Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: A Strategic Failure or Beginning of Regional Stability

Abstract

The paper examines nuclear non-proliferation and deterrence theories and applies those to the ongoing India-Pakistan conflict. The strategic issues driving India and Pakistan's nuclear programs are examined together with the implications for both the international environment and long-term regional stability. The paper highlights both the benefits and disadvantages of the development of theater nuclear weapons by each of these antagonists as a possible precedence for further proliferation and as a means by which to deter and prevent a regional conflict. It also identifies related regional issues such as prestige stability and long-term strategic consistency and finally draws some conclusions in regards to the strategic implications for Pakistan and India.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 19, 2004
Accession Number
ADA424089

Entities

People

  • Agha M. Farooq

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter WMD

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Acquisition
  • Agreements
  • Arms Control
  • Arms Control Treaties
  • Asia
  • Chemical Weapons
  • Conventional Capabilities
  • Deterrence
  • Fissile Materials
  • Materials
  • National Security
  • Negotiations
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • South Asia
  • Treaties
  • War Colleges
  • Weapons Of Mass Destruction

Fields of Study

  • Political science

Readers

  • East Asian Political and Security Studies within the Soviet Union
  • Nuclear Non-Proliferation and International Security
  • Systems Analysis and Design