Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer: U.S. Policy Options for North Korean Nuclear Weapons
Abstract
North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons has shaken the foundations of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia. Because of North Korea'a record of state-sponsored terrorism, illicit activities, human rights violations, arms sales, and fiery rhetoric, its development of operational nuclear weapons is deeply disturbing. Although most agree that North Korea should not possess nuclear weapons, nobody has a simple solution. This thesis evaluates three U.S. policy options for the North Korean nuclear crisis: incentive-based diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, or military force. It analyzes them according to four criteria: the impact on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the impact on its neighbors (China, Japan and South Korea), U.S. policy costs, and the precedent for future proliferation. This thesis shows that diplomacy will fail to achieve U.S. objectives for three reasons. First, neither the United States nor North Korea trust one another following decades of agression and the demise of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Second, Kim Jong-il will not permit the extensive inspections that the United States demands to increase transparency. Third, multilateral coercive diplomacy is difficult, time-consuming, and not supported by Washington's regional partners.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2004
- Accession Number
- ADA424612
Entities
People
- Daniel J. Orcutt
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School