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NEW ZEALAND DEFENSE POLICY FRAMEWORK, A STRATEGIC REAPPRAISAL

by

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ABSTRACT

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In June 2000 the NZ Government produced a capstone defense policy paper titled the Defence Policy Framework. In this document the New Zealand Government articulated a defense policy based on a conclusion that “New Zealand is not directly threatened by any other country”, and a focus on regional (South Pacific and SE and NE Asia) security. The paper also highlighted New Zealand's commitment to supporting military actions that are sanctioned by the broad international community represented in the United Nations.

The NZ Government paper appears to isolate defense from the other elements of national power as an ends in itself and fails to address the contemporary global linkages to security issues. Given the rapid changes in New Zealand's region, forced in some part by globalization and democratization, New Zealand must develop a security framework that recognizes the new forces which define the contemporary security environment. The security policy must work in partnership with the other elements of national power to further the national interests. In this new environment, New Zealand cannot ignore the international impacts of globalization, democratization and nationalization on New Zealand's overall security.

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PREFACE

This paper is written in the hope that the United States of America and New Zealand may gain a greater understanding of the distinct roles that each has in maintaining peace in the new world order and re-establish a full security relationship based on that understanding. This will only occur when we recognize the valuable, but different role that each nation plays in the maintenance of world order. Liberalism, viewed through the lens of a large nation, may be realism viewed through the lens of a small nation.

THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENSE POLICY FRAMEWORK – A STRATEGIC APPRAISAL

What we demand is that the world be made fit and safe to live in.

Woodrow Wilson

The capstone New Zealand defense policy paper, the New Zealand Defense Policy Framework¹ (NZDPF) was released in June 2000 by a newly elected Labour (liberal) Government, which came to power in 1999 after nine years of National Party (conservative) rule. The NZDPF was a statement of the security environment and it outlined broad defense principals from which force structure considerations could be made. The paper articulated a new approach to New Zealand's defense policy that was a radical departure from previous policies. In the NZDPF, the New Zealand Government attempted to balance immediate and long-term national security requirements (ends) against its assessment of the security environment as it stood in June 2000. The NZDPF was a change from previous security positions in its attempt to fund an affordable Defense Force (means), which was to be operationally effective in a reduced number of combat functions (ways). It also enunciated a focus on regional security.

This new approach was a departure from New Zealand's long-established defense policy in which successive governments had attempted to fund an extensive range of capabilities including combat aircraft, 'blue water' combat Navy, and an Army with broad spectrum operational capabilities. The former government policies were in response to the Cold War environment, which was epitomized by military alliance commitments. An official in the Labour Government described the situation as, "We run the risk of doing nothing adequately in an attempt to be ready for anything."² The hallmark of the NZDPF, on the operational level, is capability depth over breadth, which practically translates into a modernized Army that is capable of combat and peacekeeping operations, the removal of the Air Force strike capability and a review of the Navy's capabilities to focus more exclusively on regional operations.

The policy was drafted at a nexus in international politics where the optimism of the post Cold War 1990's was about to be challenged by the stark realities of the new security environment. Former United States Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, aptly describes this situation, "that for a decade after the Cold War, we lived on soaring hopes. The era of great power rivalry, the ambitions that make for war, seemed to be over."³ The 21st century appeared to hold a promise of peace for a world that had experienced two world wars and a nuclear super power stand off in the previous century. What was not obvious, were the new transnational

forces that were about to be unleashed, ironically to a large extent, as a consequence of dismantling the belligerent bi-polar world order.

One of the major forces that challenged world order at the end of the Cold War was globalization. Many authors have written about the globalization phenomenon. Globalization should not be regarded as a new concept as it has existed in a number of forms since humans began to socialize, or as described by Mike Moore, former head of the World Trade Organization (WTO), "...since man began to organize his life, by harvesting as well as hunting, exchanging goods and ideas."⁴ Moore further defines this current phase of globalization as a process rather than a policy which is "the acceleration of international integration, spurred by a number of factors, and is now largely technology-driven."⁵ The modern phase of globalization was assisted greatly by the removal of the east-west barrier; conversely, globalization assisted in the breakup of the Eastern Bloc itself. Robbie Robertson, in his book *The Three Waves of Globalization*, categorizes the evolution of globalization as follows: the first wave from the commencement of civilization until the French Revolution; the Second Wave starting with the industrial revolution until the end of World War II; and the current wave beginning after World War II, with the main features of American Globalism and globalizing democracies.⁶

In the post Cold War period, democratic systems of government began to replace previously undemocratic former communist and autocratic states. In the history of civilization, democracy is a relatively new form of governance, despite having its roots in Ancient Greece, being derived from the Greek *demokratia*, further broken down into *demos* (the people) and *kratos* (rule).⁷ The American Declaration of Independence and Constitution set one of the earliest models for contemporary western democracy. However, the American ideal has been adapted in many forms to suit the particular vagaries of individual nation states.

While the forces of democratization and globalization confront governments and defense planners in the new millennium, adding further challenge is the changing nature of the nation state. It is generally accepted that the system of nation states evolved at the end of the thirty-year war in Europe in 1648 under the Westphalia system. This system established geographic based units of politically independent people that were legally sovereign and accepted similar territorial based sovereign political units.⁸ What characterized this ideal was the fact that the people that formed these early nation states were mainly from a similar background such as cultural, family or religious identity and were willing participants in the group. However, on a global scale, after years of conquest and colonization and decolonization, the borders of many contemporary nation states have been redrawn numerous times and the people within these borders may not subscribe to the common values and ideals of their current nation state. This

can be a cause of internal friction as groups seek the right to self-determination, away from the parent state, in a process referred to as nationalization.

In the period since the end of the Cold War there has been an increase in the number of conflicts that are based on the clash of the concepts of nationhood and democracy. When these are added to the contemporary phenomenon of globalization, it places a severe challenge on the world order, and on a country like New Zealand as it attempts to define a defense policy, which meets the nation's current and future security requirements in a dynamic and largely unpredictable security environment.

The NZDPF appears to isolate defense from the other elements of national power as an ends in itself and fails to address the contemporary global linkages to security issues. Given the rapid changes in New Zealand's region, forced in some part by globalization, democratization and nationalization, New Zealand must develop a security framework that recognizes the new forces, which define the contemporary security environment. The security policy must work in partnership with the other elements of national power to further national interests. In this new environment, New Zealand cannot ignore the international impacts of these volatile and dynamic forces on New Zealand's overall security.

This paper will evaluate the NZDPF given the current domestic and international influences on New Zealand's security environment. To accomplish this, the paper will focus on the contemporary security environment that is heavily influenced by the combined pressures of democratization, globalization and nationalization. The paper will first outline the international challenge of defining contemporary democracy, particularly for those nations that have not previously followed a democratic system of government and for those nations that have adapted the western form of democracy to suit the nuances of their state. The current problems associated with nationalization in the post colonial and post Cold War era will then be discussed with a particular emphasis on the Asia-Pacific Region. Next, the impact of some aspects of contemporary globalization on the nation state will be discussed, particularly for those nations still in the development processes of democracy or those that are vulnerable to particular forms of globalization. While there are numerous elements of globalization that can be studied, this paper will focus on global economics and national culture. The paper will conclude by evaluating the NZDPF and assess the validity of the underlying premise in the contemporary world security environment, dominated by the forces of globalization, democratization and nationalization.

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

DEMOCRATIZATION

There exists no set template on how a nation should institute a democratic system of government and conduct itself as a democratic nation. Robertson affirms this proposition, "No universally accepted understanding of it (democracy) exists."⁹ A simple comparison between the United States and England demonstrates the diversity of systems of government between two major democratic nations. Democracy has been adapted to suit the unique social fabric of individual states. There can be no right or wrong system of democracy. Rather, states must embrace the essential features of a democratic system, which has as its cornerstone, government of the people and by the people. The basic features of a democratic government are generally considered to be: free elections, majority rule and minority rights, controls on power, constitutional government and the ability of individuals and private organizations to conduct social and economic activities free of government control.¹⁰

All democracies have a growth period where the idiosyncrasies of nation states are woven into the democratic system towards the quintessence of rule of the people by the people. The Asian forms of democracy are an example of an ideological clash between western democratic ideals and the oriental interpretation of democracy that is adapted to suit Asian cultural vagaries. According Dr Stephanie Lawson, Vice President of the Australasian Political Studies Association, "Of the values proposed as constituting the 'essence' of Asian culture and identity and, by implication, 'Asian democracy', those which have received most emphasis are consensus, harmony, unity and community."¹¹ Derived from these Asian values is the Asian style of democracy that clashes with many of the western democratic fundamentals including the right to criticize the government. The most noticeable difference in many Asian 'democratic' nations is the lack of a western style functioning opposition and its inherent freedom of political expression. Dr Lawson goes on to argue, "Singapore provides a clear example of how the existence of formal institutions associated with democratic rule provide no guarantee that substantive practices, especially in relation to freedom of political expression and opposition, are in fact operative."¹² Singapore's long time Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew declared, "What a country needs to develop is discipline more than democracy...The exuberance of democracy leads to indiscipline and disorderly conduct which are inimical to development."¹³

The governance of a state by democratic means is therefore not a straightforward concept and there is no international governing body, aside from loose UN oversight, that has defined a world best practice in democracy. Established western style democracies often criticize nations

that do not practice their own (western) ideals of democracy, but these views may not take into account the democratic development stage of the nation or national idiosyncrasies. In addition to pressures from other governments, the democratic nature of individual nations is being challenged in the new wave of globalization where non-state actors and forces internal and external to the state can decide the destiny of nations. These non-elected entities may possess the ability to redefine, or threaten the very concept of democratic statehood, even within some of the more stable world democracies. In these cases, real governmental power has been relinquished (in most cases unwillingly) to corporations and organizations that control the power of capital. Without the power of capital, states cannot achieve their domestic or international goals.¹⁴

NATIONALIZATION

Nationalization is the process by which a people with a common set of ideals and values seek independence from their current state. Nationalization is a similar concept to democratization, as it is a largely internal (domestic) process driven by the will of the population within the state for self-determination. It places significant pressure on some governments and often results in armed conflict. The former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union stand out as prominent examples of the nationalization process that has reduced two large nations into a number of smaller, independent states. While some parts of the nationalization process in these two examples was achieved without violent conflict, in many cases extreme violence was directed by all parties in the conflict, with the civilian population often targeted directly by military action.¹⁵

The Asia-Pacific Region is full of examples of nation states that are fragmenting under the pressure of people being forced to live inside the borders of a state where there is no common sense of purpose or ownership of national values. In many cases in the region, nations have been formed from non-state entities. Indonesia is one such example that is at risk of fragmentation. This is a state whose borders were drawn by former colonial powers and included a religiously, ethnically and culturally diverse grouping of people into the Federation. Strong autocratic leadership, backed by the military, had previously held the Federation together. However, since this leadership changed to a more democratic system of government, some groups within the State have sought greater degrees of representation and in some cases, such as East Timor, they have sought and gained independence.

Another recent example where intra-state disagreement has recently led to conflict is the Solomon Islands. In 2000, internal armed conflict started in this culturally disparate group of islands, which are a product of colonial era map drawing. Little regard was paid to the cultural

and ethnic diversity of the people of these islands grouped into a single state. The conflict in the Solomons is largely over a perceived disparity of power between groups from some of the islands that make up the Solomons Group. The secessionist struggle of Bougainville against the Papua New Guinea Government is another example in this increasingly troubled region. All these regional examples have a direct affect on New Zealand's security situation. As a secure regional democracy, it is expected to provide assistance to these states in difficulty in order to meet its regional responsibilities. New Zealand's challenge in these situations is to determine the legitimacy of the nationalization movement and consequently, which side in the conflict to support.

GLOBALIZATION

Given time, states may evolve to more democratic systems of governance and resolve nationalization issues. However, the necessary slow evolution of these processes is being forced aside by a revolution imposed by the rampant forces of globalization. All of the various globalizing processes throughout history have involved the persuasion of groups of people who have had their previous held beliefs, systems of governance and economics changed by external influences. In many cases this change was conducted using forceful means; by the sword and by the gun. In the contemporary sense, globalization is no less invasive, however, it utilizes the power of information age technology to conduct global business and educate mass audiences, crossing geographic borders with technology as its key weapon system. Contemporary globalization takes on many forms but it has come of age in the 1980s and 1990s with the dramatic advances in information technology, which has enabled all types of information, systems and processes to breach national boundaries.

Globalizing Economies

Arguably the element of globalization that is having the greatest trans-national impact on world order is the globalization of the international finance system. In many cases it now appears that the state function in determining the fiscal policies of the nation have been handed over, or taken over by market forces that are external to the state. According to Mike Moore, "When the world's 200 biggest corporations have combined sales greater than the combined GNP of all but the ten biggest economies, this not only changes the way business is done, but how diplomacy and international governance is conducted."¹⁶

One of the drivers of this new global economy is the exponential growth of information technology, which has enhanced the ability of the Multi-National Corporation (MNC) to reach and control foreign markets. The MNC can now operate in an international 24-hour financial

market where companies are created, sold, stocks are traded, profits and losses are made, often with scant controls by national governments. The physicist Dr Marsh, who works for the Research Division of the British Government Communication Headquarters, explains this new environment, "Whereas in 1950 foreign exchange markets could only be obtained in working hours, there is now global market coverage, which operates 24 hours a day. The scale of the transactions is beyond the control of individual governments."¹⁷ Home offices and the operations of these corporations will often change national bases. They move where the best profit can be made for the MNC, with little cognizance taken of loyalty to the nation. Profits are channeled into areas that increase profits, and similarly, areas that incur losses are rationalized with little deference given to the impact on the national economy. In effect many MNC's are economic mercenaries whose loyalties are only to the corporation. In an Economist article, this challenge to democracy and the nation state is described, "Private capital moves across the planet unchecked. Wherever it goes, it bleeds democracy of content and puts profits before people."¹⁸

Globalizing Culture

Globalization is not only challenging the economic structure of nation states but is also leading a form of cultural invasion across the world. This has had a unique affect on those states that do not subscribe to the western ideals of open democracy and the paramount right of the individual within the state. One of the significant mediums for this intrusion into nations has been through exposure to global media. This is not an entirely new phenomenon, as it has existed in such forms as the United States Voice of America and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service radiobroadcasts. However the advent, first of tape technology such as the VCR, then of mediums such as the internet and satellite technology has given greater, often uncontrollable, cross border exposure to mass populations in states where control of information is a fundamental component of population control. It has been suggested that the exposure of western information to states within the former Eastern Bloc, assisted the downfall of that system as the controlled populations within the Bloc were, for the first time, given exposure to the realities of life in the West.¹⁹

The cultural invasion is not only attributed to the free passage of information but is also caused by the globalization of products and services. The food, fashion, music and magazine industries are examples of commerce that has penetrated across borders to tempt consumers with new choices that do not necessarily enhance the cultural, religious and political values of some nations and the societies within those nations. Whereas populations may have been

content with their previous lifestyles, they now see and demand access to the products, services and lifestyles that are evident in other nations. This is problematic for governments who set values and standards for their populations that do not fit with contemporary global norms. The challenge for these governments is described by Thomas Friedman in his book, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, "Governments that want to avoid globalization not only have to prove that their alternative can still produce rising standards of living-but-and this is critically important-they have to do it in an environment in which we all increasingly know how everyone else lives."²⁰

Autocratic states such as Afghanistan under the Taliban, and radical ideological based groups like Al Qaeda, incite hatred within populations by claiming the globalization of culture and ideas are a direct attack by the West on their system of beliefs and values. These groups often use religion as the medium to channel this hatred into acts of violence against iconic globalization targets. It is in these extreme, and other cases, that confusion exists between the concepts of modernity and westernization. In these situations states can refuse to embrace important changes, which will enhance the development and well being of the population as the new ideas are interpreted as foreign (western) and against the fundamentals of the state. Robertson describes the outcome of these intransigent views as encouraging, "the idea that globalization and its by-products originate with and are directed by the West."²¹

NEW ZEALAND DEFENSE POLICY FRAMEWORK ASSESSMENT

POST COLD WAR OPTIMISM - SHAPING AN OPTIMISTIC POLICY

Anti-Western (or anti-United States) hatred appears to be the hallmark of the contemporary globalized security environment, in a new millennium that was supposed to offer a more peaceful world after the end of the Cold War. One conspicuous illustration of the new influences on world order, and this underpinning hatred, was demonstrated by the actions of the terrorists on September 11, 2001. This act of terrorism was not a start point in the new world order, instead it was a significant action in a process of change that had been occurring since the end of the Cold War. The subsequent global effects of this new world order, including Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, are typical of the volatility and connectedness of contemporary global security. In response to these recent military operations, the New Zealand Government has committed combat forces to operations outside the Asia-Pacific Region and has been forced to purchase new defense force equipment to meet the vagaries of the new threat. The response by New Zealand, in part, contradicts some of the primary tenets of the NZDPF; therefore this validates the need to reappraise the assertions that formed the background for the policy.

The NZDPF articulated a security environment for New Zealand where the primary strategic focus is on the Asia-Pacific Region,

“New Zealand's primary defense interests are protecting New Zealand's territorial sovereignty, meeting shared alliance commitments to Australia and fulfilling obligations and responsibilities in the South Pacific. The wider Asia-Pacific strategic environment, of which we are a part, is also relevant.”²²

The policy describes an optimistic view of world security expressed in the statement that “New Zealand is not directly threatened by any other country and is not likely to be involved in widespread armed conflict.”²³ The policy, in effect, confines the New Zealand Defense Force efforts to New Zealand's immediate geographic region, in an international security environment it views as benign.

Viewing the environment as benign was a significant shortfall of the NZDPF as it failed to recognize the dynamic forces that were shaping the regional and world security environment in the late 1990's and the start of the 21st Century. New Zealand politicians were not alone in believing that the end of the Cold War brought with it a sense of renewed optimism to a world that had known conflict throughout most of the twentieth century. The post Cold War period appeared to promise a new world order with less conflict.

Even the permanent members of the UN Security Council appeared to support the new found optimism. In January 1992 the Heads of State and Government tasked the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, to analyze and recommend ways to strengthen and make more efficient the capacity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. In his report back to the Council, Boutros Boutros Ghali described the change in environment, “In the course of the past few years the immense ideological barrier that for decades gave rise to distrust and hostility and the terrible tools of destruction that were inseparable companions has collapsed.”²⁴ A peace dividend appeared to many to be the payoff at the end of the Cold War and a reduction of national security forces seemed an inevitable consequence. Therefore, the decision by New Zealand to reduce the scale of its forces and focus on its region appeared logical, given the prevailing international perspective of world security.

THE NEW SECURITY REALITY

The drafters of the NZDPF, however, did not envisage the impact on New Zealand's national interests that would result from the changes in the global security environment of the new millennium, attributed to in part by globalization, nationalization and democratization. The impact of these changes now challenges the validity of the policy framework. One of New Zealand's primary strategic interests is the promotion of a stable world where trade, which is

paramount to New Zealand's economic well-being, can flourish. Statistics New Zealand, the organization that has the responsibility to measure economic data, state in their latest report, "New Zealand's small economy is heavily dependent on overseas trade."²⁵ In contrast to a stable world that facilitates trade, the features that are inherent in the contemporary security environment include the international effects of the global war on terrorism, the rise of non-state actors with global reach, and the negative impact of some of the elements of globalization, nationalization and democratization. In this current environment, defining a nation's security interests in terms of a home region no longer appears relevant. In addition, the capabilities required of a Defense Force to protect the national interest may have to be expanded to a force structure which is capable of operating globally in sustained operations against diverse threats. This could include the requirement for a Navy that is capable of sustained operations beyond New Zealand's region and an Air Force, which is capable of limited combat operations in support of the Army.

The drafters of the NZDPF were posed with the same dilemma faced by defense planners globally of trying to see into the future. Because of the scale, cost and intricate nature of defense systems, the defense planning process, up until the implementation phase, can take many years. The systems and structures of this process rely heavily on a sound prediction of the future security environment. Therein exists the challenge of trying to predict the future environment, which is at best extremely dynamic. As noted by the defense issues writer Mohan Malik, "To attempt to predict events 5 or 10 years ahead is an awesome task; to try to see events 50 years ahead is a risky business indeed."²⁶

The ultimate aim (ends) of a national Defense Force is to protect the nation's sovereignty and assist the promotion of national interests. In New Zealand, like many other countries, the structure of the Defense Force is broadly determined by a strategic estimate, which describes the domestic, regional and international security landscape. Overlaying the strategic estimate are economic realities, which determine whether a country can afford to meet its defense requirements. This latter point becomes a tangible reality and must be balanced against the national psyche, including the taxpayer willingness to spend more (or less) on the defense structure. The New Zealand taxpayer is generally apathetic about defense issues and considers domestic issues such as health, education, unemployment, (and rugby), to be more important. The New Zealand public attitude is in part attributed to New Zealand's geographic distance from many of the world's trouble spots. The former German Chancellor Willy Brandt describes this outlook; "Oh, New Zealand, so lucky to be so far away. I have found that idealism increases in direct relationship to your distance from the problem."²⁷ However, as the

effects of globalization in all its forms become more apparent, so does its direct effect on New Zealand's national interests, and New Zealand cannot afford to ignore these effects.

While the New Zealand public may struggle to link the significance of a distant conflict to New Zealand's national interest, it is also important to address the international community when enunciating a national security policy. Even though it may cater to the need of the domestic audience (voting public) to play down emphasis on defense spending, the international community takes note of a nation's approach to its security obligations. The Opposition Defense Spokesman highlights this notion, "Our partners judge us by our overall commitment to our defense capability."²⁸ The international community becomes a significant factor by which New Zealand's security policy will be judged and therefore cannot be disregarded.

Clearly a new security environment has emerged since the report was drafted. Mike Moore aptly describes this situation, "Disease, terrorism, climate change and pollution don't respect lines on a map...We sink or swim together, our interdependence never before so obvious and public in the history of our species."²⁹ New Zealand's interdependent relationship with the world is centered on its requirement for global stability, where trade can flourish. Therefore New Zealand's policy approach to defense issues must reflect this requirement for two reasons. First, trade develops best between stable economies, which exist in secure regions. New Zealand must engage using all elements of national power to ensure stability in the regions where it wants to expand trade links. This includes providing military assistance to aid the security and stability of democracies in these regions. Second, many of New Zealand's largest trading partners have their militaries actively engaged in global security missions. Therefore, as a developed, stable nation (albeit a small one), New Zealand is expected by its larger trading partners to share part of the burden in the maintenance of world peace. Failure to do so could see New Zealand labeled as a nation with a strategic view that reflects only narrow economic self-interest, and as a consequence trade with the major partners could be adversely affected.

COST OF DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

While this paper has focused on the impact of globalization, democratization and nationalization on security issues, a pragmatic factor that influenced the Labour Government to make the decision to reduce defense capabilities was the cost (means) of modernizing capabilities. This factor needs to be addressed briefly. The cost of purchasing many defense platforms has increased significantly as they have become more sophisticated. In addition to the cost of procurement, training for these capabilities has increasingly placed many platforms

beyond the economic affordability of a small nation like New Zealand. The New Zealand Strategic Assessment summarizes this issue in the statement; “The US embrace of the revolution in military affairs will make it difficult for even its closest allies to keep pace with it, let alone potential adversaries.”³⁰

Partly in response to the high cost of defense platforms, a major policy departure of the NZDPF from its predecessors was the new focus on producing a Defense Force that had depth in key areas, rather than the traditional approach of maintaining a broad capability across all three services. The NZDPF states, “It is a concern that NZDF resources are spread thinly across a range of capabilities not all of which can be well sustained.”³¹ The decision to remove the Air Force strike capability is an example of the inability to maintain a modern, operationally viable capability. The New Zealand Defense Force is an expeditionary force that has always deployed to operational commitments as part of a coalition force, and it will likely continue with this posture in the foreseeable future. The NZDPF sought to develop capabilities that provide a coalition with a tangible resource, as well as meeting the political requirements of the New Zealand Government in providing a combat capable force element. “Our core requirement is for well-equipped, combat trained land forces which are also able to act as effective peacekeepers, supported by the Navy and Air Force.”³² Given the increasing cost of military platforms, it is important for New Zealand to have an effective force to offer to any coalition, rather than a dated capability that will be a liability. New Zealand's respected commitment to military operations throughout history has been in combat operations in all three Armed Services. It is therefore unlikely that this approach will be supplanted by a national acceptance of being assigned only to support roles in future operations. Although the NZDPF does not detail specific force capabilities, Army Special Forces, light infantry and engineers are examples of quality army combat capabilities that can be offered to a coalition force, while keeping platform costs to a minimum. In this way, a low capability cost with high military/political payoff is a policy inline with the earlier stated depth over breadth. The contribution of ground combat forces to a conflict is widely considered to be the ultimate national commitment to a conflict. While the Navy and Air Force have been assigned to supporting roles in the NZDPF, inherent in the ability to deploy and support the Army on operations, is the requirement to assist the coalition in the protection of the Army in the theatre of operations. Therefore, while some of the high-end offensive capabilities remain beyond affordability, there remains the need to maintain a capability in these two services to strategically deploy the ground force and to participate in its protection.

CONCLUSION

In light of the contemporary security environment, the NZDPF may not be wide-ranging enough to facilitate the factors that have become apparent to support New Zealand's national security. This issue must be judged in terms of New Zealand's overall national interests.

Despite the evident affects of globalization, democratization and nationalization, the common held view of the world order is that the world is defined by the principle of self-determination (of nation states). It has become increasingly apparent, in this contemporary age of globalization, that the previously held notion of a nation state guiding it's own destiny in the world order is under threat by many uncontrollable cross border incursions by global organizations and mediums. The invasive threat of globalization is often perceived as a United States led threat from the West, "Led by the US, the worlds richest states have acted on the presumption that people everywhere want to live as they do."³³

Added to the pressure on nations from globalization, many states struggle with the concept of western democracy. Together, globalization and democracy should provide the opportunities for nations to improve the overall well being of the nation and individuals within the nation. However, not all nations, groups and individuals see the offerings of globalization and democracy as an improvement of their status and many view them with suspicion and hatred tantamount to an invasion of an alien way of life. This has inevitably led to conflict in many regions throughout the world, and recently, a new pointed attack on the West, its institutions and its values. The New Zealand Government must now construct a defense policy that meets the needs of this new security environment, which may not have been apparent when the NZDPF was drafted.

Some critics of the NZDPF have described it as a departure into isolationism, or unwillingness to share in the international burden of maintaining peace. However, New Zealand currently has forces deployed in 19 missions throughout the world,³⁴ thereby demonstrating its continued commitment to the maintenance of international security and acknowledging the overarching national interest. What is not outwardly apparent is the fragility of many of these commitments. Some have been conducted using outdated equipment, inadequately trained reserve forces and by specialist groups who habitually deploy. It appears that a key issue to be addressed in the policy framework is the mismatch between the policy rhetoric and the reality of the current security situation. While NZDPF appears to signal a reduction in forces and a regional focus, the contemporary reality is an increase in global commitments and a needed capability enhancement, to recognize New Zealand's role in the new security environment.

Because of its small size, New Zealand cannot use its limited defense resources to impose its will on other nations or stand alone against belligerent nations and forces. However, it can continue to demonstrate a willingness to reinforce its ideals and protect its broader national interests by contributing to a global approach and collective security responsibilities. New Zealand can no longer rely on the misguided idealism of a benign world that was enunciated in the NZDPF or ignore the negative international opinions that are ramifications of that policy. Given the new strategic environment that has been identified, New Zealand needs to not only reappraise its strategic outlook, but also review the defense force structure, which will be committed to this environment. In doing so it must be sensitive to the message it sends out to a perceptive international community that New Zealand is not going to shed responsibility because of its geographic separation from direct threat, but will continue to play an active role in the increasingly connected global community.

New Zealand's economic well-being depends on the maintenance of world order where liberalized trade practices can prosper. Therefore, the NZDPF must be congruent with the economic element of national power and encompass an international focus. While it is recognized that New Zealand cannot afford the high cost defense platforms possessed by larger nations, it can demonstrate its global commitment by developing affordable, significant coalition contribution capabilities that can deploy globally to further the national interest. These forces will be identified in a force capability study, which should follow the NZDPF reappraisal. This study should identify that the Navy and Air Force must be able to strategically deploy the Army force and offer it some element of protection, while the Defense Force must enhance the development of its 'people centric' Army forces such as, Special Forces, Light Infantry and Combat Engineers. These are capabilities that are not equipment intensive and are therefore affordable. These forces can provide a valuable operational contribution to a coalition and will send a message of strategic significance to the world that New Zealand remains an active contributor to the maintenance of world order.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ *The Government's Defense Policy Framework*, (Wellington, New Zealand.: June 2000).
- ² Rouben Azizian and Malcolm McNamara., eds. *New Zealand Foreign and Defense Policy at the End of the 20th Century: Views of the Political Parties 21 October 1999*; available from <<http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/reports/Preelection.html>>; Internet; accessed 5 August 2003, 13.
- ³ Alexander M. Haig, Jr., "The Promise and Peril of Our Times" – Address to the International Symposium on Sino-US –European relations in the New Century. Foreign Policy Research Institute, Nov 18-20 2003; available from <www.fpri.org>; Internet; accessed 3 November 2003.
- ⁴ Mike Moore, *A World Without Walls – Freedom, Development, Free trade and Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 20.
- ⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶ Robbie Robertson, *The Three Waves of Globalization* (New York.: Zed Books, 2003), 4.
- ⁷ H. Catt, *Democracy in Practice* (London: Routledge, 1999), 4.
- ⁸ L. Jensen and L.H. Miller, *Global Challenge: Change and Continuity in World Politics* (Fort Worth.: Harcourt Brace, 1997), 30.
- ⁹ Robertson, 202.
- ¹⁰ *The World Book Encyclopedia* (Chicago: World Book, Inc, 2002), 121-22.
- ¹¹ S. Lawson, "Culture, Relativism and Democracy: Political Myths About 'Asia' and the 'West,'" *Research School of Asia Pacific Studies*, ANU, Canberra, (1995): 10.
- ¹² Ibid., 13.
- ¹³ Robertson, 203.
- ¹⁴ "The neoliberal economic order that placed considerable power in the hands of multinational corporations and consequently further undermined the nation-state as unchallenged incumbent actor in international relations." See Andreas Wegner and Doron Zimmerman, *International Relations – From the Cold War to the Globalized World*. (London: Lynne Ryner Publishers, 2003), 3.
- ¹⁵ Ninety percent of the 5 million casualties of the wars fought in the 1990s' were civilians-women, children and the elderly. See Wegener and Zimmerman, 241.
- ¹⁶ Moore, 214.
- ¹⁷ S.M. Marsh., Dr., "Technological Influences on Globalization and Fragmentation: The Demise of the Nation State," *RUSI Journal* (June 1996): 46.
- ¹⁸ "Globalization and Its Critics," *The Economist* (29 September 2001): 3.

- ¹⁹ Marsh, 48.
- ²⁰ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar Strauss Ciroux, 1999), 56.
- ²¹ Robertson, 204.
- ²² The Government's Defense Policy Framework, 1.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ Boutros Boutros Ghali, *Report of the Secretary General, An Agenda for Peace – Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (New York: The United Nations, June 1992), 2.
- ²⁵ New Zealand's current largest export markets in order of priority are: Australia, United States, Japan, Peoples Republic of China, Britain, Republic of Korea and Germany. New Zealand's major exports are primary products, which are in order of revenue: dairy, meat and wood. It trades these products to purchase significant manufactured items and petroleum imports, on which the economy is dependent. Imports, in order of expenditure are: vehicles, parts and accessories, mechanical machinery and equipment, petroleum and products and electrical machinery and equipment. <<http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/web/nzstories.nsf/htmldocs/Quick+Facts+-+Economy>>; Internet; accessed 27 January 2004.
- ²⁶ J. Mohan Malik, "The Sources and Nature of Future Conflicts in the Asia-Pacific Region" *Comparative Strategy*, vol 16, no. 1, (January-March 1997): 33.
- ²⁷ Moore, 244.
- ²⁸ Azizian and McNamara.
- ²⁹ Moore, 248.
- ³⁰ External Assessments Bureau. Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 6.
- ³¹ The Government's Defense Policy Framework, 7.
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ "Is Globalization Doomed?," *The Economist* (29 September 2001):13.
- ³⁴ New Zealand Defense Force Public Relations Office. *New Zealand Defense Update* (Wellington, New Zealand, August 2003), 9.

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