JTF-GT concentrates on prosecuting the global campaign. Within JTF-GT will reside two deployable standing joint force headquarters. This deployable entity gives USSOCOM global coverage and the flexibility to operate within two regions simultaneously or from the joint operations center in Florida. This is enhanced by the theater special operations commands forward presence and regional expertise. Developing a scalable headquarters package between the SJFHQ and the TSOC allows USSOCOM to act as the supported commander and JFC within any region or enhances the supporting relationship to the GCC either as a JTF or a JSOTF. This architecture allows USSOCOM to become a global strategic warfighter with the capability to act along the full spectrum of warfare.

To defeat an asymmetrical threat, USSOCOM must be an asymmetrical force – poised to attack, anywhere at anytime. USSOCOM needs to be the nation's tip of the spear, focused on the eradication of terrorism not nation building. President Bush said it well, "[W]e will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country[.]"³² Resourced and organized correctly, USSOCOM is ready and able to defeat the enemy and defend our nation.

WORD COUNT=5826

ENDNOTES

¹ George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C.: White House, September 2002),5.

² Andrew Koch, "USA Expands Special Operations Role in 'War on Terrorism'." Jane's Defense Weekly Online November 2002 [journal on-line]; Available from http://janes.com/regional_news/americas/news/jdw/jdw021105_1_n.shtml; Internet; accessed 3 September 2003. The definition of a supported commander is the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

³ United States Special Operations Command, *History: 15th Anniversary*, (MacDill AFB, FL: 16 April 2002) 14.

⁴ Marshall Billingslea and Charles R. Holland, *United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 2003-2004: Transforming the Force at the Forefront of the War on Terrorism*, Posture Statement presented to the 108th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Publishing Office, 2003),10.

⁵ Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, *Statement on Special Operations Forces Acquisition from Marshall Billingslea*: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities. 108th Cong., 1st sess., 1 April 2003, 11.

⁶ Billingslea, 101-106.

⁷ Billingslea, 63.

⁸ Ibid, 68.

⁹ Billingslea, 107.

¹⁰ Ibid, 89.

¹¹ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 30 September 2001), 32-34.

¹² United States Joint Forces Command, "Standing Joint Force Headquarters", Available from http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_sjfhq.htm; Internet; accessed 25 November 2003.

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Michael Wimbish, "Standing Joint Force Headquarters Making Strides." May 2003. Available from <http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2003/pa050903.htm>; Internet; Accessed 25 November 2003.

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ John T. Bennett, "JFCOM to Examine 'Functionally Oriented' Standing Joint Force HQ", 30 October 2003; Available from <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s2003103000229047.html>.; Internet; Accessed 31 October 2003.

²⁰ Hugh C. McBride, "New Plans and Operations Center Exemplifies EUCOM Transformation", Defense Link News, 30 October 2003; Available from http://www.dod.mil/news/Oct2003/n10302003_200310301.html.; Internet; Accessed 25 November 2003.

²¹ Ibid

²² Wimbish, 4.

²³ McBride, 2.

²⁴ Ibid, 3.

²⁵ Rumsfeld, 33.

²⁶ Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, *Statement on Special Operations Forces Acquisition from Marshall Billingslea*: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities. 108th Cong., 1st sess., 1 April 2003, 11.

²⁷ Global Security Organization, "Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) Joint Task Force 510.", Available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/socpac.htm>.; Internet; Accessed 6 September 2003.

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Steven Buteau, *A Permanent Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE): A Regional Approach*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2003), 19-20.

³⁰ Michael Findlay, Robert Green, and Eric Braganca, "SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield.", *Military Review*, May-June 2003; Available from <http://www.militaryreview.com/05062003/sof.htm>.; Internet; Accessed 6 September 2003.

³¹ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington D.C.: The White House, February 2003), 17.

³² Bush, *National Security Strategy for the United States of America*, 6.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aaron, Christopher. "Terrorism Threat Survey 2002." Jane's Intelligence Review Online October 01, 2002. Available from <http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc/jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/jir003> Accessed on 9 September 2003
- Bennett, John T. "JFCOM To Examine 'Functionally Oriented' Standing Joint Force HQ." 30 October 2003; available from <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s200310300229047.html> . Internet. Accessed 31 October 2003.
- Billingslea, Marshall and Charles R. Holland. *United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 2003-2004: Transforming the Force at the Forefront of the War on Terrorism* . Presented to the 108th Cong., 1st sess. Washington D.C.:U.S. Publishing Office, 2003.
- Bureau of Public Affairs. U.S. Department of State. "Strategic Goal 1: Counterterrorism." Available from <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/perfplan/2004/20462.htm> . Accessed on 9 October 2003.
- Bush, George W. "White House Releases Progress Report on Global War on Terrorism." Washington D.C. 10 September 2003. Available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/texts/03091009.htm> . Accessed on 14 October 2003.
- _____. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* . Washington D.C.: The White House, September 2002.
- _____. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* . Washington D.C.: The White House, February 2003.
- Buteau, Steven. "A Permanent Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE): A Regional Approach." Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2003.
- Corera, Gordon. "Special Operations Forces Take Care of War on Terror." Jane's Intelligence Review Online January 01, 2003. Available from <http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc/jsp> . Accessed on 9 September 2003.
- Findlay, Michael. "SOCJFCOM: Integrating SOF Into Joint Task Forces." Spring 2000. available from <http://call.army.mil/products/nftf/novdec00/findlay.htm> . Internet. Accessed on 21 October 2003.
- Findlay, Michael, Robert Green, and Eric Braganca. "SOF on the Contemporary Battleground." *Military Review*, May-June 2003. Available from <http://www.militaryreview.com/05062003/sof.htm> Accessed on 6 September 2003.
- Giangreco, D.M. "Special Forces." *American Heritage*, November/December 2002, Vol 53, Number 6. Available from http://www.americanheritage.com/AMHER/2002/06/spec_forces.shtml Accessed on 4 September 2003.
- Global Security Organization. "Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) Joint Task Force 510." Available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/socpac.htm> . Accessed on 6 September 2003.

- Gurule, Jimmy. "Update on Tracking the Financial Assets of Terrorists: One Year Later." Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington D.C. 9 September 2002. Available from <http://fpc.state.gov/13337.htm> . Accessed on 9 October 2003.
- Haas, Michael E. "Air Commando! 1950-1975: Twenty-five Years at the Tip of the Spear."
- Holbein, Jack R. "JTF-510 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)." Headquarters Special Operations Command Pacific, Camp H.M. Smith: SOJ31, 14 June 1999.
- Jones, Mark and Wes Rehorn. "Integrating SOF Into Joint Warfighting." Military Review (May-June 2003).
- Kennedy, Harold. "Will Special Ops Success Change the Face of War?" National Defense Magazine, February 2002. Available from <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articl.cfm?id=721> . Internet. Accessed on 21 October 2003.
- Koch, Andrew. "USA Expands Special Operations Role in 'War on Terrorism'." Jane's Defense Weekly Online, November 5, 2002. Available from http://www.janes.com/regional_news/americas/news/jdw/jdw021105_1_n.shtml . Accessed on 3 September 2003.
- Lind, William S. "Outside View: Looping OODA Loops." Washington Times 5 August 2003. Available from <http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20030610-071739-9916r.htm> . Accessed on 17 October 2003.
- Litt, David. "Special Ops Forces Are 'Tool of Choice'" National Defense Magazine, February 2003. Available from <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?id=1028> . Internet. Accessed on 21 October 2003.
- McBride, Hugh C. "New Plans and Operations Center Exemplifies EUCOM Transformation." Defense Link News, 30 October 2003. Available from http://www.dod.mil/news/Oct2003/n10302003_200310301.html . Accessed 25 November 2003.
- Philpott, Tom. "JCS Chairman Sees 'Global War' Forcing Mission Shift." Newport News Daily Press September 5, 2003. Available from <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Sep2003/e20030905214121.html> . Accessed on 5 September 2003.
- Risen, James and Thom Shanker. "Rumsfeld Weighs Covert Activities by Military Units." New York Times, August 12, 2002. Available from <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0812-04.htm> . Accessed on 3 September 2003.
- Rolfsen, Bruce. "Busy Time Ahead for AFSOC, Commander Says." Air Force Times 6 October 2003. Available from <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/s20030929220181.html> . Internet. Accessed on 29 September 2003.
- Rumsfeld, Donald H. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 30 September 2001.
- Saxton, Jim. House Armed Services Committee. "America's Single Best Weapon in the War on Terrorism." Special Operations Technology Online Edition. Available from http://www.sotech-kmi.com/print_article.cfm?DocID=118 . Accessed on 3 September 2003.

Tiron, Roxana. "Navy Special Warfare Expands Command Role in Joint Force." National Defense Magazine, February 2003. Available from <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?id=1035> . Internet. Accessed on 21 October 2003.

. "Technologies for Special Operations Aimed at Transformation." National Defense, April 2002. Available from <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?id=776> . Accessed on 23 August 2003.

United Nations Security Council. "Resolution 1373 (2001)." Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 September 2001. Available from <http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/392a001f254b4b9085256b4b00708233?OpenDocument> . Accessed on 6 October 2003.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. *Statement on The State of Special Operations Forces from Gen Charles Holland*: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services. 108th Cong., 1st sess., 12 March 2003.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Appropriations. *Statement on The State of Special Operations Forces from Gen. Charles Holland*: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations. 108th Cong., 1st sess., 26 March 2003.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. *Statement on Special Operations Forces Acquisition from Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense – Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict*: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities; Committee on Armed Services. 108th Cong., 1st sess., 1 April 2003.

United States Code Title 10, Section 167

U.S. Department of the Air Force. *Air Force Basic Doctrine, AFDD 1* . Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Force Doctrine Center, 9 July 2003.

U.S. Department of the Air Force. *Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, AFDD 2* . Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Force Doctrine Center, 17 February 2000.

U.S. Department of the Air Force. *Special Operations, AFDD 2-7*. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Force Doctrine Center, 2 August 2001.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 2001.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Command and Control of Joint Air Operations. Joint Publication 3-56.1*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. Joint Publication 5-0*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 April 1995.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide, CJCSM 3500.06* . Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 October 1998.

- U.S. Joint Forces Command. *Standing Joint Force Headquarters*. Norfolk Virginia: United States Joint Forces Command. Available from http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_sjfhq.htm. Accessed on 25 November 2003.
- U.S. Special Operations Command. *History: 15th Anniversary*. MacDill AFB, Florida: United States Special Operations Command History and Research Office, 16 April 2002.
- U.S. Special Operations Command. *Special Operations In Peace and War, USSOCOM PUB 1*. MacDill AFB, Florida: United States Special Operations Command, 25 January 1996.
- Wimbish, Michael. "*Standing Joint Force Headquarters Making Strides*." United States Joint Forces Command, May 2003, Available from <http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2003/pa050903.htm> Accessed on 25 November 2003.