Abrams Doctrine: Has It Been Abused in the GWOT?
Abstract
In the final days of the Vietnam War, General Abrams (Chief of Staff of the Army 1972-1974) initiated a strategy whereby the U.S. Army would never go to war again without substantial mobilization of the Army Reserve Component. This strategy has become widely accepted as the Abrams Doctrine. Now the United States finds itself in another potentially long war, the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Since September 11, 2001, the United States has executed a "partial mobilization" of Soldiers from the Army Reserve Component to meet the demands of this War. In the third year of the GWOT, has the Abrams Doctrine been abused to the extent that too many Army Reserve Component Soldiers have been mobilized? This research paper examines the genesis of the Abrams Doctrine, analyzes current mobilization trends of the Army Guard and Army Reserve, and describes the effects of this current "partial mobilization" on employers, families, recruitment, and retention. Finally, recommendations were made for the future. (2 tables, 3 figures, 21 refs.)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 27, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA424075
Entities
People
- George A. Brinegar
Organizations
- United States Army War College