

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY - THE MAGNITUDE
OF SECOND AND THIRD-ORDER EFFECTS ON SMALLER
NATIONS: THE CASES OF LEBANON DURING THE
COLD WAR AND PAKISTAN DURING THE GLOBAL
WAR ON TERRORISM**

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Following World War II, America was forced to reevaluate its prewar "continentalist vision" of security strategy. A "globalist consensus" soon emerged as the United States found itself in a position similar to Great Britain in 1815. As US grand strategy became more formal and the realities of the Cold War set-in, America's leadership began to meet the Soviet challenge on all levels of national power. The resultant Cold War security strategy forged new alliances, and, in some cases, pressured relatively neutral countries into making tough decisions. A country's willingness to sign-up to a US-led security strategy could ultimately weaken its own political stability in a domestic as well as regional context. The global nature of American foreign policy and how it is perceived by smaller nations is the impetus for many of the second-order effects and consequences associated with foreign policy choices. In many cases, these devastating effects are predictable, but nonetheless are deemed acceptable when placed within the larger scheme of international relations. Some may argue that the outcomes are justified for their service to the common good of the international community. This paper will examine the security strategy of the United States in the historical setting of the Cold War as well as the contemporary setting of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Within this context, the paper will argue that the second-order effects of US Cold War strategy experienced by Lebanon in the 1950s ultimately contributed to the root causes of its Civil War in 1958. Similarly, the paper will look to present-day security strategies wed to the GWOT and suggest how second-order effects may lead to equally disastrous consequences for Pakistan. To what degree should the US concern itself with these effects and make a conscious decision to mitigate them before they begin to threaten a smaller country's stability? If ignored, can the escalation of these consequences potentially weaken US security interests in a region?

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INTRODUCTION

Following World War II, America was forced to reevaluate its prewar “continentalist vision” of security strategy. A “globalist consensus” soon emerged as the United States found itself in a position similar to Great Britain in 1815.¹ The National Security Act of 1947 and the formation of the National Security Council was a clear sign of America’s acceptance of this newfound responsibility. Policy makers realized that the informal management style used during the war years was not suited to the longer-term security issues of the post-war era.

As US grand strategy became more formal and the realities of the Cold War set-in, America’s leadership began to meet the Soviet challenge on all levels of national power. The resultant Cold War security strategies forged new alliances, and, in some cases, pressured relatively neutral countries into making tough decisions. As a leading international actor, US foreign policy is always a mix of global, regional and bilateral considerations making it extremely difficult for smaller nations to ascertain their modest place within America’s complex foreign agenda. A country’s willingness to sign-up to US-led security strategies could ultimately weaken its own political stability in a domestic as well as regional context.

The global nature of American foreign policy and how it is perceived by smaller nations is the impetus for many of the consequences associated with foreign policy choices. Robert Jervis claims that it is quite natural for actors to overestimate the importance of their role in the policies of others.² Jervis goes on to add that this phenomenon can lead actors to exaggerate their “potential influence when the other is poised between taking actions which can greatly help or greatly harm the actor.”³

In most cases, these potentially devastating effects are unintended yet predictable. Nonetheless, they may be deemed acceptable by the great powers when placed within the larger scheme of international relations. The argument runs that the outcomes are justified for their service to the common good of the international community and world order. Perhaps the most important lesson to learn for policy-makers is that the fallout from such effects often leave the most enduring legacy of any policy.

It is not the contention of this paper that all second and third-order effects of US foreign policy are negative. However, it is precisely this type of effect which, when not recognized or left unattended, can be the most harmful to allies and potentially pose risk to US interests. During a recent speech at the Worldwide Conference for Defense Security Cooperation, Dean

Borgam remarked, "as Americans, we rarely have bad intentions, but too often our good intentions have unintended consequences."⁴ Borgam's comments serve as a simple but brilliant insight for American policy-makers.

This paper will examine security strategies of the United States in the historical setting of the Cold War as well as the contemporary setting of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Within this context, the paper will argue that the second and third-order effects of US Cold War strategy experienced by Lebanon in the 1950s ultimately contributed to the root causes of its Civil War in 1958. Similarly, the paper will look to present-day security strategies wed to the GWOT and suggest how such effects may lead to equally disastrous consequences for Pakistan. To what degree should the US concern itself with these effects and make a conscious decision to mitigate them before they begin to threaten a smaller country's stability? If ignored, can the escalation of these consequences potentially weaken US security interests in a region?

This paper is a comparative study of two countries not in the traditional sense of comparative politics, but in the specific context of international relations and the effect US foreign policy can have on smaller, developing nations. The cases of Lebanon and Pakistan are used in order to illustrate the similarities of the type of second and third-order effects smaller nations may experience no matter the time period, geographic place setting, or particular security strategy in effect. From these similarities, one may gain particular insights that may be useful to policy makers, and, in the case of Pakistan, suggest future implications of US policy in South Asia.

US COLD WAR SECURITY STRATEGY

As stated earlier, American leadership firmly rejected a return to pre-WWII isolationism. Instead, the acknowledgment of a Cold War with the Soviet Union led the US to meet the Soviet challenge in every aspect of national power: economic, diplomatic, military, and ideological. Containment of the USSR became the primary focus of American foreign policy and was accomplished through a series of treaties, alliances, and forward presence of American forces extending from Scandinavia to the Asia-Pacific.⁵

Suspensions of Soviet expansionist intentions quickly materialized with the failure of Stalin to withdraw from Iran within six months of the war's end as previously agreed upon in 1942.⁶ Although pressure from the Truman administration convinced the Soviets to pullback their forces from Iran, subsequent Soviet political maneuvering in Turkey and Greece convinced President Truman of the Soviets' designs for expansion. Although the source of Soviet

involvement was different in each country, Soviet aggression was the common thread.⁷ Under the Truman Doctrine, the US provided military advisors and economic assistance to both countries. American foreign policy had reached a decisive point. From this moment forward, the US resolved to thwart Soviet aggression, whether direct or indirect, that posed a security risk to American interests.⁸

US SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The decline of British and French power, the birth of Israel, and the start of the Cold War, worked to push the US into Middle East politics.⁹ The US post WWII foreign policy in the Middle East had several major objectives. These goals included establishing influence and legitimacy in the region for controlling the escalating Arab-Israeli conflict, using that same influence to implement Eisenhower's containment policy against the spread of communism, and ensuring the unrestricted flow of Middle Eastern oil to Western Europe.¹⁰

Eisenhower's presidency coincided with the rise of Gamal Abdul Nasser as the leader in Egypt. Nasser's policy of pan-Arabism and his avocation of socialism affected not only the Arab world but its relations with the superpowers as well.¹¹ Eisenhower acknowledged that "no region in the world received as much of my close attention and that of my colleagues as did the Middle East."¹² The 1950s saw three major policies pursued by the US administration: the Tripartite Declaration in 1950, the Baghdad Pact in 1955, and the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957.

THE CASE OF LEBANON

Each of the above mentioned security policies were products of American diplomacy aimed at managing the conflict in the Arab-Israeli zone and containing the spread of communism to the newly formed nation states of the Middle East. These agreements, and the Lebanese government's generally favorable reaction to them, greatly contributed to an eventual split of the nation's population into equal camps divided along confessional lines. Many accounts of the 1958 Lebanese Civil War concentrate solely on internal struggles as the catalyst behind the opposition forces; however, this section will examine the external forces, and more specifically, the second-order effects of US foreign policy measures.

These policies served to lead Lebanon down a path of what Farwaz Gerges termed, "inflated self-importance".¹³ In reality, the Eisenhower administration was not willing to chance a confrontation with the United Arab Republic over the situation in Lebanon. Paul Salem identified Lebanon's reaction as an "instinct natural among small nations that must exaggerate their apparent value to outside players in order to survive."¹⁴

LEBANON'S NATIONAL PACT

In order to understand the division of forces that led to the armed confrontation in 1958, a brief explanation of the political institutions established in Lebanon prior to the war is helpful. Lebanon was established as a confessional democracy with a legislative body comprising the Chamber of Deputies and an executive body comprising the President and his cabinet. Its legitimacy and organization came from an "unwritten constitution", the National Pact of 1943.¹⁵ Lebanon's proclamation of independence in 1941, the collapse of France in WWII and the occupation of the Levant by Great Britain each signaled Lebanon's freedom from the inter-war mandate system. Britain mediated the National Pact between Lebanon's leading religious communities. The British supported Arab unity and the formation of the Arab League through which they hoped to maintain their interests and influence in the region.

The National Pact was primarily an attempt to co-opt the conflicting national identities of Western Christians and Arab Muslims. The resulting understanding established the distribution of political representation among the various confessional groups of the state. There were six major religious communities of which three were Christian: the Maronite; the Greek Orthodox; and the Greek Catholic. The three Muslim communities included Sunni, Shi'a, and Druze. Based upon a suspect 1932 census, the Maronites were the largest group followed by the Sunnis and Shi'as respectively. Overall, the Christians held a slight majority over the Muslims. The compromise prescribed that the President must be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni and the Speaker of the Deputies a Shi'a. All groups were to be represented in the Chamber while maintaining a six to five ratio of Christians to Muslims. Through these confessional ties, the two groups could safeguard their positions and their separate interests.

The art of Lebanese confessional politics did not begin in 1943. The beginning of confessionalism in Lebanon can be traced to as early as 1830 as a governing method of the Sublime Porte. From the 1860s to the start of WWI, confessionalism became further entrenched with the help of the European powers and the creation of an autonomous Mount Lebanon. Following World War I, the French reintroduced confessional politics under the mandate system in the interest of "sectarian equity".¹⁶

The National Pact not only provided the framework for the internal operation of this new sovereign state, it set the tone for Lebanon's foreign affairs as well. The authors of the Pact were careful not to define the state as Arab, but to admit that it had an "Arab face".¹⁷ The Pact signified the Christian understanding of Lebanon's Arab roots and the Muslims' acceptance of Lebanon's independent statehood.¹⁸

In addition, the Pact called for the Christians to step from the shadow of their Western (French) protectorate and for the Muslims to extinguish their ambitions of Arab unity.¹⁹ As an Arabic state in an Arab land, Lebanon was expected to participate in Arab politics, but not beyond the point of sovereignty's abridgment.²⁰ The rules and conditions set forth in the National Pact of 1943 determined the fate of Lebanon's foreign policy. Lebanon needed to prize neutrality or risk its very survival. Unfortunately for Lebanon, the stability of the new nation also relied heavily upon "the continued good will and stability of the external environment."²¹

THE TRIPARTITE DECLARATION

Great Britain, France and the United States issued the Tripartite Declaration in 1950. The Western powers offered military equipment to the Middle East states for the purpose of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense, while permitting them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. The declaration expressed the coalition's unalterable opposition to the use and/or threat of force between any of the states. In addition, the coalition partners stressed their commitment to prevent any forcible violation of existing frontiers or armistice lines.²²

This declaration seemed to be tailor-made for the Lebanese Christians who continued to fear cries for Arab unity by prominent Sunni Muslims longing to unite with Syria. The Sunnis saw the declaration as an obstacle.

Christians seeking Western protectorates and Muslims calling for Arab unity and reunification with Syria seemed to put the founding conditions of the National Pact in jeopardy. The declaration's intent to control Middle East hostilities and prevent threats to state sovereignty actually served as an impetus for upsetting the internal political balance of the only Arab state which remotely resembled a Western democracy. The confessional political structure of Lebanon began to shatter, and the ability to control the country's welfare was in jeopardy.

By 1955, Nasser had become the leading advocate of Arab nationalism and represented the rallying point for Arabs throughout the Middle East. Support for Nasser by Lebanese Muslims often exceeded their support for Lebanese leaders. Lebanese Christians fell in line behind President Camille Chamoun to combat their fears of Lebanon falling prey to the Arab nationalist movement.

The Chamoun regime was characterized by its anti-Nasser sentiment. Electoral reform by Chamoun eliminated many pro-Nasser deputies. Chamoun's refusal to sever diplomatic ties with France and Great Britain following their invasion of Egypt in 1956 further weakened his tenuous relationship with Nasser. Nasser declared "the rulers of Lebanon stabbed us in the

back during our time of stress."²³ Chamoun's defiance toward Nasser alienated his regime further from Muslim-led opposition forces. The West, and in particular the United States, saw Chamoun as their friend in the Middle East who could champion their campaign against the influence of Nasser's pan-Arabism.

THE BAGHDAD PACT

The Baghdad Pact of 1955 was the culmination of efforts by Great Britain and the United States to reestablish a military presence in the Middle East after losing their influence in the Suez Canal region. Military alliances and the establishment of overseas bases were paramount to their efforts in combating Soviet aggression. Originally, the pact was to involve all the Arab states, however, the growing rivalry between Egypt's Nasser and Iraq's Nuri al-Said served to split the collective support of the pact. Iraq signed the pact with Turkey in February of 1955, and eventually, Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain followed suit. Among Nasser's fears was the concern that the pact would provide a pretext for British troops to return to his land under the auspices of an international agreement.²⁴

Although the United States did not officially sign the Baghdad Pact, US diplomatic efforts ensured its creation.²⁵ Lebanon rejected the Baghdad Pact as it was seen by the Chamoun regime as intensifying the division between Iraq and Egypt. Chamoun reasoned that Lebanon's acceptance of the pact might incite the pro-Nasser opposition forces, while its denial might alter the delicate balance of power between Iraq and Egypt. In fact, Chamoun's mediatory efforts in the rising dispute between Cairo and Baghdad only produced charges by Nasser that the Lebanese president secretly favored "defectionist" Iraq and the Baghdad Pact.²⁶ The pact represented a "no win" situation for Lebanon and ultimately served to deepen the country's confessional divides.

THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

The third Middle East foreign policy program of the United States in the 1950s was the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. Egypt's growing reliance on Soviet military equipment and economic aid influenced President Eisenhower to request specific measures to protect the Middle East from the dangers of international communism.²⁷ Eisenhower's proposal and the approved bill were based upon the following three points:

1. Cooperate with and assist any nations or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

2. Undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desire such aid.
3. Employ the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of nations in the area requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.²⁸

Chamoun viewed Lebanon's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine in March of 1957 as the only answer to combat increasing Egyptian subversion of Lebanese independence. In response to Lebanon's failure to sever diplomatic ties with Great Britain and France during the 1956 Suez War, Nasser had increased his supply of arms and money to opposition forces in Lebanon. Chamoun's refusal to end relations with the West, an act unthinkable to the Christians, also caused the resignation of his Sunni Muslim cabinet members.²⁹ Demands for Chamoun's resignation soon followed.

As the only Arab country to accept the Eisenhower Doctrine, Lebanon and Chamoun's regime came under intense attacks by Nasser and Muslim led opposition forces. Lebanese-Egyptian relations were highly strained, almost reaching the point of open breach.³⁰ Gerges declared that "more than any other issue, Lebanon's international alignment and its estrangement from the Arab fold brought the crisis to a head."³¹

CONCLUSIONS ON LEBANON

Still thirteen months from a civil war, the Lebanese government continued to experience cause and effects which contributed to the widening gap along confessional lines and eventually led to open hostilities in May of 1958. The second-order effects from US sponsored security strategies in the 1950s contributed to the sectarian separation leading to Lebanon's Civil War. The Tripartite Declaration, the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine did not independently cause Lebanon's Civil War of 1958. They did, however, represent significant diplomatic efforts by the United States aimed at maintaining peace in the Middle East and containing international communism, but which actually served to undermine the Lebanese government and force it from its position of global neutrality and peaceful coexistence with its Arab neighbors.

US SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Looking to present day – how might second-order effects associated with the current US National Security Strategy (NSS)³² manifest themselves around the globe and more importantly in frontline states that have committed their full cooperation in the GWOT? The US-led war on

terrorism, as described in the NSS and its supporting document the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, has the potential to impact negatively upon ongoing regional conflicts. The willingness to take action in a preemptive or preventive fashion against “emerging threats before they are fully formed”³³ may embolden other states to take similar actions. Perhaps former National Security Advisor to President William Clinton, Samuel Berger said it best remarking that, “when the United States lends credibility to a doctrine of striking first, it gives countries from South Asia to the Middle East a pretext to act preemptively against their own enemies.” Berger continued, “developing doctrines that lower the threshold for preemptive action could put that accomplishment at risk, and exacerbate regional crises already on the brink of open conflict.”³⁴ In a critical review of the current NSS, the Brookings Institute cites the India-Pakistan rivalry as the “clearest case” of where the US preemption policy may embolden a country (India) to take decisive action against another.³⁵

Additionally the NSS identifies the attributes for “rogue” states.³⁶ Principal among these are states with links to terrorist groups and those that seek weapons of mass destruction. Presumably, the seven states currently on the State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism have been put on notice as potential targets. Equally important is how the policy on rogue states may raise concerns in states that show a propensity to cooperate, but fear reprisal from the US should the partnership end. Professor Steve Cohen cautions that Pakistani policy makers privately feel that Islamabad may well become America’s next target regardless of its current cooperation.³⁷

US SECURITY INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA

After 1947, US security interests in South Asia were principally aimed at containment of communism and regional stability including reinforcing the sovereignty and stability of independent states, encouragement of regional cooperation, and the establishment of a geopolitical presence in the Indian Ocean. Initially though, US interests in the region were not considered vital and Washington pursued very modest aims. The US focused its efforts on establishing friendly ties to India and Pakistan, providing military and economic aid to both countries, and drawing Pakistan into the northern tier security arrangements.³⁸

The central dilemma for US foreign policy in South Asia has been the Indo-Pakistani rivalry. The sources of this rivalry are many, but center on three primary themes:

1. Traditional and ethnic bitterness between Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan.
2. The “divide and conquer” legacy of colonial rule.

3. The hasty departure by Great Britain, which left little time for normalization of relations and created land disputes (most notably the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir).³⁹

The Kashmir issue and the eventual war in 1965 frustrated US efforts to the point that in an even-handed gesture, military aid was suspended to both countries. This suspension marks the point when Indo-Soviet relations began to strengthen.

US foreign policy and interests in South Asia remained linked to overall Cold War strategies for peripheral regions up to the 1980s. However, the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 brought South Asia to the forefront of US foreign policy. Pakistan quickly regained its previous status “as a frontline bulwark against communist expansion.”⁴⁰ Following the Soviet withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989, South Asia returned to its peripheral status until the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998.

American diplomacy has proven effective in reducing tensions along the line-of-control (LOC), the de facto boundary in Kashmir between India and Pakistan, on numerous occasions most prominently in the summer of 1999 and in December 2001; however, the larger issue of building a long-term strategy to promote a peace process has eluded US policy-makers. America's strategy for South Asia has often been criticized for its tactical versus strategic vision.

THE CASE OF PAKISTAN

Standing at the crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia, Pakistan's geo-strategic importance is widely accepted; however, the distribution of power in South Asia has favored India since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. In its quest to counter India's regional influence, Pakistan's foreign policy has focused on the objective of attaining parity with India in “politics and diplomacy if not military might.”⁴¹ Over the years, Pakistan increased its conventional defense, attained nuclear weapons, and coordinated security links with the major regional actors, primarily the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

From the beginning, Pakistan has felt its security threatened from all sides. India's encouragement of the Afghan government to confront Pakistan over the Durand Line (the Afghan-Pakistan border) generated fears of insecurity on its western borders. These fears intensified with the 1979 Soviet invasion into Afghanistan. On its eastern front, Pakistan has had to contend with India. Pakistanis have long believed that the Indian leadership has never accepted Pakistan's existence and would like to see it “liquidated through a gradual process of attrition.”⁴² India's pronounced role in the separation of East Pakistan in 1971 and the explosion of an Indian nuclear device in 1974 further intensified Pakistan's security fears.

The regional rivalry not only stemmed from the ongoing Kashmir dispute, but from India's aspirations to establish regional dominance as well as gain international recognition as a great power. India's arms build-up, to include a blue water navy and advanced air force, drove Pakistan to strive for a balance of power to guarantee its existence. Instead of easing the fears of its militarily inferior neighbor, thus reducing Pakistan's incentive to go nuclear, India's quest for regional hegemony accomplished the opposite. The nuclear tests by both nations in May 1998 confirmed the West's suspicions and heightened concerns over whether the next confrontation between the belligerents might go nuclear.

In the 1950s, Pakistan, consisting of its East and West entities, found itself a principle player in the American-led security alliance structure designed to check Soviet expansion. Indeed, as a member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) as well as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Pakistan was the lynchpin to a security regime extending from Southern Europe to Southeast Asia.⁴³ Pakistan eagerly accepted its role and rapidly earned the recognition of being "America's most allied ally".

However, US suspension of military assistance during the 1965 war with India generated a widespread feeling in Pakistan that America was not a reliable ally. Even though the US suspended military assistance to both countries involved in the conflict, the suspension of aid affected Pakistan much more severely. Although relations improved and the US renewed arms sales to Pakistan in 1975, American economic sanctions were imposed in April 1979 under the provisions of the Symington Amendment due to concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program.⁴⁴

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 highlighted the common interest of Pakistan and the US in peace and stability in South Asia. Recognizing national security concerns and accepting Pakistan's assurances that it did not intend to construct a nuclear weapon, Congress waived restrictions (Symington Amendment) on military assistance to Pakistan. In 1981, the US and Pakistan agreed on a \$3.2 billion military and economic assistance program aimed at helping Pakistan deal with the heightened threat to security in the region and its economic development needs.⁴⁵

In March 1986, the two countries agreed on a second six-year \$4 billion economic development and security assistance program.⁴⁶ However, on 1 October 1990, the US suspended all military assistance and new economic aid to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment, which required that the President certify annually that "Islamabad did not possess nuclear arms."⁴⁷

Cohen characterizes America's policies concerning Pakistan for part of the 1960s, most of the 1970s and during the first half of the 1990s as alternating between ignoring Pakistan outright

or being focused on the sole issue of nuclear proliferation.⁴⁸ Pakistan's Ambassador to the US, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, aptly characterized this up and down relationship when he said, "Pakistan has gone from most valuable ally to most sanctioned ally and back again."⁴⁹

After the events on September 11, Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf, seized the moment and quickly aligned his country with the US, pledging basing and logistical support for US-led operations in Afghanistan. Similar to 1979, Pakistan leveraged its geopolitical stature into "new largess and strategic significance."⁵⁰ India offered immediate support to the US as well; however, the strategic advantage was firmly in Pakistan's possession. Musharraf's quick reversal on Pakistan's nearly decade-long support of the Taliban regime was a calculated risk, but had the ancillary benefit of limiting India's political maneuver space. Left with few options, India countered by directing US attention toward Pakistan's support to terrorist activities in Kashmir.⁵¹ An effective strategy perhaps, but one not appreciated by Washington which was busy building its "Coalition of the Willing" prior to the kickoff of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.

Today, Pakistan once again finds itself on the US payroll. In June 2003, President Bush announced a five-year, \$3 billion aid package for Pakistan. The proposal sounds eerily similar to the 1980s when the US handsomely rewarded Pakistan's loyalty against the Soviets. A large segment of the Pakistani population distrusts America's objectives and its pledge to develop a long-term relationship with Pakistan. Journalist Barry Bearak reflects, "historically, the US is all too forgiving when it needs Pakistan and then smugly reproachful when it does not."⁵²

Prior to attaining its nuclear capability, Pakistan's main deterrent against Indian aggression was the conventional force of the Pakistan Army. The primacy of the Army as a national institution cannot be overstated. It has directly ruled Pakistan for more than one-half of its existence. In fact, no democratically elected leader has served a full term in office. US relations with Pakistan have been at their best during times that military rulers were in charge. This has left Pakistanis with the impression that the US prefers a military dictator over a democratic elected government.⁵³ Although the US consistently calls for a return to full democracy in Pakistan, Musharraf's support for the war on terrorism has enabled him to garner international support while being relatively immune to criticism about the full return to democracy. Military rule may facilitate US objectives in combating terrorism in the near-term, but it doesn't necessarily serve the long-term interest of creating a stable ally.⁵⁴

The following section will examine the turbulent challenges facing Pakistan and its leadership as it fulfills its frontline status in the war on terrorism. What are the guiding interests that define the current Pakistan-US relationship? How might second-order effects from

America's NSS and its strategy for the war on terrorism manifest themselves in Pakistan? What are the internal challenges Pakistan must face as it continues its full support of US objectives in the war on terrorism? What can the US do to minimize the negative effects and unintended consequences that may propel Pakistan towards open conflict with India?

CURRENT US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

American interests in Pakistan are firmly rooted in the war on terrorism. However, this issue presents a double-edged sword for a relationship that is built upon two seemingly divergent objectives. First, Pakistan must cooperate with US efforts to find al Qaeda terrorists and remnants of the Taliban leadership hiding out within its borders. A second and infinitely more complex issue involves working with Pakistan to formally end its support to Kashmir-oriented terror groups who launch operations from Pakistani soil. Islamabad's ambivalence towards these militant groups and its formal support of their operations has caused US administrations in the past to seriously consider Pakistan's inclusion of its "terrorist-sponsor" list.⁵⁵ Pakistan's relationship with radical Islamic groups is the source of much consternation for the West. On one hand, Pakistan reaps the benefits of being an essential ally in the war against terrorism, while on the other it remains "one of terrorism's essential incubators in its war against the West."⁵⁶

A second and perhaps equally important interest is the concern over Pakistan's nuclear weapons program to include its security from rogue elements. Recent revelations about Pakistan's transfer of nuclear technology to North Korea, Libya and Iran serve to further peak America's anxieties.⁵⁷ Pakistan's poor relations with a nuclear-capable India only exasperates US concerns about the further proliferation of nuclear and missile forces on the subcontinent.

Pakistan's democratization remains a key concern and source of heated debate. Many will argue that in the near term, US interests are better served with what regional expert Cohen describes as a military oligarchy.⁵⁸ Cohen points out that in the long term, democratization is preferable; however, too much pressure in the short term may prove to "disrupt the state" and lead to "worst consequences" than doing business with a military flavored government.⁵⁹ This issue adds fuel to anti-American sentiment and suspicions that the US has simply found another military dictator "willing to set in their laps."⁶⁰

Finally, Pakistan's relationship with its nuclear capable neighbor to the east, India, is constantly at the forefront of American diplomatic challenges in the region. For arguably the first time since partition, the US finds itself on reasonably good terms with both India and Pakistan. Whether the US can parlay its newfound position of influence into positive developments on the

subcontinent remains to be seen. The most significant contribution may come in the form of US mediation of the Kashmir conflict that has plagued the region for over fifty years.

INTERNAL STRAINS ON PAKISTAN

Today, Pakistan's population exceeds 140 million.⁶¹ An estimated 97 percent is Muslim; however, religion has not proven to be the unifying force once hoped for by Pakistan's first ruler and founding father, Muhammed Ali Jinnah. Pakistanis are more likely to identify themselves by their ethnic or linguistic group than by their "nationality." Speaking on this issue, Baluchi Nawab (leader) Khair Nakhsh Marri remarked, "religion is only one aspect of life, it's not enough for a country."⁶² Pakistan is "still in pursuit of a national identity on which it can build to counter that of India."⁶³ Perhaps Ralph Peters expresses it best:

Whenever a voice on the airwaves generalizes about Pakistan, I want to ask, "Which Pakistan do you mean?" Does the pundit mean the feudal territories east of the Indus river, which resemble 15th century England with electricity? Or the tribal lands to the west, where the blood feuds and clan rule of medieval Scotland are supercharged by religious ferocity? Does the Pentagon spokesperson mean the mega-city of Karachi, which the government cannot rule firmly, or the frontier settlements where Islamabad does not even pretend to rule, deferring to tribal elders? Mughal Pakistan yearning for the liberation of Kashmir, or Pathan Pakistan dreaming of Puktunistan between Kabul and Peshawar? Mohajir or Baluch Pakistan? Or Islamic Pakistan, blaming unbelievers for its self-inflicted failures?⁶⁴

Historically, Pakistani leaders have used Islam and confrontation with India to rally the various groups together in an effort to promote unity. South Asian journalist, Hussain Haqqani, dismisses this strategy, citing the dismal results: "three wars with India and Pakistan's emergence as a center of Islamic radicalism."⁶⁵ In a recent interview, Musharraf acknowledged Pakistan's failure to secure basic economic and educational opportunities for its people and the corresponding rise in fundamentalism. Commenting on the desperate situation, Musharraf said "A hungry man, an illiterate man --- anyone who comes and puts a Kalashnikov in his hand, well, he's available."⁶⁶

Several decades of state support, to include US covert funding in the 1980s, has left the Islamic extremist groups well equipped, organized, and trained.⁶⁷ Pakistani extremist groups, whether Shi'a or Sunni, have established "a violent, aggressive Islam" in the provinces of Southern Punjab, the Northwest Frontier and the city of Karachi. These groups and their affiliated religious schools, known as madrassas, were recruiting bases for thousands of Pakistani volunteers who cross the border to fight against OEF coalition forces in Afghanistan.⁶⁸

Following his pledge to fully support the war on terrorism, Musharraf came under US pressure to denounce terror attacks in Kashmir and, in particular, an attack against the Indian Parliament in December 2001. In January 2002, Musharraf announced measures to crackdown on extremist groups in Pakistan. In his speech, he stated that no religious extremism would be tolerated and that safe-havens would not be provided to groups carrying out attacks outside Pakistan's borders.⁶⁹ However, Musharraf's ability to completely reel-in the extremist groups is questionable. Perhaps more importantly, what price would Musharraf and the country be willing to pay to crackdown on the extremists? Skeptics allege that Musharraf is unwilling to end support to the groups because of their intricate web of support within the Army as well as Pakistani society.⁷⁰

As Musharraf traverses the "extremist slung" tight rope, the possibility of his downfall is high. Over the past two years, there have been four serious assassination attempts against Musharraf. One in April 2002 resulted in the arrest of a paramilitary officer. The two most recent attempts occurred within a three-day window in December 2003.⁷¹ The identity of the assailants in those cases is still unclear; however, one could make a case for several groups to include the Taliban, al Qaeda, Pakistani extremists groups, or rogue military members.

Although the likelihood of Pakistan becoming a failed state is low, the normalization of its internal and foreign political agendas remains unclear. As Pakistan continues its support of the war on terrorism, debate from within will determine its future policy in Kashmir and the ultimate fate of the extremist groups. Cohen lists three criteria, which can enable Pakistan to transform: "continued international support, abandonment of quixotic foreign policy goals, and India's tolerance."⁷²

EXTERNAL PRESSURES FROM INDIA

Pakistan and India have waged three wars since partition with the first two squarely fought over Kashmir. The basic problem over Kashmir, a predominantly Muslim region ruled by a Hindu Maharaja (prince) at the time of partition, resulted from the British decision to allow the princely state to determine its fate - remain autonomous or choose accession to a Muslim-majority Pakistan or Hindu-majority India. When Pakistani tribesmen entered into Kashmir in 1948, the Kashmiri ruler quickly ceded his defense needs to India. The resultant war between India and Pakistan ended with a United Nations (UN) mediated cease-fire line in which Pakistan controlled the upper one-third while India held the remaining two-thirds of Kashmir. In addition, the UN called for the withdrawal of all military forces and supported a plebiscite for Kashmiris to

determine their eventual fate. India has never recognized the UN resolution for plebiscite, seeking instead to fully incorporate Kashmir into the Indian Union.

In 1965, Pakistan initiated a war to gain complete control of Kashmir. The 17-day battle ended with no change in the overall situation and the signing of the Tashkent Declaration. The 1971 war was initially fought as a civil war between East and West Pakistan. Indian assistance to the Bengali rebel forces in East Pakistan eventually led to the Indian Army's direct intervention and defeat of the Pakistan Army in Bengal. Pakistan responded by opening fronts in Kashmir and along the western border with India. Heeding US pressure, India agreed to end hostilities resulting in the dismemberment of Pakistan, the creation of Bangladesh and the return of Kashmir to the approximate situation before the war. The peace accord known as the Simla Agreement was signed in 1972 and characterized Kashmir as a "bilateral" issue between the two countries.⁷³ Following Simla, India has opposed any attempt for outside mediation of the Kashmir issue.

India's frustrations with Pakistan and its direct involvement with the militancy in Kashmir steadily increased over the 1990s. Pakistan's view of the Kashmir struggle has remained unchanged since the first war in 1948. It has sought to change the situation in Kashmir through appealing to the international community and through the use of force – either by direct confrontation with the Indian military or indirectly through its support of the insurgency.

Over the last 15 years, Pakistan's military intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has trained, equipped and financed civilian jihadists to fight its proxy war in Kashmir. ISI's experience with organizing the Islamic militants was honed during the Afghan war years in the 1980s when the US was not only willing to provide the funding, but to tout their status as Mujahideen (freedom fighters) to the international community as well. The Soviets' departure from Afghanistan coincided with the indigenous Kashmiri insurgency. Pakistan immediately saw the potential of using the "unemployed" Mujahideen in Kashmir, hijacking the rebellion in the process.⁷⁴ The opportunity provided Pakistan with a low-cost but effective means to directly attack Indian economic and military power.⁷⁵

The build-up of military forces along the LOC is nothing new. In recent years, incidents in 1999 and 2002 have led to significant confrontations short of all-out war. In the spring of 1999, the Pakistan Army, led by then Army Chief of Staff Musharraf, infiltrated predominantly regular forces along the LOC to secure Indian military outposts during the seasonal return to heights vacated during the winter months. India's refusal to permit Pakistan's possession of the dominant positions resulted in a limited war fought in and around the heights surrounding the Kashmir village of Kargil. An intense battle raged from mid-May until early July when Pakistani

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, pressured by President Clinton, ordered the pullback of his forces. India's losses were huge with some estimates as high as several thousand killed. Pakistan's claim that the heights had been occupied by Kashmiri freedom fighters soon fell apart as hundreds of Pakistani soldiers were being returned to their villages for burial. India felt particularly betrayed by the Pakistan offensive, that had come on the heels of the historic Lahore Summit meeting of India's Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Sharif.⁷⁶ Significantly, the Kargil war represented the first public siding of the US with India.⁷⁷

The 2002 build-up along the LOC followed the militant terror-attack against the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on 13 December 2001. The brazen, suicide attack took place while the Indian Parliament was in session killing nine individuals. The Indian military immediately began mobilization and a build-up of forces in Kashmir. India took the unprecedented step of diverting Army Divisions from its Eastern Command; a step never taken during its three previous wars with Pakistan. By January, over one million troops were involved in a direct face-off.⁷⁸

Early on, Indian diplomats began using language similar to American justification of its preemptive strategy and the ongoing war on terrorism. Indian External Affairs Secretary, Yashwant Sinha reportedly stated, "India has a much better case to go for preemptive action" in the case of Pakistan than the US had with Iraq.⁷⁹ A significant lesson gleaned from the Kargil battle was that India and Pakistan were capable of fighting a limited war along the LOC (despite the nuclear dimension).

Over the next four months, despite minor terror incidents in Kashmir and the occasional exchange of artillery and mortars along the LOC, the situation remained relatively stable. Then militants were blamed for an attack against an Indian Army camp in Kashmir in which 34 were killed.⁸⁰ The gruesome attack included women and children among the casualties.

India used this attack and the preceding events to make the clear distinction that Kashmir was not the most important problem in South Asia - the problem was terrorism. According to Cohen, the Indians had "successfully reframed the South Asian debate over peace and war."⁸¹ Even as tensions reduced significantly during the summer and both sides began withdrawing forces, India remained insistent on Pakistan ending its support to terrorism before any solution on Kashmir could be negotiated. India had clearly linked its threat of a military strike with the US strategy on dealing with states that support terrorism.

CONCLUSIONS ON PAKISTAN

In the case of Pakistan, America's strategy of preventive war against "rogue states" and "those who sponsor or harbor terrorism" could lead to unfavorable consequences. The US

insistence that Pakistan end support to Kashmir militants may ultimately force President Musharraf into a domestically untenable policy shift on Kashmir. The US position could serve to further destabilize a Musharraf government already questioned about the price of its cooperation on terrorism with the US. Additionally, US ideas of preventive or preemptive strikes against terrorist organizations could embolden a frustrated India to attack suspected terrorist camps in Pakistan and place the nuclear armed rivals on an unavoidable path of escalation. Indeed, second-order effects of US foreign policy are as real today as was the case in the 1950s with Lebanon and the Middle East.

Pakistan presents America with some of its toughest foreign policy challenges. Former US Ambassador to India, Frank Wisner, remarked in recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that:

Dealing with terror and its supporters in Pakistan, containing nuclear and missile proliferation, and bringing order to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area must also be treated simultaneously and at the same time we pursue ways to support a lessening of tensions and negotiations between India and Pakistan. Central to our approach to Pakistan is a willingness to be frank when key boundaries are crossed; our assistance can in part be linked as incentives to Pakistani accomplishment of objectives, which we jointly agree are important. A successful policy with Pakistan requires stability and must be free of threats of sanctions and rhetorical attack.⁸²

A failure in one or more of Pakistan's elements of power could prove disastrous in the region as well as internationally. The possibilities are numerous: the loss of nuclear weapons security, the conduct of a nuclear exchange with India, the spread of Islamic terrorism, and the breakdown of political stability may be mentioned as a sampling of possibilities.

On a positive note, the war on terrorism has placed the US, Pakistan and India on the same side of a vital security interest. As noted earlier, for the first time in the history of India and Pakistan, the US finds itself in the position of having positive influence in both countries at the same time.⁸³ Indeed, serious, high-level meetings between India and Pakistan are currently taking place following the establishment of several confidence-building measures by both nations in 2003.⁸⁴

FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS FOR US POLICY

In South Asia, the US may need to rebalance its relations with India and Pakistan. The current relationships have the potential of becoming clouded and confused when so closely associated with US objectives in the war on terrorism. As quoted earlier, Robert Jervis' caution about the tendency for states to "overestimate the importance of their role in the policies of

others” may loom large in the case of Pakistan. How might Pakistan’s frontline status in the war on terrorism cause it to miscalculate US tolerance and/or support in its dealings with India?

In its bilateral relationship with Pakistan, the US must allow for incremental progress in dealing with Pakistani-based terrorists. The US cannot underestimate the serious risks that President Musharraf is facing in supporting our security objectives. The US can bolster Musharraf’s political stability by ensuring that its relationship with Pakistan is built on broader objectives than just the war on terrorism. In order to overcome his greatest internal obstacles, Musharraf must convince his critics that the US will not leave Pakistan in the wake of another hasty departure from the region.

The US must not forget that India and Pakistan view American engagement on the subcontinent through a zero-sum lens. India and Pakistan’s initial competition-like approach to allying themselves with the war on terrorism is a good example of their political maneuvering against one another. The key to American assistance during the current Indo-Pakistan rapprochement will be a policy of encouragement and facilitation, not one of mediation. The US should expect setbacks and retrenchment by both sides along the way; that is the nature of South Asian politics. In terms of a Kashmir settlement, Ambassador Wisner’s recent testimony touches on a critical point – “while we have an important stake in peace between Indian and Pakistan, we are not mediators, nor do we have solutions, including for Kashmir, which are not outcomes borne of Indian and Pakistani imagination and pursued with their political will.”⁸⁵

As the sole super power, America’s foreign policy is global in every sense of the word. As in the case of Lebanon during the early Cold War years, America must recognize how its security strategies might encroach upon the vital interests of regional states during the Global War on Terrorism. This paper has highlighted potential second and third-order effects which, if ignored, could potentially work against US objectives in South Asia and contribute to tensions within Pakistan as well as Pakistan’s relations with India.

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ENDNOTES

¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 22.

² Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 343.

³ Jervis, 348.

⁴ Dean C. Borgman, Remarks given at the Worldwide Conference of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 17 October 2002; available from <http://www.dsca.osd.mil/_vti_script/SEARCH.htm?idq>; Internet; assessed 12 October 2003.

⁵ Paul Kennedy, ed., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 172.

⁶ See George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 9. The Soviets moved into northern Iran in 1941 as part of an agreement with Great Britain and Iran. In the resultant Tripartite Agreement of 1942, Iran was identified as an ally. The foreign military presence was to be withdrawn within six months of the war's ending.

⁷ Ibid, 13.

⁸ Ibid, 21.

⁹ Paul E. Salem, "Superpowers and Small States: An Overview of American-Lebanese Relations," *The Beirut Review* Spring 1993 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/pub/breview/br5/psalemb5ptl.html>>; Internet; accessed 3 December 2003.

¹⁰ Cole C. Kingseed, *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 26.

¹¹ Lenczowski, 31.

¹² Ibid, 46.

¹³ Fawaz A. Gerges, "The Lebanese Crisis of 1958: The Risks of Inflated Self-Importance," *The Beirut Review* Spring 1992 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/pub/breview/br5/gergesbr5ptl.html>>; Internet; accessed 3 December 2003.

¹⁴ Salem.

¹⁵ The National Pact, an unwritten agreement, came into being in the summer of 1943 as the result of numerous meetings between Lebanon's first President, Khuri (a Maronite), and the first Prime Minister, Riyad as Sulh (a Sunni). At the heart of the negotiations was the Christians' fear of being overwhelmed by the Muslim communities in Lebanon and the surrounding Arab countries, and the Muslims' fear of Western hegemony. In return for the Christian promise not to seek foreign protection and to accept Lebanon's "Arab face," the Muslim side agreed to recognize the independence and legitimacy of the Lebanese state in its 1920 boundaries and to renounce aspirations for union with Syria. The pact also reinforced the sectarian system of

government begun under the French mandate by formalizing the confessional distribution of high-level posts in the government based on the 1932 census' six-to-five ratio favoring Christians to Muslims. Although disputed by some historians, the terms of the National Pact were believed to have been enunciated by the first cabinet in a statement to the legislature in October 1943. The confessional system outlined in the National Pact was a matter of expediency to overcome philosophical divisions between Christian and Muslim leaders at independence. It was hoped that once governance got underway, and as national spirit grew, the importance of confessionalism in the political structure would diminish.

¹⁶ Meo, 9.

¹⁷ Walid Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 56.

¹⁸ Ghassan Tueni, "Democracy in Lebanon: Anatomy of a Crisis," *The Beirut Review* Fall 1993 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/pub/breview/br6/tuenibr6.html>>; Internet; accessed 3 December 2003.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ J. C. Hurewitz, "Lebanese Democracy in Its International Setting," *Middle East Journal* (Spring 1963): 500.

²¹ Tueni.

²² Hurewitz, 501.

²³ Gerges.

²⁴ Meo, 95.

²⁵ President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles emphasized the deterrent power of alliances. Dulles' aspiration was to encircle the Soviet Union and China with a ring of states linked to US security strategy through formal alliances or bilateral security pacts. The Baghdad Pact would eventually become the Central Treaty Organization and although not a signatory, the US did sign separate bilateral agreements with Turkey, Pakistan and Iran in 1959. However, because of Turkey's NATO membership and Pakistan's Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), only the agreement with Iran represented a new commitment. See John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 152.

²⁶ Meo, 95.

²⁷ Lenczowski, 52.

²⁸ Meo, 102-103.

²⁹ Lenczowski, 59.

³⁰ K.S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), 200.

³¹ Gerges.

³² See George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington DC: The White House, 2002).

³³ Ibid, 2.

³⁴ Remarks delivered by Samuel R. Berger, Former National Security Advisor, to the Brookings Leadership Forum, 17 June 2003; available from <<http://brook.edu/comm/events/20030617berger.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 October 2003.

³⁵ Michael E. O'Hanlon, Susan E. Rice, and James B. Steinberg, "The New National Security Strategy and Preemption," Brookings Institute Policy Brief 113, December 2002; available from <<http://brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb113.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 October 2003.

³⁶ Bush, 13-14.

³⁷ Taken from Dr. Stephen Cohen's paper entitled "*The United States and South Asia: Core Interests and Policies and Their Impact on Regional Countries*" presented to the Conference on Major Powers and South Asia, 11 August 2003 at the Institute for Regional Studies, Islamabad Pakistan. Dr. Cohen is a Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institution and his paper is available from <<http://www.brook.edu/views/speeches/cohens/20030811.htm>>; Internet; accessed 29 January 2004.

³⁸ Richard N. Haass, "South Asia: Too Late to Remove the Bomb?," *Orbis* (Winter 1988): 107.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Robert G. Wirsing, "Precarious Partnership: Pakistan's Response to US Security Policies," *Asian Affairs* (Summer 2003): 70 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; assessed 12 October 2003.

⁴¹ Golam W. Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers*, (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 51.

⁴² Iftihar H. Malik, "The Pakistan-US Security Relationship," *Asian Survey* (March 1990): 289.

⁴³ Formed in 1956, CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) consisted of Iran, Turkey, UK, Pakistan, and Iraq (until 1959). Although not a member, the US actively supported the organization. Following Iran and Pakistan's departures in the 1970s, the organization fell apart. SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) was formed in 1955 and consisted of the US, France, UK, Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, New Zealand, and Australia. Following the end of the Vietnam War, SEATO officially disbanded in 1977.

⁴⁴ In 1974, the US Congress attached the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This amendment prohibited US aid to countries which possessed unsafeguarded

uranium enrichment facilities. The Reagan administration received a waiver from Congress in 1981 for this amendment, as did the Bush administration in 1988.

⁴⁵ Shahid Javed Burki, *Historical Dictionary of Pakistan* (London: The Scarecrow Press, 1999), 337.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Christophe Jaarelot, ed., *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins* (London: Anthem Press, 2002), 126. In 1986, US Senator Larry Pressler successfully attached an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act preventing all assistance to Pakistan if it was believed Pakistan was developing a nuclear weapon. The amendment was passed only after the approval of a provision for the President to waive the penalty by certifying that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. President Reagan and President Bush used the provision to continue aid until the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. See Burki, 231.

⁴⁸ Cohen.

⁴⁹ Delinda Hanley, "Pakistan-US Relations Since 9/11," *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* (March 2003): 77.

⁵⁰ James C. Clad, "An Unexpected Chance to Get Down to Fundamentals," in *A New Equation: US Policy Toward India and Pakistan After September 11*, May 2002; available from <<http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp27.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 29 January 2004.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Barry Bearak, "A Journey Through a State of Disequilibrium," *The New York Times Magazine*, 7 December 2003, 130.

⁵³ Hussain Haqqani, "America's New Alliance with Pakistan: Avoiding the Traps of the Past," 19 October 2002; available from <<http://www.ceip.org/files/adf/policybrief19.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 4 December 2003. Haqqani explains that in the 1960s while Pakistan was ruled by General Ayub Khan, the US actively relied on Pakistan for U-2 basing and listening posts directly toward the Soviets. Additionally under Ayub Khan in 1970, the US used Pakistan as an intermediary in the Nixon administration's contact with China. The 1980s cooperation with the US against the Soviets in Afghanistan was under General Zia ul-Haq's rule. The current cooperation with General Musharraf only serves to reinforce the belief that the US prefers to do business with a military dictator.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ The designation of state sponsors of terrorism by the US, and its corresponding imposition of sanctions, is a mechanism for isolating nations that use terrorism as a part of their political agenda. Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan are currently designated as state sponsors of international terrorism.

⁵⁶ Bearak, 64. In November 2001, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (Army of the Righteous) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of Mohammed) were added to the State Department's list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Both groups conduct their terror-based tactics in Indian-held

Kashmir and have maintained training and indoctrination centers in Pakistan and, until the fall of the Taliban, military training centers in Afghanistan. Under intense diplomatic pressure from the US and military pressure from India, President Musharraf gave a speech in which he dissolved both groups along with other known "Jehadist" groups. Although the Ministry of Interior reported arrests of over 1900 activists and the closure of 600 organizational headquarters, the jury is still out on the overall effectiveness and seriousness of the policy. See Jaarelot, 273.

⁵⁷ William J. Broad, David E. Sanger, and Raymond Bonner, "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network," *New York Times*, 12 February 2004; available from <<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/international/asia/12NUKE.html>>; Internet; accessed 12 February 2004.

⁵⁸ Cohen.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Bearak, 124.

⁶¹ Central Intelligence Agency, *World Fact Book 2002*; available from <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pk.html>>; Internet; assessed 9 September 2002.

⁶² Bearak, 121.

⁶³ Jaarelot, 256.

⁶⁴ Ralph Peters, "Hamlet of the Indus," 15 January 2003; available from <<http://delphi-s.dia.smil.mil/admin/EARLYBIRD/030115/s20030115146564.html>>; Internet; accessed 21 January 2003.

⁶⁵ Haqqani.

⁶⁶ Amy Waldman, "General, A 'Bridge' From Islam to the West, Worries About His Foundations," 10 February 2004; available from <<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/10/international/asia/10MUSH.html>>; Internet; accessed 12 February 2004.

⁶⁷ Haqqani.

⁶⁸ Stephen P. Cohen, "South Asia," In *Asian Aftershocks: Strategic Asia 2002-03*, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002); available from <<http://www.brook.edu/dydbocroot/views/articles/cohens/20021201.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 14 February 2004.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Kenneth B. Sherman, "Musharraf Escapes Assassination Attempts," *Journal of Electronic Defense* (February 2004): 18 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 12 February 2004.

⁷² Cohen.

⁷³ The Simla Agreement was signed by Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1972 following the cease-fire of the 1971 war. It is an agreement by the two nations to settle outstanding disputes between the two countries peacefully through bilateral negotiations.

⁷⁴ Bearak, 65.

⁷⁵ Haqqani.

⁷⁶ The unclassified information presented is based upon the author's direct access to information regarding the events while serving as the Assistant Army Attaché in the US Embassy in Islamabad from 1998-2001.

⁷⁷ Cohen.

⁷⁸ Mary Anne Weaver, *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002), 250.

⁷⁹ Kanti Bajpai, "An Indian 'War on Terrorism' Against Pakistan?" *Dissent* (Summer 2003): 23 [database on line]; available from ProQuest; assessed 12 October 2003.

⁸⁰ Cohen.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *India-Pakistan: Steps Toward Rapprochement*, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 28 January 2004.

⁸³ Lee Feinstein, "When Policy Priorities Converge: US Relations with India and Pakistan," in *A New Equation US Policy Toward India and Pakistan After 9/11*, May 2002; available from <<http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp27.pdf>>; Internet; accessed 4 January 2004.

⁸⁴ Amy Walden, "Indians in Deal with Pakistanis for Peace Talks," *New York Times*, 7 January 2004, sec. A, p. 1.

⁸⁵ Congress.

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