

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

WHEN WILL WE LEAVE IRAQ?

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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ABSTRACT

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This strategic research paper uses an ends, ways and means strategy paradigm to examine the conditions that must exist for U.S. military forces to depart Iraq and when that departure might occur. To determine the ends, United States policy documents were reviewed along with speeches and interviews conducted by administration officials. From an analysis of four sources with political, defense, academia and research backgrounds, this paper identifies seven conditions (ends) that must occur before the redeployment of forces. These conditions are: 1) reduced casualties; 2) a trained and ready Iraqi army and police force that are able to maintain order; 3) established and controlled Iraqi borders; 4) weapons and ammunition controlled; 5) key facilities guarded; 6) opposition captured and suppressed; and 7) operational infrastructure which includes power, water, sewer, and garbage disposal restored to pre-war capacity. Ways, which focused on the increasing military and police forces from the United States, coalition, Iraq and the United Nations to achieve those ends, are discussed. Next, the means available to support the ways are identified. In the conclusion, this paper recommends that the United Nations take a greater role for stability in Iraq and identifies the environment that must exist for this transition to occur.

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WHEN WILL WE LEAVE IRAQ?

Much has happened since the Iraqi War started on 19 March 2003, and subsequent actions taken signal that the U.S. will remain in Iraq for some undetermined time period. In an address to America on 19 March 2003, President George W. Bush's intent for military operations in Iraq was "to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger".¹ However, as of January 2004 approximately 125,000 U.S. service members remain in Iraq even though the President announced the end to major combat operations aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier on May 1, 2003.² By 30 October 2003, more Americans have died after the end of combat operations than during the fighting and that number continues to climb almost daily.³ In September 2003, members of the National Guard and Reserves learned that their tours of duty were extended to one year.⁴ In November 2003, troops in the National Guard and Reserve learned their strength in Iraq will increase from 28,700 to 39,000 by May 2004.⁵ On 6 November 2003, President Bush signed the \$87 billion bill to fund counterterrorism operations and repair Iraq's oil industry, train police officers, and rebuild the country's economy and government.⁶ It appears that the U.S. is not ready to redeploy its armed forces from Iraq but is preparing to stay in Iraq for quite some time. The question that needs to be answered is: When will U.S. forces leave Iraq?

This paper will take the position that stability is the only objective, or in the language of strategy the "end", that must exist for U.S. military forces to depart Iraq. Stability in Iraq is defined by seven conditions: 1) reduced casualties; 2) a trained and ready Iraqi army and police force that are able to maintain order; 3) established and controlled Iraqi borders; 4) weapons and ammunition controlled; 5) key facilities guarded; 6) opposition captured and suppressed; and 7) operational infrastructure which includes power, water, sewer, and garbage disposal restored to pre-war capacity. Meeting these seven conditions in Iraq establishes the stable environment required to create local, state and national governments while providing an environment for the formation of businesses and free markets for a prosperous Iraq.

This paper is structured to identify the end (stability), discuss ways to achieve it, review the means necessary, evaluate the risks, and recommend exit conditions that must exist for U.S. forces. First, this paper establishes that a stable Iraq is the key condition to enable U.S. military forces to depart Iraq and should be the main United States' policy objective. Subsequently, the ways to achieve that objective are presented. Then, this paper examines the means available to achieve that objective. Next, the risks associated with ends, ways, and

means are broadly covered. Finally, this paper recommends the environment that must exist for U.S. forces to return home and turn over stability missions to the United Nations.

U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVE FOR IRAQ

There have been numerous editorials written on the subject of whether the U.S. has an exit strategy for Iraq. To the American public it appears there is no coherent U.S. exit strategy, since the President is requesting additional money and longer commitments of forces to support operations in Iraq.

While many Americans in general believe that an Iraq exit strategy does not exist, several key administrative officers have stated a common policy. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, on 7 April 2003, presented a U.S. policy position on CNN's American Morning show. Paula Zahn asked the Deputy Secretary how long U.S. forces will remain in Iraq, and he stated: "I don't think anyone knows the answer to that. We have to stay long enough to exploit potential WMD sites and clearly to establish stability through the country, but we want to stay not a day longer than that."⁷ U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow stated a similar policy on September 21, 2003 when he cautioned that "security is a prerequisite for economic recovery in Iraq."⁸ House of Representatives supporters of the \$87 billion bill for Iraq and Afghanistan operations argued that "the quick creation of a stable, prosperous Iraq was in America's national interest".⁹ Likewise, in a speech before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated that "security is our most important and pressing objective, but its fundamental to recognize that security, economic and political objectives are closely interrelated".¹⁰ President Bush believes that a stable Iraq will lead to worldwide security. In a speech on 3 November 2003 in Birmingham, Alabama, he stated, "A free and peaceful Iraq will make it more likely that our children and grandchildren will be able to grow up without the horrors of September the 11th".¹¹ From the statements made above, a stable Iraq is the end state that must be met before U.S. Forces are able to depart.

MEASURING STABILITY

While stability allows Iraq's economy to develop and flourish, Iraq's government to be securely reestablished and the U.S. to depart, the difficulty is how to measure stability and its improvement. Numerous methods to track the progress towards stability have been identified. The White House, the Department of Defense (DoD), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and a Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monograph use different methods to measure progress. The White House webpage monitors stability's progress by measuring number of security forces; ammunition and weapons seized; and key Iraqi leadership captured.

Similarly, the Department of Defense website tracks stability's progress in various areas. CSIS suggests a casualty tracking method along with a visual method for tracking stability's progress. The SSI monograph advocates tasks that should be accomplished during the transition phase of the operation. Each one of these sources will be more fully examined to comprehensively define the conditions that are needed to create the stability advocated by this paper.

A measure of stability's progress in Iraq is posted on the White House webpage. The webpage is titled "10 Signs of Better Security," and it assesses the results 100 days after the end to major combat operations from different perspectives, which range from U.S. and Iraqi forces to general conditions.¹² The ten specific areas identified by the White House webpage are as follows:¹³

- New Iraqi army and police forces recruited, trained, and equipped.
- 58 of 89 Iraqi cities have hired police forces.
- Seizure of more than 8,200 tons of ammunition, thousands of AK-47s, grenades, and other weapons.
- 11,000 Iraqis guard key facilities around the country.
- 44 of the top 55 most wanted Iraqis have been captured or killed.
- Coalition forces continue to take the offensive against the remnants of the Ba'athist regime.
- An Iraqi Civil Defense Force will help U.S. and Coalition forces in rooting out Saddam loyalists and criminal gangs. 4,000 Iraqi militiamen have been trained by U.S. troops.
- In Basra, 500 river police have been patrolling since June 19.
- Some 148,000 U.S. service members and more than 13,000 Coalition troops from 19 countries are serving in Iraq.
- Most of Iraq is calm and progress on the road to democracy.

The above items illustrate the progress achieved during the first 100 days after President Bush declared the end to hostilities in Iraq, not what needs to be accomplished before stability is established. While progress in all of the areas should continue to be assessed, the method to measure success in each area needs to be more clearly defined by the White House. Specifically, metrics must be developed to determine whether the end state, stability, has been established in Iraq.

The Department of Defense (DoD) maintains a Defend America website that provides news about the war on terrorism. Through its *Iraq Weekly Progress Updates* progress is delineated in seven areas, while goals and milestones are only identified in the four areas of electric generation, oil production, numbers of Iraqi security forces, and milestones for establishing an Iraqi government. A summary of the information depicted on the *Iraq Weekly Progress Updates* is provided below:¹⁴

- Electrical Generation – amount of power generated

- Oil Production – crude oil production per day and crude oil export per month
- Education Enrollment – students enrolled, building rehabilitations, teachers, textbooks
- Health Care – healthcare level and immunizations
- Security – number of people in Iraqi security forces
- Governance – judicial systems, constitution prep committee, Madrid Donors' Conference
- Economics – financial markets, private sector development, donors' conference

Although this website describes the amount of progress made in these areas, it does not define what constitutes a stable Iraq.

Another method to track stability's progress is recommended in a CSIS article by Anthony H. Cordesman. CSIS article recommends that all war-related casualties be tracked, not just the number of U.S. service members killed, and reported in the following categories:¹⁵

- All U.S. wounded, not simply wounded requiring major medical treatment.
- Casualties from accidents clearly related to security procedures like high-speed convoys, etc.
- Casualties from foreign civilians, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and nation builders, and non-U.S. forces.
- Counts of Iraqis supporting the U.S. killed and wounded.
- Counts of Iraqi civilians (neutrals) supporting the U.S. that are killed and wounded. Such counts should clearly distinguish whether hostile or U.S. forces did the killing, and are a critical measure of probably popular hostility and the growth or non-growth or hostile areas.
- Counts of Iraqi hostiles by type – a clear distinction between Ba'ath/Saddam supporters, outside volunteers, Sunni Islamists, revenge/anger hostiles, Shi'ites, and other ethnic/sectarian groups.

The method of tracking casualties outlined above provides a clearer picture of the casualty numbers, who they support, whether they're friendly or hostile, and their cause. This provides leaders with a better idea of who is killing whom and may provide some insight as to why killings may or may not continue. If casualties are the key measure of stability, then it follows that when casualties decrease the environment in Iraq becomes more stable.

While a reduced number of casualties is a key measure of success in establishing stability, to understand the entire situation the same CSIS article referenced above suggests that reporting on security and stability would also have to include:¹⁶

- Maps of stable and "can go" areas showing growth or contraction over time. Such maps need to cover key urban areas and sub-regions, not simply all of Iraq. They should be validated by running casualty and sabotage counts to show if they are really secure.
- Progress in establishing peaceful and/or friendly local governments at the national, province, and local level.
- Progress by city and area in establishing functioning Iraqi security forces.

- Progress by city and area in allowing U.S. forces and CPA officials to operate without being in high security force protection areas.
- Progress by city and area in establishing functioning schools and hospitals.
- Progress maps, with measures of capacity relative to need, in restoring and security key petroleum and oil export facilities.
- Progress maps, with measures of capacity relative to need, showing the development of utility grids for water and power.
- Maps of economic restoration in terms of secure roads and markets, and local employment/unemployment data.
- Functioning financial institution maps showing the number of working and secure banks.
- Progress maps of safe NGO/contractor/civilian nation-builder areas showing whether military security activity is needed or can be reduced.

The advantage of tracking progress using the mapping process outlined above is that a clear picture of the Iraq stability situation by specific area is tracked. A major disadvantage of this method is that CSIS does not recommend the extent of progress required on each map to indicate stability has been achieved. Likewise, there is no discussion as to whether each map must be fully successful or if portions of progress in each area would provide the stability needed.

The fourth method to track stability is presented in a Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monograph. The tasks that should be accomplished are illustrated in Figure 2.¹⁷ These tasks




FIGURE 1. TRANSITION TIMELINE

are presented on a timeline which begins before decisive operations end and conclude many years after the conflict has ended. Based on the accomplishment of tasks under each block, the number of forces needed on the ground should diminish. The majority of forces should be able to redeploy when Iraq takes over stability responsibilities and support for the new government is provided by the international community. This method provides tasks that should be accomplished according to a timeline; however, it doesn't identify to what extent the tasks need be complete to establish a stable environment.

In summary, various methods or measures to track a stable environment have been identified by four different sources that range from the political to defense to academic to research. While each perspective was discussed, this paper asserts that no one source provides the "answer" to the conditions that must exist to declare that Iraq is stable. Consequently, using key ideas from each of these three sources, this paper recommends using the following seven conditions to define stability in Iraq: 1) reduced casualties; 2) a trained and ready Iraqi army and police force that are able to maintain order; 3) established and controlled Iraqi borders; 4) weapons and ammunition controlled; 5) key facilities guarded; 6) opposition captured and suppressed; and 7) operational infrastructure which includes power, water, sewer, and garbage disposal restored to pre-war capacity. The next part of this paper will focus on identifying specific ways to achieve stability using these seven conditions.

WAYS TO STABILIZE IRAQ

To achieve stability in Iraq, strategic ways must be identified to achieve that end state. An overarching way articulated by many that focuses on those first six conditions is related to the overall military and police force structure within the country. According to Ian Kemp, editor of the London-based military affairs publication ' *Jane's Defence Weekly* ', "many experts estimate that another 100,000 troops are needed to ensure stability across the country."¹⁸ These troops must be used to prevent uprisings and insurgency, to seize weapons and ammunition, and to train Iraqi army and police forces. Since General Franks, the former Central Command Commander, stated that "United States has the right number of forces in the region" and others since then have supported that point of view, there must be an increase in the number of military and police forces from other than U.S. sources.¹⁹

In addition to U.S. forces, Iraq needs to possess its own military before significant numbers of U.S. forces depart. To deter any future foreign aggression, a new Iraq military force must be vetted, trained, and then employed. To increase stability in urban areas, Iraqi police forces are better suited to maintain needed order. Likewise, the newly created police force must

be vetted, trained and then put to use. Similarly, the Iraqi customs and border police should be reestablished to control the borders. This controlled access into Iraq would prevent additional terrorists entering Iraq to destabilize the rebuilding efforts. When U.S. troops are freed from the tasks above by Iraqi forces, the majority of U.S. troops could focus more on seizing weapons and ammunition (condition 4) and capturing and suppressing the opposition (condition 6) -- two missions that they are well suited for.

Additionally, the establishment of critical infrastructure (condition 7), which consists of the electrical, water, and sewer systems as well as trash collection, will help contribute to a stable Iraq. As this infrastructure initially becomes operational, U.S. troops may be required to guard key facilities. As the Iraqis are trained, the U.S. troops could be relieved from this responsibility. To establish a stable Iraq by renewing critical infrastructure, the United States, other nations, or non-government organizations must provide forces, equipment, money, training, and infrastructure renewal aid.

Disarming the Iraqis could go a long way to improve stability, which is directly related to condition four. Coalition forces must continue to seize weapons to reduce their numbers. In addition, a weapons buy back plan must be implemented to reduce the number of weapons even more. The amount of money offered for each weapon would have to be more than the price of the weapon on the open market. This would encourage arms dealers to sell their weapons to coalition forces, since they would receive more money. Reducing unneeded or illegal weapons will help improve stability and would provide a source on income to those Iraqis selling the weapons. While this disarmament would initially have to be conducted by coalition forces, the Iraqi forces could later assume these security responsibilities upon completion of their training.

Other ways to stabilize Iraq, which include military, political, and international elements, are presented by James Philips from The Heritage Foundation. He recommends that the United States.²⁰

- Empower Iraqis to take ownership of their own political future.
- Accelerate the recruitment, training, and deployment of Iraqi army, police, and internal security forces.
- Reconfigure U.S. troop deployments and concentrate them on counterinsurgency operations, aided by Iraq's police and army.
- Upgrade border security to reduce the infiltration of foreign fighters.
- Keep international peacekeeping forces in a unified command under U.S. leadership.
- Let the United Nations do what it does best--provide humanitarian aid, supervise elections, and coordinate postwar reconstruction efforts--but

minimize its role in addressing issues on which there is no international consensus.

Philips' recommendations broadly support all seven conditions required to established stability advocated by this paper. He does go one step further and advocates Iraqi's ownership of their political future while the international community provides peacekeepers and the U.N. provides non-controversial assistance.

MEANS TO ACHIEVE STABILITY IN IRAQ

Earlier in this paper the ways of using increase military forces, regardless of origin, to help create a stable environment in Iraq was advocated. Now the means or resources available to provide for the increased military force are presented. Currently, the U.S. is providing the majority of forces and money for the Iraq effort. The U.S. military is stretched thin and some believe it either needs an increase in operational forces through activation of additional Reserve and National Guard units, or help from foreign militaries to maintain the current force level in Iraq. Recently, the Congressional Budget Office stated "under current policies, the Pentagon would be able to sustain an occupation force of 38,000 to 64,000 in Iraq long term, down from the existing 150,000 that a number of lawmakers said is not enough to confront the spiraling violence."²¹ The troop rotation schedule announced in November 2003 for the spring of 2004 reduces the number of U.S. forces in Iraq from 123,000 to 110,000.²² To compensate for the projected the lower number of U.S. troops, an increase in the number of Iraqi security forces, coalition soldiers or U.N. troops must occur to achieve the seven conditions to establish stability.

On 4 November 2003, President Bush stated that the U.S. is moving to handover more authority to the Iraqis. "We have now stood up over 70,000 Iraqi citizens to be police, border patrol and beginnings of the military, so that Iraqis will be able to run their own country," he said. "That has been our mission all along, to develop the conditions such that a free Iraq will emerge, run by the Iraqi citizens."²³ Placing more Iraqi police on the street would give an appearance of a movement towards Iraqis running Iraq. "That's key, say some: If it seems to Americans that the White House has no viable plan for improving security, support for US policy in Iraq may quickly erode."²⁴ A phased approach to the reduced U.S. force presence should be followed as more Iraqi forces begin to provide security. While this phased approach is occurring as rapidly as feasible, it is not happening as quickly as desired by some.

It appears that in the foreseeable future minimal numbers of forces will be provided by other nations. In March 2003, 48 countries were publicly committed to the Iraqi Freedom Coalition.²⁵ In August 2003, 27 countries contributed only 21,700 troops to support operations

in Iraq.²⁶ In October 2003, 10,000 Turkish soldiers designated to augment the coalition were refused entrance into Iraq by the Iraqi governing body. This refusal illustrates the point that the Iraqi political environment must be taken into account when planning for security forces.²⁷

As discussed earlier, coalition force increases are not forthcoming, U.S. forces are over committed and Iraqi forces are training at a realistic rate. Therefore, U.N. support is the only realistic alternative to increase forces in Iraq. Consequently, this paper supports the position that the United Nations must have a larger role in establishing a stable Iraq to create a "more legitimate and independent Iraq government".²⁸ German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder wrote: "the United Nations must play a central role. The international community has a key interest in ensuring that stability and democracy are established as quickly as possible in Iraq."²⁹ A position similar to the Chancellor's is held by Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, who believe "a much greater internationalization of the reconstruction effort" is required.³⁰ Simply, legitimacy in Iraq is aided by participation from the United Nations and other nations. This paper will now examine the role of the United Nations using the seven conditions to establish security in Iraq that were introduced earlier.

UNITED NATIONS STABILITY SUPPORT

The first condition for creating stability is to reduce casualties. This is perhaps best accomplished by winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqis. Since U.S. forces are doing the majority of missions to counter sabotage, they consequently appear to act like an occupation force. Allowing the Iraqis to "deal with the escalating insurgent attacks" gives the Iraqis more control over the stability situation in their country; however, this is proving difficult for a host of reasons as terrorism continues to occur.³¹ Consequently, allowing the U.N. to undertake the stability responsibility in Iraq is recommended, because they can draw on international organizations and member countries to help, thus bringing their vast experience and somewhat greater international legitimacy to bear. The key for winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqis is to continuously show improvement in stability, and a U.N. led force gives the impression that the nations of the world are helping Iraq instead of just the U.S. with coalition members.

The second stability condition, to train the Iraqi military and police, will require a diverse group of experts to conduct the instruction. By allowing the U.N. to lead the training, Iraqi forces will be trained by the nations of the world that have similar cultures and not just by U.S. forces. U.N. training could be tailored using the techniques from its members that best suits the environment in Iraq. By giving the U.N. a greater responsibility for reestablishing Iraq forces to

maintain stability, these forces have a greater opportunity to be respected and trusted by the Iraqi citizens than U.S. viewed occupation forces.

The third stability condition, to better secure the borders, would be strengthened with U.N. assistance. In November 2003, three U.N. countries, Syria, Iran, and Kuwait, agreed to sign "agreements for ensuring security on their borders with Iraq for the purpose of stopping illegal infiltration of militants."³² These agreements facilitate intelligence sharing and joint responsibility between countries to secure the open border shared by the countries. While these agreements were signed, other countries neighboring Iraq many feel reluctant to help with border security due to the U.S. influence with border operations. In order to facilitate greater participation by Iraq's neighbors, the U.N. must lead the effort to control Iraq's borders.

The fourth stability condition, to control additional weapons and ammunition, could also be aided through U.N. assistance. U.N. forces have the capability to conduct raids or administer a weapons and ammunition buy back program. The U.N. forces may be more likely to enlist Iraqi security forces in this effort, and additional weapons and ammunition may be found due to the fact that Iraqis want their country to become more stable. Once weapon and ammunition sites are identified, these locations must be guarded either by U.N. forces or Iraq forces to prevent pilfering.

The fifth stability condition, to guard key infrastructure facilities to ensure that utilities remain operational, is again within United Nation's capability. Once Iraqi security forces are trained by the U.N., they should be used to guard key facilities, to include the oil fields. Additionally, an Information Operations (IO) campaign should be launched to inform Iraqis the importance of keeping these facilities operational and stress that the quality of life is improved when the facilities are not sabotaged. The U.N. may be better suited to conduct this IO campaign, especially as it is related to the oil fields, because they may be viewed as more trustful by the Iraqi people. Again, improving infrastructure on a daily basis helps to show the Iraqis that the world is assisting Iraq.

The sixth condition of capturing and suppressing the opposition in Iraq may be more difficult with U.N. forces, but it is needed to create stability. Progress must continue to capture the remaining 11 of Iraq's 55 most wanted as of 3 January 2004.³³ U.N. forces must hunt for these individuals. Military operations should be conducted in areas that harbor the fugitives. Specifically, operations should continue in the Sunni Triangle since the majority of attacks against coalition forces have occurred in that region.³⁴ U.N. forces need to be deployed to the region as a stability force.

The last condition to improve the infrastructure may be the most costly, and U.N. member states can provide more assistance to Iraq than just the United States alone. Currently, the majority of the money to create stability in Iraq is provided by the \$87 billion bill for Iraq and Afghanistan operations signed by President Bush on 6 November 2003.³⁵ This bill includes “\$793 million for health care programs, \$2.8 billion for potable drinking water, \$217 million for border security, \$5.65 billion for electricity generation and \$2.1 billion to rebuild Iraq’s oil infrastructure”.³⁶ The money from the U.S. bill helps to provide initial infrastructure repairs but more is needed. Additional money for assistance was provided by nations and organizations that attended the Madrid Conference on 23-24 October 2003. A total of \$33 billion, \$20 billion from the U.S. and \$13 billion from other countries and organizations, in grants and loans was pledged to assist Iraq from now until 2007.³⁷ With a U.N. led force in Iraq, the amount of monetary assistance from member nations should increase, since a stable Iraq would depend on the commitment from the majority of the countries in the world. This U.N. financial aid will help Iraq rebuild critical infrastructure and provide stability.

Currently, the United States is providing the majority of resources in the form of forces, training, and infrastructure renewal to create a stable Iraq. In order to create a stable Iraq, it is imperative that the United Nations assume responsibility for the stabilization mission in Iraq. As shown in this paper, the U.N. has the capability to create and sustain the seven conditions identified as needed for a stable Iraq. Iraq stabilization leadership by the U.N. will further justify the efforts and will facilitate a larger portion of the resources to be provided by the international community and legitimize the actions taken to date to develop a stable Iraq. However, this strategy does have some risks, a subject that will now be covered.

ASSOCIATED RISK

This paper believes that the risks for the United States being associated with a United Nations coalition, instead of a U.S. led coalition, to establish a stable Iraq are minimal. This risk assessment is determined by a broad examination of the United States’ military, financial support and political support in maintaining its predominate leadership role versus sharing those military, financial and political risks with other nations through the United Nations.

The U.S. has limited military resources in the form of forces to continuously support the Iraqi stabilization operation at its current level without incurring serious consequences. If the U.S. continues to provide the same force strength in Iraq for years to come, it could break the U.S. military in terms of diminished training readiness, limited recovery time, extreme use of equipment, reduced time at home station, and long-term retention. Conversely, the experience

of the international community, especially the Europeans, in peacekeeping would help to improve the stability in Iraq as they assume more of the troop burdens. Hence, a reduced U.S. military presence in Iraq is a positive outcome for the U.S. military

The United States, as already stated, has incurred an \$87 billion cost in Iraq through a supplemental funding request with most of the financial support allocated for military operations. With the growing deficits in the U.S. there is not an unlimited supply of additional funds. Alternatively, there are numerous United Nations' members with the economic power to help fund the effort. Conversely, the United Nations could assist the United States with the \$3.9 billion spent each month to keep 100,000 plus troops in Iraq, first with financial support and then decreasing that cost as U.S. troops are replaced.³⁸ By sharing the financial burden of creating a stable Iraq, the additional United States' federal deficit created to support operations in Iraq will not continue to expand.

The last risk is related to political will as viewed by the American and International community. There is a mixture of support and nonsupport from nations surrounding Iraq to support the U.N. efforts. Some neighbors do not believe in establishing Iraq as a strong and democratic state in the region to serve as a beacon of freedom and hope.³⁹ Support from countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, would show the Iraqis that the American forces will not remain indefinitely. This lack of support may be changing since Jordan has begun to provide training to the new Iraqi police force.⁴⁰ Since the capture of Saddam Hussein on 14 December 2003, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United Nations advocated more international involvement in Iraq.⁴¹ If additional countries in the world step forward to provide support and assistance to the efforts in Iraq, the political risk to the U.S. will be reduced.

UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION RECOMMENDATION

In a speech in San Francisco, General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated "the United States will know when it has achieved success in Iraq, and can begin to pull back, by assessing three factors: security, the viability of a permanent Iraq government, and economic stability and growth that can support civic life."⁴² In a perfect world, the U.S. military could transition its military operations with international organizations fairly quickly. If these international organizations were already highly active within Iraq, they could more quickly assume responsibility from the U.S. forces. These international organizations could then help Iraqi organizations take charge and assume responsibility for their country. This view of an ideal transition is depicted in Figure 3 and illustrates the level of involvement versus time for

U.S. military with allies; U.S. Civilian Organizations and International Organizations (IOs); and Indigenous Organizations.⁴³




FIGURE 2. IDEAL VISION OF TRANSITION

In reality, the curve for U.S. Civilian Organizations and IOs is shifted to the right due to the continued terrorist bombing attacks throughout Iraq. Since the organizational curve has shifted to the right, the level of military forces in Iraq must remain larger for longer and the time required to transition operations from the military to other organizations will increase. The shifting of the curve to the right is also an indication of instability. In order to create a more stable environment, a greater involvement of military forces are required. Also, without the help of external organizations it will take longer for the indigenous organizations to be capable of assuming the responsibilities. This more realistic transition graph is depicted in Figure 4.⁴⁴ To help shift this graph back to the left, the U.S. must build support in the international community to help with stability, forces, and non-governmental agencies.




FIGURE 3. REALISTIC VISION OF TRANSITION

As earlier discussed, there are seven conditions that contribute to establishing a stable environment in Iraq. While, this paper advocates that the United States turn over the stability operations to the United Nations to create those conditions, the unanswered question is when this transition should occur. This paper recommends this transition be planned now to give each organization maximum planning time and a metric be jointly determined by the United States and the United Nations for each of the seven stability conditions. The metrics in parentheses broadly indicate a range for the conditions that should exist for the United Nations to assume the mission in Iraq. These metrics were determined after examining information from four sources used to identify the seven conditions previously discussed in this paper.

- Secure areas based on casualties
 - U.S. non-accidental deaths (less than 1% of total number of U.S. forces in Iraq)
 - U.S. wounded (less than 5% of total number of U.S. forces in Iraq)
 - Non-U.S. forces, NGOs, and nation builders deaths and wounded (less than 5% of total number in Iraq)
- Iraqi security force (greater than 75% assumption of coalition army and police duties)
- Iraqi borders (greater than 75% manned, controlled, and patrolled by Iraqi forces)
- Weapons and ammunition (greater than 75% of caches guarded by Iraqis and destruction of caches begun)
- Key facilities (greater than 75% guarded by Iraqis)
- Opposition (greater than 90% of Iraq's 55 Most Wanted captured)
- Operational Infrastructure
 - Power grid (greater than 80% of pre-war grid operational all the time)
 - Water system (greater than 80% of pre-war system operational all the time)
 - Sewer system (greater than 80% of pre-war system operational all the time)
 - Garbage collection (greater than 80% of pre-war collection established and maintained)

Once a range of metrics have been negotiated between the United States and the United Nations, they can be tracked on maps throughout Iraq. This way a clearer picture of stable areas can be illustrated. This facilitates turning over sections of the country vice a whole country turn over if so determined. The mapping process quantifies the level of stability in Iraq and establishes the conditions that should be met to allow a successful transfer of operations from a U.S. led coalition to a U.N. force.

CONCLUSION

This paper critically examined four diverse sources with political, defense, academic and research backgrounds to determine the conditions that must occur in Iraq for U.S forces to depart. This examination concluded the key "end" that must exist was stability, and stability was further defined by seven specific conditions. The paper examined the "ways" to create that stability and concluded that a combination of forces (foreign military forces to augment the Iraqi

military and police forces) were needed. Finally, the means to transition these forces and their funding from the United States to coalition forces to Iraqi forces to United Nations forces were covered. The paper recommended that the United Nations take over more responsibility and a phased transfer be negotiated using metrics within these seven conditions to enable a smooth transition.

The United States should continue to build a consensus within the international community to help share the burden to create a stable Iraq until the United Nations assumes the mission. President Bush states "the U.S. will leave once there is a 'free and peaceful Iraq' following establishment of a constitution and elections."⁴⁵ In the final analysis, the United Nations must lead Iraq's construction effort and help the Iraqi Governing Council establish a new government, as Iraq must be governed by Iraqis as soon as feasible. The U.S. led coalition must remain in Iraq until the stability mission is executed by the U.N. and the Iraqis. Once this transition is complete, the U.S. will be able to leave Iraq.

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