

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE REALIGNMENT OF THE JAPAN-UNITED STATES ALLIANCE
AND
THE EMERGING ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCE**

by

Colonel Kimihiko Kishikawa
Japan Ground Self-Defense Force
Corps of Engineers

Dr. Jerome J. Comello
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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The Japan-U.S. Security Alliance and the Japan Self Defense Force (SDF) have been the centerpieces for security of Japan since the end of WWII.

During the Cold War period, the Soviet Union was the common and only threat to both nations. The ultimate goal of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was to cope with the Soviet military threat. To do this, the United States provided deterrence by deploying its military forces forward, while Japan maintained its defense capabilities at the minimum level necessary. The roles and missions of the SDF were limited only to the defense of Japan. However, the disappearance of the Soviet Union after the end of Cold War caused huge perturbations in the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The focus of the Japan-U.S. Alliance shifted from the traditional Soviet-focus to a regional-security focus. The roles and missions of the SDF were also diversified from the defense of Japan to regional stability.

September 11, 2001 changed all this. This incident created dramatic impacts on the global security system as well as the U.S. Security Strategy. The United States shifted its security focus to the Global War On Terror (GWOT) and adopted a much more aggressive posture. Thus, the Japan-U.S. Alliance faces another challenge in its evolution.

Japan is now trying to revise its national security policy, the National Defense Program Outline, (NDPO) to cope with the emerging situation. It is a time for both nations, especially Japan, to adapt to the new situation quickly. The author will argue that the Japan-U.S Alliance is prerequisite for both nations to secure their national interests in the immediate future and also argue that cooperation on the GWOT, especially Japan's active involvement, is essential to enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

In conclusion, the Japan-U.S. Alliance is the only realistic and effective way to secure the national interests of Japan. The effectiveness of the alliance should be enhanced. To do this, the nature of the alliance should be shifted to a regional and global context, and the roles and missions of the SDF should be enlarged so that the SDF will be able to participate in future coalition activities, especially in the GWOT.

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THE REALIGNMENT OF THE JAPAN-UNITED STATES ALLIANCE AND THE EMERGING ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

After World War II, Japan was born again as a democratic country. Its national policy as a new democratic country was called the "Yoshida Doctrine". This doctrine was threefold: Japan would remain in the Western camp, make the minimal military efforts necessary to secure a defense relationship with the United States, and leave the hard security problems to Washington as Japan focused on economic recovery.¹ Based on this doctrine, Japan's national security policy had mainly consisted of the following two pillars:

- The military deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
- The exclusively defense-oriented minimum military capability of the Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF).²

The Japan-U.S. Alliance during the Cold War was formed around the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), which depicts the basic concept of Japan's security policy, the 1978 Defense Guidelines, which depicts possible defense cooperation between Japan and the United States, and the 1981-82 bilateral division of roles and missions.³ The Japan-U.S. Alliance during the Cold War period functioned very well because both nations had one common Soviet military threat. Both nations' security interests in this region were congruous. They were to defend Japan from a possible military threat from the Soviet Union. Roughly speaking, the roles and missions of both nations were that the United States would take offensive operations and Japan would take defensive operations and secure Japan's sea line of communications.⁴ There was no security dilemma or gap between two nations at that time. However, collapse of the bipolar system changed the security paradigm in this region dramatically.

Disappearance of the Soviet military threat posed a security dilemma to the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In addition, the 1990-91 Gulf War and the 1994 North Korean (NK) nuclear crisis posed new security challenges to Japan. Japan, in close cooperation with the United States, had to reexamine its national security policy. The Japan-U.S. Alliance was reexamined carefully in order to meet the more fluid strategic environment.⁵ To do this, the Government of Japan (GOJ) considered a wide variety of initiatives. One was the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO Law) in 1992. Under this law Japan contributes to regional stability through United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKO) and humanitarian assistance. Other initiatives were the adjustment of the Cold War Alliance, the creation of the 1995 NDPO and the 1997 Defense Guidelines.

Thanks to these efforts, the Japan-U.S. Alliance successfully deterred “any invasion of Japan” and controlled all “situations in the area surrounding Japan” (SIASJ) that could have a direct effect on Japan's security. Eventually, a third pillar, “the contribution to regional stability”, was added to Japan's security policy, but its primary focus remained on the defense of Japan. The roles and missions of the SDF were also diversified from the traditional defense of Japan to regional stability missions such as PKO, humanitarian assistance operations (HAO) and (international) disaster relief operations (DRO). However, these newly assigned missions were secondary.

The 9.11 terrorist attacks in the United States changed this security paradigm. This incident dramatically impacted the United States Security Strategy as well as the global security system. The United States shifted its security focus to the Global War On Terror (GWOT).⁶ Inevitably, the Japan-U.S. Alliance faced another stage in its evolution. Japan is now trying to revise its NDPO to cope with the emerging situation.⁷ It is a time for both nations, especially Japan, to adapt to the new situation quickly.

This paper will review the evolution of Japan's national security policy from the post WWII period. It will examine Japan's current security policy and will conclude that the nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance should be shifted to a regional and global context and the roles and missions of the SDF should also be enlarged to achieve Japan's national interests after September 11th.

CHRONOLOGY OF JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY

FIRST PHASE: FROM RESTORATION OF SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH THE 1960 REVISION OF THE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY TREATY (1950-1959)

The foundation of Japan's post war security policy was formed during 1950s.⁸ On 8 September 1951, Japan regained its sovereignty when it signed the Treaty of Peace. On the same day, Japan concluded the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty).

At the San Francisco Peace Conference, then Japanese Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida stressed that security was needed for Japan to maintain its independence, as restored by the Peace Treaty, by saying, “Japan cannot help asking that United States forces be stationed in Japan until Japan, a defeated nation, regains its own power to defend its independence or measures by United Nations (UN) or other collective security arrangements ensure peace and stability in the region surrounding Japan.”⁹ This decision was based on the fact that Japan was in a position to determine its national security policy after the withdrawal of Allied Powers at the

end of Korean War. Japan decided to follow the Western countries that make freedom and democracy their keynote, and chose an alliance with the United States to guarantee its national security. Thus, Japan ensured the security of its own country by garrisoning the United States forces in Japan based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, while maintaining the minimal military forces necessary. Japan advanced its national reconstruction focusing on economic prosperity. This was the so-called "Yoshida Doctrine" and became the foundation of the remarkable reconstruction of Japan.¹⁰

During this period, the Japanese Police Reserve Agency was reorganized as the Japanese National Safety Agency in October 1952, and was eventually transformed into the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) and the SDF in June 1954. Japan became a member of the United Nations in 1956 and adopted the Basic Policy for National Defense in 1957. Since then, Japan's defense policy has been based on the Basic Policy for National Defense. The centerpiece of this policy was the development of an efficient military capability and adherence to the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Under the Basic Policy for National Defense, Japan built a modest defense capability consistent with its constitution and adhered to the fundamental principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries. Japan also adhered to the principle of civilian control of the military and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement.¹¹

SECOND PHASE: FROM THE 1960 REVISION OF THE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY TREATY THROUGH THE END OF THE COLD WAR (1960-1989)

The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty possessed reciprocal and unilateral features. For example, it did not oblige the United States to defend Japan, but had an internal riots clause. After an eighteen-month review, the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America" (the current Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) was signed in 1960.¹²

The current Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was intended to solve the problems of the former treaty. The significance of the current Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is articulated in Article V and VI. Article V specifies that Japan and the United States will take joint actions in the event of an armed attack on Japan. The United States' obligation to defend Japan means that those who attempt any armed attack on Japan would have to contend not only with the SDF but also the United States' military power. Based on this, Japan was to conduct defensive operations within its territory, while the United States would conduct offensive operations both within and outside of Japanese territory.¹³

Japan, however, could not conduct joint operation outside of Japanese territory even in the event of an armed attack on Japan. This was based on the GOJ's interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution. The exercise of the right of self-defense under Article 9 of the Constitution is confined to the minimum level necessary for the defense of Japan. The GOJ recognized that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense by offensive operations exceeds that limit and is not permissible under the Constitution.

From the United States' perspective, the current Japan-U.S. Security Treaty still includes some asymmetrical provisions. The United States has responsibility for defense of Japan, while Japan has no responsibility for defense of the United States. To facilitate its execution, Article VI of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty articulates that United States forces are granted the use of facilities and areas in Japan for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan as well as international peace and security in the Far East. It also states that the United States may station its troops in Japan. Above all, Article VI of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is a necessary complement to Article V which encourages Japan-U.S. cooperation not only in security but also in economic matters and thus provides the basis for the broad, friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries.¹⁴

During the Cold War period, especially after 1960s, the Soviet Union reinforced its military capability in the Far Eastern District to cope with the emerging threat from China and the Japan-U.S. security arrangements became more important for the United States' strategy in the Far East. The basic framework of Japan's security policy was developed throughout this period. Its two main pillars were: maintaining the security arrangement with the United States, and building its moderate defense capability. During the Cold War period, the first priority of Japan's security was to cope with the military threat posed by the Soviet Union. For the United States, a strategy to contain the Soviet Union was supposed to be the best option for maintaining Japan's security. Consequently Japan attained its security objectives by playing an important role as an ally of the United States.¹⁵

These concepts are clearly stated in the 1976 NDPO which depicts the basic concept of Japan's defense policy, the 1978 Defense Guidelines which depict possible defense cooperation between Japan and the United States, and the 1981-82 bilateral division of roles and missions.¹⁶ The Japan-U.S. Alliance during the Cold War period functioned very well because both nations had a common threat. Both nations' security interests in this region were shared 100%. They were to defend Japan from a possible military threat from the Soviet Union. Roughly speaking, the roles and missions of both nations were that the United States would take offensive operations and Japan would take defensive operations and secure the Japanese

sea line of communications.¹⁷ There was no security dilemma or gap between the two nations then.

THIRD PHASE: POST COLD WAR PERIOD (1990 -1999)

The end of the Cold War brought drastic changes not only to international security but also to Japan's. The structure of confrontation between East and West on the basis of military power disappeared. The Soviet military threat in the Far East was dramatically eliminated. However, territorial disputes remained and religious conflicts and conflicts rooted in ethnic problems were increasing.

In Northeast Asia, unpredictable and uncertain elements still existed including issues such as the continuing tension on the Korean Peninsula and China's military buildup. In addition, the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was increasing. On the other hand, various efforts to promote international cooperation such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) were made to create a more stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁸

The disappearance of the Soviet military threat, the 1990-91 Gulf War, and the 1994 North Korean (NK) nuclear crisis pose new security challenges for Japan by creating a security dilemma in the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Japan, in cooperation with the United States, reviewed its security policy and issued the 1995 NDPO. Then the GOJ and the United States issued the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, and created new Defense Guidelines in 1997.

Thanks to these efforts, the two enduring pillars of Japan's security policy, namely the military deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Security Alliance, and the exclusively defense-oriented minimum military capability of the SDF were strengthened substantially. While the 1976 NDPO articulated only national defense, the 1995 NDPO addressed not only national defense but also response to large-scale disasters and various other situations. It also addressed Japan's contribution to the creation of a more stable security environment. While the 1978 Japan-Defense Guidelines focused only on the defense of Japan, the 1997 guidelines included bilateral cooperation on regional security issues as well as the defense of Japan. The focus of Japan's security policy as well as the Japan-U.S. Alliance was shifting from the defense of Japan to the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁹

To promote the effectiveness of these new policies, many administrative measures and laws were implemented during this period. For example, the Law Concerning the Dispatch of the International Disaster Relief Team, the International Disaster Relief Law was revised, and the International Peace Cooperation Law, the PKO Law was enacted in 1992. These laws enabled the SDF to participate in international cooperation activities. Moreover the Law

Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in and Areas Surrounding Japan, the SIASJ Law, and the agreement to Amend the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement Between Japan and the United States, the revised ACSA agreement were enacted in 1999.

Eventually, a third pillar, “the contribution to regional stability” was put in Japan’s national security policy. Subsequently Japan has been actively conducting bilateral and multilateral security dialogues and defense exchanges with related countries such as the ASEAN countries, European countries, China, Korea and Russia.

Even though these significant changes occurred in Japan’s security policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance, their primary focus still remained on the defense of Japan. However, the roles and missions of the SDF were also broadened from the traditional defense of Japan to include regional stability such as PKO, HAO and DRO. However, these newly assigned roles and missions were of a secondary nature.

EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT JAPAN’S SECURITY POLICY

September 11, 2001 dramatically impacted the U.S. Security Strategy as well as the global security system. The United States shifted its security focus to the Global War On Terror (GWOT).²⁰ Inevitably, the Japan-U.S. Alliance faces another stage in its evolution. Japan is now trying to revise its NDPO to cope with the emerging situation.²¹ It is a time for both nations, especially Japan, to adapt and to do so quickly.

NATIONAL INTERESTS OF JAPAN

Clarifying Japan’s national interests is the basis for formulating the future Japan-U.S. Alliance. However, the debate on its national interests has not yet occurred in Japan. During the Cold War, Japan enjoyed outstanding economic prosperity, while the United States provided its security. Japan did not feel any eminent necessity to clarify its national interests.²² After the end of the Cold War, security environment changed dramatically. It became more important for Japan to define its national interests clearly under the volatile, uncertain, complicated and ambiguous (VUCA) security environment that followed the Cold War.

There is no official document that states Japan’s national interests. However, Dr. Masayuki Yamauchi, the member of the Task Force on Foreign Relations chaired by Special Adviser to the Cabinet Secretariat Okamoto, proposed that Japan’s national interests are almost the same as those of the United States, which shares common values such as freedom, democracy and free trade with Japan.²³

Japan's national interests are:

- **Maintenance of the peace and security of Japan.** Security is the most vital national interest for every nation. To maintain its security, Japan as one of the world's political leaders should engage itself actively in global security affairs.
- **Support for the free trade system.** It is evident that the free trade system is important for Japan to enjoy economic prosperity. Accordingly, Japan should strengthen the free trade system by establishing a network of bilateral free trade agreements and support the World Trade Organization.
- **Protection of freedom, democracy and human rights.** Freedom and democracy are Japan's significant accomplishments since the Meiji Era. It is Japan's duty to demonstrate a consistent commitment to the protection of these values in order to maintain regional stability.
- **Promotion of people to people exchanges and development of human resources through exchanges in the area of culture and education.** Japan was the first modern country in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan put emphasis on developing human resources and it is because of the promotion of people-to-people exchange and development of human resources that Japan has flourished. It is important for Japan to continue to increase the number of people who understand Japan well.²⁴

Japan's national interests mentioned here should remain constant for the foreseeable future. Now is the time for Japan to actively engage the global community consistent with its national interests and security policy.

SITUATION SURROUNDING JAPAN

Assuming that Japan's national interests are as mentioned above they would seem to be constant for the foreseeable future. But the situation surrounding Japan is another major factor that impacts on its national security and that is dramatically changing.

General outlook on the situations surrounding Japan

The end of the Cold War marked the end of armed conflict between states on a global scale. However, various hostilities, which had been confined by the East-West confrontation, have become more eminent and intensified. Additionally a number of complicated regional conflicts are emerging. Furthermore, proliferation of WMD such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles poses risks and has become a global concern.

Unlike the past, not only traditional nation states but also non-state actors such as terrorists' organizations are causing concern in the international community. Various threats or risks such as terrorism, piracy and drug smuggling are dramatically increasing. This trend has accelerated after the 9.11 terrorist attacks.

Interdependences among nations also have dramatically increased economically as well as politically. Ongoing globalization is being accelerated by development in the communications and transportation fields. As a result of globalization certain events occurring in one country might bring drastic impacts on the globe quickly. It is becoming increasingly difficult to anticipate or detect the associated threats.²⁵ In all, a wide variety of complicated and unpredictable threats or risks are emerging. It has become more and more difficult to predict who, when, where, how and why attacks might occur. On the other hand, interdependences among nations have created opportunity to enhance bilateral or multilateral cooperation. Regional stability is the common goal of most countries concerned. International cooperation on the GWOT and nonproliferation of WMD has been well established.

North Korea's asymmetric military capability

Although North Korea (NK) suffers serious economic deficiency and depends on international support, it is striving to sustain and enhance its military capability by allocating 15.4% of the 2003 national budget to defense. Furthermore, NK is reported to have developed, deployed and exported WMD and ballistic missiles; to be maintaining large-scale special operation forces and to be promoting its asymmetric military capabilities. This assessment is based on the fact that NK has been advocating, as its national policy, its development as a "strong and rising great power." It is aiming to make itself a strong socialist state in all areas intellectual, political, military, and economic. It has adopted a "military first policy" to realize this goal.²⁶

NK's nuclear development program has become important not only to the security of Japan but also to the international community especially from the viewpoint of the proliferation of WMD. Although there have been some positive developments such as Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to NK in 2002 and the six-party talks on NK nuclear development program, NK has adopted a "diplomatic brinkmanship" policy by intentionally increasing tension to get a compromise from the global community.

It is believed that NK has been exporting its ballistic missiles to countries and has already deployed liquid-fuel Scud-C and No Dong missiles. The No Dong missile is estimated to have a range of about 1,300 kilometers and to be capable of hitting most parts of Japan, as well as

Siberia, Beijing and Shanghai. NK has been researching and developing missiles with longer ranges such as the Taepo Dong-1 with a range more than 1,500 kilometers and the Taepo Dong-2 with a range between 3,500 kilometers and 6,000 kilometers.²⁷ It has been reported that NK exported ballistic missiles including the No Dong and its related technologies to Iran and Pakistan.²⁸ Furthermore, NK has a substantial quantity of chemical weapons as well as the infrastructure to produce biological weapons. NK has special operation forces that can conduct various missions ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage to guerilla warfare. The NK spy boat incident in 2001 shows that NK is continuously conducting hostile activities against Japan.²⁹ In all, these NK's activities have heightened the tensions on the Korean Peninsula, posing an eminent threat to Northeast Asia and the global community.

China as a potential threat

In the midst of profound political, economic and social changes that are causing strains in its social system, China has put top priority on its economic growth, and has been pursuing a reform and open-door policy with the aim of building a "rich and strong, democratic and civilized" socialist nation.³⁰ This assessment is based on the recognition that only rapid economic growth can absorb such tensions and maintain domestic stability. This is why economic issues have become the top priority in China so rapidly in recent years.³¹

In the political arena, the transfer of power to the younger generation is taking place. In March 2003, former Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao succeeded to the office of General Secretary Jiang Zemin, who held the office for 13 years. Many senior members of the Chinese Communist Party were also replaced.³² In all, China's future depends on how China's new leaders can maintain continuous economic growth and simultaneously manage the complicated problems confronting China.

China's military capability is being built up primarily for maintaining military superiority over the other regional actors such as Japan and Russia, developing the military capability to coerce Taiwan into accommodation with the mainland, and deterring the U.S. from taking effective action against China's core interests.³³ Thanks to its economic growth, China's defense expenditures have increased remarkably since the mid-1990s, and have been spent primarily on modernization of its conventional forces as well as its nuclear capability.

China's nuclear capability is increasing remarkably. For example, China currently deploys approximately 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and is developing new-type ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Such modernization also can be seen in intermediate-range ballistic missiles and short-range ballistic missiles. Their ranges cover not

only the Asian region including Japan but also some of the United States territory such Alaska and Hawaii. However, China expresses that its nuclear power is purely for self-defense and only will be used as a countermeasure.³⁴

China is also expanding its maritime activities. The Chinese navy reinforced its bases on the Spratly and Parcel Islands, whose sovereignty is disputed with some ASEAN countries, and increased its naval activity in waters near Japan. Furthermore, Chinese naval vessels are actively engaged in long-distance navigations. It is estimated that China is aiming to build a blue-water navy in the future.³⁵

In all, China has been modernizing its nuclear and missile forces as well as naval and air forces in recent years. At the same time, China has been trying to expand the scope of its maritime operations. China is a potential threat not only to Japan but also to the United States. China might be an eminent threat if its domestic instability causes tensions in such areas as the Spratly and Parcel Islands, Taiwan Strait and waters near Japan.

DRASTIC SHIFT OF US SECURITY POLICY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS TO THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE

The 9.11 terrorist attacks in the United States gave a devastating shock throughout the world. Although the world had been aware of the threats posed by terrorism, the attacks on September 11 were beyond imagination in their scale and means. As a result, the international community recognized that terrorism has become an eminent threat to the international community in the 21st century.³⁶ The United States especially recognized that its geographical advantages of being protected by two oceans could not frustrate an enemy's attack any more. This is clearly articulated in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America issued on September 17, 2002. The United States shifted its national security priority to homeland defense with special emphases on the GWOT and non-proliferation of WMD.³⁷ On the other hand, the United States, as the only superpower after the end of the Cold War, has an overwhelming superiority in military science and technology. Because of the striking advancement of information technology and its military applications, the gap between the United States and other countries in military capability has been increasing.³⁸ With overwhelming national power, the United States seems to be the only "Hegemon" in the new century. The 9.11 terrorist attacks have caused various implications for alliances with the United States. During the Cold War, the existence of alliances was valuable. However, considering the United States' relative power, it seems that it no longer values alliances merely for their sake.³⁹

In spite of its current capabilities, it is also true that all of the international issues such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMD cannot be solved by the United States alone. The United

States recognizes that international cooperation is the key to solving these issues by enhancing common values among associated countries.⁴⁰

Over 50 years has passed since Japan and the United States signed the Peace Treaty. Japan and the United States shared common values such as freedom, democracy and human rights. Thanks to the open market, Japan and the United States enjoy economic prosperity. Japan and the United States should share the responsibilities for maintaining regional and global peace. In this sense, the Japan-U.S. Alliance is essential to promote regional as well as global stability. After the 9.11 terrorist attacks, the GWOT became the most urgent and vital common agenda. It is vital for Japan, as one of the United States' allies, to be prepared to fight against terrorists. The SDF roles and missions, force structures and related legislation should be reexamined with a view to meeting these new challenges.

The NSS articulated that the United States would, if necessary, act preemptively to forestall or prevent hostile acts by adversaries such as rogue states and terrorist.⁴¹ Current coalition military operations in Iraq are supposed to be based on this concept. This concept brought drastic implications on the traditional concepts of threat and deterrence. Because Japan's interpretation of the use of force is relatively defensive compared to that of the United States, this concept might create a security gap between Japan and the United States.

JAPAN'S EMERGING EXPECTATIONS FOR THE SDF

Since the end of the Cold War, the Japanese people's perception of the SDF has been undergoing great changes. The SDF's relief activities in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995 and the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system in 1995 proved that the SDF is an essential institution for the protection of their lives and property. The international peacekeeping operations in Cambodia (1992-93), Mozambique (1993-95), Zaire (1994), Golan Heights (1996-) and East Timor (2002-), and the dispatch of SDF's vessels to the Indian Ocean in 2002 under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law were highly appreciated not only in Japan but also internationally. Thanks to the achievements of the SDF, the Japanese people's expectations are increasing steadily, especially in the area of international peacekeeping and the GWOT. For example, according to the annual poll done by the GOJ in 2003, over 70.0% of Japanese people expected the SDF to take more active roles and missions in international peacekeeping operations, compared to 45.5% in 1993. And over 64.8% of Japanese people expected the SDF to take more active roles and missions associated with the GWOT.⁴² In all, the SDF's roles and missions dramatically enlarged in response to the emerging situation after the end of the Cold

War. The Japanese people welcomed this movement and expect the SDF to take more active roles and missions in order to fulfill its international security responsibility.

THE SDF'S CURRENT ACTIVITIES IN THE GWOT

Just after the 9.11 terrorist attacks occurred, Japan's Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi swiftly made clear the GOJ's so-called "Five-point Emergency Policy Guidance". In this guidance, Japan made it clear that the GWOT is directly related to Japan's national security, and Japan strongly supports its ally the United States in the fight against terrorism.⁴³ On 29 October 2001 after two months intensive deliberation in the Diet, "the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law" was enacted. Based on this law, on 9 November 2001, the SDF vessels left Japan for the Indian Ocean to provide rear area logistic support for the United States and coalition forces in the Afghanistan area of operations.

Another significant activity is the enactment of "the Humanitarian Relief and Iraqi Reconstruction Special Measures Law" (Iraq Special Measures Law) on 23 July 2003. The significance of this law is that Japan can provide not only humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Iraq but also logistics support to other coalition partners in Iraq.⁴⁴

These measures are just some examples of the actions Japan has taken so far. However, these events have significant implications for Japan's national security. These activities are implemented based on Japan's clear will to fight against terrorism, which is supported by the Japanese people who also support Japan's taking a more proactive role in regional and global security issues. The momentum seen in Japan's security policy should be irreversible and progressive.

ALTERNATIVE SECURITY POLICIES FOR JAPAN IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

It is critical for Japan to formulate a national security policy suitable for a VUCA security situation. Taking into accounts all of the considerations that I mentioned so far, there are three possible alternatives for Japan's future security policy. These are:

- Unilateralism (Nationalism).
- Maintain current the Japan-U.S. Alliance (Status-Quo).
- Promote the Japan-U.S. Alliance, especially in a regional and global security context (Normal Nation).

No one will argue that Japan will select the first option because this option eventually leads Japan to a regional hegemon. This could create regional as well as global uncertainty or chaos. It is clear that this option will not meet Japan's national interests as mentioned before.

Option two, often characterized as “If it isn’t broken, don’t fix it” is supposed to be relatively good for Japan. This is because Japan would be able to enjoy its current comfortable position described by the quote “The United States is in a dominant position and Japan is in a subordinate one”.⁴⁵ This option also reassures Northeast Asian countries’ concerns about “the revival of Japanese hegemony”. But this option will not meet the current shifts in the U.S. security policy and its expectations as well as the emerging Japanese peoples’ desires. Moreover, this will not work effectively against the emerging risks from NK and China. Many political and operational issues remain and require improvement for the Japan-U.S. Alliance to work effectively in the event of crises in this region. Eventually, this option contradicts Japan’s national interests.

Then, option three, which is characterized, as “Japan must do more” seems to be the best option for Japan. That is because this option satisfies all concerns mentioned so far such as national interests and changing situations. The SDF vessels’ participation in Operation Enduring Freedom and the recent Prime Minister Koizumi’s pledge for active involvement in Iraq operations, which consisted of over 5 billion dollars of aid and deployment of a SDF unit are clear evidence that Japan desires a more active role in the global context. However, this option may cause neighboring nations to be concerned over a rising Japan. In this sense, this option must be carefully considered in the context of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and multilateral cooperation to promote regional and global stability. For example trilateral cooperation among the United States, Korea and Japan should be enhanced to cope with regional issues such as NK and China.

JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

REALIGNMENT OF THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE: A NORMAL NATION

Above all, Japan’s new security policy will be based on three pillars:

- The deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
- The defense-oriented minimum military capability of the SDF.
- Cooperation for global and regional stability in the context of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

More emphasis should be placed on the third pillar than in the past. To support this new security policy, the Japan-U.S. Alliance should be strengthened in terms of the regional/global security context by implementing measures to improve the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in areas such as the GWOT, theater missile defense and so forth.

EMERGING ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE SDF

To execute the measures taken based on Japan's new security policy, the SDF should also review its current roles and missions, and add the following new ones:

- **Non-combat support for US and coalition operations in the context of the GWOT.** Because of the restrictions posed by the Constitution, it will be impossible for the SDF to conduct combat operations as a part of coalition/multinational operation in the foreseeable future. However, Japan should conduct non-combat operations such as intelligence sharing, logistics support, maritime interdiction operations (MIO), engineering support, and medical support to the United States and its coalition forces operating for the GWOT.
- **More proactive participation in PKO, HAO and DRO under UN mandate and/or other regional institution's requests.** Because of the same constitutional restrictions above, the SDF would not be able to participate in combat operations in such areas as peace enforcement even under UN mandate. However, Japan should conduct non-combat operations not only under the UN mandate but also under other regional authorizations such as the ARF.
- **Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).** In 1998, NK launched its ballistic missile over Japan. This fact shows that BMD is essential to the security of Japan. Japan's deployment of BMD system automatically provides the United States forces deployed in Japan with protection against ballistic missiles threat. It eventually improves the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
- **Measures to improve the effectiveness of the Defense of Japan and the SIASJ.** It is critically important from the Japan-U.S. Alliance perspective that Japan, in close cooperation with the United States, should take more effective measures to support the United States and coalition operations in the event of regional crises such as the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Straits, and Senkaku Islands, which might present the toughest challenges to both nations. Those are information sharing, host nation support (HNS), rear area support (RAS), search and rescue (SAR), MIO, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and bilateral combat operation in remote islands. It is also very important for both nations to inform neighboring countries of these intentions and possible actions.⁴⁶

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Japan-U.S. Alliance is the only realistic and effective way to secure the national interests of Japan. Effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance should be maintained and enhanced. To do this, the nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance should be shifted to a regional and global context and the roles and missions of the SDF should also be enlarged. To fully implement these roles and missions, the following political, legislative and organizational issues must be settled.

- Political: Right of collective self-defense and the use of force.
- Legislative: Emergency Legislation, Revised PKO Law (incl. the GWOT), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).
- Organizational: Jointness, Force Structure, Rules of Engagement, Education & Training.

Judging from current movement happening in Japan, these issues are sure to be solved. By these efforts, Japan and the United States will definitely maintain regional and global peace and stability, and enjoy further prosperity.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Steven K. Vogel, *U.S.-JAPAN Relations in a Changing World* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2002), 13.

² Ibid., 19-20.

³ Michael Green, and Robin Sakoda, "A New Agenda for the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Rethinking Roles and Missions," 2001; Available from < <http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/doc/green.sakoda.doc>>; Internet; Accessed 19 November 2003.

⁴ Ibid., 2.

⁵ Vogel, *U.S.-JAPAN Relations in a Changing World*, 23.

⁶ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2002), 5.

⁷ Fukuda, Yasuo, "Comment by Chief Cabinet Secretary"; Available from <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyokan/koizumi/2003/1219danwa.html>>; Internet; Accessed 13 January 2004.

⁸ Morimoto, Satoshi, *Anzenhosho-Ron: 21 Seiki Sekai no Kikikanri (Study on National Security: Crisis Management for 21st Century)* (Tokyo, Japan:PHP Kenkyu-jo, 2000), 358.

⁹ Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan (Defense White Paper) in JFY 2003* (English Version) (Tokyo, Japan: the Japan Defense Agency, 2003), 98.

¹⁰ Vogel, *U.S.-JAPAN Relations in a Changing World*, 13.

¹¹ Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan in JFY 2003*, 93.

¹² Ibid., 98.

¹³ Ibid., 96.

¹⁴ Morimoto, *Anzenhosho-Ron*, 360.

¹⁵ Ibid., 363.

¹⁶ Michael Green, *A New Agenda for the U.S.-Japan Alliance*.

¹⁷ Ibid., 2.

¹⁸ Morimoto, *Anzenhosho-Ron*, 363.

¹⁹ Ibid., 364.

²⁰ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 5-7.

²¹ Fukuda, "Comment by Chief Cabinet Secretary".

²² Taigai Kankei Tasuku Foosu (Task Force on Foreign Relations), "21 Seiki Nihon Gaiko no Kihon Senryaku: Aratana Jidai Aratana Bijon, Aratana Gaiko", 28 November 2002; Available from <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2002/1128tf.html>>; Internet; Accessed 19 November 2003.

²³ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 1-2.

²⁴ Taigai Kankei Tasuku Foosu, 21 Seiki Nihon Gaiko no Kihon Senryaku.

²⁵ Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan (Defense White Paper) in JFY 2004* (English Version) (Tokyo, Japan: the Japan Defense Agency, 2003), 2.

²⁶ Ibid., 46.

²⁷ Ibid., 48-50.

²⁸ Ibid., 48.

²⁹ Ibid., 50.

³⁰ Ibid., 58.

³¹ "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-China and Northeast Asia," 13 November 2003; Available from <<http://www4.janes.com/K2/docprint.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/cnasu/chins010.htm>>; Internet; Accessed 9 January 2004.

³² Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan in JFY 2004*, 59.

³³ The National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, *East Asian Strategic Review 2003* (Tokyo, Japan: The Japan Times, 2003), 53.

³⁴ Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan in JFY 2004*, 63.

³⁵ Ibid., 68.

³⁶ Ibid., 19.

³⁷ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 5-7.

³⁸ Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan in JFY 2004*, 3.

³⁹ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁰ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 5-7.

⁴¹ Ibid., 15.

⁴² Public Affairs, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, "Jieitai Boukei Mondai nikansuru Yoron Chosa," January 2003; Available from <<http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h14/h14-bouei>>; Internet; Accessed 19 November 2003.

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⁴⁵ Mike M. Mochizuki. *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Beyond the Guidelines* (Washington D.C., Pacific Forum CSIS, 2000) 2-3.

⁴⁶ Michael Green, "A New Agenda for the U.S.-Japan Alliance."

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