Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Legitimacy Focus
Abstract
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provides a superb opportunity to assess the degree of success the U.S. leadership attained in employing the Elements of National Power. Our military emphasizes the importance of identifying the enemy's center of gravity (COG) to focus planning and employment of military power. The theory originates in the writings of Cad von Clausewitz who proposed that if a leader identifies an enemy's COG and focuses his objectives strategy and resources in an effort to influence that center of gravity; he will most effectively achieve success. Although the major combat phase of OIF was highly successful our nation's leaders have received harsh criticism from the international community the Arab States U.S. media and much of the U.S. population for perceived failings in the post war reconstruction of Iraq. Our leadership never formally identified a strategic COG but established Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party as the strategic COG in numerous speeches regarding OIF. This paper will present the argument that if legitimacy were identified as the Strategic COG and all planning preparation and actions were focused on enhancing Coalition legitimacy and eradicating Hussein and Baath legitimacy the Coalition would have realized greater success in all phases of OIF.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 19, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA424165
Entities
People
- Gregory A. Brockman
Organizations
- United States Army War College