The Total Force Policy and Effective Force
Abstract
This strategy research project concludes that current Department of Defense guidance for rebalancing will reverse the Total Force Policy in terms of its essential contributions to the effectiveness of US armed forces. An inductive analysis grounded in historical precedent indicates that the Total Force Policy supports the overall readiness and decisive use of military force. The Total Force Policy is not a Cold War or post-Vietnam anachronism but an essential ingredient to the successful application of military force. The goal of conducting rapid response operations without any reserve call-up or mobilization prior to commencement of operations will obviate the use of reserve forces within the construct of the typical joint campaign. This will cause a departure from the Total Force Policy's outcome of complementary active and reserve forces and reinstate the vision of redundant roles for reserves forces that predated intervention in Vietnam. Perceived shortfalls in the Total Force Policy come from failure to invest adequately in the readiness of reserve forces not from any intrinsic inability of reserves to support military operations. Instead of altering component roles the Army should focus on achieving a reserve component readiness posture that is on par with active component forces.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 19, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA424059
Entities
People
- Chris Downey
Organizations
- United States Army War College