USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

IS THE REQUIREMENTS GENERATING SYSTEM GETTING THE 'NEEDED' RESOURCES TO THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS?

by

Lieutenant Colonel William A. Kolakowski
United States Air Force

Dr. Craig Bullis
Project Advisor

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE **03 MAY 2004**	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED **-**
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE **Is the Requirements Generating System Getting the 'Needed' Resources to the Combatant Commanders?**		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) **William Kolakowski**		5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) **U.S. Army War College,Carlisle Barracks,Carlisle,PA,17013-5050**		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT **Approved for public release; distribution unlimited**		
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
14. ABSTRACT **See attached file.**		
15. SUBJECT TERMS		

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT **unclassified**	b. ABSTRACT **unclassified**	c. THIS PAGE **unclassified**		**27**	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lt Col William Kolakowski

TITLE: IS THE REQUIRMENTS GENERATING SYSTEM GETTING THE 'NEEDED' RESOURCES TO THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 19 March 2004 PAGES: 27 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA); also known as the Department of Defense Reorganization Act. The GNA's main objectives included: improving military effectiveness, increasing civilian control of the military, and improving military advice to the President, National Security Council and Secretary of Defense. The law was one of Congress' finest hours; transforming and revitalizing the American military profession; while improving the military's performance and warfighting capabilities. Eighteen years later, many say the overall assessment is that the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) has been a success; however, others say specific areas of the act need to be readdressed. This paper will focus on one of those areas of concern: resource management. Specifically, it will assess if the U.S. military's requirements generating process and analyze whether or not the Combatant Commanders are getting the resources needed to accomplish their assigned missions.

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BACKGROUND

The Services have the responsibility under U.S. Code Title 10 to train, organize, and equip our troops. Combatant Commanders, under Title 10, are responsible for executing the National Command Authority's guidance; however, in recent years they have little influence in the generating capabilities/requirements acquisition process. Many attempts have been made to find a solution to this problem, but with little success.

Admiral Owens, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had the following opinion on the requirements generation process: "True transformation is being held back by service parochialism, leadership without vision, stovepipe organization, a lack of jointness, and too much attachment to old platforms and technologies."[1] Today, this and the inability of military leadership to divest of systems they grew up with in the Cold War is still a challenge. Why does this occur? Because the military culture too often confuses professionalism with loyalty to a particular military, or even to a professional specialty within a Service (such as Army infantry, naval career aviation, Air Force fighter communities). Many still say the Services do not adequately consult Combatant Commander (COCOM) staffs on the issues, nor to do they adequately consider COCOM warfighting requirements during the acquisition process. In some instances the Joint Staff has had to coerce the Services to go out to the COCOMs to review requirements that should have had COCOM coordination as an integral part of the process on the front end, not the back end.[2]

This is should not be the case. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation not only increased the authority of the JCS Chairman (while diluting that of the individual service chiefs), it was to give COCOMs a greater voice in decision making.[3] As a result of the legislation, the military services were to 'provide for the more efficient use of defense resources'. In other words, they were to ensure acquisition programs contribute to joint operations and interoperability (i.e. one service's communications equipment to interact with another service's).

The objective of this paper is to assess and discuss the process which provides COCOMs the equipment resources needed to accomplish their assigned missions; to include their role in determining the 'capabilities' a Service should obtain. This will be accomplished by discussing how services acquired assets pre-Goldwater-Nichols Act; what impact the Act had on the acquisition process; and how the process works today. Specifically, the paper will discuss what the Department of Defense (DoD) was not doing well, what DoD is doing well, and where DoD is going in the future. Finally, we will discuss whether or not we need to institute any changes to

the system(s). Particularly, whether or not we need another Goldwater-Nichols type legislation or can change be handled from within the Department of Defense.

Because of the complexity and ever changing joint warfighting requirements process, this paper only addressed issues, policy, and actions prior to 1 January 2004.

PRE-GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, throughout the various stages of the resource acquisition process, the COCOMs (formally known as Commander's in Chief, or CINCs) did not fare well in influencing the process. The Joint Chiefs of Staff spent much time ensuring the COCOMs had equity in the process; however, most of the interactions/discussions were last minute…well after their initial funding decisions had been made. For years, the Service Chiefs dominated DoD's resource allocation process, focusing on their modernization and force structure needs. The Services were fulfilling their needs at the expense of the COCOM's "readiness and sustainability" warfighting priorities.

In the mid-80's, there was a conscious effort not to provide COCOMs additional manpower to develop, analyze, and track their integrated priority list requirements. The rationale at the time was that senior military leaders did not want the COCOMs to become weighed down by the bureaucratic collection requirements of congress and other agencies; they wanted the COCOMs to focus on their primary mission: warfighting.[4] With this decision, the COCOMs had to depend on the Services to tell them what happened in the aftermath of the budget process.

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

In 1986, Congress passed the Defense Reorganization Act, commonly known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This law mandated jointness through structural reforms. The legislation had 8 objectives:[5]

- Reorganize DoD and strengthen civilian authority
- Improve the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council and the SECDEF
- Place clear mission accomplishment responsibility on Unified and Specified Commanders
- Give Unified and Specified Commanders full authority to accomplish mission
- Increase attention to strategy formulation and planning
- Provide for the more efficient use of defense resources

- Improve joint officer management policies
- Improve DoD management and administration

The overall assessment is that the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been a success in many areas. The 1991 Gulf War is a good example. Though falling short of true jointness in several key respects, the war did demonstrate that a more powerful JCS chairman and streamlined chain of command were vital to effective joint warfighting.[6] Jointness is now a common term and is becoming common practice within the services. However, several aspects of the 'new' joint system are coming under attack. Some complain the Pentagon's civilian leadership has been excessively weakened by Goldwater-Nichols, while the military has become too powerful; violating the 'checks-and-balances' concept.[7] Whether this is true or, is beyond the scope of the present paper. As mentioned earlier, the focus of this paper is on one of the Goldwater-Nichols objectives we have not done so well on with the past 18 years: efficient use of defense resources.

THE RESOURCE ACQUISITION PROCESS

The resource acquisition process' goal is to provide combatant commanders with the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints. Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was to give the COCOMs a major voice in this process. The Act directed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to assess military programs and advise the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) on joint military requirements, programs and budgets (in compliance with COCOM's priorities).[8] The CJCS uses the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) as his/her advisory council to formulate recommendations for his/her consideration before forwarding to the Secretary of Defense.[9] Many believe DoD needs to shift its traditional focus on procurement of weapons platforms to a "system of systems" type approach; linking sensors, communications systems and weapons.[10] The Goldwater-Nichols Act provided the COCOMs' their primary vehicle to influence and communicate their warfighting requirements; through their Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs).[11]

After a Services' Program Objective Memorandum (POM) is published, the COCOMs review and forward comments/IPLs to the Joint Staff, who in-turn shares the information with Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). OSD comments usually deal with adequacy of the Service's requirements and include an assessment of the risks remaining between the requirements of the current Defense Planning Guidance and the capabilities of the Service's POMs.[12] If the Services do not adjust their POMs as a result of the review, the COCOMs can

appeal to the SECDEF via issue papers. Ultimately, the SECDEF makes the final decision on resource acquisition.

The process has improved to some extent since 1986, but COCOMs still complain about not being able to adequately influence the process. Some of their concerns include: Services are too parochial, the acquisition process is too slow, and they (the COCOMs) don't have the time or staff to manage the process.[13]

JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) was created as a result of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Its' goal was to promote greater interservice cooperation. It serves as the link between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, and the COCOMs on joint warfighting issues. The council consists of 5 permanent members. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the Chairman while each Service (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) have appointed their Vice Chiefs as their services' representative.[14] It is important to note that the COCOMs have a standing invitation to attend all JROC sessions.[15] The JROC assesses requirements for defense acquisition, assigns a joint priority among major programs and is expected to resolve cross-service requirements issues.[16]

In recent years, JROC reviewed projects only at the end of the process. As a result, they were not able to integrate the projects to realize joint warfighting capabilities. By the time the JROC got a chance to look at a system, it was already developed to the stage, that to make the system truly interoperable would be extremely expensive.[17] Requirements were Service rather than Joint focused. Systems were not necessarily integrated, duplication existed in smaller programs, and joint warfighting needs were not prioritized.[18]

The challenge facing the JROC was to find a way to maintain the Service's abilities to optimize the systems their forces employ in the domains in which they must operate, while at the same time having greater influence over the way the Services interact.[19] The challenge remains greatest in the area of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR).[20]

FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY BOARDS/JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT TEAMS

Today, the JROC uses Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) and the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) Teams as it's' "staff". The FCB focuses on issue development and capabilities review while the JWCA conducts analytical assessment; they are a part of the decision chain, but are not decision making bodies.[21] Both analyze and validate warfighting

requirements and programs. In validating requirements, the teams (and JROC itself) interact with the COCOMs. The FCB and JWCA teams conduct an independent assessment of program alternatives, tradeoffs, risks, and effectiveness.[22] They provide a detailed assessment of each requirement and/or issue, and staff it for JROC consideration.

In 2003, the JROC Chairman directed that 5 FCBs be created (Force Application, Command and Control, Focused Logistics, Protection, and Battlespace Awareness).[23] The FCB has a number of important duties: "ensure new capabilities are developed with a joint warfighting context; ensure proposals are consistent with the joint force as described in the joint operating concepts; validate Joint Impact proposals; organize, analyze and prioritize proposals; oversee development of functional concepts; ensure integrated architectures reflect the functional areas; and finally, leverage the full resources of the Department and other Agencies as required."[24] The membership of these boards show how committed the military is making "joint" decisions. Principle members, usually O-6 or GS-15 equivalents, include: Services, Combatant Commanders, Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, USD for Intelligence, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/DoD Chief Information Officer, Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space, Defense Intelligence Agency, and many others.[25] Each FCB has a number of sub-teams, each consisting of numerous specialty area experts, and they meet on a frequent basis. Additionally, there are numerous Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment teams, one for each functional area. Each team's objective is to ensure joint warfighting aspects have been considered appropriately in the development of capabilities, coordinate with other JWCA teams, all Services, COCOMs, and other Agencies.[26]

COCOM REQUIREMENTS

How do COCOMs ensure their needs are being considered? They can accomplish this a couple of ways. As in the past, the most common way is to ensure their requirements are identified through the Integrated Priority List (IPL) process. IPLs are a formal communication from the COCOMs to the SECDEF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Services on the COCOMs' high priority operational requirements, shortfalls, and specific concerns.[27] The Services are required to specifically address their support for the IPL requirement in their POMs, or explain whey they are not meeting the requirements.

Today, COCOMs can, and should be, an active player in the JROC Process (via the FCBs, JWCA, or the JROC itself). The challenge here is that, presently, the COCOMs aren't properly staffed to support the 'dedicated' time required by the FCB's continuous process. The

bureaucracy of the FCB makes the process very time consuming, especially for a limited COCOM staff. Other informal avenues COCOMs have at their disposal to influence DoD's resource allocation process: The Joint Military Readiness Report (JMRR), Congressional Testimony, Chairman's Program Assessment, COCOM's quarterly Program review.[28] Bottom Line: Whatever the system, the Services are still required to support to the COCOMs warfighting requirements.

WHAT DOD WAS NOT DOING WELL

While progress has been made with respect to Defense reform since the Goldwater-Nichols Act, for the past 15+ years the Defense Department remained bogged down by bureaucratic processes of the industrial age, not modifying the process for today's information age.[29] DoD did not have a joint concept to guide the conduct of joint operations. DoD had concepts were generated by each of the Services…focused on how they would prefer to fight.

The Services managed (and still do today) their own budgets. Per Title 10, budgets should have been linked to planning requirements and planning guidance, but they were not. It almost seemed like the JROC did not understand the SECDEF's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)…and was not validating the requirements against the DPG. The DPG, issued by the Secretary of Defense, provides firm guidance in the form of goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal constraints, for the development of the Program Objective Memorandums by the Military Departments and Defense agencies. JROC was not matching the issues the SECDEF has identified as important and following through with them.[30] They should have taken a few of the major issues and determine what types of capabilities were needed to fill those needs, instead of being a rubber stamp they should have been more proactive in defining the joint world and assisting the entire process in getting to where the DoD should be going.[31]

Everyone within DoD understands the DPG tells the Services what the defense secretary wants the services to spend their money on. The services then embark separately and accomplish their separate budgets (rarely coordinating with one another). When the Services come back to the table, the JROC evaluated the inputs to determine whether they believe it met the DPG, or whether or not they believed it was a joint requirement. The problem with this process is that if a COCOM, or anyone else wants to modify a requirement, it was too late in the process to significantly change anything. The caboose was unfortunately driving the train, not the engine. To this day, Service-centric requirements generation and the existing resource process cause continuous interoperability problems and create few 'born-joint' solutions.

WHAT DOD IS DOING WELL

A number of events occurred since 1986 which drove changes to the acquisition process. In 2002, SECEF said the DoD requirement generating system did not provide what the COCOMs need…and the process was too slow. "We continue to buy things we do not need: We need to fix it."[32] Around the same time, the Services requested a revision of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), a system of processes that produces documents that links strategy to resourcing and warfighting.[33] The Services wanted a more clearly defined linkage between the strategic planning and the National Military Strategy and programmatic decisions driven by the JROC process.[34]

In 2003, the CJCS acted and changed the process. Its' goal: seamless command and control; "born joint" systems, identification of legacy systems which require integration.[35] The emphasis is now on up-front guidance (through the Defense Planning Guidance/National Military Strategy, etc…). The JROC obtains guidance and, in-turn, provide standards to the services to evaluate/validate future systems.[36] Then, again at the end of the process, the JROC validates each service's needs and compliance with joint capabilities.[37] This is accomplished through a new process called the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).[38] The new system institutes a capabilities-based approach to identifying current and future gaps in our ability to carry out joint warfighting missions and functions.[39]

The JCIDS process will take time to mature. Until then, the JROC will continue to carefully analyze each service's system, determine whether or not it fits into the joint world, and approve it (if it meets certain criteria). The Services Vice Chairmen, who have the authority to say yes or no with regard to whether or not a system is going to be worth or be part of the joint fighting environment, do a relatively good job of validating requirements.[40] Instead of developing a perfect system, and then building the system to meet that vision of perfection, however long it takes or costs; the new approach is to start with the basics, roll out early models faster, and then add capabilities to the basic system as they come available.[41]

Below are several FY04 joint and coalition, communications and intelligence acquisition examples highlight the uniqueness/difference of the "new" process:[42]

- $775 million for the transformation communications satellite (TSAT) which will provide the joint warfighter the unprecedented communications capability. Today, transmitting a Global Hawk image over a Milstar II satellite to the joint warfighter will take 12 minutes. The TSAT will decrease that time to less than 1 second.

- $600 million for the Joint Tactical Radio System, to provide a 'single system' which will provide communications and wireless internet capability to enable information exchange among the joint warfighters
- $700 million for the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems – a program that consolidates all the various unmanned combat air vehicle programs and focuses on developing a common operating system.
- $408 million to continue development of the Space Based Radar. The ability to monitor both fixed and mobile targets, deep behind enemy lines in any kind of weather.
- $4.6 billion for the Joint Strike Fighter program (AF/Navy and Coalition program)
- $1.7 billion of the V-22 program (joint AF/Marine program)

WHERE DOD IS GOING

In 2004, DoD's objectives are to: further strengthen our combined and joint warfighting capabilities; further streamline DoD processes (especially the 'new' 2003 process).[43] The QDR outlines DoD's future goals: prepare for an uncertain future through a focused transformation effort, develop new operational concepts and organizations to exploit new technologies, and prepare against threats which would have large security implications.[44] To achieve these goals, SECDEF has two priorities: first to reshape the U.S. military from a heavy, industrial age force designed in the Cold War to an agile, information-age force capable of defeating more elusive adversaries anywhere on the globe. The second goal: is to reassert civilian control over the military. [45]

DoD will continue to modify/upgrade the way it acquires its warfighter capabilities. Specifically, DoD will strive to improve its planning, budgeting, and interservice cooperation. Additionally, DoD will continue to look towards outside organizations to identify other potential improvements.

PLANNING

The Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), the overarching budget guidance, was distributed in fall 2003 (in draft form). In an unprecedented move, Pentagon officials met with the 4-star Regional/Combatant Commanders to discuss how to improve the SPG.[46] Earlier processes undercut the input of those commanders by given them a voice too late in the process. Commanders will continue to submit their IPLs, which itemize the COCOMs needs for a budget cycle, they will now be submitted to DoD early in the process, rather than the previous practice of issuing them at the last minute.[47] The first application of this new process occurred

last year. In Oct 2003, SECEF issued guidance to the COCOMs for their FY06-11 Integrated Priority List submittals.[48] This 'streamlined and refocused' IPL reflects DoD emphasis on capabilities-based planning. As a result, COCOMs have submitted their FY 06-11 joint warfighting requirements under this new guidance.

BUDGET PROCESS

Also in 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld implemented a 2-year budgeting process in the Department of Defense. Goal: To free up hundreds, if not thousands, of people who invest time and energy to rebuild major programs every year so they can focus more effectively on implementation."[49] The Pentagon's new planning and budgeting process will require a greater input from the COCOMS early in the process. FY '06 will be the first year the Pentagon plans to fully implement this two-year budgeting process. In this process the department forms a baseline in the even years and makes needed changes in the odd years. This process, officials intend to provide more direct and accurate upfront guidance, setting forth a process where the services and agencies craft their portions of the budget in step with senior priorities.[50] Result: the military's Combatant Commanders are expected to have an unprecedented impact on the formulation of the Pentagon's massive FY06 budget, possible shifting how the Defense Department resources joint warfighter requirements. If the FY06 budget is approved as submitted, COCOMs will get billions not millions to support their warfighting priorities. In past years, the COCOMs were able to determine the fate of only about $10-$400 million of the DoD budget.[51]

INTER-SERVICE AND INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION

As we continue to improve our DoD system, we will not only focus on internal jointness, but will look to other Agencies (i.e. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), etc…) to ensure our systems/capabilities are compatible/interchangeable. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said it best: "As we look forward to the future challenges for the United States, it seems clear that more and more of the challenges that we will face will be faced not only by the military but by the other agencies of our government. We will need to be able to tie together the interagency process in Washington and somehow develop the kinds of trust among each other."[52] One example of trying to improve the internal DoD situation is the Deployable Joint Command and Control System. The Navy is the lead service developing this system. However, the Navy has special (stability of ships, salt air, etc…)...issues the other services, and even Agencies, don't have. An inter-agency area we need to improve on is to ensure our DoD system interact with systems of the other agencies.

For example, our DoD unmanned air vehicles, satellite systems, and tactical radio systems should be designed so they can easily interact with CIA, DIA and NSA systems.

OTHER EFFORTS

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a non-profit organization, is also assessing ways to reorganize DoD. The 2003 draft study suggests improving the DoD decision making environment by encouraging a healthy competition of ideas, which would involve COCOMs, services, JCS and SECDEF. [53] CSIS will issue its initial report to Congress in Mar 2004. Preliminary reports show they will propose many new findings and recommendations; to include:[54]

- While the U.S. military is 'unparalleled in history'," the Defense Department remains highly resistant to change (finding)
- DoD is not adequately prepared for a number of 21st Century missions (finding)
- DoD has a poor linkage of strategy and planning to budgeting (finding)
- DoD has inadequate attention to execution and accountability often surfaces (finding)
- COCOMs need a stronger role for combatant commanders in Pentagon decision-making (recommendation)

The draft report goes on to say some problems outlined lie in basic organization. For instance, service secretaries continue to play a critical role, but the large, duplicative service secretariats are legacies from their WWII status as Cabinet Departments.[55] The report recommends merging secretariats and service staffs into a single, much smaller staff that would report to the SECDEF and service chief.[56] If this were to be implemented, the entire resource acquisition process would need to be overhauled.

DO WE NEED CHANGES/ADDITIONAL ACQUSITION REFORM?

As mentioned earlier, prior to 2003 there were a number of shortcomings in the existing resource acquisition process. The COCOMs felt they did not have an active voice in the process and their warfighting requirement needs were not being fulfilled by the Service secretaries or the JROC. Service parochialism determined what would be acquired. Weapon systems which would support the COCOMs were being purchased, but few true joint requirements were being created, causing the COCOMs interoperability challenges during operations. The process was also too bureaucratic. Even if a COCOM's requirement was valid and the Services supported it, the process was so slow and procedural; it was too late to make

a change to the system. Finally, and probably most importantly, the acquisition had no real links to DoD planning guidance…the DPG.

With this said, DoD has been moving in the right direction to fix some of these challenges. The recently implemented JCIDS process will help involve the COCOMs in the process earlier, push for more joint type systems, and hopefully decrease the acquisition process timeline. However, Services and the COCOMs have more mission requirements than there are funds available. Two issues which require attention for the future DoD acquisition process to succeed is: 1) The military needs to break away from Cold War obsessions; and 2) DoD needs to groom military leaders who do not default to Service parochialism. As noted, even though progress has been made, Services still have too much say in the process. The question remains: Are COCOM requirements really of equal or higher priority than the service chief's priorities of modernizing their platforms. If not, what can be done to fix the process?

One recommendation would be to create and a permanent joint requirements panel. As we know, developing joint requirements is extremely important. Even today, each of the Services develops requirements with limited knowledge of the other services' capabilities. This joint panel could consist of members who would represent all organizations interested in requirements generation: Services, Unified Commanders, Combatant Commanders...and even other U.S. governmental agencies. The panel could replace the requirements development function presently performed by each of the services. It could be chaired by an OSD civilian (not the SECDEF) as the Chairman. The Vice Chairman of the JCS and representatives from all the services/COCOMs would be voting members. Other agencies could be non-voting members. The Chairmen and a select few would be permanent members while others could be non-permanent. This panel would allow Combatant commanders to have greater roles in: helping assess transformational activities, in the acquisition process, and in defining short- & long-term joint capability needs. It definitely will ensure COCOMs are involved in the process at every stage (up-front and after funding). The proposal may be resource intensive from the manpower perspective; however, for the panel to work properly, all represented organizations would need knowledgeable people (one's with strategic, operational, and tactical experience) as permanent representatives…to include the COCOMs. This may require an increase in staffing; however the process owners really need to have 'continuity' throughout the entire acquisition process (which can be years).

What are the benefits of a more permanent panel? It would provide continuity to a process which is presently bureaucratic in nature. It allows the permanent members for focus on acquisition and not day-to-day contingency issues. The non-permanent members still would

have a voice in decisions, but they could focus on military-specific issues…organize, train, and equip.

CONCLUSION

This paper assessed and discussed the processes which provide COCOMs the equipment resources needed to accomplish their assigned missions; to include their role in determining the 'capabilities' a Service should obtain. It first looked at how the Services acquired assets pre-Goldwater-Nichols Act. It also explored what impact the Act had on the acquisition process and how the process works today. Then, it covered what DoD was not doing well, what DoD was doing well, and where DoD is going in the future. Finally, it discussed whether or not DoD needs to institute any changes to the system(s). Specifically, whether or not they need another Goldwater-Nichols type legislation or can change be handled from within the Department of Defense.

Many attempts have been made over the years to fix the resource acquisition process. The first major piece of legislation, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, established a good foundation for today's acquisition process. The Act established the JROC…which served as a mechanism for the JCS to evaluate the applicability of funded programs to operational requirements. The council had vague guidance. As a result, the Service Chiefs continued to spend money on 'their' needs, not necessarily the COCOM's warfighting requirements. Since 1986, minor changes to the system continued. The JROC still performed its basic mission of providing a senior military perspective on what the nation requires for national defense. The council judged whether major weapons, weapon systems, and other military capabilities were actually required. Specifically, the JROC performed mission need reviewed, validated and prioritized requirements, and determined the best placement of scares DoD funds. The changes were good attempts to move in the right direction; however, there was still no significant change in the end result: Services got their needs met first.

In 2003, the most significant change to the resource acquisition process occurred since the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. DoD approved Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJSCI) 3170.01, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).* JCIDS is DoD's new requirements generation system; designed to foster efficiency, flexibility, creativity and innovation in the acquisition process.[57] The JCIDS system is designed to enable organizations to define their capability needs while still focusing on national strategy. Its' goal is to implement a capabilities-based approach to studying DoD requirements, and is

designed to foster cooperation among Services, COCOMS, other government agencies, industry and academia.

Is the JCIDS process working? In past years, the COCOMs were able to determine the fate of only about $10 million to $400 million of the Pentagon's budget; however, for FY '06 the COCOMs were successful in receiving $10-$20 billion to support their warfighting requirements; increasing from a scarce .09% of the DoD's budget to approximately 4%![58] On paper, it seems the new JCIDS process is providing COCOMs with requirements they need. If this continues, then DoD may not require any Goldwater-Nichols type legislation. Any minor modifications can probably me made internal to the DoD. We have to be careful though. If history is any lesson, we will likely have to continue to adjust our processes to keep up with changes in the world around us. As U.S. policy or law changes, so shall DoD policies and processes.

WORD COUNT= 4,956

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[3] John Boatman, "The Long Road to Jointness" *Janes Defence Daily*, 10 December 1994, Vol 022, Issue 023: 1. [journal on-line]; available from <http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?t=/content1/jandesdata/mags/jdw>; Internet; Accessed 15 Feb 2004.

[4] James R. Locher, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 1996): 13.

[5] Ibid., 10-11.

[6] James R. Locher, "Has it Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act." *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 54, Issue 4 (Autumn 2001): 6.

[7] Boatman, 2.

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[9] Ibid.

[10] Sheila Foote, "Owens Says Congress Should Require More Military Jointness," *Defense Daily*, 7 November 1997. Vol. 197. Issue 27: 2. [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 15 Feb 2004.

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[19] Keeter, 2.

[20] Cambone, Stephen A. Dr. "Transforming the Defense Establishment" Remarks: 27 January 2003: 9. available from <http://defenselink.mil/speches/2003/sp20030127-0006.html>; accessed 15 Feb 2004.

[21] JROC Brief, 10.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., 11.

[24] Ibid., 13.

[25] Ibid., 14.

[26] CJCSI 3180.01, 2-3.

[27] Title 10, United States Code: Armed Forces, Sections 113 & 153 (1999).

[28] William A. Owens, "*Joint Command Readiness: Requirements and Concerns*", Prepared Testimony for the Readiness Subcommittee, House National Security Committee, March 9, 1995: 3.

[29] Donald H. Rumsfeld, "*FY 2005 Defense Budget Testimony*", Prepared Testimony for the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, 4 February 2004: 13.

[30] Peter Pace, "Goldwater-Nichols, 15 years later military reform and Future of Joint Operations" Department of Defense Briefing, 3 April 2002 : 3. (3658 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 15 Feb 2004 .

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[32] JROC Brief, 23.

[33] JSPS Brief, 17.

[34] Ibid.

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[36] Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Services Parochialism to Jointness" *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1998): 4.

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[38] JROC Brief, 24.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Pace, 3.

[41] Rumsfeld, 2.

[42] Rumsfeld, 11-12.

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[54] Ibid.

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[57] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 24 June 2003, 1-2.

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