

JUN 17 2004

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Solutions for Stabilization



*Analyzing the U.S. Military's Role in
Providing Security for Stabilization
Operations*




-Policy Analysis Exercise

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Executive Summary:

The role of Stabilization Operations (SO) has taken on great importance of late. In the context of Iraq, and in the greater picture of the War on Terror, SO has become an integral part of military operations. SO allows consolidation of gains made in 'kick-in-the-door' situations such as Iraq, and is instrumental in preventing low-level instability from threatening American interests. The military has started to recognize the importance of SO by beginning to incorporate stabilization doctrine, and by recognizing SO as within spectrum of conflict, and hence a legitimate military mission. This realization needs to continue, despite historical and cultural aversion to unconventional missions. A realization of the importance of SO can be operationalized in a combination of 'top-down' force structure solutions and 'bottom-up' force package optimizations.

The stabilization environment is characterized by several trends, leading to requirements:

- **Stabilizations are both diverse and fluid, therefore Flexibility is required.**
- **Stabilizations require large amounts of forces, therefore Mass is required.**
- **Stabilizations are not quick, therefore Endurance is required.**
- **Stabilizations are not cheap, therefore Cost Efficiency is required.**

Force Structure Solutions address these requirements from a 'top-down' perspective. This paper evaluates five possible options evaluated for a Force Structure Solution:

- **Standing Constabulary Force:** Create two constabulary divisions
 - o Meets requirements, but total force cost very high.
- **Conventional Force Rotation:** Train, deploy and retrain combat units.
 - o Readily implementable, adequate performance at reduced cost.
- **Local Stabilization Forces:** Use purged hostile forces or extant friendly units.
 - o Reliant on external situational factors, hence unacceptably inflexible.
- **Force-As-Required:** Build 6 brigades of cadre; fill in with NG/R when deployed.
 - o Difficult to implement, but performs well at relatively low cost.
- **Muddle Through:** Figure individual stabilizations out as one goes along.
 - o Cheap in the short-term, Expensive in the long-run.

The second option is recommended as the best conservative option, and the fourth as the most ambitious option. Risk preferences and feasibility should decide between these two.

Force Package Optimizations address the requirements from a 'bottom-up' perspective, and complement a Force Structure Solution. These initiatives fall into three categories:

- **Equipment:** Provide technological solutions to asymmetric threats.
- **Composition:** Identify stabilization skills, leverage relevant civilian expertise.
- **Training:** Provide skill and experience with a SO training/doctrine infrastructure.

These initiatives provide both flexibility and added capability can be implemented on an individual basis with whichever Force Structure Solution is selected.

In the synergy between force structure solutions and force package optimization, the military can meet the challenge of Security Operations head-on, preparing American forces for success in the stabilization environment.

*"There is another type of warfare – new in its intensity, ancient in its origin – war by guerillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him."*¹

- John F. Kennedy

Address to the Graduating Class, USNA, 6 Jun 1962

*A U.S. Army Second Lieutenant walks the street of the Iraqi city guarded by his unit, just as he has done each day for the last few months. Member of a unit that recently fought one of the fastest and most successful land engagements in history, he now finds himself fighting a much more elusive enemy. As his boots continue their march down the dusty street, his mind wanders...First to a friend who was recently killed, then to the time they spent together at West Point. Finally, his thoughts come to rest for a few moments on thoughts of home. It seems almost unreal, as if in another lifetime. His reverie is broken by thoughts of the men under his command, and a certain fire returns to his eye. He continues his path down the street with his back a bit straighter, as he performs his duty for yet another day.*²

Every war has an aftermath, and every battle has a conclusion. After the majority of fighting has ended, the time comes to consolidate gains. In a battle, a commander occupies the gained territory, and builds defenses so that the hard-fought ground would not be lost to an enemy counter-attack. After a war, following the Clausewitzian imperative, leaders secure the hard-won political ends, so that the sacrifices made for those gains would not be in vain. As gains made in a battle are secured in the aftermath of that battle, gains made in a conflict are secured in the post-conflict environment. Post-conflict operations then play a strategic role in the pursuit of national goals. America has also found her global interests inextricably intertwined with low-intensity conflicts, counter-insurgencies and peacekeeping actions. Engagement in these operations has not been an exception of the last decade, but a rule of the last century. Stabilization

¹ As rpt. in Connetta, Carl, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism," Joint Pub 3-07.2, 17 Mar 1998, as rpt. in "Combatting [sic] Terrorism and Homeland Security," Naval War College (NWC: 2004,) I-1.

² Adaptation of stories from and conversations with an anonymous Army Second Lieutenant friend.

Operations are the sum of the aforementioned activities, and the military has been drawn into them by the demands of the national interest.

Both Iraq and Afghanistan are close-at-hand examples of SO. During one episode in the current occupation of Iraq, one Army Second Lieutenant who was part of the occupation force was informed that he was to serve as mayor of several Baghdad city blocks. When asked how much training he was given for this task, he replied "about five minutes."³ Doubtless, this lieutenant performed his job superbly, but this episode speaks to the reality of the current occupation. Forces structured and trained to prosecute conventional conflict found themselves in the middle of an unconventional conflict. The ingenuity of American forces is often astonishing, but it should not have to be a replacement for preparation and training. There is a question that must be asked: could United States forces have been prepared and equipped better for the SO environment that they increasingly often face?

How then should United States' forces prepare for success in stabilization operations? The first underlying question is the role of SO in the spectrum of military operations, for without understanding the importance of SO, there will be little impetus to find and implement a solution. This leads to the question of requirements. A study of trends from previous stabilization operations will reveal requirements for a successful SO solution. From there, an evaluation of different force structure solutions will address these requirements from a 'top-down' perspective. Organic 'bottom-up' initiatives will then compliment these force structure solutions, creating a total solution to fill the increasingly important SO role.

When discussing a question as broad as stabilization operations, one must remember that if one seeks to answer all the questions about the topic, they will succeed in answering nothing. Framing the question correctly becomes imperative. For the purposes of our discussion, the military's role in SO will be assumed to be limited to the security and constabulary roles. The military has historically played many roles in the post-conflict, including political and economic restructuring, as well as humanitarian operations. Given the comparatively vast resources of the Department of Defense, American forces will most likely be called on to fill many roles in an occupation.

³ Story related during interview with the Hon. John White, Kennedy School of Government.

However, in nearly all occupations, the U.S. military will be called upon to provide security. From heavy security- rooting out and destroying insurgent and terrorist forces- to light constabulary actions, U.S. forces will find themselves in an armed role securing the peace in the wake of future American interventions. In the absence of a 'kick-in-the-door' intervention, U.S. forces deployed on the SO mission will likely find either organized or unorganized opposition to their presence. Even when not preceded by a conventional armed intervention, SO will still need security/constabulary functions. For this reason, the discussion is confined to these roles that DoD will almost certainly have to play.⁴ In terms of further assumptions to reduce the scope of this inquiry, the discussion will focus on post-conflict SO, with the assumption that a solution that works for an opposed-entry SO will be able to perform an unopposed-entry SO. Additionally, this discussion will focus on organized threats in SO, under the assumption that a SO solution capable of tackling an insurgency will be able to deal with banditry. Finally, this discussion acknowledges the broad range of outcomes for SO, from basic stabilization of a failed state to full 'nation-building.' The assumption is that the factors that feed into these outcomes are outside the scope of security-constabulary operations, except insofar as security-constabulary operations provide a necessary 'umbrella' under which these activities can occur. Therefore, a successful outcome is considered to be a hand-off to local security forces after goals set forth by the aforementioned activities are accomplished.⁵

⁴ It is important to note that security and constabulary operations do not take place in a vacuum. Economic and political restructuring will be hampered by a lack of security, and political legitimacy will be undermined if law and order are not maintained. Humanitarian efforts will be impeded if there is not an umbrella of security in place. These interactions necessitate a great deal of coordination with civil authorities and NGOs. However important this interaction, there is much written on its nature and facilitative mechanisms, such as the CIMIC/CMOC in Bosnia. This paper does not seek to replicate this work; therefore this paper assumes that given an effective security umbrella and an adequate amount of law and order for a certain amount of time, civil reconstruction and stabilization goals will be met. For more information, refer to Weinberger, Naomi, "Civil-Military Coordination in Afghanistan," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 55, no. 2.

⁵ The extent of the reconstruction effort will change the time required, but not the nature of security-constabulary activities.

Question #1:

How do stabilization operations fit into the overall picture of the US military?

In the context of the War on Terror, the role of SO has taken on great importance. Whether in the wake of a 'kick-in-the-door' conventional military operation, or in a more conventional stabilization context, SO consolidates the gains made in the War on Terror. In effect, SO builds fortifications against terrorism, as it provides security for the development efforts that 'poison the well' for terror acts. Yet, the current understanding of SO is that of an afterthought, a distraction from the 'real' missions. Whether this understanding of SO was appropriate to the pre-9/11 world is a question beyond the scope of this paper. In the post-9/11 world, however, effective prosecution of SO is absolutely essential to real victory in the War on Terror.

There are many reasons the military is reluctant to fully engage the question of stabilization operations. The first of these is history. Southeast Asia did much to sour the military on the prospect of messy, unconventional warfare.

"Civilian policymakers... and the conventional soldiers, with the American failure in Vietnam, did their level best to forget that insurgency was a real and continuing threat to the national interest of the United States. As a result, discussion... was relegated to peripheral field manuals."⁶

Such negative experiences were not confined to the 60s and 70s, however.

Peacekeeping does not sit comfortably within the American military culture. Moreover, it is well known that the dark shadow of events in Mogadishu in October 1993 still tempers the attitudes of senior...officials against peacekeeping.⁷

With Vietnam and Mogadishu as analogies, it is not difficult to understand the military's reluctance to fully engage on SO. There are also cultural factors that scorn SO, such as a

⁶ Fishel, John, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The Gap, and Things that go Bump in the Night," Low Intensity Conflict & LE, Vol. 4, No. 3, Winter 1995. As rpt. in "MOOTW Introduction and Failed States," Naval War College (NWC: 2004,) 385. Ralph Peters makes this point somewhat more colorfully in his "Heavy Peace," published in the Spring 1999 edition of Parameters: US Army War College.

⁷ Connaughton, Richard, "The Mechanics and Nature of the British Interventions into Sierra Leone (2000) and Afghanistan (2001-2002,)" Civil Wars, Vol. 5, No. 2, (Summer 2002), 89.

romantic European tradition among the officer corps.⁸ Enemies are to be met on the field of battle, not amongst civilians in messy partial engagements. Col. John Waghelstein, a veteran of both Low Intensity Conflict and the Naval War College, points to the constabulary actions of the Westward Expansion. "Preoccupation with the European model of warfare led the Army to dismiss the Indians as simply an annoying distraction from its 'true' role."⁹ Finally, the idea that SO is not really in the spectrum of conflict sidelines SO. This was truer with the previous term, operations other than war (OOTW).

"MOOTW and OOTW suggest a dichotomous formulation of the scope of military operations. There is *either war or not war*. Only WAR is of supreme importance. All other activities are of a lesser kind."¹⁰

For all of these reasons, SO were never truly seen as legitimate missions truly within the purview of the military, but rather as bastardized missions forced upon the military by political authorities. Indulgence of this viewpoint may have been a luxury afforded in the time before the threat of terror had fully materialized, but it is untenable in the War on Terror. Without SO, America is robbed of a key weapon in the fight against terror.

Neither the recent Iraq War nor the Conflict in Afghanistan ended with a formal declaration of surrender, nor a real cessation of hostilities. James Dobbins points out in his recent RAND analysis of occupations that often the more overwhelming the military victory, the more difficult the occupation.¹¹ It would seem that when dealing with rogue states and terror regimes, conflicts do not end as tidily as one might wish. As the threats the United States currently faces are unlikely to capitulate in the wake of a conventional military defeat, it is probable that in conflicts of the next decade American forces will face contested post-conflict environments in the wake of conventional military victories. It is in the wake of war that the ends of the war are finally realized. Clausewitz reiterates the importance of outcome in armed conflict; "No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."¹² That gained by conflict is either consolidated or lost in the post-conflict. Victories have been short-lived due to

⁸ Fishel, 376.

⁹ Waghelstein, John, as rpt. in *Ibid.*, 376.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 374.

¹¹ Dobbins, James, *America's Role in Nation-Building*, RAND, (Santa Monica: 2003.)

¹² Clausewitz, Carl von, "On War," Internet.

inadequate prosecution of post-conflict stabilization operations. B.H. Liddell Hart points out that "if you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war."¹³ If one wins the war, to lose the peace, they may as well have lost the war. If one successfully prosecutes the post-conflict phase, then the conflict is finalized. Germany and Japan come to mind, in that post-conflict stabilization operations were very successful in both of these cases. Former adversaries are now allies and pillars of stability in their respective regions. It is then more useful to consider stabilization operations as a phase of the war, rather than something to be done when the war is over. Instead of considering the post-conflict an afterthought, stabilization operations would then receive the respect it demands, and in doing so carry out the Clausewitzian imperative to its logical end.

When framed against the backdrop of the Global War on Terror, the importance of stabilization operations takes on new light. In this war, Al-Qaeda and the United States have set their will against each other, each pursuing the other's destruction. However, instead of meeting on a traditional battlefield, this conflict is resolved in the shadows and in the streets. The fundamental truths of Sun Tzu still hold true, for the battle is between the will of the commanders rather than between the blades of swords. The will of the United States is in its people, and hence its people are targeted. The will and strength of terror networks are in failed states and terror regimes, and as such recent interventions have targeted these. If these individual interventions are approached as battles in the War on Terror, then there must be a paradigm shift in the SO phase of these interventions as well.

After winning a battle, military operations do not cease; the retreat is pursued and the captured ground is secured. The mindset from which the battle was prosecuted is maintained in securing the captured territory. The follow-through to a battle is pursued with the same vigor and the same mentality as the battle itself. After winning a war, however, the military mindset changes. The military's mindset changes, as war transitions to peacetime. Violence is seen more as a crime than as an act of war. The

¹³ Liddell Hart, B.H. as rpt. In Stredansky, Susan, "Balancing the Trinity: The Fine Art of Conflict Resolution," Air University Press (Maxwell AFB: 1996,) As rpt. in "Peace Operations," Naval War College (NWC: 2004,) 1.

temptation then becomes to lose interest, to not pursue the follow-through with the same mindset that prosecuted the war. On a surface level, it is clear that in both Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been no clear transition between war and peacetime, only reductions in shades and degree of intensity. For the associated post-conflict occupations, the post-battle mentality then seems more appropriate than the post-war mindset. If Iraq and Afghanistan are indeed battles in a larger campaign, it becomes clear that the post-battle mentality should be used in prosecuting SO. In this, successful post-conflict stabilization serves as fortification on a strategic level: it assures that gains made are held.

Fortification of contested territory is equally as essential in already friendly territory as it is in recently won territory. SO plays many roles in the War on Terror beyond the post-conflict, such as the prevention of failed states, and support for allied regimes against insurgents. Outside the context of the War on Terror, SO is a valuable implement in pursuing national interests. General instability exists outside the context of terrorism, as do humanitarian crises. Stability Operations allows the military to effectively address these issues when called upon.

Stabilization operations should be thought of as operations conducted in support of military ends; a phase of conflict, a part of the liberation. Carl Connetta speaks to the importance of stabilization operations in his assessment of Operation Enduring Freedom:

Effective action against terrorism depends on a unique synergy of military and non-military measures – the latter including diplomatic, humanitarian, development... efforts... military efforts should serve to guarantee non-military measures and help maintain the conditions in which they might hope to succeed. The ultimate aim and measure of success is the establishment of a self-sustaining stability that does not leak terrorism.¹⁴

A solely military solution to the War on Terror is untenable, as “in the West Bank and Gaza, the limitations of military power are evident for all to see.”¹⁵ In this exists another aspect unique to SO: civilian and military forces must operate in synergy.

Accomplishing of military goals is contingent upon civilian success. This fact might seem unsettling to the traditional conception of military operations, as dependence upon those outside the military chain of command can be seen as a liability. Be this as it may,

¹⁴ Connetta, 9.

¹⁵ Bertrand, Serge, “Fighting Islamist Terrorism – An Indirect Strategic Approach,” Salve Regina University, 4 Oct 2002. As rpt. in “Combatting [sic] Terrorism and Homeland Security,” Naval War College (NWC: 2004,) 13.

civilians must be involved in winning the War on Terror, if it is to be won. It is the military that must provide the protective umbrella for these civilian operations integral to victory, for "there can be no economic or political development without security."¹⁶

On a more general level, the problem of SO sets against each other the ideas of 'victory-then-endstate' and 'victory-in-endstate.'¹⁷ One can focus on whether or not victory is achieved, or one can focus on what victory will look like when achieved. In both Panama and the 1991 Gulf War, the US military focused on the former question at the expense of the latter.¹⁸ Commanders considered the more comfortable operational questions, and the questions about outcomes were left to the politicians or passed off to lower levels. This mentality fit well with the European theater of the Cold War: If there were to be a Third World War, any winning outcome was vastly superior to any losing outcome.¹⁹ The decision makers focused almost exclusively on achieving the victory, rather than what the victory would look like, and justifiably so. However, as the world changed, some of this comfortable mindset remained. Discounting the separate question of a future near-peer competitor, American forces far outclass the conventional forces of any potential adversary states. Defeating the military of a threat state almost can be taken as a given. The question of victory is focused upon, as well it should be, but often the question of stabilizing desired outcomes is neglected in the process. In shifting mindsets from military victory-centric to outcome-centric stabilization operations take on new importance.

History attests to the superiority of a victory of outcomes to that of a victory of only battles. In the Punic Wars, the armies of Rome were soundly trounced multiple times by the forces of Hannibal, romping in the North of Italy. Victory was soundly achieved time and again. Rome's army would be defeated, and Rome would proceed to raise another army. Eventually, one of these armies was victorious. As Rome drove on

¹⁶ Dobbins, 69.

¹⁷ On the topic of endstate, one should note that there no 'end-state' is truly permanent. In the words of Clausewitz, 'war is never final.' This is true even with a correctly handled post-conflict. End-state is then considered to be a significant period of peace and stability preceding the next conflict, which would have different causes than the original conflict. Credit to Prof. Downes-Martin for this note.

¹⁸ For an account of post-conflict planning as -an afterthought in both Iraq and Panama, refer to Flavin, William, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," Parameters: The US Army War, Vol. 33, Issue 3, 109-110.

¹⁹ With the obvious caveat that the aftermath of a conventional conflict was far more pleasant than the aftermath of a nuclear exchange.

Carthage, the Legions learned the lessons that had eluded Hannibal: their commanders saw through the conventional military victory and to the importance of end-state. After the Romans defeated the Carthaginian army, they sowed salt into the soil around Carthage. Losing their economic infrastructure, Carthage could no longer raise an army, and could no longer challenge Rome. Rome's dominance was then secured for the next few centuries. Rome ultimately won the victory in the post-conflict. These lessons from the Punic Wars can be adapted to the War on Terror. One can wait until the forces of terror assemble themselves into something that can be attacked conventionally, such as in Afghanistan, defeating each successive incarnation until eventually exhausted, just as Carthage defeated each successive incarnation of the Roman army. Alternatively, one could follow-through on the victory and destroy the fields where terror is grown: undoing the desperation that provides Al-Qaeda with raw material to fashion into homicide bombers. By facilitating political and economic development in the breeding grounds of terror, the United States 'salts the soil,' just as Rome undid the field of the Carthaginians. This 'salting the soil' occurs in the post-conflict phase of a war, whether in the figurative modern example or the literal historical example. And just as in the historical example, if the post-conflict is not won, there will be more battles to fight in the future.

For a note of nuance, the argument presented is not that faxing the Federalist papers or building suburbias will stop terror. The causes of terror are more complex than this, as attested to by Saudi Arabia, where an increase in the middle class led to an increase in funding for terror, rather than the opposite. Nonetheless, resolution of the issues that lead to terror's strength will likely occur in the partial peace of the stabilization environment.²⁰

²⁰ An argument has been advanced that there are two forms of terror, the first a directed effort to achieve attainable goals, such as in Palestine or in Northern Ireland. The second is a general effort to achieve unattainable goals, such as Al-Qaeda trying to undo the Western way of life. This form is more an external expression of domestic tensions. The argument asserts that as the Islamic world has not seen a reformation of the sort that reshaped the West in the middle of the last millennium, there is an unresolved dialectical tension between traditional ways and Western ideas, both simultaneously present in many Islamic societies. This tension is expressed in the second form of terror, lashing out at symbolic targets such as the United States in order to manifest frustration with this domestic tension. Because of repressive leaders, this dialectical tension has not been able to resolve itself into an 'Islamic Enlightenment.' A synthesis that reconciled traditional cultural values and contemporary ideals would resolve this tension, and such a synthesis could be facilitated by maintaining stability for a non-repressive Islamic Democracy as it figured out how the competing demands of culture and classic liberalism would be expressed. Regardless .

The reality of the situation remains that the United States will remain engaged in SO for the foreseeable future. The military continues to invest much of its time in the prosecution of SO, much as it has done for the last decade. In an anecdote related by Professor Ashton Carter of the Kennedy School, “[the military] spends all its worry on the A-List [WMD, et al.,] all its money on the B-List [Iraq and North Korea,] and all its time on the C-List,”²¹ which is the realm of Stability Operations. This fact is rooted in the structure of the current international system, and is unlikely to change anytime soon.

“Since the fall of the Soviet Union... the Pax Americana has reigned like the Pax Britannica of a century ago. But like the Pax Britannica, the Pax Americana has been rife with ‘savage wars of peace.’”²²

A realization of the role of SO in the spectrum of military operations has led to its inclusion in major doctrinal documents. “The US Army included in its keystone manual, FM 100-5, *Operations*, an entire chapter devoted to operations other than war... joint doctrine has followed suit in Joint Pub 3-0, *Operations*, with its own chapter discussing military operations other than war.”²³ Secretary Rumsfeld has recently made a very significant step in addressing these concerns in the redefinition of the term Stabilization Operations.²⁴ Placing MOOTW, OOTW, LIC, PK, and the host of other acronyms used to describe the lower end of the spectrum of conflict under one term is helpful. Most significant is the fact that this term is not differentiated from war. In this, SO is placed within the purview of ‘real’ military operations, those that fall under the category of ‘war’ instead of ‘non-war.’ Herein lies one solution to the problem of mindset: if the military is “uncomfortable with elevating the status of nonviolent conduct,”²⁵ then redefining such operations to be within the spectrum of conflict overcomes this objection.

SO occupies an important role within both the War on Terror, and within the overall framework of the pursuit of US foreign policy goals. It allows military interventions to hold the ground gained, going beyond mere raids to the building of

of the veracity of this argument, stabilization operations will doubtless play a large role in the prosecution of the War on Terror. Credit to Dr. Angus Ross, Naval War College, Professor of MOOTW, 26 Mar 04.

²¹ Carter, Ashton. Class notes from ISP-205, American National Security Policy, Fall 2002.

²² Fishel, 376.

²³ *Ibid.*, 374.

²⁴ Dr. Ross, Interview.

²⁵ Gentry, John, “Complex Civil-Military Operations,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 53, Issue 4.

fortifications. It needs to be taken seriously as a legitimate mission within the purview of the military. The remainder of this paper will address how to actualize this imperative.

Question #2:

What are the requirements for a successful stabilization operations solution?

When deriving requirements for successful stabilization forces, one should look first to the case studies at hand. History serves a guide for the question at hand, for *ceteris parabus*, that which has been true in the past will continue to be true. Trends can be extracted from past stabilization operations; requirements for success can be gleaned from what has and has not worked. These requirements will point the way to a stabilization operation solution.

Trend 1: Every stabilization operation is different.

When looking at a historical cross-section of stabilization operations, one immediately notices a lack of similarity between scenarios. As illustrated by Brig. Gen. John Brown, the U.S. Army's Chief of Military History, "each constabulary and each constabulary-like mission is unique. The role is carried out in a particular political, economic, social and cultural context."²⁶ The scenarios faced in Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War Two were different from any of the situations faced in the interventions of the 1990s. These scenarios, in turn, bore little resemblance to the stabilization scenarios faced in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Differences in environment, scope, goals and threat have produced the multitude of stabilization scenarios in which the United States has found itself. The mountainous environment of an Afghanistan stands in stark contrast to the forested milieu the post-war German stabilization force faced. The stabilization force used for Kosovo is dwarfed by that for Iraq, or for Japan. The goal of alleviating a humanitarian crisis in Somalia differs greatly from that of ending genocide in Bosnia, or the economic reconstruction of Iraq. The threats faced in these interventions have varied just as greatly: from terrorists, to militia, to fears of full units failing to observe a surrender. With these four factors varying somewhat independently, it is difficult to construct a one-size-fits-all solution.

Not only do stabilization operations vary greatly amongst instances, they can rapidly change while in-scenario. What once was a marginally peaceful situation can

²⁶ Brown, John, "Combat Cops," Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 138, Issue 2, 2.

deteriorate quickly to an all-out firefight. The clearest example of this is the Battle of Mogadishu, recalled in the recent film *Black Hawk Down*. A unit that cannot ratchet up their application of force could find itself outgunned. Srebrenica stands as an example of this, where Dutch peacekeepers could do nothing to stop the mass execution of Bosniac males. This in-theater fluidity can catch an inflexible force unprepared.

Requirement 1: Flexibility amongst scenarios and across spectrum of conflict.

The variance amongst and within stabilization scenarios leads to the requirement of flexibility. A stabilization force must be both vertically and horizontally flexible; they must be able to adapt for the individual scenario they face before deployment, and must adapt to changes within the scenario while deployed. As it will be difficult to find a cookie-cutter answer for stability operations, a solution must be able to take into account the differences in goals, environment, threats and scope. This solution must also be able to respond across the spectrum of conflict: when an adversary turns up the heat, it must be able to respond in kind. If the requirement of flexibility is not met, a stabilization force can become a liability rather than an asset. Flexibility is of additional use if forces used for stabilization are desired for use in combat roles. The historical example is to the forces occupying Japan in the wake of World War Two. As the Korean War unfolded, these troops were rushed to the fray. The performance of these troops was disastrous; they exhibited a fatal inability to re-adapt to conventional combat after constabulary duty.²⁷ Forces that were flexible across the spectrum of conflict would be able to readapted for conventional combat much more rapidly. History also teaches us the importance of retraining for combat capabilities. "In World War I, the regular Army units first arriving in France had a constabulary cast...[they could] not go into combat until they had thoroughly retrained."²⁸ The importance of transition between combat and constabulary roles cannot be forgotten when considering units that must perform both.

Professor Angus Ross of the Naval War College points out that the requirement of flexibility is directly at odds with the trend of technology.²⁹ As technology increases, platforms become progressively more expensive, and hence less numerous. The F-22

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁹ Dr. Ross, Interview.

stands as testimony to this.³⁰ The Royal Navy faced a similar problem in the early 1900s. As naval propulsion technology advanced, they found their numbers of ships dwindling, as with their attendant power projection capability.³¹ As the United States' front-line combat forces become leaner, some of the flexibility gained through having larger numbers is lost, and with them much specialization. Specialized skills are very important for flexibility in SO, as one situation may require a large number of Civil Engineers, another large numbers of Public Affairs, and a third Military Police. The 8th Special Forces Group in Panama attests to the importance of such units in COIN and SO. From 1963 to 1972, "[the 8th SF] developed a 'combined arms' concept... built around a Special Forces Group, [with] Civil Affairs, PSYOP, Military Police, Engineers and Medical units attached."³² As active-duty forces become leaner and more technology-dependent, the Guard and reserve must be considered for storehousing concentrations in such skills. Flexibility allows stabilization forces to respond effectively to the vast array of scenarios they will be faced with, and respond appropriately to changes in the situation in which they find themselves.

Trend 2: Successful stabilizations require a lot of troops.

James Dobbins has recently conducted a longitudinal study of American stabilization operations of the last half-century. In the resultant RAND study, he finds two major trends related to force size. First, the likelihood of success in SO increases with force size. "Many factors influence the ease or difficulty of nation-building...the most important determinant seems to be the level of effort – measured in time, manpower, and money."³³ Second, the number of casualties decreases with an increase in force size.

"There appears to be an inverse correlation between the size of the stabilization force and the level of risk. The higher the proportion of stabilizing troops, the lower the number of casualties suffered and inflicted. Indeed, most adequately manned post-conflict operations suffered no casualties whatsoever."³⁴

³⁰ Dr. Ross cites the example of the F-22, which due to its cost will cause a diminution of the total number of USAF aircraft.

³¹ Dr. Ross, Interview.

³² Fishel, 384.

³³ Dobbins, xxv.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, xxv.

This first trend seems intuitive, but the second seems a bit counterintuitive; more troops would be more targets for an insurgent. These seemingly contradictory trends are resolved in the Principle of Mass. Recalling the Principles of War, Mass directs forces to "Achieve military superiority at the decisive place and time."³⁵ This leads to victory, and usually to reduced friendly casualties. This principle holds true for SO, albeit with adaptations. Combining these trend lines with mission requirements, Dobbins discovers that one of the most significant variables for success is military presence per unit population.³⁶ The idea that 'quantity has a quality all its own'³⁷ seems to hold true in the stabilization environment. Given the rapidly appreciating returns to force size, fielding a piecemeal force creates a liability. Taken in concert with Dobbins' trend lines, the importance of numbers is established: if one is to be successful in SO, they must put forth the numbers to do so.

Requirement 2: Application of Mass

In conventional combat, the importance of the principle of mass cannot be understated. The force which concentrates their forces at a critical point will overpower their adversary. For this reason, Mass and Offensive go hand-in-hand: the strength of the attack is the ability to choose its time and place. This allows the attacker to concentrate his forces through Maneuver, and achieve local numerical superiority at the point of attack. In stabilization operations this is rarely an option: the adversary does not often coalesce into a form that can be directly attacked. As the adversary retains much of the initiative through unconventional tactics, use of the principle of Offensive is greatly restricted. Mass then cannot be achieved by concentrating force on a local level, but must instead be generally achieved on the theater-level. Counter-balancing the enemy's inherent Offensive advantage is his inherent Mass weakness. They are likely to be small in number, making it possible to overpower them through Mass even when they coalesce to attack. Returning to Dobbins, if a certain amount of forces can be maintained per unit population, destabilizing forces will be overpowered and the stabilization successful. Therefore, mass is the second requirement for a successful stabilization force.

³⁵ U.S. Army Field Manual FM-3.

³⁶ Dobbins, graph, xvii.

³⁷ Quote courtesy of V.I. Lenin.

Trend 3: Successful stabilizations are not quick.

A quick survey of recent stabilization operations reveals that few of them have been rapidly concluded. United States forces remain in Bosnia, and will be in both Iraq and Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. In post-conflict stabilization operations this especially holds true. There is never a redistribution of power that all parties are happy with, and a redistribution of power is inherent in any reconstruction. In a liberated nation, most are happier under the new order, but those who benefited under the old order will agitate against then new, precluding a rapid solution.³⁸ In one sense, post-conflict SO is the ultimate battle of attrition: the will of the stabilizing country needs to endure until reconstruction in the stabilized country reaches the desired state. This progression toward an stable conclusion involves much outside of American control, and much that requires time. As opposed to conventional warfare, where direct intervention rapidly accelerates an engagement to its conclusion, interventions in SO take far longer to have an impact. As opposed to real-time metrics such as destroyed enemy platforms, SO is more influenced by long-cycle indicators such as economic growth. Dobbins cites a minimum of five years for enforcing an enduring transition to democracy.³⁹ Policies that pan for a 'quick-fix' make it unlikely that lasting victory will be attained, and can energize opposition to the operation. "Short departure deadlines and exit strategies diminish prospects for enduring transformation."⁴⁰

In non-post-conflict SO, the long time cycle of conflict remains true. In such a scenario, an opposing force retains the luxury of time. Such a group is not confronted with the multiple competing demands that face US forces, and hence can afford to wait to see their goals accomplished. This returns to the importance of civil development, which

³⁸ Only in a situation where one person without a group backing them oppressed an entire country would the entire country be pleased with a more equitable distribution of power, and such a situation is very rare. People are more accepting of a redistribution of power when the oppressing group was very small (such as Ceausescu), or where they have been discredited (such as Germany and Japan, although these were occupations and not liberations, as the majority of the population sided with the oppressors.) With significant militant groups, especially along ethnic divisions, a quick resolution is near impossible. Cross Reference Iraq, with the Sunni losing power, with Puerto Rico, where the Spaniards lost power and hence agitated against the American occupying force. Refer to Davis, George (Military Governor of Puerto Rico), "Puerto Rico," GPO (Washington: 1900,) 19-20.

³⁹ Dobbins, xxvi.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 84.

progressively poisons the well for insurgents by providing hope. This, in turn, worsens the prospects of the adversary as time goes on. Once again, such a victory can only be achieved over a significant length of time. A stabilization force must then be structured to deal with this demand.

Requirement 3: Endurance.

Because of the time demands of the stabilization environment, a successful SO solution must incorporate endurance. SO can be accelerated to some degree, but structural factors dictate toward protracted engagement. A force built for success must be one that recognizes and incorporates this fact. Simply stated, outlasting the American forces should not be an option for the opponents of stabilization. The nature of victory in SO requires endurance: an umbrella of security must be maintained over development efforts until these efforts are successfully concluded. The nature of the enemy in SO also requires endurance: one faces an enemy with the advantage of time. Failing to meet this requirement both precludes victory and energizes the enemy. A solution that meets the needs of the Stabilization environment must be one that can keep a force in said environment until the mission is accomplished, one that potential adversaries cannot wear down. In this is the third fundamental requirement: endurance.

Trend 4: Successful stabilizations are not cheap.

The United States' recent stabilization experiences have shown how expensive stabilizations can be. The cost of stabilization operations has been borne both by the budget and by the total force. The fiscal cost of these operations can be seen in recent headlines. \$51 Billion of the recent FY2004 supplemental budget request will pay for continuing military operations in Iraq.⁴¹ Operations in Afghanistan and Bosnia, although on a smaller scale, have hardly been inexpensive. The purely monetary cost of SO is significant, but when combined with the impact of SO on the total force, the costs can become staggering.

The total force costs of SO are not at first apparent, but accumulate over time. As combat forces are used in SO, their readiness begins to decline. Time spent in SO is time not spent training for a unit's combat specialty. SO also increases operations tempo,

⁴¹ Bowman, Steve, "Iraq: US Military Operations," Congressional Research Service.

contributing to overall unit exhaustion and eventually to retention problems.⁴² An example of this is where the Army has recently been forced to send troops involved in the liberation of Iraq back to perform SO.⁴³ The costs of SO are visited on both the budget and upon force readiness. Failure to manage these costs will lead to sapping the defense budget and exhausting units.

Requirement 4: Cost efficiency.

Because of the costs associated with SO, costs efficiency must be incorporated into any solution found. A stabilization solution must not break the bank in the short term, nor sap the force in the long term. Any solution that does either of these is not sustainable.

Most military operations involve certain exchange ratios between one's own forces and their adversary. There is a story that goes something to the effect of one F-16 is worth about five MiG-23s, and a MiG-23 is about 1/5 as capable as the F-16. Therefore, if the F-16 shoots down at least 6 MiGs, you end up on top. Half a million is expensive for a surface-to-air missile, but if you shoot down a Kingfish missile and save a carrier, you end up ahead.⁴⁴ With conventional operations, the race between measure and countermeasure is financed by a nation's economy. A nation can win this race by outspending a conventional adversary.⁴⁵ The frustrating thing about an asymmetric opponent is that it's so darn hard to outspend him. Using nearly unlimited initiative and the tremendous natural advantage inherent in unconventional operations, an asymmetric opponent multiplies the effectiveness of his expenditures manyfold. Adding to this, irregular adversaries operate independent of logistics.⁴⁶ Instead of launching a fifty-thousand dollar weapon from a million dollar platform, an asymmetric attack can consist of a \$50 bomb placed by a terrorist with less than a thousand dollars worth of training. Yet to respond to that attack, allied forces must use soldiers equipped with millions of

⁴² 'Some are concerned that the Army is being squeezed so hard that soldiers will quit in droves.' "Spread Thin, Army Calling on Same Units," AP, 12 Mar 2004.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Example of an AEGIS cruiser firing a SM2ER missile at an AS-6.

⁴⁵ These exchange ratios are modified by nations' real monetary exchange ratios, efficiencies of their military-industrial complexes, ability to innovate, and force multipliers, so there is not a dollar-for-dollar exchange. But there is some adjusted rate by which a country can outspend a conventional opponent.

⁴⁶ White, Jeffery, "Some Thought on Irregular Warfare," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 39, No. 5, Center for Studies of Intelligence (Washington: 1996) As rpt. in "Foreign Internal Defense Case Study" Naval War College (NWC: 2004,) 54

dollars of technology and training, supplied by expensive logistics networks.

The cumulative cost of an American stabilization force can run into the billions. When matched against a force whose practical fielding cost is only one or two million, the lopsided asymmetric exchange ratio quickly becomes apparent. Therefore, American forces must find ways to use their resources more efficiently, while simultaneously worsening the exchange ratio for the enemy. This can be accomplished by stripping the enemy of his concealment and initiative through information superiority, as well as by drying up the enemy's sources of funds.⁴⁷

This leads back to the need for cost-effective solutions for stabilization operations. The United States can handily outspend any potential conventional adversary foreseeable in the near future. America can likely outspend an asymmetric adversary. But as the United States finds itself engaged with multiple asymmetric adversaries, the lopsided asymmetric exchange ratio starts to catch up. Stabilization forces must be cost-efficient to survive this ratio. Therefore, cost is a key criterion in creating a sustainable stabilization force.

⁴⁷ Given the exchange ratio, the adversary should be especially sensitive to losses in funds.

Question #3:

How can the U.S. military address the challenge of Stabilization Operations by modifying force structure?⁴⁸

Force Structure is a powerful tool that can be applied to the problem at hand. By adapting the structure of the total force, changes in requirements and technology have been integrated into the total force. Force structure then can be applied to the question of stabilization. These force structure options are 'top-down' solutions, from a paradigm that believes that changes at the top will lead to capabilities on the ground, and hence to mission accomplishment.

These options emphasize capabilities over threats. Threat-based approaches are appropriate for a static enemy with predictable avenues of attack. For an enemy yet to take shape in a contingency yet to occur, one must build capabilities to respond to situations as they arise. Building capabilities, rather than devising countermeasures, will allow American forces to prepare for SO. In choosing the option that maximizes capabilities, the already established requirements will serve as a guide, cross-referenced against the feasibility and individual merits of each option. Having weighed the pros and cons of these options, a recommendation should become apparent.

Option 1: Standing Constabulary Force⁴⁹

The first force structure option for the post-conflict environment is the creation of constabulary units. The idea of standing constabulary forces is not a new one, but given the absence of superpower conflict and the increased role of stability operations, this option merits serious consideration. Such a force would still be subject to troop rotation requirements, as most post-conflict situations would last longer than six months. Therefore, a constabulary force structure option would have to include multiple division-sized constabulary units. These units would be structured and trained for stabilization operations; light forces built for a low-intensity conflict environment.

These constabulary divisions would be composed of regular Army, National Guard, or reserve troops, or some combination thereof. A unit composed of active duty

⁴⁸ Refer to attached option/requirement evaluation matrix (end of packet).

⁴⁹ Refer to attached implementation chart (end of packet).

soldiers would not be subject to the same call-up constraints as a Guard/reserve unit, and could be used more often. On the other hand, a Guard/reserve constabulary unit would allow regular forces to retain their focus on traditional combat roles. Combination units have also been used in constabulary roles, stretching the training advantage of regular forces.⁵⁰

Constabulary forces would resemble light infantry units in most regards, supported by lightly armored vehicles. To meet the needs of the stabilization environment, units would incorporate large Military Police and Civil Engineering elements. Incorporating the lessons of Somalia, units could be supplemented with gunships or heavy armor. The constabulary forces would be trained in Counter-Insurgency and Peacekeeping operations. Implemented, this option would likely result in a two-division force trained, equipped and structured for the post-conflict.

Advantages: Professional post-combat expertise always on hand.

The primary advantage of this option is the creation of a permanent capability for dealing with stabilization operations. From Bosnia, to Kosovo, to Afghanistan, to Iraq, the United States has faced no shortage of a need for such operations. Having a constabulary force on hand would allow the US military to undertake such missions without using traditional combat forces. More importantly, a constabulary force would be specifically trained and equipped for stability operations, and such a force will perform better. If stability operations will continue to be necessary, it makes some sense to create a force for those operations instead of forcing traditional combat units to fit the role. With a standing force, lessons from previous operations would be incorporated into institutional memory, applying a standing professional competence to security operations.

This option keeps a force on hand ready to respond to contingencies. This quick response time is a clear advantage when surveying contingency situations such as Haiti, where a near-immediate response would be necessary if the military were to be used. With two constabulary divisions, both mass and endurance requirements will be satisfied. This would be a constabulary force of sufficient size and staying power to any challenge posed.

⁵⁰ David Segal studies attitudes of such a unit toward their mission in his "Constabulary Attitudes of National Guard and Regular Soldiers in the U.S. Army," in the Summer 1998 editions of Armed Forces and Society.

The final advantage of this option is its relative simplicity. This option, simply stated, has the least moving parts. The only transitions required are entering and exiting theater. Training and re-training is not required, nor is synthesis of unorthodox command structures. This is not to say that it would be the easiest to implement, as institutional resistance would clearly be an obstacle. However, once in place, it would procedurally be the smoothest option of those available.

Disadvantages: May get into more trouble than they can get out of, costly.

One of the challenges of the post-conflict environment is its fluidity. A relatively calm situation can rapidly degenerate into a firefight. If the intensity of a conflict ratchets up too quickly, a constabulary unit can find itself outgunned. Remembering our examples from Korea and World War I, constabulary units are notoriously bad in high-intensity conflict situations.⁵¹ One can picture a nightmare scenario wherein a constabulary unit would be embroiled in a conflict beyond their capabilities, and the consequences to which that would lead. A constabulary force could encounter problems not only with changing situations within stabilization environments, but also with different situations between stabilization environments. The in-scenario stability of this option is limited.

The between-scenario flexibility of this option is mitigated by its static structure and the differences between stabilization situations. Using conventional forces for stabilization operations may be using the proverbial square peg for a round hole, but it makes little sense to build a round peg if the next hole is going to be triangular, and the one after that diamond-shaped. Therefore, the advantages of structuring and training for stability operations can be mitigated by differences between stabilization environments. General Brown illustrates this by noting that the force used to police Germany after World War II would be of little use for anything other than securing mid-century Bavaria.⁵²

While on a unit level constabulary units free combat forces from SO duty, constabulary units cost combat forces on a larger level. Barring an increase in end strength, some combat units will have to be sacrificed in order to create constabulary forces. Therefore, this option would not particularly help in addressing problems of

⁵¹ Refer to Brown, 2.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 2.

overextension. Additionally, this option would run into a great deal of institutional resistance. Neither the culture of the US military, nor the larger culture from which it is derived, seem very suited or amenable to constabulary operations.⁵³ Institutionalizing such operations, especially when sacrificing other forces to do so, is not likely to be a popular option. Hence, the units birthed from this option are likely to see little in the way of concern or funding from within the institution of the military.

Analysis: A good option for another military or for another country.

The option of constabulary forces, on first glance seeming the most logical solution to the problem of stabilization, seems to be more of a liability than an asset. Neither another Mogadishu nor an American Srebrenica are appetizing options, which both could happen if such a force found itself outgunned in a fluid stabilization environment. On another level, this force could tie up a significant portion of the Army's end strength in units incapable of providing deterrent value or meeting the requirements of combat. Combat forces can be used in stabilization operations, but constabulary forces cannot be used effectively in combat operations.⁵⁴ If stabilization operations were seen as a main thrust of American foreign policy, then permanent constabulary forces would play an important role in the overall makeup of the US military. Several nations are considering creating pools of permanent Peacekeeping units, notably France and Germany.⁵⁵ However, barring an equivalent domestic epiphany, the niche of security operations is not sufficient to justify the creation of two to three divisions of constabulary forces and the concomitant loss in combat capability.

Option 2: Conventional Force Rotation⁵⁶

Force rotation will likely be an element in any stabilization operation involving American forces in the near future. This second option recognizes this fact, building a

⁵³ The culture from which a military is drawn in many ways shapes the character of said military. As noted by Prof. Ross, Americans are inherently optimistic, and expect a quick solution to most problems. This leads to Americans being able to solve seemingly insurmountable problems, but also leads to Americans becoming frustrated when problems drag out without solutions in sight. The latter is more often than not the nature of constabulary operations. Also refer to the previous arguments about the military's attitudes toward SO.

⁵⁴ Refer to Brown, 3.

⁵⁵ "EU Plans to Beef Up Peacekeeping," AP, 5 Apr 2004.

⁵⁶ Refer to attached implementation chart (end of packet).

training infrastructure that will make these rotations as efficient as possible. Combat units will be trained and equipped for stabilization, sent into the field to perform security operations, and then return to be retrained for combat duty. Security operations would be viewed as a normal duty requiring a specialized skill set. The burden of stabilization operations would be spread across the force, and units would be properly prepared for their mission.

A normal rotation cycle would stretch over a span of about 10 months for one deployment. A combat unit, such as an infantry or armored division, is identified for stabilization duty. That unit then spends 3 months training for their deployment as a stabilization force, cumulating in a simulated SO exercise. Concurrently, the unit would absorb detachments of personnel⁵⁷ and equipment specific to the stabilization environment. The culmination of this phase would be an exercise at the National Training Center, or at an equivalent institution designed specifically for security operations. The next 6 months would be the deployment itself, with the unit in the field performing security operations. During this time, the unit would attempt to maintain its combat proficiency with periodic training.⁵⁸ Following the deployment, the unit would return home for one month of retraining for normal combat duty. At this time, the unit would return to its original TO&E, detaching the supplemental units and equipment used for stabilization operations. Using this rotation cycle, units could be used for one stabilization tour every two to three years. This counteracts overextension problems while allowing units to maintain their primary combat proficiency.⁵⁹ Training rotations for stabilization forces should then be included in the planning for any anticipated conflict.⁶⁰

A Rapid Response Force could be integrated with this option to allow quick response to stabilization-type contingencies.⁶¹ In the early phase of such a contingency operation, a heavier force probably would be more appropriate. Use of quick response forces such as the 82nd Airborne, the 101st Airmobile, or the Marines would effectively

⁵⁷ Such as Civil Engineering, Public Affairs, and Military Police.

⁵⁸ Conversation with Mitchell McConnell, KSG MPA '05. This also provides for unit flexibility.

⁵⁹ Incorporating Guard or reserve units into this cycle allows more time between deployments.

⁶⁰ A signaling effect of the training cycle becomes possible: if stabilization forces begin training in the run-up to conflict, the United States signals its seriousness for regime change.

⁶¹ Jason Sherman suggests one form of such a force in his article "Middle March" in the Aug 2000 issue of *Armed Forces Journal International*.

fill this role. This Rapid Response Force would fill the gap between the contingency and the introduction of the long-term contingency force.

Inherent in this option is the construction of a training infrastructure and doctrinal support for security operations. A foundation can be constructed by integrating expertise from the Army Peacekeeping Institute with lessons learned from previous stability operations. America's NATO allies also have much to contribute to the development of such a foundation. The centerpiece of a security training infrastructure would be a NTC-equivalent institution for stabilization operations. Training would pit a large number of stabilization forces against a small OPFOR using unconventional tactics, including acts of sabotage and terror. This would not be without challenges, such as replicating the long time-scale of security operations in a limited time-span training exercise. Successfully implemented, experiences from such an exercise could bind together a unit as it embarks on its stabilization mission.

United Kingdom forces used a similar rotation strategy in Northern Ireland. The British...have a long tradition of rotating war fighting units through constabulary roles and back again. For almost a generation they did so to maintain a garrison in Northern Ireland. Heavy units in Germany...routinely received notice that they were going to pull a tour in Northern Ireland. Such notification initiated a highly structured program of preparations, to include visits from a Northern Ireland Training and Advisory Team, temporary storage of heavy equipment, and three months of retraining for a constabulary role. Upon their return from Northern Ireland, yet another highly structured retraining program transitioned them back to a war fighting posture.⁶²

Northern Ireland may not be the most flattering analogy with which to compare United States reconstruction efforts, but lessons learned from protracted British experience with security operations proves valuable indeed. God willing, the United States' current security operations will not be as drawn-out, but a capacity for security operations training will likely continue to be useful.

Advantages: Effective, historically proven method of burden-sharing.

Rotating forces allows one to maintain a total force focus on combat and still accomplish the increasingly required stabilization mission. Training cycles ensure that a unit is properly equipped for their mission upon arriving in-theater, and units trained for their mission invariably perform better. Retraining units back to combat status following

⁶² Brown, 2.

their deployment ensures that the focus is kept on combat; that the burdens of the stabilization mission are borne only when necessary. Creating a cycling process spreads out the load of stabilization operations, preventing single units from being overtaxed. This option then meets requirements for mass and longevity by tapping into the pool of existing forces.

While not maintaining the same level of institutional expertise as the standing constabulary force option, the troop rotation option grants a significant level of preparation to stabilization forces without nearly the same impact on the total force. The rotation option is less structurally limited than constabulary forces, as one can draw on the entire force as opposed to two or three units. The rotation option is also more responsive across the spectrum of conflict, as a combat unit would be better able to hold their own in the midst of an escalation. This option then has in-theater flexibility.

Disadvantages: Unspecialized force confused as to its identity, retraining costs.

Specialized forces are still superior to best fit forces when facing a specialized mission. It is true that combat forces perform much better at constabulary operations than constabulary forces perform at combat operations, but constabulary forces still outperform combat forces in constabulary operations. There is much to be said for a standing institutional expertise at security operations. Having such a force on hand minimizes response time, which requires a supplemental force with this option.

There are also costs associated with the training/retraining cycle. One not insignificant cost is constructing a security training infrastructure. There is also a cost in time, as the training cycle adds 4 months onto a 6 month deployment, effectually taking a unit off-line for 10 months before even considering rest requirements. Inherent in this cost is a readiness cost, as time spent on security operations is time not spent training for the unit's primary combat mission. Training costs will be much higher for units that need to train for two missions than for a unit that trains for one. In this, the monetary cost for this option is higher than the constabulary option, even though the total force cost is far lower. There are disadvantages to spreading the burden for these operations, as combat troops can be exhausted by SO deployments.⁶³ This option minimizes the total force cost associated with such operations, but is not the best-performing option.

⁶³ AP, "Spread Thin."

Analysis: Best conservative option.

This option minimizes the costs to the total force for the security mission, while giving soldiers the tools they need to succeed in the stabilization environment. Retaining a latent stabilization capacity when not needed, realizing that capacity when required, this option keeps the security mission in the Army's toolbox, without having the mission drain a disproportionate amount of resources. There is historical precedent for this option, and the resources to build the required infrastructures are at hand. Therefore, this option should be able to be implemented with only a small degree of risk. This option does have drawbacks, however: a stabilization force needs a lead-time of 3 months from call-up. This is more of a factor in contingency operations such as Haiti, than in post-conflict situations where the stabilization mission could be anticipated, such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

Option 3: Local Stabilization Forces⁶⁴

The use of non-US forces is at first glance a very attractive option. The operational burden (and the associated casualties) is borne by another, resolving many problems. This option, however, is almost entirely constrained by circumstances. The use of non-US forces is predicated on said forces' willingness to be used, a factor outside of United States' control. Although not truly a force structure option, this would serve as a substitute to such an option, and can hence be considered in the same category.

There are several flavors of the Non-US forces option, such as using local forces, using international forces, and using forces for hire. Local forces available for use following a war can be either forces from friendly factions, such as in Afghanistan, or purged formerly hostile forces, which was an option in Iraq. The local forces option is unique to post-conflict SO, while the other flavors are applicable to all SO.

Presumably, future American actions will continue to involve some sort of cooperation with other nations, and hence there will likely be some contingent of stabilization forces provided by other nations. Many of our allies have proven willing to shoulder much of the burden of peacekeeping over the last decade and a half, not least of which is Canada. In the words of Retired Canadian Army Major General Lewis

⁶⁴ Refer to attached implementation chart (end of packet).

MacKenzie, commander of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia from 1990 to 1991, "We middle powers [e.g. Canada] should be able to handle the peacekeeping duties while the U.S. maintains a deterrent force capable of fighting and winning a major war anytime, anywhere."⁶⁵ Be this as it may, this division of labor has not been realized. Iraq stands as an example to this. Even in interventions better received by the international community, the United States would likely have to do much of the SO heavy lifting. Therefore, international forces cannot currently solve the problem of stabilization operations, although it is probable that significant international forces will bolster future US stabilization efforts. This is not to minimize the importance of Allied forces in the stabilization environment. The forces are critical to sharing the burden of SO, and cooperation with other nations is essential for success in such operations. This is only to say that relying solely on international forces to perform the stabilization mission is not an effective option. Even if it were possible for the international community to take up the burden of an occupation in the wake of an American military victory, such an arrangement would bring to mind unwelcome analogies of the Roman legions and non-Roman auxiliary occupying forces.

The mercenary option brings up unpleasant connotations, and could not meet surge capacity requirements. The British used mercenaries to some effect in Sierra Leone,⁶⁶ and hired forces were employed in Kosovo,⁶⁷ but this is not a realistic solution for the problem at hand. This is not to say that contract security personnel have no role to play in SO, as some are serving effectively currently in Iraq. However, they are not an overall solution for stabilization. Our analysis then focuses on extant local forces.

Implementation and structure look very different for our two examples of local stabilization forces. If using allied forces, the challenge lies not in composition, as there are already forces at hand, but in command and control, as those forces often pursue agendas independent of the goals of the reconstruction effort. An example of this is Afghanistan, where the leaders of the loose conglomeration of Northern Alliance forces have pursued tribal goals instead of Coalition goals. The forces made available through

⁶⁵ Grange, David, "Making Peacetime Engagement Work," Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Vol. 127, Issue 7.

⁶⁶ Connaughton, 84.

⁶⁷ Incidents of security contractors running brothels add little credibility to this option.

Afghan warlords have been sizeable, but their allegiance to the goals of the Afghan government is tenuous at best. One implements this option simply by maintaining the coalition from the conflict into the post-conflict.

The challenges associated with using previously hostile forces are in many ways opposite of those faced when using previously allied forces. In order to use previously hostile forces, one must purge the command structure of elements of the former regime. All officers mid-grade and above could be replaced; alternately, officers that had surrendered or those showing loyalty to the new government can be retained. Either way, the spirit of the former regime can be exorcized from the forces it previously commanded. PSYOPS can be of use in this endeavor, as it has done in Panama in the wake of Operation Just Cause. "PSYOPS had an important contribution to make [in] training them to think and act in ways respectful of human rights and democratic government."⁶⁸ In this, the challenge becomes composition rather than command. As the command echelons are chosen by the reconstruction authority, the question then becomes the troops placed under those commanders, and their willingness to follow orders. At the very least, orders would be implemented less effectively in a defeated force of conscripts compared to a professional force simply due to different levels of training and motivation.

Advantages: Inexpensive force familiar with territory with unlimited endurance.

Using local forces provides the reconstruction authority a large number of troops rapidly ready to provide some degree of stability. The efficacy and the loyalty of these troops may be in question, but they can be used with some effectiveness against major security problems. This option meets the security need using less U.S. forces, relieving some overdeployment issues, and likely reducing U.S. casualties. Local forces will likely be numerous, so the mass requirement will be met. Their on-station endurance is unlimited, as they serve in the same environs as they live. Their cost is low, especially when compared to a deployment of American troops. There is also merit to forces of foreign nationals providing security for their country, both in terms of reducing the American footprint, and in terms of transition to end-state.

⁶⁸ Shultz, Richard, *In the Aftermath of War*, Air University Press, (Maxwell AFB, 1993,) As rpt. in "Combatting [sic] Terrorism and Homeland Security," Naval War College (NWC: 2004,) 58.

It is important to note that this option has merit even if not chosen for a force structure replacement option. In the case of extant friendly forces, involving such forces in the transition security situation may be necessary simply to bring the commanders of these forces, and the tremendous political leverage they wield, under the aegis of the transitional government. On the other hand, purging and maintaining a previously hostile army can stabilize a situation by managing the economic and political shock of demobilizing such a force. Releasing a large number of now unemployed young men into an unstable situation may not be the best idea. In the wake of Operation Just Cause, the new Panamanian government realized that "it could not afford to disenfranchise 10 or 15 thousand ex-[Panama Defense Force] members, whose only skills consisted of beating up people and pulling triggers."⁶⁹ It should be noted that in Japan stands in contrast to Panama, in that the Japanese was disbanded in the wake of war without overly significant ill effects. Maintaining a defeated army is a good way to manage conscripts' re-entry into society. At the same time, it is easier to keep track of a conscript than a civilian, and keeping the force around allows keeping tabs on likely to cause problems. If unreliable for security functions, these forces could be put to work in the fields of humanitarian relief or economic reconstruction.

Disadvantages: Serious impediment to reform in the long-run, unreliable.

This option arms factions resistant to serious reform, setting them up as the providers of security and wielders of significant power before survivable democratic institutions can be established. This can have serious consequences for long-term reform efforts. This can be seen in Afghanistan, where the many of the population see the warlords as the largest impediment to serious change.⁷⁰ As already mentioned, the loyalty and efficacy of such units can be questioned. As recently as 23 April 2004, forces under the command of a warlord were engaged in combat with Afghan government forces.⁷¹ Such incidents remove much of the luster from this option.

Creation of these forces may not actually be possible. Situations can be imagined in which friendly forces are unwilling to help in post-conflict security, or where formerly hostile forces are too intertwined with the former regime to be purged. As such, this is a

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 46.

⁷⁰ Refer to "Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords," Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Jun 2002.

⁷¹ "Afghanistan Vows to Disarm Warlords after Major Fighting Kills Cabinet Minister," AP, 23 May 04.

very inflexible, as it is contingent upon external factors. Instead of having forces adaptable to the situation at hand, this option assumes that the forces at hand will match the situation. This is anathema to flexibility, as a solution should adapt to the problem, instead of hoping a problem comes in a form suitable to the solution.

Analysis: Good option if practical, but too inconsistent and unreliable to depend on.

Fundamentally, this option is almost entirely reliant upon conditions outside the control of United States policymakers. Therefore, this option can not be depended upon as a primary force structure equivalent option for post-conflict stabilization operations. There are situations where using local forces is the best option, and in these cases local forces should be used. However, a force structure option must build capability rather than address specific contingencies. Building capability implies consistency, which is where this option falls short. In this, a capabilities-based approach supercedes a threat-based approach: building capabilities addresses contingencies in the various forms in which they arise, building countermeasures hopes that problems arrive consistent with the assumptions about the threat. The latter approach is a better choice for well-defined situations, the former more appropriate to a world where our enemies hide in crevices and coalesce only to strike. This option is fundamentally a countermeasure to security problems given certain conditions in the security environment. Therefore, it should be employed as such: when conditions allow for the use of effective and reliable local forces, such forces should be given much thought. While this is a good countermeasure to instability, it is not a reliable means of building a capability for stabilization operations, and hence is not a good force structure option.

Option 4: Security Cadre / Force-As-Required⁷²

Emphasizing the transformational over the conventional, this option creates a virtual stabilization force. When not deployed, this force exists as a cadre and command structure of officers and senior NCOs specialized in security operations. When needed, however, flesh is attached to this skeletal unit in the form of National Guard and Reserve troops. Training forges this entity into a division sized stabilization unit, ready to perform the security mission. An ambitious option, the force-as-required creates a

⁷² Refer to attached implementation chart (end of packet).

standing professional expertise at stability operations without the associated total force cost. If implementable, this would reduce the drain on combat units while performing very effectively in security operations. The devil is always in the details, though; although vast benefit could be realized from this force, the implementation difficulties are certain to be high. Yet, were it to succeed, it would show the success of transformational thinking in addressing traditionally low-tech problems.

This unit can exist in either a virtual state, comprised of the command cadre, or an activated state, as a full-fledged stabilization unit. Given a 'two-state' unit, transitions between states become important. An operation cycle for this unit contains both a 'realization' process, where it transitions from a virtual to an activated state, and a 'deactivation' process, where it returns to the virtual state.

A typical operational cycle would start with the identification of Guard/reserve units to attach to the Force-as-Required (FAR). To avoid 'cold-calling' units, selected units in the National Guard and reserve could be designated as candidates for this process. These units would have spent some of their peacetime training with the FAR cadre either on stability operations, or on FAR integration. The identified units would fill in the cadre, with the units of the cadre providing command, and the Guard/reserve units providing manpower. The cadre would be composed of officers from field grade to the division command level, and their respective senior NCOs. Skills used by the Special Forces, such as training local forces and understanding local cultures, would find great use in such a cadre. A smattering of Captains and Sergeants would be included to serve as advisors to the Guard/reserve units. Guard/reserve units would be directly integrated from the O-3 level down, with the upper layers of command replaced by the cadre. In doing so, the essential link between the company grade officers, the sergeants, and the troops is maintained.

Following identification and assimilation of Guard/reserve units, the FAR would train for two months stateside, similar to the force rotation option. This time would both prepare the FAR for their mission and forge the FAR into one unit. This training, as with the rotation option, would culminate in a NTC-type exercise in stability operations. Following this, the FAR would conduct security operations in theater. The unit would stay in theater until operations concluded by using a brigade rotation process, to be

described later. Following the successful conclusion of operations, the FAR returns home for the deactivation process. The Guard/reserve units reattach to their original commanders, and undergo a brief retraining cycle, and the FAR returns to a virtual state.

Brigade rotation allows the FAR to stay on station as long as required, a significant advantage given the longevity of most security operations. The FAR, in its virtual state, has a command structure for six different brigades. When activated, the FAR would deploy as a division with three of these brigades. As the FAR division was being deployed, the first replacement brigade would begin its realization process. After two months, the newly trained replacement brigade would swap out with one of the currently deployed brigades. Concurrently, the second replacement brigade would begin realization and the replaced brigade would begin deactivation. With the Guard/reserve forces cleaved, the replaced brigade's cadre would recover from the deployment. At any given time, one brigade would be realizing, three activated brigades would be in the field, one brigade would be deactivating, and one virtual brigade would be recovering, incorporating its lessons learned into tactics and doctrine. There would be a transition every two months, with each activated brigade spending six months in the field. Sustainable surge capacity for the FAR would lengthen the stay of the activated units to eight months, and would cut out the recovery step from the rotation. Cadre endurance would become the limiting factor, as their recovery time would be the two months of the deactivation process, which requires less from the cadre. As the Guard/reserve units cleaving from the cadre in deactivation would not be the same units attaching to the cadre in the next realization cycle, the Guard/reserve forces would not be as limiting a constraint. The FAR could deploy all six brigades in a total effort, but this is not advisable if there is any expectation of sustained operations.

The FAR concept relies upon the cadre building and maintaining professional expertise in stabilization operations without being in direct command of troops. Liberal use of wargaming and computers could replicate to some degree the command experience on the field grade level. Exercises conducted with Guard/reserve forces periodically would also build professional expertise, as would exercises conducted through institutions such as the Canadian Pearson center. The absorption and cleaving phases are

also critical, and the advisory Captains and Sergeants in the cadre serve as facilitators in this process, a link between the attaching forces and the cadre.

There are clearly some personnel issues to be resolved with this option. First is the issue of attracting people to serve in the cadre: it would likely be seen as inglorious to command a unit comprised of no one. However, if such jobs came billeted as a command position, candidates could likely be found.⁷³ There are also structural issues with the Guard/reserve forces. Arguments have been made for making the Guard and reserve more modular,⁷⁴ but the structure of the National Guard is well beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, commanders do not usually enjoy being relieved of command, so one challenge for the FAR is the disposition of the displaced Guard/reserve commanders.

This option is the most transformational model at hand. This is a cadre around which a force is built to match the situation at hand; a force that costs little when unused yet still builds professional expertise, a unit that adapts its structure while in the field to meet deployment constraints. This unit puts on and takes off physical capabilities as necessary, yet maintains a base of information, knowledge and expertise. Building a reflection phase into the deployment cycle allows mid-course doctrinal changes, implemented with the newly deploying and fielded units. This option leverages American information superiority, United States professional military expertise, and the adaptability of American forces into a flexible, capabilities-based unit.

Advantages: Flexible, transformational force: Low cost professional expertise.

This force can provide effective security forces at a low cost to the military's combat readiness. The FAR does not need to maintain several complete constabulary divisions when not needed, making it cheaper than standing constabulary forces. At the same time, the FAR replicates the professional security operations expertise of a constabulary force. The FAR then combines the best aspects of the force rotation option

⁷³ One example of this is the USAF Academy Air Officer Commanding program. An officer is in command of a squadron of cadets, and in this position gets to 'check the box' for having been a Squadron Commander. This is unusual, in that most AOCs are Captains or Majors, and most Squadron Commanders are Lieutenant Colonels. As such, the AOC assignment went from a career-killer to a career-enhancer. For the FAR example, officers at an appropriate pay grade who would not likely receive traditional command billets but who still showed initiative and leadership would be the likely fill these billets. In this, they would be able to 'check' the command box and hence continue their career, when they might otherwise not be able to. This would provide motivated officers, but not siphon from traditional units.

⁷⁴ Such as making the fundamental unit level of these forces the company or the battalion, so that they could attach where necessary to conventional forces. Class discussion, ISP-207.

with the constabulary force model. It meets mass and endurance requirements though having a large number of troops consistently on-station.

The FAR has an added flexibility advantage: it can construct itself to fit almost any stabilization environment. Given the tremendous differences in composition between stabilization forces used in the past, this is a very significant consideration. The virtual FAR can determine a TO&E appropriate to the situation it is to enter, and realize itself accordingly. This force will then be tailor-made to its mission. The constabulary force and the rotated force can adapt to their environment by taking on supplemental units, but a purpose-built solution is better than an adaptation. The traditional TO&E of the previous two options cannot match the on-demand TO&E of the FAR. It is important to note that there is a three month lag between the construction and the deployment of the force. This means that the situation for which the force is optimized could be different from the situation the force is deployed into, contingent upon changes over those three months. The FAR offers cost-efficient, effective forces flexible enough to meet almost any stability requirement.

Disadvantages: Possible overreach: Serious implementation problems.

A force that looks good on paper can perform poorly in the field. Overreaching beyond one's capabilities can end a program, or end lives. As already alluded to, the primary problem with this option is implementation. This option will fail if the cadre and Guard/Reserve personnel cannot be made into one coherent unit during the training period. This option will also fail if the cannot maintain a professional competence at security operations. This could occur because of personnel issues, such as an inability to attract qualified officers. Also, if the cadre is unable to train when not deployed, they will not acquire said professional competence.

This force also depends upon outside planning, and requires up to three months lead time before deployment. The force is then somewhat chronologically inflexible. Should a contingency arise where a response was needed in the very-short-term, this force would be ill-equipped to respond. As also mentioned, the lag time also limits the flexibility of this force. The situation on the ground many change greatly over the course of three months and a force tailored for one mission cannot easily be readapted to another

mission. However, complementing this option with a Rapid Reaction Force as in the Rotation Option would resolve the response time issue.

Conclusion: Most ambitious option: If feasible, an outstanding option.

This force leverages technology, information superiority, and advanced command and control into a low-cost, highly-effective security force. That is, if it can in fact be implemented, which is a very significant 'if.' If the challenges associated with this option can be overcome, this would be the best force structure option. Its most significant liability, its slow response time, can be overcome with planning in most interventions. This is not the right force for exigent scenarios requiring an immediate response, but in those circumstances other forces could be used. Often, such situations require a force to 'kick in the door,' a mission a stabilization force would not be suited for regardless. This option is appropriate for post-conflict Iraq, Afghanistan and Bosnia, but would not have been useful were American forces to have been used in the recent crisis in Haiti.

Option 5: Muddle Through.

Turning from the most transformational to least, this option is the ever present choice not to decide. There is a good chance that American forces would find a way to accomplish the stabilization mission without any major structural reforms. Forces on hand can be used to occupy territory following a conflict, as was done in Iraq following Operation Iraqi Freedom. As troops must still be rotated, units would be swapped in and out. Mid-course updates would be made, tactics evolved as US forces adapted to their environment. The essence of this option is to make do with what you have on hand without making any major structural or doctrinal changes.

This somewhat murky option can be implemented with either regular units or reserve/Guard units. Supplemental forces could be attached to said units, enhancing relevant capabilities using extant forces. Through the requisition process, *ad hoc* technological solutions can be found for unanticipated problems. Some level of training can also be provided before or during deployment. This option precludes building long-term structures for the stabilization mission, but depends on interim training & equipping solutions.

This option has been pursued in different forms by the United States over the last decade and a half. In Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as in post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, this course has met with varying degrees of effectiveness. In these deployments, different units and different tactics have been applied to the security mission. However, through all of these situations significant force structure changes have been consistently avoided.

Advantages: Requires the least changes, easiest course in the short-term.

This option requires the least investment into infrastructure and the least restructuring. It would likely encounter the least institutional resistance. In the short-term, muddling through could be the cheapest option. Also in the short-term, this option costs the least actual combat capacity. No units are permanently retasked and no units are doubly purposed to stability operations and combat operations. The course requires no time to implement. Mass and endurance requirements can likely be met by scouring available forces. This option is not the most effective, but it will likely suffice in the short term.

Disadvantages: Not a good long-term option: Inefficiencies compound on each other.

That which is cheapest in the short-term is often the most expensive in the long-term. Planning for likely contingencies is cheaper and more effective than *ad hoc* solutions. That is, if those contingencies materialize. While the immediate cost to the overall force is negligible, the overall cost after repeated stability operations begins to multiply. Units lose their skills in their combat specialties, unit morale deteriorates, and retention becomes a problem. The burden of stabilization operations is not effectively spread out through the force, and little specialization is gained to be applied to such operations. Over the long-term, the costs for this option become prohibitive, as repeated stabilization deployments exhaust combat units. This option is inflexible, as it relies on whatever is on-hand, and available forces may not fit the situation at hand.

Analysis: A good option if not planning on more stability ops. Not good otherwise.

This is the correct choice if the current stability operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, or Bosnia are the last major stability operations that the military will face. If not, however, this option falls short. It seems on some level that each stabilization operation

has been approached as 'the last one.' None of them have been. And after the conclusion, if that is the right term, of each stabilization operation, troops remain. This is not a mission the military is likely to escape any time in the near future. As such, muddling through is unattractive, and becomes more so with each stability operation.

This seems to be the option selected by the Roman Empire in its latter days. Focusing on the conventional strength of the legions, the Romans faced enemies that rarely condensed into a conventional form that could be engaged by the legions. The legions found themselves deployed in constabulary actions, and their strength was siphoned, until at some point they could no longer defend Rome. The conventional enemy that the legions were built for never appeared, and unconventional forces sapped the strength of the once-mighty empire.⁷⁵

Recommendation: Option 2: Best Conservative, Option 4: Most Ambitious

A 'top-down' solution can do much to solve the problem of stabilizations. Force structure solutions directly address mass, endurance and cost requirements, and greatly impact requirements for flexibility. Returning to the recommendations, the second and fourth options have the most to offer. Constabulary forces, while a good idea, would cost too great a portion of the Army's end strength to implement effectively. The force structure substitute of using local forces, while offering many advantages, is fundamentally dependent on circumstances beyond United States' control, and is hence unreliable. Muddling through has become less pleasant, and more costly, as time has progressed: it is not a sustainable long-term solution. The second option, force rotation, provides satisfactory mass, flexibility and endurance at manageable cost. It is then the best risk-averse option. It meets the requirements for success and can be reliably implemented. This leaves option four, the Force-As-Required. This option exceeds force rotation in mass, flexibility, and endurance at lower cost. However, implementation of this option would be difficult. The Force-As-Required is then the best ambitious option. Contingent upon risk preferences, options two or four should effectively address the problems of the stabilization environment from a top-down perspective.

⁷⁵ Interview with Prof. Ross, NWC.

Question #4:

How can the U.S. military address the challenge of Stabilization Operations by optimizing force packages?

Complementing the top-down force structure options are bottom-up organic solutions. Instead of modifying force structure, these initiatives optimize force packages. In doing so, they add to the flexibility and overall effectiveness of any force used in SO. Encompassing equipment, composition and training, these solutions are independent of force structure options. They are intended as stand-alone ideas to complement the overall SO strategy and force structure.

The security environment presents tremendous adaptive challenges to any unit. The threats one faces are difficult to quantify; in stability operations there are no enemy tank companies to be destroyed. The objectives one contends for are equally elusive; there is no capital city to take, there are rarely machine gun nests to charge. The enemy compensates for his weakness by fighting by his own rules. A battle is reckoned a victory or defeat by the media, or by civilians, rather than by any objective military standard. In Mogadishu, American soldiers held against vastly superior numbers, losing 18 of their own in exchange for approximately 1,000 enemy combatants.⁷⁶ In many other contexts, this would have been counted as a victory, or at least a draw. Yet, by almost all recollection, this is considered a significant defeat. As a precursor to this, the Tet offensive was by operational standards a victory for American forces, yet was also considered a defeat. Although the American populace accepts casualties in a conventional war, it does not to nearly the same degree in stabilization operations. Dissention on the homefront during SO energizes the adversary, leading to more attacks and more casualties. As casualties feed said dissention, losses must be absolutely minimized. Yet at the same time, a very risk-adverse posture will ensure that the stabilization mission fails. If United States forces hole up in enclaves and never venture forth for fear of casualties, they will almost certainly be unsuccessful in providing security, and will hence invite more attacks. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan speaks to this fact.

⁷⁶ "Battle of Mogadishu," Wikipedia, www.wikipedia.org.

Hence, two conflicting directives remain: minimize casualties and aggressively pursue the mission. However, this is not an unfamiliar paradox; in conventional operations, the force that minimizes their losses will likely win, the defense takes fewer losses than the attack, yet the army who does not attack will surely lose. Strategists must then face this paradox in security operations in the same way that it is faced in conventional operations. The military must leverage its technological superiority, draw from the strength of our fighting forces, and employ our superiority in training. In doing so, the military can create a force resistant to losses, yet able to aggressively pursue their mission; a force able to accomplish the stabilization mission.

Equipment: Provide technological solutions to asymmetric threats.

The technological superiority of the United States has long been applied to conventional operations. The use of information technology, force multipliers and network centric warfare ensures the United States military is second-to-none. The effects of this revolution can be seen in the last Gulf War, where networked forces defeated a conventional adversary with astonishing speed. This can also be seen in Afghanistan, where Special Forces were able to leverage airpower in concert with Northern Alliance forces to win a semi-conventional war in short order. It stands to reason that American technological superiority could revolutionize stabilization operations in the same way.

Networking forges allied units into one cohesive actor, acting many places at once in the pursuit of one goal. This can be directly applied to the stabilization arena. The fog of war can actually intensify in the aftermath of conflict, with the remnants of opposing forces hiding in the dust before it settles. This is particularly true if there is organized opposition to Allied forces, such as terror networks. Such organizations strike from this fog, forcing Allied forces to remain on the defensive. Information technology disperses this fog, just as it does in conventional conflict. This can be done networking units together with reconnaissance and intelligence assets. There are specific requirements unique to the SO environment, "including geography, ecology, history, ethnicity, religion, and politics. These are not topics to which the military intelligence community devotes much attention."⁷⁷ Therefore, these assets should be supplemented in order to give them a better grasp of these factors. This could be done by identifying individuals with

⁷⁷ White, 51.

relevant skills from academia or from immigrant communities, and recruiting them for the reserves. Additional skills could be adapted from the civilian world to the stabilization arena, such as applying crime analysis techniques to terror attacks.

The difficult in SO is not in having too little information, but rather in having too much information. This is in many ways an opposite challenge than conventional networking. The pieces of the puzzle are there, they are just lost in the noise. Network centric SO must then focus on synchronizing and parsing information. Ideally, network centric SO would be able to identify attacks as they materialize, and link this information to units which would then prevent the attack or mitigate its damage. On the offensive side, high-value targets and nodes could be identified and intercepted on very short notice, with information collected, rapidly processed, and linked to appropriate units. In this, all the aspects of Network Centric Warfare are employed: robust networks lead to shared situational awareness, shared situational awareness leads to synchronization, and synchronization leads to mission accomplishment.⁷⁸

Network analysis can also be applied to the adversary, identifying critical nodes in his organization. This is much more effective at piecemeal attacks against the enemy's strikers, as strikers are usually replaceable. Additionally, terror networks tend to have low information bandwidth, as one's connections are limited to prevent 'rolling back' of the organization upon capture. Therefore, Allied forces have bandwidth superiority, with much larger amounts of information exchanged between units. Aggressively targeting the critical nodes of the enemy's networks greatly diminishes the enemy's ability to coordinate or to use information to attack critical targets. By minimizing the enemy's bandwidth, he is forced into piecemeal attacks, unaided by intelligence.

The more complete the picture becomes, the less initiative the enemy retains. As initiative is his primary strength, denying it to the enemy saps him greatly. The degree of prescience gained through information superiority mitigates the effectiveness of enemy attacks, while allowing Allied forces to effectively attack the enemy. The *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* cites military intelligence as a key factor in overcoming

⁷⁸ Refer to "Network Centric Warfare (Executive Summary,)" DoD Report to Congress, 27 Jul 2001.

insurgencies.⁷⁹ As organized opposition in SO usually arrives in the form of insurgencies, this applies directly to the situation at hand. The side that wins the information war in SO is usually the side that wins the whole war, just as in conventional combat.

Technology can also be employed outside of networks to counteract threats. One example of this is equipping soldiers and vehicles with bomb detection technology. Weapons designed for urban combat could find use in SO, as could non-lethal weapons. The conflict in Vietnam saw the use of technology to counteract asymmetric threats. One example of this is a device employed by aircraft to detect the ignition of automobile engines, used to locate vehicles on the Ho Chi Minh trail. Also used were sailplanes and night vision goggles.⁸⁰ Sensor technology can be used to trace networks, possibly by attaching tracking technology to suspect personnel or vehicles. The use of technology can counteract the enemy's inherent advantage in initiative. Stripped of this advantage, the enemy cannot contend with the conventionally superior Allied forces.

Non-lethal weaponry also serves a role, allowing Allied forces to achieve objectives with a minimum of force, and hence a minimum of repercussions. This weaponry adds to response options, as soldiers will then be able to respond in kind to low-intensity hostilities, instead of having to choose between harsh language and bullets. Technology can then provide flexibility in the stabilization environment.

Composition: Identify and build stabilization-specific skills.

A military's comparative advantage is borne out of the nature of the society form which it is drawn. America's military is fortunate to draw from a pool of highly skilled and intelligent individuals. In the active duty, this is expressed in a professional force able to rapidly absorb training. In the reserves and the National Guard, this can be found in the plethora of skills amongst reservists and Guardsmen. Many of these skills can and are put to good use in a military context. The US military must then look to the skills and abilities of our soldiers for SO solutions. In developing stabilization-specific skill sets, US forces reap flexibility; in providing SO familiarity, they bolster capacity.

⁷⁹ *Guide To The Analysis of Insurgency*, Connetta, Carl, As rpt. in "Foreign Internal Defense Case Study," Naval War College (NWC: 2004,) 13.

⁸⁰ GPS was used in the first Gulf War to overcome the enemy's inherent advantage in knowing the territory. Technology can be used in a similar way in unconventional conflict.

Active Duty personnel could be assigned a Secondary Stabilization MOS.⁸¹ Although stabilization operations are very different from conventional operations, there is still significant overlap between skill sets. "A tank gunner could also be a water-purification operator, for example, or an infantry sergeant a constable."⁸² Skills such as Civil Engineering or Security Forces are directly transferable. Implementing this program, soldiers would be provided occasional familiarization training in their Secondary MOS. This training would allow them to learn the requisite skills more rapidly when needed. Another option would be to train soldiers completely in their Secondary MOS, but this would require a much more significant investment of time, and would incur a commensurate cost in combat readiness. By creating a pool of latent capabilities, the total force gains flexibility for SO.

A similar concept can be applied to the National Guard and the Reserve. Reservists and Guardsmen perform many valuable duties, both as soldiers and as civilians. Some of the skills of the latter can be applied to the former, especially in the field of SO. Police officers, civil engineers, media personnel and tradesmen come immediately to mind, and many other skills could find a place under the rubric of stabilization. Identification and categorization of these skills would create a pool of skills in the Guard and the reserves applicable to the problem at hand. Guard and Reserve forces would hone these skills in their civilian trade, a significant advantage over Active Duty forces which must train to acquire these skills.

This concept can also be applied to National Guard and Reserve recruiting. By targeting careers with skills applicable to stability operations, the Army can grow its pool of stabilization skills. By concentrating these skills in the Guard and Reserve, the capabilities will be at hand when needed, at relatively low cost to the total force. In this, the Guard and Reserve could serve as a toolbox for the total force, the keeper of specialized skills relevant to specific circumstances. When required, these skills would be integrated into units assigned to the stabilization mission. When not, the bearers of these skills would continue to refine them through their civilian practice. The

⁸¹ Idea adapted from Brown, 3.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 3.

development of such skills and capabilities provides flexibility to decision-makers when facing the problem of stabilization.

Civilian police (CIVPOL) have been used to good effect in the past to supplement military stabilization operations. Such forces have been used to good effect in Haiti⁸³ and Kosovo.⁸⁴ Creating a reserve force of CIVPOL should be considered to supplement military forces. CIVPOL's comparative advantage is in the lower reaches of the spectrum of violence, where the military is less adept. Such a force adds to stability by integrating expertise not inherent to the military. This initiative has been implemented by European militaries, taking various forms in the Italian Carabinieri, the French Gendarmerie, and the Spanish Guardia Civil.⁸⁵

Training: Provide skill and experience with a SO training infrastructure.

When one prepares for a situation well before hand, they find they have more options when the situation is at hand. In the same vein as capabilities, training provides flexibility. In order to effectively train forces for SO, the military must create an infrastructure for both theory and application. Stabilization strategy and tactics must be developed, and units must be trained in their application. This training infrastructure must then include a doctrinal element and an operational element.

Doctrine is required if one is to effectively prosecute a mission, forces cannot be expected to simply 'make it up as they go along.' Yet in creating doctrine for a mission, the military acknowledges that mission is legitimately within its purview. There seems to be a fear that in building robust stabilization doctrine, the military will then legitimize it as a mission, and find themselves continually tasked with it. This may or may not be true, but in the absence of robust doctrine the military has nonetheless been continually tasked with this mission. As noted in the first section of this paper, SO will likely continue to be a large part of what the American military does. SO is critical to consolidating what gains are made through conventional military action. It has a very significant role to play in pursuing strategic ends in the War on Terror. Doctrine gets written for what the military considers to be important. In the context of the War on Terror, SO is important. Positive steps have been taken, from the reterming of Stabilization Operations, to the

⁸³ See Dobbins, 76.

⁸⁴ See *Ibid.*, 119, 120.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 120.

incorporation of SO into FM 100-5, and Joint Pub 3-0. However, these steps must be supported by a doctrinal infrastructure in order to create the robust doctrine required for success.

Building from institutions like the Army's Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations Institute (PKSOI), such a doctrinal infrastructure can be created. As already mentioned, the Canadian expertise in Peacekeeping can be put to good use in both doctrine and operations. Doctrine is of no use without inculcation, which requires establishments for both training and exercises.

The historical precedent for training institutions for SO was established in the wake of the Second World War. "[The military authority] established a school to train soldiers on constabulary duties."⁸⁶ This precedent can be adapted to modern training techniques in a National Training Center-equivalent institution for SO. The plan for such an institution has already been outlined in the Force Rotation option. This institution would form the hub for SO operational training infrastructure. This concept has been applied to conventional warfare at length. Col. Richard Suter developed Red Flag out of the idea that if most pilots are lost on their first 10 missions, then conducting those missions in a training environment will save lives.⁸⁷ Col. Suter's concept likely holds true for Stability Operations. A soldier's first interaction with a suspicious package or person may very well be their last if they do not know what to look for. A sense for detecting dangerous situations can save a soldier's life. A NTC-equivalent center would develop that sense, ensuring that troops had personal experience in a hostile stabilization scenario. With this center as the keystone for an operational training infrastructure, supported in turn by a doctrinal infrastructure, troops will be effectively prepared to face hostile stabilization situations.

Optimizing force packages for SO provides a commander tasked with this mission with more flexibility and capability. 'Bottom-up' solutions enhance capabilities on the unit level, under the assumption that improvements become cumulative and progress toward mission accomplishment. In this, American forces leverage their advantage in technology, composition and training to face the challenges posed by SO. Technology

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁸⁷ "Red Flag," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/red-flag.htm>

helps to mitigate the advantages posed by the enemy's asymmetric strategies.

Composition provides American forces with skills from which to draw to meet any situation and hence flexibility. Training capitalizes upon the inherent American human capital advantage. These options then complement any force structure option, providing powerful unit-level adaptations for SO.

Conclusion

SO occupies a very significant role in the pursuit of American security policy goals, and in the prosecution of the War on Terror. It should then be considered as a 'real' military mission, occupying the lower reaches of the spectrum of conflict. This mission has specific requirements, notably mass, flexibility, endurance, and cost efficiency. The challenges of this mission can be met through a combination of force structure solutions and force package optimizations. Conventional Force Rotation is the safest force structure solution, as it meets all requirements for success in SO, and is readily implementable. The Force-As-Required performs better than Conventional Force Rotation, but implementation of this option would be much more problematic.

Complementing this solution, American forces can use technology to overcome asymmetric threats, through networking and countermeasures. By building specialized stabilization skills into combat forces commanders gain more flexibility. Training forces for the challenges they will face in the stabilization environment equips them for success. Through the application of these initiatives to the force structure solution outlined, the military can effectively engage the problem of stability operations. In doing so, the military faces the challenges of the next decade head-on, able to effectively prosecute the War on Terror and other national interests intertwined with the stabilization environment.


Options/Requirements Matrix

(red-to-green progression indicates favorable-to-unfavorable,
* indicates major reservations)


REQ'TS OPTIONS	1) Flexibility	2) Mass	3) Endurance	4) Cost Efficiency
1) Standing Constabulary Force	<i>Fair</i> – Expertise, but not 'cookie-cutter.'	<i>Good</i> – Number of forces ready to respond.	<i>Good</i> – Rotating 2 divs. gives longevity.	<i>Poor</i> – Significant portion of total force.
2) Force Rotation [Best conserv.]	<i>Fair</i> – Appropriate forces can be selected.	<i>Good</i> – Large amount of forces accessible.	<i>Good</i> – Spreads burden among force.	<i>Fair</i> – Double training for two missions.
3) Local Stabilization Forces	<i>Unacceptable</i> – Reliance upon external troops for stabilization.	<i>Good*</i> – Contingent upon available forces.	<i>Excellent</i> – Unlimited endurance.	<i>Excellent</i> – With adequate high level forces.
4) Force-As-Required [Most ambitious]	<i>Good</i> – Can adapt self to circumstances.	<i>Good</i> – Expands to meet requirement.	<i>Good</i> – Unlimited on-station in theory.	<i>Good</i> – Dual-mode force saves costs.
5) Muddle Through	<i>Poor</i> – Forces may not be prepared.	<i>Fair</i> – Makes use of on-hand forces.	<i>Fair</i> – Contingent on available forces.	<i>Excellent*</i> – Low short-term, high long term.

<i>Excellent</i> – Exceeds requirement.
<i>Good</i> – Completely meets requirement.
<i>Fair</i> – Mostly meets requirement.
<i>Poor</i> – Falls significantly short of req't.
<i>Unacceptable</i> – Completely fails to meet requirement.
Major reservations on assessment.


Timeline for Option 1: Standing Constabulary Force (Initial Deployment for Stabilization Operations)




Timeline for Option 2: Stabilization as Normal Rotation (Initial Deployment for Stabilization Operations)



Timeline for Option 3: Local Stabilization Forces (Initial Deployment for Stabilization Operations)



Timeline for Option 4: Force-as-Required (Initial Deployment for Stabilization Operations, Non-Surge)



* * * *

Acknowledgements:

The author would like to thank all the people who gave their time to help me complete this paper.

- **Dr. Stephen Downes-Martin, for finding interviews and materials, and generally being very helpful,**
- **Dr. Ash Carter for his suggestions on how to proceed,**
- **Dr. Monica Toft for her advice and editing tips,**
- **Dr. John White for his time and analysis of the situation,**
- **Dr. Angus Ross for his time and insights,**
- **Luc Caltrider, David Wu, Alejandro Yepes, and Kate Kohler for editing.**

Dave Blair, 8 Apr 2004.