India as a Responsible Nuclear Power: A Strategy for Stability
Abstract
India's declared policy on the use of nuclear weapons is one of "no first use" but an assured and massive retaliation" in case of nuclear aggression on the part of its enemies. In keeping with this policy, avoiding the high costs of a ready arsenal and to reinforce its long tradition of strict civilian control over the military, India would try to acquire only a nominal deterrence capability against Pakistan and China. This "de-alerted" capability would be reflected in the form of completed nuclear weapons stored in a dissembled condition, i.e., warheads along with the sub-assemblies and delivery systems being kept at different locations separated by large geographical distances. India considers that nuclear weapons are, first and foremost, political instruments rather than military tools and therefore nuclear weapons, in the Indian context are seen as pure deterrents than as implements of war. India strongly believes that a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore must never be fought. India believes that even a delayed, or 'ragged' nuclear response should deter its adversaries. India maintains that its nuclear capability is based on the strategic challenge posed by China and on the need for a stable Asian balance of power. In the Indo-Pak case, any nuclear exchange, while being certainly painful for India, would simply obliterate Pakistan.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2002
- Accession Number
- ADA424594
Entities
People
- Govind
Organizations
- Air War College