Strategy at War: A Policy Left without Means
Abstract
The United States does not have a cogent National Military Strategy supportive of its current National Security Strategy. The relationship between the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy is such that military strategy draws direction from national strategy. The military means are not aligned with the political object. The history of strategic military theory demonstrates that the Clausewitzian relationship between the two must exist to achieve national objectives for foreign policy to succeed. The relationship is fractured because the 1997 National Military Strategy is out of date and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Report cannot fill the void because it does not support the preemption corollary in the 2002 National Security Strategy and its sub-strategies. The national strategy also places a premium on the use of force in pursuit of national interests while the goals and tenets of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Report remain fixed upon how and what to change the military into. The fracture reveals that the Department of Defense does not appreciate the totality of the change in today's global environment. The Department of Defense can mend the strategic fracture by publishing a National Military Strategy that answers the employment and force structure demands of the national strategy. Military transformation efforts cannot be ignored. However, transformation is an adjunct of strategy and it will naturally occur through adaptation to the new global security environment. (37 refs.)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 19, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA424073
Entities
People
- Xavier P. Lobeto
Organizations
- United States Army War College