Disconnected Strategies: Why Success is Elusive in Stability Operations and Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Abstract
Since the late 198O's the United States (US) has conducted an increasing number of operations other than war to include attempts at post-conflict reconstruction. Success in these operations has been elusive. The US interventions in Panama 1989-1991 Somalia 1992- 1994 and Haiti 1994-1996 provide excellent case studies for determining the foundational causes of its poor performance. An analysis of these operations yields a consistent lesson. The US Government must develop the capacity to meld national and operational level strategies in a manner that creates unified effort. Without such a capability it will continue to fail to achieve its strategic objectives in such operations. In Panama Somalia and Haiti this lack of capacity resulted in poorly developed and articulated objectives; a lack of unified effort; and an incongruence among ends ways and means. Efforts to improve the Government's capacity to successfully plan and conduct these operations have not resulted in any significant change. Given that the US will continue to face these challenges it is time to provide legislative solutions that create the structures and processes required to succeed in stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 19, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA424103
Entities
People
- John M. Moore
Organizations
- United States Army War College