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TRANS-ATLANTIC COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN LIGHT OF THE  
“WAR ON TERRORISM” AND THE WAR ON IRAQ

by

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A Research Report Submitted

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## ***Preface***

I was stationed in Europe for about eight years from 1988 to 2002 and I participated in several NATO “Partnership for Peace” programs in Eastern Europe. In dealing with military members from the former Warsaw Pact, I was intrigued with their love for their country and families and yet concerned for their military and state’s future. I started this project in order to gain insight to the security concerns facing Europe after the fall of the Cold war, the reduction of American forces from Europe, and the declining Trans-Atlantic relationship during the Clinton Administration.

I would like to thank several people that have helped me along this journey to write on a topic that is current and dynamic. First, I would like to thank my wife and children for their love, support and patience during this process. Second, I would like to thank my colleagues at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, and the John F. Kennedy School for Government at Harvard University for insight and wisdom during my fellowship at Harvard University. Finally, I would like to thank Commander Kenneth Barrett (USN), Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Dr. Steven Rosen, Dr. Elizabeth Stanley-Mitchell, Dr. Dominic Johnson (England), Michael Reynolds, Kelly Greenhill, Peter Gottwald (Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Germany), Paul Schulte (Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom), Ambassador Richard Morningstar, Lieutenant General Tad Oelstrom (USAF Ret), and Lieutenant Colonel Eero Pyotsia (Finland Defense Forces) and Barbara Kraft (my cousin) for their straightforward constructive criticism and support of my paper.

## ***Abstract***

During the 20<sup>th</sup> Century the U.S was the beacon helping rebuild Europe and the lynchpin for collective security of Europe during the Cold War. One must understand why the Europeans want to create a defense force outside the umbrella of NATO. The objectives are to address three areas concerning the security dilemma of Europe and Trans-Atlantic relations post “9/11”. These objectives are: (1) to examine the U.S National Security Strategy and the impact this strategy has on the Trans-Atlantic relationship; (2) to analyze three key European NATO committed and three neutral states to understand each states current position as it pertains to the collective security of Europe and the Relationship; and (3) analyze Russia and assess its impact on the Relationship. Policy recommendations for the U.S are: (1) to continue supporting Europe’s collective security policy; (2) to take the lead on NATO expansion of the East; (3) to ensure the relationship is maintained and focused on uniting all fronts and avoid divisions between bi-polar camps within the EU, NATO and the U.S; (4) to expand its relationship with Russia from a partnership to an alliance either through NATO or bi-laterally; and (5) to ensure the Trans-Atlantic Alliance’s stability in Asia remains status quo.

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

*“If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealths be added to that of the United States with all that such co-operation implies in the air, on the sea, all over the globe and in science and in industry, and in moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary, there will be an overwhelming assurance of security.”<sup>1</sup>*

Winton Churchill, March 5, 1946, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri

The U.S and Europe have enjoyed for the most part a tremendous relationship from the beginning of United States’ birth as a nation. Furthermore, during the 20<sup>th</sup> Century the U.S was a beacon helping the Europeans rebuild Europe from ashes after two devastating wars and the lost millions of people. Likewise, the U.S outspent and out maneuvered the Stalin/Lenin/Marxist regimes of the Soviet Union to the point it no longer exists and is a mere shadow of its former self. With this history, one should understand why Europe wants to create its own defense force outside the umbrella of NATO. Competing priorities between international organizations and various treaties created in the past 60 years added a multi-dimensional rhombus to the equation of international diplomacy in Europe and on security arrangements in Europe post “9-11.”

This paper is a policy paper on the Trans-Atlantic relationship of collective security after “9-11” and the war on Iraq. The objectives of this paper are to examine issues concerning the security dilemma of Europe and Trans-Atlantic relations post “9/11” and formulate policy recommendations. First, I will examine the U.S National Security Strategy and the impact this

strategy has on the Trans-Atlantic relationship. Second, I will analyze three key member states (France, Germany, United Kingdom) and three neutral states (Finland, Ireland, Sweden) to understand each state's current position as it pertains to the collective security of Europe and the Trans-Atlantic relationship. Third, I will examine the issues and events surrounding U.S support of the European Security and Defense Policy outside the NATO umbrella. Fourth, I will analyze Russia and assess its impact on the Trans-Atlantic Relationship. Finally, I will develop and formulate policy recommendations to enhance the Trans-Atlantic collective security relationship.

This paper should provide a better understanding of the geopolitical, socio-economic, and military indicators in the European and Russian area of operations. Furthermore, this paper should provide a perspective that the U.S National Security Strategy is congruent in supporting the Trans-Atlantic relationship.



## Chapter 2

### **The U.S National Security Strategy and Implications on the Trans-Atlantic Relationship**

*“But when the Wall fell, some people called those principles into question. As the Cold War ended, they asked whether we really needed, anymore, to work together on security issues. Wasn't it time for Europe and North America to go their separate ways? And others questioned the continued need for effective military forces. After all, hadn't history ended? If there were to be no more threats to our security, couldn't we just cash in the peace dividend?”<sup>2</sup>*

General Secretary Lord Robertson, to the Annual Meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on 21 November 2000

Collective security in Europe and the Trans-Atlantic area of responsibility evolved through a series of treaties and summits. Six treaties (Treaty of Brussels, Treaty of Washington, Treaty of Maastricht, Treaty of Amsterdam, Treaty of Nice, and the Treaty of Copenhagen) detailed the collective security arrangement of Europe since 1949. These treaties and summits tangibly showed the states involved, background development, defense significance and the evolution of a collective security for Europe inside and outside of NATO. Review of these treaties and council summits make it clearly evident that Europe had the desire and will to create a collective security apparatus after the fall of Germany and WWII; however, due to the Cold War and not being able to solidify a base to develop this force outside of the Trans-Atlantic relationship, in particular the U.S, Europe was destined to be an acquiescent partner of the U.S. As Winston Churchill prophetically stated in 1946, “What is this sovereign remedy? It is to recreate the European Family, or as much of it as we can, and provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in

peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe.”<sup>3</sup> The evolutionary process in which these treaties, summits and councils were created demonstrated Europe’s commitment to the development of the economic, political and military institutions that focused on prosperity, mankind and collective security within and out of Europe.

The acceleration of an independent collective security arrangement outside the NATO umbrella in Europe in recent years can be attributed to U.S foreign policy actions during the 1990s. Several critical issues such as Kyoto Protocol, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the preemptive nature of the U.S National Security Strategy has proven to be very contentious between the allies within the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. European criticisms of United States’ foreign policies created a wedge and various diplomats vocalized that Americans and Europeans were drifting apart on environmental, economic, WMD conventions, UN support, and globalization issues. Some individuals not familiar with the European Security Defense Policy might view this policy as a new concept. However, in the aftermath of WWII and the rise of the Soviet superpower, Europeans have always pursued some type of security arrangement to keep Germany in check as well as provide some form of common collective security for Europe. As a result, several treaties, ratifications, and agreements over the past 60 years were used as building blocks for creation of a European security policy outside of NATO.

To complicate initial U.S support for the European Security Defense Policy outside the NATO construct, Americans and Europeans were drifting apart for various reasons (as previously mentioned) after the fall of the Berlin wall. Also deteriorating the Trans-Atlantic relationship was Kosovo. The Europeans realized it was time to truly energize their security policy in the aftermath of Kosovo War in 1999 when NATO, especially the U.S, won the war

after a relentless 78-day air campaign that left Kosovo in ruins and left the Europeans picking up the pieces for several years. Also, the Europeans recognized, although they basically ignored military modernization and concentrated on economic development and social reform programs, they could not solve any European security crisis without the help of the U.S. Therefore, the Europeans sought options to create a “Euro” force dedicated to taking on missions that were outlined in the Headlines Goals known as the Petersberg tasks. These tasks included humanitarian missions, crisis management, peacekeeping operations and search and rescue missions.

On the surface, European efforts on collective security appeared reasonable, however, the Clinton administration waffled on support of this endeavor. As a continuation of policy, the new president for the U.S (Bush), supported Clinton’s policy to support European Security only when NATO was the mechanism for collective security for the entire Trans-Atlantic community. Only after “9-11,” under Prime Minister Blair’s guiding hand, did Bush change the U.S position and encourage the Europeans to develop their own collective security policy. Supporting the European collective security initiative dovetailed with the U.S National Security Strategy by maintaining alliances, confronting terrorism and stopping non-state actors and rogue states from proliferation of WMDs.

### **The U.S National Security Strategy**

At The Citadel in September 1999, during his campaign for the U.S. Presidency, Bush announced his blueprint for the U.S National Security Strategy. While addressing the cadets and faculty Bush identified three goals: (1) to renew the bond of trust between the American president and the American military; (2) to defend the American people against missiles and terror; and (3) to create the military of the next century.<sup>4</sup>

During this speech, Bush announced he would “not retreat from the world. On the contrary, I will replace diffuse commitments with focused ones...this will preserve the resources of American power and public will. The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of our commitment to allies and friends.”<sup>5</sup> To Bush, this was not a retreat to isolationism; however, he wanted to reprioritize efforts by focusing forces for certain actions instead of scattering them all over the world. Bush also revealed his vision for homeland security. He stated “the protection of America itself will assume a high priority in a new century. Once a strategic afterthought, homeland defense has become an urgent duty.”<sup>6</sup>

Bush recognized the terrorist threat, especially that from Islamic extremists. He declared, “Every group or nation must know, if they sponsor such attacks, our response will be devastating.” This could be interpreted as responding with all instruments of power as well as using the whole spectrum of military might (to include pre-emptive strikes). Furthermore, Bush stated “at the earliest possible date, my administration will deploy anti-ballistic missile systems, both theater and national, to guard against attack and blackmail. To make this possible, we will offer Russia the necessary amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty – an artifact of Cold War.”<sup>7</sup>

A second speech further refined the ideas for the NSS. In December 2001, while again at The Citadel, President Bush discussed the goals listed above in terms of the “War on Terrorism” and his vision of the world beyond the “War on Terrorism.” These goals resulted from the shifts in paradigms from the old Cold War days of superpowers, arm races, and alliances to focusing on threats on civilization caused by Islamic extremist and non-state actors. This threat was identified in Professor Samuel Huntington’s visionary book “The Clash of Civilizations--Remaking of World Order.” Thus, after “9/11” and the war in Afghanistan, President Bush stated this “new

threat to civilization is erasing old lines of rivalry and resentment between nations.” He further stated that:

“Russia and America are building a new cooperative relationship. India and the U.S are increasingly aligned across a range of issues, even as we work closely with Pakistan. Germany and Japan are assuming new military roles, appropriate to their status as great democracies. Rivals becoming partners, ideologies put on the side, countries like Japan and Germany.”<sup>8</sup>

With this in mind, President Bush is very attentive that the U.S cannot be isolationist and act unilaterally. The U.S needs its allies not only in Europe, but also throughout the world. Under his conservative Christian values, Bush appears not afraid to say “good and evil” and believes that the U.S has “God-given” moral obligations to protect “freedom and human condition” from WMD, terrorists and rogue states<sup>9</sup>. He believes he has a calling and he knows the direction in which he wants to move. With his clarity and sense of purpose, Bush believes that to secure the peace it is vital to build good relations between regional powers like Russia, France and China to “encourage free and open societies.”

In his third speech at West Point in June 2002, Bush stated that the “gravest danger” to peace is the spread of weapons of mass destruction with ballistic missile technology by non-state actors and rogue states that could inflict “catastrophic” damage to any nation. Therefore, he laid the foundation for a Homeland Security Department and the employment of multiple missile defense systems (tactical and strategic) that would provide the security to protect the U.S and its allies from any impending attack. Furthermore, he stated that fighting the “War on Terrorism” would not be on the defensive, but on the offensive. This statement was very significant since it implied, that if necessary, the U.S would attack even if not provoked.

He also stated that the U.S must have a military that “must be ready to strike at a moment's notice” and “be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.” This is also a significant statement and a tremendous shift in philosophy and

diplomacy from the Cold War days. During the Cold War days, preemption was viewed with malevolent condescension, and no nation would dare start a nuclear war with a pre-emptive strike. However, with new technologies, Bush defined a new doctrine stating that a pre-emptive action could be the right, and probable course of action, to disrupt and destroy an enemy's perceived or stated intentions.

These three speeches laid the foundation for the U.S National Security Strategy (NSS) document that was published in September 2002. The NSS is based on "American internationalism" that reflects U.S values and interests with an aim that not only "makes the world safer, but better." To achieve this, President Bush set out three goals: (1) political and economic freedom, (2) peaceful relations with other states and (3) respect for human dignity. To achieve these goals, the U.S will: (1) champion aspirations for human dignity; (2) strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism; (3) work to defuse regional conflicts; (4) prevent enemies from threatening U.S and allies with weapons of mass destruction; (5) ignite a new era of global economic growth; (6) develop more open societies and build infrastructure of democracy; (7) develop agendas for cooperative action; and (8) transform America's national security institutions for the twenty-first century.<sup>10</sup>

Throughout the NSS, themes resonating are national security, economic security, homeland security, humanitarian assistance and close cooperation with European Allies and others that the U.S needs to partner with as the world pursues the "War on Terrorism." In addition, the U.S strives to foster relationships with former Warsaw Pact nations and Russia. These themes are important considering the need to prevent Russia's nuclear arsenal from falling into the hands of terrorists planning to carry out dastardly deeds or others acting in a criminal way to achieve profit by selling nuclear weapons, components or equipment needed to produce nuclear weapons and materials.

It is also important to realize that although the U.S pursued measures that others viewed as withdrawing from the world in the form of isolationism or by exceptionalism, the U.S is keenly aware that it needs allies and that the allies need the U.S. Both the U.S and her allies bring to the table vast knowledge and capabilities to solve political, economic and military challenges. Throughout the NSS, the term “allies” is used 37 times. Recurring terms such as “share,” “work with,” “coordinate,” “committed,” and “to have” clearly demonstrate the “official” resolve of the U.S to maintaining, improving, creating and reestablishing relationships with its allies. However, there are and will be times when the U.S and its allies will disagree on issues. In those cases, the U.S “will respect the values, judgment, and interests of its friends and partners; be prepared to act apart when interests and unique responsibilities require; and disagree on particulars, explain forthrightly the grounds for concerns and strive to forge viable alternatives.”<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the NSS emphasizes that the U.S will “not allow such disagreements to obscure our determination to secure together, with our allies and our friends, our shared fundamental interests and values.”<sup>12</sup>

This is essential. Over the past 200 years, the U.S and Europe enjoyed a very substantial relationship that fostered in aligning themselves to be the two most powerful economic, military and political “States” in the world. Therefore, it is imperative that Europe and the U.S recognize that each needs the other to achieve economic prosperity and democracy throughout the world for generations to come while maintaining a strong Trans-Atlantic alliance. Furthermore, the U.S recognizes and encourages the development of the European Security Defense Policy meet regional challenges in Europe.

The U.S must ensure the Trans-Atlantic relationship is maintained and focused on uniting all fronts and avoid divisions between bi-polar camps (German/France and the rest of Europe) within the EU, NATO and the U.S. The Trans-Atlantic relationship is paramount to the freedom,

democracy and security of Europe, the U.S and the world! The U.S welcomes its' "European allies" efforts to forge a greater foreign policy and defense identity with the EU, and commit itself to close consultations to ensure that these developments work with NATO."<sup>13</sup> If the Europeans can take on roles and missions outside the umbrella of NATO, it helps Russia and the U.S to concentrate on other missions that need more military might to solve regional conflicts. If the Europeans adhere to the Petersberg Tasks then, for example, the Europeans can take the lead in the Balkans, allowing the U.S to reconstitute forces and equipment to be utilized in other regions of the world where the U.S deems necessary. Ironically, the EU exchanged flags with NATO as the lead organization in March 2003 in FYROM fulfilling the EU mandate by providing a force by 2003.

The U.S should realign its forces within Europe while assuring new NATO members and the EU that the U.S is committed to maintaining strong Trans-Atlantic relationship. Maintaining base/post infrastructure in Western Europe is expensive. Relocate some fighting units from Western Europe to Eastern Europe. Relocating units to Eastern Europe would suggest to the Europeans that the U.S still maintains national interests within Europe while supporting the Trans-Atlantic relationship. Furthermore, maintaining some units in Western Europe is necessary to show the Europeans that the U.S is still committed to the collective security of Europe. The U.S spends billions of dollars yearly in operation and maintenance costs keeping these bases and posts open. In addition, there are several constraints hampering effective training in Western Europe. Pilot and aircrew training are limited to minimal ranges and airspace restrictions. Likewise, the Army has limited areas to hold field exercises and is constantly scrutinized for environmental issues. Relocating tactical fighter wings and infantry/armor units from Western Europe to Eastern Europe makes sense. The training and strategic benefits outweigh relocation costs and "sunk" cost for infrastructure. U.S fighting units



will have less operational restrictions and would be located closer to potential conflict regions on the fringe of Europe's borders. Although political support in Western Europe might resent force realignment, collective security for Europe will still be maintained and perhaps enhanced due to the geolocations fighting units could operate from. In addition, tactical airlift could be used to get units to the fight, versa strategic lift that may be delayed due to prioritization of lift should a conflict arise in the region.

Intervention covers the range of military actions from military operations other than war (show of force, humanitarian missions, peace keeping operations) to preemptive strikes. Over the years, the U.S has always had "preemptive strikes" as an option in the NSS "to counter a sufficient threat to our national security." However, President Bush has recently seen it as a "need" to thwart a terrorist action or eliminate potential WMD manufacturing capabilities in rogue states that aid terrorists to cause harm towards the U.S and the rest of the world.

It is important to note that the term "preemptive" is used only four times in the NSS. Each time, it is used in reference to terrorism or emerging threats to the U.S. Although the U.S will seek support from the international community, like all nations that come under threat, the U.S will use all options available to include the economic, political and military instruments of power to counter a perceived or real threat.

If the U.S feels severely threatened, it will not "hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise its right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against its people and country."<sup>14</sup> Likewise, the U.S has always maintained the position that it will "forestall or prevent such hostile acts by adversaries and, if necessary, will act preemptively."<sup>15</sup> Of course it must be recognized, that the U.S understands international law and the UN Charter and the U.S will not use force "in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression."<sup>16</sup>

The Europeans such as the Germans and French should not underestimate the current global security dilemma with Iraq. Although the “War on Iraq” is not necessarily the same situation as it was prior to WWII, ignoring Iraq like Neville Chamberlain and Douard Daladier did while achieving appeasement with Hitler is unacceptable. Trying to pacify the “current” threat by compromising significant elements of national and international security will eventually lead to a chaotic and anarchic environment like that prior to and during WWII that will breed terror for years to come.

To understand the European concerns about the Trans-Atlantic relationship after “9-11”, it is important to examine some states that affect this relationship between the U.S and Europe.

## Chapter 3

### Trans-Atlantic Security Post 9-11 and IRAQ

*“America and the nations in Europe are more than military allies, we're more than trading partners; we are heirs to the same civilization. The pledges of the Magna Carta, the learning of Athens, the creativity of Paris, the unbending conscience of Luther, the gentle faith of St. Francis -- all of these are part of the American soul. The New World has succeeded by holding to the values of the Old.”*

President George W. Bush, 23 May 2002,  
Berlin, Germany

There are many critics that believe that the Trans-Atlantic community is on shaky ground. There are those that think the U.S has retreated into a world of isolationism and view the U.S' diplomatic endeavors as “American exceptionalism.” With the events of “9-11,” the Iraq crisis, the follow-on campaign “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” and recent elections on both sides of the Atlantic, cooperation within the Trans-Atlantic relationship has vacillated within NATO, the UN and the EU. It is important for diplomats to save “face” with their constituents and government; however, when world peace and security is at stake, cooperation is vital to secure the peace and ensure security against criminal elements, terrorist groups, economic espionage, migrations and a whole list of other transnational issues and concerns that effect a state's and global security.

In order to understand these security issues and concerns, it will be necessary to understand the interwoven relationships within and out of the Trans-Atlantic relationship in regards to security matters. For the purpose of discussion, six states (France, Germany, United Kingdom,

Ireland, Finland and Sweden) are used as case examples for analysis. France, Germany and U.K. are used as examples due to major contributions to the collective security of Europe (NATO) and level of commitment to the European Security Defense Policy (France—very high, Germany—middle of the road, U.K—low). Ireland, Finland and Sweden are highlighted to represent states support operations under the auspices of international institutions such as the UN.

Robert Kagan in his June 2002 *Policy Review* article “Power and Weakness,” “Today’s Trans-Atlantic problem, in short, is not a George Bush problem. It is a power problem. American military strength has produced a propensity to use that strength. Europe’s military weakness has produced a perfectly understandable aversion to the exercise of military power.”<sup>17</sup> He goes on to say “Indeed, it has produced a powerful European interest in inhabiting a world where strength doesn’t matter, where international law and international institutions predominate, where unilateral action by powerful nations is forbidden, where all nations regardless of their strength have equal rights and are equally protected by commonly agreed-upon international rules of behavior.”<sup>18</sup>

Kagan makes a keen observation and many on both sides of the Atlantic agree. The U.S. solves problems militarily that it cannot solve either with economic or political influence with or without international backing. The Europeans for the most part would rather use international institutions such as the UN or NATO to do their bidding in resolving crisis that cannot be solved economically or politically. With this realization, the Europeans have had a “free-ride” on the backs of the U.S. defense spending and manpower commitments since the Washington Treaty was signed in 1949 with the creation of NATO.

During these fifty years, the U.S. has spent more on defense annually than the European Community/Union. The Europeans relied on the U.S. strategic forces, C<sup>4</sup>ISR (Command,

Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) assets, and sea and airlift platforms for logistical support and security protection for years.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, and the U.S led coalitions in Kosovo and Bosnia, the Europeans reluctantly concluded that a common foreign and security defense initiative was required outside the scope of NATO. This conclusion was based on a variety of issues from command and control to resolving regional problems within the confines of the European borders. However, creating a “Euro” force could not be accomplished since the Europeans did not actively pursue investing in capabilities such as C<sup>4</sup>ISR, strategic airlift, space surveillance, and a naval fleet as large as the U.S. Therefore, the Europeans approached these capabilities by amending the security concept to use such assets from NATO until they could develop independent assets. The Europeans, after a series of summits and treaties, established the framework and institutions for a common foreign and security defense formula known today as the European Security Defense Policy.

This policy is an attempt to establish a 60,000-person force made up of assets from the 15 member states of the EU as well as the seven aspirant states seeking membership into the union to support the Petersberg tasks. Although all the members of the union contribute much less than 3 percent of its GNP to defense, there are three states, France, Germany, and the U.K., that are the architects and major contributors towards this policy. In addition, there are four states (Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) of the EU that maintain neutrality when it comes to entering security alliances for security purposes. It is important to understand their roles in the Trans-Atlantic relationship and how they plan to support the collective security policy for Europe.

## France

Although the French and Americans shared a fairly good relationship for 225 years, during the past 30 years, it appears the French government as a big power in Europe has tried to undermine U.S' national interests. The French believe they have legitimate reasons for making diplomatic issues difficult for the U.S. These reasons are founded on how and why the U.S withdrew from treaties such Kyoto, ICC, and ABM, as well as U.S reaction on farming and steel import issues; and importing food items like beef, bananas and genetically altered food products. In addition, the French are adamant about keeping the "hyperpuissance" of the world, the U.S, in check. The French use the UN Security Council and G-8 as avenues to keep the U.S at bay. Although there are many issues the U.S and the French agree on, there are two major issues, the Iraq and ESDP, which have strained relationships over the past several years.

Many American critics say that the French are obstinate about protecting Iraq because they received significant economic benefits from Iraq over the years. During the seven phases of the UN "Oil for Food" program, from December 1996 to May 2000, France garnered more contracts valued at \$2 billion from Iraq than any other state supporting this program.<sup>19</sup>

On 12 September 2002, President Bush speaking to the United Nations:

"My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the U.S should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power."<sup>20</sup>

With this challenge the French for several weeks "stone-walled" the resolution the U.S drafted allowing the return of weapon inspectors back into Iraq. After negotiations with France, Russia and the U.S, U.N. Resolution 1441 was adopted. Although, several in the Bush Administration including Secretary Defense Rumsfield, Vice President Cheney, and Deputy

Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz were working issues for the preparation of war with Iraq and thought the proposed resolution was sufficient, the French trumped this proposal and developed a new proposal that was acceptable to the U.S and the UN Security council. On 8 November 2002, the UN Security unanimously approved UN Resolution 1441, requiring Iraq to disarm itself of its weapons of mass destruction and to disclose all of its nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs. However, with several more months of inspection and the lack of progress the Iraqi's were making to fully disarm its WMD, the U.S along with Britain pushed for regime change in Iraq. France along with Germany, Russia and several other nations fervently opposed taking force against Iraq and wanted more time for inspections to take work.

The Chirac and Bush foreign policy machines were at loggerheads. The U.S and Britain pushed for one more "final" UN resolution authorizing force to remove the regime in Iraq and the French, without compromise and negotiations stated that they would veto this resolution on principle alone. Britain and the U.S withdrew the resolution. After a meeting with Spain, U.S, Portugal and U.K in Azores on 15 March 2003, the "Coalition of the Willing" finalized the war plans to remove the Iraqi leadership from power. On 19 March 2003, the "Coalition of the Willing" led by the UK and the U.S, declared war on Iraq. During the events leading up to the war with Iraq, many experts suggested that the U.S lost standing in the international community and the French gain tremendously on the diplomatic front. However, during the initial successful operations conducted by the coalition forces in Iraq; several chemical, biological and nuclear weapon grade material were found; hundreds of weapon storage areas located inside schools and hospitals; numerous torture chambers uncovered; the mobs of Iraqis celebrating in the streets with knowing the Saddam regime was destroyed, support for Chirac was significantly degraded. However, it is still to earlier to speculate how the French will fair in the international community with the war in Iraq and the rebuilding effort that is to follow.

Then again, there is the Rumsfeld declaration that Europe is divided between old (Franco/German) and new Europe (Eastern European states). This statement although initially made to show that the German/French connection was undermining the U.S/U.K efforts to bring action to prosecute a war with Iraq, has really resonated to show that in fact Europe is divided. The Gang of Eight (Britain, Spain, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Portugal) published a letter on 30 January 2003 in *The Wall Street Journal* supporting U.S efforts to remove the Iraqi threat to the world.<sup>21</sup> Then a week later, ten more countries known as the Vilnius Group (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania) hurled their support behind United States intervention in Iraq further dismissing the French and German declaration that “Franco-German claims to speak for the continent on the crisis.”<sup>22</sup>

Depending on what side one views these events, one can suggest that the French gained tremendously in the international community standings by challenging the U.S on the Iraqi crisis. Where on the other hand, the French may have not only alienated the U.S and UK, but may have alienated the Eastern European countries aspiring for EU membership as well. Chirac launched an infuriated assault against several Eastern European countries, in particularly Romania and Bulgaria, saying that they behaved "recklessly" and that they “missed a good opportunity to keep quiet. When you are in the family, after all, you have more rights than when you are asking to join and knocking on the door.”<sup>23</sup>

The French, although having veto power on the Security Council, understood the ramifications if they vetoed the Resolution based on President Bush’s challenge to the UN to deal with the Iraqi regime. They understood that the *hyperpuissance* could and would probably act with or without UN Security Council backing if the resolution was not sanctioned and



approved. The French gained an impetus as a formidable force in the international community when dealing with the U.S. However, it is still too soon to determine if the French gained any standing with their lack of support for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The other issue the French have energized in the EU is the establishment of the European Security Defense Policy and a force that can carry the Petersberg tasks mandated by the Helsinki Summit in 1999. Over the past decade the French have been the engine behind this policy. According to France's Minister of Defense, Michele Alliot-Marie, in her first official visit to Washington, D.C., "Within NATO, many Europeans have been free-riders in security terms. They have consumed more than they have invested. The development of the ESDP is the only real chance for the US to see the Europeans accepting at last their full share of responsibilities and increasing their capabilities." With this acknowledgement that Europeans were "free-riders," the French have taken an ambitious attempt to transform their defense policy and take the lead for other European States to follow.

Last year, the French went from drafting French citizens for conscription use into an all-volunteer professional force. Furthermore, the French developed the equivalent of the US National Security Strategy called the "2003-2009 Military Programme Bill of Law." This document outlined various themes from threat, changing strategic environment, deterrence, projection, prevention, 2015 Armed Forces Model, reform, resources, research, modernization, to capabilities and shortfalls. This document also forecasted the French vision of leading the Europe as a military powerhouse.

The goals of the "Programme" for 2003-2008 were to: (1) Ensure security for the French people, defend its interests better by affirming its strategic autonomy and giving France a driving role again in Europe and thereby in the world; (2) Restore availability of equipment to improve the forces' operational level; (3) Modernize the forces in the strategic fields of situation

evaluation, command, projection and deep action means, and to equip the professional army with new generation hardware needed to accomplish missions corresponding to the new strategic context; (4) Increase research effort to integrate the technological developments to face the variety of threats effectively.<sup>24</sup>

This Programme addresses France's commitment to the ever-changing strategic environment. As a member of the EU, France recognized that they must; "protect autonomy of decision and actions," "preserve influence in alliances and coalitions," and "maintain technological know-how." Furthermore, within the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), the French acknowledge within the framework of the plan that they needed to: "develop the capabilities that allow them to assume the role of "lead nation;" "support already existing bilateral treaties of multilateral cooperation;" and reinforce the interoperability ...to improve their command of intelligence."

The French noted that based on the ECAP, there were four fundamental themes that require investment efforts. These themes are: command, intelligence and resource assessment; a decrease of the projection and force mobility capability deficit; an increase of long range and strike capabilities; and reinforcement of protection resources.<sup>25</sup> With these themes, the French were committed to increasing their defense budget by a total of 87.33 billion Euros, averaging over the next five years, starting in 2003 and ending in 2008, nearly 14.533 billion Euros a year.<sup>26</sup> This is a very significant commitment of resources, considering that the French, since the 1930s, have not put an enormous emphasis on defense.

The French plan to procure a new generation nuclear missile-launching submarine, carry the new *MICA* 51 missile for the strategic oceanic force, and eight multi-mission frigates, three Horizon type frigates and two Barracuda class nuclear attack submarines for patrolling. For the air component, France will procure 57 *Rafale* fighters capable of firing the Scalp/EG airborne

missile for deep strike mission and 20 “COUGAR *Mk 2*” helicopters for Special Forces. For mobility operations and logistical support for movement of equipment and personnel, the French forecast procurement of three A400M Airbuses in 2008, two Projection and Command Ships with amphibious action capable of delivering light armored forces of 1400 personnel from sea, and the procurement of 34 NH 90 Helicopters for theater mobility.<sup>27</sup>

The land force and space component will receive significant gains for the “Programme” as well. To protect the infantry and provide the necessary firepower to thwart a threat from the ground; 272 VBCI (armored vehicles), 152 articulated tracked vehicles, renovation of 500 light armored vehicles and 10 RC tanks, and 117 *Leclerc* tanks will be procured. As for upgrading platforms for using the space spectrum of warfare, the French are modernizing the SDCA (AWACS) detection and command systems, procuring an E-2C Hawkeye for airborne operations and command and control, and buying two *Girafe* radars to protect national assets. Furthermore, the French committed 3,814 million Euros for research and development in areas such as missiles, command/control/communication/reconnaissance, space surveillance, robotics, stealth platforms, battle management conception and development.

The French are committed to the European Security Defense Force and want the “lead” to shape the vision as well as mold the future of these forces capable of carrying out the Petersberg tasks. To enhance this vision, the French have aligned with Germany to enhance military capabilities.

## **Germany**

Over the past 10 years, Germany has gone through radical changes in the way it approaches security. After World War II, Germany was partitioned. In the West, the Federal Republic of Germany was allowed a self-defense force to assist the U.S, France and U.K. within the

framework of NATO to defeat the USSR should they invade Germany. After the Cold War ended, the Americans, French and British dramatically reduced forces in Germany, and Germany had no choice but to debate and modify its constitution regarding their security apparatus. Thus, in 1994, the German Parliament amended Grundgesetz, the German Basic Law, changing the Bundeswehr's roles, responsibilities, and missions, allowing the Bundeswehr to employ forces in operations outside the boundaries of Germany as well as NATO. This was a radical shift in the way Germany viewed itself. Over the next decade, the Bundeswehr saw action as peacekeepers in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

Due to German politics prior to "9-11" and recent elections of Chancellor Schroeder agitated by media and diplomats, a political wedge between the U.S and Germany was created causing anti-American sentiment in Europe. There were minor issues such as the construction of the American Embassy in Berlin and the America-designed Holocaust Memorial near the Brandenburg gates; the killings of two women by American military dependents; and the U.S veto of Germany's initial nominee to the International Monetary Fund.<sup>28</sup> Then there were the serious issues such as the U.S construction of huge communications intercept installations accused by the European Parliament to conduct economic espionage; the U.S criticism of the ESDP which the U.S said threatens to duplicate the NATO structures; the role of US airpower in Kosovo and the lack of support by the U.S on various treaties; and more recently the comment referring to President Bush as "Hitler" by the Herta Daeubler-Gmelin, Germany's Justice Minister prior to Chancellor Schroeder's reelection bid.<sup>29</sup>

However, in the past several months, there has been a serious diplomatic effort that has put the German/American relationship back on the proper course. On May 22, 2002, Chancellor Schroeder and President Bush mended the fence and had lengthy discussions on an array of topics from terrorism to European and NATO partnership with Russia.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, the U.S

was also one of the first countries to congratulate the German government when they were selected to serve a 2-year term on the UN Security Council. There was also agreement about fighting the “War on Terrorism”; that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was a dangerous dictator; and the role of the ESDP within NATO construct. The two states, however, would use different ways and means of achieving these goals and this sometimes causes consternation in achieving those missions.

The German government understood the level of involvement and commitment to combating worldwide terrorism. Germany has 1,163 soldiers on duty in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the second largest contingent, behind Great Britain, in the multinational brigade of approximately 4,700 troops in Kabul.<sup>31</sup> Chancellor Schroeder is committed to help in the reconstruction effort in Kabul with over 320 million euros pledged by 2005. However, he has misgivings about allowing ISAF forces to expand their area of responsibility beyond Kabul. The German Parliament approved a 12-month extension of German forces assigned to ISAF in Kabul to fulfill the UN Resolution 1444 approved in November 2002.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, Germany and the Netherlands assumed command functions in early 2003 allowing them a wide-reaching influence in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

Germany is a pacifist state. The thought of war causes Germans great agony and distress. They do not want to repeat the history that has plagued them for sixty years. Hence, the Germans would rather use all economic and political means (to sue for a peace) in Iraq versus having the U.S lead a coalition to achieve the UN mandates if at all possible. In addition, they are concerned about the U.S deploying over 300,000 troops in the region; as well as the U.S acting bi-laterally with Great Britain to force a regime change in Iraq. Chancellor Schroeder, even prior to the German elections, was critical of the Bush Administration’s desire to go to war against Iraq. The Germans did not support the use of German Forces to fight in Iraq.

Then, there is the issue of the ESDP. In the early years in the development of the ESDP, the U.S supported the Europeans in taking more of an active role in the security of Europe outside the scope of NATO shouldering the responsibility. However, during the development of the ESDP, the Europeans needed the command and control elements, strategic lift and intelligence of the NATO apparatus to support any European endeavor in the security of Europe. In the late 90s and the early part of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the U.S and in particularly Turkey were adamantly opposed to this arrangement for two important reasons. First, the U.S was shouldering the brunt of the economic commitment to NATO by nearly 66 percent. Secondly, Turkey, a very strategically located country, was seeking membership to the EU. The Union did not want Turkey in for various reasons such as European identity, Cyprus, Greek-Turkish relationships, human rights and country with a Muslim majority. Since Germany and France were the major players in developing the ESDP, carefully scripted negotiations were required between the U.S and Turkey to achieve NATO support of ESDP. With the recent EU Summit in Copenhagen in December 2002, under a German/French proposal, it was agreed that in December 2004, if Turkey “pursues energetically its reform process” and on the basis “of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.”<sup>33</sup> Thus with this act, Turkey withdrew its objection to Europeans pursuing the ESDP under NATO’s umbrella.

Although the Germans have a great distain for conflict, they have a clear understanding and appreciation that collective security for Europe is necessary. The Germans view the ESDP as obtainable and as a vehicle to enhance NATO and the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. However, the honest broker from the U.S perspective in the entire EU in regards to balancing the EU’s commitments for a defense force and maintaining a strong Trans-Atlantic relationship within the framework of NATO is the U.K.

## **United Kingdom**

The Bush and Blair administrations have an exceptional relationship. According to Michael Dobbs, “The Bush-Blair relationship is reminiscent of the relationship between Kennedy and then-Prime Minister Harold MacMillan during the Cuban crisis. In public, MacMillan was Kennedy's number one international cheerleader. In private, he was a leading voice of caution.”<sup>34</sup> Bush and Blair cooperated together on complex issues like the use of weapon inspectors in Iraq, the “War on Terrorism” and European security. On the flip side, there are issues, like the Palestinian/Israel conflict, where disagreement between Bush and Blair occurs.

The Bush-Blair relationship was distant from the start; however, their relationship was strengthened after the events on 11 September 2001. On 20 September 2001, Prime Minister Blair was in the gallery while President Bush delivered his passionate speech to a joint session of Congress naming Usama Bin Laden and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as the perpetrators responsible for the terrorist assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

As President Bush stated in this address to Congress, “This is not, however, just America's fight! And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight! This is civilization's fight! This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.”<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, just before this speech, Prime Minister Blair declared, “This is a struggle that concerns us all, the whole of the democratic and civilized free world. And we have to do two things very clearly; we have to bring to account those responsible, and then we have to set about at every single level, in every way that we can, dismantling the apparatus of terror, and eradicating the evil of mass terrorism in our world.”<sup>36</sup> Therefore, it is clearly evident Bush and Blair are talking from the “same sheet of music” and are committed to the “War on Terrorism”.

In addition, President Bush paid glowing tributes towards the U.K and Prime Minister Blair at his Crawford Ranch in Texas on 6 April 2002, stating that “No nation has been stronger in fighting global terrorism than Great Britain. I’m grateful for the Prime Minister’s courageous leadership since September 11<sup>th</sup>. And the world is grateful for all that Great Britain has contributed in the war against terror—everything from special forces to ground forces to peacekeepers.” Another subject they discussed was the Palestinian/Israeli situation.

Both Prime Minister Blair and President Bush are committed to finding a “just settlement.” According to President Bush, “Both of us agree on the fundamental elements that a just settlement must be included. We share a vision of the two states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and in security.”<sup>37</sup> He further states, “We agree that this vision will never be realized through terrorism, and that it can only be realized through a political process.” He also stated “Palestinian leadership must order an immediate and effective cease-fire and crackdown on terrorist networks...and Israel should halt incursions in the Palestinian controlled areas and begin to withdraw without delay from those cities it has recently occupied.”<sup>38</sup> In addition, Prime Minister Blair not only agreed to what President Bush said, but added that to achieve a “viable and lasting peace”, there must be “a state of Israel, secure in its own borders, recognized by the entirety of the Arab world, and also a viable Palestinian state where people can live side by side with each other.”<sup>39</sup>

Prime Minister Blair has further solicited representatives from the U.S, the UN, Russia, the EU, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia to discuss this situation and come up with a process to secure the peace in this region. However on 7 January 2003, Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Foreign Minister, said Israel would not allow any Palestinian official to travel to Britain to discuss reforming the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the wake of 6 January 2003’s suicide



bombings in Tel Aviv.<sup>40</sup> This conference has been postponed indefinitely, until the diplomatic situation becomes more advantageous to hold this meeting.

The other issue that the U.K. has been supporting long before the United Nation's Resolution 1444 was to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Prime Minister Blair supported the U.S intentions regardless if it would or would not take unilateral action against Iraq. The U.K would be there as they have been in the past, supporting no-fly zones in the northern and southern areas of Iraq over the past 11 years, as well as conducting operations targeting Iraq's surface-to-air, radar and anti-air artillery sites prior to "Operation Iraqi Freedom."

After "9-11", President Bush declaration that Iraq, Iran and North Korea were the "Axis of Evil" and the possible use of military action against Iraq prior and after President Bush's speech to the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Blair has always advocated that "Iraq would be a better place without Saddam Hussein."

Hussein's "appalling brutality," "repression of his own people," "development of weapons of mass destruction," and the fact that Hussein did not allow the UN weapon inspectors back to verify destruction of WMD, nor did Hussein adhere to UN resolutions gave ample reasons for removal of Hussein from power. Furthermore, in Blair's dossier "Iraq's Weapons Of Mass Destruction: The Assessment Of The British Government" that he presented to a special session of the British Parliament on 24 September 2002, noted "The threat posed to international peace and security, when WMD are in the hands of a brutal and aggressive regime like Saddam's, is real. Unless we face up to the threat, not only do we risk undermining the authority of the UN, whose resolutions he defies, but more importantly and in the longer term, we place at risk the lives and prosperity of our own people."<sup>41</sup>

In this regards, even prior to the 27 January 2003 report provided to the UN General Assembly by Dr. Hans Blix, Chief of the UN Weapon Inspectors and Swedish Diplomat; Prime Minister Blair's announcement on 20 December 2002 that he "regrettably is calling up the reserves and sending forces to the Persian Gulf area for possible engagement of Iraqi forces, should the UN mandate fail."

Another area for Trans-Atlantic concern that the U.K is actively advocating and being the "honest broker" within the EU is the European Security Defense Policy. The U.K takes the position that parallels the U.S in that they wish to resolve security issues within Europe without having the U.S intervene like they did in Kosovo and Bosnia unless Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is invoked. The British believed, if they can share the defense burden in Europe, it will allow the U.S to focus on those areas of the world where the U.S military might possibly be used when intervention is necessary to thwart aggression, the use of WMD, or fighting terrorism.

According to the U.K Ministry of Defense's Paper No.3 on European Defense, the U.K is emphatic about the position of NATO in the collective security of Europe. The position they take is whatever happens in Europe with collective security, the U.K is categorical behind the fact that NATO must remain the cornerstone of Europe's collective defense. Furthermore, this position paper lays out three fundamental principles they believe are the touchstone for collective security in Europe. These fundamental principles are:

- NATO is the only organization for collective defense in Europe. Territorial defense and collective security guarantees are NATO's business;
- NATO will continue to have a role in many crisis management operations. This will certainly be the case for the larger and more complex ones, and those where Europeans and Americans wish to act together. The EU has been quite explicit that it will act only "where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged;"
- NATO operational structures will not be duplicated by the EU. This would be unacceptable in military, financial and political terms.<sup>42</sup>

With these fundamental principles, it is obvious that the U.K's position is that NATO comes first and the European Security Defense Policy is important; however, not as supportive as NATO. According to the U.K, this policy suggests that Europeans are to supplement NATO within the confines of Europe and to carry out the Petersberg tasks that were agreed at Helsinki. The British also believe that it "will strengthen European military capabilities and thereby strengthen the European contribution to NATO. It will bring new responsibilities to the EU - responsibilities which the EU is uniquely well placed to carry out."<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, "it will ensure that Europe takes a fairer share of the security burden and reinforce and sustain the relationship between Europe and North America."<sup>44</sup>

As for the U.K's contribution towards the ESDP, they committed 20,000 troops towards this policy, with a maximum of 12,500 available for any give operation the EU deems necessary to carry out the mission when called upon. They also signed several letters of intent (LOI) between 1996 and 2001 with the French in which the principle desire was to advance the European Security defense initiative. The areas addressed in the U.K/France Bilateral Defense Cooperation Arrangement were maritime, army, air force, operations, peacekeeping, logistics, strategic lift, exercises, equipment, mutual system development, and acquisition within the defense industries of France and the U.K.<sup>45</sup> For example, the U.K signed a LOI on co-operation and areas of mutual interests in maritime defense in 1996 with the French. The activities that this LOI addressed are: future aircraft carrier development; operational planning; training between surface fleets; submarines; operational doctrine (anti-submarine warfare); operational doctrine (anti-air warfare and anti-surface warfare); naval aviation; communications; personnel exchanges; and amphibious operations.<sup>46</sup>

Therefore, it can be concluded that the U.K is pursuing an aggressive campaign with the French in pursuit of goals for a European pillar for collective security. Moreover, the British balanced its significantly strong ties, enhanced by Bush and Blair, between the U.K and the U.S to maintain a strong Trans-Atlantic relationship under the awning of NATO.

### **Neutral States**

Although U.K, France and Germany are the major actors and provide the preponderance of assets to the collective security of Europe, there are a host of other states in the EU providing assets towards the collective security of Europe. Also, there is another set of European states that were neutral states during the post World War II and Cold War periods and were not members of the Warsaw Pact or NATO. These non-NATO states are Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. Finland, Ireland, and Sweden are highlighted in this analysis as states demonstrating security commitments to ESDP while maintaining neutrality by not seeking NATO membership. Although Austria is a good example due to its location in Europe, language limitations of the author prevented this state from being used in this analysis. Each of these states had its reasons for neutrality; however, with the Cold War ending, ethnic conflict in Europe, terrorism, migration, environmental concerns and other transnational issues rising as well of the implementation of ESDP, these countries have more or less reversed their position. These countries are committed to institutional security arrangements that are provided under the auspice of the UN, EU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

With the creation of the “Headline Goals,” each of these states increased its budget, and assessed capabilities, limitations, force structure, levels of force and equipment commitments to the UN and EU, and the security environment that affects it. All have concluded that the threat from an invasion force such as Russia or the U.S is benign and therefore, territorial defense,

although important, needs less emphasis. They have all agreed that the events on “9-11” have forced each state to evaluate internal and external threats that could pose security tribulations to their governments, militaries and general populations. These threats, which are also aligned with the rest of the EU, are terrorism, trade, ethnic conflict, human trafficking, ecological disasters, migration, money laundering, drug traffic and criminal activities. Therefore, these states focused their efforts towards collective security as they are aligned with the “Petersberg Tasks.” Ironically, although these countries are not part of NATO, they see participation in the “Partnership for Peace” Program (PfP) as inherently a “considerable benefit to enhance their capability for multinational peacekeeping operations in the future through the medium of interoperability development, training and exercises.”<sup>47</sup> Each of these states has entered into bilateral agreements with NATO to participate in PfP. Participation in PfP does not obligate these states in forming an alliance with NATO. Another state participating in PfP is Ireland. Ireland is the most eastward neutral state in Europe and provides collective security for Europe with a small force.

## **Ireland**

Although the Irish have a relatively small standing Army compared to the rest of the EU, they have committed up to 850 personnel at any given time, roughly 9 percent of its Army strength, to support any UN resolution through the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) or EU tasking.<sup>48</sup> According to the Irish’s Department of Defense White Paper (February 2000), there are increasingly proactive and preventive approaches, which entail a range of coordinated techniques such as, political, diplomatic, humanitarian, policing and military actions.

Furthermore, to ensure stability and to defend against threats to security in the European Community, it will be necessary to use forms of regional peacekeeping and crisis management.<sup>49</sup>

In addition, the Irish have revised their roles for the defense forces to cover the “broader security and defense context” as well as “participating in overseas missions.” One role is “to participate in multinational peace support, crisis management and humanitarian relief operations in support of the United Nations and under UN mandate, including regional security missions authorized by the UN.” Whereas other roles the Irish could conduct are “search and rescue, air ambulance service, ministerial air transport service, assistance on the occasion of natural or other disasters, assistance in connection with the maintenance of essential services, assistance in combating oil pollution at sea.”

What is interesting about these roles is that the Irish, since 1958 have completed 47,000 tours of duty and completed 51 missions supporting like roles for the UN.<sup>50</sup> Just in calendar year 2000 alone, the Irish provided 869 personnel supporting 14 EU or UN missions. Just like the Irish, the Finnish and Swedish are under going some hefty reforms to adapt their security roles to support the European’s common foreign and security policy. Both states are moving from a security apparatus designed to react against an invasion to a flexible operational style focused on shifting forces from the national level to the international level when the need arises.

## **Sweden**

In 1999, the Swedes recognized, that they were “no longer at risk of being drawn into a war between two power blocs.” However, they refocused their priorities on the “risks associated with regional and local conflicts and on the risks of authoritarian regimes or disintegration and inadequate social control in certain countries.”<sup>51</sup> In addition, the Swedish Defense Commission stated “actors that could be thought to act against Sweden and threaten our security are not primarily great powers with overwhelming military resources but rather small states or organizations and groups, perhaps geographically far from Sweden that might want to exert an

influence on us by means of threats and pressure, violence and damage.”<sup>52</sup> The Swedes are restructuring their forces to adapt to these threats into a “Total Defense.” They are focusing on a “network operational” defense system that is characterized by flexibility, development, renewal, advance technology, economic efficiency and has popular support.<sup>53</sup> This defense system encompasses two features: Military Defense and Civilian Defense. Both are focused on the entire spectrum of war from rescue operations to full-scale war. In addition, both features are flexible to significantly improve capabilities through greater coordination training and exercise to be a credible force within the EU construct of a rapid reaction force.

Although Sweden’s defense budget has relatively remained steady at approximately 45 billion Swedish Krona, the Swedes are tailoring their forces, improving efficiency in logistics support and operations, placing greater emphasis on civil defense preparedness for possible WMD attacks, and giving priority to exercises, training and development for forces that are involved in international operations.

It is also important to note that Sweden still remains neutral. In a speech by Goran Persson, the Swedish Prime Minister, stated “freedom of action that the military non-alignment gives us has always been of central importance...it has served us well for almost two hundred years.”<sup>54</sup> He also mentions that it gives them flexibility, access and influence in regards to NATO and disarmament. However, after the events of “9-11” and the recent UN mandates on Iraq, Sweden recognized and would participate to remove Saddam Hussein, eliminate the WMD threat and help establish a pro-democracy regime in Iraq if the UN security passed a resolution to wage war on Iraq. Why? Persson sums it: “work on non-proliferation and disarmament must be carried forward energetically.”<sup>55</sup> This shift in Sweden’s philosophy approach to security gives the EU additional support for collective security in Europe.

## **Finland**

Just like the rest of the European Union, the Finns are transforming their defense infrastructure and policies. The Finns are committed to EU crisis management capability and consider close cooperation between EU, NATO and UN critical to supporting this capability. The Finnish Ministry of Defense, Puolustusministerio, established guidelines in their strategic security plan called the “Finnish Security and Defense Policy 2001.” Based on this policy, the Finns agreed, like the other neutral countries, the threat of a large-scale military conflict is minimal and that the new threat in Europe will be due to “interdependence and globalization based on trans-boundary risks and threats.”

The Finns adopted the following aspects as the basic components for defense: 1) to maintain and develop a credible defense capability; 2) to remain militarily non-allied under the prevailing conditions; and 3) to participate in international cooperation to strengthen security and stability.<sup>56</sup> The Finns recognize that their status as a neutral state, they will continue to contribute to international crisis management under the OSCE, EU, UN and NATO’s PfP program. Unlike Ireland, the Finns have manpower and budget to coalesce an effective fighting force; however, what constrains them is their law.

Under the provisions of the Finnish Act on Peace Support Operations 2000, the Finns can only provide up to 2000 peacekeepers at any given time. In 2001, they participated in 10 operations contributing 1,600 personnel.<sup>57</sup> Under the ESDP, the Finns offered 1,500 for the EU’s rapid reaction force for use in international crisis management. The Finns are also exploring ways NATO can use their personnel in NATO led operations in the Balkan region. They are participating in “operational planning and decision making” aspects of NATO. However, one of Finland’s limitations is the fiscal constraint they have on defense expenditures



that are based on other social and economic commitments in supporting the government and general population. Although there are marginal incremental increases in the Finnish Defense Budget in 2002, 2003 and 2004, their average maximum commitment according to the “Policy” between 2003 and 2008 is approximately 10.8 billion Finnish Markka (FIM) or roughly two billion dollars a year for “Total Defense.”

In light of 9-11, the Finns are very active fighting the “War on Terrorism.” They provide assistance to the UN’s ISAF operation in Afghanistan with a civil military cooperation contingent carrying out various projects related to infrastructure, reconstruction of schools and nurseries, educational materials and medical equipment, with both national and EU funding.<sup>58</sup> In addition, the Finns contributed FIM 39.5 million to international organizations providing humanitarian assistance and mine clearing in Afghanistan, as well as EUR 10 million per year for the next 2 to 3 years for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.<sup>59</sup>

The analysis of six member states of the EU, (Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Sweden and the UK) suggests that the Europeans are very concerned and committed to the security of Europe and the Trans-Atlantic relationship after the events of “9-11.” To reiterate this level of commitment to the collective security of Europe and the international community:

1. Each state has evaluated its capabilities and limitations under ECAP;
2. Each state has restructured its military organization to some degree;
3. Each state has openly increased their defense spending in all areas of defense to include the military and civil sectors;
4. Each state is modernizing its forces and acquiring new technology and equipment;
5. Each State is committed to the ESDP;
6. Each state is committed to making the Trans-Atlantic relationship stronger under the auspices of NATO although France is less supportive;

7. Each state and in particular Germany and the U.K, want the U.S to have freedom to concentrate and conduct operations outside of Europe;
8. Each state has evaluated its ability, improved in those areas that need improvement, to conduct the “War against Terrorism” and counter WMD proliferation and;
9. Each state will commit forces to be led under EU, NATO, UN and OCSE led operations and missions.

With this level of commitment to these international organizations, the Trans-Atlantic relationship should be on firm ground, regardless of the position the United States prescribes to on various issues and treaties in the international community.

### **After Iraq—U.S position on European Collective Security**

American foreign policy has been dynamic over that last ten years and has changed significantly and abruptly as a result of the events of “9-11”; however, where will the U.S be in the next 10 to 20 years? Will the US still be fighting a “War on Terrorism?” Will Europe still be there to support? Or will the possibility or eventually war with Iraq divide Europe and the rest of the world, causing the U.S to retract on its current policies and focus them into a more concentric and compromising approach that is more conducive in operating multilaterally with the European and international community? The answer to these questions could be published in volumes of literature and will not be addressed here. But what is imperative is that the U.S seeks better relations with its Allies and in particular within the Trans-Atlantic community while maintaining national self interests in the realm of collective security.

The events leading to Operation Iraqi Freedom have significantly damaged the relationship between the U.S and Europe and within Europe. Europe and the U.S must strengthen the Trans-Atlantic relationship and use international institutions like NATO and the UN or these institutions will fold and dissolve it to intangible organizations like the League of Nations or the Western European Union was prior to the 1990s. Furthermore, the Trans-Atlantic Alliance must

ensure the collective security apparatus for this community is substantial and flexible to meet and eliminate threats.

The U.S must understand the complexities, culture and ideologies that solidify the European desire of the Euro Force and gradual implementation of the European Security Defense Force. Although it will take resources and manpower from the European Member states to support this force, the Europeans are definitely behind ESDP with the preponderance of assets belonging to Germany and France. However, consensus amongst the member states of the EU and sovereignty issues makes the ESDP more fluid then concrete. On the surface, ESDP might take resources away from NATO to support this endeavor; however, with the US backing, it should be minimal.

The U.S should continue backing Europe's collective security program. Backing gives the U.S flexibility to maneuver and stay out of regions where the Europeans can operate and it assures the Europeans that the U.S is concerned about security in Europe. According to Yannis Papantoniou, Minister of National Defense of the Hellenic Republic, "the aim is to complete a Trans-Atlantic pact the world would recognize the existence of a autonomous EU defense agenda with a independent capability which, however, would not compete, but, compliment NATO."<sup>60</sup> Let the European Security Defense Force and NATO take on the crisis management issues in such areas like the Middle East and Africa. NATO and EU involvement in these areas will alleviate the U.S with much needed manpower and resources for utilization in other critical areas of the world when and should the need arise.

Likewise, after "9-11", NATO expanded eastward and more NATO members are allocating and contributing manpower and resources to support NATO operations spanning the spectrum of war to include crisis management, humanitarian, police enforcing actions within and outside of Europe. With a collective population of 377 million and a GNP of approximately \$8.5 trillion

dollars, Europe has the manpower and financial capability to support arming a defense force as well as allocating and developing resources for NATO.

However, what Europe lacks is consensus to support such opportunities. Until Europe becomes federated or establish some constitutional mechanism that has “teeth,” the EU will not have the collective support necessary to spend resources on defense. Each member state understands the purpose and the commitments necessary to support the EU; however, each state still has obligations towards its citizens and governments. Until Europe federates, Europe will continue to have a force comparable currently to China and only capable of strategically deploying forces with minimum assets. Furthermore, there is the question of sovereignty in the EU community. Member states are willing to give up some sovereignty rights politically and economically, but not militarily. Until the EU and its member states can break the deadlock on the military sovereignty issue, Europe’s defense force will not materialize to the degree it wishes to participate in regional areas supporting the Petersberg tasks or invoke a mutual assistance clause. Also, the Europeans will attempt to maintain the peace in the Balkans. On 31 March 2003, the EU and NATO exchanged flags in the Balkans with command and control, intelligence and leadership provided by Germany and France.

Ironically, the Europeans put the cart before the horse in regards to a European Collective Security Strategy by establishing the roles and missions outlined in the Petersberg Tasks. Without a clear strategy, when and where will forces be deployed? What is the area of responsibility for this EURO Force? Will the Europeans extend area of responsibility to 5000 km beyond Europe’s borders? If the Europeans want to stretch out their logistics tail and operational commitment in support of crisis management operations in areas like Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, or Congo, then they need a clear vision to increase their force’s roles and capabilities or they will continue to sponge off NATO assets and capabilities to ensure the ESDP is a success.

In addition, the Trans-Atlantic alliance is divided on what the true threat assessment are that impact the way each side of the Atlantic strategically views the world. Based on a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund of the United States detailed study of U.S and European public opinion on foreign affairs published in *Foreign Policy*, the Europeans and the U.S differ somewhat on the critical threats and their priorities.<sup>61</sup> This study argues that U.S public opinion views the threats as (1) international terrorism, (2) Iraq and WMD, (3) Israeli-Arab Conflict, (4) Islamic Fundamentalism, (5) large number of refugees and (6) China as a world power. Interestingly, the Europeans see this order somewhat differently and see global warming almost on the same par as Iraq and WMD as critical threats. Based on European public opinion, the Europeans views the critical threats as (1) international terrorism, (2) Iraq and WMD, (3) global warming, (4) Islamic Fundamentalism, (5) Israeli-Arab Conflict, and (6) large number of refugees.

The U.S has a great opportunity to show Europe statesmanship and leadership during this transformational time for Europe. Although the Bush Administration is often accused of having a unilateral approach in dealing with the Europeans and other global issues, it appears that the Europeans have apparently “failed to remember” that Bush inherited the previous administrations’ policies that Bush should support as a continuation of policy. Under the Clinton era, the Europeans were up in arms about U.S: 1) extraterritorial application of economic sanctions contained in the Helms–Burton and Iran–Libya sanctions legislation; 2) refusal to sign the land mines ban and to be a party to the International Criminal Court; 3) failure fully to pay UN dues; the veto of the EU’s candidate to head the International Monetary Fund; 4) Senate’s rejection of the nuclear test ban treaty; 5) diplomatic and military conduct of the Kosovo crisis and war; 6) refusal to compromise on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol on global climate

change; and 7) pursuit of missile defense deployments that are barred by the 1972 ABM Treaty.<sup>62</sup>

The U.S must partner with its Trans-Atlantic partners to include France and Germany in the reconstruction of Iraq to secure the peace and establish a democratic government. Also, it is important that regardless what happens after objectives are achieved in Iraq, the U.S must show that benevolence for Iraq is paramount. The U.S must rebuild Iraq like it did in Europe and change the minds and hearts of Muslim throughout the world. During the reconstruction effort, the U.S should use the reconstruction period as a time to rebuild and mend relationships with Europe. In order to mend this relationship, the U.S should engage institutions such as the UN and EU for participation in the rebuilding of Iraq and not do it alone. If the U.S goes it alone during the reconstruction period, the same type of criticism and condemnation prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom will occur. This condemnation will not only come from Europe, it will come from developing countries that see the U.S as manipulating the UN and “bullying” states that are much inferior in strength, technology, and force.

Therefore, what the U.S does after that action is taken in Iraq will set the stage for U.S foreign policy for generations to come. This was quite evident after Kosovo. Consequentially after Kosovo, the Europeans are restructuring and transforming their military instrument of power to engage in crisis management as well as to contend or compete with the U.S military might. It might be a while for Europe to achieve the level the U.S is currently at; however, with economic spending and perseverance, a firm and established military-industrial base and technology advancement in an array of disciplines and fields, Europe can certainly accomplish this feat.

## Chapter 4

### Russia--Collective Security With The Trans-Atlantic Community

*“Russia is a part of European culture. Therefore, it is with difficulty that I imagine NATO as an enemy.”*

Vladimir Putin

After the Cold War was over, there was much rhetoric about trying to isolate Russia; however, there were other policy makers that thought it was necessary to seek reforms with Russia to promote democracy, reduce WMD threat, increase economic prosperity and to achieve peace throughout the world.

Russia had a difficult time transitioning from a communist system into a democratic system. The major issues that both deal with are the economy, migration, terrorism, military reform, criminal activity, weapon stockpiles, and ethnic unrest in the Caucasus. In addition, human rights issues have plagued Russia for many years. With the hostage takeover of over 700 innocent people in a Moscow theater by Chechen terrorists in October 2002, Russian military forces used a sleeping agent to incapacitate both the terrorist and hostages, killing all the terrorists and many hostages (nearly 130 innocent lives) and injuring scores of others. As a result, although horrendous casualties, many members of the international community became conscious that the Russians were dealing in fact with a fundamentalist Islamic organization profoundly rooted in a

conflict similar to that of “al Qaeda” aspiring to inflict momentous injury and devastation on Russia.

After the horrific events in U.S and Russia: the U.S, Europe and Russia sought partnerships economically, militarily and politically promoting reform in the Trans-Atlantic community. Fundamental changes within the Russian Government in the past three years since Russian President Vladimir Putin took over the reigns from Boris Yeltsin occurred. These changes went from a free market economy that had no controls and was under siege from opportunists and criminals to an economy that has controls and governance. Another change that occurred in Russia was military reform. Russia went from neglecting its military (except for the strategic rocket forces which maintains the Russians nuclear arsenal and some aircraft and weaponry modernization programs) to a military concentrating on trying to create a professional defense force. Issues that concern the Russian military are pay increases, military reform, morale, eliminating programs that are Cold War relics, capitalizing on efforts that are conducive to new global security threats and creating security and economic partnerships with the U.S, EU and NATO.

## **Russia**

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S/Russian relationships have been like ebb of tidal flows, there have been high and low tides. During the Bush Administration from 1991 to 1993, there was a honeymoon period where the U.S pledged \$40 million to stimulate Russia’s economy, “encouraged liberal economic and political reforms, and negotiated new security arrangements.” However, under the Clinton Administration, there were many like Senator Richard Lugar (Indiana) and former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski who argued



for a “tough policy” and keeping the Russian in check with developing relationships with CIS states like Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

According to John Feffer, author of *Shock waves: Eastern Europe after the Revolution*, U.S policy on Russia was wavering “between two poles--misguided engagement and irresponsible containment—embracing elements of both.” This wavering caused U.S and Russian acerbic relations. Why did a potentially great opportunity for the US/Russia abate during the Clinton administration, when it appeared there were immense advancements being made in solidifying a relationship with a former foe over the last 55 years?

There were several reasons. First, the Clinton administration advocated liberal trade reform through organization such as the Overseas Private and Invest Corporation and the Export Bank to facilitate U.S commerce to “extract” natural resources from Russia.<sup>63</sup> The Russian and U.S industries capitalized on the profits creating an economic wedge between the rich and the poor as well as reducing the economic staying power for Russia. This reduction in economic prosperity reduced Russia military spending from an amount that was equivalent to the U.S’ in the early 80s to approximately just 10 to 15 percent of the U.S defense budget or roughly \$52 billion dollars in 2000.<sup>64</sup> In addition, suffering from the losses resulting from profiteering from these businesses, hyperinflation and poor fiscal discipline, Russia under went an economic crisis in 1998.

Second, the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy apparatus focused on Balkans and Iraq where the Russians were thoroughly opposed to U.S involvement and intervention. Russia’s opposition challenged the Trans-Atlantic Alliance seeking UN Security council approval for use of intervention in these regions. Likewise, according to Feffer, the Clinton administration “downplayed criticism of Russian conduct in Chechnya and has largely uncritically accepted Russian “peacekeeping” operations in Tajikistan, Moldova, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh.” This was significant in view of the fact that the EU and several human rights organizations were

obdurately opposed to Russian conduct in Chechnya. This placid support by U.S of Russia human rights violations significantly hampered Trans-Atlantic relationships amongst the U.S and Europeans, especially after the Balkans crisis.

Finally, the Clinton administration's lack of support in Russia's arms control and disarmament area, and in particularly START II, soured Russia/US and Trans-Atlantic relationships. According to Article I of this treaty, "Each Party shall reduce and limit its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments"...and that it furthermore "does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3800 and 4250 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 4250."<sup>65</sup>

Although this treaty was signed in 1993, the U.S Senate did not ratify it until 1996. Furthermore, in 1998, the Clinton Administration launched an air attack against Iraq just hours before the Russian Duma was to ratify the START II Treaty. As a result of this air attack, the Duma did not ratify the treaty. It wasn't until 2000, under Putin, that the Russians finally ratified this treaty nearly 7 years after the treaty was signed.

The current Bush Administration has made great progress in developing a relation with Russia on a variety of issues. Although there is still some distrust between poles of influence, the Bush Administration has worked aggressively to convince Russia that the U.S needs Russia as a global strategic partner. In the aftermath of "9-11," there has been an unprecedented move to further show great signs of cooperation both in the security, political and economic realm.

Over the past two years, the Bush administration has redefined the paradigms that existed between the U.S and Russia over the past 55 years. With his persona, Bush has forged a

remarkable relationship with Russia like no other President has since maybe, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Bush's relationship with Vladimir Putin has fortified a friendship that each other can count on during times of danger and turmoil. Although there are different views on certain issues like Iraq, Chechnya, Israel/Palestine, these men have changed history in just two years. President Bush has deliberately and progressively worked at developing and deepening a relationship with Putin. During the Ljubljana, Genoa, Crawford, Shanghai, Moscow, Calgary and Prague summits, these men discussed and implemented fundamental changes to the way the U.S and Russia views each other in regards to security arrangements, economic reform and political mandates. However, with the recent Russian foreign policy intervention opposing force to remove the Iraqi regime and the discovery of recent Russian arms sells to Iraq as late as 2002, Russian/U.S relations have chilled somewhat, but not to degree seen during the Clinton years.

In this short period of time, both Russia and U.S advocated a plan reducing nuclear arsenal under START II from 3,700 to roughly between 1,700 to 2,200 warheads for each state. This plan created the Nuclear Arms Treaty and was signed in Moscow by both President Bush and Putin on 24 May 2002. This was a momentous accomplishment considering that President Bush laid the foundation and eventually withdrew the U.S from the ABM treaty of 1972, and started the U.S missile defense program.

On this subject of the treaty on strategic defensive reduction between Russia and the U.S, President Putin stated, "It's the statement of our countries to reduce our nuclear arsenals and the joint work for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It's the decision of two states which are particularly responsible for international security and strategic stability. We're on the level of adopting the declaration on a new strategic relationship which determines the basic directions in the security and international policy."<sup>66</sup> Although the Russians are concerned about the U.S missile defense system, Lt-General Anatoliy Mazurkevich, head of the Defense

Ministry's main directorate for international military cooperation, stated "The president of the Russian Federation and the Russian Minister of Defense have said many times that the U.S decision to pull out of the ABM Treaty was no surprise for us and does not pose a serious threat to Russia's security." He also said "there was no chance of creating real and efficient antimissile defense system in the near future, because such technologies exist only on paper. The U.S antimissile system exists on paper only!"<sup>67</sup>

The U.S and Russia signed economic agreements reducing trade barriers and promoting business investment opportunities in Russia. Some examples of opportunities were to extract Russia's vast amounts of natural resources, promote tourism and increase agriculture prosperity. Since the 1998 Russian economic crisis and Putin's coming to power, the Russians have made a remarkable economic turnaround.

During the past 4 years, Russian economic growth has been substantial, with GDP increases of 5.4, 9, 4 and 4 percent in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively.<sup>68</sup> According to a CSIS executive summary on "The Russian Economy in September 2002," this increase in GNP over the past 4 years is "largely attributable to the remaining impact of import substitution after the 1998 devaluation; high world prices for Russia's export commodities; the first fruits of Putin's economic restructuring; sound fiscal and monetary policies; and the recovery in private consumption and investment."

Furthermore, major international industries such as Ford and General Motors recently established plants in Russia to increase automobile production as well as create jobs in the local Russian economies. According to Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Ambassador of the United States to the Russian Federation, discussing the state of Russia's economy and Putin's Presidency during the past three years, he articulated "This had been a period characterized by

greater stability and steady growth, with the institutions of a market economy and civil society continuing to set down solid, if still very shallow and uneven roots.”

In spite of recent economic successful partnerships between the U.S and Russia, there are still issues that could facilitate a stronger market economy development and reform as viewed by the Russians that the U.S could expedite to cement a truly strategic global partnership. For example, President Putin is campaigning for the US to repeal the Jackson-Vanik Amendment contained in Title IV of the 1974 Trade Act.

This amendment is a Cold War relic targeted against certain countries like the USSR and the Russian Federation, with non-market economies and restricted emigration rights that deny them unconditional normal trade relations with the U.S. With the recent market turnaround and increased emigration rights, President Bush agreed and asked the U.S Senate to terminate this amendment to strengthen the U.S/Russian relationship. Nevertheless, Russia and the U.S still had some contentious issues regarding poultry and steel import tariffs that prevented the U.S Senate from passing a bill terminating this amendment for Russia’s benefit. It appears that sometime in 2003 that this bill might eventually get passed.

Signs of cooperation were initially enhanced on the Iraqi situation. Russia has economic ties to Iraq and is walking a political tightrope in the international community. During the Cold War, it would be almost anticipated that Russia would veto any U.N. resolution to take action on Iraq; however, the Putin/Bush relationship has cemented some type of commitment on the surface in recent months. At President Bush’s Crawford Ranch, he elucidated, "The United States and Russia are in the midst of a transformation of a relationship that will yield peace and progress. We're transforming our relationship from one of hostility and suspicion to one based on cooperation and trust that will enhance opportunities for peace and progress for our citizens and for people all around the world." He further stated, “ Russia and the United States agreed on a

framework for restructuring sanctions. This agreement restored unanimity in the Security Council, which will increase pressure on Iraq to comply with UN weapons inspections.” As a result, Russia with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council unanimously voted to take action against Iraq should the weapon inspectors find evidence that Iraq failed to disclose information on weapons of mass destruction. However, after French and Germany intervention on UN resolution supporting regime change in Iraq, Russia has not thoroughly supported US and Britain’s declaration of war on Iraq.

Furthermore, during these discussions, the foundation for the establishment of the NATO/Russian Council was instituted. Prior to the Crawford summit, Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs on 7 December 2001 stated, “NAC’s Final Communiqué was issued yesterday. It outlined a goal of creating a new NATO-Russia Council to facilitate broader cooperation and joint action between NATO and Russia, while maintaining its prerogative of independent action on all issues consistent with its obligations and responsibilities.”<sup>69</sup>

At the Crawford Summit, President Bush stated that “we looked at opportunities for improvement in U.S/Russia relations, we should also be open to the potential for improvement in Russia-NATO relations.” Thus, it is apparent that the U.S saw this as an avenue for Russia to accept eastern expansion by both NATO and the EU to enhance security for the Trans-Atlantic community. Prior to “9-11”, NATO, EU, U.S and Russia lucidly cooperated together under a series of decrees to facilitate stronger Trans-Atlantic relationships between NATO and Russia in 1991, 1994 and 1997.<sup>70</sup> In 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later re-named Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) was created to establish formal contacts between NATO and Russia. In 1994, NATO worked with Russia and formalized the NATO-Russian Partnership for

Peace (PfP) program. Later in 1997, NATO and Russia established the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.

The Founding Act served as the cornerstone for allowing Russia to participate in a formal NATO forum and operations. The purpose of the “Act” was defining the “goals and mechanism of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action that will constitute the core of the mutual relations between NATO and Russia.”<sup>71</sup> One of the key components of this Act was the establishment of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. According to this Act in Part II, “the central objective of this Permanent Joint Council will be to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security of none.”

The event of “9-11,” operations in Afghanistan, fighting in the breakaway republic in Chechnya, and the October 2002 Hostage taking in a Moscow theater by Chechnyan terrorists, served as a catalyst for great NATO-Russian cooperation. As a result, with the sponsorship from President Bush and Putin, the NATO and Russian relationship entered into a new phase of cooperation. According to NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, at the Diplomatic Academy, “For the past decade, it has been equally obvious that this Cold-War paradigm no longer holds true, and that NATO and Russia should - indeed must - be partners in overcoming the common threats that face us all in today's world.”<sup>72</sup>

Consequently, the NATO-Russia Council was established by the Rome Declaration and was adopted and signed by NATO member states and Russia on 28 May 2002. The purpose of this council focuses on “consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint-decision and joint action on a wide range of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region between NATO and Russia on all areas of mutual interest recognized in Section III of the Founding Act.”<sup>73</sup> Russia and NATO

member states agreed to concentrate and cooperate in the following areas: arms control, civil emergencies, confidence-building measures, crisis management, military-to-military cooperation, non-proliferation, theatre missile defense, search and rescue at sea, and terrorism.

The U.S/EU/NATO/Russian rapport has improved appreciably since the terrorist attacks in New York, Moscow and Washington. Recently, President Bush signed waivers releasing \$466 million in frozen funds helping Russia destroy its deadly and deteriorating WMD assets such as the 5,400 tons of nerve agent, 2 million chemical artillery shells, and 800 Scud missile warheads filled with nerve agents at the Siberian border town of Shchuchye near Kazakhstan.<sup>74</sup> However, there are still several issues that have probably aggravated this rapport in recent months. These issues concern reforms of Russia's military, visa denial of individuals in certain sectors of IGOs such as OCSE monitors and Peace Corps workers, human rights issue in the Caucasus and Russia Arm sales to Iraq.

To further complicate this rapport, is one of President Putin's greatest challenges--reforming the military. The military is plagued by poor pay, low morale, criminal activity such as embezzlement, alcoholism, dedovshchina (hazing), ruined equipment, dismal recruitment and retention, and leadership that is still locked in a Cold War paradigm distrusting the West and U.S motives.

As a result of vast amounts of recourses such as fiscal obligations, personnel and equipment committed to support Afghanistan (1980s) and Chechnya (1990 to present) as well as supporting equipment, facilities and people to a Cold War standard in the early 1990s, Russia's military and the military industrial complex are essentially broke and barely able to support it people, facilities and equipment.

In 1992, based on the UK Ministry of Defense computations of Russian defense expenditure in constant 2000 prices, Russia spent nearly \$130 billion; where as in 1998, it was only \$42



billion--a 68 percent reduction from 1992's expenditures. However, based on President Putin accession to power and concerns over NATO policies fueled by the intervention in former Yugoslavia, the war in Chechnya and by economic recovery, spending has increased by 16 percent or 5 percent of GNP to nearly \$50 billion or equivalent to 50 days of expenditures spent on U.S Defense.<sup>75</sup> Fifty billion dollars to support Russia's Navy, Strategic Rocket Forces, Army, Air Force and the military/industrial complex will not go far to improved equipment, morale or research and development unless Russia restructures/reforms itself into a regional military capable of deploying to areas where the Russian military can be used in activities outlined in previous discussions under NATO mandates.

Furthermore, military pay for Russian military personnel is desolate. According to an GRANI article "Size of Military Pay," in 2000, the average Russian contract soldier (corporal) is paid 1,294 rubles (U.S\$44) a month; a praporscbik (warrant officer) 1,541 rubles (U.S\$52); a lieutenant (platoon leader) 1,626 rubles (U.S\$55); a lieutenant colonel (battalion commander) 2,562 rubles (U.S\$86).<sup>76</sup> This makes it understandable why criminal activity such as corruption, bribery and theft occurs in the Russian military. It is also understandable, why desertion is extremely high in the military.

Recently, 78 soldiers deserted their units in North Ossetia, while 56 soldiers in Tatarstan, are wanted for desertion.<sup>77</sup> According to Valentina Melnikova, Executive Secretary of the human rights organization, the Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers, over the past 12 months, 900 servicemen who had deserted from their military units applied to the Moscow branch office of her organization for amnesty and up to 40,000 servicemen desert their military units annually.<sup>78</sup>

Reasons for desertion are numerous but can be answerable to leadership, the constrict system, hazing, criminal activity and to the social-economic depravity caused by the Russian economy over the last 10 years. For example, soldiers are forced to look for toothpaste from local citizens

and berries to survive. Also, the majority of conscripts or contracted soldiers come from dismal socio-dysfunctional backgrounds. The qualities of these conscripts are appalling: twenty percent of these recruits are from a broken family or a single-parent family; 22 percent primary or secondary education only; 5 percent were known to the police; 10 percent had previous convictions; 14 percent took drugs or toxic substances; and 7 percent were drinking heavily.<sup>79</sup>

However, there is a bright light to all these problems and that is military reform. In 2001, President Putin outlined his objectives for military reform. Those objectives adopted in the “Plan for the Development of the Armed Forces” were made public and are threefold. First, the army and the state power structure should be optimized, and parallel ineffective structures should be liquidated.<sup>80</sup> Second, the number of active servicemen should be reduced with simultaneous improvement of troop quality; the reduction of about 600,000 personnel from all military formations already has been approved, including 365,000 servicemen and 120,000 civilian personnel from the Defense Ministry (currently employing 1.2 million military personnel) over the next three years.<sup>81</sup> Finally, the defense budget is to be balanced from the current 70 percent (personnel) versus 30 percent on research and development (R&D), acquisition, and operations and management (O&M), in favor of a 60 percent to 40 percent ratio by 2006, and 50 percent to 50 percent by 2011.<sup>82</sup>

With these guiding objectives outlined for Russia government, military and population, Putin challenged Russia’s military generals with radical ideals according to the old general’s thinking that they are still fighting a war with the U.S and the West. These radical reforms included: (1) aggressively pursuing partnerships with the old Warsaw Pact menace (NATO); (2) establishing a professional military enlisted and officer corps; (3) eliminating the draft; (4) consolidating organizations; (5) and eliminating regional headquarters; (6) replacing a “lame duck” Minister of

Defense with a most trusted Sergei Ivanov; (7) and promoting generals that have been combat proven.<sup>83</sup>

These reforms will require President Putin and Minister Ivanov to demonstrate a substantial amount of perseverance and tenacity to overcome the generals that want Russia to regain Russia's superpower status similar to that prior to the Cold War ending. Although it is difficult to dictate policy, here are some suggestions to reform Russia's military. First, Russia should gain the confidence and trust of generals seeking military reform and put them in charge to implement Putin's vision and goals. Second, Russia should retire generals that are reluctant to make the necessary changes. Third, Russia should develop an educational structure, similar to the U.S and UK, promoting professionalism, accountability and loyalty to the professionalism of arms. Fourth, Russia should change the image of the military from a corrupted organization to an organization that is much revered within the military, the Russian population and the world. Finally, Russia should modernize its infrastructure, equipment, military/industrial complex and nuclear force. This cannot be achieved unless consolidation amongst the service components occurs. Threat assessments on the international and national levels are accurately made. Measurements are established and implemented to correctly regulate the procedures that affect these assessments. Finally, military economic reform and fiscal discipline require implementation to accurately support Russia's future military.

Of course, these actions should happen by 2010. However, a major drawback from any of these reforms from occurring is the fact that in 2004, President Putin will be facing a new round of elections. It will be imperative for President Putin to show the Russian people that the military is changing for the better and remain in office to carry out these mandates by 2010 to reform the military.

## **Russia's Growing Threat From the South**

If the U.S is serious about fostering a relationship with Russia, the U.S should congruently align itself with Russia's future strategic and projected threats in the outlining years. Russia may be worried about the U.S due to its relationship with the U.S during the Cold War period; however, Russia's biggest threat may be looming on its backdoor—China. China has a population of nearly 1.3 billion people or nearly 21 percent of the world's population. China will grow to 1.454 billion people by 2025 and by 2050 its population will be reduced to 1.394 billion.<sup>84</sup> The negative growth rate in population is due to China's "one-child per family" policy and mass education scheme to promote later marriages and delayed pregnancy in the childbearing years.

China's market economy grew after acquiring Hong Kong after the 99-year lease by the United Kingdom expired in the 1990s and global industrialization contributed to tremendous growth in production and GNP. Not only has this occurred, but also China has ramped up its expenditures to support a formidable armed force by 2010.

Ironically, prior to "9-11" and with the eastern expansion of NATO and Europe, Russia found itself in a strategic dilemma. Since the fall of the Soviet Empire, Russia has waffled back and forth with cyclical relationships with China and the West. Russia's concern is that the West is still plagued by the Cold War mentality, whereas with China, Russia is keenly aware of China's population and economic strength in Asia. In addition, the majority of Russia's population resides in Western Russia where as the east is less populated. Therefore, where China borders Russia, it makes it quite easy for China to populate Siberia and the borders with out much resistance. It was necessary for Russia to forge a relationship with China out of necessity versus a security alliance. As one Russian official said, "Russia's China problem stems from the fact that, today, China already significantly surpasses Russia in aggregate national

power...such a radical change from previous patterns of relations based on Russia's strength and China weakness necessitates a fundamental rethinking of all aspects of Russia-Chinese relations, from economic to demographic to defense policy.”<sup>85</sup>

Ever since 1992, Russia and China have worked on a “constructive partnership” to enhance Sino/Russia relations oriented to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.<sup>86</sup> As a result of seven summits by 2000, China and Russia secured the demarcation of the eastern section of the Russia/China border—a clearly established designated border. They formed a partnership between Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan known as the “Shanghai Five.” Also, Russia and China reduced its military forces from the borders between Russia and China. Likewise, both have made significant economic and trade gains. Russia required the economic stability to stimulate its economy and restore its military to a military that can establish internal, regional and international order. On the other hand, Russia has the oil, gas, nuclear and military technology and hardware that China needed to support its billion population and borders.

Russia and China are in the process of constructing two gas pipes valued at \$12 billion that originate from the Kovytkinskii Gas Field in Russia and terminate at the Irkutsk Region to China; the other one will go from Western Siberia to China.<sup>87</sup> These pipes lines will eventually offset the damaging emission hazards from coal that China is 75 percent dependent on for energy sources.<sup>88</sup> China has heavily relied on Russia to help construct a nuclear power station in China's Jiangsu province providing Russia with about \$3 billion to build the plant.<sup>89</sup>

Russia is very active in the arms business with China. Over the past decade China purchased nearly 10 billion (U.S) dollars of military hardware and equipment to supplement China's navy, army, and air force with modernized equipment. Since 1992, Russia sold and/or is currently building 70 Su-27Sk fighter aircraft, 76 Su-30MKKs as well as signed a \$2.5 billion agreement to manufacture 200 Su-27SKs under license at a plant in Shenyang, China.<sup>90</sup>

Furthermore, Russia sold two Project 956E Sovremenny class destroyers to China in a \$603 million deal and two ship-based S-300F Reef anti-aircraft missile systems designed to provide major naval task forces with air defense.<sup>91</sup> Both states also signed another contract for \$1.4 billion contract to build another two Project 956EM destroyers equipped with Sunburn anti-ship cruise missiles.<sup>92</sup> Additionally, Russia supplied China with two Project 877EKM diesel-electric submarines, two Project 636 vessels and signed a \$1.5-billion contract to build another eight Project 636 vessels.

Likewise, China aggressively procured eight regiments of the Russian S-300PMU1 long-range anti-aircraft missile system and 27 short-range Tor-M1 systems for China's air defense as well as signed another contract for \$400 million to supply another four regiments of the more modern S-300PMU-2.<sup>93</sup> China is not remaining idle. The Chinese are in discussions with Russia for future acquisitions of MiG-31M interceptors, Tu-22MZ bombers with Granit cruise missiles, Project 949 nuclear missile subs with 24 Granit cruise missiles, Project 1144 nuclear cruisers with 20 Granit systems, Russian Akula nuclear submarines and two Slava-class cruisers armed with 16 P-500 anti-ship missiles with a range of more than 500 kilometers.<sup>94</sup>

With close economic and military cooperation occurring between Russia and China, it appears Russia conceded to China and allowed China to become the next regional hegemony in Asia; however, this is quite contrary. Russia arms sales to China are only for economic gain to stimulate the Russian economy. The Russians are providing airframes and ships with fewer features and avionics to China than the Russians currently maintain in their inventory. From a military point of view, selling equipment and hardware with less features to a neighboring country is like the U.S selling arms to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. These sales provide resources

for states requiring equipment for collective security, yet, with fewer features, keeps the technological advantage to the seller and not the procurer.

Russia is concerned about the regional security in Russia's eastern provinces. Russia is outnumbered 1:8 in troop strength between the Russian, Chinese and Koreans. Russia has 560,000 troops in four Siberian military districts, where as China has 2,930,000, North Korea has 920,000 and South Korea has 690,000.<sup>95</sup> The only stabilizing force that Russia has to counter any invasion from the Korean Peninsula or China is the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. If Russia were to rely on conventional forces, Russia would significantly struggle due to the sheer numbers of forces the Chinese and Koreans could muster during a conflict.

This is a concern for the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. The Trans-Atlantic Alliance should aggressively ensure the political, economic and military stability in Asia stays at a status quo. If the Alliance does not ensure stability, the Alliance will be drawn into a regional conflict that it does not want to get into with China or North Korea. The Alliance currently has Iraq, North Korea and the terrorist threat to contend with. If the reunification of Korea does not coalesce soon, then the Alliance will have to restructure its armed forces to contend with a potential Chinese threat. This threat is not now; it is potentially on the horizon in 10 to 20 years.

### **Create an Alliance with Russia**

With this threat looming, the U.S should expand its relationship with Russia from a partnership to an alliance either through NATO or bi-laterally. This alliance is paramount to the security of the region and the protection of Russia's vast and enormous natural resources that are critical to supporting technology and life throughout the world. Both sides on the circle of spheres need to shake off the old paradigms and focus on the future.

The Russians are having a difficult time supporting their armies as well as providing for a well paid, professional, modernized and technically sound force. Likewise, Russia suffers from a negative growth from migration to Western Europe, the U.S and other parts of the world, alcoholism and a significant rise in HIV and other infectious diseases. Currently, Russia's population hovers around 143.5 million. According to the World Population Data Sheet, by the year 2025, it is estimated that Russia's population will be 129.1 million and rapidly decrease to 101.7 million by 2050.<sup>96</sup> Therefore, from 2002 to 2050, it is anticipated that Russia will have a 29 percent negative growth rate.<sup>97</sup> To further complicate this situation, nearly 1 percent of the population of the reported government figures in Russia has HIV/AIDS related health problems. Likewise, Russia will go from the fifth largest state in 2002 to fifteenth in 2050, with Egypt, Ethiopia and Congo surpassing Russia in terms of population.

In addition, where the average life expectancy rate for the male population in more developed countries is 72 years; however, for Russia it is a mere 59 years.<sup>98</sup> This average is less than the average age for "less developed" countries which average 63 years for the male population. Therefore, it will be difficult for Russia to retain the infrastructure as well as security over its vast 13 time zone regions and 17,075,200 km<sup>2</sup>. Russia has demonstrated that they do not have the resources, budget or manpower to support their military instrument of power. In addition, they are only getting enough economic support by selling arms to China or providing nuclear assistance to Iran and India.

This is why it is imperative for the U.S to encourage the EU to develop a European Defense Force and to lead NATO expansion of the East for the next couple of decades. Let the European Security Defense Force and NATO take on the crisis management issues in the Middle East and Africa. From a U.S perspective, encourage EU involvement in these areas to help alleviate the



U.S with much needed manpower and resources to be utilized in other critical areas of the world when and should the need arise.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Conclusion**

This paper focused on three major issues involving the Trans-Atlantic Relationship: U.S National Security Strategy; European perspective on the collective security and defense of Europe; and Russia's relationship to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance.

Throughout Chapter Two, the NSS was discussed. The themes resonating in the NSS are national security, economic security, homeland security, humanitarian assistance and close cooperation with European Allies and others that U.S needs to partner with as the world pursues the "War on Terrorism." In addition, the U.S strives to foster relationships with former Warsaw Pact nations and Russia. These themes are important considering the need to prevent Russia's nuclear arsenal from falling into the hands of terrorists planning to carry out dastardly deeds or others acting in a criminal way to achieve profit by selling nuclear weapons, components or equipment needed to produce nuclear weapons and materials. Although the U.S will seek support from the international community, like all nations that come under threat, the U.S will use all options available to include the economic, political and military instruments of power to counter a perceived or real threat.

Chapter Three focused on the interwoven relationships within and out of the Trans-Atlantic relationship in regards to security matters. Each European state has evaluated its capabilities and limitations under ECAP. They have restructured their military organization to some degree and have openly increased their defense spending in all areas of defense to include the military and

civil sectors. They are also in the process of modernizing their forces and acquiring new technology and equipment. Furthermore, these states are committed to the ESDP and to making the Trans-Atlantic relationship stronger under the auspices of NATO although France is less supportive. With this in mind, each state and in particular Germany and the U.K, want the U.S to have freedom to concentrate and conduct operations outside of Europe. Likewise, each state has evaluated its ability, improved in those areas that needed improvement, to conduct the “War against Terrorism” and counter WMD proliferation. Finally, each state has committed forces to some degree to be used under EU, NATO, UN and OCSE led operations and missions.

Chapter Four centered on the issues and concerns that are at the hub of Russia’s internal and external political, economic and military apparatus. Russia had a difficult time transitioning from a communist system into a democratic system. The major issues Russia contends with are the economy, migration, terrorism, military reform, criminal activity, weapon stockpiles, and ethnic unrest in the Caucasus regions. After “9-11,” Russia and the U.S focused on more cooperation and discussed and implemented fundamental changes to the way the U.S and Russia view each other in regards to security arrangements, economic reform and political mandates. Also, President Bush and Putin have redefined the paradigms that existed between the U.S and Russia over the past 55 years. Bush’s relationship with Putin has fortified a friendship that each other can count on during times of danger and turmoil. Although there are different views on certain issues like Iraq, Chechnya, Israel/Palestine, these men have changed history in just two years.

Furthermore, the U.S withdrew from the ABM treaty of 1972, and started the U.S missile defense program and yet was able to work with the Russians to reduce each state’s nuclear arsenal under START II from 3,700 to roughly between 1,700 to 2,200 warheads with the creation and implementation of the Nuclear Arms Treaty. In addition, the Nato-Russia Council

was created to “facilitate broader cooperation and joint action between NATO and Russia.” This permitted the barriers to be eliminated with NATO’s eastern expansion of some of the former Warsaw pact nations and potentially some CIS member states.

Likewise, Russia is aggressively looking at ways to establish a professional military enlisted and officer corps, eliminating the draft, consolidating organizations and eliminating regional headquarters and promoting generals that have been combat proven. Furthermore, they are in the process of developing and promoting professionalism, accountability and loyalty to the professionalism of arms as well modernizing their infrastructure, equipment, military/industrial complex and nuclear force.

Russia may be worried about the U.S due to its relationship with the U.S during the Cold War period; however, Russia’s biggest threat may be looming on its backdoor—China. With close economic and military cooperation occurring between Russia and China, it appears Russia conceded to China and allowed China to become the next regional hegemony in Asia; however, this is quite contrary. Russia arms sales to China are only for economic gain to stimulate the Russian economy.

### **Policy Recommendations:**

The rest of this conclusion outlines policy recommendations for the dealing with the Trans-Atlantic relationship in the future in regards to collective security of Europe. These recommendations are:

1. The U.S should continue backing Europe’s collective security program. Backing gives the U.S flexibility to maneuver and stay out of regions where the Europeans can operate and it assures the Europeans that U.S is concern about security in Europe. Let the European Security Defense Force and NATO take on the crisis management issues in such areas like the Middle East and Africa. NATO and EU involvement in these areas will alleviate the U.S with much needed manpower and resources for utilization in other critical areas of the world when and should the need arise.

2. The U.S must ensure the Trans-Atlantic relationship is maintained and focused on uniting all fronts and avoid divisions between bi-polar camps (German/France and the rest of Europe) within the EU, NATO and the U.S. The Trans-Atlantic relationship is paramount to the freedom, democracy and security of Europe, the U.S and the world!
3. The U.S should realign its forces within Europe while assuring new NATO members and the EU that the U.S is committed to maintaining strong Trans-Atlantic relationship. Relocate some fighting units from Western European to Eastern European. Relocating units to Eastern Europe would suggest to the Europeans that the U.S still maintains national interests within Europe while supporting the Trans-Atlantic relationship. Furthermore, maintaining some units in Western Europe is necessary to show the Europeans that the U.S is still committed to the collective security of Europe.
4. The U.S should partner with its Trans-Atlantic Allies to include France and Germany in the reconstruction of Iraq to secure the peace and establish a democratic government. During the reconstruction effort, the U.S should use the reconstruction period as a time to rebuild and mend relationships with Europe.
5. U.S should expand its relationship with Russia from a partnership to an alliance either through NATO or bi-laterally. This alliance is paramount to the security of the region and the protection of Russia's vast and enormous natural resources that are critical to supporting technology and life throughout the world.
6. The Trans-Atlantic Alliance should aggressively ensure the political, economic and military stability in Asia stays at a status quo. If the Alliance does not ensure stability, the Alliance will be drawn into a regional conflict that it does not want to get into with China or North Korea.

## *Glossary*

|                    |                                                                                            |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AMB                | Anti-Ballistic Missile                                                                     |
| AWACS              | Airborne Warning And Control System                                                        |
| C <sup>4</sup> IRS | Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance |
| CFSP               | Common Foreign and Security Policy                                                         |
| ECAP               | European Capabilities Action Plan                                                          |
| ECSC               | European Steel and Coal Community                                                          |
| ESDI               | European Security Defense Initiative                                                       |
| ESDP               | European Security Defense Policy                                                           |
| GNP                | Gross National Product                                                                     |
| GUAAM              | Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova                                             |
| EU                 | European Union                                                                             |
| ICBM               | Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles                                                        |
| IGO                | International Governmental Organization                                                    |
| ISAF               | International Security Assistance Force                                                    |
| LOI                | Letter of Intent                                                                           |
| NAC                | North Atlantic Council                                                                     |
| NSS                | National Security Strategy                                                                 |
| NATO               | North Atlantic Treaty Organization                                                         |
| PfP                | Partnership for Peace Program                                                              |
| SAR                | Search and Rescue                                                                          |
| SLBM               | Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles                                                      |
| WEU                | Western European Union                                                                     |
| WTO                | World Trade Organization                                                                   |
| WMD                | Weapons of Mass destruction                                                                |
| UN                 | United Nations                                                                             |
| USSR               | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics                                                        |

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid

<sup>95</sup> "Russia in Asia: Unwelcome intruder or Accommodative Player?" pp 22

## Notes

<sup>96</sup> 2002 World Population Data Sheet, pp 11.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

